
EDO Principal Correspondence Control

DUE: 08/12/04 EDO CONTROL: G20040522 FROM: DOC DT: 07/30/04 FINAL REPLY: Danielle Brian Project on Government Oversight (POGO) TO: Chairman Diaz FOR SIGNATURE OF : ** GRN ** CRC NO: 04-0486 Reyes, EDO DESC: ROUTING: NEI's Hiring of Wackenhut Corp. to Supply/Manage Reyes Adversary Teams for the Force-on-Force Program Norry Virgilio Kane Merschoff Dean DATE: 08/03/04 Burns Dyer, NRR CONTACT: ASSIGNED TO: Cyr, OGC NSIR Zimmerman SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS: Add Commission on for concurrence. Commission to review response prior to dispatch.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET

Date Printed: Aug 02, 2004 14:23

PAPER NUMBER:	LTR-04-0486	LOGGING DATE: 08/02/2004
ACTION OFFICE:	EDO	
AUTHOR:	Danielle Brian (POGO)	
AFFILIATION:		
ADDRESSEE:	CHRM Nils Diaz	
SUBJECT:	Expresses concern of NEI's hiring of Wackenhut Corp. to supply/manage adversary teams for force-on-force program	
ACTION:	Signature of EDO	
DISTRIBUTION:	RF, SECY to Ack	
LETTER DATE:	07/30/2004	
ACKNOWLEDGED	Νο	
SPECIAL HANDLING:	Commission to review prior to dispatch	
NOTES:		
FILE LOCATION:	ADAMS	
DATE DUE:	08/16/2004	DATE SIGNED:



July 30, 2004

Chairman Niles J. Diaz Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Via facsimile: (301) 415-1757

Dear Chainnan Diaz,

We have been encouraged by and supportive of the NRC's recent efforts to develop a credible force-on-force program to test the effectiveness of guard forces and defensive strategies at nuclear power plants. We were led to believe that the NRC would develop its own adversary teams for these tests. Credible adversary teams are essential for these performance tests.

Therefore, we were shocked to learn that Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the lobbying arm of the nuclear industry, has hired Wackenhut Corporation to supply and manage these adversary teams. This is more than a case of the proverbial fox guarding the henhouse. It is not an apparent conflict of interest -- but a blatant conflict of interest. As you know, Wackenhut guard forces protect 30 of the nation's 64 nuclear power plants. At nearly 50 percent of the nuclear plants, then, Wackenhut guard forces would be tested by Wackenhut adversaries. Under these conditions no one would have any confidence in the results of these force-on-force tests, regardless of whatever oversight the NRC might provide. The NRC should not abdicate its responsibility to run security preparedness tests to the nuclear industry, much less hand over authority to the very entity being tested. (Appendix A)

Having a trained full-time adversary force is a good idea, but any benefit gained is lost by the current arrangement. Oversight of critical infrastructure security is an inherently governmental function and must not be entrusted to a private company, particularly one with an obvious self-interest and poor track record, like Wackenhut.

If this inappropriate arrangement were not enough for the commission to reclaim the force-on-force program, Wackenhut's dubious past performance should. Some examples of Wackenhut's performance:

As recently as last January, DOE inspector general reported that Wackenhut personnel had cheated during a force-on-force exercise of June 2003 at the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge, Tenn. This facility houses hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium. The inspector general, Greg Friedman, said the test results were "tainted and unreliable." Moreover, Friedman gleaned from

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more than 30 testimonies that this was part of "a pattern of actions" dating back almost two decades. (Appendix B)

A stunning case study of Wackenhut's incompetence with nuclear security: Between 1986 and 2003, Wackenhut provided security at Indian Point #2 Nuclear Power plant, which is less than 35 miles north of Manhattan. The utility, Entergy, that had recently acquired the plant, hired a consultant to conduct an internal probe of security at the facility; and found:

- "Only 19 percent of the security officers stated that they could adequately defend the plant."
- Some officers believed that as many as "50 per cent of the force may not be physically able to meet the demands of defending the plant";
- Wackenhut allowed guards to take their weapons qualifying tests over and over again until they passed;

 Citing officers' fears of retaliation for raising concerns, the report said, "The security officers stated that a chilled environment existed among security officers... as a result of issues related to Wackenhut site management;"

Guards told of minimal training, of other guards reporting for duty drunk, of security drills that were carefully staged by Wackenhut to insure that mock attackers would be repelled, and of out of shape guards forced to work 70 to 80 hours or more per week.
Entergy subsequently terminated Wackenhut's contract as a result of the investigation.
(Appendix C)

The vast majority of the almost 200 guards at both NRC and Energy department sites that have complained to POGO about security problems have been Wackenhut employees.

