

Outline for Report on the

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
FOR SPENT FUEL DRY STORAGE

I. Executive Summary

- A. Purpose and Background
- B. Analysis Results
- C. Recommendations

II. Introduction

III. Purpose

IV. Background

- A. New security environment in U.S.
- B. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs)
 - 1. Fuel Handling and Loading
 - 2. Transfer Equipment and Transfer Operations
 - 3. Dry Storage Units
 - 4. Dry Storage Support Pad
 - 5. Monitoring and Maintenance
- C. Threat Development/Definition Process
- D. Scenario Development Process
- E. Discussion of Realistic, Bounding or Other Conditions
- F. Threat Assessment of ISFSIs Prior to 9/11/01

V. Description of New Threats (Ref: Commission Scoping Paper of 11/28/01, Attach. #10)

Ex 2

VI. Description of New Event Scenarios from New Threats Against ISFSIs

- A. (To be determined)
- B. (")
- C. (")
- D. (")
- E. (")
- F. Results of Scenarios
 - 1. Release of Radioactive Materials from a Breach During Handling/Transfer on ISFSI Site
 - 2. Release of Radioactive Materials from a Breached Storage System on ISFSI Site
- G. Scenario Assumptions
 - 1. Theft of radioactive material for diversion from ISFSI site will not occur

Portions Ex 2

E(1)