

**U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Site-Specific
RO Written Examination****Applicant Information**

Name:

Date:

Facility/Unit:

License Level: RO / SRO Region: I / II / III / IV

Reactor Type: W / CE / BW / GE

Start Time:

Finish Time:

Instructions

Use the answer sheets provided to document your answers. Staple this cover sheet on top of the answer sheets. ~~The passing grade requires~~ To pass the examination you must achieve a final grade of at least 80.00 percent. Examination papers will be collected six hours after the examination starts.

Applicant Certification

All work done on this examination is my own. I have neither given nor received aid.

Applicant's Signature**Results**

Examination Value _____ Points

Applicant's Score _____ Points

Applicant's Grade _____ Percent

Name: _____

1. U-2 is operating at 100% when a reactor trip occurs.
The RO observes the following indications on the CEA mimic:
4 CEAs do not have the amber lights energized
2 of the above CEAs have green lights energized
What must be performed when performing the Reactivity Control Safety Function?
- A. Take the alternate actions to deenergize CEDM MG sets and verify all CEAs are inserted.
 - B. Depress the Reactor Trip pushbuttons on 2C15, verify reactor power is lowering, and verify a negative startup rate exists.
 - C. Verify reactor power is lowering, check that no CEA deviation alarms are present, verify a negative startup rate exists, check that RCS makeup is secured and inform CRS that Reactivity Control is complete.
 - D. Commence RCS boration to at least 2300 ppm via gravity feed or a Boric Acid pump using all available charging pumps.

2. Given the following conditions:
- | | |
|-----------------------|--------------|
| RCS pressure: | 1600 PSIA |
| PZR level: | 360" |
| T h: | 532.5°F |
| Tc: | 532.2°F |
| Containment Pressure: | 2.4 PSIA |
| Containment temp: | 115°F |
| S/G pressures: | 880/885 PSIA |

EOP-0 is being implemented

What is the most likely cause of these conditions?

- A. RCS cold leg break
- B. RCS leak at the top of the PZR
- C. S/G tube leak
- D. Main Steam line break in containment

3. The CRS ordered Unit-1 manually tripped due to rapidly loweing PZR level and RCS pressure. EOP-0 is being implemented and the following conditions exist:

RCS pressure:	1900 PSIA
Tc:	532.5°F
Containment pressure	0.5 PSIA
Containment temperature	98°F

What is the status of the Containment Air Coolers? **(Assume no operator action)**

- A. 4 Coolers in slow speed with maximum SRW flow
- B. 4 Coolers in fast speed with normal SRW flow
- C. 3 Coolers in slow speed with maximum SRW flow
- D. 3 Coolers in fast speed with normal SRW flow

4. Which one of the following describes the credited RCS inventory and core heat removal processes during a large break LOCA?

- A. HPSI injection provides makeup and heat is removed via natural circulation flow to the S/Gs.
- B. HPSI pumps, LPSI pumps and the SITs provide makeup and heat is removed via flow out the break.
- C. LPSI pumps and the SITs provide makeup and heat is removed via forced flow to the S/Gs.
- D. Charging pumps provide makeup and heat is removed via flow out the break.

5. Given the following conditions:

- 11A RCP tripped due to a breaker fault
- EOP-0 has been completed, no alternate actions were required

How will the RCS and Steam Generators have responded?

- A. 11 and 12 loop differential temperatures will be equal and 11 and 12 S/G pressures will be equal.
- B. 11 loop will have an inverted differential temperature and 11 S/G pressure will be lower than 12 S/G pressure.
- C. 12 loop differential temperature will be greater than 11 loop differential temperature and 11 and 12 S/G pressures will be equal.
- D. 12 loop will have a smaller differential temperature than 11 and 12 S/G pressure will be lower than 11S/G pressure.

6. A reactor trip has occurred and the following conditions exist:

- Pressurizer level is 140 inches and stable
- One Charging Pump is available
- Pressurizer pressure is 1900 psia and rising
- RCS Subcooling is 65°F and steady

After performing the immediate actions for PIC, the Reactor Operator reports "Pressure and Inventory Control cannot be met" to the CRS.

What is the reason for this report?

- A. Letdown has been isolated.
- B. RCS subcooling is not in band.
- C. All Charging Pumps are not in operation.
- D. Pressurizer level is not trending toward setpoint.

7. Why does the Component Cooling system realign on a SIAS?

- A. Minimize dose rates due to contamination of Component Cooling system
- B. Provide long term cooling to containment after RAS
- C. Minimize load on the Saltwater system to ensure containment cooling via Service Water
- D. Provide continuous cooling to LPSI pump seals

8. Unit-1 is in Mode 3 with the following conditions:

RCS pressure is 2150 PSIA and lowering
Pressurizer Spray Valves, 1-RC-100E and F are fully open
PIC-100X is indicating 2400 PSIA, controller output is 100%
PIC-100Y is indicating 2150 PSIA output is 0%

What action is required?

- A. Stop 11A and 11B Reactor Coolant Pumps.
- B. Energize all Pressurizer Heaters.
- C. Place PZR PRESS CH SEL switch, 1-HS-100 in "Y".
- D. Place PRESSURIZER SPRAY VALVE CONTROLLER, 1-HIC-100 in manual with a 100% output.

9. EOP-8 has been implemented because the Reactivity Safety Function was not met in EOP-0. What indications are used to verify that boration is successfully meeting the acceptance criteria?
- A. WRNI power is less than $10^{-4}\%$ and SUR is negative or zero
 - B. LRNI power is less than $10^{-4}\%$ or SUR is negative
 - C. A boric acid pump is running and charging header flow is 40 GPM or greater
 - D. SUR is zero and the CHG HDR FLOW LO PRESS LO alam is clear
10. Which one of the following is the reason for equalizing the pressure on the primary and secondary sides of a ruptured Steam Generator per the applicable EOP?
- A. Lowering the RCS pressure allows HPSI flow to restore Pressurizer level.
 - B. Reducing the differential pressure lowers the RCS leak rate.
 - C. Reducing RCS pressure and temperature aids initiation of natural circulation.
 - D. Equalizing RCS and S/G secondary side pressures initiates backflow to control affected S/G level.
11. Emergency Operating Procedures provide specific guidance for feeding a dry S/G to restore RCS heat removal.
- This guidance is based on _____.
- (Select the phrase that correctly completes the above statement)
- A. minimizing S/G tube voiding, which would inhibit natural circulation
 - B. preventing a rapid RCS cooldown, avoiding a pressurized thermal shock to the Reactor Vessel
 - C. preventing uneven cooling of the RCS, which may result in a localized reactivity excursion
 - D. minimizing the probability of creating a waterhammer, and damaging S/G internals

12. EOP-0 was completed and the following conditions exist:

11 S/G pressure 725 PSIA and lowering
12 S/G pressure 840 PSIA and stable
11 S/G level -260" and lowering
12 S/G level - 80" and rising slowly
Tc 521°F
Pzr pressure 1830 PSIA
MSIVs and S/G Blowdown Isolation Valves are shut

Which event would cause these indications?

- A. A Feedwater line rupture inside Containment
- B. An RCS leak inside Containment
- C. A Main Steam line rupture in the Turbine Building
- D. A rupture of the S/G Blowdown Tank

13. EOP-7 (Station Blackout) has been initiated on U-1 and the CRS has directed the CRO to restore power to 11 4KV bus using the 0C Emergency Diesel Generator.

Which Control Room annunciator condition reflects that the bus has been re-energized?

- A. "ACTUATION SYS LOSS OF POWER" alarm clears
- B. "ACTUATION SYS U/V RELAY TRIP" alarm clears
- C. "SEQUENCER INITIATED" alarm actuates
- D. "0C DG CONTR BOARD 1C19C" alarm actuates

14. Unit-1 has experienced a Loss of Offsite Power from 100% power. 11 and 14 4 KV buses have been re-energized by their associated Diesel Generators. EOP-0 is being implemented.

What action must the CRO take for step B, "ENSURE TURBINE TRIP" that would **NOT** be expected on a reactor trip with offsite power available?

- A. Depressing the Turbine TRIP button.
- B. Opening 11 GEN FIELD BKR, 1-CS-41.
- C. Shutting the MSIVs due to not being able to verify Turbine speed dropping.
- D. Dispatching an operator to shut the MSR 2nd stage bypass valves.

15. The inverter backup bus is powering 1Y01 when offsite power is lost.
How is 4 KV bus 11 affected?
- A. 1A DG will start but not load because ESFAS logic cabinet ZA remains deenergized, maintaining a UV (load shed signal) to 4 KV bus 11 loads.
 - B. 4 KV bus 11 will be re-energized by manually starting and loading 0C Diesel Generator.
 - C. 1A DG will automatically start and load to energize 4KV bus 11 after the 1B DG starts and energizes 4KV bus 14.
 - D. 4 KV bus 11 cannot be re-energized until power is restored to 1Y01 via DC bus 11.

16. A plant transient has occurred and the following conditions exist:
- All Unit-1 annunciator lights are deenergized
 - CC CNTMT RETURN, 1-CC-3833-CV has failed shut
- How will SPDS indicate the cause of this event?
- A. All Safety Function boxes turn red, and a "Loss of AC bus " alarm appears on the "Vital Auxiliaries" Safety Function screen.
 - B. The "Vital Auxiliaries" Safety Function box turns red, and the indicator for the affected AC bus on the electrical systems mimic flashes.
 - C. The "Vital Auxiliaries" Safety Function box turns yellow, and the indicator for the affected DC bus on the electrical systems mimic changes color.
 - D. All Safety Function boxes turn magenta and a small red box appears next to the indicator for the affected DC bus on the electrical systems mimic.

17. 2-HS-5155, 22A/22B SRW HXR EMERGENCY OUTLET VLVS handswitch is inadvertently placed in 'OPEN'.
How are the Service Water Heat Exchangers affected?
- A. 22A/22B SRW HXR emergency outlets valves open, but normal SW flow is maintained because the emergency overboard valve is normally gagged shut.
 - B. 22A/22B SRW heat exchangers are removed from service because the heat exchangers' SW inlet valves will also shut.
 - C. 21A/21B SRW heat exchangers lose SW flow because the emergency overboard valve automatically opens, and 22A/22B SRW heat exchangers SW outlets shift to 21 SW supply header.
 - D. 21A/21B SRW heat exchangers' SW inlet and outlet valves automatically shut, and 22A/22B SRW heat exchangers will be supplied by 21 SW header.

18. Unit-2 is at full power with 21 Plant Air Compressor in Standby when a leak causes Instrument Air header pressure to decrease to 85 psig. Plant Air header pressure is 95 psig. No operator actions have been performed.
Which list is composed of all the air compressors that will be running?
- A. 21 and 22 Instrument Air Compressors, 11 and 21 Plant Air Compressors, 21 and 22 Saltwater Air Compressors
 - B. 21 and 22 Instrument Air Compressors, 11 Plant Air Compressor, 21 and 22 Saltwater Air Compressors
 - C. 21 Instrument Air Compressor and 11 Plant Air Compressor
 - D. 21 and 22 Instrument Air Compressors and 11 Plant Air Compressor
19. Group 5 CEAs were being withdrawn from 120.5" to 128.0" using Manual Sequential. CEA-1 dropped to 124.25" by secondary indication after CEDS was turned off. Primary and secondary position indication for all other CEAs in the group is 127.25" to 128.0".
What is the expected primary position indication for CEA-1?
- A. 127.25" to 128.0"
 - B. 124.25
 - C. 120.5"
 - D. 0"
20. Given the following conditions:
Unit-2 is on Shutdown Cooling, RCS temperature is 120°F
RCS pressure is 14.7 PSIA
The reactor vessel head is fully tensioned
Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers are open
One of two operable WRNI channels has failed low

What action is required immediately?
- A. Commence boration of at least 40 GPM until RCS boron is 2300 PPM or greater.
 - B. Suspend all operations involving positive reactivity additions.
 - C. Commence actions to restore two WRNI channels to operable status.
 - D. Perform SDM verification per Surveillance requirement 3.1.1.1.

2. Which of the following would be classified as a fuel handling incident per AOP-6D?
- A. A large object was dropped in the Spent Fuel Pool and is laying on top of a spent fuel assembly .
 - B. During refueling of the core, a fuel assembly was placed in an incorrect core location.
 - C. A new fuel assembly was dropped when being moved from the New Fuel Storage Area to the New Fuel Inspection Platform.
 - D. A portable light pole hanging off the refueling machine bridge was damaged when performing the refueling machine operational checks per OI-25C.

22. "RMS PANEL 1C26" alarm at 1C18 has annunciated.
2-RI-7010, Unit-2 BAST room Area Radiation Monitor is reading off-scale, high.
No other indications of abnormal conditions are present.

What action is directed by plant procedures?

- A. Contact Chemistry to obtain samples of the BASTs, VCT and RCS.
- B. Recommend Radiation Safety Supervision post the area.
- C. Obtain CRS permission to bypass the alarm to clear the alarm at 1C18.
- D. Sound the emergency alarm, evacuate the immediate area and declare a Radiological Event per ERPIP 3.0.

23. During a severe fire in the Control Room, (AOP-9A), why are the Fairbanks Diesel Generators shutdown?
- A. To prevent overloading the Diesel Generators when equipment starts, as the sequencers may not be operable.
 - B. To ensure fuel is conserved for continued extended operation of the OC Diesel Generator
 - C. To protect the engine from damage due to loss of cooling
 - D. To ensure MCCs 104 and 114 are de-energized to keep PORVs from failing open

24. On Unit-2 PAMS, what does a single "?" next to a CET temperature indication signify?
- A. The indication is outside the quality check parameters.
 - B. The CET is the highest reading CET in it's quadrant.
 - C. The CET has been "bypassed", and the value is an old, non-updated indication.
 - D. The indication is a calculated value, not an actual temperature measurement.

25. Which phrase describes the relationship of RCS activity to the Process Rad Monitor?
The Process Radiation Monitor:

- A. detects increases in specific isotopes due to fuel failures
- B. detects only increases in RCS activity specifically related to CRUD bursts
- C. measures RCS activity changes associated with Severe Accident Mitigation scenarios
- D. measures dose rates in the Letdown HX room at power due to CRUD bursts or fuel failures.

26. Using provided references, given the following Unit-2 information:

Reactor Power:	100%
Tc:	547.7°F and steady
Letdown flow:	30 GPM
Charging flow:	135 GPM
PZR level:	Lowering at 2.5 inches/minute
RCS pressure:	2210 PSIA and slowly lowering
Total CBO flow:	6 GPM

What is the approximate RCS leak rate, in GPM?

- A. 135
- B. 146
- C. 152
- D. 172

27. Which one of the following conditions would allow you to exit EOP-8?

- A. A plant cooldown has been completed, shutdown cooling flow has been established, and Core/RCS Heat Removal and Pressure/Inventory safety function status checks for EOP-8 are met.
- B. All the safety function acceptance criteria for success paths implemented are being met, a single event diagnosis can be made and intermediate safety function status checks for single event are being met.
- C. The CRS or STA has analyzed plant conditions and has verified that steps in an optimal recovery procedure, or an Operating Procedure, will address the safety functions such that EOP-8 final acceptance criteria for all the safety functions will be met.
- D. In the case of multiple events, one event has been terminated, (such as a when the affected S/G goes dry during an ESDE) and all intermediate safety function status checks for EOP-8 are being satisfied.

28. When restoring forced circulation it is necessary to verify the 4KV bus voltage greater than 4100 volts prior to starting the RCPs.

What is the basis for this requirement?

- A. To prevent the 4KV degraded voltage relays from actuating upon RCP start.
- B. To prevent tripping the oil lift pumps on low voltage when the first RCP is started.
- C. Ensures that the running component cooling pump will operate within its design voltage limits.
- D. Ensures that excessive starting current is not developed which could damage RCP windings.

29. Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit One has tripped due to a Loss of Offsite Power
- 11 and 14 4KV busses are energized from the EDGs
- Pzr level is 100" and slowly lowering

How does this affect charging pump operation to restore Pzr level?