Another of Wackenhut's most notorious cases came in the 1990s, and involved Wackenhut's work on the Alaskan pipeline. Chuck Hamel coordinated a number of whistleblowers who testified about serious structural problems before Congress (Hamel is currently a member of POGO's board of directors but was not at the time of this case). Wackenhut then fired most of the whistleblowers, and mounted a massive undercover surveillance operation against Mr. Hamel. The undercover private investigators acquired the Hamel family private phone records - to identify and fire pipeline whistleblowers. Wackenhut also used clandestine and malicious tactics such as stealing his garbage, creating a phony environmental front-organization, employing hidden cameras in hotel rooms in an attempt to compromise him with women, and stationing, for several months, an eavesdropping electronics van beside his Alexandria, Va., home. Federal Judge Stanley Sporkin, during the 1993 U.S. District Court proceedings, described the details of Wackenhut's operation on Mr. Hamel as "horrendous" and "reminiscent of Nazi Germany." Judge Sporkin further observed, "no one should be subjected to the kind of treatment the Hamels were." (Appendix D)

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We have another major concern about the NRC's reliance on Wackenhut to provide security - and now the testing of security - at our nation's nuclear power plants. As you probably know, the Department of Homeland Security has a pilot program to evaluate the possibility of private contractors taking over passenger and checked bag screening from the federal government at some U.S. airports. The legislation authorizing the pilot program – the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 – specifically prohibits foreign firms from being hired to handle screening. Congress wanted to preserve the security of such critical infrastructure for domestic companies.

Why is the NRC, a federal regulatory agency with responsibility for security of nuclear power plants, increasing rather than decreasing reliance on a foreign owned corporation – Wackenhut – to manage security at the majority of U.S. nuclear power plants? Why would the United States government want a foreign corporation to know the defensive strategies, vulnerabilities, targets, timelines, and protective weapons of nuclear power plants, some of which are close to U.S. cities?

Wackenhut is owned by Group 4 Falck A/S, a Danish company, which has just merged with a British firm, Securicor, PLC. Securicor is the parent company of Cognisa - the same company that was in charge of airport security on Sept. 11, 2001 when terrorists with weapons passed through checkpoints at Washington-Dulles and Newark International Airports (back then the company called itself Argenbright). We now have one mega-foreign owned corporation with an abysmal record inside the U.S. operating security at many our nuclear power plants.¹

We are not suggesting that Group 4 Falck-Securicor would disseminate this information to a terrorist group or foreign power. The point is that the U.S. government and the nuclear power utilities should keep this critical information in as few hands as possible, or the risk increases.

Security of nuclear power plants is a fundamental homeland security issue. If the NRC does not have the resources to support this effort, then it is imperative that you ask the Department of Homeland Security to provide this funding.

As always, we would be happy to meet with you to discuss our concerns.

Sincerely,

Danielle Brian

Executive Director

We are aware of the procedures of the Foreign Ownership, Control and Influence (FOCI) programs. We are not confident that the oversight of the foreign corporation is adequate to ensure that the so-called firewall between the domestic subsidiary and the foreign owner is effective.

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Appendix A

POGO

NEI - Nuclear Energy Institute Selects Contractor For Adversary Team in Security Exerci... Page 1 of 2



Nuclear Energy Institute Selects Contractor For Adversary Team in Security Exercises

WASHINGTON, D.C., June 9, 2004—The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has selected Wackenhut Corp. to train and manage elite adversary teams that will be used when the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) evaluates nuclear power plants' security strategies and tactics.

The adversary teams used in these government-required and -evaluated "force on force" exercises will test each nuclear power plant in the nation every three years, increasing the frequency of the evaluated exercises from the eight-year rotation that previously was in place. The exercises are used to identify what steps, if any, nuclear power plant security forces can take to improve their ability to repel attackers.

The nuclear energy industry is the only private sector entity that undergoes such government-required force-on-force exercises. Mock adversary exercises for many years have been one of the ways that the industry and the NRC evaluate nuclear plant security.

