



Final Exercise Report

INDIAN POINT ENERGY CENTER

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Exercise Date: June 8, 2004

Report Date: October 25, 2004

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
REGION II
26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York 10278**

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region II evaluated an exercise on June 8, 2004 and related out of sequence activities ending on July 27, 2004, in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Station. The purpose of the exercise and out of sequence activities was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. The exercise and out of sequence activities were held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in New York State; Westchester, Rockland, Orange, and Putnam Counties; and Bergen County, New Jersey who participated in this exercise.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. The cooperation and teamwork of all participants were evident during this exercise.

This report contains the draft evaluation of the biennial exercise and of the following out-of-sequence activities in Orange, Putnam, Rockland and Westchester counties: Reception Centers; Congregate Care Centers; Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Centers; General and Special Population Bus Companies; School Bus Companies; Traffic Control Points; School Interviews and Medical Drills.

The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, satisfactorily demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were no Deficiencies and seven Areas Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCAs) identified during the exercise. Four additional ARCAs were identified during out of sequence activities. Ten of the ARCAs identified in this exercise and the out of sequence activities, as well as seventeen ARCAs from prior exercises, have been resolved. There is one open ARCA to be addressed.

II. INTRODUCTION

On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351, and 352. These regulations are a key element in the REP Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

- Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments;
- Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;
- Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993, (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993); and
- Coordinating the activities of the following Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
 - U.S. Department of Commerce,
 - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
 - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
 - U.S. Department of Energy,
 - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
 - U.S. Department of Transportation,
 - U.S. Department of Agriculture,
 - U.S. Department of the Interior
 - U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and
 - U.S. Department of Defense.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region II Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the Indian Point Energy Center to FEMA Region II by the State of New York and involved local jurisdictions occurred on October 10, 1991. Formal approval of the RERP was granted by FEMA on May 3, 1996, under 44 CFR 350.

A full-scale REP exercise was evaluated on June 8, 2004 by FEMA to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency at the Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Station. The purpose of this exercise report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region II RAC Chairperson, and approved by the Regional Director.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980; and
- "Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology," published in the Federal Register on September 12, 2001, and revised April 25, 2002.

Section III of this report, titled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV of this report, titled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise objectives at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all Deficiencies and ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions for each identified exercise issue, and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them.

III. EXERCISE OVERVIEW

Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the June 8, 2004 exercise held to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the Indian Point 3 site. This section of the exercise report includes a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description

The Indian Point Energy Center's (IPEC) 10-mile plume pathway EPZ contains portions of four New York State counties: Orange, Putnam, Rockland, and Westchester.

The IPEC is located on the east bank of the Hudson River about 24 miles north of the New York City boundary line at Indian Point, Village of Buchanan in upper Westchester County, New York. The station is about 0.8 miles southwest of the city of Peekskill, 8.3 miles south of West Point, 1.5 miles northeast of the Lovett Generating Station site, 4.6 miles north of the Bowline Point Generating Station site, and 2.3 miles north of Montrose Point.

The Indian Point Site is accessible by several roads in the Village of Buchanan. Broadway, a two-lane paved road, borders the site to the east and is the primary access road to the site. The Village roads of Bleakley Avenue and First Street enter Broadway across from the eastern site boundary. Additionally, a paved road links the eastern boundary of the site to the plants.

There are no residences within the site boundary. In addition, there are no public highways or railroads that traverse the site area.

The Indian Point Site is surrounded on almost all sides by high ground ranging from 600 to 1,000 feet above sea level. The site is on the east bank of the Hudson River which runs northeast to southwest at this point but turns sharply northwest approximately two miles northeast of the site. The west bank of the Hudson is flanked by the steep, heavily wooded slopes of the Dunderberg and West Mountains to the northwest (elevations 1,086 feet and 1,257 feet respectively) and Buckberg Mountain to the west-southwest (elevation 793 feet). These peaks extend to the west by other names and gradually rise to slightly higher peaks.

The general orientation of this mass of high ground is northeast to southwest. One mile northwest of the site, Dunderberg Mountain bulges to the east; north of Dunderberg and the site, high ground reaching 800 feet forms the east bank of the Hudson as the river makes a sharp turn to the northwest. To the east of the site, peaks are generally lower than those to the north and west. The Spitzenberg and Blue Mountains average about 600 feet in height and there is a weak, poorly defined series of ridges that again run mainly in a north-northeast direction. The river south of the site makes another sharp bend to the southeast and then widens as it flows past Croton and Haverstraw.

The IPEC is approximately 239 acres in size and contains three pressurized water reactors: Unit 1 (615 MWt, 265 MWe, de-fueled), Unit 2 (2,758 MWt, 873 MWe), and Unit 3 (3,025 MWt, 965 MWe). Indian Point Unit 3 is adjacent to and south of Unit 1 and Unit 2 is to the north of Unit 1. The two operating units, #'s 2 and 3, were designed by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Indian Point Unit 1 was decommissioned and defueled in 1974.

The Indian Point pressurized water nuclear power plants each contain a nuclear reactor and closed loops of pressurized water that remove the heat energy from the reactor core and transfer the energy to a secondary water system that generates steam. The steam, in turn, drives a turbine generator set which produces electric power.

B. Exercise Participants

The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the Indian Point 3 exercise on June 8, 2004.

Federal Agencies

United States Military Academy

State of New York

New York State Department of Health

New York State Department of Highways

New York State Department of Social Services

New York State Department of Transportation

New York State Emergency Management Office

New York State Emergency Medical Services Coordinator

New York State Energy Research and Development Authority

New York State Police

New York State Public Service Commission

Risk Jurisdictions

Orange County

Orange County Attorney

Orange County Department of Health

Orange County Department of Public Works

Orange County Department of Social Services

Orange County Emergency Management Office

Orange County Emergency Medical Services

Orange County Executive

Orange County Radiological Officer

Orange County Public Information Officer

Orange County School Liaison
Orange County Sheriff's Office

Putnam County

Putnam County Bureau of Fire and Emergency Medical Services
Putnam County Fire Department
Putnam County Health Department
Putnam County Highway Department
Putnam County Office for the Aging
Putnam County Office of Personnel
Putnam County School District
Putnam County Sheriff's Office
Putnam County Social Services

Rockland County

Local Police Departments
Rockland County Department of Health
Rockland County Mental Health
Rockland County Office of the Aging
Rockland County Public Information Office
Rockland School Representative

Westchester County

Bureau of Environmental Quality
Bureau of Public Health Protection
City of Peekskill
Civil Air Patrol
Department of Schools
General Services Department
Westchester County Community Mental Health
Westchester County Department of Environmental Facilities
Westchester County Department of Health
Westchester County Department of Parks, Recreation & Conservation
Westchester County Department of Social Services
Westchester County Emergency Management Agency
Westchester County Emergency Medical Services
Westchester County Executive Office
Westchester County Finance Department
Westchester County Fire and Safety
Westchester County Local Emergency Planning Committee
Westchester County Medical Center
Westchester County Office of Emergency Services
Westchester County Police
Westchester County Public Information Office
Westchester Department of Public Works
Yorktown Municipal Police Department

Support Jurisdictions

Bergen County

Bergen County Office of Emergency Management

Private/Volunteer Organizations

American Red Cross

Civil Air Patrol

Nuclear Power Generation Utilities Technical Representative

Orange County Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES)/

Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES)

Putnam County RACES

Putnam Emergency Amateur Repeater League

Rockland County RACES

Salvation Army

Volunteers from RACES

WHUD AM Radio Station

Westchester County RACES

C. Exercise Timeline

Table 1, on the following page, presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the Indian Point Exercise on June 8, 2004. Also included are times notifications were made to the participating jurisdictions/functional entities.

TABLE 1. EXERCISE TIMELINE

June 8, 2004 – Indian Point Nuclear Power Station

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken							
		NY State EOC	JNC	EAS Station	Putnam County EOC	Rockland County EOC	Westchester County EOC	Orange County EOC	Bergen County EOC
Unusual Event	0801		0804		0814	0807	0807 (WP)	0807	0908
Site Area Emergency	0924	0936	0928		0934	0924	0935	0924	0942
General Emergency	1402	1413	1402	1440	1404	1402	1413	1403	1422
Simulated Rad. Release Started			N/A	N/A	N/A			N/A	
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated			N/A	N/A	N/A			N/A	
Facility Declared Operational		0843	0905		1000	0831	1006	1042	0913
Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency		0944	0949	1440	0933	0942	0941	0942	1014
Exercise Terminated		1600	1600	1510	1600	1604	1600	1606	1604
Early Precautionary Actions:		0927 (parks)			0945 (schools)	0945 (schools, parks)		0925	1013
“Heads Up” Siren Activation		0936	0936		0936	0936	0936	0936	0936
“Heads Up” EAS Message		0940	0940	0933	0940	0940	0940	0940	0940
1st Protective Action Decision Shelter: Evacuate:		1425			1425	1425	1424	1425	
1st Siren Activation		1436	1436		1436	0936	1436	1436	1436
1st EAS or EBS Message		1440	1440	0940	1440	0940	1440	1440	1440
2nd Protective Action Decision Shelter: Evacuate:									
2nd Siren Activation				1440		1436			
2nd EAS or EBS Message				1440		1440			
KI Administration Decision:		1425	1425	1440	1435	1425	1425	1425	

IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS

Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the June 8, 2004, exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the Indian Point 2 Nuclear Power Station.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria contained in the September 12, 2001, Federal Register Notice (revised April 25, 2002). Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.

A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following pages, presents the status of the exercise evaluation area criteria from the FEMA REP Exercise Evaluation Methodology that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise evaluation area criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of the criteria is indicated by the use of the following letters:

- M – Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)
- D – Deficiency assessed
- A – ARCA(s) assessed
- N – Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B)
- U – Unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercises

TABLE 2. Summary of Exercise Evaluation

TABLE 2. Summary of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: June 8, 2004 - Indian Point Energy Center	State EOC/WP	EOF	JNC	EAS WHUD	State PMC	Orange Co. EOC	Orange Co. FMTs
Evaluation Area/Criteria							
1. Emergency Operations Management							
1.a.1. Mobilization	M					M	M
1.b.1. Facilities							
1.c.1. Direction and Control	M	M	M			A	
1.d.1. Communications Equipment	M	M	M	A		M	
1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations	M	M	M			M	
2. Protective Action Decision Making							
2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control	M					M	
2.b.1. Radiological Assessment PARs & PADs Based on Available Information	M					M	
2.b.2. Radiological Assessment and PARs and PADs for the General Public	M					M	
2.c.1. Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations	M					M	
3. Protective Action Implementation							
3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control		M			M	M	M
3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions		M				M	M
3.c.1. Implementation of PADs for Special Populations	M					M	
3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools						M	
3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control						M	
3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control						M	
4. Field Measurement and Analysis							
4.a.1. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment							M
4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management						M	
4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures							M
5. Emergency Notification & Public Information							
5.a.1. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification	M		M	M		M	
5.a.3. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification Backup Alert and Notification						M	
5.b.1. Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	M		A			M	
6. Support Operations/Facilities							
6.a.1. Monitoring and Decon of Evacuees and EWs and Registration of Evacuees					M		
6.b.1. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment					M		
6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees							
6.d.1. Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals							

LEGEND: M = Met A = ARCA(s) D = Deficiency

TABLE 2. Summary of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: September 24, 2002, Indian Point 2	Orange Backup Route Alert	Orange County Reception	Orange Co. Congregate Care	Orange - Transit Dep. Bus	Orange – School Bus	Orange - Schools
Evaluation Area/Criteria						
1. Emergency Operations Management						
1.a.1. Mobilization						
1.b.1. Facilities						
1.c.1. Direction and Control						
1.d.1. Communications Equipment						
1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations						
2. Protective Action Decision Making						
2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control						
2.b.1. Radiological Assessment & PARs & PADs Based on Available Information						
2.b.2. Radiological Assessment and PARs and PADs for the General Public						
2.c.1. Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations						
3. Protective Action Implementation						
3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control	M	M		M	M	
3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions	M	M		M	M	
3.c.1. Implementation of PADs for Special Populations				M		
3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools					M	M
3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control						
3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control						
4. Field Measurement and Analysis						
4.a.1. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment						
4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management						
4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures						
5. Emergency Notification & Public Information						
5.a.1. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification						
5.a.3. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification Backup Alert and Notification	M					
5.b.1. Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media						
6. Support Operations/Facilities						
6.a.1. Monitoring and Decon of Evacuees and EWs and Registration of Evacuees		M				
6.b.1. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment						
6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees			M			
6.d.1. Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals						

LEGEND: M = Met A = ARCA(s) D = Deficiency

TABLE 2. Summary of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: September 24, 2002, Indian Point 2	Orange Co. MS-1	Orange Co. TCPs	Putnam Co EOC & WP	Putnam Co. FMTs	Putnam Backup Route Alert	Putnam Co. Reception
Evaluation Area/Criteria						
1. Emergency Operations Management						
1.a.1. Mobilization			M	M		
1.b.1. Facilities						
1.c.1. Direction and Control			M			
1.d.1. Communications Equipment			M			
1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations			M			
2. Protective Action Decision Making						
2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control			M			
2.b.1. Radiological Assessment & PARs & PADs Based on Available Information			A			
2.b.2. Radiological Assessment and PARs and PADs for the General Public			M			
2.c.1. Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations			M			
3. Protective Action Implementation						
3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control	M	M	M	M	M	M
3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions		M	M	M	M	M
3.c.1. Implementation of PADs for Special Populations			M			
3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools			M			M
3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control		M	M			
3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control			M			
4. Field Measurement and Analysis						
4.a.1. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment				M		
4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management			M			
4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures				M		
5. Emergency Notification & Public Information						
5.a.1. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification			M			
5.a.3. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification Backup Alert and Notification			M		M	
5.b.1. Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media			M			
6. Support Operations/Facilities						
6.a.1. Monitoring and Decon of Evacuees and EWs and Registration of Evacuees						M
6.b.1. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment						
6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees						
6.d.1. Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	M					

LEGEND: M = Met A = ARCA(s) D = Deficiency

TABLE 2. Summary of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: September 24, 2002, Indian Point 2	Putnam Co. Cong Care	Putnam Co. PMC	Putnam Transit Dep. Bus	Putnam School Buses	Putnam Co. Schools	Putnam Co. MS-1 Drill
Evaluation Area/Criteria						
1. Emergency Operations Management						
1.a.1. Mobilization						
1.b.1. Facilities						
1.c.1. Direction and Control						
1.d.1. Communications Equipment						
1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations						
2. Protective Action Decision Making						
2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control						
2.b.1. Radiological Assessment & PARs & PADs Based on Available Information						
2.b.2. Radiological Assessment and PARs and PADs for the General Public						
2.c.1. Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations						
3. Protective Action Implementation						
3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control		M	M	M		M
3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions			M	M		
3.c.1. Implementation of PADs for Special Populations			M			
3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools				M	M	
3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control						
3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control						
4. Field Measurement and Analysis						
4.a.1. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment						
4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management						
4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures						
5. Emergency Notification & Public Information						
5.a.1. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification						
5.a.3. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification Backup Alert and Notification						
5.b.1. Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media						
6. Support Operations/Facilities						
6.a.1. Monitoring and Decon of Evacuees and EWs and Registration of Evacuees		M				
6.b.1. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment		M				
6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees	M					
6.d.1. Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals						M

LEGEND: M = Met A = ARCA(s) D = Deficiency

TABLE 2. Summary of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: September 24, 2002, Indian Point 2	Putnam TCPs	Rockland Co. EOC	Rockland County FMTs	Rockland Co. Reception	Rockland PMC	Rockland Transit Dep. Bus
Evaluation Area/Criteria						
1. Emergency Operations Management						
1.a.1. Mobilization		M	M			
1.b.1. Facilities						
1.c.1. Direction and Control		M				
1.d.1. Communications Equipment		M				
1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations		M				
2. Protective Action Decision Making						
2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control		M				
2.b.1. Radiological Assessment & PARs & PADs Based on Available Information		M				
2.b.2. Radiological Assessment and PARs and PADs for the General Public		M				
2.c.1. Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations		M				
3. Protective Action Implementation						
3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control	M	M	M	A	M	M
3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions	M	M	M			M
3.c.1. Implementation of PADs for Special Populations		M				M
3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools		M				
3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	M	M				
3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control		M				
4. Field Measurement and Analysis						
4.a.1. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment			M			
4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management		M				
4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures			M			
5. Emergency Notification & Public Information						
5.a.1. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification		M				
5.a.3. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification Backup Alert and Notification		M				
5.b.1. Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media		M				
6. Support Operations/Facilities						
6.a.1. Monitoring and Decon of Evacuees and EWs and Registration of Evacuees				A	A	
6.b.1. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment					M	
6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees						
6.d.1. Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals						

