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River Bend Station
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St. Francisville, LA 70775
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December 28, 2004

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Licensee Event Report 50-458 / 04-004-00
River Bend Station – Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458
License No. NPF-47


File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

RBG-46378
RBF1-04-0240

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, enclosed is the subject Licensee Event Report.
This is a preliminary report which will be supplemented upon completion of the root
cause analysis report.

Sincerely,


David N. Lorfing
Manager – Licensing (acting)

DNL/dhw
enclosure

TE22

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cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
P. O. Box 1050
St. Francisville, LA 70775

INPO Records Center
E-Mail

Mr. Jim Calloway
Public Utility Commission of Texas
1701 N. Congress Ave.
Austin, TX 78711-3326

Mr. Prosanta Chowdhury
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
Office of Environmental Compliance
Surveillance Division
Radiological Emergency Planning & Response Unit
P.O. Box 4312
Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4312

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

| | | |
|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. FACILITY NAME River Bend Station, Unit 1 | 2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000 458 | 3. PAGE 1 of 3 |
|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|

4. TITLE
Unplanned Automatic Start of Standby Diesel Generator Due to Loss of Division 2 Switchgear

| 5. EVENT DATE | | | 6. LER NUMBER | | | 7. REPORT DATE | | | 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED | |
|---------------|-----|------|---------------|-------------------|---------|----------------|-----|------|------------------------------|---------------|
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REV NO. | MONTH | DAY | YEAR | FACILITY NAME | DOCKET NUMBER |
| 11 | 1 | 2004 | 2004 | - 004 - | 00 | 12 | 28 | 2004 | | 05000 |
| | | | | | | | | | FACILITY NAME | DOCKET NUMBER |
| | | | | | | | | | | 05000 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 9. OPERATING MODE 5 | 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply) | | | | | | | | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b) | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii) | | | | | | |
| 10. POWER LEVEL 0 | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d) | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | | | | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1) | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | | | | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) | | | | | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | | | | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) | <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4) | | | | | | |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) | <input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5) | | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) | <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER | | | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) | <input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) | Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A | | | | | | | |

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

| | |
|--|---|
| FACILITY NAME David N. Lorfing, Manager – Licensing (acting) | TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 225-381-4157 |
|--|---|

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

| CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO EPIX | CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO EPIX |
|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|--------------------|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|--------------------|
| na | | | | | | | | | |

| | |
|--|---|
| 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input type="checkbox"/> NO | 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE MONTH: 02 DAY: 17 YEAR: 2005 |
|--|---|

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On November 1, 2004, at approximately 4:44 p.m. CST, the Division 2 emergency diesel generator (DG) automatically started as a result of the loss of the Division 2 4160kv standby switchgear. The switchgear was de-energized as a result of an inadvertent trip signal generated during scheduled testing of the sudden overpressure relay on the preferred station service transformer supplying the switchgear. The Division 2 DG started and restored power to the standby switchgear as designed. The Division 2 residual heat removal (RHR) system was operating in the shutdown cooling mode at the time of the event, and was temporarily out of service as a result. Division 2 RHR was restarted approximately 50 minutes after the event. This is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that caused the automatic actuation of the Division 2 DG. At the time of the event, the plant was in cold shutdown for a refueling outage. This event was of minimal safety significance.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FAILURE CONTINUATION

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| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | |
| River Bend Station Unit 1 | 05000-458 | 2004 | - 004 | - 00 | 2 OF 3 |

REPORTED CONDITION

On November 1, 2004, at approximately 4:44 p.m. CST, the Division 2 emergency diesel generator (DG) (**DG**) automatically started as a result of the loss of the Division 2 4160kv standby switchgear. The switchgear was de-energized as a result of an inadvertent trip signal generated during scheduled testing of the sudden overpressure relay on the preferred station service transformer supplying the switchgear. The DG started and restored power to the standby switchgear as designed. At the time of the event, the plant was in cold shutdown for a refueling outage.

The Division 2 residual heat removal (RHR) system was operating in the fuel pool cooling assist mode at the time of the event, and was subsequently out of service for approximately 50 minutes. Bulk coolant temperature had increased approximately 4 degrees F by the time RHR was restored, and the highest measurement remained below 103 degrees F.

Core alterations were in progress at the time of the event, and this activity was suspended while plant systems were restored. The reactor cavity was flooded to greater than 23 feet, thus no emergency core cooling systems were required to be operable.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Three assessment teams were assembled to review specific elements of outage activities. All work on Division 1 was suspended pending completion of these reviews.

- Human performance deficiencies occurring thus far in the outage were studied to determine any potential common causes. This review included the work management approval process and supervisory oversight of tasks in the field.
- Ongoing work on all three safety-related divisions was reviewed to verify system configurations, control logic status, and fidelity of control room annunciators.
- Optimum methods for systematically restarting divisional work with a potential for affecting safety-related system configuration were developed, taking into account the recommendations of the other assessment teams.

Supervisors and above were briefed on actions from these reviews and expectations were reinforced prior to recommencing divisional work.

CAUSAL ANALYSIS and CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

The root cause analysis and development of corrective actions to prevent recurrence for this event are still in progress. These will be reported in a supplement to this LER.

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SAFETY ANALYSIS

The Division 2 DG started and restored power to the standby switchgear as designed. The reactor cavity was flooded to greater than 23 feet of water at the time of the event, thus no emergency core cooling systems were required to be operable. Bulk coolant temperature increased approximately 4 degrees, and remained below 103 degrees F. This event was of minimal safety significance.

(NOTE: Energy Industry Component Identification codes are annotated as (**XX**).)