- A. One charging pump starts automatically, the other charging pumps must be manually started and will stop automatically when Pzr level reaches +13 inches above program.
- B. All 3 charging pumps must be started manually and will receive no signals to stop on Pzr level deviations from program.
- C. All 3 charging pumps must be started manually and the backup pumps will stop automatically when Pzr level reaches +13 inches above program.
- D. One charging pump starts automatically the other charging pumps must be operated manually to control pressurizer level.

30. Which of the following is a possible cause when the following alarm has actuated?

--On panel 1C19 **"U-1 4KV Eng SF Motor Overload"**

- A. 152-1204 (11 Condensate Booster Pump breaker) tripped
- B. 152-1114 (U-440-11A high side Feeder) tripped
- C. 152-1104 (11 LPSI Pump breaker) tripped
- D. 152-2107 (21 Containment Spray Pump breaker) tripped

31. During recovery from a LOCA on U-2, you are directed by the U-2 CRS to reset SIAS from the control room using the implemented EOP . Containment pressure is 2.0 psig and PZR pressure is 800 psia. What sequence of actions must occur to complete this action?

- A. Match required handswitches per the EOP attachment, block PZR pressure SIAS, and depress both SIAS channel reset pushbuttons.
- B. Block PZR pressure SIAS and depress either SIAS channel reset pushbutton.
- C. Match required handswitches and depress both SIAS channel reset pushbuttons.
- D. Block the PZR pressure SIAS and depress both SIAS channel reset pushbuttons.

32. Unit 2 is in Mode 1 at 100% power when a loss of Component Cooling occurs. Which condition from this event alone would require a manual Reactor trip?

- A. Main Generator gas temperature of greater than 48°C for at least 15 minutes.
- B. RCP bleed off temperature of 200°F.
- C. Component Cooling heat exchanger outlet temperature of 175°F.
- D. Letdown is automatically isolated due to high temperature.

33. Unit 1 is in Mode 5, preparing for a plant heatup.
E01, QUENCH TK TEMP LVL PRESS is in alarm on 1C06.

Given the following Quench Tank parameters:

- 1) Pressure is 12 PSIG
- 2) Temperature is 105°F
- 3) Level is 29 inches

What action is required?

- A. Open WGS CNTMT ISOL valves, WGS-2180, 2181-CVs and open QT VENT, 1-RC-400-CV.
- B. Place PORV handswitches, 1-HS-1402 and 1-1404 in "OVERRIDE"
- C. Open Quench Tank Drain, 1-RC-401-CV
- D. Open Containment Nitrogen Supply Valve, 0-N₂-238.

34. Unit-1 was initially at 100% power when a major plant transient occurred. The following conditions exist:

The 500 KV Red Bus was lost (P-13000-2 is de-energized)

RCS pressure is 1600 PSIA

Tc is 532.4°F

Containment pressure is 2.2 PSIG

No other malfunctions occurred.

How many Component Cooling Pumps would be running, assuming no operator actions?

A. 0

B. 1

C. 2

D. 3

35. RCS pressure is initially 2250 PSIG.

Spray Valve Controller, 1-HIC-100 fails to a 0% output.

What is a direct result of this failure?

A. All Backup Heaters will energize if in "Auto".

B. Spray Valves 1-RC-100E and F will fully open.

C. All Backup heaters will deenergize.

D. Proportional heaters will receive full power

36. Unit-2 is at 16% power, with the Turbine Generator having just been paralleled with the grid.

A malfunction in RPS channel B causes the Power Trip Test Interlock (PTTI) to actuate.

How is the Turbine Generator affected?

A. A turbine trip will result due to ESFAS B logic cabinet initiating a turbine trip signal.

B. Trip logic will be reduced to 1 out of 3, since channel B Loss of Load trip unit will actuate.

C. The Turbine Generator will not be affected since the Loss of Load Trip is disabled.

D. RPS will initiate a Turbine Trip signal, but the signal is bypassed at ESFAS due to low reactor power.

37. Using provided references:

If 1Y03 were de-energized, which RPS matrix power supply lights at 1C15 would be extinguished?

- A. 5 and 15
- B. 5,9 and 7
- C. 8,12 and 15
- D. 9 and 10

38. A S/G tube rupture has been diagnosed, the correct EOP has been implemented and the following conditions exist:

RCS pressure is 1280 PSIA

RCS temperature is 485°F

PZR level is 85"

11A and 12B RCPs are running

Cooldown rate is 95°F/hr, using TBVs

The affected S/G has been isolated and pressure is 700 PSIG

What action is required?

- A. Secure the remaining RCPs to prevent exceeding pump curve limits.
- B. Throttle HPSI flow to allow for backflow from the affected S/G as RCS depressurization continues.
- C. Lower TBV controller output to avoid exceeding cooldown rate limits when HPSI injection begins.
- D. Increase RCS depressurization using Main Spray to lower the leak rate into the affected S/G.

39. Part of the 2003 modification to the LOCI sequencer advanced the start of the Service Water pumps from step 4 to step 0.

Why was this modification made?

- A. Prevents overloading the Emergency Diesel Generators
- B. Prevents tripping the supply breakers for the safety related 4 KV buses
- C. Prevents damage to the Service Water Pump motors caused by excessively high starting currents
- D. Prevents a rupture of the Service Water system caused by water hammer in the Containment Air Coolers

40. 2A Diesel Generator is being taken out of service for routine maintenance. Which component is also potentially affected? **ASSUME NORMAL SYSTEM LINEUPS**
- A. 21 Containment Spray Pump
 - B. 22 Charging Pump
 - C. 12 SFP Cooling Pump
 - D. 23 Saltwater Pump
41. A LOCA has occurred, SIAS initiated and RWT level is 7 feet and lowering. What actions are directed by the applicable EOP to prevent or mitigate cavitation of the Containment Spray Pumps?
- A. Align a HPSI pump to the suction of a CS PP if discharge pressure lowers and amps fluctuate.
 - B. Verify Containment Sump level rises as RWT level lowers and, after RAS has initiated, place a second CC HX in service.
 - C. Prior to RAS, place both CS PPs in PULL TO LOCK. Verify sump level is greater than 28". When RAS actuates, place a second CC HX in service.
 - D. When RWT level lowers to 4 feet, throttle CS PP discharge valves per EOP attachments. After RAS has initiated, verify flow less than 1300 GPM.
42. With reactor power at 25%, what indication is available to the operator to monitor a S/G tube leak of 5 GPD?
- A. Only S/G sample results reported by Chemistry
 - B. N-16 monitors and Condenser Off Gas RMS
 - C. Condenser Off Gas RMS and Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors
 - D. N-16 monitors only

43. The following conditions exist on Unit 2:

Reactor/Turbine trip has just occurred
(Power prior to trip--100%)
S/G pressures are currently 850 psig

What operator action (in the Control Room) must initially be taken to prevent an overcooling of the RCS per EOP-0?

- A. Press "Close Valves" button on the turbine control panel.
- B. Press "Reset" button on the MSR control panel.
- C. Shut the MSIVs.
- D. Press the BFV "reset" buttons.

44. Unit 1 is operating at 50% power.

An electrical system malfunction occurs resulting in the loss of 12 and 13 Condensate Pumps.

What is the effect of this transient, and what action must be taken?

- A. Reduced feed flow to the S/Gs and lowering levels will result. Bias feed pumps as required to maintain S/G levels.
- B. Lower SGFP suction pressure will exist. Verify a Condensate Booster Pump automatically starts.
- C. Reduced feed flow to the S/Gs and lowering levels will result. Trip the reactor and implement EOP-0.
- D. Low suction pressure to the SGFPs and runout of the operating Condensate Pump will result. Reduce power to maintain condensate header flow less than 8,000 GPM.

45. Unit-1 is at 100% power. Both feedwater flow transmitter signals from 12 S/G to DFWCS fail low (out of range).

How is 12 FRV, 1-FW-1121-CV, affected?

- A. The last good feed flow input is used and 12 FRV control is shifted to the Backup CPU.
- B. Both CPUs fail and 12 FRV controller is shifted to "MANUAL".
- C. An "11/12 S/G FW CONTR XFER INHIBIT" alarm is received, a shift from high power to low power control mode will not occur and 12 FRV will be controlled by the Backup CPU.
- D. Steam flow/feed flow error signal is not used and the Main CPU operates the FRV in single element control.

46. Unit-2 was initially at 100% power when a major plant transient occurred. The following conditions exist:

RCS pressure is 1800 PSIA

Containment pressure is 0.4 PSIG

21 S/G pressure is 865 PSIG

22 S/G pressure is 680 PSIG

Which list correctly identifies Main Feedwater/Condensate system automatic actions?

- A. Both SGFPs trip, all Condensate Pumps trip, both Heater Drain Pumps trip, only 22 Main Feed MOV and 22 MSIVs shut.
- B. Both SGFPs trip, all Condensate Booster Pumps trip, both Heater Drain Pumps trip, both Main feed MOVs shut and both MSIVs shut.
- C. Both SGFPs trip, all Condensate Booster Pumps trip, both Heater Drain Pumps trip, only 22 Main Feed MOV and 22 MSIV shut.
- D. Both SGFPs trip, all Condensate Pumps trip, all Condensate Booster Pumps trip, both Heater Drain Pumps trip, both Main Feed MOVs shut and both MSIVs shut.

47. What is the basis for the AFW flow controller automatic setpoints of 150 GPM?

- A. S/G levels will be restored to EOP-1 limits within 10 minutes of AFAS actuation with MFW isolated, and AFW suction piping flow limits are not exceeded.
- B. EDG ratings are not exceeded on SIAS with a Loss of Offsite Power, and S/G inventory is adequate for worst case decay heat with 2 trains of AFW operating.
- C. AFW flow will be adequate with one AFW train to remove highest decay heat, but low enough to prevent initiating SIAS due to RCS overcooling with 2 trains operating.
- D. AFW flow will be adequate to maintain S/G level in the unaffected S/G in the event of AFAS Block to the affected S/G with no operator action, yet low enough to prevent RCS cooldown to less than 525°F with one train operating.

48. A Loss of Offsite Power exists with Unit-1 previously at 100% power and Unit-2 in Mode 5. Unit-2 has been unable to restore Shutdown Cooling and is using 13 AFW Pump to restore S/G levels.
Unit-1 is using 11 AFW Pump to feed 11 and 12 S/Gs at 150 GPM per S/G.

What is the flow limit for 13 AFW pump to supply Unit-2?

- A. 275 GPM
- B. 300 GPM
- C. 600 GPM
- D. 900 GPM

49. Unit-1 is at 100% power when 13B 480 Volt Bus is lost.

What is the major affect to the plant, and what action must be taken?

- A. Boration via the RWT from all operable Charging Pumps causes power to decrease. Place 2 Charging Pumps in Pull-To-Lock and shift suction back to the VCT.
- B. All Circulating Water Pumps lose excitation. Trip the Reactor and implement EOP-0.
- C. Feedwater Heater Level Dump Valves fail open, reactor power increases. Reduce Reactor power, match HLDV handswitches and tie 1Y09 and 1Y10.
- D. 12 and 13 Condensate Pumps' bearing temperatures rise due to loss of lube oil cooling. Tie MCCs 106T and 116T.

50. The 13 HPSI pump breaker charging spring has failed to charge after securing the pump for an STP. How will this condition be detected in the control room?

- A. 13 HPSI PP BKR L/U IMPR alarm
- B. 13 HPSI PP SIAS BLOCKED AUTO START alarm
- C. U-1 4KV ESF MOTOR OVERLOAD alarm
- D. ACTUATION SIGNAL BLOCKED alarm

51. 1A Diesel Generator is out of service for maintenance when a Loss of Offsite Power occurs.

2B Diesel Generator did not load due to a faulted 4 KV bus.

What affect does this have on the DC electrical distribution system as indicated at 1C24A?

- A. 11 DC bus will be supplied only by 11 battery.
- B. 21 DC bus will be supplied by 21 battery charger.
- C. 12 DC bus will be supplied by 24 battery charger.
- D. 22 DC bus will be supplied by 22 battery charger.

52. What type of radiation do the Component Cooling, Service Water and S/G Blowdown Recovery (process rad. monitors) detect?

- A. Alpha
- B. Beta
- C. Gamma
- D. Neutron

53. During normal operation at 100% power, what is the largest heat load on the Service Water system?

- A. Main Generator Hydrogen Coolers.
- B. Hydrogen Seal Oil Coolers
- C. Containment Air Coolers
- D. 1B Diesel Generator

54. After a SIAS actuation, what is the source of Instrument Air supplied to the AFW flow control valves?

- A. Saltwater Air Compressors
- B. The opposite unit's Plant Air Compressor
- C. Auxiliary Feedwater system air accumulators
- D. Nitrogen backup to Instrument Air

55. Which of the following is a requirement for a containment entry at power?
- A. Containment airlock door seals must be tested within 7 days after the last entry
 - B. Someone must be stationed outside the airlock door while it is open
 - C. A containment vent must be performed prior to containment entry
 - D. An FME log (MN-1-109 att.5) is required
56. Under which condition can CEAs be WITHDRAWN in the manual sequential mode? **(without using CMI bypass features)**
- A. Tavg-Tref deviation alarm.
 - B. Group 5 CEAs below the PDIL.
 - C. 2 out of 4 TM/LP channel pretrips at RPS.
 - D. A misaligned CEA 7.5 inches from its group.
57. The reactor is at steady state conditions and turbine load has been adjusted to maintain Tc on program.
- Given the following:
- T cold is 538°F
 - T hot is 556°F
- What is reactor power?
- A. 18%
 - B. 34.5%
 - C. 37.5%
 - D. 40.5%

58. Which statement satisfies the requirements for minimum operable position indication channels for a CEA?

- A. CEA voltage divider reed switch position indicator channel capable of determining the absolute CEA position within ± 6 inches
and
CEA pulse counting position indicator channel.
- B. CEA voltage divider reed switch position indicator channel capable of determining the absolute CEA position within ± 7.5 inches
or
CEA "Full Out" reed switch position indicator channel only if the CEA is fully withdrawn as verified by actuation of the applicable position indicator.
- C. CEA voltage divider reed switch position indicator channel
and
CEA pulse counting position indicator channel in agreement within 4.5 inches.
- D. CEA voltage divider reed switch position indicator channel capable of determining the absolute CEA position within ± 1.75 inches of absolute position
or
CEA "Full Out" reed switch position indicator channel only if the CEA is fully withdrawn as verified by actuation of the applicable position indicator.

59. Which condition would cause **audible** WRNI count rate to rise?

- A. Pulling CEAs to criticality when performing the first reactor startup following a refueling outage
- B. Reinserting a once-burned fuel assembly in a new core location
- C. During RCS drain down to reduced inventory for RCP seal replacement
- D. Withdrawing CEA #1 from a fuel assembly while swapping CEAs

60. How are the **sample locations** indicated on the Hydrogen Analyzer recorders on 1(2)C10 selected?

- A. Manually at the recorder
- B. Automatically or manually by the plant computer
- C. Automatically or manually from sample panels in the Aux. Building
- D. Automatically at the recorder

61. Refueling operations are in progress and Containment Purge is in operation. While taking logs in the Cable Spreading Room, the CRO notices that channel ZF of CRS is bypassed.
How does this affect Containment Purge?
- A. Containment Purge will be automatically secured if any other channel of CRS actuates.
 - B. In the event of a valid CRS signal, one Containment Purge CV will remain open.
 - C. Containment Purge must be secured (or fuel movement suspended), per Technical Specification requirements.
 - D. The remaining channels of CRS must be verified operable to allow Containment Purge to remain in operation
62. High Spent Fuel Pool temperature is corrected by what action?
- A. Adjusting spent fuel pool temperature controller setpoint.
 - B. Throttling 11A/B SRW heat exchanger Saltwater outlet valves open.
 - C. Adjusting SFP CLR OUT THROTTLE valve to obtain a discharge pressure of greater than 120 psig.
 - D. Throttling open SFP CLR DISCH HDR stop valve.
63. Performing which evolution poses the highest radiological risk to the operator?
- A. Discharging the contents of 12 RCW Monitor Tank
 - B. Filling 21 RCW Degassifier Vacuum Pump reference leg
 - C. Filling 11 RCW Ion Exchanger with resin
 - D. Recirculating 11RCWMT through a MWS prefilter
64. Control Room Vent RMS, 0-RI-5350 is in alarm.
How is the Control Room HVAC system affected?
- A. Outside air dampers open to purge the Control Room, and the air conditioning unit is shutdown
 - B. Control Room ventilation is in recirculation with Post-LOCI filter fans in operation and the kitchen exhaust fan secured.
 - C. The Control Room HVAC shifts to winter mode of operation with Post-LOCI filter fans in operation.
 - D. Control Room air handling unit is secured. Only outside air dampers open.

