(1)

≈ 50 people.

Polo Verde - AIT exit From State: Toby Morales, Aubrey Godwin B. Mallett

Licensee: Overbeck, Dave Smith, Dave Mauller - Jim LeVine
NRC: Gody, Pavlik, Hannah, Salgado, Jim Adams, Brock Henderson, Claude Johnson, Tim Conner
Tony Gody's Comments
(ITV Station)

Conclusion - overall: - 6/14 event
- uninterrupted ground Fault
- PV responded appropriately - nevertheless
no. of issues - short & long term
- corrected those immediate for continued operation.
- all offsite power - to PV disrupted & all 3 units shutdown.

Me:
✓ AIT - 2nd highest level of our inspection - imp't
we reviewed timely to assess - licensee correct actions.
& share findings w/you.

7:50 am - NOUE - all 3 units
- equip. failure in west wing
7:57 am - ALERT on Unit 2



* safely shutdown all units. - all 3 responded
- operator actions appropriate.
* No. of actions to improve reliability in offsite power lines.
- Aggressive pressure of the causes.

Tony - spoke to workers & licensee

- losing all 3 units at same time - caused communication & coordination issues.

D/15

From Greg Overbeck

- understand info provided - Agree.
- plants are designed to safely shutdown in LOOP.
  & staff responded as trained.
  - but everything not perfect. several deficiencies corrected

[1] ? connection btwn NE & this one
answer: we are looking to see if - lessons learned "generically"
- There are differences.

[2] ? how triggered in w/ red hawk & Duke plants' response
any reason why those 2 failed & not Mesquite
& Arlington valley.
me: Loop & designed - but not acceptable for this to occur

[3] - ? relay out on line & demarcation point when not NRC's concern.

(4) ? did not cause delay plants startups in 8/03

(5) ? Mark - & Moriety 2 miles from plants - report b/c systems did what supposed to do. & outside event! - need to focus on + side instead of negative.

(6) ? report - publically available

- 2 issues from Jim LeVine & Greg Overbeck after:
  1. Security - things asking to do are different than plan agreed upon w/ NRC but industry (keeping racing, bar & individuals keep asking for things & not sure how fits in
  2. Security - consistency of response to 6/18 advisory - some plants not saying with trip plant.

B. Mallett's

Palo Verde - AIT exit

- Let me summarize, regulatory conclusions from Tony's findings

Message at end from me:

- Glad to see the interest -

- As Tony indicated, some points I want to emphasize

(1) The 6/14 event where ~~the~~ offsite power line problem cause (a) loss all incoming power lines to power safety systems at Palo Verde

(b) lost operation of all 3 units at same time was a significant one - as shown by our response, licensee response & our discussion

(2) Although plant response to put all 3 plants in safe condition and ~~the~~ to correct immediate safety problem was timely and sufficient for continued operation ~~is~~ ~~[illegible]~~

There are no. of problems that occurred that ~~are~~ were not ~~acceptable~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~improved~~ ~~[illegible]~~

not acceptable or not [illegible] must be addressed in the long term. Top 3 one:

(A) enhance independence/reliability of offsite power to be best can be

(B) Make certain way aspect of U2 EDG A not loading to vital bus is reviewed thoroughly before declare fixed

(C) improve causes of several interface problems which complicated emergency response.

(3) where do we go from here - continuing review for some issues long term