May 21, 2004

MEMORANDUM TO: Davis-Besse Oversight Panel

FROM: John A. Grobe, Chairman, Davis-Besse Oversight Panel ***/RA/***

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF INTERNAL MEETING OF THE DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL

The implementation of the IMC 0350 process for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station was announced on April 29, 2002. An internal panel meeting was held on November 4, 2003. Attached for your information are the minutes from the internal meeting of the Davis-Besse Oversight Panel, the approved RAM Closure Forms, the Closure Basis Document to Support Closure of Restart Checklist Item 5.a, the Closure Basis Document to Support Closure of Restart Checklist Item 3.i, and the "Open" Action Items List.

Attachments: As stated

cc w/att: D. Weaver, OEDO
J. Caldwell, RIII
G. Grant, RIII
S. Reynolds, DRP
B. Clayton, EICS
DB0350

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OFFICE	RIII		RIII		RIII		RIII	
NAME	RBaker/dtp		DPassehl		CLipa		JGrobe	
DATE	05/17/04		05/20/04		05/21/04		05/21/04	

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MEETING MINUTES: Internal IMC 0350 Oversight Panel Meeting
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

DATE: November 4, 2003

TIME: 12:30 p.m. Central

ATTENDEES:

J. Grobe	W. Ruland	J. Stang
C. Lipa	A. Mendiola	S. Thomas
D. Passehl	J. Hopkins	R. Baker
M. Phillips	D. Hills	A. Dunlop

Agenda Items:

1. Discuss/Approve Today's Agenda

   The Panel approved the agenda, but modified the order of presentations. **THE APPROVED AGENDA REFLECTS THE ORDER LISTED IN THESE MINUTES.**

2. Discuss Plant Status and Inspector Insights and Emergent Issues List

   S. Thomas led a discussion of plant status and inspector insights and emergent issues. High Pressure Injection pump #1 should arrive onsite next Monday, November 11, 2003. The licensee desires to have High Pressure Injection pump #2 testing complete before the public meeting on November 12, 2004, and have both pumps operable by November 18, 2003. The licensee is still completing the Engineering Design packages.

   Both Component Cooling Water coolers #4 and #5, in ECCS Room #1, have leaks. Obtaining replacement coolers onsite may be the limiting Mode change items.

   Barry Allen is onsite and is the Deputy of Operations reporting to Mark Bezilla until after restart. After restart, Barry Allen will be the Plant Manager.

3. Discuss Licensee's Recent Submittal, LER 2003-010-00, "Potential Inoperability of Decay Heat/Low Pressure Injection System Due to Loss of Valve Disc Pins"

   C. Lipa led a discussion of the licensee's LER 2003-010-00 submittal. This is not a Part 21 issue or a restart concern, and will be closed out in resident Inspection Report 50-346/03-22.

4. Discuss New/Potential Licensing Issues

   J. Hopkins reported that there are no new or potential licensing issues to report. The Panel decided that the TIA for the High Pressure Injection pumps needs to be reviewed again. J. Hopkins will send a copy of the Safety Evaluation to the Region so that a final comparison may be made to ensure all the questions have been addressed.

5. Discuss Allegations: 1) New; 2) Determine If Required to Be Resolved Prior to Restart; and 3) Requested Extensions

D. Passehl discussed the status of outstanding allegations. The is one allegation which impacts restart, concerning Emergency Diesel Generator relays. R. Daley is working with the licensee to develop a time frame for resolution of this issue. D. Passehl reported that all open allegations were all on track for meeting timeliness goals.

