




UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

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CHAIRMAN

September 28, 2001

MEMORANDUM TO: William Travers  
Executive Director for Operations

FROM: Richard A. Meserve 

SUBJECT: Response to Terrorist Acts

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the continuing uncertainty about future terrorist intentions, the NRC must undertake a thorough review of its safeguards and physical security program. I believe that the NRC has responded to these unsettling events in an appropriate, expeditious, and thoughtful manner, and that the NRC's current security and safeguards programs provide for a very high level of security. However, the nature and scope of the attacks have made clear that special and focused attention must be given to any necessary adjustments in NRC, licensee, and Federal, State, and local response capabilities. Moreover, the nature of the terrorist attacks requires that the NRC's review include a comprehensive examination of the basic assumptions underlying the current safeguards and physical security program.

This effort should include, but should not necessarily be limited to, an evaluation of the following items:

- o the agency's safeguards and security regulatory requirements, as well as policies and guidance to licensees. This should include evaluation of NRC inspection and assessment activities;
- o the scope of licensee obligations and those of governmental entities in the event of attacks that exceed NRC's Design Basis Threat (DBT);
- o the vulnerability of NRC-licensed facilities to attacks that exceed the DBT;
- o the policies and procedures relating to the protection of critical NRC infrastructure, including both headquarters and regional offices. This should include an evaluation of the adequacy of contingency plans to maintain continuity of operations during events that result in the unavailability of the Headquarters Emergency Response Center [REDACTED].
- o the capability for handling and processing classified information in the Emergency Response Center and the Region Incident Response Centers. Recommendations should be provided for improving these capabilities and for making physical modifications to allow classified briefings in or near the Emergency Operations Center or backup facilities;

Ex. 2

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- o the capability to transmit classified information in a timely fashion to appropriate State officials and licensee facilities with the need to know;
- o the agency's organizational structure, staffing, and training in the security and safeguards area;
- o the policies, procedures, and regulations related to the control of the availability and access to information having safeguards and security implications regarding licensed activities;
- o the agency's emergency response planning, staffing and training for handling protracted events;
- o coordination and communication with other Federal agencies, State and local governments, and licensees. This should include consideration of the need for contacts at a variety of levels at other Federal agencies, including contacts at a decision/policy-making level; and
- o communication with the press, public, and interested parties as appropriate.

Because there will no doubt be widespread examination of the implications of the recent terrorist attacks by the Executive Branch and the Congress, the NRC effort will have to be integrated in some respects with a broader national strategy.

Therefore I, with the full support of the Commission, direct you to establish a special task force to conduct a comprehensive review of the safeguards and security program. The task force should include representatives from the Office of General Counsel, the Regions, and the program offices. An early product should be a paper for Commission review that sets out the staff's proposed course of action, the proposed schedule, and any preliminary issues on which the staff seeks guidance.<sup>1</sup>

Additional resources, beyond those provided in the budget, should be requested from OMB in support of this effort. The initial paper scoping the effort should be provided to the Commission within the next 60 days.

SECY please track.

cc: See next page

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<sup>1</sup> Due to the many significant and interrelated activities already underway in the reactor safeguards area that may be impacted by the recommendations of the task force, the staff should immediately identify the papers now pending Commission review that should be withdrawn, supplemented, or revised.

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cc: Commissioner Dicus  
Commissioner McGaffigan  
Commissioner Merrifield  
OCA  
OGC  
CFO  
SECY

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EDO Principal Correspondence Control

FROM: DUE: 10/10/01

EDO CONTROL: G20010427  
DOC DT: 09/28/01  
FINAL REPLY:

Chairman Meserve

TO:

Travers, EDO

FOR SIGNATURE OF :

\*\* GRN \*\*

CRC NO:

DESC:

Response to Terrorist Acts

ROUTING:

Travers  
Paperiello  
Kane  
Norry  
Craig  
Burns/Cyr  
Collins, NRR  
Thadani, RES  
Wessman, IRO  
Cyr, OGC  
Springer, ADM  
Reyes, RI  
Mallett, RII  
Dyer, RIII

DATE: 10/03/01

ASSIGNED TO:

NMSS

CONTACT:

Virgilio

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

NMSS has lead with support from NRR, RES, IRO, OGC and ADM. Provide draft charter for the task force to the Deputy EDO's by 10/10/01. The charter should include a discussion of roles and responsibilities and participants for necessary support.

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