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Energy to Serve Your World™

NL-04-2389

December 10, 2004

Docket No.: 50-425

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
Licensee Event Report 2-2004-003
Inoperable ESF Room Cooler Results in a Condition
Prohibited by the Technical Specifications

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby submits a Vogtle Electric Generating Plant licensee event report for a condition that was determined to be reportable on October 22, 2004.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Sincerely,

Don E. Grissette

DEG/DWM/daj

Enclosure: LER 2-2004-003

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Mr. J. T. Gasser, Executive Vice President
Mr. W. F. Kitchens, General Manager – Plant Vogtle
RType: CVC7000

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Dr. W. D. Travers, Regional Administrator
Mr. C. Gratton, NRR Project Manager – Vogtle
Mr. G. J. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector – Vogtle

IE22

NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104		EXPIRES 7/31/2004				
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)				Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,						
1. FACILITY NAME Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 2				2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000-425		3. PAGE 1 OF 3				
4. TITLE INOPERABLE ESF ROOM COOLER RESULTS IN A CONDITION PROHIBITED BY THE TECH. SPECS.										
5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE				
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
10	22	2004	2004	003	00	12	10	2004		
9. OPERATING MODE 1			11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § : (Check all that apply)							
10. POWER LEVEL 100			20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(3)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)(B)			
			20.2201(d)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)			
			20.2203(a)(1)		50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)			
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		50.36(c)(1)(iii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)			
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)			
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.46(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)			
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)			
			20.2203(a)(2)(v)		X 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)			
			20.2203(a)(2)(vi)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
			20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER										
NAME Tom Webb, Performance Analysis						TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (706) 826-3105				
13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED						15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE				
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)				X NO		DATE		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)										
<p>On October 22, 2004, a system engineer found a fan compartment access door improperly secured on an Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Room Cooler. The access door was hinged, and latched at top and bottom. However, to maintain seismic qualification of this ESF room cooler, the door must be held closed either with clips that are screwed to the housing, or by utilizing a hasp with a padlock. Neither method was installed. A padlock was quickly placed into the existing hasp and the cooler was returned to operable status. However, the failure to maintain the room cooler seismically qualified represents operation of Unit 2 in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications.</p> <p>The access door to the room cooler is situated in a difficult to reach location and, in all likelihood, had not been opened since prior to initial unit start-up in 1989. Therefore, the cause of this event was improper original construction and improper start-up acceptance in failing to ensure the door met seismic qualifications by being properly secured. A walkdown of approximately 50 ESF room coolers has been completed and no similar conditions have been found that would render coolers inoperable.</p>										

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL YEAR	REVISION NUMBER	
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 2	05000-425	2004	-- 003	-- 00	2 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B). The unit operated in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specification (TS) when an engineered safety features (ESF) room cooler was inoperable for a period of time greater than that allowed by the action requirements.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of the discovery of this event, Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (Power Operations) at 100% of rated thermal power. Other than that described herein, there was no inoperable equipment that contributed to the occurrence of this event.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

In early October 2004, screws were found missing from the housing of an ESF room cooler, raising the possibility that the cooler, or surrounding components, may become inoperable during a seismic event. A review determined that the missing screws did not render components inoperable. As a precaution, plant personnel began inspecting all ESF room coolers to verify that housings, panels and doors were secure. On October 22, 2004, a system engineer found a fan compartment access door improperly secured on an Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Room Cooler, 2-1539-A7-002. The access door was hinged, and latched at top and bottom. However, to maintain seismic qualification, the door must be held closed either with clips that are screwed to the housing, or by utilizing a hasp with a padlock. Neither method was installed. A padlock was quickly placed into the existing hasp and the cooler was returned to operable status.

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The access door to the room cooler is situated in a difficult to reach location and, in all likelihood, had not been opened since prior to initial unit start-up in 1989. Therefore, the cause of this event was improper original construction and improper start-up acceptance in failing to ensure the door met the seismic qualifications by being properly secured.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
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		2004	-- 003	-- 00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

An engineering evaluation determined that the safety related components in the room involved will continue to perform their intended functions at temperatures up to 130 degrees F. It was further determined that under the worst case conditions, the temperature of the room involved would not exceed 130 degrees F, even with the cooler out-of-service. Therefore, no safety function is lost due to this cooler being inoperable. Furthermore, no design basis event has occurred that would have precipitated the worst case conditions. Based on these considerations, there was no adverse effect on plant safety or on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- 1) A padlock was placed into the existing hasp, returning the room cooler to operability.
- 2) A walkdown of approximately 50 ESF room coolers has been completed, and no similar conditions have been found that would render coolers inoperable.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- 1) Previous Similar Events:
None
- 2) Failed Components:
None
- 3) Energy Industry Identification System Codes:
Control Building HVAC System - VI