6. Discuss RAM Closure Forms

M. Phillips led a review of RAM closure items. **THE RESTART ACTION MATRIX ITEMS THAT THE PANEL APPROVED FOR CLOSURE ARE ATTACHED TO THESE MINUTES.**

7. Decision on Closure of Restart Checklist Item 5.a, "Review of Licensee's Restart Action Plan," based on Licensee's Return to Service Plan, Revision 6, Dated March 31, 2003

C. Lipa led a discussion on closure of Restart Checklist Item 5.a, based on review of inspection results and the licensee's Return to Service Plan, Revision 6. The Panel discussed the fact that the Restart Checklist items focus inspection activities to address areas of concerns presented in the licensee's Restart Action Plan, which are given in the Return to Service Plan. The Panel reviewed the philosophy for closure of Restart Checklist Item 5.a and the completed inspection activities to date. The Panel approved closure of Restart Checklist Item 5.a., and closure will be documented in resident inspection report 50-346/03-22. **THE APPROVED CLOSURE BASIS DOCUMENT IS ATTACHED TO THESE MINUTES.**

8. Brief the Panel on Maintenance Rule Inspection Preliminary Results

A. Dunlop briefed the Panel on the preliminary results of the Maintenance Rule Inspection. There were no significant findings with a few observations of note. Need to clearly define the limited scope of the Maintenance Rule Inspection. The Maintenance Rule Inspection focuses on failures and subsequent actions vice actions leading to degradation. The Maintenance Rule Inspection also focuses on past, not present, events. The licensee performed actions for failure determination, looking at common causes and effects on similar equipment. The Maintenance Rule Inspection compares averages or common actions to other plants. The licensee has shifted in some areas to more of a Condition Monitoring approach than strict availability and reliability tracking. The inspection results will be documented in resident Inspection Report 50-346/03-22, focused on Section A-3 of the Maintenance Rule.

9. Discuss Closure of Restart Checklist Item 3.i, "Process for Ensuring Completeness and Accuracy of Required Records and Submittals to the NRC," Based on Completeness and Accuracy Inspection Results

D. Passehl led a discussion on closure of Restart Checklist Item 3.i, based on review of the Completeness and Accuracy inspection results. The Completeness and Accuracy inspection team reviewed the licensee's closure packages for Restart Checklist Item 3.i. Review of two of the LERs (LER 99-003 & 97-004) caused an extensive expansion of the licensee's review. The Panel approved closure of Restart Checklist 3.1, and **THE APPROVED CLOSURE BASIS DOCUMENT IS ATTACHED TO THESE MINUTES.**

10. Discuss October 0350 Input - Monthly Update to Congress

D. Passehl led a review of the draft input for the monthly report to congress. The Panel provided several comments which D. Passehl took action to incorporate. The revised draft will be presented at the next Panel meeting.

11. Discuss Communication Status

J. Stang provided an update on the communication status. The Panel decided that the Communication Team Tracking Matrix and Email Disposition List should be updated each Friday and sent out the next Monday for review at the following Panel meeting each week.

The Panel also decided to set up a conference call this week between J. Strasma, J. Grobe, C. Lipa, A. Mendiola, and J. Stang to discuss and finalize the list of Restart Q&As. The final list will then be sent to the Regional Administrator and EDO for comments.

12. Discuss Punchlist

C. Lipa led a review of the Punchlist. The Panel provided several comments and updates. More updates will be available following the weekly call with the licensee. R. Baker took the action to update the Punchlist for the next Panel meeting.

13. Discuss Items for Licensee Weekly Calls

C. Lipa led a discussion of specific issues to address with the licensee during the weekly call with the licensee. The major topics include:

a) When will NRR receive the Final HPI pump Design Modification Package?

b) What is the plan for repair/replacement of the leaking Component Cooling Water coolers, and is a Cause Analysis in progress to determine why the coolers are leaking?

c) When will the Design Package for the Breaker Modifications be completed?

d) Is the date for delivery of the draft Integrated Readiness to Support Restart Report on track? When will the final version be available?

e) Does the week of December 15 still look good for a possible Public Restart meeting?

f) Any pertinent comments from the Corporate Nuclear Review Board meeting?

14. Discuss Process Plan

D. Passehl led a review of the process plan, and R. Baker took the action to incorporate the Panel's comments.

15. Discuss Action Items

The Panel discussed the list of open action items. No new action item were added and one open action item was closed. **THE UPDATED ACTION ITEMS LIST IS ATTACHED TO THESE MINUTES.**

16. Discuss/Update Milestones and Commitments

The Panel reviewed and discussed upcoming milestones and commitments.