65. What condition will start the diesel fire pump?

- A. Fire main header pressure less than 105 PSIG
- B. A smoke detector or temperature detector actuation
- C. Both electric fire pump feeder breakers being open
- D. Preaction solenoid valve or sprinkler alarm check valve actuation

66. Which category of deficient equipment status should be annotated on the Shift Turnover Information Sheet to communicate the status of 21 Condensate Pump which has a broken lube oil pump?

- A. (OOS) Out Of Service
- B. (I/F) Inoperable But Functional
- C. (D) Degraded
- D. (O) Inoperable

67. What is the condenser differential temperature (condenser delta T) limit, as stated in the facility license?

- A. The calculated flow weighted hourly average of the temperature rise across both condensers is limited to 12°F
- B. The calculated flow weighted hourly average of the temperature rise across each condenser is limited to 12°F.
- C. The calculated average of the 24 flow weighted hourly readings of both units for a calendar day is limited to 12°F.
- D. The calculated average of the 24 flow weighted hourly readings of each unit for a calendar day is limited to 12°F.

68. Given Nuclear Plant Operations Section Standing Order 03-03:
A known Component Cooling system leak is causing a Unit-2 sump frequency of 3.4 hours.
Sump frequency changes to 95 minutes with a corresponding increase in unidentified RCS leak rate.
- Which method of informing the GS-NPO is required per administrative procedures?
- A. Voicemail
 - B. Alpha-page
 - C. Alpha-page and detailed voicemail
 - D. Talk directly
69. Which condition requires that the Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation charcoal filters be placed in service?
- A. Spent fuel is being loaded into an ISFSI storage cask.
 - B. New fuel is being loaded into the Spent Fuel Pool.
 - C. A dummy fuel assembly is being transferred from the Spent Fuel Pool to the Refueling Pool for RFM testing.
 - D. Refueling is in progress which does not include a complete core offload.
70. Where is the regulating group CEA "All Rods Out" (ARO) position stated?
- A. NEOP-13 (23)
 - B. COLR figure 3.1.6
 - C. System 55 (CEDS) setpoint manual
 - D. OI-42, CEDM System Operation
71. What documents, used by Operations personnel to run the plant, are updated to communicate the core reactivity effect changes due to core age or fuel composition?
- A. USFSAR and NFM Operator Surveillance Procedures (NEOP-301/302)
 - B. TRM and Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
 - C. COLR and Technical Data Book (NEOPs)
 - D. Calvert Cliffs Operating Manual and Technical Specification LCOs

72. The Shift Manager has declared an Alert per ERPIP 3.0
The Operational Support Center is not yet staffed.

A plant operator is required to perform a task in the Auxiliary Building where dose rates are unknown.

What is required prior to the operator being sent to perform the task?

- A. The 2-person rule must be invoked, the operator is not allowed to work alone.
- B. The Shift Manager must approve the action and the selection of personnel to perform the task.
- C. The Shift Radiation Technician must be contacted to assess radiological conditions and preferred access and egress routes.
- D. A pre-evolution brief must be held with the Interim Radiation Protection Director and the CRS in attendance.

73. Which operation always requires an approved Discharge Permit?

- A. Dumping Condensate to the Circulating Water System after system cleanup
- B. Discharging S/G sludge lancing water
- C. Dewatering the Saltwater side of a Component Cooling Heat exchanger
- D. Initiating S/G Blowdown to Circulating Water

74. Which one of the following defines the term "success path" as it applies to EOP-8?

- A. A course of action based on plant conditions used to address a safety function.
- B. A series of actions which, if performed correctly, will allow the CRS to make a single event diagnosis.
- C. A table which directs the operator to a set of actions to assess a safety function.
- D. A form which provides criteria for the STA to use in evaluating safety function status.

7 11 Saltwater pump tripped due to a motor overload and reactor trip criteria were reached before the system could be recovered. The RO manually tripped the reactor from 100% and all systems responded normally.

Which Control Room panel would have **no** alarms annunciated?

- A. 1C18
- B. 1C13
- C. 1C08
- D. 1C03

ATTACHMENT (1)
Page 1 of 2

ESTIMATE GROSS LEAK RATE

RO
Handouts

Record the following information:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| a. Initial PZR Level | a. _____ inches |
| b. Initial RCS Temp., T_{AVE} | b. _____ °F |
| c. Initial Time | c. _____ |
| d. Final PZR Level | d. _____ inches |
| e. Final RCS Temp., T_{AVE} | e. _____ °F |
| f. Final Time | f. _____ |
| g. RCS Pressure | g. _____ psia |
| h. Charging Flow | h. _____ gpm |
| i. Letdown Flow | i. _____ gpm |
| j. Total CBO Flow | j. _____ gpm |

Determine Factors:

- k. Estimate PZR volume factor based on RCS Pressure Step g.

2200 psia = 18.9 gallons/inch
1500 psia = 21.5 gallons/inch
1000 psia = 23.3 gallons/inch
500 psia = 25.5 gallons/inch
200 psia = 27.4 gallons/inch k. _____

- l. Estimate RCS expansion factor based on RCS Temp., T_{AVE} Step e.

550° F = 78.8 gallons/° F
500° F = 63.1 gallons/° F
450° F = 55.7 gallons/° F
400° F = 50.4 gallons/° F
350° F = 43.1 gallons/° F
300° F = 38.2 gallons/° F
250° F = 32.1 gallons/° F l. _____

Nuclear Plant Operations Section Standing Orders

Number:
03-03, Rev. 0

Effective Date/Time:
08-01-2003 / 1200

Expiration Date/Time:

Page 1 of 4

Title: RCS Leakage

Purpose:

This Standing Order is intended to provide basic guidance for Operations to ensure consistent response at varying levels of unidentified RCS leakage. This Standing Order is not intended to change any responses or actions dictated by the CCOM, the Tech Specs, or any other Operational guidance.

Definitions:

Unidentified RCS Leakage – Leakage from the RCS that has not been determined to be from a specific source. For example, if total RCS leakage has been determined to be 0.6 GPM, but 0.4 GPM has been determined to be from 12 Charging Pump primary packing leakage, then the unidentified RCS leakage, as referred to in this Standing Order, would be 0.2 GPM.

Considerations:

- Historical baseline RCS leakage for both units has typically been in the range of 0.1 GPM to 0.15 GPM following a refueling outage. This value tends to increase over the fuel cycle due to minor degradations of RCS sealing interfaces (e.g., packing, etc...). Larger leakrates are typically seen very near the end of a fuel cycle (during times of increased CVCS diversion) due to inaccuracies in the diversion integrator.
- Calculated leakrate values will be greatly impacted by non-steady-state operation. Consideration of minor changes in RCS leakrates should be given only when the RCS has been in steady-state conditions.
- The sensitivity of the Containment Gaseous and Particulate detectors is based on a source term with 1%-failed fuel. Therefore, these detectors will be essentially blind to leakage within the range of this Standing Order.
- The values presented in this Standing Order are to be considered general guidance. Plant conditions may dictate that actions be taken prior to these values being reached.
- Any actions taken to attempt to identify sources of unidentified RCS leakage should be documented in the CRO logs (e.g., "*Quantified charging pump primary leakage per OI-2A. No primary leakage detected.*") This will ensure efficiency in the search, should it go over several shifts.
- Small changes in RCS leakage may need to be trended over several shifts before actions to find leakage need to be taken.
- Single evolutions that cause the planned loss of RCS inventory (but are not "leakage") should be annotated in the CRO logs. Examples include large quantities of charging pump venting (such as restoring from maintenance), large diversion activities (such as rinsing a CVCS IX), etc...

Guidance

I. RCS Leakage Condition 1

Definition:

- A) Unidentified RCS leakage >0.2 GPM
- B) Unexplained increase of 0.1 GPM

Actions:

- ___ Notify the GS-NPO (voicemail).
- ___ Evaluate Charging Pumps for increased primary packing leakage.
- ___ Consider performing the Miscellaneous portions of STP O-27 (e.g., RCDT leakage).
- ___ Consider performing the Leak Identification attachment of AOP-2A.
- ___ If potential leak sources are addressed, start a Supplemental STP-O-27 to verify the effect.

II. RCS Leakage Condition 2

Definition:

- A) Unidentified RCS leakage >0.4 GPM
- B) Unexplained increase of 0.3 GPM
- C) Unexplained Containment Sump Frequency of <8 Hours concurrent with increased RCS Leakage.

NOTE

A leakrate of 0.1 GPM into a completely empty containment 49-gallon (44-gallon) sump will cause the alarm to come in every 8.2 hours (7.3 hours).

Actions:

- ___ Initiate an Issue Report per QL-2-100.
- ___ Notify the GS-NPO and PE-PSE (alpha-page).
- ___ Leave detailed Voicemail for Site Managers per the Notification Matrix.
- ___ Perform the Miscellaneous portions of STP O-27.
- ___ Perform the Leak Identification attachment of AOP-2A.
- ___ If the increased RCS leakrate is indicated in the Containment:
 - Begin planning a Containment entry while carrying out other actions. After planning is complete, the decision to make the entry will be made by the GS-NPO.
 - Request Chemistry obtain a fresh sample of the 12/22 ECCS pump room sump for Boric Acid and hydrazine content. Chemistry should grab the sample while the containment sump is being drained.
 - Evaluate SRW and CC system leakrates for changes.
 - Request Health Physics obtain a sample of the Containment atmosphere for indications of RCS leakage.
- ___ If potential leak sources are addressed, start a Supplemental STP-O-27 to verify the effect.

III. RCS Leakage Condition 3

Definition:

- A. Unidentified RCS leakage >0.5 GPM with all potential corrective actions taken.
- B. Unexplained Containment Sump Frequency of <4 hours concurrent with increased RCS leakage.


Actions:

- ___ Alert Site Management with alpha-page and detailed voicemail per Notification Matrix. Ensure you talk directly to the GS-NPO and PE-PSE.
- ___ Begin planning a controlled unit shutdown. Activate the Forced Outage Protocol Checklist per OAP 01-03.

NOTE:

A leakrate of 0.2 GPM into a completely empty containment 49-gallon (44-gallon) sump will cause the alarm to come in every 4.1 hours (3.6 hours).

- ___ If the increased RCS leakage is indicated in the containment:
 - Implement the Rapid Containment Entry procedure. Consideration for personnel safety must be applied. If the RCS leakrate is degrading a containment entry may not be advisable.
- ___ Review RCS Leakage Condition 2 checklist for appropriate actions.

Approved by: GS-NPO	Original signed by J. K. Mills		08/01/03
	Printed Name and Signature		Date
Canceled by: GS-NPO			
	Printed Name and Signature		Date

**U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Site-Specific
SRO Written Examination****Applicant Information**

Name:

Date:

Facility/Unit:

Region: I / II / III / IV

Reactor Type: W / CE / BW / GE

Start Time:

Finish Time:

Instructions

Use the answer sheets provided to document your answers. Staple this cover sheet on top of the answer sheets. To pass the examination you must achieve a final grade of at least 80.00 percent overall, with a 70.00 percent or better on the SRO-only items if given in conjunction with the RO exam; SRO-only exams given alone require an 80.00 percent to pass. You have eight hours to complete the combined examination, and three hours if you are only taking the SRO portion.

Applicant Certification

All work done on this examination is my own. I have neither given nor received aid.

Applicant's Signature**Results**

RO / SRO-Only / Total Examination Values ____ / ____ / ____ Points

Applicant's Scores ____ / ____ / ____ Points

Applicant's Grade ____ / ____ / ____ Percent

Name: _____

1. U-2 is at 100% power when the "ACTUATION SYSTEM CIS TRIPPED" alarm is received on 2C08. CIS has been determined to be invalid by the crew, but all attempts to reset CIS "A" from the control room have failed. The Reactor Operator tripped the reactor, as directed by the CRS.

When are the RCPs tripped?

- A. Immediately after the CRS completes the mid-EOP-0 brief
- B. When the RO has reported that controlled bleedoff temperatures exceed 200°F, or bearing temperatures exceed 195°F
- C. After the RO has reported the reactivity safety function is complete
- D. After an attempt has been made to reset CIS from the cable spreading room

2. Per Technical Specifications, under what conditions can a spent fuel pool cooling loop replace a Shutdown Cooling loop?

- A. There is less than 23 feet of water above the fuel in the reactor vessel, the spent fuel pool cooling loop is aligned to provide flow to the core, and the heat generation rate is less than the heat removal capacity of the spent fuel pool cooling loop.
- B. There is greater than 23 feet of water above the fuel in the reactor vessel, the heat generation rate is less than the heat removal capacity of the spent fuel pool cooling loop, and no operations are permitted that would cause a reduction of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration.
- C. There is greater than 23 feet of water above the fuel in the reactor vessel, the heat generation rate is less than the heat removal capacity of the spent fuel pool cooling loop, and both spent fuel pool cooling loops are available.
- D. There is less than 23 feet of water above the fuel in the reactor vessel, the spent fuel pool cooling loop is aligned to provide flow to the core, and no draining operations to further reduce the RCS water volume are permitted.

3. Unit-1 was at 100% power when the following alarms annunciated:

PZR CH 100 PRESS

PZR CH Y LVL

ACTUATION SYS SENSOR CH ZF TRIP

1-PIC-100X indicates 2210 PSIA

1-PIC-100Y indicates 1400 PSIA

1-LI-110X indicates 208 inches

1-LI-110Y indicates 360 inches

What additional alarm would be expected with these indications and what action will be taken?

- A. PZR PRESS BLOCK A PERMITTED, block SIAS
- B. ACTUATION SYS SIAS TRIP, verify SIAS actuation
- C. CNTMT NORMAL SUMP LVL HI, implement AOP-2A
- D. PORV/SAFETY VLV ACOUSTIC MON, implement EOP-0

4. Unit-2 has experienced a loss of 2Y09. Reactor trip criteria was reached and the RO depressed the reactor trip buttons on 2C05.

Approximately 10 seconds later the RO reported WRNI power indications on 2C05 are reading approximately 100% power and startup rate is 0.

What is the cause of these indications and what actions are required?

- A. The reactor failed to trip when the trip buttons were depressed. The electrical buses feeding the CEDM MG sets are deenergized.
- B. Normal reactor response immediately following a reactor trip from 100% power. After 30 seconds, verify a prompt drop in reactor power and a negative SUR exists.
- C. Loss of power to NI instrumentation due to loss of 2Y09. Verify all CEAs are inserted and delta-T power is lowering.
- D. An overpower condition occurred due to feedwater heater high level dump valves opening on the loss of 2Y09. Verify all CEAs are inserted and the turbine has tripped.

5. A feed system malfunction has occurred and the following indications exist:
- Reactor power is 100%
 - SGFPs speed is 4550-4650 RPM
 - SGFP suction pressure is 380 PSIG
 - 11 S/G level is -2" 12 S/G level is -25"
 - TR1011/1111 recorder blue pen (feed flow) is slightly greater than the red pen (steam flow)
 - TR1021/1121 recorder red pen (steam flow) is greater than blue pen (feed flow)

What is the proper action for the CRS to direct the panel operators to perform?