The formation of a dedicated adversary force skilled in the tactics that potential attackers might use will further enhance the robust security programs that the industry has in place to protect nuclear power facilities. Nuclear power plants already are widely acknowledged to be the bestdefended facilities in the nation's industrial infrastructure.

Wackenhut is one of the world's largest and most diversified security organizations. Wackenhut's Nuclear Services Division provides security services at about one-half of U.S. nuclear power plant sites as well as many nuclear facilities internationally.

"The formation of this adversary team program is one example of how the industry works to achieve excellence and to ensure that all NRC security requirements are met," said Stephen Floyd, NEI vice president of regulatory affairs.

The Wackenhut contract employees selected for the exercises must meet NRC requirements. The NRC has the authority to determine and ensure that the force-on-force exercises meet the level of attack against which the industry must defend.

The adversary team members will be thoroughly trained and must meet rigorous industry and NRC-mandated physical fitness requirements and weapons proficiency standards, including expertise in the use of state-of-theart laser-based weaponry.

Beginning in November, the independent adversary teams will participate in approximately 24 NRC-evaluated exercises each year, such that all nuclear

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NEI - Nuclear Energy Institute Selects Contractor For Adversary Team in Security Exerci. Page 2 of 2

POGO

power plants receive an exercise over a three-year period. Members of the two adversary teams must commit for at least two years, but serve no more

The industry is taking the initiative to develop separate adversary teams skilled in offensive tactics at the same time that plant security forces – much like reactor operators – enter a new NRC-required training regimen that improves their readiness against potential attack. As part of the new regimen, security forces will conduct mock adversary training exercises regularly, with the expectation that they will train and perform to the same level at which they will be tested during the NRC-evaluated exercises every three years.

Last year, the NRC expanded the design basis threat, which is the scenario against which the industry's security forces must defend, and increased requirements for security officer training and qualifications and for the conduct of force-on-force exercises.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, additional security measures include extending plant security perimeters, increasing patrols within plant security zones, installing additional physical barriers, and conducting vehicle checks at greater stand-off distances.

Security forces at 64 nuclear power plant sites also have been increased by about one-third to more than 7,000 well-armed, highly trained officers. The industry has enhanced coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, and put in place more restrictive site access controls for personnel. Additional measures have been put in place to provide greater protection against land attacks, including the use of a substantial vehicle bomb, and against water-borne attacks.

In addition to regular NRC inspection of industry security programs at each nuclear power plant, the agency conducts force-on-force exercises to assess and improve, as necessary, the performance of the industry's security strategy and its implementation.

"Using an adversary team that is trained in attacking a facility will make the force-on-force drills as realistic as possible, and provide the industry with the best possible ongoing training in security," Floyd said.

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Appendix B

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Department of Energy Wastington, DC 20545

January 2: 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THESECRETARY

TTTO

FROM:

Encycly H. Friedman Inspector General

SUBJECT

INFORMATION: Impection Report on "Protective Force Ferformance Test happoprieties"

BACKGROUND

On June 26, 2003, a protective force performance test was conducted at the Department of Energy's Y-12 National Security Complex, which is a component of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The purpose of the test was to obtain realistic data for developing the Y-12 Site Safeguards and Security Plan. The mission at the site includes a number of sensitive activities, such as enriched aranium material warebousing, and weapon dismontlement and storage. These activities necessitate that the site have a protective force expable of responding to potential security incidents such as a terrorist anack.

Computer simulations conducted prior to the June 2003 performance test had predicted that the responder (defending) protective forces would decisively lose two of the four scenarios that comprised the test. When the responder protective forces won all four of the scenarios, the Y-12 Site Manager became concerned that the test may have been compromised. The Manager initiated an inquiry, which identified issues regarding responder protective force personnel having had access to the computer simulations of the four scenarios prior to the performance test. Subsequently, at the Y-12 Site Manager's request, the Office of Inspector General initiated a review to address these issues.

Based on information developed during the course of the review, the scope of the inspection was expanded to examine whether there had been a pattern over time of site security personnel compromising protective force performance tests.

RESULTS OF INSPECTION

Our inspection confirmed that the results of the Just 26, 2003, performance test may have been compromised. We found that shortly before the test, two protective force personnel were insppropriately permitted to view the computer simulations of the four scenarios. This action compromised controlled (test-sensitive) information. As a consequence, the test results were, in our judgment, minted and unreliable.

