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10CFR 50.73

April 30, 2004


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Unit 3
Facility Operating License No. DPR-56
NRC Docket No. 50-278

Subject: Licensee Event Report (LER) 3-04-01

This LER reports a loss of safety function involving the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) resulting from an inoperability of the system flow controller. In accordance with NEI 99-04, the regulatory commitment contained in this correspondence is to restore compliance with the regulations. The specific methods that are planned to restore and maintain compliance are discussed in the LER. If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,


John A. Stone
Plant Manager
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station

JAS/djf/CR 209005

Attachment

cc: PSE&G, Financial Controls and Co-owner Affairs
R. R. Janati, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
INPO Records Center
H. J. Miller, US NRC, Administrator, Region I
R. I. McLean, State of Maryland
C. W. Smith, US NRC, Senior Resident Inspector

CCN 04-14045

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SUMMARY OF EXELON NUCLEAR COMMITMENTS

The following table identifies commitments made in this document by Exelon Nuclear. (Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by Exelon Nuclear. They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments.)

Commitment	Committed Date or "Outage"
In accordance with NEI 99-04, the regulatory commitment contained in this correspondence is to restore compliance with the regulations. The specific methods that are planned to restore and maintain compliance are discussed in the LER.	In accordance with the Corrective Action Program

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

1. FACILITY NAME Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3	2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000 278	3. PAGE 1 OF 3
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4. TITLE
Loss of High Pressure Coolant Injection System Function as a Result of Inoperable Flow Controller

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
03	17	04	04	- 01 -	00	4	30	04		
9. OPERATING MODE			11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)							
1			20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)	
10. POWER LEVEL			20.2201(d)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	
100			20.2203(a)(1)		50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)		73.71(a)(4)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)		73.71(a)(5)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)		OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.46(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)			
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)		X 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)			
			20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)			
			20.2203(a)(2)(vi)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
			20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

NAME James Mallon, Regulatory Assurance Manager	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (717) 456-3351
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13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
B	BJ	TC	M430	Y					

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED				15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE		
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO		MONTH	DAY	YEAR

16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On 3/17/04, at approximately 1235 hours, during the performance of a routine surveillance test for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, Operations personnel discovered that HPCI was inoperable. During performance of the surveillance test, the HPCI turbine could not achieve a speed above 1000 rpm and no significant discharge pressure was observed. Within two minutes of the initial turbine start, HPCI was tripped and the steam supply isolation valve was closed. The cause of the event is due to an inoperability of the HPCI system flow controller. The HPCI controller was discovered to not respond properly. The flow controller was replaced. HPCI was satisfactorily tested and returned to an operable status on 3/19/04 by 0145 hours. Other flow related components on the HPCI system were evaluated and found to be in an acceptable condition. Other similar flow controllers (HPCI and RCIC) on Units 2 and 3 were evaluated for extent of condition concerns and determined to be operable. There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3	05000278	04	01	00	2 OF 3

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Unit Conditions Prior to the Event

Unit 3 was in Mode 1 and operating at approximately 100% rated thermal power when the event occurred. There were no structures, systems or components out of service that contributed to this event.

Description of the Event

On 3/17/04, at approximately 1235 hours, during the performance of a routine surveillance test for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) (EIIS: BJ) system, Operations personnel discovered that HPCI was inoperable. During performance of the surveillance test, the HPCI turbine (EIIS: TRB) could not achieve a speed above 1000 rpm and no significant discharge pressure was observed. Within two minutes of the initial turbine start, HPCI was tripped and the steam supply isolation valve (EIIS: ISV) was closed.

This condition was reported to the NRC on 03/17/04 at approximately 1519 hours pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) (Event Notification # 40593).

Troubleshooting of the HPCI system determined that the HPCI system flow controller (EIIS: TC) was inoperable resulting in the HPCI turbine not achieving proper speed and therefore, not developing discharge pressure. The flow controller was replaced. HPCI was satisfactorily tested and returned to an operable status on 3/19/04 by 0145 hours.

Analysis of the Event

There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event.

HPCI was considered as Technical Specification inoperable from 03/17/04 at approximately 1235 hours to 03/19/04 at approximately 0145 hours. During this time period, other core cooling systems (Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) (EIIS: RV), Core Spray (EIIS: BM) and Low Pressure Coolant Injection (EIIS: BO)) were fully operable. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system (EIIS: BN) was operable through this time period except for a brief inoperability on 3/18/04 from approximately 0600 to 0605 hours (approximately 5 minutes) due to inadvertent flow adjustment of the RCIC flow controller during Instrumentation & Control maintenance work intended to be performed on the HPCI flow controller. Licensed Operators promptly detected the condition and returned the RCIC system to an operable status. Technical Specification actions were appropriately taken. This coincident inoperability of HPCI and RCIC was reviewed and determined to not be risk significant.

A review of HPCI operations was performed by Engineering personnel to determine the length of time this condition may have existed. HPCI was operated for a routine surveillance test on 12/18/03 with no abnormalities noted. The exact time of controller failure between 12/18/03 and 3/17/04 could not be determined due to the nature of the failure.

This event is not considered to be risk significant.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3	05000278	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
		04	- 01	- 00	

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Cause of the Event

Troubleshooting of the HPCI system determined that the HPCI system flow controller was inoperable resulting in the HPCI turbine not achieving proper speed and therefore, not developing discharge pressure. The cause of the event is due to an inoperability of the HPCI system flow controller. The HPCI controller was discovered to not respond to faceplate manipulations. Flow controller output was measured and found to not meet specifications.

The flow controller (FC-3-23-108) was sent off-site for further analysis. It was determined that the power supply board within the controller had failed.

The flow controller is a Moore Controller, Model # 352EA21NMF and has been in service since 1994. The Power Supply is a Micro 352, 120/240 Volt Plug-in Power Supply (part no. 1455-123).

Corrective Actions

The flow controller was replaced. HPCI was satisfactorily tested and returned to an operable status on 3/19/04 by 0145 hours.

Other flow related components on the HPCI system were evaluated and found to be in an acceptable condition.

Other similar flow controllers (HPCI and RCIC) on Units 2 and 3 were evaluated for extent of condition concerns and determined to be operable.

Additional corrective actions are being evaluated in accordance with the corrective action program including evaluating the appropriateness of the controller preventative maintenance frequency.

Previous Similar Occurrences

There were no previous similar LERs identified involving a loss of HPCI safety function due to an inoperable flow controller.