LEGEND: M = Met A = ARCA(s) D = Deficiency

TABLE 2. Summary of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: September 24, 2002, Indian Point 2	Rockland School Buses	Rockland Co. Schools	Rockland Co. MS-1 Drill	Rockland Co. TCPs	Westchester EOC & WP	Westchest Co. FMTs
Evaluation Area/Criteria						
1. Emergency Operations Management						
1.a.1. Mobilization					A	M
1.b.1. Facilities						
1.c.1. Direction and Control					M	
1.d.1. Communications Equipment					M	
1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations					M	
2. Protective Action Decision Making						
2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control					M	
2.b.1. Radiological Assessment & PARs & PADs Based on Available Information					M	
2.b.2. Radiological Assessment and PARs and PADs for the General Public					M	
2.c.1. Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations					M	
3. Protective Action Implementation						
3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control	M		M	M	M	M
3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions	M			M	M	M
3.c.1. Implementation of PADs for Special Populations					M	
3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools	M	M			M	
3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control					M	
3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control				M	M	
4. Field Measurement and Analysis						
4.a.1. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment						M
4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management					M	
4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures						A
5. Emergency Notification & Public Information						
5.a.1. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification					M	
5.a.3. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification Backup Alert and Notification					M	
5.b.1. Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media					M	
6. Support Operations/Facilities						
6.a.1. Monitoring and Decon of Evacuees and EWs and Registration of Evacuees						
6.b.1. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment						
6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees						
6.d.1. Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals			M			

LEGEND: M = Met A = ARCA(s) D = Deficiency

TABLE 2. Summary of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: September 24, 2002, Indian Point 2	Westchester Reception Center	Westchester Cong. Care Cntr	Westchester Transit Dep. Buses	Westchester Co. School Buses	Westchester Schools	Westchester TCP/ACPs
Evaluation Area/Criteria						
1. Emergency Operations Management						
1.a.1. Mobilization						
1.b.1. Facilities						
1.c.1. Direction and Control						
1.d.1. Communications Equipment						
1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations						
2. Protective Action Decision Making						
2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control						
2.b.1. Radiological Assessment & PARs & PADs Based on Available Information						
2.b.2. Radiological Assessment and PARs and PADs for the General Public						
2.c.1. Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations						
3. Protective Action Implementation						
3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control	M		M	A		M
3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions	M		M	M		M
3.c.1. Implementation of PADs for Special Populations			M			
3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools				M	M	
3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control						M
3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control						
4. Field Measurement and Analysis						
4.a.1. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment						
4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management						
4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures						
5. Emergency Notification & Public Information						
5.a.1. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification						
5.a.3. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification Backup Alert and Notification						
5.b.1. Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media						
6. Support Operations/Facilities						
6.a.1. Monitoring and Decon of Evacuees and EWs and Registration of Evacuees	M					
6.b.1. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment						
6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees		M				
6.d.1. Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals						

LEGEND: M = Met A = ARCA(s) D = Deficiency

TABLE 2. Summary of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: September 24, 2002, Indian Point 2	Bergen Co. EOC
Evaluation Area/Criteria	
1. Emergency Operations Management	
1.a.1. Mobilization	M
1.b.1. Facilities	
1.c.1. Direction and Control	M
1.d.1. Communications Equipment	M
1.e.1. Equipment & Supplies to Support Operations	M
2. Protective Action Decision Making	
2.a.1. Emergency Worker Exposure Control	
2.b.1. Radiological Assessment & PARs & PADs Based on Available Information	
2.b.2. Radiological Assessment and PARs and PADs for the General Public	
2.c.1. Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations	
3. Protective Action Implementation	
3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control	
3.b.1. Implementation of KI Decisions	
3.c.1. Implementation of PADs for Special Populations	
3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools	M
3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	M
3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control	
4. Field Measurement and Analysis	
4.a.1. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Equipment	
4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management	
4.a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures	
5. Emergency Notification & Public Information	
5.a.1. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification	
5.a.3. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification Backup Alert and Notification	
5.b.1. Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	
6. Support Operations/Facilities	
6.a.1. Monitoring and Decon of Evacuees and EWs and Registration of Evacuees	
6.b.1. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment	
6.c.1. Temporary Care of Evacuees	
6.d.1. Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	

B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated

This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity, in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. Presented below is a definition of the terms used in this subsection relative to objective demonstration status.

- **Met** - Listing of the demonstrated exercise objectives under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.
- **Deficiency** - Listing of the demonstrated exercise objectives under which one or more Deficiencies were assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.
- **Area Requiring Corrective Actions** - Listing of the demonstrated exercise objectives under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved. Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.
- **Not Demonstrated** - Listing of the exercise objectives which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.
- **Prior ARCAs - Resolved** - Description of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises which were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.
- **Prior ARCAs - Unresolved** - Description of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises which were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues which are discussed in this report.

- A Deficiency is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."
- An ARCA is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified

inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."

FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

- **Plant Site Identifier** - A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.
- **Exercise Year** - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.
- **Evaluation Area Criterion** - A letter and number corresponding to the criteria in the FEMA REP Exercise Evaluation Methodology.
- **Issue Classification Identifier** - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.
- **Exercise Issue Identification Number** - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

1. NEW YORK STATE

1.1 Emergency Operations Center

- a. **MET:** 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** ONE

Issue No.: 32-02-1.c.1-A-01

CONDITION: At 1112 hours, it was announced in the State Command Center, that the Governor had declared a State of Disaster Emergency for the counties of Orange, Putnam, Rockland, and Westchester and contiguous areas. The State Plan indicates that, once the State of Disaster Emergency has been declared, the State assumes the lead in decision-making and a State Coordinating Officer will be designated; however, this was not done. There was no announcement or mention to the counties that a change in the decision making process had occurred; decisions still occurred within the counties in coordination with the State Command Center even though the State EOC issued a news release (News Release No. 4, at 1:09 PM) indicating response actions were being coordinated by the Disaster Preparedness Commission.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: This particular process in the State Plan has not been practiced in recent drills or exercises. Specific players may not have been aware that the decision-making authority changes after a declaration of emergency has been made by the Governor for a nuclear power plant emergency.

REFERENCE: State Plan, Section III, paragraph 2.8

EFFECT: Risk counties were not informed that the State was now the lead decision-maker for protective actions during the emergency response and may have been unaware that additional resources may have been available for the response.

RECOMMENDATION: When a decision is made by the Governor to declare a State of Disaster Emergency, an announcement should be made over the Radiological Emergency Communication System (RECS line) indicating that the State is assuming overall command of response operations and is making available additional State resources. In addition, the State Plan should be reviewed to determine if this provision agrees with State law and the county plans. Annual training is required to ensure that all response personnel are aware of this procedure.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: This ARCA was cleared through an interview with the EMD and FEMA evaluator. The EMD had a good understanding of his role and the role of the State in an emergency. Once a Declaration of Disaster Emergency by the Governor occurs, the County agency duties and responsibilities are the same, however the Declaration allows the State to mobilize additional resources should it be necessary.

- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

1.2 Emergency Operations Facility

- a. **MET:** 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** ONE

Issue No.: 32-02-3.a.1-A-02

CONDITION: The Westchester County, Rockland County, Orange County, and State Department of Health (DOH) personnel assigned to the EOF traveled through the Emergency Planning Zone, enroute to the EOF, without personnel monitoring dosimetry or potassium iodide (KI). They also were not aware of dose limits or administrative and decontamination reporting requirements.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: These individuals were not issued dosimetry or KI, as is required for all emergency workers.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, Criteria K.3.a and J.10.e

EFFECT: The exposures received by these emergency workers coming to or leaving the facility would not be recorded. In addition, the EOF is not a shielded facility and these emergency workers could receive additional exposure while inside the EOF.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide all personnel assigned to the EOF a dosimetry/KI kit and training in the dose limits and reporting requirements.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: All emergency responders from Westchester County, Rockland County, Orange County, and the State Department of Health reported to the EOF with a dosimetry kit consisting of a TLD, a 0-5 R dosimeter, a 0-200 R dosimeter, and a 14-day supply of potassium iodide. Through interview during

the exercise, all responders demonstrated knowledge of dose limits, administrative reporting requirements, and decontamination reporting requirements. This ARCA is resolved.

- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

1.3 Joint News Center

- a. **MET:** 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.a.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** ONE

Issue No.: 32-04-5.b.1-A-01

CONDITION: Neither EAS messages nor the Follow-On-Bulletin were provided to the public in Spanish. It is noted that the Bureau of the Census has listed the county of Westchester, as a county where there is greater than 5% of the adult voting age population that are non-English speaking population. Because of this all public information materials, EAS messages, and Follow-On-Bulletins must be in Spanish. It is noted that there is a write in card in the back of the booklets to submit in order to get a non-English booklet.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: This portion of public information has not been done.

REFERENCE: Based on the 2000 Census, a Federal Register notice in 2002 indicated that Westchester County must provide information in Spanish. This is based on the Voting Rights Act and the requirement to provide information if there is 5% of the adult voting population who does not use English. See also Guidance Memorandum 20.

EFFECT: Part of the population would not understand the instructions to evacuate or take KI.

RECOMMENDATION: Prepare EAS and Follow-On-Bulletins in Spanish.

- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** TEN

Issue No.: 75-00-11-A-03 (5.b.1)

CONDITION: The rumor control telephone number was not included in any printed information such as Special News Broadcasts, public information brochures or news releases. (NUREG-0654, G.2.c.; 2000 Joint News Center Procedures and Public Education Workplan; Planning For Emergencies, pg.5, Rumor Control.)

REASON ARCA UNRESOLVED: Although the number was announced at the media briefings, the rumor control telephone number is not printed in the Westchester, Rockland, Orange or the Putnam Counties' Important Information on Indian Point and Planning for Emergencies Brochure. Orange County did not publicize the public inquiry telephone number in its press releases at the Alert, SAE or the GE classification levels.

RECOMMENDATION: A listing in the public information brochure of a toll-free (800) emergency telephone number for public inquiries is necessary. It is confusing and misleading to print a toll-free (800) number for non-emergency questions and general information when it does not provide the public an immediate service during emergency situations. The plan and public information brochure should be revised to specify the dedicated public inquiry number that will be operational during an emergency. Once the predominant and significant rumors are identified, government officials must address them with the public through press releases and media briefings.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The rumor control telephone number was included on all EAS, Follow-On-News messages and media releases. In addition, the number was provided in all media briefings.

Issue No.: 75-00-11-A-04 (5.a.1)

CONDITION: Per joint news center procedures, "if the EAS [Emergency Alert System] message contains a PAR [Protective Action Recommendation] for evacuation or sheltering, EAS personnel from counties and state will assist in preparing a special news bulletin which expands the information contained in the EAS broadcast message. Immediately after sign-off, the Special News Bulletin is faxed to the EAS station. The EAS coordinator confirms receipt of faxed bulletin with the station." This did not occur during the exercise. There was no follow-up message or bulletin sent to the EAS station. (NUREG-0654, E.5; 2000 Joint News Center Procedures and Public Education Workplan, pg. 4, EAS Message Preparation Procedures.)

REASON ARCA UNRESOLVED: The initial EAS message did not include a Follow-On-News Bulletin, and so none was faxed to the EAS station. Subsequent EAS messages did have Follow-On-News Bulletins, but these, in accordance with the Extent-of-Play, were also not faxed to the EAS station. Therefore, the ARCA has not been resolved.

RECOMMENDATION: Demonstrate that Follow-On-News Bulletins will be faxed to the EAS station in the event of an emergency.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Both EAS messages and the one follow-on news bulletin were transmitted via facsimile and telephone to the EAS station.

Issue No.: 75-00-12-A-05 (5.a.1)

CONDITION: At the Joint News Center (JNC) media briefing, conducted at 1035 hours, the Westchester County Public Information Officer (PIO) announced that at 1039 hours sirens had been sounded at 1041 hours and an EAS message had been broadcast at 1044 hours. This was prior to these events. At the next media briefing at 1145 hours, the briefing was conducted during the time the second alert and notification sequence was occurring (with sirens sounded at 1150 hours and the EAS being broadcast at 1153 hours). Both of these media briefings should have been delayed until after the alert and notification activity had concluded. If these briefings had been broadcast live they could have created a great deal of confusion. (NUREG-0654, E.7; 2000 Joint News Center Procedures and Public Education Workplan, pg. 2, Media Briefings.)

REASON ARCA UNRESOLVED: As noted in the new issue #32-02-5.b.1-A-06 described above, there were, again, significant disconnects between the time that events occurred and the times that information was given to members of the media during briefings at the Joint News Center.

RECOMMENDATION: The plan and procedures for conduct of press briefings must be revised to permit the introduction of new information and late-breaking news, if it arises shortly before or during briefings. Press briefings should be delayed or interrupted in order to disseminate the most current information and protective actions. Additionally, when an alert and notification sequence is scheduled, the media briefings should be delayed until after the EAS broadcast. In addition, all public information staff, particularly those who would report to the JNC, should be trained on how to manage the situation when there is new information arriving just before or during a press briefing.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Information was immediately conveyed to the media when received in the JNC. The first full media briefing occurred at 0941. This occurred after the EAS message was broadcast.

Issue No.: 32-02-1.d.1-A-03

CONDITION: The videoconference link in the Media Briefing room, (both audio and visual), between Orange County and the Joint News Center (JNC) was non-operational through the first three briefings.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: According to State personnel working on the failed link, "it is an AT&T problem, not ours."

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654

EFFECT: As the videoconference equipment was located in the media briefing room in lieu of a Public Information Officer (PIO) from Orange County, the ability of the County and the media to discuss and disseminate accurate information was adversely affected.

The media would have had to contact the Orange County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) directly for information, and would have received information that had not been coordinated through the JNC.

RECOMMENDATION: The videoconference equipment requires two dedicated telephone lines to allow two-way data flow for a video connection. This equipment should have been tested and the link established early for the exercise. When the link does fail to operate, a representative PIO from Orange County should be repositioned to the JNC, or a telephone conference line should be added to the media briefing room.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The videoconferencing system link worked fine during the exercise, enabling the Orange County PIO to participate fully in all the briefings.

Issue No.: 32-02-1.e.1-A-04

CONDITION: The Main Briefing room audio multi-box was non-functional throughout the exercise.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The audio multi-box in the main briefing room had a problem somewhere in the wiring.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, E.5, E.7

EFFECT: The media was unable to gather and transmit good quality audio coming from the microphone located at the front podium. Media personnel were forced to place microphones against speakers for sound. Eventually, additional microphones were added to the podium.

RECOMMENDATION: The multi-box should be tested, repaired, or replaced. A back-up wire from the podium to the rear platform could also be installed, or provide one long enough to run the length of the room, to the rear platform.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: All speakers on the Media Briefing Room dais had individual microphones connected to the room's and the entire JNC's public address system. All worked flawlessly during the exercise.

Issue No.: 32-02-5.a.1-A-05

CONDITION: The EAS messages and the Follow-On-News Bulletins did not provide timely, accurate information to the public. For example, the initial EAS message concluded with the phrase "Stay tuned to this Emergency Alert System station for further information and instructions." Since there was no Follow-On-News Bulletin for airing on the EAS station, and the EAS message did not contain a public inquiry number, the

public would have had to wait two hours and 12 minutes until the second EAS airing at 1226 to receive the public inquiry number and further information and instructions.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The staff developing the EAS messages and Follow-On-News Bulletins most likely did not develop a Follow-On-News Bulletin for the first EAS message since there were no detailed emergency instructions or protective action recommendations in the EAS message, and they did not realize that the EAS message did not include the public inquiry number.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, E.5, 7

EFFECT: The public would have had to wait over two hours before hearing the public inquiry number. This is too long; many members of the public would have had important questions to ask of public safety officials.

RECOMMENDATION: Revise the EAS messages to include the public inquiry telephone number. Provide a Follow-On-News Bulletin for every EAS message. Provide additional training to the personnel who will compose the public information messages so that they will check to make sure that the public inquiry telephone number is broadcast in a timely fashion.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Both EAS messages and the one follow-on news bulletin did include the public inquiry number.

Issue No.: 32-02-5.b.1-A-06

CONDITION: There were major delays between the actual times events occurred and the times that information was given to members of the media during briefings at the Joint News Center. Specific instances are documented in press briefings # 3, 4 & 5.

- The utility spokesperson, who introduced each press briefing, in press briefing # 3 announced at 1256 that a General Emergency (GE) had been declared, but failed to explain the significance of the event. He was followed by the Westchester County spokesperson who began reading EAS message #2 at 1257, describing a Site Area Emergency at the plant. Upon completion, the Westchester County spokesperson did refer to the previously announced GE condition at the plant, but also did not offer an explanation or additional information. Near the conclusion of this briefing, the State of New York spokesperson finally expressed grave concern about the GE, but offered no guidance.
- Press briefing # 4 began at 1356 and continued until 1423. At 1358, the Westchester County spokesperson read EAS message # 3 that had aired at 1318 hours. The message stated that there was no radiation release at the plant. Actually, a radiation release had been detected at the plant at 1354.

