



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

April 1, 2005

Framatome ANP
ATTN: Mr. Ronald J. Land
Plant Manager
2101 Horn Rapids Road
Richland, Washington 99352-5102

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 70-1257/2005-001

Dear Mr. Land:

This report refers to the inspection conducted from February 28 through March 4, 2005, at the Richland Facility. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether activities authorized by the license were conducted safely and in accordance with NRC requirements. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff.

Areas examined during the inspection were emergency preparedness, maintenance and surveillance, and training. The inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of activities in progress.

Based on the results of this inspection, one violation was identified. The violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A.8 of the Enforcement Policy. The NCV is described in Section 6.a of the enclosed inspection report. If you contest the violation or significance of this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and Enclosure 1 will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

Steve Caudill for */RA/*

David A. Ayres, Chief
Fuel Facility Inspection Branch 1
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Docket No. 70-1257
License No. SNM-1227

Enclosure: NRC Inspection Report

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X SISP REVIEW COMPLETE: Initials: SRC SISP REVIEW PENDING*: Initials: _____ *Non-Public until the review is complete
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 ADAMS: Yes ACCESSION NUMBER: _____

OFFICE	RII:DFFI	RII:DFFI	RII:DFFI				
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E-MAIL COPY?	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No.: 70-1257

License No.: SNM-1227

Report No.: 70-1257/2005-001

Licensee: Framatome ANP, Inc.

Facility: Richland Facility

Location: Richland, Washington

Dates: February 28 through March 4, 2005

Inspectors: C. Taylor, Fuel Facility Inspector
J. Jimenez, Fuel Facility Inspector

Approved by: David A. Ayres, Chief
Fuel Facility Inspection Branch 1
Division of Fuel Facilities Inspection

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Framatome ANP, Inc.
NRC Inspection Report 70-1257/2005-001

This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of emergency preparedness, maintenance and surveillance, training, and the status of open items from a previous inspection. The inspection involved observation of work activities, a review of selected records, and interviews with plant personnel. The inspection identified the following aspects of the licensee programs as outlined below:

Emergency Preparedness

- Changes to the emergency preparedness program did not decrease the effectiveness of the program. Emergency response personnel with changed or new responsibilities were trained and knowledgeable of their roles and responsibilities. However, the current Emergency Plan (EP) required updating to include the Blended Low Enriched Uranium (BLEU) facility and Region II as the regional office with responsibilities during emergencies. The EP update was considered an inspector followup item (IFI) (Paragraph 2.a).
- The reviewed EP implementing procedures were adequate and maintained current. The implementing procedures control, review, and issuance practices were in compliance with requirements (Paragraph 2.b).
- Emergency response personnel who had EP-related duties were adequately trained in the appropriate topics. The licensee's emergency preparedness training program was in compliance with regulatory requirements (Paragraph 2.c).
- The licensee's off-site support organizations understood their respective written agreements with the licensee. The performance of off-site responders during actual emergencies and drills was adequate. The off-site support area of the licensee's EP program was in compliance with regulatory requirements (Paragraph 2.d).
- The licensee had established a scenario team to assist in the planning and development of challenging and variable accident scenarios. The licensee also added quarterly training sessions on various roles and responsibilities of Plant Emergency Response Team (PERT) and Plant Emergency Response Management Team (PERMT) members (Paragraph 2.e).
- The licensee's emergency equipment was maintained functional and in good condition. The licensee's program for tracking the periodicity of maintenance/calibration on emergency equipment was adequate. The licensee was in compliance with regulatory requirements (Paragraph 2.f).

Maintenance/Surveillance

- The observed maintenance work conducted at the facility was properly performed. Maintenance personnel implemented the proper authorizations and procedures. The personnel performing the work were qualified for their positions and tasks (Paragraph 3.a).

- In accordance with procedures the licensee performed timely surveillance tests and calibrations of equipment and adequately documented the results (Paragraph 3.b).
- Two violations from a previous inspection were reviewed and remain open pending the licensee's completion of the items detailed in the Condition Reports (Paragraph 3.c).

Operator Training

- The licensee adequately implemented refresher training for: nuclear criticality safety, general employee, radiation protection, and general emergency training (Paragraph 4.a).
- The training system used to maintain qualified operators was adequate (Paragraph 4.b).

Temporary Instruction 2600/011

- The licensee was complying with the commitments written in their response to NRC Bulletin 2003-003. At the time of the inspection the licensee's actions were in compliance with the bulletin requirements (Paragraph 5).

Plant Operations

- An NCV was identified for failure to maintain configuration control when nuclear criticality safety procedures were not followed by licensee personnel (Paragraph 6.a).

