Entergy

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December 28, 2004

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Licensee Event Report 50-458 / 04-003-00
River Bend Station – Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458
License No. NPF-47

File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

RBG-46377
RBF1-04-0239

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, enclosed is the subject Licensee Event Report. This is a preliminary report which will be supplemented upon completion of the root cause analysis report.

Sincerely,

David N. Lorfing
Manager – Licensing (acting)

DNL/dhw
enclosure

IE22

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
P. O. Box 1050
St. Francisville, LA 70775

INPO Records Center
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Public Utility Commission of Texas
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NRC FORM 366 (6-2004) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

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4. TITLE

Unplanned Automatic Start of Standby Diesel Generator Due to Loss of Division 1 Switchgear

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
10	31	2004	2004	- 003 -	00	12	28	2004	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

9. OPERATING MODE

5

10. POWER LEVEL

0

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: *(Check all that apply)*

☐ 20.2201(b)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
☐ 20.2201(d)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
☐ 20.2203(a)(1)	☐ 20.2203(a)(4)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	☒ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(x)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.36(c)(2)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	☐ 73.71(a)(4)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	☐ 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	☐ 73.71(a)(5)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	☐ OTHER
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

FACILITY NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
David N. Lorfing, Manager – Licensing (acting)	225-381-4157

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
na									

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

☒ YES *(If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)* ☐ NO

15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE

MONTH	DAY	YEAR
02	17	2005

ABSTRACT *(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)*

On October 31, 2004, at approximately 10:36 p.m. CST, an automatic start of the Division 1 emergency diesel generator (DG) occurred as a result of the loss of the Division 1 standby switchgear. The plant was in cold shutdown for a refueling outage at the time of the event. The normal feeder breaker to the Division 1 4160kv bus tripped during the installation of test jumpers in preparation for surveillance testing. The technician inadvertently contacted an adjacent terminal, generating a trip signal to the feeder breaker. The diesel generator started as designed on a bus low voltage condition, and its output breaker automatically closed, restoring power to the bus. At the time of the event, the reactor cavity was flooded to greater than 23 feet. The reactor water cleanup system was in service and the Division 2 residual heat removal system was operating in the shutdown cooling mode. These systems were unaffected by this event and continued to provide alternate means of coolant circulation. This is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in the automatic actuation of the Division 1 DG. This event was of minimal safety significance.

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REPORTED CONDITION

On October 31, 2004, at approximately 10:36 p.m. CST, an automatic start of the Division 1 emergency diesel generator (DG) (**DG**) occurred as a result of the loss of the Division 1 4160kv standby bus. The plant was in cold shutdown for a refueling outage at the time of the event. The normal feeder breaker to the Division 1 4160kv bus tripped during the installation of test jumpers in preparation for surveillance testing. The technician inadvertently contacted an adjacent terminal, generating a trip signal to the feeder breaker. The diesel generator started as designed on a bus low voltage condition, and its output breaker automatically closed, restoring power to the bus.

At the time of the event, the reactor cavity was flooded to greater than 23 feet. The reactor water cleanup system was in service, and the Division 2 residual heat removal system was operating in the fuel pool cooling assist mode. These systems were unaffected by this event and continued to provide alternate means of coolant circulation. The Division 1 residual heat removal system was operating in the shutdown cooling mode prior to the event, but tripped upon loss of the switchgear. It was restored to service approximately 40 minutes later.

The Division 1 DG was returned to the standby condition at 2:06 a.m. the following day.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A briefing was held with all Instrumentation & Control technicians and electricians to discuss the use of tape to cover exposed terminals when installing test connections on critical circuits in congested areas.

For the remainder of the surveillance test being performed, all work involving lifted leads and jumpers was monitored directly by the test director.

CAUSAL ANALYSIS and CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

The root cause analysis and development of corrective actions to prevent recurrence for this event are still in progress. These will be reported in a supplement to this LER.

SAFETY ANALYSIS

The Division 1 DG started as designed and restored power to its standby switchgear. At the time of the event, the reactor cavity was flooded to greater than 23 feet. The reactor water cleanup system was in service and the Division 2 residual heat removal system was operating in the shutdown cooling mode. These systems were unaffected

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by this event and continued to provide alternate means of coolant circulation and decay heat removal. Thus, this event was of minimal safety significance.

(NOTE: Energy Industry Component Identification codes are annotated as (**XX**).)