During the Office of Inspector General review, several current and former protective force personnel provided us with compelling testimony that there has been a pattern of actions by site

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security personnel going back to the mid-1980's that may have negatively affected the reliability of site performance testing. We were told, for example, that controlled information had been shared with protective force personnel prior to their participation in a given performance test. This included such important data as:

The specific building and wall to be attacked by the test adversary;

The specific target of the test adversary, and

Whether or not a diversionary metic would be employed by the test adversary

Two other protective force contractor employees who were identified as having some level of involvement in these actions denied any such involvement. However, it was clear that if controlled information was, in fact, disclosed prior to the performance tests, the reliability of the information used to evaluate the efficacy of the protective force at the Oak Ridge complex was in question.

The report includes several recommendations to Department management designed to enhance the integrity of future performance tests.

MANAGEMENT REACTION

NNSA concurred with our findings and recommendations and provided a series of corrective actions that either had been initiated or were planned as a result of direction from the NNSA Administrator and the Y-12 Site Office Manager. NNSA's comments, which are provided in their entirety in an appendix to this report, also represent the position of the Oak Ridge Operations Office. The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, whose comments are also appended to this report, concurred with our recommendation to that Office.

We found management's comments to be responsive to our recommendations.

Attachment

ec Deputy Secretary

Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment Director, Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance Director, Office of Science Manager, Y-12 Site Office Manager, Oak Ridge Operations Office Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management

Appendix C

Luine.

Report of Investigation

Entergy Nuclear Northeast

Indian Point #2

Security Scrivices (IP2-431)

Keith G. Ibgan

January 25, 200 Date

A. Executive Summary

In early November 2001, several concerns regarding security services at Indian Point #2 were brought to the attention of the Employee Concerns Program (ECF), Entergy Nuclear Northeast, Buchanan, NY. On November 13, 201, Concerns by Mr. ECP Manger, commissioned an independent investigation of the concerns by Mr.

The investigation focused on whether the security officers at Indian Point #2 believed they could adequately defend the plant on the day of their interview and if they believed that a chilled environment existed among the security force. In addition, there are other issues such as: security officer requalification, the security of safeguards information, and the accuracy of Wackenhut's Report (01-CED-011-02) on a chilling affect at Indian Foint #2. A total of 59 security officers, including sergeants and lieutenants, were interviewed and, as a minimum, they were each asked a series of standard questions during the interviews.

The results of the investigation indicate that only 19% of those security officen stated that they could adequately defend the plant after the terrorist event of September 11°. The general feeling is that the standard "design basis threat" no longer applies and more security is needed. Each of the officers provided a list of improvements he/she thinks is necessary in order to "adequately" defend the plant. Some of their suggested improvements have already been made; other improvements are in the process of being made, and still other changes are under review by the Enlergy Security Manager at Indian Point and consultants. The suggested improvements include new and updated security systems, weapons, defensive positions and equipment, additional training, and more security officers. Of particular concern to many of the officers is the belief that they should be carrying their weapons with a chambered round, as is the practice at Indian Point #3; they feel tids would enable them to be better prepared to defend against an attack.

When asked, 59% of the security officers stated that they believe that a chilled environment exists among the security force. However, they stated that this does not apply to nuclear safety issues, which they believe would always be raised. Thirty-one percent of the officers stated that they have raised nuclear safety issues and 95% stated that they have raised concerns. Their belief is that the chilled environment exists as a result of issues related to Wackenhut site management, in areas such as administration, promotions, discipline, and general program management. Of those officers who raised issues with management, only 42% stated that they are adequately addressed. At the same time, 93% of the officers stated that they are willing to provide both positive and negative feedback to management. While 90% stated that they would raise issues during Guard Mount meetings, others have been

ndian Point #2

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told it was appropriate to raise them after the meeting.

