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December 23, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Serial No. 04-713
NSS&L/DF R0
Docket No. 50-423
License No. NPF-49

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3
LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (LBDCR 04-MP3-013)
RELOCATION OF SELECTED REFUELING OPERATIONS
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) hereby requests to amend Operating License NPF-49 for Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) to relocate selected Technical Specifications related to refueling operations and the associated Bases to the MPS3 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). These selected Technical Specifications do not fulfill any one or more of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) on items for which Technical Specifications must be established. Therefore, these Technical Specifications can be relocated verbatim to the TRM where changes are controlled under 10 CFR 50.59.

The proposed amendment does not involve a significant impact on public health and safety and does not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.92 (see Significant Hazards Consideration in Attachment 1).

The Site Operations Review Committee and the Management Safety Review Committee have reviewed and concurred with the determinations.

The NRC approved a similar license amendment (No. 240) for Millstone Power Station Unit 2 on February 10, 2000. Additionally Beaver Valley received a license amendment September 7, 2000 and D. C. Cook on April 18, 2002, for relocation of specifications for their fuel building cranes.

DNC is requesting NRC staff review and approval of the proposed change by August 1, 2005 to support effective planning for the fall 2005 refueling outage.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b), a copy of this license amendment request is being provided to the State of Connecticut.

If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Paul R. Willoughby at (804) 273-3572.

Very truly yours,



William R. Matthews
Senior Vice President – Nuclear Operations

Attachments: (3)

1. Evaluation of Proposed License Amendment
2. Marked-Up Pages
3. Re-typed Pages

Commitments made in this letter: None

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ATTACHMENT 1

LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (LBDCR 04-MP3-013)
RELOCATION OF SELECTED REFUELING OPERATIONS
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

EVALUATION OF PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT

**MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3
DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.**

Evaluation of Proposed License Amendment

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- 6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

1.0 DESCRIPTION

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) hereby requests to amend Operating License NPF-49 for Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) to relocate selected Technical Specifications related to refueling operations and the associated Bases to the MPS3 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). These selected Technical Specifications do not fulfill any one or more of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) on items for which Technical Specifications must be established. Therefore, these Technical Specifications can be relocated verbatim to the TRM where changes are controlled under 10 CFR 50.59.

These specifications were originally proposed as candidates for relocation based on an evaluation by the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) in 1987. The NRC also concluded that the above-mentioned specifications did not need to be retained in the Technical Specifications in a letter from Dr. T. E. Murley to the WOG on May 9, 1988. The basis for the conclusions in the both of these evaluations is the same as the basis for the Millstone requirements. The Commission's Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors, dated July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132), encourages licensees to upgrade their Technical Specifications by evaluating their Limiting Conditions for Operation against the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria. These changes are consistent with NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants," Revision 3, dated March 31, 2004.

DNC is requesting NRC staff review and approval of the proposed change by August 1, 2005 to support effective planning for the fall 2005 refueling outage.

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGES

Change 1

Technical Specification 3/4.9.5, "Communications," will be relocated to the TRM where changes to this information will be controlled under 10 CFR 50.59. The text on the corresponding page will be deleted and replaced with, "THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK."

Change 2

Technical Specification 3/4.9.6, "Refueling Machine," will be relocated to the TRM where changes to this information will be controlled under 10 CFR 50.59. The text on the corresponding page will be deleted and replaced with, "THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK."

Change 3

Technical Specification 3/4.9.7, "Crane Travel – Spent Fuel Storage Areas," will be relocated to the TRM where changes to this information will be controlled under 10 CFR 50.59. The text on the corresponding page will be deleted and replaced with, "THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK."

Change 4

Index pages xi, xii and xv will be revised by eliminating the sections corresponding to Technical Specifications 3/4.9.5, 3/4.9.6, and 3/4.9.7 and the associated Bases sections. The titles of these sections will be replaced with the word "DELETED".

Change 5

The proposed amendment will relocate the associated Technical Specification Bases sections 3/4.9.5, 3/4.9.6, and 3/4.9.7 to the TRM. Specifically, the text associated with each section in the Bases will be deleted and the section title will be replaced with the word, "DELETED." A mark-up of the changes to the Bases section is provided for information in Attachment 2.