- Press briefing # 5 began at 1456 hours. The Westchester County spokesperson announced that EAS Follow-On-News Bulletin # 3, distributed at 1338 hours – an hour and 18 minutes earlier – had inadvertently stated that there had been a radiation release at the plant. The spokesperson asked that persons holding copies of Follow-On-News Bulletin # 3 destroy them, replacing them with “revised” Follow-On-News Bulletin #3. It was later learned that the JNC personnel had been aware of the incorrect bulletin by about 1353, several minutes before press briefing #4 began. However, a decision was made to hold on to the corrected announcement for more than an hour.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: There were instances during the exercise when press briefings were scheduled in order to deliver specific information, but even before the information was delivered to the media, it was being superseded by new and more serious information. Decisions were made to withhold the new information until a later press briefing instead of delaying or interrupting a press briefing in order to disseminate the most current information about conditions and protective actions to the media, and, therefore, the public.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654; E.5, 7.

EFFECT: The delays between the actual times that events occurred and the times that information was given to members of the media during briefings at the Joint News Center resulted in the most urgent and needed information being delayed for up to ninety minutes until the next scheduled press briefing.

RECOMMENDATION: The plan and procedures for conduct of press briefings must be revised to permit the introduction of new information and late-breaking news if it arises shortly before or during briefings. Press briefings should be delayed or interrupted in order to disseminate the most current information and protective actions. In addition, all public information staff, particularly those who would report to the JNC, should be trained on how to manage the situation when there is new information arriving just before or during a press briefing.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: There were two fully staffed briefings and three partial briefings. When the General Emergency ECL arrived, the PIOs discussed and delayed a complete media briefing. Instead, the State PIO announced to the media there was a General Emergency and that the state and counties were working to determine any PADs. The state PIO left the podium and the utility and NRC continued the briefing. Discussions were thorough and in depth.

Issue No.: 32-02-5.b.1-A-07

CONDITION: The Joint News Center personnel used emergency response protective area (ERPA) numbers only in announcing protective action decisions, rather than explaining the ERPAs by geographic descriptions as well.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Since emergency response protective area zone numbers are published and made available to residents living within close proximity to the Indian Point Energy Center, it is assumed that all residents know “their” ERPA number, evacuation route and designated reception center. This is an unrealistic expectation. It also does not take into account how transients are given geographic information.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654; E.5, 7

EFFECT: Using ERPA zone numbers in public information, without giving the appropriate geographical information, could result in confusion on the part of residents and transients and cause them to respond incorrectly to emergency information and emergency instructions.

RECOMMENDATION: Review and revise the plan and procedures for providing protective action decision information to the public in order to clearly identify for residents and transients the area in which they are at the time of the announcement, and the correct protective actions to take at that time from that location. Provide additional training to all public information staff on the revised plan and procedures.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: When ERPAs were used, there were generic references to landmark descriptions given and also references to the brochure where a more complete description is located. In addition, during the media briefings, a large map was visible showing the ERPAs.

Issue No.: 32-02-5.b.1-A-08

CONDITION: There were discrepancies between information in the EAS messages and the Follow-On-News Bulletins as well as missing or incorrect information in the Follow-On-News Bulletins. Specifically:

- EAS message #2 did not list ERPA 9 as evacuating, yet the Follow-On-News Bulletin references the evacuation route for ERPA 9 on page 2.
- EAS message #3 stated that there had not been a release of radioactive materials, while the first issuance of Follow-On-News Bulletin #3 stated that there was a release (see below).
- Follow-On-News Bulletins #'s 3 & 4 did not contain evacuation route instructions for previously evacuated ERPAs that were still under an evacuation directive.

- Follow-On-News Bulletin # 5 stated that all ERPAs in Putnam County were sheltered when all ERPAs in Putnam County were evacuated.
- There was no explanation in any of the Follow-On-News Bulletins that the numbers preceding each paragraph are referring to the ERPA numbers.

The Follow-On-News Bulletin for EAS message # 3 had to be retracted and revised because the Bulletin stated that there had been a radioactive release when there had not been a release. EAS message # 3 was aired (simulated) at 1318; the original Bulletin was faxed (simulated) to the EAS station at 1336. At 1428, the State Public Information Officer (PIO) informed the County PIOs that the first version of the Bulletin contained erroneous information and had been retracted and replaced by a revised Bulletin. At 1501, during briefing # 5, the Westchester County PIO told the media representatives that they were to destroy the originals of the Bulletin and pick up the revised Bulletin. This was too late to prevent confusion on the matter.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The pre-scripted EAS messages do not include the public inquiry telephone number. Also, the persons composing and approving the EAS messages and Follow-On-News Bulletins did not catch the errors and discrepancies noted above.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654; E.5, 7

EFFECT: Potential confusion on the part of the media and the public on (1) what the status of the emergency situation was, (2) how to get additional information via a public inquiry number, and (3) what to do in response to the emergency situation.

RECOMMENDATION: Review and revise the Joint News Center plan and procedures to include revised pre-scripted EAS messages and Follow-On-News Bulletins. The revisions should include necessary information (such as the public inquiry number) and a method to reduce the possibility of discrepancies between the EAS messages and the Follow-On-News Bulletins. One way to do this is to provide a series of pre-scripted EAS messages and Follow-On-News Bulletins that are consistent with each other that would cover a variety of emergency situations and protective responses, as is found in many other radiological plans and procedures for other sites in the country. The current "One Size Fits All" pre-scripted EAS message and Follow-On-News Bulletin included in the JNC plan and procedures is not sufficient. Also, provide additional training to the personnel who will compose and approve the EAS messages and Follow-On-News Bulletins during an exercise or incident.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The two EAS messages and one follow-on message were carefully reviewed and contained accurate information. The public inquiry number was included in all messages.

Issue No.: 32-02-5.b.1-A-09

CONDITION: Personnel at the Joint News Center did not explain the protective action decisions that had been made for residents and transients under the various emergency classification levels (ECLs) that were included in the EAS messages and Follow-On-News Bulletins.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: There may be a misconception among emergency management officials that residents understand emergency classification levels and know exactly what to do when given instructions in an EAS message and/or a Follow-On-News Bulletin, without further explanation provided at the press briefings.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654; E.5, E.7

EFFECT: A failure to completely inform residents and transients of what the emergency classification levels (ECLs) mean, and what protective action decisions are based on the ECLs, could result in the public not following appropriate and timely emergency instructions.

RECOMMENDATION: Review and revise the plan and procedures, and the text of the pre-scripted EAS messages and Follow-On-News Bulletins, to include explanations of the emergency classification levels and what they mean to the public. Provide all public information staff with additional training on the revised plan and procedures.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The protective action decisions and Emergency Classification Levels were clearly discussed in both the media briefings and the press releases.

f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

1.4 Emergency Alert Station - Station WHUD-FM

a. **MET:** 5.a.1

b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE

c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** ONE

Issue No.: 32-04-1.d.1-A-02

CONDITION: WHUD-FM (EAS Radio Station) is on the air 24/7; however, between 7 PM and 12 PM, Monday to Friday, the station utilizes a satellite feed for broadcasting. Accordingly, between those hours, alternate arrangements need to be made to receive and act upon requests to activate the Emergency Alert System.

Calls from the Joint News Center regarding activation of the Emergency Alert System come into the radio station directly to the on-air announcers. Since there are no on-air announcers when there is a satellite feed for programming, the station arranged for the telephone call to roll-over to the on-air announcers at sister station WSPK-FM, which has live programming 24/7. Additionally, a light on a status board indicates that there is a call into the EAS system “hot-line”. The broadcast booth for WSPK is located adjacent to WHUD.

During an exercise test of the rollover feature, an incoming call failed to rollover to the alternate number at WSPK-FM. If this had occurred during the period when there were no on-air announcers at WHUD-FM, the call requesting activation of the Emergency Alert System may have gone unanswered. The Station’s Chief Engineer stated that the telephone system was supposed to have the rollover feature. A call to Verizon verified that the telephone system had the rollover feature inadvertently removed during recent system modifications. The Chief Engineer requested Verizon re-install the rollover feature, which was supposed to be initiated on June 9.

The back-up fax machine used for notification is located in the station’s News Room. This facility is not manned outside of normal business hours and any faxes would not be noticed or responded to, and thus cannot be considered a back-up during off-hours.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The rollover feature of the telephone system was inadvertently canceled during recent system changes.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, F.1.2

EFFECT: A telephone call from the Joint News Center to activate the Emergency Alert System may go unanswered during periods when there is no live on-air programming.

RECOMMENDATION: Reinstall the rollover feature to the telephone system.

Revise Emergency plans at the Joint News Center to include a contingency if a call for EAS activation is not answered. The plans should include the back-up phone number at WSPK-FM and notification calls to the WHUD News Director for fax receipt confirmation.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The issue has been resolved – the Chief Engineer of WHUD contacted Verizon on June 8, 2004 (as soon as the problem was discovered - during the exercise) and requested Verizon reinstall the rollover feature to the telephone system of the station. The State Exercise Director reported on June 10, 2004 that the work had been completed.

- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE

- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

1.5 State of New York Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Center
(Out-of-Sequence at Monroe DOT Facility on June 3, 2004)

- a. **MET: 3.a.1, 6.a.1, 6.b.1**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2. RISK JURISDICTIONS

2.1 ORANGE COUNTY

2.1.1 Orange County - Emergency Operations Center

- a. MET:** 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.c.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 4.a.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1
- b. DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** ONE

Issue No.: 32-04-1.c.1-A-03

CONDITION: The Orange County Attorney released Executive Order (EO) No. 4, which contained erroneous information. The EO stated “due to the reported release of radioactivity into the environment I have determined that the public health, safety, and welfare requires that all persons within the ten-mile Emergency Planning Zone be sheltered in place to minimize the exposure to radiological contaminated air.” EO 4 was faxed to the Joint News Center and posted for the media for about an hour before the New York State Emergency Management Office contacted the Orange County PIO about the error. SEMO recommended that the PIO inform the public by producing a news release that acknowledged the error and that the County Attorney amend the EO.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The County Attorney either was not informed that there was no release or did not realize that a typographical error occurred. This was further complicated by the fact that the EO, though reviewed by the County Executive, was still signed and released.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, G.2

EFFECT: The news media, and possibly the general public, received this EO and would have assumed that a radioactive release had occurred.

RECOMMENDATION: Develop procedures for verification of documents prior to signature and release to the public. Provide additional training on reviewing documents.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The County Attorney issued EO 5, which amended EO 4. EO 5 further stated “that portion of Executive Order No. 4 which referred to a release of radioactivity at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant; said reference in Executive Order No. 4 was solely the result of an inadvertent clerical error.”

- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** ONE

Issue No.: 32-02-5.b.1-A-10

CONDITION: Orange County press releases did not provide telephone numbers for the Public Inquiry Line, JNC-Media Response Desk, and the Orange County PIO.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The public information function at the county emergency operations center was disrupted by failure of the video conference link with the Joint News Center.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c

EFFECT: The news media and general public did not have complete information on who to contact for information on actions in Orange County.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide all public information staff with additional training to ensure that they understand which emergency information numbers should be provided to the media and the public. Develop or revise Standard Operating Procedures for preparing news releases.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The PIO developed/coordinated 13 news releases. Each one of the news releases included a media inquiry telephone number (914 683-8499) and a public inquiry telephone number (914 683-6499). During the media (video conference) briefing, the PIO reiterated these numbers, plus the Orange County telephone number. This corrected this ARCA.

f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.2 Orange County – Warning Point

a. **MET:** 1.a.1, 1.d.1

b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE

c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE

d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE

e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE

f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.3 Orange County – Field Monitoring Teams

- a. MET:** 1.a.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.3
- b. DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.4 Orange County – Backup Alert and Notification *(Out of Sequence on June 8, 2004)*

- a. MET:** 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 5.a.3
- b. DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.5 Orange County – Reception Center *(Newburgh Free Academy Out of Sequence on May 5, 2004)*

- a. MET:** 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 6.a.1
- b. DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.6 Orange County – Congregate Care Center

(American Red Cross Chapter Interview, Out of Sequence on April 12, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 6.c.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.7 Orange County – Transit Dependent Bus Company Interviews

(Out of Sequence with West Point Tours on May 14, 2004 and Bosch & Son, Inc. on May 28, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.8 Orange County - School Bus Company Interviews

(Out-of-sequence with West Point Tours on May 14, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE

- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.9 Orange County - School Interview

(Out-of-sequence at Sacred Heart of Jesus Middle School on April 23, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 3.c.2
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.10 Orange County Medical Drill

(Out-of-sequence at Cornwall Hospital with Cornwall Ambulance Corps on November 13, 2003)

- a. **MET:** 3.a.1, 6.d.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.1.11 Orange County Traffic and Access Control

(Out of Sequence on June 8, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE

- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.2 PUTNAM COUNTY

2.2.1 Putnam County - Emergency Operations Center

- a. **MET:** 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 4.a.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: ONE**

Issue No.: 32-04-2.b.1-A-04

CONDITION: Dose Assessment Staff did not know how to calculate the Total Organ Dose Equivalent (TODE-thyroid) from field measurements. The staff used the wrong data (i.e., particulate reading) to calculate the Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE-thyroid), made mistakes with units, and did not add the Deep Dose Equivalent (DDE) for external exposure to the CDE- thyroid to obtain the TODE-Thyroid. A PAR was not provided.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Staff did not have a basic understanding of the methodology for calculating doses from field measurements.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654 I.8, 10

EFFECT: Inability to make accurate dose calculations may result in development of a protective action recommendation that is not accurate, and is not protective of the general public.

RECOMMENDATION: More extensive training is needed on performing dose calculations using field measurement data.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The Deputy Commissioner of Emergency Services and Dose Assessment Staff participated in a FEMA Staff Assistance Visit on July 27, 2004 with representatives of SEMO. The Dose Assessment Staff demonstrated the ability to calculate Total Organ Dose Equivalent (TODE-Thyroid) from field data.

- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE**

- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2.2 Putnam County Warning Point

- a. **MET:** 1.a.1, 1.d.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** ONE

Issue No.: 32-02-1.a.1-A-11

CONDITION: The initial notification to several county emergency management leaders indicated that a Site Area Emergency (SAE) had been declared; however, this was not correct: at that time an Alert had been declared.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The initial notification to these personnel came from the Warning Point (WP) located in the County Supervisor Dispatch Office. The information provided to them incorrectly called the situation an SAE. This is not consistent with the initial call from the plant's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) over the Radiological Emergency Communications System line (RECS).

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654; E.1, E.2

EFFECT: Emergency workers were given incorrect information and could have made inappropriate decisions.

RECOMMENDATION: County Dispatcher / Communications personnel should participate in additional training with emphasis on accuracy.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Using both an automated computerized notification system and commercial telephones, the communications staff, at 0814, began notification of key county government officials in accordance with established standard operating procedures. Copies of these procedures are kept on file at the CCC and were referred to during the notification. The group notification utilized pagers, cell phones, office and home telephone numbers that were accurate and up to date. Key personnel notified included the Sheriff's duty Sergeant, and the County Executive, Commissioner of the Bureau of Emergency Services, and Deputy Director of Emergency Services.

- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2.3 Putnam County - Field Monitoring Teams

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.3**
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.2.4 Putnam County Backup Alert and Notification *(Out of sequence on April 27, 2004)*

- a. MET: 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 5.a.3**
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.2.5 Putnam County - Reception Center *(Out-of-sequence at Fischer Middle School on May 27, 2004)*

- a. MET: 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 6.a.1**
- b. DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.2.6 Putnam County – School Reception Center

(Out-of-sequence at Kent Elementary School on May 20, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 3.c.2
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2.7 Putnam County - Congregate Care Center

(American Red Cross Chapter Interview, out of sequence on June 6, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 6.c.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2.8 Putnam County – Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Center

(North Highlands Fire Department, out of sequence on November 21, 2002)

- a. **MET:** 3.a.1, 6.a.1, 6.b.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2.9 Putnam County – Transit Dependent Buses

(Out of Sequence on May 27, 2004 with the Haldane Central School District and Putnam Valley School District buses)

- a. **MET:** 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2.10 Putnam County – School Bus Interviews

(Out of sequence on May 20, 2004 with Haldane Central School District and Putnam Valley School District)

- a. **MET:** 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.2.11 Putnam County - School Interviews

(Out-of-sequence at Haldane Central School District, Garrison Union Free District Elementary School and Putnam Valley School District on May 27, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 3.c.2
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE

- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.2.12 Putnam County - Medical MS-1 Drill

(Out-of-sequence at Putnam Hospital and Carmel Ambulance Service on May 13, 2004)

- a. **MET: 3.a.1, 6.d.1**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.2.13 Putnam County – Traffic and Access Control

(Out-of-sequence on April 27, 2004)

- a. **MET: 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.3 ROCKLAND COUNTY

2.3.1 Rockland County - Emergency Operations Center

- a. **MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 4.a.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**

e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: TWO**

Issue No.: 75-00-03-A-11 (1.c.1)

CONDITION: Rockland County did not keep Bergen County abreast of important information and developments. For example, Rockland County did not notify Bergen County that an SAE had been declared until after notifying Bergen that a GE had been declared. Bergen County learned of the SAE only after calling back to Rockland to confirm the GE. In addition, Bergen County was only notified of the first siren activation and EAS message. No notice was given of the final three activations and messages, nor was Bergen County notified of the termination of the radioactive release. (NUREG-0654, A.1.d., 2.a.,b.; *Rockland County REPP*, Procedure RC/BC-1, *Rockland County/Bergen County Liaisons*, Section 5.3.1, *EOC Operations*.)

