L. M. Stinson (Mike) Vice President

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July 9, 2004

NL-04-1218

Docket Nos.: 50-348 50-364

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Application for License Renewal – Supplemental Information

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In response to NRC Staff requests, this letter provides supplemental information to aid in the review of the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Application for License Renewal. Descriptions of the specific requests and the SNC responses are provided in the Enclosure.

Mr. L. M. Stinson states he is a vice president of Southern Nuclear Operating Company, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company and to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.

If you have any questions, please contact Charles Pierce at 205-992-7872.

Respectfully submitted,

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY

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L. M. Stinson

Sworn to and subscribed before me this $\underline{Q^{H}}_{day}$ of \underline{July}_{day} 2004.

Hena 21. Buie Notary Public

My commission expires: 10-7-05



U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-04-1218 Page 2

LMS/JAM/slb

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- Enclosure: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Application for License Renewal – Supplemental Information
- cc: <u>Southern Nuclear Operating Company</u> Mr. J. B. Beasley Jr., Executive Vice President Mr. D. E. Grissette, General Manager – Plant Farley Document Services RTYPE: CFA04.054; LC# 14081

<u>U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission</u> Ms. T. Y. Liu, License Renewal Project Manager Dr. W. D. Travers, Regional Administrator Mr. S. E. Peters, NRR Project Manager – Farley Mr. C. A. Patterson, Senior Resident Inspector – Farley

<u>Alabama Department of Public Health</u> Dr. D. E. Williamson, State Health Officer NL-04-1218

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ENCLOSURE

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Application for License Renewal Supplemental Information

Supplemental Information - Atmospheric Vents on the Refueling Water Storage Tanks, Condensate Storage Tanks, and Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tanks

During the recent NRC Region II scoping and screening inspection, inspectors noted that atmospheric vents on several tanks were not included in the scope of license renewal. SNC agreed to include the vents for the refueling water storage tanks, condensate storage tanks, and the reactor makeup water storage tanks in the scope of license renewal. (Refer to NRC inspection report 50-348/2004-007, 50-364/2004-007 dated June 22, 2004.)

The following table lists the tanks and the applicable parts of the LRA:

Tank (vent)	LRA Sco	LRA AMR Table	
Refueling Water Storage Tanks (RWSTs)	Sect. 2.3.2.3 -	Emergency Core Cooling System	Table 3.2.2-3
Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tanks (RMWSTs)	Sect. 2.3.3.23 -	Reactor Makeup Water Storage System	Table 3.3.2-23
Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs)	Sect. 2.3.4.4 -	Auxiliary Feedwater System	Table 3.4.2-4

The vents are considered integral subparts of the tanks and consequently are lumped into the existing "tank" component type. Therefore, the components subject to an aging management review (AMR) tables in the corresponding LRA scoping sections are unaffected.

For the refueling water storage tanks, the "air/gas (wetted)" environment is conservatively applied to the tank vents since they may be exposed to moisture (condensation) from high humidity in the tank (as a result of the open water level). For the condensate storage tanks and reactor makeup water storage tanks which have internal diaphragms, the "air/gas" (non-wetted) environment is applied to these vents because they are not exposed to high moisture (humidity) from the tank's water contents due to the protective internal diaphragm.

The aging management review summary tables in the LRA should have included the following additional material environment combinations for the tanks as a result of bringing the tank vents into scope:

Enclosure NL-04-1218

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Table 3.2.2-3 Engineered Safety Features, Emergency Core Cooling System – Summary of Aging Management Review

Component Type GALL Reference	Intended Function	Material	Environment	Aging Effect Requiring Management	Aging Management Programs	NUREG-1801 Volume 2 Item	Table 1 Item	Notes
Refueling Water Storage Tank (includes tank vent) V.D1.8.3	Pressure Boundary	Stainless Steel	Air/gas (wetted)	Loss of Material	One Time Inspection Program			G

