

March 17, 2005

The Honorable Thomas Abinanti  
Westchester County Board of Legislators  
800 Michaelin Office Building  
148 Martine Avenue  
White Plains, NY 10601

Dear Mr. Abinanti:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRC's goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nation's nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability -- have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

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recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly. The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRC's Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

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Sincerely,

*/RA/*

Samuel J. Collins  
Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1. NUREG/CR-6863, "Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants"
2. NUREG/CR-6864, "Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations," Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005

Louis Alagno, Chief  
Town of Mt. Pleasant  
One Town Hall Plaza  
Valhalla, NY 10595

Dear Chief Alagno:

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Tara Bernard  
Office of Legislator Kaplowitz  
Westchester County  
800 Michaelin Office Building  
148 Martine Avenue  
White Plains, NY 10601

Dear Ms. Bernard:

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March 17, 2005

Nick Bianco  
Town of Yorktown  
363 Underhill Avenue  
Yorktown Heights, NY 10598

Dear Mr. Bianco:

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March 17, 2005

Michael Blau  
Village of Briarcliff Manor  
111 Pleasantville Road  
Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510

Dear Mr. Blau:

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March 17, 2005

Robert Bondi  
County Executive, Putnam County  
Putnam County Office Building  
40 Gleneida Avenue, 3rd floor  
Carmel, NY 10512

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March 17, 2005

Catherine Borgia, Chief of Staff  
Office of Assemblywoman Sandra R. Galef  
State of New York  
2 Church Street  
Ossining, NY 10562

Dear Ms. Borgia:

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Sincerely,

*/RA/*

Samuel J. Collins  
Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1. NUREG/CR-6863, "Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants"
2. NUREG/CR-6864, "Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations," Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005

Steve Bass  
Office of Legislator Kaplowitz  
Westchester County  
800 Michaelin Office Building  
148 Martine Avenue  
White Plains, NY 10601

Dear Mr. Bass:

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March 17, 2005

David Brower  
Town of Phillipstown  
238 Main Street  
Cold Spring, NY 10516

Dear Mr. Brower:

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Regional Administrator

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March 17, 2005

John Buckley  
Town of New Castle  
200 South Greeley Avenue  
Chappaqua, NY 10514

Dear Mr. Buckley:

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March 17, 2005

John V. Chervokas  
Supervisor, Town of Ossining  
16 Croton Avenue  
Ossining, NY 10562

Dear Mr. Chervokas:

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March 17, 2005

Francis Corcoran  
Councilman, Town of Bedford  
321 Bedford Road  
Bedford Hills, NY 10507

Dear Mr. Corcoran:

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March 17, 2005

Korky Dulgerian  
Orange County Government Center  
255 Main Street  
Goshen, NY 10924

Dear Mr. Dulgerian:

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March 17, 2005

Jerry Faiella  
New Castle Town Administrator  
200 South Greeley Avenue  
Chappaqua, NY 10514

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Sincerely,

**/RA/**

Samuel J. Collins  
Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1. NUREG/CR-6863, "Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants"
2. NUREG/CR-6864, "Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations," Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005

Andrew Feeney  
1st Deputy Director, Emergency Management Office  
Bldg. 22, suite 101, State of New York,  
1220 Washington Avenue  
Albany, NY 12226-2251

Dear Mr. Feeney:

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March 17, 2005

Peter Feroe  
Office of Congresswoman Lowey  
United States House of Representatives  
2327 Rayburn House Office Bldg.  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Feroe:

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March 17, 2005

Bill Fienemann  
Office of Assemblywoman Sandra R. Galef  
New York State Assembly  
2 Church Street  
Ossining, NY 10562

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March 17, 2005

The Honorable Sandra R. Galef  
New York State Assembly  
2 Church Street  
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March 17, 2005

Dan Greeley  
Assistant Commissioner of Emergency Services  
Rockland County  
16 East Lake Drive  
Thiells, NY 10984

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March 17, 2005

Roger Gross  
Special Assistant to State Senator Leibell  
State of New York  
1441 Route 22, Suite 205  
Brewster, NY 10509

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Sincerely,

*/RA/*

Samuel J. Collins  
Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1. NUREG/CR-6863, "Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants"
2. NUREG/CR-6864, "Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations," Volumes 1 and 2



March 17, 2005

Jerry Herbert  
Patterson Town Hall  
1142 Route 311  
Patterson, NY 12563

Dear Mr. Herbert:

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March 17, 2005

The Honorable Michael B. Kaplowitz  
Westchester County Board of Legislators  
800 Michaelin Office Building  
148 Martine Avenue  
White Plains, NY 10601

Dear Mr. Kaplowitz:

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March 17, 2005

Diane Kopenhaver  
Town of North Castle  
15 Bedford Road  
Armonk, NY 10504

Dear Ms. Kopenhaver:

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March 17, 2005

Walter Koury  
Commissioner, Department of Emergency Services  
Orange County Government Center  
255 Main Street  
Goshen, NY 10924