REASON ARCA UNRESOLVED: Rockland County did not provide information to Bergen County in a timely manner. Information to Bergen County from Rockland County was obtained only in response to direct requests to Rockland County from the Bergen County EOC. The Liaison from the Rockland County Sheriff's Office arrived and immediately stated that he had only been directed to perform this duty 48 hours previously. He further stated that he had received no training for the task he was about to undertake and that he had been told to report to the Bergen County EOC Director who would tell him what to do. Ultimately, the Bergen County EOC Director asked the Rockland County Liaison to call the Rockland County EOC for updates every 15 minutes.

In addition, the Bergen County liaisons within the Rockland County EOC also indicated that they were new to this assignment and unfamiliar with their responsibilities and the plan. For example, the Rockland County Operations Chief had to speak directly to the liaison in Bergen County to pass information to Bergen County, because the liaisons within the Rockland EOC did not know what information to pass on: the decision to activate school reception centers, and congregate care centers (which are in Bergen County) was not communicated to Bergen County.

RECOMMENDATION: Review and revise the Rockland County Plan and Procedures for communication with Bergen County. Review and revise the plan and procedures for Bergen County. Train all personnel who will have duties providing communications between Rockland and Bergen Counties.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The plan/procedures for liaison personnel located in the Bergen County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) have been revised through close coordination with Rockland County Emergency Management. The Radiological Emergency Response Agency Procedure, Rockland County/Bergen County Liaisons, (RC/BC-1) was revised and issued in April 2004. It contains a detailed description of the duties for liaison personnel. The Rockland County liaison person, located in the Bergen County EOC, was very well trained in the listed duties. Through

observation and interview throughout the exercise, it was determined that he had extensive knowledge of the duties for this position, as described in RC/BC-1. All information (siren soundings, Emergency Alerting System messages, press releases, etc.) was conveyed to Bergen County in a timely manner. These actions resolve ARCA 75-00-03-A-11.

Issue No.: 32-02-4.a.2-A-12

CONDITION: Field Monitoring Team #1 was not informed of key information in accordance with Radiological Emergency Response Agency Procedure, DOH-7, "Field Monitoring Team Coordinator," Section 5.4.9.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Periodic contacts with Field Monitoring Team #1 did not request acknowledgement from the team that appropriate information designated in the procedure was received.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, I.8., 11

EFFECT: Information related to protective actions taken is essential for field teams supporting plume tracking, contamination control, and management of radiological exposures.

RECOMMENDATION: EOC staff involved in transmission of information to field teams should carefully follow the designated procedure and request acknowledgements from field teams that they are aware of prescribed information affecting field activities.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Both FMTs were kept informed of changing conditions at IPEC and the current meteorology. At 1020, the FTC updated both FMTs by radio on current meteorological conditions and the status of IPEC. At intervals of approximately 15 minute, the FMC reminded the FMTs to check their DRDs. At 1410, the FMC read Radiological Emergency Communication System (RECS) Message #23 to the FMTs. The time denoted on Message #23 was 1358 and provided an update of current meteorological conditions, status of IPEC, information that there were no off-site protective action recommendations, and reiterated that an emergency classification level of Site Area Emergency had been declared by IPEC at 0924. At 1414, RECS Message #24 was received by the dose assessment team. At 1424, the FTC read this message to the FMTs. The message stated that an emergency classification level of General Emergency had been declared by IPEC at 1414 and provided an updated status of IPEC, meteorological conditions, and identified the off-site protective action recommendations. This resolves Issue Number 32-02-4.a.2-A-12.

f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.3.2 Rockland County – Warning Point

- a. **MET:** 1.a.1, 1.d.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.3.3 Rockland County - Field Monitoring Teams

- a. **MET:** 1.a.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.3
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** ONE

Issue No.: 32-02-4.a.3-A-13

CONDITION: After completing the air sample with the Air Sampler H-809C, a field team member placed the uncovered filter and cartridge on the radiator grill area adjacent to the battery, causing cross contamination from the vehicle surface to the filter and cartridge.

Through interview, the team simulated moving to a low background area to survey the filter and cartridge. A team member placed the Ludlum 14C survey instrument (pancake probe) directly on the contaminated filter and cartridge while surveying the samples.

The Air Sampler H-809C and the Eberline RO-2A were placed in the same plastic bag as was used for personal protective clothing and equipment.

Though the filter and cartridge samples were properly bagged and labeled, they were placed in the field team kit without being monitored.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The Rockland County Emergency Preparedness Radiological Response Plan and support procedures did not adequately address contamination control of samples during collection and transfer. The instrumentation operation procedures

within the plan did not adequately detail contamination control procedures with regards to instrument usage and storage during field operations.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, I.9

EFFECT: The lack of contamination control in the control and transfer of field samples could result in the Field Monitoring Team relaying incorrect exposure information to Dose Assessment at the EOC, thus altering the Rockland County Protective Action Decisions.

RECOMMENDATION: Additional training of the Field Monitoring Team and further clarification of the sampling and contamination reduction procedures should be considered. The Field Team Procedures and other portions of the field kit should not be placed on the ground or under the hood during sampling. To reduce general cross contamination during field operations, the team should place the air sampler and the Eberline RO-2A in separate individual plastic bags.

The Air Sampler H-809C, Ludlum 14C, and Eberline RO-2A survey techniques contained in the Rockland County Emergency Preparedness Radiological Response Plan Standard Operating Procedures (DOH 11, Attachment 4, pp. 11-13) should be updated to include detailed information on general field team and instrument specific cross-contamination techniques.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The members of Rockland County Field Monitoring Team 2 exhibited good contamination control procedures. The probe of the counting instrument (Ludlum 14C) was encased in thin plastic and changed after each use. Team members constantly changed their gloves after handling potentially contaminated equipment. The air sampler was placed on a clean plastic bag on the tailgate of the vehicle in a low background area while the sample was being counted. The plastic bags containing the samples were monitored prior to placing them in the vehicle. The instrument was placed in a “dirty” bag for transport.

f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.3.4 Rockland County - Reception Center

(Out-of-sequence at Spring Valley High School on November 25, 2002 and Chestnut Ridge Junior High School on October 7, 2003)

a. **MET:** NONE

b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE

c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** TWO

Issue No.: 32-04-3.a.1-A-05

CONDITION: Some of the newer members of the Spring Valley Volunteer Fire Department assigned to vehicle monitoring were not knowledgeable on the proper use of dosimetry.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Unfamiliarity with procedures.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, K.3

EFFECT: Possible inability to keep track of their exposure to radioactive materials.

RECOMMENDATION: Additional training on the correct dosimetry procedures needs to be provided to members of the Spring Valley Volunteer Fire Department.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The proper use of dosimetry was demonstrated at Chestnut Ridge Junior High School on October 7, 2003.

Issue No.: 32-04-6.a.1-A-06

CONDITION: The registrars for the Chestnut Ridge Junior High School were not as knowledgeable about what happens to an evacuee after being registered. They were unclear on (1) which congregate care centers were available and therefore could not tell the evacuee where he would be taken, (2) what to do about a dog that was left behind, and (3) how missing medications would be obtained for evacuees. Since this is the type of information that evacuees will be seeking, it is important for the registrars to have this information provided to them.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The Department of Social Services has not received recent training in the registration process for reception centers.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, J.10.h

EFFECT: The evacuees would have been unable to get the information that they needed.

RECOMMENDATION: Additional training of the Rockland County Department of Social Services is given to those personnel who would be assisting at Reception Centers.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The Rockland County Department of Social Services demonstrated knowledge on the processing of evacuees at the Tappan Zee High School Reception Center on April 29, 2004.

d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE

- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.3.5 Rockland County - Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Center
(Out-of-sequence at the County Sewer District offices on May 18, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 3.a.1, 6.b.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** ONE

Issue No.: 32-04-6.a.1-A-07

CONDITION: Failure to properly monitor contaminated individual. The monitor of the male contaminated individual failed to monitor the front and back of the torso or the soles of the shoes. After showering, the emergency worker was re-monitored using the same improper technique.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Inadequate training.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, K.5.b

EFFECT: By failing to monitor the torso (front and back) and soles of the feet the contaminated individual could have remained contaminated after the removal of the detected contamination. He could have spread this undetected contamination to clean areas and individuals with resultant adverse health effects to them and himself.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide retraining on proper monitoring techniques.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The proper technique to monitor a contaminated individual was explained to the monitor. Proper monitoring technique was demonstrated on another individual.

- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.3.6 Rockland County – Transit Dependent Bus Company Interviews
(Out of sequence at Haverstraw Transit Company on April 29, 2004 and Clarkstown Central School District on May 27, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1

- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.3.7 Rockland County – Special Population Bus Run
(Out of sequence Chestnut Ridge Bus Company on June 8, 2004)

- a. **MET: 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.3.8 Rockland County - School Bus Company Interviews
(Out of sequence at Haverstraw Transit on April 29, 2004)

- a. **MET: 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

2.3.9 Rockland County - School Interviews

(Out-of-sequence at West Haverstraw School on June 6, 2004; Liberty Elementary School on June 3, 2004; Grandview Elementary School on June 4, 2004; New City Elementary School on June 4, 2004; and Robin Hill Nursery School on June 4, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 3.c.2
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.3.10 Rockland County –Medical Drill

(Out of sequence with Good Samaritan Hospital and South Orangetown Ambulance Corps on May 14, 2003)

- a. **MET:** 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 6.d.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.3.11 Rockland County -Traffic and Access Control

(Out of sequence on June 8, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE

- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.4 WESTCHESTER COUNTY

2.4.1 Westchester County - Emergency Operations Center

- a. **MET:** 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 4.a.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** ONE

Issue No.: 32-04-1.a.1-A-08

CONDITION: At 1006 the EOC was declared operational. Unfortunately most of the dose assessment staff did not receive the automated calls and were not present. They had been left off the list. At the time the EOC was declared fully operational no one checked with dose assessment to see if there were sufficient staff for that function.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The automated telephone alerting system was incomplete and most of the dose assessment staff was not notified. In addition, the dose assessment room in the EOC was not checked to ensure that all functions were staffed.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654 E.1, E.2, H.4

EFFECT: Dose assessment reports and recommendations expected to help determine emergency response would be unavailable and alternates from other locations would not have been prepared promptly, delaying emergency decisions.

RECOMMENDATION: Check automated phone list to ensure that all necessary staff have been included. Test the response to a call out periodically. In addition, someone should be responsible for checking with personnel in each room of the EOC to ensure that they are sufficiently staffed to be operational.

CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN: This issue has been resolved – the Health Department has updated its automated telephone notification system and has instituted a new, internal notification system for the personnel who will be used to augment the telephone notification system. Procedures have also been revised to provide guidelines on declaring the EOC operational. These actions were confirmed in writing on September 30, 2004 by the County Department of Emergency Services and in a meeting on October 20, 2004 with the State and County. The revised notification system will be demonstrated in the next evaluated drill or exercise.

- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE

- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.4.2 Westchester County – Warning Point

- a. **MET:** 1.a.1, 1.d.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.4.3 Westchester County - Field Monitoring Teams

- a. **MET:** 1.a.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** TWO

Issue No.: 32-04-4.a.3-A-09

CONDITION: Contamination control measures were inadequate to preclude the potential for cross-contamination of sample media. Although two pairs of gloves (polyvinyl chloride and latex) were worn, they were not changed during the entire time that the team member handled the sample pump, the sampling head, the two components of the sample (i. e. the particulate filter and the radioiodine collection cartridge) as they were inserted into the sample holder, and the sample media as they were being bagged. Second, the sample media were counted in the vehicle's area of greatest contamination potential (on the floor, just inside the sliding side doors of the van). Third, the contaminated waste materials bag was positioned so that potentially contaminated materials (shoe covers, gloves, wipes, etc) would pass directly over the area where the sample media were counted. Fourth, no checks of the vehicle, equipment, or persons for contamination were made during the entire sampling operations. At one point, potentially contaminated gloves were laid on the seat above the sample counting area without first being checked for contamination and, at another, the particulate filter was dropped onto the contaminated floor and then picked up and placed in the sample envelope without monitoring of the floor or consideration of whether that filter should be discarded and another sample taken.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Over-emphasis on the need for speedy field team-generated information and under-emphasis on need for contamination control during sample collection and counting sequences in Westchester County plans and field monitoring procedures together with resulting lack of sufficient training in the area of sample contamination control.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, I.9

EFFECT: Cross-contamination or artificial contamination of air sample filter media can result in significant error in the estimation of plume radioactivity. Counting results are used to formulate protective action recommendations; therefore, overestimation or underestimation of plume radioactivity can have significant consequences on estimated dose and actions prescribed for public safety.

RECOMMENDATION: Emphasize in existing procedures and training the need for high quality contamination control practices with regard to maintaining plume air sample integrity.

CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN: This issue has been resolved – the Health Department has revised its procedures to emphasize contamination control practices and to specifically include the changing of gloves after the air sample is brought back to the vehicle and before the air sample reading is taken. The field teams will be trained in these revised procedures. These actions were confirmed in writing on September 30, 2004 by the County Department of Emergency Services and in a meeting on October 20, 2004 with the State and County. The revised procedures will be demonstrated in the next evaluated drill or exercise.

Issue No.: 32-04-4.a.3-A-10

CONDITION: Monitoring of the radiation field during (or at the beginning and end of) air sample collection was not accomplished.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The field monitoring instructions call for field measurements to be made only prior to taking an air sample.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, I.9

EFFECT: The Dose Assessment Center may make protective action recommendations based on imperfect data coming from the field. Effective collection of an air sample must include the assurance that the equipment actually sampled the plume from beginning to end of the sampling period. If the plume passes or diminishes (or increases) in strength during the sampling period, plume strength can be significantly under- or over-estimated. Because protective action recommendations are formulated on the basis of field air sampling results, impact on the public may be potentially significant.

RECOMMENDATION: Change field procedures to include a procedure requirement to monitor ambient radiation conditions during, or immediately before and after, collection of air samples and train team members in the purpose and application of the requirement. This would indicate whether or not the plume had passed during the time of air sampling activities.

CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN: This issue has been resolved – the Health Department has revised its procedures to include instructions to leave the RO-20 meter turned on throughout the air sampling process. The field teams will be trained in these revised procedures. These actions were confirmed in writing on September 30, 2004 by the County Department of Emergency Services and in a meeting on October 20, 2004 with the State and County. The revised procedures will be demonstrated in the next evaluated drill or exercise.

- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.4.4 Westchester County - Reception Centers

(Out-of-sequence at HC Crittenden Middle School on April 7 and 8, 2004 and White Plains High School on April 16, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 6.a.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.4.5 Westchester County - Congregate Care Center

(Out-of-sequence at American Red Cross Chapter on May 25, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 6.c.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE

- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.4.6 Westchester County – Transit Dependent Buses

(Out of sequence on May 18, 2004 with Liberty Lines Bus Company)

- a. **MET:** 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.4.7 Westchester County - School Bus Company Interviews

(Out-of-sequence at the Ardsley Bus Company, Briarcliff Manor School District, Chappaqua Bus Company, County Coach Bus Company, Croton Harmon School District, Hendrick Hudson School District, Lakeland, Liberty Lines, Miles Square, Royal Coach Bus Company, Super Trans Bus Company, TFD Bus Company and White Plains Bus Company on December 17, 2002 and May 4, 5, 13, 18, 19, 20, 25, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 3.b.1, 3.c.2
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** ONE

Issue No.: 32-04-3.a.1-A-11

CONDITION: Bus Drivers and Dispatchers from Super Trans and TFD had very little knowledge on dosimetry instructions, procedures and equipment for emergency workers.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Lack of training.

REFERENCE: E.7, J.9, 10.c.d.e.g

EFFECT: Inability of emergency workers to properly protect themselves from exposure to radiation.

RECOMMENDATION: More training is required on the County's dosimetry procedures and use of equipment for emergency worker protection.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The proper use and care of dosimetry was explained to the drivers and dispatchers after the interviews were completed. The drivers and dispatchers then demonstrated their understanding of the proper use and care of dosimetry. In addition, this issue did not arise in the interviews with the other bus companies.

- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.4.8 Westchester County - School Interviews

(Out-of-sequence at Briarcliff Middle School; Brookside Elementary School; French Hill Elementary School; Furnace Woods Elementary School; Lincoln-Titus Elementary School; Pierre Van Cortlandt Middle School; Seven Bridges Middle School; Peekskill High School, Yorktown Christian Academy, and Yorktown Heights Tech Center on May 3, 4, 5, 18, 19, 20, 27, 2004, and July 27, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 3.c.2
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE
- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:** NONE

2.4.9 Westchester County - Traffic and Access Control

(Out of sequence with the Westchester County Police on June 8, 2004)

- a. **MET:** 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1
- b. **DEFICIENCY:** NONE
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:** NONE
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED:** NONE
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED:** NONE

- f. **PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE**

3. SUPPORT JURISDICTION

3.1 Bergen County - Emergency Operations Center

- a. **MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1**
- b. **DEFICIENCY: NONE**
- c. **AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE**
- d. **NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE**
- e. **PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE**
- f. **PRIOR ARCAs – UNRESOLVED: NONE**

APPENDIX 1. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations that were used in this report.

ACP	Access Control Point
ARC	American Red Cross
ARCA	Area Requiring Corrective Action
ARES	Amateur Radio Emergency Service
BOCES	Board of Cooperative Educational Services
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CPM	Counts Per Minute
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DOH	Department of Health
DOT	U.S. Department of Transportation
EAL	Emergency Action Level
EAS	Emergency Alert System
ECL	Emergency Classification Level
EMS	Emergency Medical Service
EMO	Emergency Management Organization
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
ERPA	Emergency Response Planning Area
EWPMC	Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Center
FDA	U.S. Food and Drug Administration
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GE	General Emergency
ICF	ICF Consulting, Inc.
IPNPS	Indian Point Nuclear Power Station
JNC	Joint News Center
KI	Potassium Iodide
MIDAS	Meteorology Information and Dose Assessment System
mR	MilliRoentgen
MRP-DAS	Meteorological Radiological Plant Data System

NOUE	Notification of Unusual Event
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NUREG-0654	
NYS	New York State
NYSEMO	New York State Emergency Management Office
OCEOC	Orange County Emergency Operations Center
ORO	Offsite Response Organization
PAR	Protective Action Recommendation
PCEOC	Putnam County Emergency Operations Center
PIO	Public Information Officer
PMC	Personnel Monitoring Center
PSC	New York State Public Service Commission
RAC	Regional Assistance Committee
RACES	Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service
RCEOC	Rockland County Emergency Operations Center
REA	Radiological Emergency Treatment Area
RECS	Radiological Emergency Communications System
REP	Radiological Emergency Preparedness
REPP	Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan
RERP	Radiological Emergency Response Plan
RETA	Radiological Emergency Treatment Area
SAE	Site Area Emergency
SEMO	State Emergency Management Office
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
TCP	Traffic Control Point
TDD	Telephone Device for the Deaf
TEDE	Total Effective Dose
TL	Team Leader
TLD	Thermoluminescent Dosimeter
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
WCEOC	Westchester County Emergency Operations Center

APPENDIX 2. EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Indian Point 3 exercise on June 8, 2004. Evaluator Team Leaders are indicated by the letters "(TL)" after their names. The organization which each evaluator represents is indicated by the following abbreviations:

DOT	- Department of Transportation
EPA	- Environmental Protection Agency
FEMA	- Federal Emergency Management Agency
ICF	- ICF Consulting
NRC	- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
USDA	- US Department of Agriculture

POSITION	NAME	ORGANIZATION
RAC Chairperson	R. Reynolds	FEMA
Project Officer	R. Thomson	FEMA

EVALUATION SITE	EVALUATOR	ORGANIZATION
------------------------	------------------	---------------------

New York State

Emergency Operations Center (EOC)	L. De Marco	FEMA (TL)
	M. Campbell	ICF
	W. Vocke	ICF
	N. Johnson	ICF
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)	R. Black	ICF
Joint News Center (JNC)	J. Young	FEMA (TL)
	D. Jacks	FEMA
	P. Nied	ICF
	M. Meshenberg	ICF
EAS Station	G. Goldberg	ICF

**EVALUATION SITE
RISK JURISDICTIONS****EVALUATOR****ORGANIZATION****Orange County**

Orange County EOC

B. Hasemann

FEMA (TL)

H. Harrison

ICF

P. Malool

FEMA

R. Graham

USDA

Warning Point

R. Fernandez

ICF

Field Monitoring Team

N. Gaeta

ICF

J. Staroba

ICF

Route Alerting

J. Jackson

ICF

Putnam County

Putnam County EOC

R. Fox

FEMA (TL)

D. Blunt

ICF

R. Echavarria

FEMA

Warning Point

R. Smith

ICF

Field Monitoring Team

H. Berry

ICF

D. Schweller

ICF

Rockland County

Rockland County EOC

K. Reed

FEMA (TL)

D. Thome

ICF

W. Cullen

FEMA

M. Weston

FEMA

Warning Point

A. Davis

FEMA

Field Monitoring Team

J. Eng

EPA

R. Bernacki

FDA

Traffic Control Point

D. Goldbloom-
Helzner

ICF

EVALUATION SITE	EVALUATOR	ORGANIZATION
Westchester County		
Westchester County EOC	R. Poole J. Keller D. Petta S. Nelson	FEMA (TL) ICF USDOT ICF
Warning Point	A. Fernandez	ICF
Field Monitoring Team	E. Simpson L. Slagle	EPA ICF
Traffic Control Points	M. Santiago	FEMA
Bergen County		
Bergen County EOC	H. Christansen R. Ohlsen	ICF (TL) FEMA
Orange County		
Sacred Heart of Jesus Middle School (April 23, 2004)	R. Thomson W. Cullen	FEMA FEMA
West Point Tours GP and School Bus Interviews (May, 14, 2004)	B. Hasemann D. Schweller	FEMA ICF
Newburgh Free Academy Reception Center (May 20, 2004))	J. Keller D. Schweller	ICF ICF
Bosch Tours School Bus and Transit Dependent Interviews (May 28, 2004)	B. Hasemann	FEMA
Medical Drill - Cornwall Ambulance & Hospital (November 13, 2003)	W. Cullen J. Keller	FEMA ICF
Congregate Care Center ARC Interview (April 12, 2004)	J. Keller	ICF

EVALUATION SITE	EVALUATOR	ORGANIZATION
Putnam County		
Traffic Control and Route Alerting (April 27, 2004)	J. Keller	ICF
Medical Drill - Carmel Ambulance and Putnam Hospital (May 13, 2004)	R. Fox D. Schweller	FEMA ICF
Haldane GP and School Bus Interview (May 20, 2004)	R. Reynolds D. Schweller	FEMA ICF
Putnam Valley GP and School Bus Interview (May 20, 2004)	R. Reynolds D. Schweller	FEMA ICF
Kent Elementary School Reception Center (May 20, 2004)	R. Reynolds D. Schweller	FEMA ICF
Putnam Valley School District School Bus & Transit Dependent Bus Interview (May 20, 2004)	R. Reynolds D. Schweller	FEMA ICF
Haldane School District Interview (May 27, 2004)	S. Nelson	ICF
Garrison Elementary School Interview (May 27, 2004)	S. Nelson	ICF
Fisher Middle School Reception Center (May 27, 2004)	J. Keller S. Nelson	ICF ICF
Congregate Care Center – ARC Interview (June 22, 2004)	B. Hasemann	FEMA
Rockland County		
Haverstraw Transit Bus Interview (April 29, 2004)	J. Keller D. Schweller	ICF ICF
Tappan Zee High School Reception Center Registration (April 29, 2004)	J. Keller	ICF
Spring Valley High School Reception Center (November 25, 2002)	B. Hasemann	FEMA

EVALUATION SITE	EVALUATOR	ORGANIZATION
Chestnut Ridge Reception Center (October 7, 2003)	R. Reynolds R. Thomson	FEMA FEMA
Sewer District Emergency Worker PMC (May 18, 2004)	J. Keller D. Schweller	ICF ICF
Clarkstown School District and GP Bus (May 27, 2004)	B. Hasemann M. Santiago	FEMA FEMA
West Haverstraw School Interview (June 1, 2004)	W. Cullen M. Santiago	FEMA FEMA
Liberty Elementary School Interview (June 3, 2004)	W. Cullen M. Santiago	FEMA FEMA
Grandview Elementary School Interview (June 4, 2004)	W. Cullen M. Santiago	FEMA FEMA
New City Elementary School Interview (June 4, 2004)	W. Cullen M. Santiago	FEMA FEMA
Robin Hill School Interview (June 4, 2004)	W. Cullen M. Santiago	FEMA FEMA
Chestnut Ridge General Population Bus Run (June 8, 2004)	D. Goldblum-Helzner	ICF
Westchester County		
HC Crittenden Middle School Reception Center - Outside (April 7, 2004)	W. Cullen J. Keller	FEMA ICF
HC Crittenden Middle School Reception Center - Inside (April 8, 2004)	W. Cullen J. Keller	FEMA ICF
Pierre Van Cortlandt Middle School Interview (May 3, 2004)	R. Reynolds W. Cullen	FEMA FEMA
Brookside Elementary School Interview (May 3, 2004)	R. Reynolds W. Cullen	FEMA FEMA
Yorktown Heights Tech Center	R. Reynolds	FEMA

EVALUATION SITE	EVALUATOR	ORGANIZATION
Interview (May 3, 2004)	W. Cullen	FEMA
Briarcliff Middle School Interview (June 4, 2004)	R. Reynolds W. Cullen	FEMA FEMA
Lakeland School Bus Interview (May 5, 2004)	W. Cullen S. Nelson	FEMA ICF
Hendrick Hudson School Bus Interview (May 5, 2004)	W. Cullen S. Nelson	FEMA ICF
Yorktown Christian Academy (May 5, 2004)	W. Cullen S. Nelson	FEMA ICF
Liberty Lines GP Bus Interview (May 13, 2004)	R. Thomson B. Hasemann	FEMA FEMA
White Plains School Bus Interview (May 18, 2004)	R. Thomson W. Cullen	FEMA FEMA
Royal Coach School Bus Interview (May 18, 2004)	R. Thomson W. Cullen	FEMA FEMA
French Hill Elementary School (May 18, 2004)	R. Thomson W. Cullen	FEMA FEMA
Ardsley School Bus Interview (May 19, 2004)	R. Thomson W. Cullen	FEMA FEMA
County Coach School Bus Interview (May 19, 2004)	R. Thomson W. Cullen	FEMA FEMA
Lincoln-Titus Elementary School (May 19, 2004)	R. Thomson W. Cullen	FEMA FEMA
Miles Square School Bus Interview (May 20, 2004)	R. Thomson W. Cullen	FEMA FEMA
Furnace Woods Elementary School (May 20, 2004)	R. Thomson W. Cullen	FEMA FEMA
Super Trans School Bus Interview (May 25, 2004)	B. Hasemann R. Reynolds	FEMA FEMA
TFD School Bus Interview	B. Hasemann	FEMA

EVALUATION SITE

(May 25, 2004)

EVALUATOR

R. Reynolds

ORGANIZATION

FEMA

ARC-Congregate Care Interview

(May 25, 2004)

B. Hasemann

R. Reynolds

FEMA

FEMA

Seven Bridges Middle School

(May 27, 2004)

J. Keller

ICF

Peekskill High School

(May 27, 2004)

J. Keller

ICF

Westchester County PD TCP

(June 8, 2004)

M. Santiago


FEMA

APPENDIX 3. EXERCISE OBJECTIVES & EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT

This appendix lists the exercise evaluation area criteria that were scheduled for demonstration in the Indian Point Energy Center exercise on June 8, 2004 and the extent of play agreement approved by FEMA Region II.

The exercise evaluation area criteria, contained in the “FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology”, 66 FR 47525, September 12, 2001, represent a functional translation of the planning standards and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, “Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,” November 1980.

Because the exercise evaluation area criteria are intended for use at all nuclear power plant sites, and because of variations among offsite plans and procedures, an extent of play agreement is prepared by the State and approved by FEMA to provide evaluators with guidance on expected actual demonstration of the evaluation area criteria.



**FINAL
OFFSITE EXTENT-OF-PLAY
FOR THE JUNE 8, 2004
INDIAN POINT
ENERGY CENTER – UNIT 3
FULL-PARTICIPATION EXERCISE**

EXTENT-OF-PLAY GROUND RULES

- REAL LIFE EMERGENCIES TAKE PRIORITY OVER EXERCISE PLAY.
- The Scenario Development Team will develop the free play messages. The State Controller will inject the message to the County Emergency Management Director or his designee for action. A control cell will inject free play messages via telephone to the lead law enforcement agency in each Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to test the procedures for removal of traffic impediments.
- The Scenario Development Team will develop free play messages for Public Inquiry at the JNC. Public Inquiry messages will be injected at the JNC by a control cell.
- The State Controller will inject radiological data for any radiological field activities (e.g., Field Teams, Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Centers, Reception Centers, etc.).
- According to REP Program Strategic Review Initiative 1.5, “During tabletop exercises, drills and other demonstrations conducted out-of-sequence from an integrated exercise, if FEMA and the offsite response organizations (ORO) agree, the FEMA Evaluator may have the participants re-demonstrate an activity that is determined to be not satisfactorily demonstrated. Immediate correction of issues in an integrated exercise is authorized only if it would not be disruptive and interrupt the flow of the exercise and affect other Evaluation Areas.” This initiative is not applicable to EOC/JNC/EOF demonstrations during the June 8, 2004 exercise.
- The following criteria, which deal with ingestion pathway, relocation, re-entry and return, post-plume phase and lab operations, will not be demonstrated:
 - 2.d.1
 - 2.e.1
 - 3.e.1
 - 3.e.2
 - 3.f.1
 - 4.b.1
 - 4.c.1
- Additionally, criterion 5.a.2 for the activation of the prompt alert and notification system will not be demonstrated.
- Shift changes will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.a – Mobilization

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)

WARNING POINTS

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

The latest quarterly revised call lists will be provided at the Federal/State evaluators briefing session the day before the exercise, if requested by FEMA. The lists will contain the business telephone numbers only.

Informational inject messages may be introduced at the Warning Points but will not be evaluated.

EOCs

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

State liaisons will be pre-positioned in the area and will arrive at County EOCs 30 minutes after receiving notification to activate via pager or other means.

Licensee Technical Liaisons will be pre-positioned and will arrive at the State and county EOCs 30 minutes after receiving notification to activate via pager or other means.

EOF

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

State liaisons will be pre-positioned in the area and will arrive at the EOF 30 minutes after receiving notification to activate via pager or other means.

JNC

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

Orange County will utilize a videoconferencing link from the County EOC to the JNC. A member of the State JNC staff will act as liaison between the Orange County PIO at the County EOC and other agencies at the JNC.

State and Westchester, Rockland and Putnam County JNC staffs will be pre-positioned in the area. County JNC staffs will arrive at the JNC no sooner than 20 minutes after receiving notification to activate via pager or other means. State JNC Staff will be pre-positioned in the area and will arrive at the JNC no sooner than 30 minutes after receiving notification to activate via pager or other means.

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.b – Facilities

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654, H.3)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

This criterion will not be evaluated since no new facility will be utilized and there have been no significant changes to existing facilities since the last evaluation in 2002.

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a., b.)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

The State Controller will inject free play messages to the County Emergency Management Director or designee for action.

A control cell will inject free play messages via telephone to the lead law enforcement agency in each county EOC to test the procedures for removal of traffic impediments.

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.d – Communications Equipment

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1, 2).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

The use of RACES as a back up to commercial telephones or radios will be demonstrated between the State and four Risk County EOCs only.

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

Sub-element 1.e – Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; J.10.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

Maps and displays will vary with each facility and may include printouts and listings.

The instruments that are used for field monitoring are the RO-20 or RO-2A (Gamma and Beta-mR/hr or R/hr) or equivalent and RM-14 (Gamma and Beta – CPM) or equivalent.

Field team equipment is calibrated by IPEC's RP Department. An internal IPEC requirement provides for calibration of this equipment every six months. Therefore, the calibration sticker for this equipment shows a "calibration due date" which reflects the six month calibration schedule. The instruments are considered calibrated as long as the current date is within one year of the calibration date.

No equipment (e.g., barriers, traffic cones, signs, etc.) will be deployed to the field, except as specified in this Extent-of-Play Agreement (See criterion 3.d.2)

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.a – Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, J.10.e, f; K.4)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the OROs' plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections,

as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, I.8, 10 and Supplement 3).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

In the event of a simulated radiological release, the licensee field teams will provide plume centerline data.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.f, m).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

An alternate to the Executive Hotline may be used to coordinate protective action decisions (PADs) among the Risk Counties and State.

EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING

Sub-element 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.d, e)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the OROs' plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.a – Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the OROs' plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION**Sub-element 3.b – Implementation of KI Decision**

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained. (NUREG-0654, J.10. e)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

All activities will be based on the OROs' plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.

The post distribution of KI to the public will also be discussed at reception centers when demonstrated as per the Offsite Extent-of-Play Activities Schedule.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION**Sub-element 3.c – Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations**

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g).

