

REGION I

Site	Finding	Color	Problem	SDP Phase?	Risk Arguments
Millstone	FIN50-423/01-012-01	Green	Inadequate comp measures for lockout of cable spread room CO2 system. (Degraded fire brigade perf.)	Phase 2	The probability of occurrence of a fire in the CSR that could cause substansitive damage was negligible. (Combustible material controls and IEEE 383 cables) Also they did have alternate shutdown capability outside the CR in the event of a fire.
Hope Creek	FIN 354/2001-002-01	Green	Procedure problem would have delayed initiation of cold shutdown,	?	The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with the SDP because the procedure deficiency would not have prevented operators from achieving cold shutdown. Also GE indicated that not securing A recirc pump was not critical to opposite side RHR.
TMI	NCV 289/02-11-01	Green	Inadequate Control of Transient Combustible Materials (Relay Room)	Phase 1?	Screened as green since it did not significantly impact any fire mitigation defense in depth elements.
Ginna	NCV 244/00-09-02	Green	Failure to ensure that the ASD capability for the screen house was electrically and physically independent of the area. (LER) Inadequate fusing results in loss of B edg. A edg already lost.	?	The item was screened using the SDP process and found to be of very low safety significance (Green) since offsite power remains available to power equipment necessary for post-fire SSD.
NMP	NCV 410/03-07-01	Green	Failure to Promptly Correct a Fire Protection Deficiency. (Previous licensee concerns with the familiarity of the licensee's fire brigade members with the plant were not promptly resolved.)	?	The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because the delay in the fire brigade response during fire drills have not been frequent and the duration of the delay during the observed drill was relatively small with respect to the established response time goal such that it is unlikely that the safe shutdown equipment would have been affected.
BV1	NCV 334/01-05-03	Green	Inadequate Procedure for Safe Shutdown Outside the CR Could Result in Damage to Both EDGs. Lose all RW after operators leave CR. Lose protected train EDG and all AC power, loss of RCS makeup, and seal cooling.	Phase 1	The issue did not affect detection, suppression, or fire barriers. Screened as green because the team determined that the likelihood of a fire which could cause a loss of all RW and necessitate shutdown outside the CR was small.
Pilgrim	NCV 293/00-04-001	Green	Failure to Install Emergency Lighting Units for manual operation of heat exchanger service water outlet valves.	Phase 1	Did not affect detection, suppression, or fire barriers.
Pilgrim	NCV 293/00-04-02	Green	Postulated Fire in Cable Spread Room Potentially Affecting Safe Shutdown (LER) . Fire in the CSR could damage EDG watt meter cables and result in a station blackout	Phase 3	SPAR model to determine prob of power recovery, 12-hour delay ok low risk significance.

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Region III

Site	Finding	Color	Problem	SDP Phase?	Risk Arguments
Point Beach	Cross cutting issue		The inspectors identified a number of issues which collectively indicated that human performance		
Braidwood	NCV 06-		Molded case circuit breakers nor Periodically Inspected and Tested		
Braidwood	NCV		Instrumentation not Available for Determining RCP Seal Temperature		
Quad Cities	NCV		Technical Errors in Appendix R Safe Shutdown Procedures		
Braidwood	NCV		Failure to Assess and Address Coordination Calculation Conclusions/Recommendations		
Braidwood	NCV		Molded Case Circuit Breakers not Periodically Cycled/Exercised		
Duane Arnold	NCV		Lack of Demonstrated Water Level Instrumentation		
Duane Arnold	NCV		Inadequate Circuit Breaker Coordination for Inst Power Supply		
Duane Arnold	NCV		Inadequate Corrective Actions for Smoke to Enter Control Room		
Fermi	NCV		Failure to Have Adequate Procedures for Alternate SD in Effect		
Fermi	NCV		Failure to Take Prompt Corrective Actions to Correct Identified Deficiencies in ASD Procedures		
Monticello	NCV		Failure to Meet Separation Criteria for Redundant Cabling and Equipment in FZ 23A, Intake Structure Pump Room		
Mont	NCV		Procedures...Associated with Responding to a Plant Fire Were Not Appropriate to the Circumstances		
Monticello	NCV		Failure to Maintain Full Area Detector Coverage in FZ 23 A, 14A, 13B, 19A and 19B		
Monticello	NCV		Failure to Maintain Complete Sprinkler Coverage in FZ 13A&B		
Monticello	NCV		Failure to Enter Conditions Adverse to Quality into the CA program and to Correct Conditions Adverse to Quality		

Monticello	NCV	(SLIV)	Failure to Perform Written Safety Evaluations and Submit a Summary to the NRC for Changes Made to the FPP, FHA, and SSA for 1984-2001		
Dresden	NCV		Reactor Water Level Could Drop Below Top of Active Fuel in the Event of Fire		
Cook	NCV		Failure to Ensure that Breaker Coordination and Selective Tripping was Provided at the 4160 system		
Point Beach	NCV		Failure to Ensure Adequate Emergency Lighting to Support Safe Shutdown		
Point Beach	NCV		Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Halon System Inadequate		
Point Beach	NCV		Insufficient Appendix R Fuel Oil Supply		
Point Beach	NCV		Possible Spurious Opening of PORVs During Fires		
Kewanee	NCV		Non-Rated Fire Barrier		
Kewanee	NCV		Inadequate Smoke Detector Coverage in Fire Zone TU-95B		
Kewanee	NCV		Failure to Test Fire Door and Fire Plan		
Quad Cities	NCV		Failure to Seal Tops of Electrical Cabinets		
Quad Cities	NCV		Failure to Provide Fire Stops in Cable Trays		
Braidwood	NCV		ESW Valves not Protected from Fire Induced Spurious Actuations		
Perry	NCV		Failure to Update Procedures		
Perry	NCV		Failure to Address extended Inoperability of the Control Room sub Floor CO2 System		

## Region IV

Site	Finding	Color	Problem	SDP Phase?	Risk Arguments
ANO	AV	TBD	The Acceptability of Manual Actions in Lieu of Providing Protection for Cables Associated with Equipment Necessary for Achieving and Maintaining Hot Shutdown		
Diablo	Fin		Degraded 1-hour fire rated ceiling in FA 4A and Degraded 2-hr fire Rated fire Barrier between FA 4A&B		
FCS	NCV		Failure to Assure At Least One Train of Charging Pumps Was Free of Fire Damage		
Wolf Creek	NCV		Inadequate Alt SD Procedure		
Grand Gulf	NCV		Inadequate Alt SD Procedure		
Com Peak	NCV		Failure to Establish and Maintain Adequate Procedures Covering Activities Associated with FP program implementation		
WAT	NCV		Failure to Demonstrate the Ratings of 3-hour Barriers		
Wat	NCV		Failure to Initiate Condition Reports for ELU Battery Failures		
WAT	NCV		Failure to Maintain in effect a 1-hour rated fire barrier between redundant trains of equip necessary to achieve and maintain SSD		
Calloway	NCV		Three Examples of Changes to the FPP w/o prior NRC approval that adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain ssd		
Calloway	NCV		Failure to Maintain in effect a 3-hour barrier between redundant trains of equipment necessary to achieve and maintain SSD		
WNP	NCV		Detectors found Not Installed law the Fire code		
WNP	NCV		A degraded Damett Raceway Barrier found with an unsealed gap through the post-fire ssd envelope.		