17. Discuss Draft Management and Human Performance Phase III Plan

The Panel discussed the plan for the next phase of the Management and Human Performance inspection. J. Grobe will fax the specifics to NRR for budgeting.

RAM Items Approved for Closure at Panel November 4, 2003

RAM Item No. - L-76 **Closed: Y**

Date of Letter - 11/21/02 (G-14)

Author - Gurdziel

Description of Issue - Is there another leaking source of the "rust trails" at the bottom of the vessel rather than assuming cavity seal leakage?

Restart Checklist Item: 2.c.

Description of Resolution - In its July 30, 2003, submittal to the NRC, the licensee stated that based on evidence to date, there were four potential sources of the "rust trails" at the bottom of the vessel. While one of these potential sources was refueling cavity seal leakage, the others related to leakage from the refueling canal through the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) nozzle access covers, leakage from cracks found in the RPV flange O-rings monitor lines, and effluent from RPV upper-head decontamination and cleaning activities during the past Davis-Besse outages. The NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation reviewed the licensee's submittal and concluded that (1) the results of the chemical analysis do not provide conclusive evidence that the deposits observed at Davis-Besse were from IMI nozzles, and (2) the deposits observed at Davis-Besse were characteristic of deposits left by washdown from higher elevation sources." This conclusion was confirmed by the observations made by the licensee and NRC inspection of the lower vessel head after the conclusion of the NOP test, which was completed in early October 2003.

Reference Material - Licensee submittal to NRC dated July 30, 2003, (ADAMS Accession No. ML032160384) and NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/03-23.

RAM Item No. - C-8 **Closed: Y**

Description of Issue - Bulletins 2002-01, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection Programs," and 2002-02, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity," response and acceptance.

Description of Resolution - Bulletin 2002-02 was superceded by Order EA-03-009. The licensee responded to the bulletin by letters dated March 25 and 31, 2003. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's response letters and concluded that the licensee's response was acceptable. Acceptability of the licensee's response was documented in a letter to the licensee dated June 25, 2003.

Reference Material - Letter to licensee dated June 25, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031640072).

RAM Item No. - C-16 **Closed: Y**

Description of Issue - Evaluate Adequacy of Lower Incore Guide Tube Penetrations - Review the licensee completed corrective actions for the as-found condition of the reactor vessel (e.g.,

boron deposits, corrosion stains, and potential for leakage at the in-core penetration tubes). Ref. CR 02-07059 and CR 02-02498.

Description of Resolution - The licensee completed its 7-day pressure test at normal operating pressure. Inspections performed subsequent to completion of the test did not identify any boric acid leakage from any of the lower nozzles. Staff from NRR did not object to the testing methodology, which was reviewed by NRR prior to performance of the test. An NRC inspection of the licensee's examination of the lower nozzles and review of the licensee's results determined that there was no evidence of lower nozzle leakage. To monitor leakage while operating, the licensee has installed an online local leak monitoring system (Flüβ) in the area of the lower RPV head, and perform a mid-cycle inspection of the lower head for evidence of leakage that will help to assure prompt identification of any significant RCS pressure boundary leakage should it develop.

Reference Material - Davis-Besse Unit 1 Incore Monitoring Nozzle Inspections (ADAMS Accession No. ML032510339) and NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/03-23.

RAM Item No. - C-17 **Closed: Y**

Description of Issue - Reactor Bottom Head - A public meeting is scheduled for November 26, 2003, in headquarters to discuss the Framatome analysis and the licensee's plans are to perform a test during normal operating pressure and temperature (NOP/NOT) conditions. Evaluate acceptability of licensee's test.