- A. Trip the reactor and implement EOP-0.
 - B. Start the standby Condensate Booster pump.
 - C. Place 12 S/G FRV controller in manual and open 12 FRV.
 - D. Bias SGFP speed to maintain FRV D/Ps greater than 75 PSIG.
6. 1B Diesel Generator was out of service for maintenance when a loss of offsite power occurred. 1A Diesel Generator tripped shortly after starting. Per the appropriate procedure, in what order are the following actions taken?
- 1. Minimize 250 VDC battery discharge and restoration of forced circulation if desired.
 - 2. Establish RCS Heat Removal and protect the condenser from overpressure.
 - 3. Attempt to regain either an onsite or an offsite power source.
 - 4. Evaluate the need for a plant cooldown via either forced or natural circulation.
- A. 1, 2, 3, 4
 - B. 3, 2, 4, 1
 - C. 2, 1, 3, 4
 - D. 2, 3, 1, 4

7. Given an electrical system malfunction, what Control Room panel indications will reflect the status of the 125 VDC buses to allow selection of the correct section of the AOP to implement?
- A. Reactor Protective System cabinets at 1C15
 - B. Steam Generator Feed Pump emergency lube oil pump lights on 1C03
 - C. AFW pump controls on 1C04
 - D. Containment pressure transmitter isolation valves on 1C10

8. Upon a loss of MCC-114, what Technical Requirements Manual credited boration flow path would be available?

- A. RWT to RWT charging pump suction valve (CVC-504) to charging pump suction
- B. 12 BA pump to BA direct M/U valve (CVC-514) to charging pump suction
- C. 12 BA pump to BA flow control valve (CVC-210Y) to VCT M/U valve (CVC-512) to VCT outlet (CVC-501) to charging pump suction
- D. 11 or 12 BAST gravity drain valves (CVC-508 or 509) to charging pump suction

9. U-1 is in Mode 1. The latest leakage reports are:

- 0.6 gpm from Pressurizer Safety Valve leakage
- 1.8 gpm from leakage past check valves from the RCS to the SI system
- 0.15 gpm from primary to secondary leakage (12 S/G)
- 0.5 gpm reactor vessel head seal leakage
- 4.8 gpm total RCS leakage

Based upon these known leak rates, which of the following Technical Specification RCS leakage limits are being exceeded?

- A. Pressure Boundary leakage and Identified leakage.
- B. Primary to Secondary leakage and Unidentified leakage.
- C. Identified leakage and Unidentified leakage.
- D. Primary to Secondary leakage and Pressure Boundary leakage.

10. What assumptions are made for the implementation of AOP-9A in addition to a major fire in the Control Room?

- A. Station Blackout, LOCA
- B. Loss of Offsite power, no other accidents
- C. Station Blackout, no other accidents
- D. Loss of Offsite power, LOCA

11. An RCS leak has resulted in implementing the applicable plant procedure. What direction from the CRS is provided when RCS leakage exceeds T.S. 3.4.13 LCO but is within the capacity of one charging pump? (ASSUME INITIAL ACTIONS TO LOCATE SOURCE OF LEAKAGE HAVE BEEN COMPLETED)
- A. Evaluate operation of the plant with letdown isolated and align charging pumps to operate as needed to prevent exceeding a pressurizer level of 225 inches.
 - B. Commence a plant shutdown to COLD SHUTDOWN per OP-3, OP-4, and OP-5.
 - C. Trip the reactor and implement EOP-0 when PZR level deviates from program by 15".
 - D. Perform a rapid power reduction and trip the reactor when Tave is less than 537°F and implement EOP-0.

12. Using provided references:

Functional Recovery Procedure, EOP-8, has been implemented and the following plant conditions exist:

- 4 CEAs indicate fully withdrawn
- SUR is 0
- All charging pumps are inoperable
- RWT is available and operable
- SIAS has actuated and 2 HPSI pumps are running
- One 500 KV bus is energized
- Both SG levels indicate at -100" and constant and AFW flow is available
- Containment pressure is 0.4 psig and lowering

Which one of the following groups of Success Paths is implemented to assess and restore safety functions?

- A. VA-1, PIC-3, HR-2, CE-2, RLEC-2
- B. VA-1, PIC-4, HR-3, CE-2, RLEC-1
- C. VA-1, PIC-3, HR-3, CE-3, RLEC-2
- D. VA-1, PIC-4, HR-2, CE-2, RLEC-1

13. 13 Component Cooling Pump is to be run 24 hours for PMT after bearing replacement. What action is required and why?
- A. 12 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger must be placed in service to ensure a Component Cooling loop remains in operation.
 - B. 13 Component Cooling Pump must be powered from 11 4KV bus to ensure both loops remain operable.
 - C. 12 Component Cooling Pump must be placed in PTL to prevent damage to a SDC Heat Exchanger due to high flow if a SIAS occurs.
 - D. IX BYPASS 1-CVC-520 must be placed in BYPASS to prevent a reactivity event due to lowering letdown temperature.
14. 21B SRW Heat Exchanger is to be removed from service for cleaning today. How is the Containment Cooling System affected?
- A. The manual SRW inlet isolation valve on 21 or 22 Containment Cooler is shut to maintain 2A Diesel Generator operable.
 - B. One train of Containment Cooling is declared inoperable because 2A Diesel Generator is inoperable.
 - C. The Containment Cooling System is degraded but remains operable and functional.
 - D. 21 and 22 Containment Coolers must be declared inoperable because 21 Component Cooling Heat exchanger must be taken out of service.
15. Using provided references:
- After investigating an alarm at 1C33, the CRO returns from the cable spreading room and reports that #23 Battery Charger output voltage is 120 VDC. How is the 125 VDC system affected and what action is required?
- A. One DC channel is inoperable. Restore to operable status within 2 hours.
 - B. #23 battery charger remains operable as long as it's offsite power source remains operable, perform a breaker lineup per STP-O-90.
 - C. #23 battery charger is inoperable, verify an operable battery charger is supplying 11 125 VDC bus.
 - D. The battery charger is inoperable, 11 125 VDC bus is inoperable and 1Y01 must be placed on the Inverter Backup Bus.

15. Which list represents plant personnel that must be notified in the event of a Containment entry at power?
- A. Rad Con ALARA, Nuclear Security, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
 - B. Nuclear Security, Nuclear Training, Operations Work Control
 - C. Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor, Instrument and Controls Maintenance Supervisor, Control Room Supervisor
 - D. Instrument and Controls Maintenance Supervisor, Rad Con ALARA, Nuclear Security

17. Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit One has tripped due to a loss P-13000-1
- 11 4KV bus is energized from 1A Diesel Generator
- Pzr level is 100" and slowly lowering
- RCS pressure is 1920 PSIA and slowly lowering

The RO reports that only 12 Charging Pump is running and Pressure and Inventory is being monitored for positive trends.

What alternate actions must the CRS direct or verify?

- A. Verify SIAS actuation when RCS pressure reaches 1725 PSIA.
- B. Manually start 11 and 13 charging pumps to restore pressurizer level to greater than 101" and locally reset 11 pressurizer backup heater breaker.
- C. Isolate letdown, check that charging pumps automatically start to restore pressurizer level and reset pressurizer proportional heaters by momentarily placing the handswitches to OFF.
- D. Verify charging pumps start automatically to restore Pressurizer level to greater than 101", verify 12 and 14 pressurizer backup heaters start to restore RCS pressure.

18. A core shuffle is in progress and the refueling machine is indexed over a core location with a fuel assembly grappled in the hoist box. What condition would require the Fuel Handling Supervisor to stop core alterations?
- A. Count rate increases from 10 CPS to 12 CPS when the fuel bundle is inserted into the core.
 - B. Communications between fuel handling stations is lost.
 - C. One channel of 3 available nuclear instrumentation channels is declared out of service.
 - D. The personnel airlock doors are both open.
19. Which selection is the requirement for notification of plant management in the event that a deviation to a Controlling Technical Procedure was approved by the CRS and performed? (**Assume no Technical Specification deviation was required**)
- A. Shift Manager
 - B. Shift Manager, GS-NPO or M-NO
 - C. Shift Manager, GS-NPO, M-NO and NRC resident
 - D. Shift Manager, GS-NPO, M-NRM
20. Who has approval authority for Nuclear Plant Operations Section Standing Orders and who can cancel them?
- A. Approval--GS-NPO, cancellation-- Shift Managers
 - B. Approval--Manager-Nuclear Operations, cancellation--Manager-Nuclear Operations
 - C. Approval --GS-NPO, cancellation--GS-NPO
 - D. Approval--Shift Manager, cancellation--GS-NPO
21. What systems/components are credited for protection of the RCS Pressure Safety Limit?
- A. All systems listed in the Limiting Conditions for Operations of Technical Specifications.
 - B. PORVs, Steam Bypass Control System (ADV and TBVs), Pressurizer Pressure Control system
 - C. RPS high RCS pressure trip, Pressurizer Safety Valves and main steam safety valves
 - D. Auxiliary Feedwater system, ESFAS system and RPS actuation of PORVs

22. Which evolution requires direct supervision by a Senior Reactor Operator?
- A. Bypassing an RAS sensor module
 - B. Discharging a RCWMT
 - C. Performance of any "trip sensitive" PE
 - D. Placing the SFP ion exchanger in service
23. Who is responsible for writing an SWP for an Operations evolution when the task is not covered by an existing permit?
- A. The person who is in charge of performing the task
 - B. Operations ALARA Coordinator
 - C. Operations Work Control
 - D. An ALARA planner
24. Unit-2 has been stable for the past 24 hours with RCS pressure 100 PSIA.
RCS temperature is 110°F.
Containment closure deviations exist.
Pressurizer level starts rapidly lowering from 160".
- What procedure provides the required actions for these conditions?
- A. AOP-2A, Excessive RCS Leakage
 - B. EOP-5, Loss of Coolant Accident
 - C. AOP-3B, Abnormal Shutdown Cooling Conditions
 - D. AOP-4A, Loss of Containment Integrity/Closure

25. The RCP Trip Strategy in EOP-0 and any of the succeeding EOPs will:

- A. Ensure that during a cold leg break LOCA, RCPs remain running as long as possible; during non-LOCA conditions, pressurizer spray is maintained.
- B. Ensure during a hot leg small break LOCA, RCPs are secured early enough to prevent a deep uncover of the core; during non-LOCA conditions pressurizer spray is maintained and minimizes voiding in the RV upper head during cooldown.
- C. Ensure that during LOCAs, sufficient flow is maintained to aid heat removal from the reactor vessel head; during non-LOCA events, pressurizer spray heat losses are minimized.
- D. Ensure that during all events (LOCA and non-LOCA) the core is kept from too deep of an uncover and that the use of aux spray is minimized.

SRO
Handouts

VI. RESOURCE ASSESSMENT TABLE

REACTIVITY CONTROL	SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS PATH DETERMINATION	
	RESOURCE CONDITIONS	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
RC-1: CEA Insertion	a. CEAs are able to be inserted, and SUR is negative OR b. A loss of ALL Vital 4KV Buses may have occurred	1. NO more than ONE CEA NOT fully inserted, WRNI power is lowering, OR 2. WRNI power below 10-4% and SUR is negative or zero
RC-2: Boration Using CVCS	a. Charging pump is available for boron addition b. Boric acid source is available: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BAST • RWT c. Charging path is available via normal flow path or SIS flow path	1. Boration rate greater than or equal to 40 GPM, WRNI power is lowering, and SUR is negative OR 2. WRNI power below 10-4% and SUR is negative or zero
RC-3: Boration Using SIS	a. HPSI pump is available for boron addition b. RWT is available as boric acid source c. A flow path is available	1. Boration rate greater than or equal to 40 GPM, WRNI power is lowering, and SUR is negative OR 2. WRNI power below 10-4% and SUR is negative or zero

VI. RESOURCE ASSESSMENT TABLE

VITAL AUXILIARIES	SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS PATH DETERMINATION	
	RESOURCE CONDITIONS	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
VA-1: 500KV Offsite Power	a. At least ONE 500KV Bus is available	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. At least ONE 4KV vital bus is energized 2. 11, 12, 21 and 22 125V DC Buses, ALL greater than 105 volts 3. At least THREE 120V AC Vital Buses are energized: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11 • 12 • 13 • 14 4. EITHER 1Y09 or 1Y10 is energized
VA-2: Diesel Generators	a. 1A, 1B OR 0C Diesel Generator is available	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. At least ONE 4KV vital bus is energized 2. 11, 12, 21 and 22 125V DC Buses, ALL greater than 105 volts 3. At least THREE 120V AC Vital Buses are energized: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11 • 12 • 13 • 14 4. EITHER 1Y09 or 1Y10 is energized

(continue)

VI. RESOURCE ASSESSMENT TABLE

VITAL AUXILIARIES (continued) SUCCESS PATH	SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS PATH DETERMINATION	
	RESOURCE CONDITIONS	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
VA-3: SMECO	a. SMECO Power Supply System is available	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. At least ONE 4KV vital bus is energized 2. 11, 12, 21 and 22 125V DC Buses, ALL greater than 105 volts 3. At least THREE 120V AC Vital Buses are energized: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11 • 12 • 13 • 14 4. EITHER 1Y09 or 1Y10 is energized

VI. RESOURCE ASSESSMENT TABLE

SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS PATH DETERMINATION		
RCS PRESSURE AND INVENTORY CONTROL	RESOURCE CONDITIONS	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
SUCCESS PATH		
PIC-1: CVCS	a. Charging pump is available b. Charging path is available via normal flow path or SIS flow path c. A charging source is available: • VCT • BAST • RWT d. A method of pressurizer pressure control is available: • Pressurizer heaters • Main Spray • Aux Spray • Controlled Steaming e. SIAS has NOT actuated OR has been reset	1. Pressurizer pressure less than the upper limits of Att. (1) 2. Pressurizer level greater than 30 inches 3. RCS subcooling is between 25°F and 140°F based on CET temperatures 4. RVLMS indicates level above the top of the hot leg
PIC-2: PORVs or Pressurizer Vent	a. PORV or Pressurizer Vent required to reduce pressure b. PORV or Pressurizer Vent available to control pressure c. Charging and letdown and/or SIS is available to control pressurizer level d. Once-Through-Cooling is NOT in progress	1. Pressurizer pressure less than 2400 PSIA 2. Pressurizer pressure less than the upper limits of Att. (1) 3. RCS subcooling is between 25°F and 140°F based on CET temperatures 4. Pressurizer level greater than 30 inches {90} 5. RVLMS indicates level above the top of the hot leg
	(continue)	

VI. RESOURCE ASSESSMENT TABLE

RCS PRESSURE AND INVENTORY CONTROL (continued) SUCCESS PATH	SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS PATH DETERMINATION	
	RESOURCE CONDITIONS	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
PIC-3: Loss Of Vital AC	a. A loss of ALL 4KV Vital Buses has occurred b. SIAS has NOT actuated OR has been reset	1. Pressurizer pressure less than the upper limits of Att. (1) 2. RCS subcooling greater than 25°F based on CET temperatures (1) OR CET temperatures less than 50°F superheated (1) 3. RVLMS indicates the core is covered
PIC-4: SIS	a. SIAS has actuated OR SIS is able to be used to supply RCS makeup	1. IF RAS has NOT occurred, AND pressurizer pressure is greater than 1270 PSIA, THEN at least ONE Charging Pump operating 2. HPSI and LPSI Pumps are injecting water into the RCS PER Atts. (10) and (11) (2) (3) 3. RVLMS indicates the core is covered

- (1) Refer to Attachment (12) to read CETs while vital AC buses are de-energized.
 (2) Limits in Attachments (10) and (11) are not required to be met if SIS throttle criteria are met.
 (3) LPSI Pumps are **NOT** required post-RAS.

