



JUL 30 2004

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U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Units 1 and 2
Dockets 50-282 and 50-306
License Nos. DPR-42 and DPR-60

Supplement to Bulletin 2002-01, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation And Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity," 60-Day Response For The Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Request For Additional Information (TAC Nos. MB4568 and MB4569)

By letter dated January 20, 2003, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, (NMC) responded to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) dated November 18, 2002. The January 20, 2003, letter noted, "The pressurizer has no Alloy 600 penetrations or Alloy 82/182 welds." This statement was based on information available at that time including Westinghouse reports developed as a result of a Westinghouse Owners Group effort to identify all locations where Alloy 600 is in use. The January 20, 2003, letter also stated, "The reactor coolant piping consists of the following: ...and a 14-inch, schedule 140 surge line pipe between the pressurizer and one hot leg."

Subsequent investigation by Westinghouse determined that the Unit 2 pressurizer was repaired prior to being shipped to the site. Westinghouse records indicate that as part of this repair an Alloy 82 weld was used on the Unit 2 pressurizer surge line safe end to nozzle weld. The Westinghouse investigation and additional investigation by NMC did not identify any other penetrations on the Unit 2 (or Unit 1) pressurizer that contain Alloy 600 or Alloy 82/182 welds.

Additional review of the January 20, 2003, letter found the surge line pipe that was described as a 14-inch, schedule 140 pipe is actually a ten-inch, schedule 140 pipe that is connected to the 14-inch pressurizer surge line nozzle.

The NRC RAI requested information on Inspection Techniques, Personnel Qualifications, Extent of Coverage, Frequency, Degree of Insulation Removal/Insulation Type, and Corrective Action for Alloy 600 penetrations, bolted connections, and carbon steel pressure vessels. Attachment 2 to the January 20, 2003, letter titled "Table 1 -

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Alloy 600 Penetrations, Bolted Connection Inspections and Carbon Steel Pressure Vessels," included the requested information. The requested information for the Unit 2 pressurizer surge line safe end to nozzle weld inspections is provided below:

- Visual examination by a VT-2 qualified examiner at each refueling with the mirrored insulation in place. Corrective actions for this examination are per Prairie Island procedures H2 and SP-2070.
- Ultrasonic examination by a UT qualified examiner once per 10 year interval. The mirrored insulation is removed for this inspection. The extent of coverage and corrective actions are per American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code (ASME), Section XI.
- Liquid penetrant examination by a PT qualified examiner once per 10 year interval. The mirrored insulation is removed for this inspection. The extent of coverage and corrective actions are per ASME, Section XI.


A review of past ASME, Section XI, Inservice Inspection of the subject weld indicates it was last examined in 2002 using ultrasonic and liquid penetrant methods. The examinations identified no indications.

Summary of Commitments

This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on JUL 30 2004


Joseph M. Solymosy
Site Vice President, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Nuclear Management Company, LLC

cc: Administrator, Region III, USNRC
Project Manager, Prairie Island, USNRC
Resident Inspector, Prairie Island, USNRC