

From: STAFF REQUIREMENTS - COMSECY-01-0030 - GUIDANCE TO THE STAFF ON  
RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC, of 1/25/02

CRITERION 22. The staff should withhold information in any type of agency document (e.g., plant status report, press release) that provides the current status or configuration of systems and equipment that could be used to determine facility vulnerabilities if used by an adversary. This does not include general conditions such as 100 percent power or shutdown.

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Subject: Deciding which Event Reports should have a delayed release date in response to Criterion 22.

The majority of the Event Reports received in the Headquarter's Operations Center don't rise to the limits of Criterion 22, in that they don't provide any current information "that could be used to determine facility vulnerabilities if used by an adversary." In a review of the July, 2001 Event Reports, of which there were 70, only 4 of them met the withholding limits of Criterion 22.

The interpretation of the limits, as compared to the actual Event Reports, centered on whether the Event Report detailed a condition of the reporting facility that could be used such that a challenge to the safety of the facility could be more easily obtained. A good example of this would be when a [ ]

Ex. 2

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The Headquarter's Operation Center receives about 9 different sources of Event Reports. They are as follows with the number for July, 2001 indicated:

- 1. Power Reactor [ ]
- 2. Fuel Cycle Facility [ ]
- 3. Research Reactor [ ]
- 4. Other Nuclear Material [ ]
- 5. Hospital [ ]
- 6. Transportation Event [ ]
- 7. Agreement State [ ]
- 8. General Info [ ]
- 9. Part 21 [ ]

*renewals - what about this status advised NPS*

Ex. 2

There is very little likelihood that event types 4 through 9 would need to be delayed as they will seldom rise to the limits of Criterion 22. At present, some of the type 7 events, Agreement State, are delayed a few days at the request of the reporting State to coordinate their investigative process and public release of information. The type 9, Part 21, events will need to be closely checked for increased general plant vulnerabilities, but typically they are very limited in aspect and would pose no additional threat to the operational safety of a given plant.

The Event Reports from types 1 through 3 will typically need to be reviewed more completely. Of the [ ] type 1 events, Power Reactor [ ] reached the limits of Criterion 22. Of the [ ] type 2 events, Fuel Cycle Facility, none rose to the limits of Criterion 22.

Ex. 2

*leakage 5%*


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Most of the Event Reports that are received report a condition that occurred and is already corrected. Also, the facility could have placed itself in a condition where the problem no longer exists or compensatory measures that provide an acceptable substitute are in place. An example would be the reactor plant has been placed in a mode of operation where the disabled equipment is not required per the plant operating procedures or technical specifications.

The staff will use the following process to evaluate each Event Report. The following questions assessed, in order, such that when a no answer is received there is no need to delay release of the report.



\* withheld for one day  
everything else gets released

- will be developing a classification guide or definitions of SGI, SHSI, ER.
- will refine criteria, send around comments + start posting this month
- A/S reports mostly, just events

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