3.0 BACKGROUND

3.1 Communications During Refueling Operations

Communications are required to be established during refueling operations to ensure refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions. Currently the communications equipment consists of FM radios at the two refueling areas with their base stations hardwired to a command station in the control room. Several Technical Specifications actions require suspension of fuel movement when a limiting condition for operation cannot be met. Contact with refueling operations personnel conducting fuel movements ensures these requirements can be met promptly. Although the FSAR does not specifically address communication in this context, plant communication is generally discussed in FSAR section 9.5.2.2.

3.2 Fuel Handling System

The fuel handling system consists of the equipment needed for refueling operations and is described generally in FSAR section 9.1.4.2.1 and in more detail in section 9.1.4.2.4. The refueling machine is located in containment and is used to move fuel between the reactor vessel and the fuel transfer system. The fuel transfer system moves fuel assemblies between the containment and the fuel building through the fuel transfer tube. In the fuel building, fuel assemblies are transported using the spent fuel

bridge and hoist. The new fuel handling crane is used to remove new fuel assemblies from their shipping containers and transfer them to the new fuel dry storage vault and eventually to the fuel elevator in the transfer canal. The safety features including interlocks and limit switches are discussed in detail in FSAR section 9.1.4.3.

The fuel handling accident in the fuel building assumes that one fuel assembly is dropped into the spent fuel pool onto another fuel assembly. This results in the rupture of all of the rods in the dropped assembly and fifty rods in the struck assembly. This accident and the fuel handling accident in containment are discussed in FSAR section 15.7.4. The NRC issued a license amendment (203) on February 20, 2002 related to the fuel handling accident for MPS3. The movement of heavy loads in the spent fuel storage area is addressed in FSAR section 9.1.5.

3.3 Reason for Proposed Amendment

The proposed amendment is being requested to more closely align the content of the Refueling Operations Technical Specifications for MPS3 with NUREG 1431, Revision 3. The NRC approved a similar license amendment (No. 240) for MPS2 on February 10, 2000. Additionally Beaver Valley received a license amendment September 7, 2000 and D. C. Cook on April 18, 2002, for relocation of specifications for their fuel building cranes.

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 Details of the Proposed Amendment

Change 1

The proposed amendment will relocate Technical Specification 3/4.9.5, "Communications," verbatim to the TRM where changes to this information will be controlled under 10 CFR 50.59.

This specification requires direct communication between the control room and the refueling station, to ensure any abnormal change in the facility status, as indicated on the control room instrumentation, can be communicated to refueling station personnel. Relocation of this Technical Specification to the TRM does not imply any reduction in its importance in ensuring communication between the control room and the refueling station. This Technical Specification was a candidate for relocation during the development of the Standard Technical Specification by the Westinghouse Owner's Group. The proposed change will not alter the requirement on communication between the control room and the refueling station, it will not alter any of the assumptions used in the fuel handling accident analysis, nor will it cause any safety system parameters to exceed their acceptance limit. Therefore, the proposed change will have no adverse effect on plant safety.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Criterion 1

The communication equipment ensures prompt notification to refueling personnel to alert them to potential degradation in plant operation. This Technical Specification related to communications during refueling does not cover installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. This specification does not satisfy Criterion 1.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Criterion 2

The requirement to have communication between the refueling station and the control room is not an assumption of any design basis accident. This Technical Specification does not cover a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. This specification does not satisfy Criterion 2.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Criterion 3

The communication equipment does not perform any accident mitigating functions. This Technical Specification does not cover a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. This specification does not satisfy Criterion 3.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Criterion 4

The operating requirement on communications between the control room and the refueling station, which is covered by this Technical Specification, has not been shown to be risk significant to public health and safety by either operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment. This Technical Specification does not cover a component or system related to key safety functions requiring risk review/unavailability monitoring in accordance with the station conduct of outages procedure. This specification does not satisfy Criterion 4.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Conclusion

This Technical Specification for communication during refueling operations does not fulfill any one or more of the 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) criteria on items for which Technical Specifications must be established. Therefore, this Technical Specification can be relocated verbatim to the TRM.

Change 2

The proposed amendment will relocate Technical Specification 3/4.9.6, "Refueling Machine," to the TRM where changes to this information will be controlled under 10 CFR 50.59.