Attachment:

List of Persons Contacted

Inspection Procedures Used

List of Items Opened, Closed, Discussed

List of Acronyms

REPORT DETAILS

1. Summary of Plant Status

This report covered the period of February 28 through March 4, 2005. Most fuel manufacturing operations were active during the inspection period. There were no plant upsets or unusual operational occurrences during the inspection.

2. Emergency Preparedness (Inspection Procedure (IP) 88050) (F3)

a. Review of Program Change (F3.01)

(1) Scope and Observations

The inspectors reviewed changes in emergency preparedness personnel responsibilities and organizational functions that had occurred during the last 12 months. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's emergency action level bases documents, in which the licensee had incorporated the declaration of an "Alert" emergency action level in response to the Department of Homeland Security's Advisory System. From a review of the licensee's Emergency Plan (EP), the inspectors determined that the site's EP map had not been updated to show the addition of the Blended Low Enriched Uranium (BLEU) facility nor description of BLEU activities in Section 1.2 of the Plan. In addition, Section 4.4.1.1 of the Plan required updating to reflect Region II as the regional office with responsibilities during emergencies. The inspectors discussed these changes with the licensee's staff and determined that the licensee had identified other administrative changes that need to be incorporated into the plan. The licensee stated that the changes identified by the inspectors would be added to the EP during the next biennial review due in April of 2005. The licensee was informed that the EP update would be tracked as inspector followup item (IFI) 70-1257/2005-001-01.

(2) Conclusion

Changes to the emergency preparedness program did not decrease the effectiveness of the program. Emergency response personnel with changed or new responsibilities were trained and knowledgeable of their roles and responsibilities. However, the current EP required updating to include the BLEU facility, and Region II as the regional office with responsibilities during emergencies. The EP update was considered an IFI.

b. Implementing Procedures (F3.02)

(1) Scope and Observations

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's process for approving EP procedures, and reviewed the contents of selected procedures pertaining to emergency communications and fire and explosion event response. The inspectors reviewed selected EP procedures that were maintained current in field locations, and were readily accessible. Regular employees and employees who were members of the Plant Emergency Response Team (PERT) and Plant Emergency Response Management Team (PERMT) were questioned by the inspectors. They were aware of the contents and locations of selected EP implementing procedures. Relevant EP procedures were reviewed for improvement based on lessons learned from drills and actual emergency events. For

example, improvements to field team notebooks identified during the October 2003 exercise were verified by the inspectors to be incorporated into the procedures.

(2) Conclusion

The reviewed EP implementing procedures were adequate and maintained current, and the procedural control, review, and issuance practices were consistent with program requirements.

c. Training and Staffing of the Emergency Organization (F3.03)

(1) Scope and Observations

Through a record review and discussions with on-site personnel, the inspector verified that the licensee had provided training that was consistent with the frequency and performance objectives outlined in the EP. The inspectors also verified that the training covered the use of any special emergency equipment such as communication devices, self contained breathing air (SCBA) packs, monitoring devices for radioactive and other hazardous materials, and providing first aid for personnel who have become injured or contaminated. The inspectors further verified the adequacy of the licensee's methods for tracking the initial qualification and subsequent re-qualification due dates for response personnel.

(2) Conclusion

Emergency response personnel were adequately trained in the appropriate topics. The licensee's emergency preparedness training program was in compliance with regulatory requirements.

d. Off-site Support (F3.04)

(1) Scope and Observations

The inspectors ascertained by plant tours, staff interviews, annual training and event critique reports that off-site agencies such as the local ambulance service, hospital, fire departments, and law enforcement responders understood their respective response roles as contained in the Memorandums of Understanding (MOU). The inspector further reviewed the actual written agreements and verified that they were adequate. The inspectors confirmed by telephone interview with Richland's Fire Chief that the local fire department was aware of the MOU with their facility. There were no problems detected during the interview. In addition, the inspectors determined that the licensee sent invitations annually to off-site responders for participation in annual refresher training and tours of the facility.

The inspectors reviewed pertinent records, interviewed EP staff, and performed a walk-down of the chemical storage areas to verify that the licensee had maintained its certification of compliance with the "Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986."

(2) Conclusion

The licensee's off-site support organizations understood their respective written agreements with the licensee as evidenced by reviewed events. The performance of off-site responders during actual emergencies and drills was adequate. The off-site support area of the licensee's program was in compliance with regulatory requirements.

e. Drills and Exercises (F3.05)

(1) Scope and Observations

The licensee had conducted additional drills since the last biennial exercise in October 2003. The drills were performed on May 7, 2004, August 10, 2004, and January 7, 2005. The inspectors reviewed the self-assessments and critiques from the drills and noted that corrective actions were being entered into the licensee's corrective action program, entitled "WEBCAP." The licensee identified during the last audit conducted in January 2005 those corrective actions from the previous exercise conducted in October 2003 had not been fully implemented. Those corrective actions are now being tracked in WEBCAP with June 2005 due dates.