VI. RESOURCE ASSESSMENT TABLE

CORE AND RCS HEAT REMOVAL SUCCESS PATH	SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS PATH DETERMINATION	
	RESOURCE CONDITIONS	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
HR-1: S/G Heat Sink With NO SIS Operation	<p>a. At least ONE S/G level greater than (-)350 inches</p> <p>b. Feedwater is available:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Main Feedwater • AFW • Booster Pump Injection <p>c. SIAS has NOT actuated OR has been reset</p> <p>d. SIS operation NOT required</p>	<p>1. At least ONE S/G has level between (-)24 inches and (+)30 inches</p> <p>OR</p> <p>S/G level is being restored by feedwater flow</p> <p>2. IF RCPs are operating, THEN T_{HOT} minus T_{COLD} is less than 10°F</p> <p>3. IF RCPs are NOT operating, THEN T_{HOT} minus T_{COLD} is less than 50°F</p> <p>4. RCS subcooling greater than 25°F based on CET temperatures (1)</p> <p>5. RVLMS indicates level above the top of the hot leg</p>

(1) Refer to Attachment (12) to read CETs while vital AC buses are de-energized.

(continue)

VI. RESOURCE ASSESSMENT TABLE

CORE AND RCS HEAT REMOVAL (continued) SUCCESS PATH	SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS PATH DETERMINATION	
	RESOURCE CONDITIONS	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
HR-2: SG Heat Sink With SIS Operation	a. At least ONE S/G level greater than (-)350 inches	1. At least ONE S/G has level between 0 inches and (+)38 inches
	b. Feedwater is available: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Main Feedwater• AFW• Booster Pump Injection	OR S/G level is being restored by feedwater flow
	c. SIAS has actuated or SIS operation required	2. CET temperatures less than 50°F superheated (1)
		3. IF RAS has NOT occurred, AND pressurizer pressure is greater than 1270 PSIA, THEN at least ONE Charging Pump operating
		4. HPSI and LPSI Pumps are injecting water into the RCS PER Atts. (10) and (11) (2) (3)

- (1) Refer to Attachment (12) to read CETs while vital AC buses are de-energized.
(2) Limits in Attachments (10) and (11) are not required to be met if SIS throttle criteria are met.
(3) LPSI Pumps are **NOT** required post-RAS.

(continue)

VI. RESOURCE ASSESSMENT TABLE

CORE AND RCS HEAT REMOVAL (continued) SUCCESS PATH	SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS PATH DETERMINATION	
	RESOURCE CONDITIONS	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
HR-3: Shutdown Cooling System	a. CET temperatures less than 300° F b. Radiation levels are low enough to allow valve repositioning	1. CET temperatures less than 300°F and less than 50°F superheated (1) 2. HPSI Pumps are injecting water into the RCS PER Att. (10) (2) 3. Pressurizer pressure less than 270 PSIA {245} 4. RVLMS indicates the core is covered
HR-4: Once-Through-Cooling	a. HPSI pumps are available b. BOTH PORVs are available c. Flow path is available d. RWT is available as a makeup source	1. CET temperatures less than 50°F superheated (1) 2. IF RAS has NOT occurred, AND HPSI throttle criteria are NOT met, THEN ALL available Charging Pumps operating 3. HPSI and LPSI Pumps are injecting water into the RCS PER Atts. (10) and (11) (2) (3) 4. Pressurizer pressure less than 1270 PSIA, OR is lowering

- (1) Refer to Attachment (12) to read CETs while vital AC buses are de-energized.
 (2) Limits in Attachments (10) and (11) are not required to be met if SIS throttle criteria are met.
 (3) LPSI Pumps are **NOT** required post-RAS.

VI. RESOURCE ASSESSMENT TABLE

CONTAINMENT ENVIRONMENT	SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS PATH DETERMINATION	
	RESOURCE CONDITIONS	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
CE-1: NO CIS	a. Containment pressure less than 2.8 PSIG b. CIS has NOT actuated OR has been reset c. Containment radiation alarms are clear with NO unexplained rise (2)	1. Containment pressure less than 2.8 PSIG 2. Containment temperature less than 220°F (1) 3. Containment radiation alarms are clear with NO unexplained rise (2)

- (1) **NOT** available if 1Y10 is de-energized.
 (2) **NOT** applicable if OOS due to loss of power.

(continue)

VI. RESOURCE ASSESSMENT TABLE

CONTAINMENT ENVIRONMENT (continued) SUCCESS PATH	SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS PATH DETERMINATION	
	RESOURCE CONDITIONS	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
CE-2: Containment Isolation	a. Containment pressure less than 4.25 PSIG	1. Containment pressure less than 4.25 PSIG
	b. CSAS has NOT actuated OR has been reset	2. ALL available Containment Air Coolers are operating with maximum SRW flow 3. ALL containment penetrations required to be shut have an isolation valve shut 4. Hydrogen concentration less than 0.5% (1) OR ALL available hydrogen recombiners are energized with Hydrogen concentration less than 4.0% (1) OR Hydrogen purge operation per Tech Support recommendation (1)

(1) Hydrogen concentration acceptance criteria may be omitted until Chemistry has been able to place hydrogen monitors in service.

(continue)

VI. RESOURCE ASSESSMENT TABLE

CONTAINMENT ENVIRONMENT (continued) SUCCESS PATH	SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS PATH DETERMINATION	
	RESOURCE CONDITIONS	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
CE-3: Containment Spray	a. Containment pressure greater than 4.25 PSIG	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Containment pressure less than 50 PSIG 2. ALL available Containment Air Coolers are operating with maximum SRW flow 3. Containment spray flow is greater than 1350 GPM per pump, if operating 4. ALL containment penetrations required to be shut have an isolation valve shut 5. Hydrogen concentration less than 0.5% (1) <p>OR</p> <p>ALL available hydrogen recombiners are energized with Hydrogen concentration less than 4.0% (1)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>Hydrogen purge operation per Tech Support recommendation (1)</p>

(1) Hydrogen concentration acceptance criteria may be omitted until Chemistry has been able to place hydrogen monitors in service.

VI. RESOURCE ASSESSMENT TABLE

RADIATION LEVELS EXTERNAL TO CONTAINMENT	SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS PATH DETERMINATION	
	SUCCESS PATH	RESOURCE CONDITIONS
		ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
RLEC-1:Normal Levels	a. Normal Radiation levels exist outside of containment	1. Noble Gas Monitor (1-RIC-5415) alarm clear with NO unexplained rise
	b. Containment pressure less than 2.8 PSIG	2. Condenser Off-Gas RMS (1-RI-1752) alarm clear with NO unexplained rise (1)
	c. A loss of ALL Vital 4KV Buses may have occurred	3. S/G B/D RMS (1-RI-4014) alarm clear with NO unexplained rise (1)
		4. Main Vent Gaseous RMS (1-RI-5415) alarm clear with NO unexplained rise (1)

(1) **NOT** applicable if OOS due to loss of power.

(continue)

VI. RESOURCE ASSESSMENT TABLE

RADIATION LEVELS EXTERNAL TO CONTAINMENT (continued) SUCCESS PATH	SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS PATH DETERMINATION	
	RESOURCE CONDITIONS	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
RLEC-2:Containment Isolated	a. Radiation detected outside containment	1. ALL of the following alarms are clear with NO unexplained rise:
	OR Containment pressure greater than 2.8 PSIG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Noble Gas Monitor (1-RIC-5415) • Condenser Off-Gas RMS (1-RI-1752) • S/G B/D RMS (1-RI-4014) • Main Vent Gaseous RMS (1-RI-5415) OR 2. ALL containment penetrations required to be shut have an isolation valve shut IF a tube rupture is identified in a S/G, <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ALL release paths from the affected S/G to the environment are isolated • Affected S/G pressure less than 920 PSIA

VI. RESOURCE ASSESSMENT TABLE

RADIATION LEVELS EXTERNAL TO CONTAINMENT (continued) SUCCESS PATH	SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS PATH DETERMINATION	
	RESOURCE CONDITIONS	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
RLEC-2:Containment Isolated	<p>a. Radiation detected outside containment</p> <p>OR</p> <p>Containment pressure greater than, 2.8 PSIG</p>	<p>1. ALL of the following alarms are clear with NO unexplained rise:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Noble Gas Monitor (1-RIC-5415) • Condenser Off-Gas RMS (1-RI-1752) • S/G B/D RMS (1-RI-4014) • Main Vent Gaseous RMS (1-RI-5415) <p>OR</p> <p>2. ALL containment penetrations required to be shut have an isolation valve shut</p> <p>IF a tube rupture is identified in a S/G,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ALL release paths from the affected S/G to the environment are isolated • Affected S/G pressure less than 920 PSIA

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3.8.4 DC Sources-Operating

LCO 3.8.4 Four channels of DC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One DC channel inoperable due to an inoperable battery and the reserve battery available.	A.1 Replace inoperable battery with reserve battery.	4 hours
B. One DC channel inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.	B.1 Restore DC channel to OPERABLE status.	2 hours
C. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	C.1 Be in MODE 3.	6 hours
	<u>AND</u> C.2 Be in MODE 5.	36 hours

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.8.4.1	Verify battery terminal voltage is ≥ 125 V on float charge.	7 days
SR 3.8.4.2	Verify no visible corrosion at battery terminals and connectors. <u>OR</u> Verify battery connection resistance is within limits.	92 days
SR 3.8.4.3	Verify battery cells, cell plates, and racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that degrades performance.	18 months
SR 3.8.4.4	Remove visible terminal corrosion and verify battery cell to cell and terminal connections are coated with anti-corrosion material.	18 months
SR 3.8.4.5	Verify battery connection resistance is within limits.	18 months
SR 3.8.4.6	Verify each battery charger supplies ≥ 400 amps at ≥ 125 V for ≥ 30 minutes.	24 months

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.8.4.7 -----NOTE----- The modified performance discharge test in SR 3.8.4.8 may be performed in lieu of the service test in SR 3.8.4.7. ----- Verify battery capacity is adequate to supply, and maintain in OPERABLE status, the required emergency loads for the design duty cycle when subjected to a battery service test.</p>	<p>24 months</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.8.4.8 Verify battery capacity is $\geq 80\%$ of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test or a modified performance discharge test.</p>	<p>60 months</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>12 months when battery shows degradation or has reached 85% of the expected life with capacity $< 100\%$ of manufacturer's rating</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>24 months when battery has reached 85% of the expected life with capacity $\geq 100\%$ of manufacturer's rating</p>

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.4 DC Sources-Operating.

BASES

BACKGROUND

The station DC sources provide the AC emergency power system with control power. It also provides both motive and control power to selected safety related equipment and preferred AC vital bus power (via inverters). As required by Reference 1, Appendix 1C, Criterion 39, the DC electrical power sources are designed to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions, assuming a single failure. The DC sources also conform to the recommendations of References 2 and 3.

The 125 VDC electrical power sources consist of four independent and redundant safety related Class 1E DC channels. Each channel consists of one 125 VDC battery, the associated battery charger for each battery, and all the associated control equipment and interconnecting cabling.

During normal operation, the 125 VDC load is powered from the battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system. In cases where momentary loads are greater than the charger capability, or a loss of normal power to the battery charger, the DC load is automatically powered from the station batteries.

The DC channels provide the control power for its associated Class 1E AC power load group, 4.16 kV switchgear, and 480 V load centers. The DC channels also provide a DC source to the inverters, which in turn power the AC vital buses.

The DC sources are described in more detail in the Bases for LCO 3.8.9 and for LCO 3.8.10.

Each battery has adequate storage capacity to carry the required load continuously for at least 2 hours and to carry load duty cycle as discussed in Reference 1, Chapter 8.

Each 125 VDC battery is separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its charger and distribution centers. Each channel is separated physically and electrically from the other channel to ensure that a single failure in one channel does not cause a failure in a redundant channel. There is

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bus, are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an AOO or a postulated DBA. Loss of any DC channel does not prevent the minimum safety function from being performed (Reference 1, Chapter 8).

An OPERABLE DC channel requires the battery and one OPERABLE charger to be operating and connected to the associated DC bus(es).

A battery charger is considered OPERABLE as long as it is receiving power from its normal offsite source and can be connected to a DG within 2 hours following an event.

APPLICABILITY

The DC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODEs 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure safe unit operation and to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

The DC sources requirement for MODEs 5 and 6 are addressed in the Bases for LCO 3.8.5.

ACTIONS

A.1

Required Action A.1 requires the inoperable battery to be replaced by the reserve battery within four hours when one DC channel is inoperable due to an inoperable battery and the reserve battery is available. The reserve battery is a qualified battery that can replace and perform the required function of any inoperable battery. The four hour Completion Time is acceptable based on the capability of the reserve battery and the time it takes to replace the inoperable battery with the reserve battery while minimizing the time in this degraded condition.

B.1

Condition B represents one channel with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event, and a potential loss of

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charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery and maintain the battery in a fully charged state. The voltage requirements are based on the nominal design voltage of the battery (2.13 V per cell average) and are consistent with Reference 6 and the initial state of charge conditions assumed in the battery sizing calculations. The 7 day Frequency is conservative when compared with manufacturer recommendations and Reference 6.

SR 3.8.4.2

Visual inspection to detect corrosion of the battery cells and connections, or measurement of the resistance of each cell to cell and terminal connection, provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

The limits established for this SR must be no more than 20% above the resistance as measured during installation or not above the ceiling value established by the manufacturer.

The SR Frequency for these inspections, which can detect conditions that can cause power losses due to resistance heating, is 92 days. This Frequency is considered acceptable based on operating experience related to detecting corrosion trends.

SR 3.8.4.3

Visual inspection of the battery cells, cell plates, and battery racks provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

The presence of physical damage or deterioration does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR, provided an evaluation determines that the physical damage or deterioration does not affect the OPERABILITY of the battery (its ability to perform its design function).

The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

BASES

The SR Frequency is acceptable, given the unit conditions required to perform the test and the other administrative controls existing to ensure adequate charger performance during these 24 month intervals. In addition, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 3.8.4.7

A battery service test is a special test of battery capability, as found and with the associated battery charger disconnected, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC source. The test duration must be ≥ 2 hours and battery terminal voltage must be maintained ≥ 105 volts during the test. The discharge rate and test length should correspond to the design accident load (duty cycle requirements as specified in Reference 1, Chapter 8. A dummy load simulating the emergency loads of the design duty cycle may be used in lieu of the actual emergency loads.

The SR Frequency of 24 months is consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The Note allows the performance of a modified performance discharge test in lieu of a service test. This substitution is acceptable because a modified performance discharge test represents a more severe test of battery capacity than SR 3.8.4.7.

SR 3.8.4.8

A battery performance discharge test is a test of constant current capacity of a battery after having been in service, to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test. The test is intended to determine overall battery degradation due to age and usage.

A battery modified performance discharge test is a simulated duty cycle consisting of just two rates; the one minute rate published for the battery or the largest current load of the duty cycle, followed by the test rate employed for the performance discharge test, both of which envelope the duty

BASES

the previous performance test or when it is $\geq 10\%$ below the manufacturer's rating. These Frequencies are consistent with the recommendations in Reference 6.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR
 2. Safety Guide 6, Revision 0, "Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Steam Line Break Accident for Boiling Water Reactors," March 1971
 3. IEEE Standard -308-1978, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"
 4. IEEE Standard -485-1983, "Recommended Practice for Sizing Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations (ANSI)," June 1983
 5. Regulatory Guide 1.93, "Availability of Electric Power Sources," December 1974
 6. IEEE Standard -450-1995, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications," May 1995
 7. Regulatory Guide 1.32, Revision 2, "Criteria for Safety-Related Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants," February 1977
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3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating

LC0 3.8.9 The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One or more AC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.	A.1 Restore AC electrical power distribution subsystems to OPERABLE status.	8 hours <u>AND</u> 16 hours from discovery of failure to meet Limiting Condition for Operation
B. One or more AC vital bus subsystem(s) inoperable.	B.1 Restore AC vital bus subsystems to OPERABLE status.	2 hours <u>AND</u> 16 hours from discovery of failure to meet Limiting Condition for Operation

Distribution Systems-Operating
3.8.9

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. One DC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable.	C.1 Restore DC electrical power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE status.	2 hours <u>AND</u> 16 hours from discovery of failure to meet Limiting Condition for Operation
D. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.	D.1 Be in MODE 3. <u>AND</u> D.2 Be in MODE 5.	6 hours 36 hours
E. Two or more electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable that result in a loss of function.	E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.8.9.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems.	7 days

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The onsite Class 1E AC, DC, and AC vital bus Electrical Power Distribution Systems are divided into two redundant and independent AC electrical power distribution subsystems and four independent and redundant DC and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems (Reference 1, Chapter 8).