This specification ensures that the lifting devices on the refueling machine and auxiliary hoist have adequate capacity to lift the weight of a fuel assembly or drive rod. Additionally, this specification ensures that the automatic load limiting device on the refueling machine and the load indicator on the auxiliary hoist are available to prevent damage to the core internals and reactor vessel in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations. The automatic load limiting device and the load indicator are not assumed to function to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident and are checked on a periodic basis to ensure operability. There is no accident analysis based on the minimum capacity and overload cutoff limits of the cranes. Relocation of this Technical Specification to the TRM does not imply any reduction in its importance in ensuring that the lifting device on the refueling machine has adequate capacity. The proposed change will not alter the requirement that the lifting device on the refueling machine has adequate capacity, it will not alter any of the assumptions used in the accident analysis, nor will it cause any safety system parameters to exceed their acceptance limit. Therefore, the proposed change will have no adverse effect on plant safety.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Criterion 1

This Technical Specification does not cover installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. This specification does not satisfy Criterion 1.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Criterion 2

This Technical Specification does not cover a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. This specification does not satisfy Criterion 2.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Criterion 3

The automatic load limiting device and/or load indicator are not assumed to function to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident. This Technical Specification, which ensures the lifting devices on the refueling machine and auxiliary hoist have adequate capacity, does not cover a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or

transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. This specification does not satisfy Criterion 3.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Criterion 4

The operating requirement to ensure the lifting devices on the refueling machine and auxiliary hoist have adequate capacity, which are covered by this Technical Specification, have not been shown to be risk significant to public health and safety by either operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment. This Technical Specification does not cover a component or system related to key safety functions requiring risk review/unavailability monitoring in accordance with the station conduct of outages procedure. This specification does not satisfy Criterion 4.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Conclusion

This Technical Specification for the refueling machine's operability does not fulfill any one or more of the 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) criteria on items for which Technical Specifications must be established. Therefore, this Technical Specification can be relocated verbatim to the TRM.

Change 3

Technical Specification 3/4.9.7, "Crane Travel – Spent Fuel Storage Areas," will be relocated to the TRM where changes to this information will be controlled under 10 CFR 50.59.

This specification ensures loads in excess of 2200 pounds will not be moved over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage racks. This represents the working load of the fuel assembly plus handling tool. This specification ensures that in the event this load is dropped, the activity released will be limited to the damage and consequences incurred by the drop of one fuel assembly, consistent with the design basis accident analyses for a fuel handling accident. The load drop event is not a design basis accident and is not discussed in the FSAR.

Crane interlocks and physical stops that prevent crane travel with loads in excess of 2200 pounds are not assumed to function to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident and are checked on a periodic basis to ensure operability. Relocation of this Technical Specification to the TRM does not imply any reduction in its importance in ensuring that loads in excess of 2200 pounds are prohibited from travel over fuel in the spent fuel pool. The proposed change will not alter the requirement that the crane interlocks and/or physical stops are operable, it will not alter any of the assumptions used in the spent fuel pool fuel handling accident analysis, nor will it cause any safety system parameters to exceed their acceptance limit. Therefore, the proposed change will have no adverse effect on plant safety.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Criterion 1

This Technical Specification does not cover installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. This specification does not satisfy Criterion 1.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Criterion 2

This specification ensures that loads in excess of 2200 pounds will not be moved over fuel assemblies stored in the spent fuel storage racks. Therefore, for a load drop event, the activity released is limited to that contained in the design basis fuel handling accident analysis. Restrictions on heavy load moves over irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool also prevent any possible distortion of fuel assemblies in the storage racks from achieving a critical configuration. Criterion 2 requires design features or operating restrictions associated with the limiting condition for operation to be initial conditions of a design-basis accident. The initial condition of the design-basis fuel handling accident is the dropping of a single fuel assembly. The crane interlocks and physical stops are in place to prevent exceeding the initial condition (damage to more than the dropped assembly plus 50 rods in the second assembly) but is not an initial condition in and of itself. The heavy load limit of 2200 pounds is also not an initial condition of any analyzed accident and is provided to prevent operation in a condition that could lead to an unanalyzed load drop accident. This specification does not cover a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. Therefore, this specification does not satisfy Criterion 2.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Criterion 3

This Technical Specification, which ensures loads in excess of 2200 pounds are prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the storage pool, does not cover a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. This specification does not satisfy Criterion 3.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Criterion 4

The operating requirement to ensure that loads in excess of 2200 pounds are prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the storage pool, which is covered by this Technical Specification, has not been shown to be risk significant to public health and safety by either operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment. This Technical Specification does not cover a component or system related to key safety

functions requiring risk review/unavailability monitoring in accordance with the station conduct of outages procedure. This specification does not satisfy Criterion 4.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) Conclusion

This Technical Specification does not fulfill any one or more of the 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) criteria on items for which Technical Specifications must be established. Therefore, this Technical Specification can be relocated verbatim to the TRM.