The inspectors determined from interviews and record reviews, that the drill performed on January 7, 2005 used the alternate Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and had alternates replace primary members. The inspectors determined from a review of the critiques and interviews of emergency response personnel that the licensee was provided good feedback on ways to improve the system.

The licensee had established a scenario team consisting of six members from different areas in the plant to assist in the development and screening of accident scenarios. The team had been meeting monthly. In addition, the licensee added quarterly training sessions for PERT and PERMT members. The sessions discussed various roles and responsibilities of emergency team members. The inspectors determined from interviews conducted with team members that the additional training had been beneficial and welcomed.

(2) Conclusion

The licensee had established a scenario team to assist in the planning and development of challenging and variable accident scenarios. The licensee also added quarterly training sessions on various roles and responsibilities of PERT and PERMT members.

f. Emergency Equipment and Facilities (F3.06)

(1) Scope and Observations

The inspectors selectively examined the emergency equipment and kits as specified in the EP. This equipment included fire extinguishers/hoses in the fuel manufacturing areas, field monitoring kits stored in the Emergency Operations Storage Center and one supply area located in the office building area containing medical treatment kits. The inspectors also examined the backup battery power console for the criticality alarm system and the fire alarm system. The inspectors verified that both systems were checked and serviced at the required frequencies. The inspectors confirmed that proper inventory levels were maintained and periodically checked. The inspectors further

determined that the equipment was operable, selected survey meters were within calibration frequencies, and air tanks on respiratory equipment were full.

The inspectors accompanied staff during a routine inventory check of emergency equipment. The individual was knowledgeable and well-trained on performing the required checks on the equipment and supplies. The inspectors noted no problems. In addition, the inspector was given a tour of the Joint Information Center (JIC) located approximately one mile from the facility. The licensee had an agreement with Northwest Energy Battel for use of the facility during an emergency. The facility also serves as the JIC for the local nuclear power generating plant, Columbia Nuclear Station.

(2) Conclusion

The licensee's emergency equipment was maintained functional and in good condition. The licensee's program for tracking the periodicity of maintenance/calibration on emergency equipment was adequate. The licensee was in compliance with regulatory requirements.

3. Maintenance/Surveillance (IP 88025) (F1)

- a. Conduct of Maintenance (F1.01)
Work Control Procedures (F1.02)
Work Control Authorizations (F1.03)

(1) Scope and Observations

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's conduct of maintenance, including the proper use of procedures and the process to obtain work authorizations, to ensure that maintenance work did not adversely impact the safety of plant operations or the worker. The inspectors observed several maintenance jobs performed in the plant to ensure that the workers knew the requirements for the job.

The maintenance jobs observed by the inspectors followed the licensee's established practice of a safety review by operations just before the beginning of the work. The reviews were conducted using the Maintenance Work Permit (MWP) which included a pre-Job briefing. The briefing includes relevant information to make sure the work is done safely from start up until job completion. The inspectors observed these pre-job briefings and determined they provided adequate communication between operations and maintenance to ensure items relied on for safety (IROFS) were being covered as well as any abnormal condition that could arise during work activities. The MWP is part of the maintenance package which includes the authorizations for conducting the work. The MWP also contains information on how to accomplish some of the tasks and if applicable, instructions for conducting functional tests. The maintenance packages for the jobs observed were in order and contained the required information for the safe completion of the work.

The inspectors observed the maintenance operators conducting some of the scheduled work for the reactor filter change out, the wet process calciner troubleshooting and some work being conducted in the Specialty Fuels Building. The maintenance operators were following the personal protective equipment requirements and the required

procedures for each job. When interviewed, operators were able to satisfactorily explain the safety requirements involved with their work and what was needed to bring the system back to safe operation. The inspectors interviewed operators in the control room to verify they were following the activities being performed by maintenance. The operators explained the work scheduled and how they were monitoring the progress of each job. The operators also provided the inspectors with information detailing the process from when a maintenance job is scheduled to when it is completed. The information provided was in accordance with procedures.

The inspectors verified that personnel conducting the maintenance work were properly qualified for their jobs. A sample of personnel qualifications records were reviewed to verify that their education and training adequately qualified them for their jobs. The records reviewed contained all the necessary information confirming that the workers' expertise was adequate for the tasks assigned to them.