Several issues were raised regarding the requalification of the security officers. During the course of this investigation, there was also an ongoing Quality Assurance (Q/A) audit of the Wackenhot security officer training. Shers are five parts to an officers' annual requalification and each part is completed at different times of the year. It is the responsibility of the Training Coordinator to ensure that the security officers requalify within twelve months. Only 69% of the officers stated that they bad completed what they believe to be the requalification process. The officers generally believed that the Simunition training was part of the Training and Qualification Plan (T&Q) required for requalification. While it was included in the Wackenhut training program, it was not part of the official T&Q standard. Seventy-nine percent of the officers stated that they had completed that they had complete training as alleged to the ECP. While 98% of the officers who carry the Glock believe that their training was adoquate, most believe that they should qualify more than once each year. They would also like to see additional time at the range to improve their akills.

In response to a concern about the security of Safeguards information, 5 (-8%) security officers identified a problem in this area. One problem dated back to 2000 and related to the security of training modules and exams, and the handling of those documents by one person. When the problem was reported to management in October 2000, it was not perceived as a Safeguards issue and no section was taken. There was a new Training Coordinator in the following year and none of the comments reflected any concerns with the security of the modules during 2001. Another officer indicated that he saw improtected Safeguards insterial and then pecured it.

Most of the security officers were critical of the results of the report conducted in March 2001 by Wackenhurt (TWC) to "evaluate if a 'chilling effect' existed, or resulted from...the termination of a security officer" at Indian Point #2. Over an eight day petiod, two auditors interviewed 80 TWC personnel from each of the functional work groups. They concluded that "No chilling effect was indicated from the candid responses received during the interview process, nor a hesitation to report any concern or safety issue in the past, or future." During this investigation, several officers recalled telling TWC auditors that they thought that a chilled environment did exist as a result of that iermination. Most of the officers stated that they did not believe that their concerns were adequately addressed by the TWC report. The officers further indicated that their responses in March were similar to the responses that they provided during this investigation pertaining to the issue of a chilled environment.

However, the report did identify several problems which are relevant to concerns

Indian Point #2

Page 3 of 22

Identified during this investigation. The Wackenhut report indicated that "some of the TWC supervisory cadre are not trusted by the security force to properly and professionally address issues or concerns"; "perceived problem behaviors were the result of feedback/communication, lack of understanding, or lack of personnel management skills by supervision"; security officers are "more often "in the dark' about emerging issues and changes that affect their performance on the job"; and "the lack of feedback caused a perception that "management did not care"."


Entergy has retained consultants to review and improve security at Indian Foint #2; preliminaty changes to the defensive positions and strategy have already been made. Entergy has also organized a team to consolidate the security plans of the two units and ensure that the technical systems and strategies are compatible. The security officers favorably commented on the new support and respect they have received from the Vice President Operations. As noted above, a majority of the officers have articulated improvements which they feel are necessary to present a strong defense and repel any threat. They believe that Entergy management is concerned about security and noted that the time that was taken to listen to their concerned about security and noted that the time that was taken to listen to their concerned about security and look to Entergy to effect some of those changes over the next several months.

Indian Point #2

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Appendix D



POGO

BY CHARLES MCCOY And RICHARD E. SCIDNITT

A STATES OF Scatt Re Alyerka Pipeline Service Co. agreed to multimultion-dollar settlement of an in-

varion of privacy lawault by a whistle-blower, stemming from a spying campaign that Alyeska mounted sgainst him. The outcame was halled by whistle-blower advocates as an important legal

victory for corpo-rate critics. in part because of several pretrial rulings by federal Judge Stanley Sporkin in Washington that appear to exception or ad-



wrongdoing. Precise terms of the settlement were

not discosed. But Alyesta and its owners, including Down Oo., British Petrelsum Lid. and Atlantic Richfield Co., have spent more than Sio million just to defend the suit, and the settlement requires a paynent of millions more, scording to people famillar with iL

familiar with 12. The still stammed from the slaborals campaign that Alyeska mounted against whittle-blower Chuck Hamel and Ms asso-clates in 1990, after Mr. Hamel repeatedly had dipped foil regulators and Congress about alleged environmental wrongdoing slong the Trans-Alaska pipeline. Mr. Ha-mel remived much of the information-from workers inside Alyeska, which runs the slocing for the di tombanies.

from workers inside Alyeska, which runs the pipeline for the oil companies. Alyeska down's contrait that during its campaign against Mr. Hamel, its opera-sives secretly taped Mr. Hamel's phone estis and rified through mail, garbage, phone woords and credit records of him and several amodates. They even am-ployed attractive female operatives to ury to entice Mr. Hamel into admissions of actions that might discredit him. But the company has deligned that the actions were iswful and legitimate attempts to ratifieve documents it atteras Mr. Hamel stole from uments it alleges Mr. Hamel stols from the company.