EOC ACTIVITIES**TRANSPORTATION DEPENDENT POPULATION****Extent-of-Play Agreement:**

During the June 8, 2004 exercise, there will be initial contact with the transportation providers (telephone call) by the Transportation Coordinator. Initial contacts will be actual and some follow-up contacts may be simulated. All calls will be logged at each EOC.

NOTIFICATION OF HEARING IMPAIRED

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

Jurisdiction	Extent-of-Play	In Sequence With Exercise	Out of Sequence; Day of Exercise	Out of Sequence; NOT Day of Exercise	Comments
Westchester County	<p>The hearing-impaired list will be available for review at the county EOC. This list will be reviewed but not copied or retained by the Federal evaluator.</p> <p>The procedure to contact hearing-impaired individuals will be discussed with the federal evaluator at the EOC.</p>	X			
Rockland County	<p>The hearing-impaired list will be available for review at the county EOC. This list will be reviewed but not copied or retained by the Federal evaluator.</p> <p>The procedure to contact hearing-impaired individuals will be discussed with the federal evaluator at the EOC.</p>	X			
Orange County	<p>The hearing-impaired list will be available for review at the county EOC. This list will be reviewed but not copied or retained by the Federal evaluator.</p> <p>The procedure to contact hearing-impaired individuals will be discussed with the federal evaluator at the EOC.</p>		X		

Jurisdiction	Extent-of-Play	In Sequence With Exercise	Out of Sequence; Day of Exercise	Out of Sequence; NOT Day of Exercise	Comments
Putnam County	<p>The hearing-impaired list will be available for review at the county EOC. This list will be reviewed but not copied or retained by the Federal evaluator.</p> <p>The procedure to contact hearing-impaired individuals will be discussed with the federal evaluator at the EOC.</p>	X			

NON-INSTITUTIONALIZED MOBILITY IMPAIRED INDIVIDUALS

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

Jurisdiction	Extent-of-Play	In Sequence With Exercise	Out of Sequence; Day of Exercise	Out of Sequence; NOT Day of Exercise	Comments
Westchester County	<p>The list of non-institutionalized mobility-impaired will be available for review at the county EOC. This list will be reviewed but not copied or retained by the Federal evaluator.</p> <p>The procedure to contact non-institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals will be discussed with the federal evaluator at the EOC.</p>	X			

Jurisdiction	Extent-of-Play	In Sequence With Exercise	Out of Sequence; Day of Exercise	Out of Sequence; NOT Day of Exercise	Comments
Rockland County	<p>The list of non-institutionalized mobility-impaired will be available for review at the county EOC. This list will be reviewed but not copied or retained by the Federal evaluator.</p> <p>The procedure to contact non-institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals will be discussed with the federal evaluator at the EOC.</p>	X			
Orange County	<p>The list of non-institutionalized mobility-impaired will be available for review at the county EOC. This list will be reviewed but not copied or retained by the Federal evaluator.</p> <p>The procedure to contact non-institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals will be discussed with the federal evaluator at the EOC.</p>		X		
Putnam County	<p>The list of non-institutionalized mobility-impaired will be available for review at the county EOC. This list will be reviewed but not copied or retained by the Federal evaluator.</p> <p>The procedure to contact non-institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals will be discussed with the federal evaluator at the EOC.</p>	X			

SPECIAL FACILITIES

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

During the exercise, there will be initial contact with the special facilities (telephone call). Initial contacts will be actual and some follow-up contacts may be simulated. All calls will be logged at each EOC.

FIELD ACTIVITIES

EVACUATION OF TRANSPORTATION DEPENDENT POPULATION

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

Jurisdiction	Extent-of-Play	In Sequence With Exercise	Out of Sequence; Day of Exercise	Out of Sequence; NOT Day of Exercise	Comments
Westchester County	Bus companies will be interviewed prior to the June 8, 2004 exercise as per the Offsite Extent-of-Play Activities Schedule. Each company will provide a dispatcher and 5-10% (dependent on company's size) of that company's drivers for interviews. A State Controller will provide the bus routes to be discussed to the dispatcher for the briefing of drivers.			X	Group interviews requested.

Jurisdiction	Extent-of-Play	In Sequence With Exercise	Out of Sequence; Day of Exercise	Out of Sequence; NOT Day of Exercise	Comments
Rockland County	Bus companies will be interviewed prior to the June 8, 2004 exercise as per the Offsite Extent-of-Play Activities Schedule. Each company will provide a dispatcher and 5 -10% (dependent on company's size) of that company's drivers for interviews. A State Controller will provide the bus routes to be discussed to the dispatcher for the briefing of drivers.		X		Group interviews requested
	One (1) bus route will be driven. The bus company and route to be driven will be determined prior to the demonstration. A vehicle with appropriate communications capability may be utilized in lieu of a bus.			X	
Orange County	Bus companies will be interviewed, procedures will be reviewed and equipment will be inspected. Each company will provide a dispatcher and at least 5-10% (dependent on company's size) of that company's drivers for interview. A State Controller will provide the bus routes to be discussed to the dispatcher for the briefing of drivers.			X	

Jurisdiction	Extent-of-Play	In Sequence With Exercise	Out of Sequence; Day of Exercise	Out of Sequence; NOT Day of Exercise	Comments
Putnam County	Bus companies will be interviewed, procedures will be reviewed and equipment will be inspected. Each company will provide a dispatcher and 5-10% (dependent on company's size) of that company's drivers for interview. A State Controller will provide the bus routes to be discussed to the dispatcher for the briefing of drivers.			X	Putnam County proposes to demonstrate with school administrator, dispatcher and driver(s). Also proposes interviews of General Population and School Bus on same day.

NOTIFICATION OF HEARING IMPAIRED

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

There will be no actual notification of hearing-impaired individuals during the exercise.

EVACUATION OF NON-INSTITUTIONALIZED MOBILITY IMPAIRED INDIVIDUALS

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles for transport of non-institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals.

There will be no actual contact of non-institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals identified on the list.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.c – Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g).

EOC ACTIVITIES:

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

During the June 8, 2004 exercise, there will be initial contact with the schools and transportation

providers (telephone call) by the School and Transportation Coordinators. Initial contacts will be actual and some follow-up contacts may be simulated. All calls will be logged at each EOC.

FIELD ACTIVITIES:

EVACUATION OF SCHOOL POPULATIONS

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

Bus companies will be interviewed prior to the June 8, 2004 exercise as per the Offsite Extent-Of-Play Activities Schedule.

Each company will provide a dispatcher and 5-10% (dependent on company's size) of that company's drivers for interview.

A State Controller will provide the bus routes to be discussed to the bus dispatcher for the briefing of drivers.

SCHOOL INTERVIEWS

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

The minimum number of schools (one school per district) to be interviewed prior to the June 8, 2004 exercise is as follows:

Westchester County – 10 schools
Rockland County – 5 schools
Orange County – 1 school
Putnam County – 3 schools

Additional interviews of schools and school reception centers will be conducted after the exercise as agreed to by FEMA, NYSEMO and each county EMO.

Interviews for schools within the same district may be conducted with school administrators or the District Superintendent (or designee) at a regularly scheduled monthly meeting.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.d. – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j)

TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL POINTS (TCPs and ACPs)**Extent-of-Play Agreement:**

Jurisdiction	Extent-of-Play	In Sequence With Exercise	Out of Sequence; Day of Exercise	Out of Sequence; NOT Day of Exercise	Comments
Westchester County	There will be two (2) interviews of law enforcement officials to discuss how to activate TCPs/ACPs. Each designated law enforcement agency will provide one (1) officer. The State Controller will provide a free play message to select the TCP/ ACP assigned to that agency to be discussed. The interviews will take place at the police stations.		X		
Rockland County	There will be two (2) interviews of law enforcement officials to discuss how to activate TCPs/ACPs. Each designated law enforcement agency will provide one (1) officer. The State Controller will provide a free play message to select the TCP/ ACP assigned to that agency to be discussed. The interviews will take place at the EOC.		X		

Jurisdiction	Extent-of-Play	In Sequence With Exercise	Out of Sequence; Day of Exercise	Out of Sequence; NOT Day of Exercise	Comments
Orange County	There will be two (2) interviews of law enforcement officials to discuss how to activate TCPs/ACPs. Each designated law enforcement agency will provide one (1) officer. The State Controller will provide a free play message to select the TCP/ ACP assigned to that agency to be discussed. The interviews will take place at the EOC.		X		
Putnam County	There will be two (2) interviews of law enforcement officials to discuss how to activate TCPs/ACPs. The interviews will take place at actual TCP/ACP locations. Each designated law enforcement agency will provide one (1) officer. All required equipment will be deployed to the field locations, but will not be set up to block traffic. The State Controller will provide a free play message to select the TCP/ ACP assigned to that agency to be discussed.			X	Propose to demonstrate two (2) points in EPZ on the same day. Also propose to demonstrate Route Alerting on the same day.

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

Sub-element 3.d. – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654, J.10.k).

IMPEDIMENTS TO EVACUATION

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

Each of the four 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ counties is to demonstrate the organizational ability to deal with at least two (2) impediments to evacuation.

A control cell will inject free play messages via telephone to the lead law enforcement agency in each county EOC to test the procedures for removal of traffic impediments and coordination of assistance from other EOC agencies.

No equipment (Barriers, Traffic cones, Signs, etc.) will be deployed to the field.

This demonstration will not involve the dispatch of a police or other emergency vehicle to the scene of a simulated impediment. Initial contact of resource providers will be actual and some follow-up contacts may be simulated. All calls will be logged at each EOC.

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10; I.7, 8, 9)

FIELD MONITORING TEAMS

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

The monitoring teams will not be suited up in anti-contamination clothing. However, the clothing will be available for inspection.

Field team equipment is calibrated by IPEC's RP Department. An internal IPEC requirement provides for calibration of this equipment every six months. Therefore, the calibration sticker for this equipment shows a "calibration due date" which reflects the six month calibration schedule. The instruments are considered calibrated as long as the current date is within one year of the calibration date.

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; I.8, 11; J.10.a)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

In the event of a simulated radiological release, the licensee field teams will provide plume centerline data.

EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS

Sub-element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, I.9).

FIELD MONITORING TEAMS

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

Each EPZ County will dispatch two (2) radiological monitoring teams. Each team will be supplied with a State Controller and FEMA evaluator.

The monitoring teams will not be suited up in anti-contamination clothing. However, the clothing will be available for inspection.

Each team will take at least six (6) ambient radiation measurements (including background measurements) and at least two (2) air samples. All teams must take the air samples as though they were in the presence of the plume including County teams that may not be impacted by the plume. If necessary, an inject message from the State Controller may be used to complete the taking of all six measurements prior to the end of the exercise.

The use of silver zeolite cartridges will be simulated and charcoal cartridges will be used. However, the silver zeolite cartridges will be available at dispatch point of kit.

There will be no actual packaging or transport of samples to the laboratory. EOC staff will be questioned only regarding means of transportation of air samples to a central point and the location of the laboratory. Field teams will demonstrate how to obtain air samples during the exercise and will be questioned only regarding the procedures for the pick-up point of air samples.

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D & NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

There will be no actual sounding of sirens and no actual broadcasting of EAS messages. The Indian Point siren system will be tested during the first and second quarters of 2004. FEMA will be invited to observe the tests at those times.

To demonstrate the procedures for siren activation, all counties will conduct an actual “All-Cancel” test (silent test - no siren sounding) in conjunction with an EAS message broadcast (simulated) during the exercise.

One (1) complete alerting and notification sequence will be evaluated. This sequence will include simulation of siren activation, preparation and transmission of a simulated EAS message to the LP-1 radio station, and preparation and transmission of a simulated EAS Follow-On News Bulletin to the LP-1 radio station. Therefore, there will be actual contact with the radio station for one (1) simulated EAS message and one (1) simulated EAS Follow-On News Bulletin, both of which contain protective actions. Contact with the radio station for all other EAS messages will be simulated.

Airing of the initial EAS message will be simulated.

Regular programming responsibilities of the radio station may preclude participation at the time of the issuance of the simulated EAS message.

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.c).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

To demonstrate the procedures for siren activation, all counties will conduct an actual “All-Cancel” test (silent test - no siren sounding) in conjunction with an EAS message broadcast (simulated) during the exercise.

The results of the “All-Cancel” test will be used to discuss route alerting procedures for sirens that have been simulated to fail.

An inject message(s) to simulate siren failures will be used if no sirens appear to have failed on the “All-Cancel” test.

For those counties demonstrating actual route alerting (See table below), the route alerting demonstrations will not include actual vehicle siren sounding or public address announcement of emergency instructions. However, the emergency instructions or message will be read aloud to the Federal evaluator.

Jurisdiction	Extent-of-Play	In Sequence With Exercise	Out of Sequence; Day of Exercise	Out of Sequence; NOT Day of Exercise	Comments
Westchester County	EOC discussion only, after “All-Cancel” test.	X			
	The county’s telephone call-out system will be demonstrated to notify an area impacted by a simulated siren failure.		X		
Rockland County	EOC discussion only, after “All-Cancel” test.	X			
	The county’s telephone call-out system will be demonstrated to notify an area impacted by a simulated siren failure.		X		

Jurisdiction	Extent-of-Play	In Sequence With Exercise	Out of Sequence; Day of Exercise	Out of Sequence; NOT Day of Exercise	Comments
Orange County	EOC discussion after “All-Cancel” test.	X			
	Route alerting personnel will be interviewed, the procedure will be reviewed and the required equipment will be inspected at a location other than the actual route.		X		
Putnam County	EOC discussion after “All-Cancel” test.	X			
	One (1) route alerting route will be demonstrated in the field with all required procedures and equipment. The State Controller will provide a free play message to select the route to be run to the route alerting personnel. The route will be timed from the start of the route. (Starting point location)			X	Propose demonstration of Route Alerting on the same day as TCP interviews.

EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION

Sub-element 5.b – Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c).

PUBLIC INSTRUCTION AND EMERGENCY INFORMATION

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

One (1) simulated EAS Follow-On News Bulletin following an EAS message containing protective actions will be actually transmitted to the LP-1 EAS radio station.

Transmission of all other EAS Follow-On News Bulletins to the LP-1 EAS radio station will be simulated.

All simulated EAS Follow-On News Bulletin documents will actually be provided to the media at the JNC.

EMERGENCY INFORMATION

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

At least two (2) media briefings will be conducted and evaluated. The briefings to be evaluated will be selected by a controller with concurrence from the lead JNC FEMA evaluator.

Preparation and scheduling activities for all media briefings will be conducted in accordance with the JNC procedures.

Orange County will utilize a videoconference link from the County EOC to the JNC.

PUBLIC INQUIRY

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

The public inquiry function will be fully staffed for evaluation in accordance with the Joint News Center Procedures.

Inject messages will indicate false or misleading information to enable the public inquiry function to identify trends and false rumors.

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.a – Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers, and Registration of Evacuees

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

Reception centers will be demonstrated as per the offsite extent of play activities schedule.

Additional reception centers will be evaluated (baseline evaluations) after the exercise as agreed

to by FEMA, NYSEMO and each county EMO.

At least 1/3 of the required monitors will be present and at least six (6) simulated evacuees will be monitored.

Initial personnel monitoring staff will be demonstrated as tabulated below. Staff will be provided to simulate evacuees.

Number of Persons for Initial Personnel Monitoring

Number of Persons for Initial Personnel Monitoring				
Category	Orange County	Rockland County	Westchester County	Putnam County
Radiological monitors for initial monitoring	2 (See Note 1)	3 (See Note 4)	3 (See Note 4)	2 (See Note 1)
Recorders	1 (See Note 2)	0 (See Note 2)	0 (See Note 5)	0 (See Note 3)
No. of Portal Monitors	1	2	2	1

Note 1: One monitor for portal monitoring; one monitor for hand held monitoring.

Note 2: Evacuees will be monitored, then either given a “clean” card or directed to decontamination area.

Note 3: Evacuees will be monitored, then either hand-stamped clean or directed to decontamination area.

Note 4: Two monitors for portal monitoring, one monitor for hand held monitoring.

Note 5: Evacuees will be monitored, then directed to a “clean” area or to decontamination area.

- The number of decontamination personnel, vehicle monitoring/decon personnel and social services personnel demonstrating this criterion will be in accordance with each county’s plans and procedures.
- Each vehicle monitor will process at least two (2) vehicles.
- There will be only a representative sample of supplies available at each facility.
- Decontamination techniques will be simulated. At the PMC, activities that may damage property (such as parking vehicle on grass) are to be simulated.
- The monitoring and decontamination teams will not be suited up in anti-contamination clothing. However, all required materials will be available for inspection.
- Reception Center floors will be covered with a representative sample of paper/plastic during this demonstration. However, all required materials will be available for inspection.

- Both male and female decontamination areas and techniques will be demonstrated.
- Portal monitors will be operated in accordance with each county's procedures. Portal monitors are checked with a check source to verify operability and the capability to meet the FEMA portal monitor standard (1 μ Ci Cs-137 at midline).
- Monitoring and decontamination capabilities for a school reception center (Rockland County only) will be demonstrated as per the Offsite Extent-of-Play Activities Schedule.
- Monitoring and decontamination capabilities at a State Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Center will be demonstrated as per the Offsite Extent-of-Play Activities Schedule.

