

April 5, 2005

Mr. David A. Christian
Sr. Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Blvd.
Glen Allen, Virginia 23060-6711

SUBJECT: SURRY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS
ON REVISION OF ACTIONS FOR UNPLANNED EMERGENCY DIESEL
GENERATOR INOPERABILITY (TAC NOS. MC3639 AND MC3640)

Dear Mr. Christian:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 241 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-32 and Amendment No. 240 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-37 for the Surry Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments change the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated June 23, 2004.

These amendments revise the TS requirements for verifying the operability of the remaining emergency diesel generator (EDG) when either unit's dedicated EDG or the shared backup EDG is inoperable.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Stephen Monarque, Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 241 to DPR-32
2. Amendment No. 240 to DPR-37
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

April 5, 2005

Mr. David A. Christian
Sr. Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Blvd.
Glen Allen, Virginia 23060-6711

SUBJECT: SURRY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS
ON REVISION OF ACTIONS FOR UNPLANNED EMERGENCY DIESEL
GENERATOR INOPERABILITY (TAC NOS. MC3639 AND MC3640)

Dear Mr. Christian:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 241 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-32 and Amendment No. 240 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-37 for the Surry Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments change the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated June 23, 2004.

These amendments revise the TS requirements for verifying the operability of the remaining emergency diesel generator (EDG) when either unit's dedicated EDG or the shared backup EDG is inoperable.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Stephen Monarque, Project Manager, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 241 to DPR-32
2. Amendment No. 240 to DPR-37
3. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Distribution: See next page

Package No.: ML051020418

TS: ML050980273

ADAMS Accession No.: ML050940001

*No Legal Objection

NRR-058

OFFICE	PDII-1/PM	PDII-2/LA	EEIB/SC	DIPM/IROB/SC	OGC*	PDII-1/SC
NAME	SMonarque	EDunnington	RVJenkins	TBoyce	KKannler	JNakoski
DATE	03/ 15 /05	03/ 16 /2005	01/18/2005	10/22/2004	03/ 25/2005	03/ 31/2005

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

DATED: April 5, 2005

SUBJECT: SURREY POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS
ON REVISION OF ACTIONS FOR UNPLANNED EMERGENCY DIESEL
GENERATOR INOPERABILITY (TAC NOS. MC3639 AND MC3640)

Distribution:

PUBLIC

PDII-1 R/F

E. Dunnington

RidsNrrPMSMonarque

RidsNrrDlpmLpdii (EHackett)

RidsNrrDlpmLpdii1 (JNakoski)

RidsOgcRp

G. Hill (4), TWFN, 5 F27

RidsAcrcAcnwMailCenter

RidsRgn2MailCenter (KLandis)

RidsNrrDlpmDpr

O. Chopra

M. Concepcion-Robles

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-280

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 241
Renewed License No. DPR-32

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Virginia Electric and Power Company (the licensee) dated June 23, 2004, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-32 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(B) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 241, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

John A. Nakoski, Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 5, 2005

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-281

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 240
Renewed License No. DPR-37

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Virginia Electric and Power Company (the licensee) dated June 23, 2004, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-37 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(B) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 240, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

John A. Nakoski, Chief, Section 1
Project Directorate II
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 5, 2005

ATTACHMENT TO
LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 241 TO
RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-32
LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 240 TO
RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-37
DOCKET NOS. 50-280 AND 50-281

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages

TS 3.16-2
TS 3.16-3
TS 3.16-7

Insert Pages

TS 3.16-2
TS 3.16-3
TS 3.16-7

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 241 TO

RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-32

AND

AMENDMENT NO. 240 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-37

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-280 AND 50-281

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 23, 2004, Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, pursuant to Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), Part 50, Section 50.90. The proposed changes would revise the TS requirements for verifying the operability of the remaining operable emergency diesel generator (EDG) when either unit's dedicated EDG or the shared EDG is inoperable. A related Bases change was provided as part of this submittal. VEPCO had requested this change in order to reduce the number of times the remaining operable EDG would be tested whenever entry into TS 3.16.B.1.a occurs.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The NRC staff has identified the applicable regulatory requirements that the NRC staff considered in its review of the application. These requirements are listed below.

General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, "Electric power systems," requires, in part, that nuclear power plants have onsite and offsite electric power systems to permit the functioning of structures, systems, and components that are important to safety. The onsite system is required to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety function, assuming a single failure. The offsite power system is required to be supplied by two physically independent circuits that are designed and located so as to minimize, to the extent practical, the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. In addition, this criterion requires provisions to minimize the probability of losing electric power from the remaining electric power supplies as a result of loss of power from the unit, the offsite transmission network, or the onsite power supplies.

