

April 5, 2004

Nuclear Protected Train or Equipment: 

No Protected Equipment at this time.

Accomplishments & challenges:

- Provided Open Access to Containment
- Started Containment Purge
- H2O2 RCS Crud Burst Initiation
- Secured Last RCP
- Establish RHR Letdown
- Depressurize the RCS
- Start A RCP Motor Work
- Drain Pressurizer to 25%

Personnel safety 

Last 24 Hours	Outage to Date
Recordable - 0 Disabling - 0	Recordable - 0 Disabling - 0

No reported injuries.

Schedule focus areas/Priorities

- B Train ESFAS Testing
- S/G Safety Valve Header Machining
- A Train ESFAS Testing
- Drain S/G Tubes
- Enter Reduced Inventory
- S/G Eddy Current Testing
- Refueling Preparations

ALARA 

Last 24 Hours	Outage to Date
2.236 rem	2.236 rem

Dose as of the end of Day 0.
Dose exceeded projected due to BMI project being ahead of schedule.

Message from Outage Director

We have completed depressurizing and draining the Reactor Coolant System to establish conditions for performing the Integrated Safeguards Surveillance also known as ORT-3B and A. This is a very important and complicated evolution. It simulates a Loss of Offsite Power coincident with a Safety Injection Signal. Upon initiation the emergency diesel generators start and the safeguards equipment is sequentially powered as to not cause an overload condition. It verifies that our standby emergency equipment will start and function when called upon. About 30 people from Operations, Electrical Maintenance, I&C and Engineering are involved in the test. ORT 3B will start this morning followed by ORT 3A early AM tomorrow. Be aware that planned power interruptions are a normal part of this test.

U1R28 Today
This daily publication is provided during U1R28 for employee information and for use as a supervisor briefing tool.

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OUTAGE GOALS

NUCLEAR SAFETY PERFORMANCE	GOAL	ACTUAL
Unplanned orange/red paths	None	None
Reactor trips (either unit)	None	None
Safeguards actuation (either unit)	None	None
Loss of shutdown cooling	None	None
Loss of Rx vessel level control	None	None
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY PERFORMANCE		
Lost time accidents	None	None
Personnel injuries (OSHA recordable)	None	None
RADIOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE		
Radiation exposure (Excludes additional dose from any head or BMI repair contingencies)	≤ 75 R	2.236 R
Personnel contaminations	≤ 18 w / >5K CPM	0
Radiological events (defined as unplanned uptake w/assigned dose >10 mrem or dose event based on ED alarms)	≤ 1 event	0
Radmaterial event (defined as any rad material outside RCA ≥ 100 CPM)	≤ 1 event	0

HUMAN PERFORMANCE	GOAL	ACTUAL
Security Violations	≤ 12 loggable events	0
Station human performance clock resets	None	0
Rework	≤ 1%	<1%
SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE		
Outage Duration(excludes extensions due to extended head or BMI inspections)	≤ 30 days	12 Hrs Late
Mod Implementation	100% of Rev 0	On schedule
Schedule Compliance	> 85% schedule compliance with outage milestone	On Goal
Emergent work (during implementation)	≤ 2% late additions ≤ 5% Emergent	On Goal
Scope	Complete ≥ 95% of Rev 0 scope	On Goal
Operator Burdens	100% of Scheduled Operator Burdens complete	On Schedule
Post Outage availability	≥ 150 days of continuous operation	Available at a later date
BUDGET PERFORMANCE	Within -2% to 0% of outage budget	On Budget



Safety Snippet

When you fail to report a hazardous condition, you may contribute to employee attrition

Near-miss failure story: A co-worker is using a ladder. It seems fine, but as he comes down, one of the rungs sags as he steps on it. He notices a crack. He puts the ladder back without tagging it as needing repairs. The next day you grab the same ladder. As you start to climb you put your foot through the rung, lose your balance and fall, spraining your ankle. Do you check your ladder before you climb?

Human Performance

Take the time to check and see, should you operate A or B?


CAP 50725 documents an incident where a danger tag was hung on similarly named component (on 2CW- 44 rather than 2CW 44A). Remember every letter counts! **Think!** - Verify the equipment identity, per reference to the component label.

Operating Experience

Inadvertent draining of the Pressurizer at Turkey Point

Operations personnel drained the pressurizer farther than intended because of an erroneous level indication. During the draining evolution the crew noted that the inventory balance calculation did not match the observed changes in pressurizer level. It was subsequently determined that a vacuum was drawn in the pressurizer causing the false level indication. The station attributed the event to the method used by Instrument Technicians to fill the Pressurizer level reference legs.

Contact Information



Control Room Emergency – x2911
 EMT Pager 6442
 Work Control Center – x6703
 OCC - x 7190 - Option 1
 Lessons Learned - x7190 - Option 2
 Plant Status - x7190 - Option 3