Table 3.4.2-4 Steam and Power Conversion Systems, Auxiliary Feedwater System – Summary of Aging Management Review

Component Type GALL Reference	Intended Function	Material	Environment	Aging Effect Requiring Management	Aging Management Programs	NUREG-1801 Volume 2 Item	Table 1 Item	Notes
Condensate Storage Tank (includes tank vent) VIII.G.4.1	Pressure Boundary	Carbon Steel	Air/Gas (non- wetted)	Loss of Material	One-Time Inspection Program			G

Table 3.3.2-23 Auxiliary Systems, Reactor Makeup Water Storage System – Summary of Aging Management Review

Component Type GALL Reference	Intended Function	Material	Environment	Aging Effect Requiring Management	Aging Management Programs	NUREG-1801 Volume 2 Item	Table 1 Item	Notes
Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (includes tank vent)	Pressure Boundary	Stainless Steel	Air/Gas (non- wetted)	None	None Required			J

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RAI 3.6.2-5 – Supplemental Information

SNC responded to RAI 3.6.2-5 in SNC letter NL-04-0678 dated April 22, 2004. After review of the SNC response, the NRC staff requested supplemental information via a follow-up question. The following question was originally identified by the staff as a follow-up to RAI 3.6.2-2 but was clarified as being associated with RAI 3.6.2-5 during a telephone conference on June 10, 2004:

The applicant has stated in its RAI response that Cable Bus will be in the Non-EQ Cable Program. The staff requests the applicant indicate which part of that program. Because the cable in the Cable Bus is not accessible, it is expected to be treated as non-accessible medium voltage cable. The LRA Table 3.6.2-1 has it listed in the low voltage cable program.

Response

The FNP Cable Aging Management Program is made up of NUREG-1801 Aging Management Programs XI.E1, XI.E2, and XI.E3. Each NUREG-1801 program applies to a different cable aging issue. All cables, regardless of voltage rating or application, are included in the XI.E1 program even if they are affected by an aging issue covered by one of the other programs, since this program requires plant-wide inspections.

The cable in the Cable Bus is in the XI.E1 portion of the Non-EQ Cables Program as reflected in LRA Table 3.6.2-1. The bus cables exit the bus duct enclosures in the low voltage switchyard and approximately six feet of the cables are exposed where they connect to the start-up auxiliary transformers. This portion of the cables will be visually inspected per the Non-EQ Cables Program.

Enclosure NL-04-1218

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Supplemental Information to LRA Section 3.1.2.2.4

In a teleconference on June 23, 2004, the NRC staff requested supplemental information in reference to LRA Section 3.1.2.2.4 (and the corresponding item 7 in LRA Table 3.1.1) on ASME Class 1 small bore piping inspections to be performed under the recently approved Risked Informed Inservice Inspection (RI-ISI) Program for Farley Nuclear Plant. The staff specifically requested that SNC identify any ASME Class 1 small bore piping weld locations that will be volumetrically examined under the RI-ISI Program.

The FNP Unit 1 and Unit 2 RI-ISI Program includes volumetric examination of one ASME Class 1 small bore (defined as piping less than 4-inch nominal pipe size) segment per unit. Segment 1(2)RC-024A is the 2-inch drain line that tees off of the 3-inch normal letdown line in each unit. The 2-inch circumferential butt weld at the tee in each unit is scheduled for ultrasonic examination under the RI-ISI Program.

As stated in LRA Section 3.1.2.2.4, the One-Time Inspection (OTI) Program will provide for examinations of small bore (< 4-inch NPS) ASME Class 1 piping to confirm cracking (due to thermal cycling or stress corrosion cracking) is not occurring in these lines. As a clarification, examinations performed under the RI-ISI Program that permit inspection of the inside surfaces (e.g., volumetric examination) of the small bore ASME Class 1 piping will be included as part of the representative sample for the OTI Program as applicable.