GDC-18, "Inspection and testing of electric power systems," requires that electric power systems that are important to safety must be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing.

The regulations in 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical specifications," require that the TS include the following items in five specific categories: 1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; 2) limiting conditions for operation (LCOs); 3) surveillance requirements (SRs); 4) design features; and 5) administrative controls. However, the regulations do not specify the particular TS to be included in a plant's license.

Additionally, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) sets forth the following criteria to be used in determining whether an LCO is required to be included in the TS: 1) installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; 2) a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design-basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; 3) a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design-basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; and 4) a structure, system, or component that operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

Existing LCOs and related surveillances included as TS requirements that satisfy any of the criteria stated above must be retained in the TS, while those requirements that do not fall within or satisfy these criteria may be relocated to licensee-controlled documents.

The NRC staff also considered the following guidance:

NUREG-1366, "Improvements to Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements," dated December 1992.

NUREG-1431, Rev. 3, "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants," dated June 2004

Generic Letter (GL) 93-05, "Line-Item Technical Specifications Improvements to Reduce Surveillance Requirements for Testing During Power Operations," dated September 27, 2003.

GL 84-15, "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability," dated July 2, 1984.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The NRC staff has reviewed VEPCO's regulatory and technical analyses in support of its proposed license amendments, which are described in the June 23, 2004, submittal. The NRC staff's detailed evaluation is below.

3.1 System Description

The Surry Power Station Class IE alternating current (AC) electrical power distribution system consists of offsite power sources and onsite standby sources. Using multiple transmission lines, the transmission network supplies offsite power to the switchyard. From the switchyard, two electrically and physically separated circuits provide AC power through reserve station

service transformers to the 4.16 kV emergency buses. The design of the AC electrical power system provides independence and redundancy using load groups (trains) to ensure an available source of power to the Engineered Safeguards systems. Each train has connections to one preferred offsite power source and a single EDG to provide a continuous source of power under normal operating conditions.

Three 100-percent capacity EDGs serve as the safety-related onsite standby power source for the 4.16 kV emergency buses 1H and 2H at Surry, Units 1 and 2, respectively. One EDG is used exclusively for Surry, Unit 1 while the second EDG is used exclusively for Surry, Unit 2. The third EDG functions as a backup for either unit. This third EDG can be automatically aligned to emergency bus 1J (Surry, Unit 1) or 2J (Surry, Unit 2) depending on which unit sends an actuation signal and which signal is sent. Upon a loss of offsite power (LOOP) with no safety injection (SI) signal present, the third EDG is configured to connect to the Surry, Unit 2 emergency bus. On a LOOP coincident with an SI signal on a unit, the third EDG automatically aligns to the accident unit. The EDGs start automatically on an SI signal, consequence limiting safeguards signal, emergency bus degraded voltage signal, or undervoltage signal. After the EDG has started, it will automatically tie to its dedicated bus after offsite power has been tripped as a consequence of emergency bus undervoltage or degraded voltage. The EDGs will also start and operate in the standby mode without tying to the emergency bus on an SI signal or a momentary degraded voltage condition.

After the LOOP, an undervoltage signal initiates stripping of non-permanent loads from the emergency bus. When the EDG is tied to the emergency bus, loads are sequentially connected to their respective emergency bus by sequencing timing relays. The specific engineered safeguards equipment sequencing timers control the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading the EDG by automatic load application. The engineered safeguards electrical loads are then automatically connected to the EDGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a design-basis accident such as a loss-of-coolant accident.

3.2 Proposed TS Changes

VEPCO requested the following changes.

1. TS 3.16.B will be revised to replace the defined term “power operation” with “POWER OPERATION.”
2. TS 3.16.B.1.a.2 is being revised to delete the following wording:

If the diesel generator became inoperable due to any cause other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, demonstrate the operability of the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator daily.

and replace it with the revised wording as follows:

Within 24 hours, determine that the OPERABLE diesel generator is not inoperable due to common cause failure or demonstrate the operability of the

remaining OPERABLE diesel generator by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.6.A.1.a.

3.3 NRC Staff's Evaluation

The NRC Technical Specifications Improvement Program (TSIP) issued NUREG-1366 in order to report the findings of a comprehensive examination of TS SRs that require testing during power operation. This study provided recommendations to remove certain testing requirements that may be counter-productive to safety in terms of equipment availability and degradation. As part of the TSIP effort, the NRC staff issued GL 93-05 to provide guidance and to assist licensees in preparing and implementing the mentioned recommendations as line-item TS improvements. Section 10.1 of NUREG-1366 and GL 93-05 include the following recommended improvements to TS for the EDGs.