Description of Resolution - In its July 30, 2003, submittal to the NRC, the licensee stated that based on evidence to date, there were four potential sources of the "rust trails" at the bottom of the vessel. While one of these potential sources was refueling cavity seal leakage, the others related to leakage from the refueling canal through the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) nozzle access covers, leakage from cracks found in the RPV flange O-rings monitor lines, and effluent from RPV upper-head decontamination and cleaning activities during the past Davis-Besse outages. The NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation reviewed the licensee's submittal and concluded that (1) the results of the chemical analysis do not provide conclusive evidence that the deposits observed at Davis-Besse were from IMI nozzles, and (2) the deposits observed at Davis-Besse were characteristic of deposits left by washdown from higher elevation sources." This conclusion was confirmed by the observations made by the licensee and NRC inspection of the lower vessel head after the conclusion of the NOP test, which was completed in early October 2003. The NRR staff also concluded that the licensee's proposed NOP test was acceptable, in conjunction with other planned activities (installing an online local leak monitoring system (Flüβ) in the area of the lower RPV head, and performing a mid-cycle inspection of the lower head for evidence of leakage), to ensure the prompt detection of any pressure boundary leakage from the lower head region.

Reference Material - Davis-Besse Unit 1 Incore Monitoring Nozzle Inspections (ADAMS Accession No. ML032510339) and NRC Inspection Report No. 50-346/03-23.

RAM Item No. - SUP-38 **Closed: Y**

Description of Issue - Assessment of Performance in the Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area: Key Attribute - Human Performance: Review specific problem areas and

issues identified by inspections to determine if concerns exist in Control of Overtime and Fatigue.

Description of Resolution - The inspectors reviewed approximately 24 CRs, 130 overtime deviation requests, and had discussions with representatives from Nuclear Quality Assessment and senior Davis-Besse management. Based on the information evaluated, the inspectors concluded that the licensee was meeting regulatory requirements in regard to the control of overtime for personnel during an extended outage. The inspectors found a number of issues where management expectations, which were also described in the inspection report, were not being met regarding the control of overtime or the implementation of the overtime deviation process. However, the inspectors did not identify any significant issues that involved personnel performing safety-related functions.

Reference Material - Inspection Report No. 50-346/03-17 (ADAMS Accession No. ML032721592).

RAM Item No. - LER-18 **Closed: Y**

Description of Issue - Loss of offsite power due to grid disturbances.

Description of Resolution - As a result of the loss of power, the diesels started and restored station vital loads. However, as a result of stopping and automatic restarting of the Service Water Pumps, a pressure transient was experienced in the Service Water System which caused a gasket leak on a Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchanger and distortion of Containment Air Coolers (CAC) expansion bellows. The licensee attributed the distortion of the CAC Service Water piping expansion bellows to an inadequate hydrodynamic transient analysis which under-predicted the peak pressures that would occur for a loss of offsite power condition. The Service Water system leakage from the end bell of the CCW Heat Exchanger 3 was attributed to the inadequate thickness dimensions of the gasket material installed during the current extended outage. Corrective actions implemented included the replacement of the expansion bellows for all three CACs and the installation of the appropriately sized gasket on CCW Heat Exchanger 3. In addition, the licensee modified the valving to the CACs to significantly reduce the potential for water hammer in the service water supply to the CACs. These issues have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CRs 03-06590, 03-06597 and 03-06651.

Reference Material - Inspection Report No. 50-346/03-22.

RAM Item No. - NCV-18 **Closed: Y**

Description of Issue - Failure to Properly Implement Work Instructions During the Reinstallation of Electrical Conduit and the Electrical Termination of Operating Power and Indication Power to RC4608A and RC4608B (loop 1 reactor coolant system high point vent valves). Closed in same report.

Description of Resolution - The performance deficiency associated with this event was the failure to correctly implement procedures which directed maintenance activities which removed/installed electrical power to safety related equipment. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions implemented associated with condition report (CR) 03-03427, "RC4608A and RC4608B Are Not Wired Properly." The inspectors determined that the corrective actions

associated with this CR had been implemented and appropriately addressed the causes of the performance deficiency. The inspectors also reviewed the outstanding corrective action and determined the due date assigned to this action was appropriate.