The AC primary Electrical Power Distribution System consists of two 4.16 kV ESF buses, each having at least one separate and independent offsite source of power as well as a dedicated onsite DG source. Each 4.16 kV ESF bus is normally connected to a preferred offsite source. After a loss of the preferred offsite power source to a 4.16 kV ESF bus, the onsite emergency DG supplies power to the 4.16 kV ESF bus. Control power for the 4.16 kV breakers is supplied from the Class 1E batteries. Additional description of this system may be found in the Bases for LCOs 3.8.1 and 3.8.4.

The 480 V system include the safety-related load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels shown in Table B 3.8.9-1.

The 120 VAC vital buses are divided into four independent and isolated subsystems and are normally supplied from an inverter. The alternate power supply for the vital buses are non-Class 1E 120 VAC Buses fed from a Class 1E ESF motor control center through the regulating transformer, and its use is governed by LCO 3.8.7. Each constant voltage source transformer is powered from a Class 1E AC bus.

There are four independent 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystems.

The list of all required Distribution Systems-Operating is presented in Table B 3.8.9-1.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in Reference 1, Chapters 6 and 14, assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC, DC, and AC vital bus Electrical Power Distribution Systems are designed to provide sufficient

BASES

capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Sections 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6.

The OPERABILITY of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus Electrical Power Distribution Systems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining power distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC electrical power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.

The distribution systems satisfy 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), Criterion 3.

LCO

The required electrical power distribution subsystems listed in Table B 3.8.9-1 ensure the availability of AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical supply for the systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an AOO or a postulated DBA. The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

Maintaining the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of ESF is not defeated. Therefore, a single failure within any system or within the electrical power distribution subsystems will not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.

OPERABLE AC electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses, load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels to be energized to their proper voltages. OPERABLE DC electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses to be energized to their proper voltage from either the associated battery or charger. OPERABLE vital bus electrical distribution

BASES

subsystems require the associated buses to be energized to their proper voltage.

In addition, tie breakers between redundant safety-related AC, DC, and AC vital bus distribution subsystems, if they exist, must be open. This prevents any electrical malfunction in any distribution subsystem from propagating to the redundant subsystem, which could cause the failure of a redundant subsystem and a loss of essential safety function(s). If any tie breakers are closed, the affected redundant electrical distribution subsystems are considered inoperable. This applies to the onsite, safety-related redundant electrical power distribution subsystems.

APPLICABILITY

The electrical distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODEs 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and Containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

Electrical distribution subsystem requirements for MODEs 5 and 6 are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.10.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one or more required AC buses, load centers, motor control centers, or distribution panels, except AC vital buses, inoperable and a loss of function has not yet occurred, the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC buses, load centers, motor control centers, and distribution panels must be restored to OPERABLE status within eight hours.

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Condition A worst scenario is one train without AC power (i.e., no offsite power to the train and the associated DG inoperable). In this condition, the unit is more vulnerable to a complete loss of AC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the unit operator's attention be focused on minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining train by stabilizing the unit, and on restoring power to the affected train. The eight hour time limit before requiring a unit shutdown in this condition is acceptable because of:

- a. The potential for decreased safety if the unit operator's attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected train, to the actions associated with taking the unit to shutdown within this time limit; and
- b. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component in the train with AC power.

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition A is entered while, for instance, a DC bus is inoperable and subsequently restored OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to two hours. This could lead to a total of ten hours, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the AC distribution system. At this time, a DC circuit could again become inoperable, and AC distribution restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

The Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time Condition A was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely.

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B.1

With one or more AC vital buses inoperable and a loss of Function has not yet occurred, the remaining OPERABLE AC vital buses are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the unit and maintain it in the safe shutdown condition. Overall reliability is reduced, however, since an additional single failure could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the AC vital bus must be restored to OPERABLE status within two hours by powering the bus from an associated inverter via DC or the non-Class 1E 120 VAC bus powered by an ESF motor control center through a regulating transformer.

Condition B represents one or more AC vital buses without power; potentially both the DC source and the associated AC source are non-functioning. In this situation, the unit is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all noninterruptible power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining vital buses, and restoring power to the affected vital bus.

This two hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that are without adequate vital AC power. Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate vital AC power, which would have the Required Action Completion Times shorter than two hours if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:

- a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) and not allowing stable operations to continue;
- b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous Applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without adequate vital AC power and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected train; and
- c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.

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The two hour Completion Time takes into account the importance to safety of restoring the AC vital bus to OPERABLE status, the redundant capability afforded by the other OPERABLE vital buses, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.1 establishes a limit on the maximum allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, an AC bus is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to eight hours. This could lead to a total of ten hours, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the vital bus distribution system. At this time, an AC train could again become inoperable, and vital bus distribution restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time Condition B was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely.

C.1

With one DC bus inoperable, the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystem could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the DC bus must be restored to OPERABLE status within two hours by powering the bus from the associated battery or charger.

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Condition C represents one DC bus without adequate DC power; potentially both with the battery significantly degraded and the associated charger nonfunctioning. In this situation, the unit is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all DC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining trains and restoring power to the affected train.

This two hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components which would be without power. Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate DC power, which would have Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours, is acceptable because of:

- a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while allowing stable operations to continue;
- b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without DC power and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected train; and
- c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.

The two hour Completion Time for DC buses is consistent with Reference 2.

The second Completion Time for Required Action C.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition C is entered while, for instance, an AC bus is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have not been met for up to eight hours. This could lead to a total of ten hours, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the DC distribution system. At this time, an AC train could again become inoperable, and DC distribution restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

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This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time Condition C was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely.

D.1 and D.2

If the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within six hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

E.1

Condition E corresponds to a level of degradation in the electrical distribution system that causes a required safety function to be lost. When more than one inoperable electrical power distribution subsystem results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.9.1

This SR verifies that the AC, DC, and AC vital bus Electrical Power Distribution Systems are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical divisions is maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required bus. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system

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loads connected to these buses. The seven day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems, and other indications available in the Control Room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR
 2. Regulatory Guide 1.93, "Availability of Electric Power Sources," December 1974
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Table B 3.8.9-1 (page 1 of 1)
AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution Systems⁽¹⁾

4160 Volt Emergency Bus No. 11 (Unit 1), No. 21 (Unit 2)	
4160 Volt Emergency Bus No. 14 (Unit 1), No. 24 (Unit 2)	
480 Volt Emergency Bus No. 11A (Unit 1), No. 21A (Unit 2)	
480 Volt Emergency Bus No. 11B (Unit 1), No. 21B (Unit 2)	
480 Volt Emergency Bus No. 14A (Unit 1), No. 24A (Unit 2)	
480 Volt Emergency Bus No. 14B (Unit 1), No. 24B (Unit 2)	
480 Volt Emergency Bus No. 104R (Unit 1), No. 204R (Unit 2)	
480 Volt Emergency Bus No. 114R (Unit 1), No. 214R (Unit 2)	
120 Volt AC Vital Bus No. 11 (Unit 1), No. 21 (Unit 2)	
120 Volt AC Vital Bus No. 12 (Unit 1), No. 22 (Unit 2)	
120 Volt AC Vital Bus No. 13 (Unit 1), No. 23 (Unit 2)	
120 Volt AC Vital Bus No. 14 (Unit 1), No. 24 (Unit 2)	
125 Volt DC Bus No. 11 (Unit 1 and Unit 2)	
125 Volt DC Bus No. 12 (Unit 1 and Unit 2)	
125 Volt DC Bus No. 21 (Unit 1 and Unit 2)	
125 Volt DC Bus No. 22 (Unit 1 and Unit 2)	

⁽¹⁾ Each bus of the AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution System is a subsystem.

Name: _____

1. RCP MALFUNCTIONS 002//BANK-1/CRO-63-1-3/1.7E/020630311/015AA2.10/3.7/3.7/SD 63 - ES

U-2 is at 100% power when the "ACTUATION SYSTEM CIS TRIPPED" alarm is received on 2C08. CIS has been determined to be invalid by the crew, but all attempts to reset CIS "A" from the control room have failed. The Reactor Operator tripped the reactor, as directed by the CRS.

When are the RCPs tripped?

- A. Immediately after the CRS completes the mid-EOP-0 brief
- B. When the RO has reported that controlled bleedoff temperatures exceed 200°F, or bearing temperatures exceed 195°F
- ✓C. After the RO has reported the reactivity safety function is complete
- D. After an attempt has been made to reset CIS from the cable spreading room

A and B are incorrect, the reactor is first tripped manually to avoid an automatic trip.

C is correct per the Alarm Response Manual--G-06

D is incorrect, there is no requirement to attempt resetting from the ESFAS panels, and this action is not directed by a procedure.

Basis: "ACTUATION SYSTEM CIS TRIPPED" AlarmReferences: 55.41:10 55.43:5 /
ARP 1C08KA1: 063A7.02KA2: 013000GEN8

Per Technical Specifications, under what conditions can a spent fuel pool cooling loop replace a Shutdown Cooling loop?

- ✓A. There is less than 23 feet of water above the fuel in the reactor vessel, the spent fuel pool cooling loop is aligned to provide flow to the core, and the heat generation rate is less than the heat removal capacity of the spent fuel pool cooling loop.
- B. There is greater than 23 feet of water above the fuel in the reactor vessel, the heat generation rate is less than the heat removal capacity of the spent fuel pool cooling loop, and no operations are permitted that would cause a reduction of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration.
- C. There is greater than 23 feet of water above the fuel in the reactor vessel, the heat generation rate is less than the heat removal capacity of the spent fuel pool cooling loop, and both spent fuel pool cooling loops are available.
- D. There is less than 23 feet of water above the fuel in the reactor vessel, the spent fuel pool cooling loop is aligned to provide flow to the core, and no draining operations to further reduce the RCS water volume are permitted.

A is correct per TS 3.9.5, the first note.

B and C are incorrect. SFP cooling may only be used to replace a SDC loops with RCS at low water levels. At greater than 23', only 1 SDC loop is required.

D is incorrect. Per the TS, the heat generation rate must be less than the SFP heat removal capacity. The requirement for not being permitted to lower RCS level is for de-energizing all pumps for less than 15 minutes to shift trains.

References: 43.2

Unit-1 was at 100% power when the following alarms annunciated:

PZR CH 100 PRESS

PZR CH Y LVL

ACTUATION SYS SENSOR CH ZF TRIP

1-PIC-100X indicates 2210 PSIA

1-PIC-100Y indicates 1400 PSIA

1-LI-110X indicates 208 inches

1-LI-110Y indicates 360 inches

What additional alarm would be expected with these indications and what action will be taken?

A. PZR PRESS BLOCK A PERMITTED, block SIAS

B. ACTUATION SYS SIAS TRIP, verify SIAS actuation

✓C. CNTMT NORMAL SUMP LVL HI, implement AOP-2A

D. PORV/SAFETY VLV ACOUSTIC MON, implement EOP-0

A is incorrect, indications are of a reference line leak, only one safety channel is affected, it takes 3 channels to get this alarm.

B is incorrect, the unaffected pressure instrument does not support SIAS conditions.

C is correct, with unaffected pZR level at 208 inches, a minimum of approximately 144 gallons has leaked, the sump alarms at 49 gallons.

D is incorrect. Indications are of an instrument failure, not lifting of a PORV or Safety.

References: 43.5

Unit-2 has experienced a loss of 2Y09. Reactor trip criteria was reached and the RO depressed the reactor trip buttons on 2C05.

Approximately 10 seconds later the RO reported WRNI power indications on 2C05 are reading approximately 100% power and startup rate is 0.

What is the cause of these indications and what actions are required?

- ✓A. The reactor failed to trip when the trip buttons were depressed. The electrical buses feeding the CEDM MG sets are deenergized.
- B. Normal reactor response immediately following a reactor trip from 100% power. After 30 seconds, verify a prompt drop in reactor power and a negative SUR exists.
- C. Loss of power to NI instrumentation due to loss of 2Y09. Verify all CEAs are inserted and delta-T power is lowering.
- D. An overpower condition occurred due to feedwater heater high level dump valves opening on the loss of 2Y09. Verify all CEAs are inserted and the turbine has tripped.

A is correct, SUR would be negative if CEAS inserted and an initial decrease in NI power is expected.

B is incorrect, per EOP-0.

C is incorrect, NI indications are powered from vital buses.

D is incorrect, although a high power condition may have resulted, the normal SUR and NI indications would still be evident if the reactor had tripped.

Reference: 43.5

A feed system malfunction has occurred and the following indications exist:

Reactor power is 100%

SGFPs speed is 4550-4650 RPM

SGFP suction pressure is 380 PSIG

11 S/G level is -2" 12 S/G level is -25"

TR1011/1111 recorder blue pen (feed flow) is slightly greater than the red pen (steam flow)

TR1021/1121 recorder red pen (steam flow) is greater than blue pen (feed flow)

What is the proper action for the CRS to direct the panel operators to perform?

A. Trip the reactor and implement EOP-0.

B. Start the standby Condensate Booster pump.

✓C. Place 12 S/G FRV controller in manual and open 12 FRV.

D. Bias SGFP speed to maintain FRV D/Ps greater than 75 PSIG.

A is incorrect, trip criteria is not being challenged yet (-50")

B is incorrect, suction pressure is sufficient.

C is correct, given that a feed system malfunction exists (no steam leak), with feed flow less than steam flow, a FRV problem is most likely.

D is incorrect, SGFP speed is in the normal range and the pumps will respond to adjustment of the FRVs automatically.

References: 41.10, 43.5

1B Diesel Generator was out of service for maintenance when a loss of offsite power occurred. 1A Diesel Generator tripped shortly after starting. Per the appropriate procedure, in what order are the following actions taken?

1. Minimize 250 VDC battery discharge and restoration of forced circulation if desired.

2. Establish RCS Heat Removal and protect the condenser from overpressure.

3. Attempt to regain either an onsite or an offsite power source.

4. Evaluate the need for a plant cooldown via either forced or natural circulation.

A. 1, 2, 3, 4

B. 3, 2, 4, 1

C. 2, 1, 3, 4

✓D. 2, 3, 1, 4

D is correct per EOP-7

Basis: Major Actions of EOP-7References: EOP-7 Rev. 4 U-1 placekeeper

References: 41.10, 43.5

Given an electrical system malfunction, what Control Room panel indications will reflect the status of the 125 VDC buses to allow selection of the correct section of the AOP to implement?

- A. Reactor Protective System cabinets at 1C15
- B. Steam Generator Feed Pump emergency lube oil pump lights on 1C03
- C. AFW pump controls on 1C04
- ✓D. Containment pressure transmitter isolation valves on 1C10

A is incorrect, RPS channels are powered by Vital AC buses and have been used to give improper reports of DC bus losses in the past.

B is incorrect, these are listed indications for losses of turbine building MCCs

C is incorrect, AFW pump controls are Vital Instrument bus power supplies, and can be fed from the opposite unit.

D is correct, these indications are located close together, each is powered by a different DC bus and provide the CRS with a quick diagnostic tool for losses of DC bus reports.

References: 43.5

Upon a loss of MCC-114, what Technical Requirements Manual credited boration flow path would be available?