(2) Conclusion

The observed maintenance work conducted at the facility was properly performed. Maintenance personnel implemented the proper authorizations and procedures. The personnel performing the work were qualified for their positions and tasks.

b. Surveillance Testing (F1.06)
Calibration of Equipment (F1.07)

(1) Scope and Observations

The inspectors verified that surveillance tests and calibrations of equipment were performed according to established frequencies. The inspectors also verified that safety requirements were met by the employees performing the work. The licensee controls the schedule of these activities using a computer software program named "SAP." The program schedules calibrations and surveillance testing according to their due dates. It warns the licensee when a calibration or testing is close to its due date. When the work is finally completed the program then keeps this information in its records. The program also provides instructions to follow in order to properly complete the calibration or surveillance test. The forms reviewed by the inspectors were adequately written. The forms were easy to understand and included the steps to ensure the equipment was functional. In the event the calibration or surveillance testing involved an IROFS, the form includes a special character that lets the licensee know of its presence. The personnel interviewed that conducted this work were able to identify when an IROFS was present and explain what functionality tests were required to make sure the IROFS were not adversely impacted by the work.

The inspectors reviewed some of the documentation for work done in the recent weeks to verify that an adequate amount of detail was incorporated. The inspectors noted adequate detail in the steps taken to complete the task, with emphasis on the safety requirements specific to the job. The procedures used for the jobs were clear and provided the required information to test the reliability of the equipment.

(3) Conclusion

In accordance with procedures the licensee performed timely surveillance tests and calibrations of equipment and adequately documented the results.

c. Follow Up on Previously Identified Issues (F1.08)(1) Scope and Observations

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions associated with violation (VIO) 70-1257/2004-05-01 (Failure to review and approve a modified procedure prior to use in the BLEU process area) and non-cited violation (NCV) 70-1257/2004-05-02 (Failure to adequately test HEPA filter prior to operations). The inspector reviewed the Condition Report prepared by the licensee. The document contained information detailing actions done and in need of completion to close the pertinent open items. The actions taken along with the recommendations provided in the report presented an adequate resolution to both of the previously stated events. The inspectors interviewed the people in charge of implementing these actions. The interviews provided the inspectors with information that validated the Condition Report as well as the physical changes observed in the processes, for example improved operating procedures and change control procedures. However, some minor items were not completed at the end of the inspection and both items remain open pending the completion of corrective actions.

(2) Conclusion

Two violations from a previous inspection were reviewed and remain open pending the licensee's completion of the items detailed in the Condition Reports.

4. Operator Training (IP 88010)

- a. 10 CFR 19.12 Training (F2.01)
General Nuclear Criticality Safety Training (F2.02)
General Radiological Safety Training (F2.03)
General Emergency Training (F2.04)

(1) Scope and Observations

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's training program to verify compliance with the license requirements and that the information was relevant to the areas being operated. The refresher included radiation protection, nuclear criticality safety, and emergency evacuation instructions. The area-specific training contained adequate information that would enhance an employee's safety awareness. The inspectors also reviewed the test results for selected operators and noted adequate scores and proper testing materials. The inspectors also noted that the refresher training satisfied the requirements for 10 CFR 19.12.

(2) Conclusion

The licensee adequately implemented refresher training for nuclear criticality safety, general employee, radiation protection, and general emergency training.

b. Operator Procedure Training (F2.05)
On-the-job Training (F2.06)

(1) Scope and Observations

The inspectors noted that the licensee was performing adequate on-the-job training for operators in conversion (wet/dry) and special fuels areas. The inspectors also reviewed test results for the training of operators on process area procedures. The inspectors noted that operators were properly qualified for their positions and had scored adequately on the procedure exams. The inspectors noted that the control of training records for the plant was adequate.

(2) Conclusion

The training system used to maintain qualified operators was adequate.

5. Temporary Instruction 2600/011

(1) Scope and Observations

This issue concerned potentially defective 1-inch Hunt valves designed for use on 30-inch and 48-inch uranium hexafluoride cylinders. This issue was described in NRC Bulletin 2003-03. It required the licensees to assess if they had cylinders with the relevant Hunt valves either in operations or in storage. If the bulletin was not applicable to the particular licensee, the licensee was required to submit evidence as such, and if they had cylinders with Hunt valves they had to provide an action plan to deal with them in accordance with the bulletin. The inspectors reviewed the response from the licensee in regard to the disposition of potentially defective 1-inch Hunt valves for uranium hexafluoride cylinders.