Reference Material - CR 03-03427, "RC4608A and RC4608B Are Not Wired Properly."

RAM Item No. - NCV-20 **Closed: Y**

Description of Issue - Inadvertent Operation of DH7A and DH7B Caused By Inadequate SFAS Component Testing Procedure. Closed in same report.

Description of Resolution - The performance deficiency associated with this event was the failure to develop adequate procedures for testing SFAS components. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions associated with condition reports (CR) 03-02554, "DH7B Opened Unexpectedly," and CR 03-02571, "DH7A Opened After Testing Was Complete." The inspectors determined that the corrective actions associated with these condition reports had been implemented and appropriately addressed the causes of the performance deficiency.

Reference Material - CR 03-02554, "DH7B Opened Unexpectedly," and CR 03-02571, "DH7A Opened After Testing Was Complete."

RAM Item No. - NCV-21 **Closed: Y**

Description of Issue - Failure to Provide Adequate Procedural Guidance for Tightening Fasteners Internal to the High Pressure Injection Pump.

Description of Resolution - The performance deficiency associated with this event was the failure to provide adequate procedural guidance in a safety-related maintenance procedure which provides guidance for tightening fasteners internal to the high pressure injection pump. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions associated with CR 03-04278, "Broken Bolting Found in High Pressure Injection Pump #1." The inspectors determined that the corrective actions associated with this CR had been implemented and appropriately addressed the causes of the performance deficiency. The inspectors also reviewed the outstanding corrective actions and determined the due dates assigned to these actions were appropriate.

Reference Material - CR 03-04278, "Broken Bolting Found in High Pressure Injection Pump #1."

RAM Item No. - NCV-22 **Closed: Y**

Description of Issue - Failure to Perform Work in Accordance With Approved Maintenance Procedures During the Installation of Reactor Coolant Pump Mechanical Seal RTDs.

Description of Resolution - The performance deficiency associated with this issue was the failure to perform work in accordance with approved maintenance procedures. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions associated with CR 03-04773, "RCP/RTD Installation Not In Accordance With Vendor Manual." This CR was classified by the licensee as a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality. The inspectors determined that a majority of the corrective actions associated with this CR had been implemented and appropriately addressed the causes

of the performance deficiency. The inspectors also reviewed the outstanding corrective actions and determined the due dates assigned to these actions were appropriate.

Reference Material - CR 03-04773, “RCP/RTD Installation Not In Accordance With Vendor Manual.”

Nov. 4, 2003

Panel Briefing Paper

Restart Checklist Item 5.a, "Review of Licensee's Restart Action Plan"

For the Panel's review of this restart checklist, it is recommended that the panel be familiar with Section G of the licensee's Return to Service (RTS) Plan, dated March 31, 2003, and consider several activities that have taken place by the licensee and NRC since the RTS plan was initiated.

Section G, Restart Action Plan, describes the licensee's building block, the charter of this plan is described as:

> Administer the identification, coordination, monitoring, and closure of actions required to meet all Company-identified objectives and requirements under the Davis-Besse RTS Plan.

Specific Activities credited in the plan and NRC associated actions are described below:

Licensee Activities	Associated NRC Activities
Establish the process and criteria for evaluation of CRs	NRC Inspections (IR03-02&03-04) - see attached excerpt
RSRB - identify and classify items	NRC Inspections - see attached excerpt
Senior Management Team - approve addition of items to licensee's "0350 list"	NRC Inspections - see attached excerpt
Restart Readiness Reviews	NRC Resident Inspection (IR) + Phase 3 Inspection - 03-12
Restart Oversight Panel	0350 Panel member attendance for observation/evaluation
Engineering Assessment Board - evaluate Building Block Action Plans	NRC evaluation of EAB during Programs (IR02-11) and System Health (IR02-13)
Closure/approval of activities associated with building blocks	NRC discussions with licensee at weekly phone calls and public monthly meetings. Also, specific inspections related to other restart checklist items.