- A. RWT to RWT charging pump suction valve (CVC-504) to charging pump suction
- ✓B. 12 BA pump to BA direct M/U valve (CVC-514) to charging pump suction
- C. 12 BA pump to BA flow control valve (CVC-210Y) to VCT M/U valve (CVC-512) to VCT outlet (CVC-501) to charging pump suction
- D. 11 or 12 BAST gravity drain valves (CVC-508 or 509) to charging pump suction

A is incorrect, 504 is powered from MCC 114

B is correct, all listed components are powered from MCC 104

C is incorrect, this is not a flowpath taken credit for meeting the TRM

D is incorrect, both gravity feed valves are powered from MCC114

Basis: Boration Flow Path Availability References: 55.43.2 55.45.13 KA1:

006K2.02-3KA2: 004000K2.01

U-1 is in Mode 1. The latest leakage reports are:

- 0.6 gpm from Pressurizer Safety Valve leakage
- 1.8 gpm from leakage past check valves from the RCS to the SI system
- 0.15 gpm from primary to secondary leakage (12 S/G)
- 0.5 gpm reactor vessel head seal leakage
- 4.8 gpm total RCS leakage

Based upon these known leak rates, which of the following Technical Specification RCS leakage limits are being exceeded?

- A. Pressure Boundary leakage and Identified leakage.
- ✓B. Primary to Secondary leakage and Unidentified leakage.
- C. Identified leakage and Unidentified leakage.
- D. Primary to Secondary leakage and Pressure Boundary leakage.

A is incorrect, no pressure boundary leakage is evident, identified leakage limit is 10 GPM

B is correct, primary to secondary is 216 GPD, limit is 100 GPD, and unidentified leakage is 2.25 GPM, limit is 1 GPM per 3.4.13

C is incorrect, identified limit is 10 GPM

D is incorrect, no pressure boundary leakage is evident.

Basis: RCS leak rate limits References: LCO TS 3.4.13 43.2, 43.3 KA1:
02005A8.02KA2:

10. LOR-202 025/ AOP-9A/ BANK-1/ 202-9A-02/ 2.0/ 201.001/ 068 2.2.25/ 2.5/3.7/ AOP-9A

What assumptions are made for the implementation of AOP-9A in addition to a major fire in the Control Room?

- A. Station Blackout, LOCA
- ✓B. Loss of Offsite power, no other accidents
- C. Station Blackout, no other accidents
- D. Loss of Offsite power, LOCA

A. is incorrect because a loss of offsite is assumed not a SBO and a LOCA is not considered.

B. is correct per AOP-9A notes.

C. is incorrect because a loss of offsite is assumed not a SBO.

D. is incorrect because a LOCA is not considered.

References; AOP-9A, Basis, 43.1, 43.5, 43.2

An RCS leak has resulted in implementing the applicable plant procedure.

What direction from the CRS is provided when RCS leakage exceeds T.S. 3.4.13 LCO but is within the capacity of one charging pump? (ASSUME INITIAL ACTIONS TO LOCATE SOURCE OF LEAKAGE HAVE BEEN COMPLETED)

- A. Evaluate operation of the plant with letdown isolated and align charging pumps to operate as needed to prevent exceeding a pressurizer level of 225 inches.
- ✓B. Commence a plant shutdown to COLD SHUTDOWN per OP-3, OP-4, and OP-5.
- C. Trip the reactor and implement EOP-0 when PZR level deviates from program by 15".
- D. Perform a rapid power reduction and trip the reactor when Tave is less than 537°F and implement EOP-0.

A is incorrect, but is close to steps in AOP-7I where letdown is lost.

B is correct per AOP-2A

C is incorrect, but similar to steps if the leak is greater than the capacity of one charging pump.

D is incorrect, but reflects actions for a S/G tube leak in excess of 1 charging pump

.Basis: REQUIREMENTS TO TRIP REACTOR References: AOP-2A, 43.5 KA1:
000037EK3.07KA2:

Using provided references:

Functional Recovery Procedure, EOP-8, has been implemented and the following plant conditions exist:

- 4 CEAs indicate fully withdrawn
- SUR is 0
- All charging pumps are inoperable
- RWT is available and operable
- SIAS has actuated and 2 HPSI pumps are running
- One 500 KV bus is energized
- Both SG levels indicate at -100" and constant and AFW flow is available
- Containment pressure is 0.4 psig and lowering

Which one of the following groups of Success Paths is implemented to assess and restore safety functions?

- A. VA-1, PIC-3, HR-2, CE-2, RLEC-2
- B. VA-1, PIC-4, HR-3, CE-2, RLEC-1
- C. VA-1, PIC-3, HR-3, CE-3, RLEC-2
- ✓D. VA-1, PIC-4, HR-2, CE-2, RLEC-1

A is incorrect, PIC-3 would be used if no 4 KV bus was available and SIAS had not actuated.

B is incorrect, HR-3 requires SDC initiation to satisfy heat removal.

C is incorrect-see above for PIC-3 and HR-3

D is correct per the resource assessment table.

RC-3 is used for more than one stuck CEA, SUR is not negative and CVCS not available, PIC-4 uses SIS for pressure/inventory control, S/G and HPSI are used for heat removal. Basis: Success path determination via R.A.T. EOP-8

References: EOP-8, 43.5 KA1: KA2:

13 Component Cooling Pump is to be run 24 hours for PMT after bearing replacement. What action is required and why?

- A. 12 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger must be placed in service to ensure a Component Cooling loop remains in operation.
- B. 13 Component Cooling Pump must be powered from 11 4KV bus to ensure both loops remain operable.
- ✓C. 12 Component Cooling Pump must be placed in PTL to prevent damage to a SDC Heat Exchanger due to high flow if a SIAS occurs.
- D. IX BYPASS 1-CVC-520 must be placed in BYPASS to prevent a reactivity event due to lowering letdown temperature.

A is incorrect, either heat exchanger can be in service.

B is incorrect, 11 Component Cooling Pump remains operable.

C is correct, per the note for in OI-16.

D is incorrect, procedures for shifting pumps does not require bypassing the ion exchanger. For the short period of time 2 pumps are running, temperature does not change appreciably.

References: OI-16, 41.5, 43.5

21B SRW Heat Exchanger is to be removed from service for cleaning today. How is the Containment Cooling System affected?

- ✓A. The manual SRW inlet isolation valve on 21 or 22 Containment Cooler is shut to maintain 2A Diesel Generator operable.
- B. One train of Containment Cooling is declared inoperable because 2A Diesel Generator is inoperable.
- C. The Containment Cooling System is degraded but remains operable and functional.
- D. 21 and 22 Containment Coolers must be declared inoperable because 21 Component Cooling Heat exchanger must be taken out of service.

A is correct, per OI-29 and Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6 basis.

B is incorrect, one train of air coolers is declared inoperable, but it is because one cooler is isolated, not due to the EDG.

C is incorrect per TS.

D is incorrect, only one heat exchanger is out of service, but that makes the train out of service.

References: OI-29, 43.5

Using provided references:

After investigating an alarm at 1C33, the CRO returns from the cable spreading room and reports that #23 Battery Charger output voltage is 120 VDC.
How is the 125 VDC system affected and what action is required?

- A. One DC channel is inoperable. Restore to operable status within 2 hours.
- B. #23 battery charger remains operable as long as it's offsite power source remains operable, perform a breaker lineup per STP-O-90.
- ✓C. #23 battery charger is inoperable, verify an operable battery charger is supplying 11 125 VDC bus.
- D. The battery charger is inoperable, 11 125 VDC bus is inoperable and 1Y01 must be placed on the Inverter Backup Bus.

A is incorrect, as long as one charger is operable, the bus is operable.

B is incorrect, the chargers must maintain greater than or equal to 125V at 400 amps or greater to maintain operability.

C is correct per TS 3.8.4 basis.

D incorrect, one battery charger is available to maintain the bus operable.

References: TS LCO 3.8.4 and basis, 41.10 43.2

Which list represents plant personnel that must be notified in the event of a Containment entry at power?

- A. Rad Con ALARA, Nuclear Security, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
- B. Nuclear Security, Nuclear Training, Operations Work Control
- C. Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor, Instrument and Controls Maintenance Supervisor, Control Room Supervisor
- ✓D. Instrument and Controls Maintenance Supervisor, Rad Con ALARA, Nuclear Security

A is incorrect, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor is not required to be notified.

B is incorrect, Nuclear training is not required to be notified.

C is incorrect, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor is not required to be notified.

D is correct. Per NO-1-104, I&C is notified to perform airlock door testing after entry is complete, Rad Con is notified prior to entry, and Security must be notified and to verify the EAL outer hatch woodruff key is installed.

References: NO-1-104, 43.5

Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit One has tripped due to a loss P-13000-1
- 11 4KV bus is energized from 1A Diesel Generator
- PZR level is 100" and slowly lowering
- RCS pressure is 1920 PSIA and slowly lowering

The RO reports that only 12 Charging Pump is running and Pressure and Inventory is being monitored for positive trends.

What alternate actions must the CRS direct or verify?

- A. Verify SIAS actuation when RCS pressure reaches 1725 PSIA.
- ✓B. Manually start 11 and 13 charging pumps to restore pressurizer level to greater than 101" and locally reset 11 pressurizer backup heater breaker.
- C. Isolate letdown, check that charging pumps automatically start to restore pressurizer level and reset pressurizer proportional heaters by momentarily placing the handswitches to OFF.
- D. Verify charging pumps start automatically to restore Pressurizer level to greater than 101", verify 12 and 14 pressurizer backup heaters start to restore RCS pressure.

A is incorrect, action should be taken so that SIAS does not actuate.

B is correct, charging pumps must be manually started, and heaters must be reset, and they will not operate below 101" in the pressurizer.

C is incorrect, letdown will automatically isolate, 11 and 13 charging pumps will not automatically start, and the proportional heaters will take a long time to restore RCS pressure.

D is incorrect, 11 and 13 charging pumps will not automatically start with the normal and alternate 4 KV bus feeder breakers open and 12 and 14 heaters will not have power available.

References: EOP basis docs. 41.5, 43.5

A core shuffle is in progress and the refueling machine is indexed over a core location with a fuel assembly grappled in the hoist box. What condition would require the Fuel Handling Supervisor to stop core alterations?

- A. Count rate increases from 10 CPS to 12 CPS when the fuel bundle is inserted into the core.
- ✓B. Communications between fuel handling stations is lost.
- C. One channel of 3 available nuclear instrumentation channels is declared out of service.
- D. The personnel airlock doors are both open.

A is incorrect, a small increase in countrate may be normal, depending on age of the fuel assembly and proximity of excore NI.

B is correct, per TRM TNC 15.9.2

C is incorrect, TS LCO only requires 2 NIs operable

D is incorrect, TS LCO 3.9.3 allows both doors to be open, as long as one is capable of being shut.

References: TRM, 41.10, 43.2, 43.6

Which selection is the requirement for notification of plant management in the event that a deviation to a Controlling Technical Procedure was approved by the CRS and performed? (**Assume no Technical Specification deviation was required**)

- A. Shift Manager
- ✓B. Shift Manager, GS-NPO or M-NO
- C. Shift Manager, GS-NPO, M-NO and NRC resident
- D. Shift Manager, GS-NPO, M-NRM

A is incorrect, additonal notification is required

B is correct, per NO-1-200, 5.1.C

C is incorrect, NRC resident is not part of plant staff, and is not required to be notified per RM-1-101.

D is incorrect, Manager- Nuclear Regulatory Matters notification is not a requirement per NO-1-200.

References: NO-1-200, 43.3, 43.5

20. NITE/STANDING ORDRS 001//NEW-1///204.037/2.1.15/2.3/3.0/

Who has approval authority for Nuclear Plant Operations Section Standing Orders and who can cancel them?

- A. Approval--GS-NPO, cancellation-- Shift Managers
- B. Approval--Manager-Nuclear Operations, cancellation--Manager-Nuclear Operations
- ✓C. Approval --GS-NPO, cancellation--GS-NPO
- D. Approval--Shift Manager, cancellation--GS-NPO

C is correct, per the forms in the NPO Section Standing Orders book.
Distractions are possible Operations Management personnel.
References: 41.10, 43.3,

21. CRO-212-1-1-02 003//NEW-1/TECH.SPECS/25,26/204.094/2.2.22/3.4/4.1/

What systems/components are credited for protection of the RCS Pressure Safety Limit?

- A. All systems listed in the Limiting Conditions for Operations of Technical Specifications.
- B. PORVs, Steam Bypass Control System (ADV and TBVs), Pressurizer Pressure Control system
- ✓C. RPS high RCS pressure trip, Pressurizer Safety Valves and main steam safety valves
- D. Auxiliary Feedwater system, ESFAS system and RPS actuation of PORVs

C is correct per B 2.1.1, Applicable Safety Analyses
Distractors are systems of components not listed in TS Basis.
References: TS Safety Limits, basis, 43.1, 43.2

22. SRO RESPONSIBILITIES 001//NEW-2/048-1-0/1.11/048.007/2.3.3/1.8/2.9/

Which evolution requires direct supervision by a Senior Reactor Operator?

- ✓A. Bypassing an RAS sensor module
- B. Discharging a RCWMT
- C. Performance of any "trip sensitive" PE
- D. Placing the SFP ion exchanger in service

A is correct per OI-34, 5.0.B
B is incorrect, a signed permit is required, but not direct supervision of the lineup.
C is incorrect, only requires notification and approval to perform.
D is incorrect, requires PWS supervision, which can be a non-licensed operator per NO-1-200
References: OI-34, 43.4, 43.5

23. RADWORK PERMIT 001//NEW-1//204.007/2.3.7/2.0/3.3/

Who is responsible for writing an SWP for an Operations evolution when the task is not covered by an existing permit?

- A. The person who is in charge of performing the task
- B. Operations ALARA Coordinator
- C. Operations Work Control
- ✓D. An ALARA planner

D is correct per RSP-1-200

Distractors are Operations personnel or shift personnel without this responsibility or authority.

References: 41.10, 43.3, 43.4

24. EMER PRO 001//NEW-2/052-4-0/5.0/204.093/2.4.4/4.0/4.3/

Unit-2 has been stable for the past 24 hours with RCS pressure 100 PSIA.
RCS temperature is 110°F.

Containment closure deviations exist.

Pressurizer level starts rapidly lowering from 160".

What procedure provides the required actions for these conditions?

- A. AOP-2A, Excessive RCS Leakage
- B. EOP-5, Loss of Coolant Accident
- ✓C. AOP-3B, Abnormal Shutdown Cooling Conditions
- D. AOP-4A, Loss of Containment Integrity/Closure

A is incorrect, this provides guidance only when RCS is at a higher pressure.

B is incorrect, EOP-5 assumes a trip and EOP-0 have been completed

C is correct. Section V is specifically for a loss of inventory.

D is incorrect. Deviations are allowed in Mode 5, there is no guidance in AOP-4A for these indications, and AOP-3B will address containment closure.

References: 43.2, 43.5

The RCP Trip Strategy in EOP-0 and any of the succeeding EOPs will:

- A. Ensure that during a cold leg break LOCA, RCPs remain running as long as possible; during non-LOCA conditions, pressurizer spray is maintained.
- ✓B. Ensure during a hot leg small break LOCA, RCPs are secured early enough to prevent a deep uncover of the core; during non-LOCA conditions pressurizer spray is maintained and minimizes voiding in the RV upper head during cooldown.
- C. Ensure that during LOCAs, sufficient flow is maintained to aid heat removal from the reactor vessel head; during non-LOCA events, pressurizer spray heat losses are minimized.
- D. Ensure that during all events (LOCA and non-LOCA) the core is kept from too deep of an uncover and that the use of aux spray is minimized.

A is incorrect, maintaining spray flow is not a requirement--aux spray is available.

B is correct per EOP-0 basis IV.D.1, rev 14

Distractors are not referenced in the Basis

References: EOP Rev. 3 Basis Document 41.10, 43.5

Name: _____

1. SRO-201-0-2-05 005//NEW -2/ SRO-201-0-/ 3.0/ 020590408/ 007EA1.06/ 4.4/4.5/ EOP-0, STU

U-2 is operating at 100% when a reactor trip occurs.

