

International Safeguards
Obligations Affecting
American Centrifuge Plant and
Lead Cascade

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US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement

- Safeguards Agreement entered into force in December 1980
- All U.S. facilities not of direct national security significance to be placed on list of U.S. facilities eligible for IAEA inspections
- 19 facilities have been selected from the Eligible Facilities List, at some time

GCEP

- The Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP) was selected by the IAEA in 1983
- Seven IAEA safeguards verification inspections were conducted between 1983 and 1985
 - Design information verification
 - Material accountancy
 - Undeclared production of HEU

Hexapartite Approach

- U.S. Government participated in Hexapartite Safeguards Project (1980-83)
 - Australia, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, UK, US, and IAEA (as an observer)
 - Safeguards approach designed to protect proliferation sensitive centrifuge enrichment design information
 - IAEA verification under Limited frequency-unannounced access approach (LFUA)

Hexapartite Agreement

- Formal exchange of letters between governments
 - Implement LFUA at centrifuge plants existing, planned, or under consideration
 - Place centrifuge facilities under IAEA safeguards
- IAEA commitment to apply safeguards to centrifuge plants in U.K. and U.S.
- Capenhurst centrifuge plant in U.K. inspected by IAEA for 20 years

GCEP Commitments

- U.S. committed to place GCEP on Eligible Facilities List one year before nuclear material received.
- U.S. and IAEA committed to maintain safeguards on GCEP and not remove from safeguards inspections
- DOE determined that GCEP was not of direct national security significance and could be placed on Eligible Facilities List (except R/A Building)

New Pressures

- Brazil refusal to allow IAEA inspections at new centrifuge enrichment facility
 - Protection of proprietary information
 - Discrimination between NNPT and NPT States
- Lack of resolution detrimental to U.S. efforts in Iran and North Korea
- Issue to IAEA Board of Governors in June
- U.S. Delegation to Brazil this week
- U.S. is urging other countries to meet safeguards commitments for centrifuge enrichment plants

Impacts

- Inter-Agency Meetings
- Add American Centrifuge Lead Cascade and Plant to Eligible Facilities List
 - Recycle/Assembly building could be excluded
 - Exclusion of other areas
- US-IAEA Discussions

Impacts

- IAEA inspections of Lead Cascade expected to be minimal
 - Facility on recycle: small shipment/receipts
 - Inventory less than one significant quantity
- Impacts on centrifuge plant much greater
 - Frequent shipment and receipts
 - Inventory exceeds one significant quantity

Additional Protocol

- Additional Protocol to the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement approved by Senate
- General description of all buildings on designated site of facility selected from Eligible Facilities List
- Protection of proliferation sensitive, export controlled, and proprietary information is a common issue for all enrichment plants

Other Issues

- LES National Centrifuge Facility
 - Not covered by Hexapartite Agreement
 - USEC and LES should be treated equally under IAEA safeguards
- IAEA Budget and Resources
 - IAEA safeguards only at NWS facilities for which there is an obligation
 - U.S. has paid for IAEA safeguards on excess weapons material

Actions

- Place American Centrifuge Lead Cascade on Eligible Facility List
 - Facility definition
- Coordinate with IAEA on priorities
- Determine funding for IAEA safeguards implementation
- Begin IAEA-U.S. Govt-USEC coordination
 - GCEP baseline