1. When an EDG itself is inoperable (not including a support system or independently testable component), the other EDG(s) should be tested only once (not every 8 hours) and within 8 hours, unless the absence of any potential common mode failure can be demonstrated.
2. EDGs should be loaded in accordance with the vendor recommendations for all test purposes other than the refueling outage LOOP tests.
3. The hot-start test following the 24-hour EDG test should be a simple EDG start test. If the hot-start test is not performed within 5 minutes following the 24-hour EDG test, it should not be necessary to repeat the 24-hour EDG test. The only requirement should be that the hot-start test is performed within 5 minutes of operating the diesel generator at its continuous rating for 2 hours or until operating temperatures have stabilized.
4. Delete the requirements for alternate testing of EDGs and other unrelated systems not associated with an inoperable train or subsystem (other than an inoperable EDG).

While the majority of testing at power is important, the NRC staff found that reducing the amount of testing at power required by the TS can improve safety, decrease equipment degradation, and eliminate unnecessary burden on personnel resources. The recommendations provided by NUREG-1366 were also incorporated into the improved Standard Technical Specifications.

3.3.1 VEPCO's Proposed Revision to TS 3.16.B

By letter dated June 23, 2004, VEPCO proposed to replace the defined term "power operation" with "POWER OPERATION." VEPCO had requested this change because the term "power operation" is a defined term in the TS and defined terms are capitalized throughout the TS. As such, VEPCO's proposed editorial change is acceptable.

3.3.2 VEPCO's Proposed Revision to TS 3.16.B.1.a.2

In its letter dated June 23, 2004, VEPCO proposed to change the requirement for operability testing of an EDG when the EDG for the alternate safety bus is inoperable. Currently, TS 3.16.B.1.a.2 specifies that if either unit's dedicated or shared EDG is unavailable or inoperable due to any cause other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, then the operability of the remaining operable EDG(s) must be demonstrated daily. The objective of this TS section is to ensure that the opposite train EDG(s) is not affected by a common cause failure and to provide assurance of continued operability of the operable EDG(s). However, the inoperability of an EDG does not necessarily affect the reliability of the operable EDG(s), unless there is some common mode failure possibility. There are many potential failures of EDG subsystems that would not be classified as a common mode failure yet would cause an EDG to be declared inoperable. In addition, the action contained in TS 3.16.B.1.a.2 can also cause unnecessary testing of the operable EDG(s). This unnecessary testing can result in equipment degradation and the potential for reduced reliability.

The NRC staff recommended in NUREG-1366 that the requirements to test the remaining diesel generator(s), when one diesel generator is inoperable due to any cause other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, be limited to those situations where the cause for inoperability has not been conclusively demonstrated to preclude the potential for a common mode failure. NUREG-1366 and GL 93-05 suggest that when an EDG itself is inoperable (not including support system or independently testable components), the other EDG(s) should be tested only once and within 8 hours, unless the absence of any potential common mode failure can be demonstrated. The proposed change incorporates the wording provided in the generic example of GL 93-05 and NUREG-1431. Furthermore, this proposed change states that if a common cause possibility does not exist on the operable EDG(s), testing of the operable EDG(s) does not have to be performed. Although VEPCO's proposed 24-hour time period differs from the 8-hour time period that is specified in NUREG-1366 and GL 93-05, the 24-hour timeframe is consistent with the guidance contained in GL 84-15. The NRC staff concludes that the proposed change is intended to reduce unnecessary testing of EDG(s) as recommended by GL 84-15.

On the basis of the above review, the NRC staff finds that the proposed change maintains compliance with requirements governing the design and operation of the Electrical Power System, provides adequate assurance of system operability, and is consistent with the recommendations contained in NUREG-1366, GL 93-05, GL 84-15, and NUREG-1431. Therefore, the NRC staff finds VEPCO's proposed change to be acceptable.

3.3.3 VEPCO's Proposed Revision to TS 3.16 Bases

TS 3.16 Bases state that an EDG is aligned exclusively for each unit, and the third generator functions as a backup for either Unit 1 or Unit 2. VEPCO proposed to eliminate this sentence and replace it with the following statement.

The Unit 1 diesel generator and the Unit 2 diesel generator are dedicated to emergency buses 1H and 2H, respectively. A third diesel generator is provided as a "swing diesel" and is shared by Units 1 and 2. Upon receipt of a safety injection signal on a unit, the shared diesel generator automatically aligns to either emergency bus 1J (Unit 1) or 2J

(Unit 2) as a backup power supply for the accident unit. The shared diesel is configured to preferentially load to the Unit 2 emergency bus on a loss of offsite power without a safety injection signal. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 diesel generators also supply power for certain common or shared plant systems/components.

