

From: "Daflucas, Ronda" <rdafluc@entergy.com>
To: "Rick Ennis" <RXE@nrc.gov>
Date: 3/9/04 9:36AM
Subject: ISI-06 call

Rick,

Jim D would like to have a follow-up phone call with you, Stephanie and the reviewer (Nehar Ray) re: ISI-06.

Jim would like to discuss the indicated text (bars in margin) of the attached page of the 4/7/99 NRC SE.

Please let me know of NRR availability this week.

Also, we would like to have a status call (<30 min) this week. How's Wed at 11am?

Thanks,

<<SE excerpt.pdf>>

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B-13

complying with the requirements. The licensee demonstrated that the proposed alternative has an acceptable level of quality and safety by employing the approved criteria (reproduced in Section 2.0 of this SE) in the BWRVIP-05 report for eliminating successive reexaminations of subsurface flaws in RPV circumferential welds.

3.4 Proposed Alternatives

The licensee proposes to eliminate the successive reexaminations of subsurface flaws in RPV circumferential welds for the current inspection interval.

3.5 Evaluation

It was stated in the relief request that the detected flaws in the RPV circumferential welds, which were approved for continued service, meet all three criteria of BWRVIP-05 for the elimination of the successive reexamination requirement of the ASME Code. As mentioned, these proposed criteria for the circumferential welds were accepted by the staff. This determination was based on the low failure probability of $8.2 \times 10^{-8}/\text{yr}$ from the staff's independent calculation for the limiting plant-specific analyses (32 EFPY) using a low temperature transient with an event frequency of $1 \times 10^{-3}/\text{yr}$. In the current evaluation, the staff confirmed that (1) the detected flaw is characterized as a subsurface flaw, which was accepted by the staff in another SE dated October 11, 1996, (2) the NDE technique and evaluation that detected and characterized the flaw are documented in the flaw evaluation report previously submitted, and (3) the vessel containing the flaw was approved (the same SE dated October 11, 1996) for continued service without repair through end-of-license for Vermont Yankee. Hence, all three criteria in the BWRVIP-05 report for eliminating successive reexaminations of detected flaws have been satisfied.

It should be noted that the bounding failure probability of $8.2 \times 10^{-8}/\text{yr}$ from the staff's independent evaluation of the BWRVIP-05 report is for the limiting Babcock and Wilcox vessel. The corresponding value for the limiting Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I) vessel (Vermont Yankee's RPV was manufactured by CB&I) is an order of magnitude lower as indicated in the final SE for the BWRVIP-05 report. This provides additional assurance that an acceptable level of quality and safety will be maintained for the alternative inspection requested by the licensee.

4.0 CONCLUSIONS

The staff has reviewed the licensee's alternative proposal for the reexamination of the circumferential welds with detected flaw indications in the Vermont Yankee RPV. The staff has determined that the licensee's alternative proposal for the circumferential welds meets the conditions in the BWRVIP-05 report approved by the staff for the elimination of the successive reexaminations for the circumferential welds with detected flaw indications. Hence, the staff has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i), that the alternative inspection provides an acceptable level of quality and safety relative to assuring the structural integrity of the subject circumferential weld.

Principal Contributor: S. Sheng

Date: April 7, 1999

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