

**Don E. Grissette**  
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*Energy to Serve Your World™*

NL-04-2389

December 10, 2004

Docket No.: 50-425

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant  
Licensee Event Report 2-2004-003  
Inoperable ESF Room Cooler Results in a Condition  
Prohibited by the Technical Specifications

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby submits a Vogtle Electric Generating Plant licensee event report for a condition that was determined to be reportable on October 22, 2004.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Don E. Grissette".

Don E. Grissette

DEG/DWM/daj

Enclosure: LER 2-2004-003

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company  
Mr. J. T. Gasser, Executive Vice President  
Mr. W. F. Kitchens, General Manager – Plant Vogtle  
RType: CVC7000

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Dr. W. D. Travers, Regional Administrator  
Mr. C. Gratton, NRR Project Manager – Vogtle  
Mr. G. J. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector – Vogtle

IED2

1. FACILITY NAME  
**Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 2**

2. DOCKET NUMBER  
**05000-425**

3. PAGE  
**1 OF 3**

4. TITLE  
**INOPERABLE ESF ROOM COOLER RESULTS IN A CONDITION PROHIBITED BY THE TECH. SPECS.**

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
10	22	2004	2004	003	00	12	10	2004		05000
										05000

9. OPERATING MODE	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § : (Check all that apply)			
1	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10. POWER LEVEL 100	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(iii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	OTHER
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER  
 NAME: **Tom Webb, Performance Analysis** TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code): **(706) 826-3105**

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED: YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO   
 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE: MONTH  DAY  YEAR

16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On October 22, 2004, a system engineer found a fan compartment access door improperly secured on an Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Room Cooler. The access door was hinged, and latched at top and bottom. However, to maintain seismic qualification of this ESF room cooler, the door must be held closed either with clips that are screwed to the housing, or by utilizing a hasp with a padlock. Neither method was installed. A padlock was quickly placed into the existing hasp and the cooler was returned to operable status. However, the failure to maintain the room cooler seismically qualified represents operation of Unit 2 in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications.

The access door to the room cooler is situated in a difficult to reach location and, in all likelihood, had not been opened since prior to initial unit start-up in 1989. Therefore, the cause of this event was improper original construction and improper start-up acceptance in failing to ensure the door met seismic qualifications by being properly secured. A walkdown of approximately 50 ESF room coolers has been completed and no similar conditions have been found that would render coolers inoperable.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 2	05000-425	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL YEAR	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 3
		2004	-- 003	-- 00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

**A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT**

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B). The unit operated in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specification (TS) when an engineered safety features (ESF) room cooler was inoperable for a period of time greater than that allowed by the action requirements.

**B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT**

At the time of the discovery of this event, Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (Power Operations) at 100% of rated thermal power. Other than that described herein, there was no inoperable equipment that contributed to the occurrence of this event.

**C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT**

In early October 2004, screws were found missing from the housing of an ESF room cooler, raising the possibility that the cooler, or surrounding components, may become inoperable during a seismic event. A review determined that the missing screws did not render components inoperable. As a precaution, plant personnel began inspecting all ESF room coolers to verify that housings, panels and doors were secure. On October 22, 2004, a system engineer found a fan compartment access door improperly secured on an Auxiliary Relay Cabinet Room Cooler, 2-1539-A7-002. The access door was hinged, and latched at top and bottom. However, to maintain seismic qualification, the door must be held closed either with clips that are screwed to the housing, or by utilizing a hasp with a padlock. Neither method was installed. A padlock was quickly placed into the existing hasp and the cooler was returned to operable status.

**D. CAUSE OF EVENT**

The access door to the room cooler is situated in a difficult to reach location and, in all likelihood, had not been opened since prior to initial unit start-up in 1989. Therefore, the cause of this event was improper original construction and improper start-up acceptance in failing to ensure the door met the seismic qualifications by being properly secured.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 2	05000-425	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL YEAR	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
		2004	-- 003	-- 00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

**E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT**

An engineering evaluation determined that the safety related components in the room involved will continue to perform their intended functions at temperatures up to 130 degrees F. It was further determined that under the worst case conditions, the temperature of the room involved would not exceed 130 degrees F, even with the cooler out-of-service. Therefore, no safety function is lost due to this cooler being inoperable. Furthermore, no design basis event has occurred that would have precipitated the worst case conditions. Based on these considerations, there was no adverse effect on plant safety or on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

**F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS**

- 1) A padlock was placed into the existing hasp, returning the room cooler to operability.
- 2) A walkdown of approximately 50 ESF room coolers has been completed, and no similar conditions have been found that would render coolers inoperable.

**G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**

- 1) Previous Similar Events:  
None
- 2) Failed Components:  
None
- 3) Energy Industry Identification System Codes:  
Control Building HVAC System - VI