Below is an excerpt from Resident Inspection IR 03-04:

.3 Classification, Categorization, and Resolution of Restart Related Issues

The resident inspectors continued to monitor the licensee activity related to properly classifying, categorizing and resolving their backlog of work orders, corrective actions, and modifications required to be completed prior to transitioning to Mode 5 and 4. To accomplish this, the inspectors:

- attended and assessed licensee management meetings;
- monitored the management of open Mode 5 and 4 restraints;
- evaluated the licensee classification of emergent deficient conditions; and
- evaluated closed mode restraints.

As part of this inspection, the inspectors attended selected Mode Change Readiness Review meetings, Senior Management Team meetings, Management Review Board meetings, and Restart Station Review Board meetings where classification of CRs, prioritization of work activities, and setting of work completion dates took place. Specific items noted by the inspectors during these meetings included:

- a large number of issues that originally were classified as Significant Conditions Adverse to Quality (SCAQ), were downgraded to Conditions Adverse to Quality (CAQ);
- approximately 17 percent of the Design Engineering issues discussed at a Mode Change Readiness Review meeting and approximately 33 percent of the Plant Engineer issues discussed at another Mode Change Readiness Review meeting had work completion dates moved up to align the completion of the work activities with current milestone schedule; and
- Some “rolling” up of multiple CRs and corrective actions into single CRs was noted.

The inspectors evaluated a sampling of CR downgrade documentation forms associated with the SCAQs that were downgraded to CAQs and a sampling of CRs that resulted from the “rolling” up process.

No significant issues were identified by the inspectors. The process of adjusting work activity completion dates so that milestone dates were met, alone, was not an issue.

The inspectors continued to evaluate, on a day-to-day basis, the impact that scheduling had on quality of work and safety conscious work environment. No significant issues were identified.

Restart Checklist Item 3.i, "Process for Ensuring Completeness and Accuracy of Required Records and Submittals to the NRC"

EXTENT OF CONDITION REVIEWS PERTAINING TO THE MATERIAL OMISSIONS/INACCURACIES REVIEW PROJECT

The licensee's Project Plan requires FENOC to increase the review sample size if any of the original documents contained statements that are inaccurate or incomplete in any material respect. The Project Plan requires that the sample size for that category of documents be expanded to include another 20 percent. If more than one document in that category contained statements that are inaccurate or incomplete in any material respect, then the balance of documents within the category (submitted between January 1996 and March 2002) will be verified.

Based on the licensee's reviews, FENOC will perform additional reviews on the following documents by March 31, 2004:

Document Type	Number (percentage of total population)
Licensee Event Reports[1]	39 (100)
License Amendment Requests[2]	9 (20)
Responses to Generic Letters[3]	5 (20)
Total:	**53**

1 Sample expanded based on two LERS: LER 99-003 (excessive cooldown not mentioned in previous LER - Minor Violation) and LER 97-004 (deleted paragraph regarding RCP lube oil - Apparent Violation)

2 Sample expanded based on LAR 96-0008, "License Amendment Application to Revise Technical Specification 3/4.7.5.1, Ultimate Heat Sink". Issue involved EQ equipment stated to be have a qualified life of approximately 1 year or greater but further review found at least one instrument that was qualified for about 0.58 years. SL IV violation.

3 Sample expanded based on GL 98-04 response (Coatings). Probably SL III violation.

The licensee reviewed 70 regulatory submittals that contained over 2,200 statements of fact. In addition, questionnaires were distributed via a site-wide e-mail, which requested personnel to identify any submittals to the NRC that may have contained incomplete or inaccurate information. FENOC determined that none of the issues resulted in significant implication for public health and safety or common defense and security.

As a result of the issue in LER 97-004 (deleted paragraph regarding RCP lube oil), FENOC performed a review of 286 documents that were prepared, revised, or submitted by the individual responsible for the material omission. FENOC determined that none of the issues resulted in significant implication for public health and safety or common defense and security.

