Progress Energy

APR 2 2 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Serial: HNP-04-068
10CFR50.73

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2004-002-00

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report 2004-002-00 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This initial report describes inoperability of the Containment Fan Cooler (AH-1) and will be followed by a supplemental report. The expected submission date for the supplemental report is June 10, 2004.

Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. John Caves, Supervisor – Licensing/Regulatory Programs, at (919) 362-3137.

Sincerely,

(for)

B. C. Waldrep
Plant General Manager
Harris Nuclear Plant

BCW/jpy

Enclosure

c: Mr. R. A. Musser (HNP Senior NRC Resident)
Mr. C. P. Patel (NRC-NRR Project Manager)
Mr. L. A. Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)

Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.
Harris Nuclear Plant
P.O. Box 165
New Hill, NC 27562

IE22

NRC FORM 366 (7-2001) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7-31-2004
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. PAGE
Harris Nuclear Plant – Unit 1	05000400	1 OF 3

4. TITLE
Containment Fan Cooler (AH-1) Inoperable

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
02	22	2004	2004	- 002 -	00	04	22	2004	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER

9. OPERATING MODE	1
10. POWER LEVEL	100

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
	20.2201(d)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)
	20.2203(a)(1)		50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)		73.71(a)(4)
	20.2203(a)(2)(i)		50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)		73.71(a)(5)
	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)		OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.46(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)		
	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)		
	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		
	20.2203(a)(2)(vi)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
	20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
John Yadusky – Lead Licensing Engineer	(919) 362-2020

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
X	BK	DMP	Ruskin	Y					

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED				15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)		NO		06	10	2004

16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On March 3, 2004, Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) personnel discovered the discharge gravity damper for containment fan AH-1A partially open with the fan out of service. With the discharge gravity damper of fan AH-1A in the open position, a recirculation path was created for operating fan AH-1B. Therefore, some discharge flow from fan AH-1B was being diverted through fan AH-1A rather than to its normal discharge flowpath.

This diversion of discharge flow from containment fan cooler AH-1 is a degraded condition that potentially existed since the last time fan AH-1A was operated on February 22, 2004. It is postulated that the discharge gravity damper of fan AH-1A failed to close when the fan was stopped at that time. This condition had potentially existed for approximately 10 days, which would have exceeded the allowed outage time per technical specifications.

Immediate corrective action included closing the discharge gravity damper of fan AH-1A.

The root cause evaluation of the event has not been completed to date pending further investigation. The root cause and corrective actions to prevent recurrence will be submitted in a supplemental report.

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER (2)	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Harris Nuclear Plant – Unit 1	05000400	2004	- 002 -	00	2 OF 3

17. NARRATIVE *(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)*

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On March 3, 2004, with the Unit in Mode 1 at 100% power, Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) personnel discovered the discharge gravity damper [DMP] for containment fan AH-1A partially open with the fan out of service. With the discharge gravity damper of fan AH-1A in the open position, a recirculation path was created for operating fan AH-1B. Therefore, some discharge flow from fan AH-1B was being diverted through fan AH-1A rather than to its normal discharge flowpath. Immediate corrective action included closing the discharge gravity damper of fan AH-1A. Follow-up corrective action included performing inspections and repair of the discharge gravity damper of fan AH-1A.

This diversion of discharge flow from containment fan cooler AH-1 is a degraded condition that potentially existed since the last time fan AH-1A was operated on February 22, 2004. It is postulated that the discharge gravity damper of fan AH-1A failed to close when the fan was stopped at that time. This condition had potentially existed for approximately 10 days, which would have exceeded the allowed outage time per technical specifications. An analysis is in progress to determine the impact of the open damper, which will determine whether the technical specification requirements were satisfied.

Technical Specification 3.6.2.3 (Containment Cooling System) requires, "Four containment fan coolers (AH-1, AH-2, AH-3, and AH-4) shall be OPERABLE with one of two fans in each cooler capable of operation at low speed." Technical Specification Action 3.6.2.3.a requires, "With one train of the above required containment fan coolers inoperable and both Containment Spray Systems OPERABLE, restore the inoperable train of fan coolers to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours." During the time period that this condition existed, both Containment Spray Systems [BE] and the other three containment fan coolers (AH-2, AH-3, and AH-4) were operable.

The purpose of the Containment Cooling System [BK] is to provide cooling air to the containment and to remove heat produced during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or major steam-line break. The Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) has four containment fan coolers (AH-1, AH-2, AH-3, and AH-4) as part of the Containment Cooling System. The "A" Train consists of containment fan coolers AH-2 and AH-3. The "B" Train consists of containment fan coolers AH-1 and AH-4. Each containment fan cooler has two fans that can be operated at high or low speeds. One of two fans capable of operation at low speed is required to maintain each containment fan cooler operable. The containment fan coolers provide cooling air and remove heat under accident conditions to maintain the containment temperature and pressure within design limits.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text within brackets [ ].

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER (2)	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Harris Nuclear Plant – Unit 1	05000400	2004	- 002 -	00	3 OF 3

17. NARRATIVE *(If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)*

II. CAUSE OF EVENT AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The root cause evaluation of the event has not been completed to date pending further investigation. The root cause and corrective actions to prevent recurrence will be submitted in a supplemental report.

Immediate corrective actions included placing fan AH-1A under clearance until repaired and closing the discharge gravity damper of fan AH-1A. Follow-up corrective action included performing inspections and repair of the discharge gravity damper of fan AH-1A.

III. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

There were no actual safety significant consequences of this event. The potential safety consequences under alternate conditions will be submitted in a supplemental report pending completion of the root cause evaluation. During the time period that this condition existed, both Containment Spray Systems and the other three containment fan coolers (AH-2, AH-3, and AH-4) were operable.

This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for a condition which was prohibited by HNP's technical specifications.

IV. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

No previous HNP events or conditions are known related to an open discharge gravity damper that caused a condition prohibited by technical specifications.