3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM NORMAL AND EMERGENCY AIR HANDLING SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.6 Two independent control room normal and emergency air handling systems shall be OPERABLE.*

APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES

ACTION:

a. MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4:

1. With one control room normal and emergency air handling system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

2. With both control room normal and emergency air handling systems inoperable due to an inoperable control room boundary, restore the control room boundary to OPERABLE status within 24 hours. Otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. MODES 5 and 6:

1. With one control room normal and emergency air handling system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the remaining OPERABLE control room emergency air cleanup system in the recirculation mode.

2. With both control room emergency air cleanup systems inoperable, or with the OPERABLE control room emergency air cleanup system, required to be in the recirculation mode by ACTION (a), not capable of being powered by an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

3. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.6 Each control room normal and emergency air handling system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours by verifying that the control room air temperature is less than or equal to 85°F.

b. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 15 minutes.

c. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

* The control room boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (Continued)

The limitations on minimum water level and maximum temperature are based on providing a 30 day cooling water supply to safety related equipment without exceeding their design basis temperature and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.27, "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Plants", March 1974.

3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM NORMAL AND EMERGENCY AIR HANDLING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the control room ventilation system ensures that 1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system and 2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General design Criteria 19 of Appendix "A", 10 CFR 50.

The control room boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative controls. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering and exiting the area. For other openings, these controls consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening when a need for control room boundary integrity is required.

If the control room boundary is inoperable in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4, the Control Room Normal and Emergency Air Handling System trains cannot perform their intended functions. Actions must be taken to restore an OPERABLE control room boundary within 24 hours. During the period that the control room boundary is inoperable, appropriate compensatory measures (consistent with the intent of GDC 19) should be utilized to protect control room operators from potential hazards such as radioactive contamination, toxic chemicals, smoke, temperature and relative humidity and physical security. Preplanned measures should be available to address these concerns for intentional and unintentional entry into the condition. The 24-hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during the time period, and the use of supplemental mitigating actions. The 24-hour Completion Time is typically a reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with the control room boundary.

3/4.7.7 SNUBBERS

All snubbers on systems required for safe shutdown/accident mitigation shall be OPERABLE. This includes safety and non-safety related snubbers on systems used to protect the code boundary and to ensure the structural integrity of these systems under dynamic loads.

SNUBBERS (Continued)

Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size. For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features of the 2 kip, 10 kip and 100 kip capacity manufactured by company "A" are of the same type. The same design mechanical snubber manufactured by company "B" for the purposes of this specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to systems. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection. Table 4.7-2 establishes three limits for determining the next visual inspection interval. Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection. Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability one of two sampling and acceptance criteria methods are used:

1) functionally test 10 percent of a type of snubber with an additional 10 percent tested for each functional testing failure, or

2) functionally test a sample size and determine sample acceptance using Figure 4.7-1.

Figure 4.7-1 was developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Plan" as described in "Quality Control and Industrial Statistics" by Acheson J. Duncan.

The service life of a snubber is established via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubber, seal replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc. . .). The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life. The requirements for the maintenance of records and the snubber service life review are not Intended to affect plant operation.

Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for Individual snubbers may be granted by the Commission If a justifiable basis for exemption Is presented and, if applicable, snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify the snubber for the applicable design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date. Snubbers so exempted shall be listed in Section 3.7.7 with footnotes indicating the extent of the exemptions.