The licensee's argument is, when considered together, the material inaccuracies/omissions identified during these reviews indicate that there were no widespread noncompliances or programmatic concerns associated with the preparation, review, and submittal of regulatory correspondence at Davis-Besse. The reviews did not identify any issues having significant implications for public health and safety or common defense and security. (The licensee states that the past material false statements in GL 98-04 on coatings is not a current issue affecting public health and safety or common defense and security.)

Under the Davis-Besse Return to Service Plan, FENOC has conducted extensive reviews to verify that its systems, programs, and organizations are ready to support safe and reliable operation. These reviews included reviews under the Systems Health Assurance Plan to provide additional assurance that plant systems can perform their safety functions. Given the results of the Completeness and Accuracy Review together with the results of the reviews under the Return to Service Plan, there is reasonable assurance the plant can be restarted and will operate: (1) without endangering the public health and safety or common defense and security; and (2) in compliance with applicable NRC regulations and requirements.

Going forward, FENOC has taken several actions to ensure that future regulatory submittals are complete and accurate in all material respects. For example, the licensee revised its procedure for regulatory submittals to ensure that they be properly validated before the submittal can be issued. Site supervisory personnel have been given training to ensure that they are cognizant of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.9 and the implications of not complying with those requirements. New employees will also receive training on the requirements of 10 CFR 50.9 as part of their New Employee Orientation. New supervisory personnel will also be trained on management responsibilities related to completeness and accuracy.

November 4, 2003

DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL "OPEN" ACTION ITEM LIST			
Item Number	Action Item (Date generated)	Assigned to	Comments
138	Evaluate the effectiveness of the Comm Plan (01/07)	A. Mendiola, C. Lipa	01/31-Ongoing; 02/21-New EDO Comm Plan for Crisis Update, A. Mendiola to review for inclusion; 10/14-Discussed, The new revised Comm. Plan is with the Panel Chairman for review. This item will be closed upon approval of the revised plan; 10/28-Comm Plan is to Regional Administrator for approval.
147	Generate a list of items to consider after restart as well as transition back to the normal 0350 when terminating the 0350 Panel. The items should include plans to augment inspection of corrective actions, inservice inspection, and safety culture monitoring. (01/09)	D. Passehl	01/31-Working; 02/11-Include dates and deadlines to Manual Chapter 0350 restart inspections planner; 07/0-Discussed; 7/22-Dave has list with Christine's comments; 08/05-Discussed. Bring back 6 weeks; 09/23-Discussed; 09/30-The Panel decision is to separate this into three distinct listings: Inspection Schedule items for both prior to and following restart; Focus Areas for post restart; and 0350 Panel termination criteria. The Panel will approve listings; 10/14-Discussed, The inspection schedules and focus areas for post restart are incorporated in the punch list. When developed, the listing for 0350 Panel termination criteria will be presented to the Panel for approval.
197	Develop a communication plan with restart Qs and As. (06/17)	J. Stang	6/24-Lead changed; 08/21-Lead changed; 09/30-Discussed, list of Q & As is being gathered for review and forwarding to RA; 10/14-Discussed, J. Shea is compiling the list of Q & As for review by the Panel and results will be forwarded to the RA; 10/21-Brainstorming session to occur 10/23 to final presentation to Panel; 11/04-Discussed, J. Strasma will have draft Q&As drafted by 11/07.
202	Put a discussion of the actions the NRC took in reviewing concerns involving the reactor coolant pumps in the August 2003 newsletter. (07/15)	J. Strasma	10/14-Discussed, Information surrounding this issue will be collated and discussed at a future meeting; 11/04-Discussed, will put in the November 2003 Newsletter.
208	Evaluate the need to call back CI regarding Allegation RIII-2002-A-0177 (D-B) after the OI Investigation is complete (08/21)	M. Phillips	10/14-Investigation is still ongoing.