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.b – Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Centers (EWPMC) will be demonstrated prior to the June 8, 2004 exercise as per the offsite extent-of-play agreement schedule.

Each facility will demonstrate the following:

At least one (1) monitor for personnel monitoring;

At least two (2) monitors for personnel decontamination (1 male and 1 female);

At least one (1) monitor for vehicle monitoring;

At least one (1) monitor for vehicle decontamination.

The monitoring and decontamination teams will not to be suited up in anti-contamination clothing. However, all required materials will be available for inspection.

Decontamination actions are to be simulated. At the PMC, activities that may damage property (such as parking vehicles on grass) are to be simulated.

EWPMC floors will be covered with a representative sample of paper/plastic during this demonstration. However, all required materials will be available for inspection.

One (1) portal monitor for personnel monitoring will be demonstrated by Rockland County and Orange County.

Both male and female decon technique will be demonstrated; though only 1 decon area will be set up.

The Portal monitor will be operated in accordance with each county's procedures. Portal monitors are checked with a check source to verify operability and the capability to meet the FEMA Portal Monitor standard (1 uCi Cs-137 at midline).

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CARE-Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h, J.12).

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

For those facilities not evaluated in 2002, Congregate Care Center capabilities will be demonstrated through an interview with the American Red Cross as per the Offsite Extent-Of-Play Activities Schedule.

These interviews can take place either in the EOC on the day of the exercise, or out-of-sequence, not on the day of the exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES

Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)

Extent-of-Play Agreement:

MS-1 drills for Westchester and Putnam Counties will be conducted as per the Offsite Extent-Of-Play Activities Schedule.

The use of flashing lights and sirens for exercise play is not required.

APPENDIX 4. 2004 INDIAN POINT ENERGY CENTER EXERCISE SCENARIO

This appendix contains a summary of the simulated sequence of events used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by OROs during the Indian Point Energy Center Exercise on June 8, 2004.

Note: All times are approximate.

Time	Message Number	Event
May 30	FED#0	An advisory (Message FED #0, Advisory #1) was issued by NRC Incident Assessment Team (IAT) and concerns a DHS, FBI, and Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) advisory of possible terrorist threats. (Delivered with initial conditions package on June 7, 04).
June 7	FED#0	An advisory (Message FED #0, Advisory #2) was issued by NRC IAT and concerns a DHS, FBI, and Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) advisory of possible terrorist threats and a raised security awareness. NRC notes that no specific credible threats against nuclear plants have been observed. (Delivered with initial conditions package on June 7, 04).
11pm, day before exercise	Storyline only	Four individuals leave Canadian Airport bound for Connecticut International Airport. Upon arrival at the airport at 12:10 am, they rent two cars on the same credit card. Two begin driving south toward NY and the other two begin driving north toward the Boston area. The Massachusetts bound car crashes into another car on I – 91 near exit 48 (Thompsonville, north of Hartford) at 1:30am. When State Police investigate the wreck, they find two injured men, the rental contract (showing rental of two cars), and plant information for Indian Point and Pilgrim. The information includes plant drawings, maps of the areas around the plants, and a lot of generally accessible information from the Internet. The men provide no information. State police begin calls through their investigation bureau and eventually call the FBI at about 4:00am.

Time	Message Number	Event
0700	IPEC #001	<p><u>Initial Condition for IPEC Exercise Players</u></p> <p>The Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC) Unit No. 3 has been operating at 100%power for 150 Effective Full Power Days. Plant Operations personnel are completing shift turnover and the following occurrences have been noted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 32 Diesel Generator is disassembled and OOS for PM. ETA = 1800 hrs • Gas Turbine - GT-1 is out of service. Turbine blades out at vendor being re-machined. Not due back until 9/26/04. • 33 AFW pump is out of service due to a surveillance failure. ETA =1200 hrs • Primary Met Tower is OOS due to the lightning strike during the 6/2/04 rainstorm. The back-up met tower is providing met data to required locations. <p>Pressure Relief in progress</p> <p>Wind Speed – 3.2m/s Wind Direction – 30 degrees Pasquill - C</p> <p>In addition, provide the NRC advisories.</p>
0745	FED#1 FED#2	<p>FBI and DHS review the recovered information, and after subsequent investigation, determine that a credible threat exists. The FBI contacts the NRC. The NRC Headquarters Operations Office (HOO) receives the call, and notifies the IAT. Following conference calls between NRCHQ and Region 1, and based on the information provided by FBI, it is decided to contact the two plants to alert them that a “credible threat” exists for their plants.</p>
0800	FED#3A	<p>IPEC and Pilgrim are alerted to the “credible threat” based on the recovered information and other intelligence, which indicates that some potential attack on a nuclear plant may occur.</p>
0805	IPEC #002 IPEC #004 IPEC #005	<p>IPEC U3 Simulated Control Room (SCR) calls Security to notify them of the credible threat notification.</p>

Time	Message Number	Event
0815	IPEC #003	<p>IPEC U3 SCR declares an NUE based on EAL 8.1.1, Bomb device or other indication of attempted sabotage discovered within plant PA OR Notification of any credible site specific security threat by the Security Shift Supervisor or outside agency (NRC, military or law enforcement). Shift Manager decides to activate IPEC Emergency Response Facilities (ERF's) and notifies the Emergency Response Organization. Non-essentials will be instructed to leave the site. Security notifies the National Guard of the threat and makes any other necessary notifications.</p> <p>Pilgrim also declares an NUE. Both plants notify the NRC that an NUE has been declared. Both units initiate additional preparatory actions in accordance with each site's Security Safeguards Plans and Emergency Plans. Neither plant initiates a plant shutdown at this time.</p> <p>Security will initiate response in accordance with the Integrated Response Plan, ONOP-SEC-1 and their contingency procedures.</p>
0830	Storyline only	<p>Offsite agencies are notified by the plants of the NUE declaration.</p> <p>Two individuals, originally traveling south to NY, arrive at Upstate Airport and secure "Air Power" flight uniforms, with identification cards, which facilitates their access to the cargo aircraft flight line, and subsequently to the fully loaded 767-300 cargo aircraft as the primary flight crew for Seattle bound Flight 13.</p> <p><i>NOTE: The elements in this portion of the scenario were crafted to help facilitate exercise "play." They purposely exclude Transportation Security Administration measures designed to counter efforts by criminals to gain access to, and or hijack an aircraft.</i></p>
0848	Storyline only	As scheduled, the aircraft taxis to the runway and is given permission to take off.

Time	Message Number	Event
0850	Storyline only	FAA Tower at Upstate Airport records wheels up for Flight 13, and an acknowledgment by the pilot as to flight plan and assigned altitude; but observes the plane begin to deviate from flight plan, by turning South and observes aircraft is slow to gain altitude, as confirmed by FAA readout. Multiple transmissions from both Upstate Airport and Regional FAA controllers go unanswered.
0852	Storyline only	FAA contacts NORAD to report situation and request assistance. <i>NOTE: A significant portion of the NORAD methods and means relating to their mission involve sensitive and/or classified information, which is not appropriate to share in this forum. To best facilitate exercise “play” using an aircraft as the initiating event, NORAD aircraft do not intercept the suspect aircraft. There should be no conclusions drawn relating to NORAD capabilities, using this unclassified exercise as a basis.</i>
0853	Storyline only	NORAD commences the scrambling and vectoring of aircraft, while simultaneously initiating multiple internal and external communication efforts.
0855		Offsite State and County EOC’s may establish skeleton crews.
0900	FED#4	NORAD communicates with NRC and licensee, providing eah with current flight path and status of efforts to intercept aircraft.
0902	IPEC #006A	Following receipt of NORAD/NRC call, the Unit 2 and Unit 3 shift personnel will notify security. Security will subsequently declare an onsite Security Code Red.
0905	IPEC #007A	The shift manager makes a PA announcement to plant personnel to seek shelter immediately. The Operation crews at U2 & U3 should trip both units.

Time	Message Number	Event
0910	IPEC #006	<p>IPEC Onsite Emergency Response Facilities (ERF's) should be manned.</p> <p>A security officer posted at the SW protected area boundary fence observes a large, low flying jet approaching from the north. He/she follows established protocol and promptly alerts CAS of the observation. CAS promptly notifies the IPEC U3 SCR. The U3 SCR notifies the EOF regarding the call from Security. Security notifies the National Guard and the other law enforcement agencies. The officer watches the plane proceed down river just past the site, then slowly turns, heading toward the site. The officer continues to report observations. Some reports of sighting the plane over the river will also be received offsite.</p>
0912	IPEC # 007	The CAS notifies the control room of the approaching plane.

Time	Message Number	Event
0915	IPEC #008	<p>At 100' elevation, the plane hits Unit #3 345kv feeder W96 and 138kv feeder 95331 and explodes. Debris falls on and around the Unit #3 Transformer Yard and against the Vapor Containment. Burning plane fuel covers an area of 200' x 200' (40,000 sq. ft.). The Containment Access Facility (CAF), CAF Truck Bay Annex, the Fan House roof and the Condenser Tube Pulling Area storage space have severe damage as well as active fires. The corrugated steel walls on the east side of the Turbine Building, the Fan House and the southwest corner of the Fuel Storage Building have extensive damage. The 480v power for Plant Vent Rad Monitor R27 trips due to jarring of the RM skid in the Purge Valve enclosure space. The 32 Main Transformer oil coolers and fire protection spray header are crushed by plane debris; transformer oil ignites without water spray. One plane engine impacts the unit 3 Vapor Containment and falls in to the transformer Yard. The second plane engine smashes through a fence at the North entrance of the Transformer Yard and impacts the APP-R DG enclosure disabling the diesel. A LOOP occurs at Unit #3 with 480v bus 6A normal supply and MCC-36B supply breakers tripping on over current. 31 and 33 EDG's start and energize the remaining 480v buses. 13.8kv power remains available to both units. PORV 455C fails open and remains open, MOV 535 can not be used to isolate PORV 455C due to 480v bus 6A and MCC-36B being de-energized, a Safety Injection occurs and two of three Pressure Relief Valves fail to close. The Fire Brigade is activated. The back-up met tower is out of service (OOS), the U3 PA system, the U3 Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and the U3 Simulated Control Room (SCR) Emergency Notification System (ENS) line all fail to operate.</p> <p>The Security officer in the vicinity of the crash does not respond to radio transmission being conducted by CAS and is reported missing.</p>

Time	Message Number	Event
0920	IPEC #009 IPEC #009A Unless suspended by Security	Unit #3 shift personnel terminate VC Pressure relief. Unit #2 shift personnel report all equipment is OK. Unit #2 continues to be powered from Unit #2 138kv feeder 95332. The EDG's are operable and remain in standby. Fire Brigade is activated. Offsite fire and ambulance services are requested. IPEC JNC should be manned with Entergy personnel. Upstate Township police confirm that 2 individuals they found bound and gagged are the Air Power pilot and copilot. N.Y. State Police notified.
0925	IPEC #010 IPEC #010A Unless suspended by Security	Some reports of explosion and fire at the site are received offsite.
0930	IPEC #011 IPEC #011A IPEC #011B	SAE 8.1.3, Intrusion into a plant security vital area by an adversary OR any security event which represents actual or likely failure of plant systems needed to protect the public will be declared. Offsite fire trucks and ambulances arrive onsite. Additional fire support is requested from Westchester County. The missing Security Officer is found deceased at the scene of the crash.
0932	IPEC #011C	Reports from the fire scene are provided to the U3 SCR.
0940	IPEC #012 Unless suspended by Security	Security Manager, Westchester Homeland Security Representative & LLEA arrive at the onsite Incident Command Post (ICP) (or sooner if established).

Time	Message Number	Event
0945	IPEC #013	<p>Offsite notifications to State/local governments and the NRC should be completed or in progress by this time. (Some additional information from either NRC or DHS may be available, but is not necessary until the time break. Direct notifications to State & Federal agencies from DHS, FBI, or NRC may also be occurring at this time, and that does not impact the scenario.)</p> <p>Federal Player Cell's are operational by this time, and calls into the following agencies will be taken and responded to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FBI, simulating FBI Headquarters request for assistance and support of local field office • DHS Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) (simulated) • NORAD Incident Response Center • Other federal agencies, simulating requests for assistance
0950	IPEC #014	NRC Operations Center should be operational by this time.
~1000	IPEC #015	<p>DHS should request representation of NRC at HSOC and Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG).</p> <p>NRC should be expected to perform lead functions in regard to Federal protective action recommendations for the public.</p>
1000	FED#5 FED #5A IPEC #015A	<p>DHS and NY State Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR) discuss events in progress and the need for additional federal assistance.</p> <p>Notice of 1030 AM DHS Public announcement will be provided at about this time.</p>

Time	Message Number	Event
~1000		<p>NRC Operations Center (NRCHQ) should be fully operational by this time, with Executive Team (ET) in place including Commission representation. NRC updated licensee advisory should be issued with information related to licensee actions and results of licensee event declarations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advisory to licensees • Unusual Event at Pilgrim for credible threat • Site Area Emergency at Indian Point • NRC security Level V status for all US nuclear plants • Heightened awareness by licensees and notice to report any suspicious activity immediately
1015	IPEC #016 IPEC #016A	JNC should be activated with State and County personnel. State/Local EOC's should be fully staffed.
1025	IPEC #017	More information regarding the fire scene is provided to the Fire Chiefs.

Time	Message Number	Event
~1030	FED#6	<p>The Secretary, Department Homeland Security issues public announcement concerning the events at Indian Point including the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information from conversation with GAR concerning federal assistance, if results in a Presidential Declaration, will be determined and announced • The Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) is being activated • Air space in the New York, Hartford, and Boston regions is being closed down at this time to general and cargo aviation. Additional closures may occur, if deemed necessary. • NORAD has established aircraft exclusion zones, or caps, over nuclear power plants, including Indian Point, and other important infrastructure. Fighter aircraft are in the area. • Coast Guard has established an exclusion zone on the Hudson River • A Joint Field Office will be set up in the Indian Point area to coordinate FBI activities and interagency response actions (will not occur prior to end of exercise) • FEMA Region II Director, Joe Picciano, has been designated as the Principal Federal Official (PFO) <p>DHS is maintaining a “global focus”, and is in the process of determining, along with other federal agencies, if other terrorist related incidents could occur.</p>
1030		<p>FBI announces that a Joint Operations Center will be set up as part of the Joint Field Office (JFO) to support the Indian Point event. (This will not occur prior to end of exercise)</p> <p>Agents are responding to the onsite Incident Command Post in the interim.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination with FBI field agents will be maintained through FBI Headquarters in Washington.
1035	IPEC #016B IPEC #018 (at 1040)	<p>The fire scene reports injured fire fighters are being removed from the scene via an ambulance.</p>

Time	Message Number	Event
1045		Media reports indicate that DHS plans to increase the Homeland Security Advisory System threat level and that an announcement is planned for 11:15 am.
1100	IPEC #019 IPEC #019A (at 1105)	NRC Site Team arrives at IPEC ERF's.
1115		DHS, after a determination that the aircraft strike was an act of terrorism; and after consultation with multiple government agencies announces that the HSAS is being raised to the RED level for the nuclear power plant sector. DHS, in coordination with the NRC, and FBI, issues a public announcement regarding the RED HSAS.
1130	IPEC #020	The ICP reports to the U3 SCR/EOF and Montrose Fire Chief that the plane was carrying produce only – no hazardous material.
1200	IPEC #021	Controllers and evaluators should begin to prepare for time advance period for the exercise scenario at this time.
~1230	IPEC #022	Controllers immediately begin briefing on time advance period. When play resumes, the scenario time will have advanced by approximately 6 hours. To avoid confusion, the actual time shall be used for all communications and log keeping.