Changes 4 and 5

The modification of the index and Bases pages are consistent with the relocation of the Technical Specifications to the TRM. The Bases will be moved verbatim to the TRM where changes will be controlled under 10 CFR 50.59. These changes do not fulfill any of the criteria under 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

4.2 Summary

The proposed amendment to relocate the Technical Specifications associated with communications during refueling, the refueling machine, and crane travel over the spent fuel pool agrees with the industry standard in NUREG 1431, "Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants," Revision 3. These requirements, although important to plant operation, do not meet 10 CFR 50.36 criteria as items for which a limiting condition for operation must be established in the plant Technical Specifications. In addition, these changes can be made without adverse impact to plant operations or to the health and safety of the public. Therefore these changes can be relocated to the TRM where modification to these requirements will be controlled under 10 CFR 50.59.

5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration

Refueling Operations Technical Specifications 3/4.9.5, "Communications," 3/4.9.6, "Refueling Machine," and 3/4.9.7, "Crane Travel – Spent Fuel Storage Areas," are proposed to be relocated to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) where future changes will be controlled in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. The communications specification requires communication between the control room and the refueling station to ensure any abnormal change in the facility status, as indicated on the control room instrumentation, can be communicated to the refueling station personnel. The refueling machine specification ensures the refueling equipment used for fuel movements inside containment has sufficient load capacity and ensures the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive force in the event they are

inadvertently lifted. The specification for spent fuel pool crane travel provides a restriction for movement of heavy loads in excess of 2200 pounds over irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool.

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC) has evaluated whether or not a Significant Hazards Consideration (SHC) is involved with the proposed changes by addressing the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as discussed below.

Criterion 1:

Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The communications equipment, refueling machine, and spent fuel pool crane are not designed to perform accident mitigation functions. The proposed change to relocate selected refueling specifications does not modify any plant equipment and does not impact any failure modes that could lead to an accident. Relocating the specifications to the TRM where changes would be controlled under the 10 CFR 50.59 process does not change the ability of the communications or refueling equipment to function as expected. Additionally, these specifications have no effect on the consequence of any analyzed accident since the equipment is not related to accident mitigation. Based on this discussion, the proposed amendment does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2:

Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed changes do not modify any plant equipment and there is no impact on the capability of the existing equipment to perform their intended functions to move fuel safely or conduct refueling operations while in contact with the control room. No system setpoints are being modified and no changes are being made to the method in which refueling operations are conducted. No changes to the heavy loads program are being proposed by this change. No new failure modes are introduced by the proposed changes. The proposed amendment does not introduce accident initiators or malfunctions that would cause a new or different kind of accident. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3:

Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The relocation of Technical Specification 3/4.9.5, "Refueling Operations, Communications," to the TRM does not imply any reduction in its importance in insuring communication between the control room and the refueling station. The proposed change will not alter the requirement on communication between the control room and the refueling station, it will not alter any of the assumptions used in the fuel handling accident analysis, nor will it cause any safety system parameters to exceed their acceptance limit. The relocation of Technical Specification 3/4.9.6, "Refueling Machine" to the TRM does not alter the requirement for the lifting device on the refueling machine to have adequate capacity or for the interlocks to be demonstrated operable prior to fuel movement. The assumptions used in the accident analysis are not impacted by this change and no impact to any safety system parameters will result. The relocation of Technical Specification 3/4.9.7, "Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Areas," to the TRM will not alter the requirement that the crane interlocks and/or physical stops are operable, nor will it alter any of the assumptions used in the fuel handling accident analysis. Heavy load lifts are administratively controlled by a safe load path and crane interlocks. The proposed changes do not modify any heavy load path criteria. Administrative changes associated with the proposed revision such as relocation of associated Technical Specification Bases to the TRM will not have an impact on any established safety margins.

The proposed changes do not affect any of the assumptions used in the accident analysis, nor do they affect any operability requirements for equipment important to plant safety. Therefore, the proposed changes will not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the Bases for Technical Specifications covered in this License Amendment Request.

In summary, DNC concludes that the proposed amendment does not represent a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c).

5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria

Existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation that do not meet the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) can be relocated to another licensee controlled document.

The 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) criteria is as follows:

- “(ii) A technical specification limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor must be established for each item meeting one or more of the following criteria:
- (A) Criterion 1. Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
 - (B) Criterion 2. A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
 - (C) Criterion 3. A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
 - (D) Criterion 4. A structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.”