Alyesta said that it and other parties to the settlement eren't "concoding any wrongdoing.

In a ruling last month that helped greate the settlement: .Judge Sporkin noted that whistle-blowers are sites rebuilnoted that whistle-blowers are sites result-sted arainst by their employers and beld that Mr. Etamet Gould oot be required to divulge his sources unless Alyeska agreed to guarantee those sources illetime em-ployment. Alyests, declined, and, the sources waren't disclosed. Whistle-blower advocates say Judge Sportin, is the first referal judge-and perhaps the first judge st any level - to institut on such protec-tions for sources.

Moreover, two weaks are, Judge Spor-ion advised attorneys in the case that he intended to rule that the secret taping of

AIT. Hamel was illegal - a devastating blow a Alyerka's defense. Although that fuling the Alyerks's celense. Although that summer yes never formalized, is also was seen as potentially limiting the kinds of activities that companies may be willing to engage in to ferral out million

Alyeska Settles Suit by a Whistle-Bl

"Judge Sporklu's ruling: will coverber "Judge Sporklu's ruling: will coverber ate in whistle-blower cases for years," and Louis Clark, excettive director of the Government Accountability' Project, a whistle-blower legal support group. "He has said a company must in affect port a boad to protoci whistle-blowers from retai-istion if they want to learn their identities through legal action."

In comments after the settlement was entered in federal court, Judge Sporkin observed: "No one should be subjected to the hind of weatment the Hunsis were." Earlier in the proceedings, Judge Sporkin had described the details of Alyesks's spy operation signings Mr. Hamel as "horren-dous" and "reminiscent of Nazi Gernous" and many."


Waltkahut Corp., the Misini-based ar-curity concern that ren the spy campaign for Alyerks, was included in the satilement and will be required to help fund it. Mr. Hamel is not enjoined from future whis-Ue-blowing spainst Alyests, though he did agree to relinquish certain types of documents should they fall the his hands In the future.

The affair had its roots in the carty Isto, whom Mr. Hammel, an pit horder by Isto, whom Mr. Hammel, an pit horder by Isto, whom Mr. Hammel has butthers dispute with Alyenka that he says cost him millions, of dollars. Mr. Hamel then began funnei-ling tips about Alyesha's alleged environ-mental wrongdoing and internal Alyeska documents to regulators and Congress, and eventually accumulated a sizable act-work of whistle-blowers within Alyeska. In 1880, in an effort to stop Mr. Hamel, Alyeska Mred Wackshult to Set up a bogus environmental erganization bailed Zcoill. It effers to help Mr. Hamel purnue litiga-tion against the oil industry, but the feat purpose, Alyeska has acknowiedged, was to gather evidence supporting the allega-tion that he had stoin documents. The operation was shut foown after seven months by Alyeska's owner eil com-anders. A subscourse on artice in the seven support.

Ine operation was said cown after seven months by Alyseks's gener sil com-panies. A subsequent congressions! inves-tigation concluded that the operation may have violated criminal laws and usked the Justice Department to look into the matter. So far, the Justice Department has decided not to pursue any criminal charges stamhing from the case.

From the start of the case, Judge Browkin repeatedly urged Alyests to con-sider setting. He sparred with defeore lawyets and chied, then for refusing to lawyers and childed there for refuring to enter settlement talks. At one point, he threatened to find Robert Jordan - least councel for the defense and a former head of the Washington bar - injerimingi con-tempt because of a brief Mr. Jordan submitted criticizing Judge Sportion. In October, Judge Sportio ruled against a defense motion seeking to compel a newspaper reporter to divulge sources.

Although courts' contributly protect re-porters' sources, mer, don't always do so, and whiste blower sources say this ruting was significant, because the information sought by Alyesta was important for its defense. This ruling was followed by the one protecting Mr. Hamel's sources within Alyerke.



FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET

DATE:	<u> 30 July 2004</u>
DELIVER TO:	<u>Bouly</u> 2004 Chairman Diaz
	NRC
PHONE:	
FAX:	301.415.1757
FROM:	project on government oversight Danielle Brian
DESCRIPTION:	
PAGES TO FOLLO	N: <u>16</u>
COMMENTS:	

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