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Nuclear LLC

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

LER 272/04-007-00
SALEM - UNIT 1
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272

This Licensee Event Report, " Operation in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification – Technical Specification 3.3.2.1," is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

The attached LER contains no commitments.

Sincerely,

Carl Fricker
Salem Plant Manager

Attachment

/EHV

C Distribution
LER File 3.7

IE22

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. PAGE
Salem Generating Station Unit 1	05000272	1 OF 4

4. TITLE
Operation in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification – Technical Specification 3.3.2.1

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
12	08	2004	2004	- 007 -	00	2	7	2005	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

9. OPERATING MODE: 1

10. POWER LEVEL: 15%

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: *(Check all that apply)*

☐ 20.2201(b)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
☐ 20.2201(d)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
☐ 20.2203(a)(1)	☐ 20.2203(a)(4)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(x)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.36(c)(2)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	☐ 73.71(a)(4)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	☐ 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	☐ 73.71(a)(5)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	☐ OTHER
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	☒ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

FACILITY NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
E. H. Villar, Licensing Engineer	856-339-5456

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
A	JE	V		No					

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED		15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
☐ YES *(If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)*	☒ NO				

ABSTRACT *(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)*

On December 16, 2004, during a reactor power increase the nuclear control operator (NCO) (Licensed operator) noticed that the 11 Steam Generator steam line flow Channel 1 was reading approximately 10% while channel 2 and all the other loop channels were reading approximately 26%. Initial trouble shooting into this event revealed a leak on the low pressure side of the transmitter and identified that the transmitter equalizing valve was open slightly. The transmitter equalizing valve must remain closed for the transmitter to function properly. Further investigation revealed that this transmitter was last worked on December 8, 2004 to perform a sensor calibration. Therefore, it is assumed that the transmitter was inoperable as of December 8, 2004, and therefore Technical Specification 3.3.2.1 Action Statement 19 was not complied with. Specifically, that the inoperable channel be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours.

The apparent cause of this event is attributed to failure of personnel to utilize self-check techniques and to comply with written procedures. The transmitter equalizing valve was closed and the leak was repaired.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications..."

17. NARRATIVE *(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)*

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrument (ESFAS){JE/CHA}

* Energy Industry Identification System {EIIS} codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC}

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Event Date: December 8, 2004

Discovery Date: December 16, 2004

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Salem Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (Power Operations) at approximately 15% power at the time of the event. No structures, systems or components were inoperable at the time of the occurrence that contributed to the event.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On December 16, 2004, during a reactor power increase the nuclear control operator (NCO) (Licensed operator) noticed that the 11 Steam Generator steam line flow channel 1 was reading approximately 10% while 11 Steam Generator steam line flow channel 2 was reading approximately 26%. All other Steam Generators (12, 13 and 14) steam line flow channels 1 and 2 were also reading approximately 26%.

11 Steam Generator steam line flow channel 1 was declared inoperable and Technical Specification (TS) 3/4. 3. 2 was entered at approximately 1725 hours. TS 3.3.2.1 states in part: "The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS){JE/CHA} instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4 and with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-5."

The Steam Line Flow Channels are required to be operable in Modes 1, 2 and 3 ##. The ## indicates that the function may be by-passed below P-12. The P-12 interlock is based on reactor coolant average temperature.

With the 11 Steam Line Flow Channel 1 inoperable Action Statement 19 requires in part that:

"With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a) inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours...."

17. NARRATIVE *(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)*

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd)

Initial troubleshooting into this event revealed a leak on the low pressure side of the transmitter and identified that the transmitter equalizing valve was slightly open. The transmitter equalizing valve must remain closed for the transmitter to function properly. Further investigation revealed that the transmitter was last worked on December 8, 2004 to perform a sensor calibration. Therefore, it is assumed that the transmitter equalizing valve was left partially open, and therefore the transmitter was inoperable as of December 8, 2004. Accordingly, the Action Statement, as stated above, was not complied with since December 8, 2004. Specifically, the portion of the Action Statement not complied with was that the inoperable channel be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours.

The leak on the low pressure side of the transmitter was repaired and the transmitter equalizing valve was closed.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications..."

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The apparent cause of this event is attributed to failure of personnel to utilize self-check techniques and to comply with written procedures.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

A review of LERs at Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations for the years 2002 through present identified the events listed below relative to human performance issues. The corrective actions associated with these events, were appropriate and specific to the events, and as such they could have not been expected to prevent this event.

LER 311 2002-001 "Technical Specification Shutdown due to 2A Diesel Generator being inoperable," dated March 11, 2002.

LER 354 2002-006 "Operation with Offgas Rad Monitors Inoperable," dated August 21, 2002.

LER 354 2003-004 "Failure to Fully Implement LCO Action to Put Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN During Mode 5," dated June 19, 2003.

LER 311 2004-001 "Failure to Take Proper Compensatory Containment Air Samples," dated April 7, 2004.

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17. NARRATIVE *(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)*

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES (cont'd)

LER 272 2004-004 "Non-essential Loads Not Isolated With One Chiller Inoperable as Required by Technical Specifications," dated September 20, 2004.

LER 354 2004-007 "Technical Specification Noncompliance – Radiation Effluent Monitor On North Plant Vent," dated October 18, 2004.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event.

The two safety functions associated with the steam line flow channels are: (1) the initiation of a Safety Injection, and (2) the initiation of main steam line isolation. The Safety Injection function from the steam flow channel is an anticipatory signal for a steam line break event that is backed by the low Pressurizer pressure safety injection signal and the steam line differential pressure. The main steam isolation function is backed up by the containment pressure high - high.

These back up safety functions were operable and available through this event. Additionally, manual initiation by operator action was available.

A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in NEI 99-02 did not occur because this event did not impact the ability of the system to mitigate the consequences of an accident or control the release of radioactive material.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The leak on the low pressure side of the transmitter was fixed.
2. The transmitter equalizing valve was closed.
3. The personnel performance issues were addressed in accordance with PSEG procedures and policies.

COMMITMENTS

This LER contains no Commitments.