November 4, 2003

DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL "OPEN" ACTION ITEM LIST			
Item Number	Action Item (Date generated)	Assigned to	Comments
211	(a) Issue a status report of the NOP test results thus far; (b) Issue a status report after the NOP inspection of record has been completed; (c) Issue a status report after the upper reactor vessel head and lower reactor vessel head tests are completed. The reports are to be forwarded to NRC Division of Engineering personnel. (09/23)	J. Jacobson	10/09-Discussed; Mr. Jacobson provided the Panel with an update on the licensee's progress to date. Draft status reports are pending; 10/14-Discussed, This issue will be completed by licensee 10/15, and the results will be presented to the Panel within the next 2 weeks; 10/28-Mr. Jacobson will brief the Panel on 11/06, following final week at site, with results.
212	Determine whether the Communication Team has received all electronic and written correspondence from external sources. If there is reasonable confidence that the Communication Team has all the correspondence then develop a set of bullets explaining why there is reasonable confidence. (09/23)	J. Stang	10/14-Discussed, Set of bullets still under development; item will be discussed at next Panel meeting on 10/16; 11/04-Discussed, J. Stang will add this item to the Comm. Team tracking matrix and send J. Grobe the draft set of bullets.
213	Update the punch list that will be used to ensure that NRC activities necessary for restart are accomplished with intermediate steps and their due dates. (09/25)	C. Lipa	10/14-Discussed, Milestones are still being developed using 12/15/2003 as a reasonable target date for restart and completed matrix will be presented to the Panel next week; 10/21-Punch list has been added as a Standing Item to the Panel Agenda for ongoing update and discussion.
214	Discuss with Region III Public Affairs Officers whether to include a discussion of the September 20, 2003, rally sponsored by the Union of Concerned Scientists in the next monthly NRC newsletter. (09/25)	C. Lipa	10/14-Discussed, The preliminary decision is that it is not appropriate to respond via the NRC newsletter; final disposition is pending; 11/04-Discussed, final resolution is to not include discussion in the NRC Newsletter. The Panel decided that this item is Closed.

November 4, 2003

DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL "OPEN" ACTION ITEM LIST			
Item Number	Action Item (Date generated)	Assigned to	Comments
216	Submit a TIA which addresses issues and questions related to the licensee's 1991 10 CFR Appendix R exemption request regarding Alternative Shutdown (ASD) regulations. (10/02)	J. Lara	10/14-The TIA has been submitted to the Branch Chief for review; 10/21-The TIA is with A. Mendiola; 10/28-Held telephone conversation yesterday for obtaining information.
217	Review and document the acceptability of the licensee's withdrawal of the single safety group of control rods to provide a prompt trip response source of negative reactivity. The review will be documented in a resident inspection report. (10/09)	S. Thomas	10/14-Discussed, This review is ongoing and will be documented in Inspection Report 03-22.
219	Brief Jim Caldwell on how Immediate Action Maintenance issue was resolved. He would like to see the revised procedure. (10/21)	S. Thomas	10/28-Brief will include research information on Exelon approach.
220	Develop inspection plan requirements which include review of post restart security program effectiveness. (10/28)	D. Passehl	
221	Research use of a "Quick Look" letter which formalizes preliminary inspection results prior to final report being issued to address urgent Restart decision issues. (10/28)	D. Passehl	11/04-Discussed, suggestion was made to send an email to S. Collins for assistance.
222	Develop a list of Q's and A's for the CATI discussion during the November 12, 2003 public meeting. (10/30)	J. Strasma	11/04-Discussed, conference call set up for later today.

November 4, 2003

DAVIS-BESSE OVERSIGHT PANEL "OPEN" ACTION ITEM LIST			
Item Number	Action Item (Date generated)	Assigned to	Comments
223	Develop a list of Q's and A's for discussions on the October 17, 2003, NRC Inspector General Report, "Event Inquiry Regarding NRC's Oversight of Davis-Besse Boric Acid Leakage and Corrosion During the April 2000 Refueling Outage," for use during the November 12, 2003 public meeting. (10/30)	J. Strasma	