The revised TS 3.16 Bases provide clarification on the alignment of the EDGs and specific information on the function of the swing diesel during a LOOP with and without an SI signal. In addition, the revised Bases include a note to state that certain common/shared components are powered by Unit 1 and Unit 2 EDGs. On the basis of the above, the NRC staff finds the proposed change does not alter the original intent of the TS Bases, and provides adequate assurance of system operability. As such, the NRC staff finds this change acceptable.

3.3.4 VEPCO's Proposed Addition of Paragraphs to TS 3.16 Bases

VEPCO proposed to add the following paragraphs at the end of the current TS 3.16 Bases text.

TS action statement 3.1 6.B.1.a.2 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of an OPERABLE EDG(s). If it can be determined that the cause of an inoperable EDG does not exist on the OPERABLE EDG(s), operability testing does not have to be performed. If the cause of the inoperability exists on the other EDG(s), then the other EDG(s) would be declared inoperable upon discovery, and the applicable required action(s) would be entered. Once the failure is repaired, the common cause failure no longer exists and the operability testing requirement for the OPERABLE EDG(s) is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable EDG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining EDG(s), performance of the operability test within 24 hours provides assurance of continued operability of those EDG(s).

In the event the inoperable EDG is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing the operability testing requirement for the OPERABLE EDG(s), the corrective action program will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility, including the other unit's EDG or the shared EDG. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24-hour constraint imposed by the action statement.

According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 6), 24 hours is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE EDG(s) is not affected by the same problem as the inoperable EDG."

These paragraphs explain the TS action statement 3.16.B.1.a.2 and provide an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of an operable EDG(s). The revised text states that if VEPCO can determine that a common cause failure does not exist on the operable EDG(s), operability testing does not have to be performed. However, if a common cause failure exists on the other EDG(s), then the other EDG(s) would be declared inoperable upon discovery, and the applicable required action(s) would be entered. Once the failure is repaired, the common cause failure no longer exists and the operability testing requirement for the operable EDG(s) is satisfied. Operability testing applies when the cause of the initial inoperable EDG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining EDG(s).

This addition to the TS 3.16 Bases provides clarifying information on the reasons for testing or not testing an operable EDG when either a unit's EDG or the shared EDG(s) is inoperable. The NRC staff finds the proposed change is consistent with the proposed revision of TS 3.16.B.1.a.2, maintains compliance with requirements governing the design and operation of the electrical power systems, provides adequate assurance of system operability, and is consistent with NUREG-1431. As such, the NRC staff finds this change acceptable.

3.3.5 VEPCO's Proposed Revision to References of TS 3.16 Bases

By letter dated June 23, 2004, VEPCO proposed to change the term "Final Safety Analysis Report" (FSAR) to "Updated Final Safety Analysis Report" (UFSAR), add GL 84-15 as a reference, and add numbering to improve consistency. The regulations in 10 CFR 50.71(e) require licensees to periodically update their FSAR. Thus, the UFSAR is understood to mean the most up-to-date version of the FSAR, and no further identification is necessary. In addition, these proposed changes are completely administrative in nature. As such, the NRC staff finds these proposed changes acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Virginia State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comment.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (69 FR 51490). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

7.0 REFERENCE

Virginia Electric and Power Company Application for License Amendment to the Surry Power Station, dated June 23, 2004 (ADAMS ACCESSION NO. ML042160223)

Principal Contributors: M. Concepcion-Robles
O. Chopra

Date: April 5, 2005

Surry Power Station, Units 1 & 2

cc:

Ms. Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq.
Senior Counsel
Dominion Resources Services, Inc.
Building 475, 5th Floor
Rope Ferry Road
Waterford, Connecticut 06385

Mr. Donald E. Jernigan
Site Vice President
Surry Power Station
Virginia Electric and Power Company
5570 Hog Island Road
Surry, Virginia 23883-0315

Senior Resident Inspector
Surry Power Station
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
5850 Hog Island Road
Surry, Virginia 23883

Chairman
Board of Supervisors of Surry County
Surry County Courthouse
Surry, Virginia 23683

Dr. W. T. Lough
Virginia State Corporation Commission
Division of Energy Regulation
Post Office Box 1197
Richmond, Virginia 23218

Dr. Robert B. Stroube, MD, MPH
State Health Commissioner
Office of the Commissioner
Virginia Department of Health
Post Office Box 2448
Richmond, Virginia 23218

Office of the Attorney General
Commonwealth of Virginia
900 East Main Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219

Mr. Chris L. Funderburk, Director
Nuclear Licensing & Operations Support
Dominion Resources Services, Inc.
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Blvd.
Glen Allen, Virginia 23060-6711