

March 30, 2005

MEMORANDUM TO: Sunil Weerakkody, Chief  
Fire Protection Engineering and Special Projects Section  
Plant Systems Branch  
Division of Systems Safety and Analysis

FROM: James Downs, Fire Protection Engineer **//RAI//**  
Fire Protection Engineering and Special Projects Section  
Plant Systems Branch  
Division of Systems Safety and Analysis

SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 10, 2005 TRIP REPORT OF  
VISIT AT PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION

On February 10, 2005, I was taken on a tour of Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station in support of the staff's review of the license amendment request submitted regarding manual activation of CO<sub>2</sub> fire suppression systems. Attached is my trip report. Please contact me if you require any additional information.

Attachments: Attachment 1 - Trip Report

Contact: James Downs, NRR/DSSA/SPLB  
415-2840

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DATE	03/30/05		03/30/05			

## **Trip Report - February 10, 2005 Visit Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station**

I was given a tour various portions of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) facility on February 10, 2005 to clarify various information through first hand observation. The licensee recently submitted a License Amendment Request (LAR) dealing with the transition of the means of activating their carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) fire suppression systems from automatic to only manual. The areas of focus in the LAR were the four emergency diesel generator (EDG) rooms and the cable spreading room (CSR). The CO<sub>2</sub> fire suppression systems acceptance test reports and fire brigade pre-firefighting strategies were also reviewed during the plant walkdown, . A Safety Evaluation Report (SER), which includes information gathered from this visit, has been prepared.

The original design of the EDG rooms utilized heat detectors to initiate activation of the CO<sub>2</sub> system. I observed the redundancy of EDGs, the presence of manual firefighting equipment, and the 30 foot separation from the power block. I also noted that a manual actuation station was located outside of each EDG room.

The original design of the CSR utilized ionization smoke detections, installed in accordance with NFPA 72E, to initiate activation of the CO<sub>2</sub> system. If the system were to remain manually operated, it would occur only after notifying the control room that the handle held fire extinguishers had not be sufficient. A Thermolag upgrade was proposed to better separate certain safety-related cables, but it is not related to the auxiliary shutdown panel in the motor generator (MG) set room. Installation of a water based suppression system would appear to be difficult given the numerous obstructions the cable trays present.

I repeatedly stressed the need for proper fire detection notification during my visit, after the licensee stated their intent to upgrade the system. This is a vital aspect of insuring the safety of the operators and maintaining the quickest possible activation of the CO<sub>2</sub> systems. The manual activation of either CO<sub>2</sub> system would likely be delayed if operators remained in after a fire was detected.

No other safety-related observations were made on this visit. Prior to leaving the site, I briefed the NRC Resident Inspector of my observations.

ATTACHMENT