The inspectors interviewed plant personnel that handle cylinders that may contain Hunt valves. Interviewees were able to explain the measures to be taken when a cylinder with an installed Hunt valve was found. They adequately explained the procedure that describes what actions to take with cylinders with Hunt valves and what were managements expectation when handling these cylinders. Cylinders with Hunt valves are being phased out during cylinder refurbishment. The majority of cylinders with Hunt valves being received by the licensee comes from U.S. Enrichment Corporation. At the time of the inspection the licensee's cylinder inventory included a number of cylinders with Hunt valves. These cylinders mostly contained heels with a couple being completely empty. The inspectors verified that the licensee was in compliance with the actions specified in their response letter to the NRC dated September 29, 2003. The inspectors found no problems with the present handling of cylinders with Hunt valves at the plant. As stated in the NRC response letter dated May 14, 2004, the licensee was granted a period of 36 months to dispose of licensee-owned cylinders with Hunt valves. This period will end on August 29, 2006.

(2) Conclusion

At the time of the inspection the licensee's actions were in compliance with Bulletin 2003-003 requirements.

6. Plant Operations (88020)**a. Follow-up on Previous Event (O3.12)****(1) Scope and Observations**

The event concerned the failure to maintain configuration control when an operator did not follow the established nuclear criticality safety procedures for the storage of material. Four potentially moderated pails of UO_2 grinder sludge were placed edge to edge on a lift truck (referred to by the licensee as a BT cart) for movement to moderated storage while awaiting moisture analysis, violating the one foot spacing requirement for moderated containers. The licensee conducted an Apparent Cause Analysis which identified workplace distractions, habit of conducting daily activities, lack of clear procedural guidance for the use of BT carts, and inadequate self-verification process when transporting potentially moderated material as the main causes for the event. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's Event Analysis, and determined the licensee had completed an adequate assessment of the causes and the actions taken to prevent recurrence. The inspectors conducted walk-throughs of plant operations and did not identify additional deficiencies relative to the root causes analyzed. Personnel interviewed by the inspectors demonstrated good knowledge of the event and were able to show what actions were taken by the licensee to prevent the recurrence of this type of event. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.8 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 70-1257/2005-01-02, Failure to maintain configuration control in process area). This NCV is considered closed.

(3) Conclusion

An NCV was identified for failure to maintain configuration control when nuclear criticality safety procedures were not followed by licensee personnel.

4. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and results were summarized with licensee management on March 4, 2005. Although proprietary documents and processes were occasionally reviewed during this inspection, the proprietary information is not included in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

ATTACHMENT

1. **PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED**

Licensee

- J. Deist, Nuclear Criticality Safety
- B. Doane, Nuclear Criticality Safety
- R. Link, Manager, Environmental, Health, Safety and Licensing
- L. Maas, Manager, Licensing and Compliance
- C. Manning, Manager, Criticality Safety
- T. Longmire, Manager, Training
- C. Perkins, Manager, Operations
- T.C. Probasco, Manager, Safety, Security and Emergency Preparedness
- L. Stephens, Manager, Ceramics
- B. Terhark, Manager, Human Resources

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, and office personnel.

2. **INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED**

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| TI 2600/011 | Verification of Disposition of Potentially Defective 1-inch Hunt Valves for Uranium Hexafluoride Cylinders |
| IP 88025 | Maintenance/Surveillance |
| IP 88010 | Training |
| IP 88050 | Emergency Preparedness |
| IP 88020 | Plant Operations |

3. **LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED**

<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Description</u>
70-1257/2005-01-01	Open	IFI	The current Emergency Plan required updating to include the Blended Low Enriched Uranium (BLEU) facility and Region II as the regional office with responsibilities during emergencies (Paragraph 2.a).
70-1257/2004-05-01	Discussed	NOV	Failure to review and approve a modified procedure prior to use in the BLUE process area (Paragraph 3.c).
70-1257/2004-05-02	Discussed	NCV	Failure to adequately test HEPA filter prior to operations (Paragraph 3.c).
70-1257/2005-01-02	Open/Closed	NCV	Failure to maintain configuration control in process area (Paragraph 6.a).

4. LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS	Agency-Wide Document Access Management System
ALARA	As Low As Reasonable Achievable
BLEU	Blended Low Enriched Uranium
DCF	Dry Conversion Facility
ECN	Engineering Change Notices
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EP	Emergency Plan
HEPA	High Efficiency Particulate Air
IP	Inspection Procedure
IROFS	Item Relied on for Safety
JIC	Joint Information Center
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MWP	Maintenance Work Permit
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PARS	Publicly Available Records System
PERT	Plant Emergency Response Team
PERMT	Plant Emergency Response Management Team
PM	Preventive Maintenance
SCBA	Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SNM	Special Nuclear Material
VIO	Violation