Time	Message Number	Event
During Time AdvancePeriod	No message. Included in ETR Summary Report	<p>IPEC to provide the following information regarding actions that occurred during the 6 hour time step:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6A energized from 13.8kv power (MCC-36B remained de-energized) • Loss of 13.8kv • Loss of 31 & 33 EDG • 32 EDG ready for a return to service • Shift Change • Restoration of previously OOS equipment – 33 AFW pump • All fires are out • Two injured personnel transported to HVHC along with the deceased Security officer • Additional plane info – plane carrying produce only, no hazardous material • Federal response • Security Code Red & Security status • Provide 1230 31 A, B, C to ERF's • Chemistry has sampled the U3 RCS, VC, and plant vent for activity. The results are consistent with a small fuel defect. RCS total activity = 1.98 uCi/cc, Dose Equivalent I-131 = 2.1E-1 uCi/cc. VC Gas activity is elevated. VC activity = 2.35E-2 uCi/cc, total VC Iodine = 2.47E-07 uCi/cc. The offsite data indicates that there is NO Release. • Chemistry also sampled the U2 RCS, VC and plant vent for activity. The results are consistent with normal plant activities: RSC total activity = 6.22E-01uCi/cc, Dose Equivalent Iodine = 5.26E-02 uCi/cc. VC Gas activity = 1.30E-05 uCi/cc. The Plant Vent data indicates that there is no release through the plant vent. <p>Repair & corrective action team activities will be provided at the time of the time advance period.</p>

Time	Message Number	Event
During Time Advance Period	No message. Included in ETR Summary Report	<p>Follow-up information from DHS:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HSAS activity (as determined by DHS) (focus by DHS is “sector – nuclear power plants”) – player action determines discussion in this press release • Air traffic in the New York, Hartford, and Boston areas is shut down for general and cargo aviation. Cargo and general aviation aircraft in that region are on the ground. All passenger flights have been accounted for. • Air patrols, using armed military fighter aircraft, are in the air and over pre-designated infrastructure, including nuclear power plants. • DHS is coordinating overall Federal response in accordance with the NRP • DHS anticipates that the JFO will be in place by 2100 hours this evening. • Additional attempts at terrorism or sabotage have not been reported.
During Time Advance Period	No message. Included in ETR Summary Report	<p>Follow-up information from NRC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The NRC Operations Center is fully operational. • The Regional Incident Response Center (IRC) is operational. • The NRC site response team is at Indian Point • Pilgrim Nuclear Plant, which has an operating unit and is located on the MA coast near Plymouth, has shut down as a precaution to a credible threat to that site. Pilgrim declared an Unusual Event at 0815am this morning and performed an orderly shutdown at 1040am. The unit is in a safe shut down condition. • All commercial nuclear power plants in this country are at a heightened state of security, in several cases, local law enforcement has responded to the site to support on-site security forces.
During Time Advance Period	No message. Included in ETR Summary Report	<p>Follow-up information from FBI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Since the incident at Indian Point, no other “chatter” or indications of additional attacks have been observed • Two additional suspects, who were involved in a car accident early this morning, are being questioned concerning a possible connection to the Indian Point incident. They are providing some information concerning the event.

Time	Message Number	Event
During Time Advance Period	No message. Included in ETR Summary Report	NRC Public Information Officers (PIOs) have arrived in the Indian Point JNC and supporting utility, State, and Local government PIOs in informing the media of events in progress.
1300		Exercise play resumes.
1315	IPEC #023	32 EDG fails to restart.
1330		General Emergency (GE) will be declared based on EAL 6.1.5. Loss of all 480 volt safeguards Bus (5A, 2A/3A, 6A) AC power AND either: Power restoration to required core cooling systems is not likely in ≤ 4 hrs. OR Actual or Imminent entry into ORANGE or RED path on F-0, "CORE COOLING".
1345		The offsite agencies are notified of the GE.
1430	IPEC #024	33 EDG returns to service providing power to bus 5A.

Time	Message Number	Event
1500	FED#7	<p>DHS public announcement: [Specifics to be determined by player actions]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The HSAS level RED for nuclear power plant sector • Air traffic controls in the New York, Hartford, and Boston areas have grounded general and cargo aviation. • Air patrols, using armed military fighter aircraft are in the air and protecting designated infrastructure and nuclear power plants, including Indian Point. • Additional attempts at terrorism or sabotage have not been reported. <p>DHS, FBI, and other Federal agencies are in process of establishing the JFO in the Indian Point area.</p> <p>Follow-up information from NRC</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No terrorist or sabotage related events have been reported at any other US nuclear power plant. • The state of security remains HIGH at all nuclear power plants. LLEA is supporting site security officers in maintaining areas around the plants secured. <p>Follow-up “closure statement” information from FBI (necessary to enable DHS to reduce HSAS level, if necessary from earlier determination)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No other terrorist related events have been observed. • Two suspects, who were involved in a car accident early this morning, have provided additional information concerning the event at Indian Point. They are being held in federal custody, and may be charged with criminal offenses within the hour. • Closure statement – e.g., conclusion is that Indian Point incident was an isolated single-group attempt - and there are no indications of additional planned terrorist attacks <p>DHS update –</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IIMG meeting scheduled for 2300 tonight to address HSAS level reduction • Deputies Committee meeting scheduled for 0900 tomorrow – • Secretary Ridge will brief the President at 1100 tomorrow

Time	Message Number	Event
1515	IPEC #025	In approximately one hour, restoration of 31 EDG will occur. The work on the air start system is about 95% complete and is expected back by 1615. Con Ed line trucks have arrived on site and are preparing to restructure the 138kv feeders to the Station Aux. Transformer that were destroyed when the plane crashed through them. In addition, Con Ed will also begin work on the 13.8kv feeder 13W93. Expected completion will be at midnight tonight.
After 1515		The exercise is terminated when objectives are met.

June 8, 2004 Exercise Event Summary Report

TO ALL EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS:

A six (6) hour time jump has now occurred. It is now evening hours of the same day.

This Time-Jump Summary Report captures what has occurred today including the last six hours.

ALTHOUGH SIX HOURS WILL HAVE PASSED, ACTUAL CLOCK TIME WILL CONTINUE TO BE USED FOR EXERCISE PURPOSES. DO NOT ADD OR SUBTRACT TIME FROM THE CLOCK.

1. INDIAN POINT ENERGY CENTER STATUS – PLANT STATUS

- IPEC remains in a Site Area Emergency ECL
- Unit 3 was aligned to 13.8kv power with 31&33 EDGs returned to standby, if not completed prior to 1200.
- Fires in Condenser Tube Pulling Area storage space, Containment Access Facility (CAF), CAF Truck Bay Annex and Fan House roof have been extinguished. These spaces are severely damaged.
- All Transformer Yard fires have been extinguished by the plant Fire Brigade and responding Fire Departments, and there is indication that only 32 Main Transformer oil had ignited.
- One Entergy Fire Brigade member and one Verplanck fire fighter were injured and have been sent to Hudson Valley Hospital Center. They are in stable condition.
- The missing security officer has been found, deceased, at the scene of the crash.
- The power for the plant vent radiation monitor R-27 was lost.
- One plane engine was found in the transformer yard and a second engine was found to have impacted the APP-R DG enclosure with extensive damage to the APP-R Diesel however, 13.8kv power initially remained intact.
- All cables for Feeders W-96 and 95331 are down.
- Turbine Hall east wall and Fuel Storage Building south-corner walls have significant damage to corrugated siding.
- Operators continued with Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization procedure.
- At 1 hour into time jump, 6A was energized from 13.8kv power based on isolation of faulted MCC-36B feed.
- At 2 hours into time jump, 13.8kv power was lost from the Buchanan switchyard effecting both feeders 13W92 and 13W93, 31&33 EDG re-started and re-energized 5A, 2A and 3A.
- At 4 hours into time jump, 31&33 EDGs were lost and operators entered EOP ECA0.0 Loss Of All AC.
- Repair and corrective action teams have been dispatched to restore power to

the emergency diesel generators. Estimates for restoration of 13.8kv power by Con Edison is for midnight.

- At end of time jump, due to plant cooldown and depressurization prior to loss of all AC, the RCS is approximately 100psig and 332°F with 1°-2° of subcooling. PORV 455C remains open and RCS inventory continues to slowly deplete. Steam Generators are approximately 100 psig with 32 AFWP providing sufficient flow to maintain level and remove decay heat.
- Chemistry samples of the RCS, VC and plant vent represent levels consistent with plant conditions. There is no indication of any radiological release.
- Both primary and backup meteorological towers are out of service.
- Unit 2 is in cold shutdown. There is no damage to any of the equipment supplying power to the station. The reactor is being cooled by via normal methods.

2. FEDERAL AGENCY RESPONSE/STATUS

- The President has been fully briefed, and is monitoring the situation closely.
- All federal agencies have been notified and are on heightened alert.
- **Follow-up information from DHS:**
 - DHS is coordinating overall federal response in accordance with the National Response Plan.
 - Air traffic in the New York Metropolitan Area, Hartford and Boston areas, is shut down for general and cargo aviation. Cargo and general aviation aircraft in that region are on the ground. All passenger aircraft have been accounted for.
 - Air patrols using armed military fighter aircraft are in the air and over pre-designated infrastructure, including nuclear power plants.
 - DHS anticipates that the Joint Field Office (JFO) will be in place later this evening.
 - DHS officials are monitoring for any other terrorist related threats. Additional attempts at terrorism or sabotage have not been reported.
- **Follow-up information from NRC:**
 - The NRC Operations Center is fully operational.
 - The Regional Incident Response Center (IRC) is operational.
 - The NRC Site Response Team is at IPEC. The Director of Site Operations at IPEC now has the lead for the NRC.
 - NRC State Liaisons have arrived at the New York State EOC.
 - Entergy's Pilgrim nuclear plant, located near Plymouth, Mass., has shut down as a precaution to a credible threat to that site. Pilgrim declared an Unusual Event at 8:15 this morning and performed an orderly shutdown at 10:40 a.m. The unit is in a safe shutdown condition.

- All commercial nuclear power plants in this country are at a heightened state of security. In several cases, local law enforcement has responded to the sites to support on-site security forces.
 - NRC public information officers (PIOs) are at the Indian Point JNC and are supporting licensee, state, and local government PIOs in informing the media of events in progress.
- **Follow-up information from FBI:**
- FBI representatives are at the onsite Incident Command Post.
 - No other “chatter” or indications of additional attacks have been observed.
 - Two additional suspects, who were involved in a car accident early this morning, are being questioned concerning a possible connection to the Indian Point incident. They are providing some information concerning the event.

3. NEW YORK STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE / STATUS

NON-REP PLAN RESPONSE TO INCIDENT AT IPEC

- _____ Fire Department(s) remain on the scene of the fires at IPEC
- _____ EMS Unit(s) continue to stand by at IPEC to assist with casualties from the crash or injuries to emergency responders.
- _____ Police Unit(s) continue to restrict access to local roads
- State and local police liaisons continue to coordinate with the Onsite Incident Command Post
- Local hospitals remain on standby to receive casualties.
- National Guard units and State Police continue to provide security at IPEC.
- National Guard units are providing additional security in the EPZ area.
- All requested higher-level government support for augmentation of security, fire, EMS operations in the field have been filled.
- Authorities have taken actions to secure and/or protect public facilities within their jurisdictions.

REP-PLAN RESPONSES

- Emergency Operations Centers in _____ are partially activated.
- Emergency Operations Centers in _____ are fully activated.
- Emergency response organizations have:
 - Established 24-hour operational capability
 - Deployed Liaisons to Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
 - Activated/Staffed Joint News Center (JNC)
 - Placed Field Monitoring Teams on Standby
 - Deployed Field Monitoring Teams to provide offsite radiation monitoring. (No readings reported)
 - Placed Reception Center Monitoring and Decontamination Teams on

standby

- Opened Reception Centers (receiving people?)
- Opened Congregate Care Centers (receiving people?)
- Activated Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Centers. (receiving workers?)
- Activated auxiliary KI distribution locations. (locations announced?)
- Notified local and county authorities as per Plan
- Notified schools and special facility administrators.
- Closed Parks and Recreation Areas in 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)
- Closed and Cleared parks comprising ERPAS 39 and 40
- Suspended road construction.
- Identified any evacuation travel impediments (Status of impediments)
- Requested Coast Guard closing of Hudson River. The Coast guard has closed the Hudson River at New York Harbor north to Newburgh.
- Requested FAA closing of air space over EPZ.
- Requested halting of rail traffic into EPZ. Metro-North has suspended all rail traffic north of Peekskill and south of Croton Harmon.
- Early-dismissed or closed all schools in County Children at home.
- Early-dismissed or closed all schools in EPZ. Children at home.
- Sheltered all schools in EPZ. Children dismissed in afternoon and are at home.
- Relocated school children within 2 miles of IPEC to School Reception Centers. All children have been picked up from School Reception Centers.
- Relocated schools in EPZ to School Reception Centers by ERPA:
- Westchester: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 21 22 47 48 49 50 51
- Rockland: 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39/40 41
- Orange: 24 25 26 27 28 39/40
- Putnam: 16 17 18 19 20 23
- Relocated Special Facility populations to host facilities outside of EPZ.
- Instructed residents to place farm animals on stored feed and water; Supporting any State-directed quarantine of foodstuffs and water
- Sounded sirens and activated Emergency Alert System (EAS)
- Sheltered (remain) general population and special facilities by ERPA:
- Westchester: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 21 22 47 48 49 50 51
- Rockland: 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39/40 41
- Orange: 24 25 26 27 28 39/40
- Putnam: 16 17 18 19 20 23
- Evacuated general population and special facilities by ERPA: (CHECK ETE)
- Westchester: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 21 22 47 48 49 50 51
- Rockland: 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39/40 41
- Orange: 24 25 26 27 28 39/40
- Putnam: 16 17 18 19 20 23
- Directed ingestion of KI for evacuating populations and all emergency workers in the EPZ.

- Deployed evacuation buses for general public (CHECK ETE)
- Established Traffic Control Points to facilitate evacuation traffic. Traffic is moving, although slower than normal.
- Established Access Control Points to limit unnecessary traffic entering EPZ
- Established Mobility-Impaired Phone
- Declared Local State of Emergency (Article 2B)
- The Governor has declared of State-level State of Emergency (Article 2B) (WHAT ACTIONS TAKEN?)

4. CONNECTICUT, NEW JERSEY, NEW YORK CITY RESPONSE STATUS

- The governors of Connecticut and New Jersey, and the Mayor of New York City have been notified of the situation by their respective emergency management organizations, which were given that information by the New York State Emergency Management Office (NY SEMO).
- The Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) in these three jurisdictions have not been fully staffed or activated. However, EOC staff personnel have been notified and are on standby in the event that they are needed to respond to the support the operation of the EOC.
- Connecticut has sent a liaison to the New York State Emergency Operations Center as per their plan.
- The Bergen County, New Jersey EOC is activated and supporting Rockland County as appropriate.
- New York City immediately offered to provide any/all assistance to Westchester County and New York State. The City Office of Emergency Management will continue to monitor conditions and will determine if a representative should be dispatched to the Westchester County EOC or Onsite Incident Command Post.

5. JOINT NEWS CENTER RESPONSE/STATUS

- Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge spoke at a mid-morning news conference in Washington D.C., stating that the government is responding in full, and all necessary resources were being provided to New York state and local governments. Investigations are underway.
- Governor Pataki also made a brief statement from Albany announcing the State of Emergency to free up all state resources for the response and investigation. The Governor also indicated that all state buildings have increased security.
- The JNC conducted periodic media briefings throughout the past 6 hours, and concluded the last media briefing at 12:55 p.m. The next scheduled media briefing is set for 2:15 p.m. and will include representatives from all agencies.
- No additional EAS messages have been requested or issued since the initial

message broadcast at _____.

- Each representative of the JNC issued written news statements consistent with their media briefings and the response actions being taken.
- Public Inquiry and Media Referral have received constant telephone inquiries since the activation of the facility, and are using existing written statements to answer inquiries. International media inquiries have been increasing.
- News media present at the JNC include the broadcast networks, MSNBC, CNN, Fox, RNN, Channel 12, all major radio stations and the major daily and weekly newspapers.
- There are currently numerous satellite trucks in the JNC parking lot and most media have done live broadcasts from inside and outside the JNC.
- A number of media representatives have tried to get near the plant and into Entergy's White Plains office and have been directed to the JNC. The county EOCs have been attempting to respond to media present at their facilities. Orange County has conducted one media briefing at its facility.

6. ENTERGY (CORPORATE) STATUS

- Additional security precautions have been taken at other Entergy plants and corporate buildings to secure and protect personnel and property.
- Entergy's Corporate Emergency Center in Jackson, Mississippi is staffed to support IPEC response with company resources from outside the northeast.
- Entergy Corporate is scheduling interview opportunities with senior Entergy officers.
- Government Relations staff is keeping elected officials apprised of the situation and response by Entergy on a regular basis. They are coordinating written and verbal statements with the JNC and Entergy offices in Jackson, New Orleans and Washington, DC.
- Investor Relations staff has announced that a decision will be made this evening on whether to allow trading in Entergy stock tomorrow. Trading was suspended earlier today. They are coordinating written and verbal statements with the JNC and Entergy offices in Jackson, New Orleans and Washington, DC.

7. INDIAN POINT ENERGY CENTER STATUS - SECURITY

- IPEC remains in a Security Color Code "RED".
- IPEC remains in a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Level V posture.
- The onsite Incident Command Post (ICP) has been established at the EOF building. The State Police Incident Commander is directing security response from the ICP while the IPEC Emergency Director is directing plant operations from the EOF.
- The National Guard is providing perimeter protection for IPEC.
- Site access has been restricted.

- Investigations are underway to determine if all areas of the plant are secure, and if all personnel inside the Protected Area have been identified and accounted for.
- IPEC Security remains in a defensive posture protecting vital equipment.
- IPEC Security has established compensatory measures for the degraded barriers and alarm systems that were caused by the fire and impact of the cargo plane.
- Security is calling in additional Security resources from home to help assist with the recovery effort.
- The ICP has been informed that the plane was carrying produce only. No hazardous material was present.