Dear Mr. Koury:

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March 17, 2005

Jon Lemie, Chief of Staff  
State of New York  
4 New King Street  
North Castle, NY 10604

Dear Mr. Lemie:

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March 17, 2005

Ron Levine  
State of New York  
158 Airport Executive Park  
Nauet, NY 10954

Dear Mr. Levine:

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March 17, 2005

Don Maurer  
New York State Emergency Management Office  
1220 Washington Avenue, Bldg 22, suite 101  
Albany, NY 12226-2251

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Sincerely,

**/RA/**

Samuel J. Collins  
Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1. NUREG/CR-6863, "Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants"
2. NUREG/CR-6864, "Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations," Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005

Robert McMahon  
Commissioner, Putnam County Emergency Services  
Putnam County Office Building, 3rd floor  
40 Gleneida Avenue  
Camel, NY 10512

Dear Mr. McMahon:

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March 17, 2005

Robert F. Meehan  
Supervisor, Town of Pleasant  
One Town Hall Plaza  
Valhalla, NY 10595

Dear Mr. Meehan:

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March 17, 2005

Chris Menzel, Police Chief  
Town of Bedford  
321 Bedford Road  
Bedford Hills, NY 10507

Dear Chief Menzel:

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March 17, 2005

The Honorable Thomas P. Morahan  
New York State Senate  
158 Airport Executive Park  
Nanuet, NY 10954

Dear Mr. Morahan:

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March 17, 2005

Mary Beth Murphy  
Town of Sommers  
335 Route 202  
Somers, NY 10589

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March 17, 2005

Daniel Paschkes  
Councilman, Town of Pound Ridge  
179 Westchester Avenue  
Pound Ridge, NY 10576

Dear Mr. Paschkes:

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Sincerely,

**/RA/**

Samuel J. Collins  
Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1. NUREG/CR-6863, "Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants"
2. NUREG/CR-6864, "Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations," Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005

Jason Rashford  
Office of Congresswoman Sue Kelley  
United States House of Representatives  
1127 Longworth House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Rashford:

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March 17, 2005

Susie Rush  
State of New York  
700 White Plains Road, suite 252  
Scarsdale, NY 10583

Dear Ms. Rush:

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March 17, 2005

James Seimarco  
Liaison to Indian Point  
Town of Buchanan  
236 Tate Avenue  
Buchanan, NY 10511

Dear Mr. Seimarco:

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March 17, 2005

Geri Shapiro  
Office of Senator Clinton  
United States Senate  
476 Russell Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Ms. Shapiro:

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March 17, 2005

John Sloan  
Town of Cortlandt  
1 Heady Street  
Cortlandt Manor, NY 10567

Dear Mr. Sloan:

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March 17, 2005

Adam Stiebeling  
Deputy Commissioner, Putnam County Emergency Services  
Putnam County Office Building, 3rd floor  
40 Gleneida Avenue  
Camel, NY 10512

Dear Mr. Stiebeling:

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March 17, 2005

Anthony Sutton  
Commissioner of Westchester County Emergency Services  
800 Michaelin Office Building  
148 Martine Avenue  
White Plains, NY 10601

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Sincerely,

*/RA/*

Samuel J. Collins  
Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1. NUREG/CR-6863, "Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants"
2. NUREG/CR-6864, "Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations," Volumes 1 and 2



March 17, 2005

Neil Sweeting  
Westchester County Emergency Services  
800 Michaelin Office Building  
148 Martine Avenue  
White Plains, NY 10601

Dear Mr. Sweeting:

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March 17, 2005

Jeff Tkacs  
Homeland Safety Coordinator  
Town of Cortlandt  
1 Heady Street  
Cortlandt Manor, NY 10567

Dear Mr. Tkacs:

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March 17, 2005

Kent Tosch  
Bureau of Nuclear Engineering  
State of New Jersey  
P.O. Box 402  
Trenton, NJ 08625-0402

Dear Mr. Tosch:

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March 17, 2005

James W. Tuffey  
Director, Emergency Management Office  
State of New York  
1220 Washington Avenue, Bldg. 22, suite 101  
Albany, NY 12226-2251

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March 17, 2005

Gerry Walsh  
County Executive Office  
Rockland County  
16 East Lake Drive  
Thiells, NY 10984

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March 17, 2005

Gary D. Warshauer  
Supervisor, Town of Pound Ridge  
179 Westchester Avenue  
Pound Ridge, NY 10576

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The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRC's document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

**/RA/**

Samuel J. Collins  
Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1. NUREG/CR-6863, "Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants"
2. NUREG/CR-6864, "Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations," Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005

Bill Weitz  
Office of Congressman Engel  
United States House of Representatives  
2228 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, DC 20518

Dear Mr. Weitz:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRC's goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nation's nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability -- have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly. The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRC's Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

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March 17, 2005

Janet L. Wells  
Supervisor, Town of New Castle  
200 South Greeley Avenue  
Chappaqua, NY 10514

Dear Ms. Wells:

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