The Millstone Power Station Unit 3 Technical Requirements Manual is controlled by station administrative procedures and all changes to the requirements are evaluated using the 10 CFR 50.59 process.

In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission’s regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

DNC has determined that the proposed amendment would change requirements with respect to use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined by 10 CFR 20, or would change inspection or surveillance requirements. DNC has evaluated the proposed change and has determined that the change does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released off site, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

ATTACHMENT 2

LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (LBDCR 04-MP3-013)
RELOCATION OF SELECTED REFUELING OPERATIONS TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS

MARKED-UP PAGES

MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3
DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

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REFUELING OPERATIONS

JAN 31 1986

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

DELETE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.5 Direct communications shall be maintained between the control room and personnel at the refueling station.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS.

ACTION:

When direct communications between the control room and personnel at the refueling station cannot be maintained, suspend all CORE ALTERATIONS.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.5 Direct communications between the control room and personnel at the refueling station shall be demonstrated within 1 hour prior to the start of and at least once per 12 hours during CORE ALTERATIONS.

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REFUELING OPERATIONS

JAN 31 1986

3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.9.6 The refueling machine and auxiliary hoist shall be used for movement of drive rods or fuel assemblies and shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. The refueling machine used for movement of fuel assemblies having:
 - 1) A minimum capacity of 4000 pounds, and
 - 2) An overload cutoff limit less than or equal to 3900 pounds.
- b. The auxiliary hoist used for latching and unlatching drive rods having:
 - 1) A minimum capacity of 3000 pounds, and
 - 2) A load indicator which shall be used to prevent lifting loads in excess of 1000 pounds.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of drive rods or fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel.

ACTION:

With the requirements for crane and/or hoist OPERABILITY not satisfied, suspend use of any inoperable manipulator crane and/or auxiliary hoist from operations involving the movement of drive rods and fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.6.1 Each manipulator crane used for movement of fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 100 hours prior to the start of such operations by performing a load test of at least 4000 pounds and demonstrating an automatic load cutoff when the crane load exceeds 3900 pounds.

4.9.6.2 Each auxiliary hoist and associated load indicator used for movement of drive rods within the reactor vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 100 hours prior to the start of such operations by performing a load test of at least 3000 pounds.

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REFUELING OPERATIONS

November 28, 2000

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE AREAS

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.7 Loads in excess of 2200 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the storage pool.

APPLICABILITY: With fuel assemblies in the storage pool.

ACTION:

- a. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, place the crane load in a safe condition.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.7 Crane interlocks and physical stops which prevent crane travel with loads in excess of 2200 pounds over the fuel storage pool shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 7 days prior to crane use and at least once per 7 days thereafter during crane operation. Administrative controls may be used in lieu of crane interlocks and physical stops for handling fuel racks, spent fuel pool gates, or loads less than 2200 pounds.

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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

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information only.

March 17, 2004

BASES

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

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The requirement for communications capability ~~ensures that~~ refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of ~~significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.~~

3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE

DELETED

The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine ensure that: (1) ~~refueling~~ machines will be used for movement of drive rods and fuel assemblies, (2) each crane has sufficient load capacity to lift a drive rod or fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals and reactor vessel are protected from ~~excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.~~

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL SPENT FUEL STORAGE AREAS

DELETED

The restriction on movement of loads over fuel assemblies in the ~~storage pool ensures that~~ in the event this load is dropped: (1) the activity release ~~will be less than the activity release~~ assumed in the design basis fuel handling accident, and (2) the resulting geometry will not result in a critical array.

3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

3/4.9.8.1 HIGH WATER LEVEL

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System in MODE 6 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), as required by GDC 34, to provide mixing of borated coolant and to prevent boron stratification. Heat is removed from the RCS by circulating reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchanger(s), where the heat is transferred to the Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System. The coolant is then returned to the RCS via the RCS cold leg(s). Operation of the RHR system for normal cooldown or decay heat removal is manually accomplished from the control room. The heat removal is manually accomplished from the control room. The heat removal rate is adjusted by controlling the flow of reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchanger(s) and the bypass. Mixing of the reactor coolant is maintained by this continuous circulation of reactor coolant through the RHR system.

ATTACHMENT 3

LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (LBDCR 04-MP3-013)
RELOCATION OF SELECTED REFUELING OPERATIONS
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

RE-TYPED PAGES

MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3
DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

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