

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
Millstone Power Station
Rope Ferry Road
Waterford, CT 06385



Dominion™

JUN 28 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Serial No. 04-390
MPS Lic/TGC R0
Docket No. 50-423
License No. NPF-49

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNIT 3
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2004-001-00
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION STATEMENT NOT MET

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2004-001-00, documenting an event that occurred at Millstone Power Station, Unit 3, on April 30, 2004. This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as any event or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. David W. Dodson at (860) 447-1791, extension 2346.

Very truly yours,

Stephen P. Sarver, Director
Nuclear Station Operations and Maintenance

IE22

Attachments: (1)

Commitments made in this letter: None.

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415

Mr. V. Nerses
Senior Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint North
11555 Rockville Pike
Mail Stop 8C2
Rockville, MD 20852-2738

Mr. S. M. Schneider
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Millstone Power Station

Serial No. 04-390
LER 2004-001-00

Attachment 1

Millstone Power Station, Unit No. 3

LER 2004-001-00

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION	APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7-31-2004 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)		

FACILITY NAME (1) Millstone Power Station – Unit 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000423	PAGE (3) 1 OF 3
--	--------------------------------------	---------------------------

TITLE (4)
 Technical Specification Action Statement Not Met

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV. NO.	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
04	30	2004	2004 – 001 – 00			06	28	2004	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)								
		20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)					
POWER LEVEL (10)	000	20.2201(d)	20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)					
		20.2203(a)(1)	50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	73.71(a)(4)					
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)	50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	73.71(a)(5)					
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	50.35(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	OTHER					
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.46(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A					
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)						
		20.2203(a)(2)(v)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)						
		20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME David W. Dodson, Supervisor Nuclear Station Licensing	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 860-447-1791
--	---

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/>	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NO		

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On April 30, 2004, while operating at 0% power in Mode 5, an oncoming Shift Manager performing a main control board walkdown questioned if the equipment failure in the electrical distribution system that had occurred earlier required Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action in accordance with plant Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.3.2 "Onsite Power Distribution – Shutdown". Plant Technical Specification 3.8.3.2 has one Action. It states, in part, "With any of the above required electrical busses not energized in the required manner, immediately suspend all operations involving...positive reactivity changes..." At the time of this discovery, the plant was in the process of heating up as part of the startup sequence following a refueling outage, with "B" train protected and the "A" train emergency diesel generator (EDG) inoperable. The Shift Manager directed that the plant heatup be suspended. The time period from the equipment failure until the plant heatup was suspended was approximately three hours.

Upon further review, engineering determined that, based on the core design, boron concentration and reactor coolant system temperatures, the increase in temperature from 135 to 165°F over this (approximately) three hour time period did add positive reactivity. Since TS 3.8.3.2 Action should have been entered and a positive reactivity change occurred, this event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

The cause of the delayed entry into the Action for TS 3.8.3.2 is human error and the individuals involved have been coached. Additional corrective actions are being taken in accordance with the Millstone Corrective Action Program.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Millstone Power Station - Unit 3	05000423	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NI IMRFR	REVISION NI IMRFR	2 OF 3
		2004	-- 001 --	00	

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

1. Event Description

On April 30, 2004, while operating at 0% power in Mode 5, an oncoming Shift Manager performing a main control board [MCBD] walkdown questioned if the equipment failure in the electrical distribution system [EK] that had occurred earlier required Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action in accordance with plant Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.3.2 "Onsite Power Distribution – Shutdown". Plant Technical Specification 3.8.3.2 has one Action. It states, in part, "With any of the above required electrical busses not energized in the required manner, immediately suspend all operations involving...positive reactivity changes..." At the time of this discovery, the plant was in the process of heating up as part of the startup sequence following a refueling outage, with "B" train protected and the "A" train emergency diesel generator (EDG) inoperable. The Shift Manager directed that the plant heatup be suspended. The time period from the equipment failure until the plant heatup was suspended was approximately three hours.

Upon further review, engineering determined that, based on the core design, boron concentration and reactor coolant system [AB] temperatures, the increase in temperature from 135 to 165°F over this (approximately) three hour time period did add positive reactivity. Since TS 3.8.3.2 Action should have been entered at 1512 when Inverter #INV-4 failed [INVT] and swapped to its alternate source, and a positive reactivity change occurred, this event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

TS 3.8.3.2 requires, as a minimum, one train (A or B) of electrical busses [BU] shall be Operable. The "B" train was the credited train, requiring in part, Bus #VIAC-4 energized from Inverter #INV-4 connected to DC Bus #301B-2 (TS 3.8.3.2.b.3.b). At 1512, an "Inverter Trouble" alarm was received. Operators entered the alarm response procedure (ARP). In accordance with the ARP, an operator was dispatched to the inverter panel to determine the cause of the alarm. The operator informed the control room that the "Fuse Blown" indicator for Inverter #INV-4 was lit. Per the ARP, operators notified the maintenance department to check the fuses. At this point the issue was turned over to the Outage Control Center, without completing the ARP. The last step of the ARP requires review of the applicable Technical Specifications, specifically noting TS 3.8.3.2. Although Inverter #INV-4 was still energized, the alternate source was not credited for Operability since the "A" EDG was inoperable, therefore the Action Statement for TS 3.8.3.2 should have been entered. The "A" EDG was not Operable because a necessary support system (service water) was out of service for maintenance.

2. Cause

The cause of the delayed entry into the Action for TS 3.8.3.2 is human error. When Inverter #INV-4 failed, both the Unit Supervisor and Shift Manager believed that Technical Specification requirements were being met by two means: the fact that the Inverter was still energized and the belief that the "A" train electrical distribution could be credited. However, they did not complete the Alarm Response Procedure that would have prompted further consideration of the Technical Specification implications.

The cause of the Inverter #INV-4 failure is attributed to a blown fuse. Troubleshooting did not reveal any other failures that would have caused the fuse to blow. (CR-04-04385)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Millstone Power Station - Unit 3	05000423	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NI IMRFR	REVISION NI IMRFR	3 OF 3
		2004	-- 001 --	00	

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

3. Assessment of Safety Consequences

This event is of very low safety significance. The Operability of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that: (1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods, and (2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status. Inverter #INV-4 was still energized, although the alternate source is not credited for Operability. Even with Bus #VIAC-4 not supplied from the Technical Specification required source, the "B" train remained capable of providing power to the structures, systems and components credited with detecting and mitigating the following events: loss of residual heat removal, loss of offsite power, loss of reactor inventory and loss of refueling cavity level control.

At the time of this event, the "A" train onsite power distribution system was available (although not Operable since the "A" emergency diesel generator was out of service). The plant experienced a minor increase in positive reactivity, less than 15 PCM (percent millirho), for a period of about three hours.

4. Corrective Action

The individuals involved have been coached. The Operations Manager is reinforcing the expectation that Alarm Response Procedures be reviewed completely when used. Additional corrective actions are being addressed in accordance with the Millstone Corrective Action Program (CR-04-04396).

5. Previous Occurrences

No previous similar events or conditions were identified.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].