

Corrections to NRC Transcript

Page 72, line 5: Change "would" to "would not"

Page 72, line 9: Change "we" to "they"

Page 80, line 18: Change "possible" to "impossible"

Page 83, line 4: Change "It's something" to "It's not something"

Page 83, line 17: Change "I have come up with -- I think iodine-131 is the worst case. An it's less than one rem to the nearest resident." to "I have come up with (I think iodine-131 is the worst case) less than one rem to the nearest resident."

are relying upon generator knowledge, as is common throughout the industry. The generator tells us what they are giving us. And we accept it as that. We don't even make any allowances for each case.

MR. RAHON: Usually the generator gives them the manifest or list of activities before the waste is picked up. And then they would compare that to their license.

MS. MAUPIN: I wonder, do you have like a database where we have like .2 curies of whatever isotopes are on site? So we can't take any more --

MR. GREEN: We carry our databases on a daily basis. And we can gear this to an NRC 541 form, where you specifically list tritium, carbon-14, I-129, and tec-99, special nuclear material, along with source material, which are carried in grams and kilograms, as reporting procedures make us do or force us to do.

Everything else is grouped together in all other isotopes. So if you are asking about thorium, it comes under source material.

MR. WEST: But your specific question was, how does Radiac know that they are not exceeding these limits? And the specific answer is that they keep these daily inventory sheets. And they can look at

the chemical side of things had three years of inspections with the New York State DEC. And we have had no violations for three years. Those inspections are usually at the frequency of two to three times a year, which have been stepped up since the Arnold and Porter submission to EPA, where EPA rejected that the facility is unsafe but they asked the department to continue their thorough review of the facility.

MR. WEST: That does point to one other fact that I omitted in my presentation. Mr. Gerrard made the statement that the proximity of these two facilities has fallen through the cracks.

I can assure you I have been representing this facility since the late 1980s. And in virtually every meeting that I have attended with any agency, we discussed the proximity of the two facilities and the separation of those two facilities, the fire-rated walls and fire-rated doors, the double doors, the fusible length.

Every one of those agencies has looked at the proximity of the two facilities as part of their evaluation of the facility that is under their direct jurisdiction.

MR. SUICH: And every NAG petition has mentioned both.

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MR. GERRARD: May I just make two factual inquiries of Mr. West that --

MODERATOR FEDERLINE: Sure.

MR. GERRARD: -- could be very helpful to us as we do this?

MODERATOR FEDERLINE: Yes.

MR. GERRARD: First is with respect to the fire doors. Can you describe the configuration of the fire doors, how they work?

MR. WEST: Just one second.

(Pause.)

MR. WEST: Mr. Tekin is going to respond to that question.

MR. TEKIN: The fire door with the bias on is the one of the chemical waste storage facility. And, as Mr. West indicated earlier, that is the fire door that is a self-closing door and is always remained shut. The only way it can be opened is if an employee is entering or exiting the facility from the rear.

The second fire door that was referred to is a fire door that is immediately on the other side of that door in a separate building, the radioactive storage area. That is not a fusible link, but in the event there is a fire, the door is designed to close