The RO observes the following indications on the CEA mimic:

4 CEAs do not have the amber lights energized

2 of the above CEAs have green lights energized

What must be performed when performing the Reactivity Control Safety Function?

- A. Take the alternate actions to deenergize CEDM MG sets and verify all CEAs are inserted.
- B. Depress the Reactor Trip pushbuttons on 2C15, verify reactor power is lowering, and verify a negative startup rate exists.
- C. Verify reactor power is lowering, check that no CEA deviation alarms are present, verify a negative startup rate exists, check that RCS makeup is secured and inform CRS that Reactivity Control is complete.
- ✓D. Commence RCS boration to at least 2300 ppm via gravity feed or a Boric Acid pump using all available charging pumps.

A is incorrect, the reactor has tripped, de-energizing the MG sets is not required

B is incorrect, the reactor has tripped and depressing the trip buttons on 2C15 is not required.

C is incorrect, these are normal trip actions, but do not include the actions required for more than one CEA failing to insert.

D is correct per EOP-0 and bases, page13, rev 14

Basis: EOP-0 reactivity control questionReferences: EOP-0 Rev. 3KA1: KA2:

Given the following conditions:

RCS pressure:	1600 PSIA
PZR level:	360"
T h:	532.5°F
Tc:	532.2°F
Containment Pressure:	2.4 PSIA
Containment temp:	115°F
S/G pressures:	880/885 PSIA

EOP-0 is being implemented

What is the most likely cause of these conditions?

- A. RCS cold leg break
- ✓B. RCS leak at the top of the PZR
- C. S/G tube leak
- D. Main Steam line break in containment

A is incorrect, a difference in Tc and T h would be more evident, also, pressurizer level would not be high during EOP-0 with RCS pressure above the shutoff head of the HPSI pumps

B is correct--classic indications

C is incorrect, pressurizer level again does not support this

D is incorrect, Tc and S/G pressures don't support this

The CRS ordered Unit-1 manually tripped due to rapidly loweing PZR level and RCS pressure. EOP-0 is being implemented and the following conditions exist:

RCS pressure:	1900 PSIA
Tc:	532.5°F
Containment pressure	0.5 PSIA
Containment temperature	98°F

What is the status of the Containment Air Coolers? **(Assume no operator action)**

- A. 4 Coolers in slow speed with maximum SRW flow
- B. 4 Coolers in fast speed with normal SRW flow
- C. 3 Coolers in slow speed with maximum SRW flow
- ✓D. 3 Coolers in fast speed with normal SRW flow

A is incorrect, but describes operation during SIAS. SIAS setpoints have not been reached.

B and C are incorrect, but could be options with manual actions by the operator

D is correct per OI-5A, normal system lineup.

Which one of the following describes the credited RCS inventory and core heat removal processes during a large break LOCA?

- A. HPSI injection provides makeup and heat is removed via natural circulation flow to the S/Gs.
- ✓B. HPSI pumps, LPSI pumps and the SITs provide makeup and heat is removed via flow out the break.
- C. LPSI pumps and the SITs provide makeup and heat is removed via forced flow to the S/Gs.
- D. Charging pumps provide makeup and heat is removed via flow out the break.

A is incorrect, for Large break LOCAs, heat removal is via flow out the break and inventory is established by SITs and LPSIs

B is correct per EOP-5 basis pages 10-11

C is incorrect, S/Gs are not providing heat removal for DBA LOCA

D is incorrect, but this is correct for small RCS leaks

Basis: Core Heat RemovalReferences: EOP-5 Rev. 3 Basis DocumentKA1:
02007K3.01KA2:

Given the following conditions:

- 11A RCP tripped due to a breaker fault

- EOP-0 has been completed, no alternate actions were required

How will the RCS and Steam Generators have responded?

- A. 11 and 12 loop differential temperatures will be equal and 11 and 12 S/G pressures will be equal.
- B. 11 loop will have an inverted differential temperature and 11 S/G pressure will be lower than 12 S/G pressure.
- ✓C. 12 loop differential temperature will be greater than 11 loop differential temperature and 11 and 12 S/G pressures will be equal.
- D. 12 loop will have a smaller differential temperature than 11 and 12 S/G pressure will be lower than 11S/G pressure.

A is incorrect, this reflects equal flow conditions.

B is incorrect, 11 loop will still have forward flow with one RCP in operation, and S/G pressures will be equal.

C is correct, validated with simulator response. 12 loop differential temp. will be about 2°F, 11 loop differential temperature will be approximately 1°F. S/G pressures are essentially equal due to operation of the TBVs.

D is incorrect, 12 loop differential temperature will be approximately twice 11 and S/G pressures will be equal.

A reactor trip has occurred and the following conditions exist:

- Pressurizer level is 140 inches and stable
- One Charging Pump is available
- Pressurizer pressure is 1900 psia and rising
- RCS Subcooling is 65°F and steady

After performing the immediate actions for PIC, the Reactor Operator reports "Pressure and Inventory Control cannot be met" to the CRS.

What is the reason for this report?

- A. Letdown has been isolated.
- B. RCS subcooling is not in band.
- C. All Charging Pumps are not in operation.
- ✓D. Pressurizer level is not trending toward setpoint.

A is incorrect, letdown status is not a basis for meeting Pressure and Inventory Control

B is incorrect, Subcooling band is 30 to 140 °F.

C is incorrect, charging pump status is not a basis for Pressure and Inventory

D is correct per EOP-0.

ControlBasis: Proper Report from RO to CRS References: EOP-0 Rev. 3 and NO-1-201KA1: 03PA3.01KA2: 03PA3.03

Why does the Component Cooling system realign on a SIAS?

- A. Minimize dose rates due to contamination of Component Cooling system
- ✓B. Provide long term cooling to containment after RAS
- C. Minimize load on the Saltwater system to ensure containment cooling via Service Water
- D. Provide continuous cooling to LPSI pump seals

A is incorrect, CC should not become contaminated due to a LOCA

B is correct per SD-15. The system realigns to cool containment spray which becomes the largest heat load to Component Cooling after RAS.

C is incorrect, the Saltwater system alignment ensures this happens.

D is incorrect, LPSI pumps are secured during RAS.

Basis: System Description References: 55.41.5, 41.10:

Unit-1 is in Mode 3 with the following conditions:

RCS pressure is 2150 PSIA and lowering
Pressurizer Spray Valves, 1-RC-100E and F are fully open
PIC-100X is indicating 2400 PSIA, controller output is 100%
PIC-100Y is indicating 2150 PSIA output is 0%

What action is required?

- A. Stop 11A and 11B Reactor Coolant Pumps.
- B. Energize all Pressurizer Heaters.
- ✓C. Place PZR PRESS CH SEL switch, 1-HS-100 in "Y".
- D. Place PRESSURIZER SPRAY VALVE CONTROLLER, 1-HIC-100 in manual with a 100% output.

A is incorrect, would stop depressurization, but indications are of a failed instrument channel.

B is incorrect, with spray valves failed open, RCS would still depressurize.

C is correct, per 1C07 ARM, E-29.

D is incorrect, 100% output would keep spray valves open.

EOP-8 has been implemented because the Reactivity Safety Function was not met in EOP-0. What indications are used to verify that boration is successfully meeting the acceptance criteria?

- ✓A. WRNI power is less than $10^{-4}\%$ and SUR is negative or zero
- B. LRNI power is less than $10^{-4}\%$ or SUR is negative
- C. A boric acid pump is running and charging header flow is 40 GPM or greater
- D. SUR is zero and the CHG HDR FLOW LO PRESS LO alarm is clear

A is correct per EOP-8, appendix 1, rev 26.

B is incorrect, both conditions are required

C is incorrect, boration at the given rate in addition to lowering power and negative SUR indications

D is incorrect, negative SUR and boration rate of at least 40 GPM is specified.

Which one of the following is the reason for equalizing the pressure on the primary and secondary sides of a ruptured Steam Generator per the applicable EOP?

- A. Lowering the RCS pressure allows HPSI flow to restore Pressurizer level.
- ☒ B. Reducing the differential pressure lowers the RCS leak rate.
- C. Reducing RCS pressure and temperature aids initiation of natural circulation.
- D. Equalizing RCS and S/G secondary side pressures initiates backflow to control affected S/G level.

A is a correct statement, but does is not a basis for initially lowering RCS pressure during tube leaks.

B is correct per EOP-6 Basis page 33, rev.18

C is incorrect, cooldown and depressurization are directed to lower the RCS leak rate and to allow isolating the affected S/G without lifting a S/G safety valve.

D is incorrect, level is controlled via backflow be depressurizing RCS to less than S/G pressure.

Basis: Basis for subcooling limits in EOP-6References: EOP-6 Rev. 2 Step J

BasisKA1: KA2:

Emergency Operating Procedures provide specific guidance for feeding a dry S/G to restore RCS heat removal.

This guidance is based on _____.
(Select the phrase that correctly completes the above statement)

- A. minimizing S/G tube voiding, which would inhibit natural circulation
- B. preventing a rapid RCS cooldown, avoiding a pressurized thermal shock to the Reactor Vessel
- C. preventing uneven cooling of the RCS, which may result in a localized reactivity excursion
- ☒ D. minimizing the probability of creating a waterhammer, and damaging S/G internals

A is incorrect, the steps to slowly introduce water into the feedring is not based on voiding.

B is incorrect, under the conditions outlined in the procedure, thermal shock is not an issue.

C is incorrect, reactivity addition is not a concern for this method of RCS heat removal.

D is correct per EOP-3 Basis ,step IV.K.2. page 37, rev.20.

EOP-0 was completed and the following conditions exist:

11 S/G pressure 725 PSIA and lowering
12 S/G pressure 840 PSIA and stable
11 S/G level -260" and lowering
12 S/G level - 80" and rising slowly
Tc 521°F
Pzr pressure 1830 PSIA
MSIVs and S/G Blowdown Isolation Valves are shut

Which event would cause these indications?

- ✓A. A Feedwater line rupture inside Containment
- B. An RCS leak inside Containment
- C. A Main Steam line rupture in the Turbine Building
- D. A rupture of the S/G Blowdown Tank

A is correct, a feedline break downstream of the check valve will exhibit the same indications as a Main Steam line rupture inside containment.

B is incorrect, RCS leak would not cause 11 S/G level to continue to lower

C is incorrect, the MSIVs shutting would isolate this leak, Tc and 11 S/G parameters would trend to normal.

D is incorrect, shutting the Blowdown valves would isolate this leak.

13. STATION BLACKOUT 002/NONE/MOD-1/ SRO-201-7-/9.0/201.077/055EA1.06/4.1/4.5/201 - EMER

EOP-7 (Station Blackout) has been initiated on U-1 and the CRS has directed the CRO to restore power to 11 4KV bus using the 0C Emergency Diesel Generator.

Which Control Room annunciator condition reflects that the bus has been re-energized?

- A. "ACTUATION SYS LOSS OF POWER" alarm clears
- B. "ACTUATION SYS U/V RELAY TRIP" alarm clears
- ✓C. "SEQUENCER INITIATED" alarm actuates
- D. "0C DG CONTR BOARD 1C19C" alarm actuates

A is incorrect. This will not be in alarm, power to the actuation systems is maintained by station batteries, through inverters.

B is incorrect. A U/V signal will still exist on 14 bus, not allowing the alarm to clear.

C is correct per OI-21C.

D is incorrect. Closing the output and bus feeder breakers will not cause this alarm.

Basis: Restore Vital buses.

References: EOP-7 Rev. 4 step R , OI-21C. 41.7

14. LOSS OF OFFSITE 001//NEW-2/201-0-9/1.8/202.071/056AA2.43/3.9/4.1/

Unit-1 has experienced a Loss of Offsite Power from 100% power.
11 and 14 4 KV buses have been re-energized by their associated Diesel Generators.
EOP-0 is being implemented.

What action must the CRO take for step B, "ENSURE TURBINE TRIP" that would **NOT** be expected on a reactor trip with offsite power available?

- A. Depressing the Turbine TRIP button.
- B. Opening 11 GEN FIELD BKR, 1-CS-41.
- C. Shutting the MSIVs due to not being able to verify Turbine speed dropping.
- ✓D. Dispatching an operator to shut the MSR 2nd stage bypass valves.

A is incorrect, this must be performed for all turbine trips.

B is incorrect, DC power is available, the Generator Field Breaker will automatically open.

C is incorrect, Turbine speed indication is available

D is correct per EOP-0, alternate action 3.1

15. LOSS OF VITAL AC 001//BANK-3/CRO-63-1-3/1.7A, 1.7D/020540103/057AA2.17/3.1/3.4/SD 63 - ES

The inverter backup bus is powering 1Y01 when offsite power is lost.
How is 4 KV bus 11 affected?

- A. 1A DG will start but not load because ESFAS logic cabinet ZA remains deenergized, maintaining a UV (load shed signal) to 4 KV bus 11 loads.
- B. 4 KV bus 11 will be re-energized by manually starting and loading 0C Diesel Generator.
- ✓C. 1A DG will automatically start and load to energize 4KV bus 11 after the 1B DG starts and energizes 4KV bus 14.
- D. 4 KV bus 11 cannot be re-energized until power is restored to 1Y01 via DC bus 11.

A is incorrect, logic cabinet ZA will be re-energized when 4 KV bus 14 is re-energized.

B is incorrect, the automatic actions associated with the 1B EDG will restore power to 1Y01 which will re-energize ESFAS to start the 1A EDG and repower 11 4 KV bus.

C is correct, the inverter backup bus is powered from MCC 104 which will be re-energized by the 1B EDG.

D is incorrect, see C.

Basis: MCC that is used for backup AC power when inverter OOS

References: 55.41:7 55.43KA1: 063K2.01KA2: 013000K2.01

16. LOSS OF DC POWER 001//NEW-1/69-5-4/1.0/094.013/058-2.1.19/3.0/3.0/

A plant transient has occurred and the following conditions exist:

- All Unit-1 annunciator lights are deenergized
- CC CNTMT RETURN, 1-CC-3833-CV has failed shut

How will SPDS indicate the cause of this event?

- A. All Safety Function boxes turn red, and a "Loss of AC bus " alarm appears on the "Vital Auxiliaries" Safety Function screen.
- B. The "Vital Auxiliaries" Safety Function box turns red, and the indicator for the affected AC bus on the electrical systems mimic flashes.
- ✓C. The "Vital Auxiliaries" Safety Function box turns yellow, and the indicator for the affected DC bus on the electrical systems mimic changes color.
- D. All Safety Function boxes turn magenta and a small red box appears next to the indicator for the affected DC bus on the electrical systems mimic.

A is incorrect, indications are for a loss of 21 DC bus, listed indications are not supported by SPDS

B is incorrect, indications are for a loss of 21 DC bus, listed indications are not supported by SPDS

C is correct, per AOP-7J and SPDS alarm response manual.

D is incorrect, indications are for a loss of 21 DC bus, listed indications are not supported by SPDS

2-HS-5155, 22A/22B SRW HXR EMERGENCY OUTLET VLVS handswitch is inadvertently placed in 'OPEN'.

How are the Service Water Heat Exchangers affected?

- A. 22A/22B SRW HXR emergency outlets valves open, but normal SW flow is maintained because the emergency overboard valve is normally gagged shut.
- B. 22A/22B SRW heat exchangers are removed from service because the heat exchangers' SW inlet valves will also shut.
- ✓C. 21A/21B SRW heat exchangers lose SW flow because the emergency overboard valve automatically opens, and 22A/22B SRW heat exchangers SW outlets shift to 21 SW supply header.
- D. 21A/21B SRW heat exchangers' SW inlet and outlet valves automatically shut, and 22A/22B SRW heat exchangers will be supplied by 21 SW header.

A is incorrect, emergency outlet valve automatically opens when any emergency outlet valve handswitch is in the OPEN position, the valve is not gagged.

B is incorrect, inlet valves are not affected by this H/S

C is correct per OM-49.

D is incorrect, 21 heat exchanger valves are unaffected, and 21 header will not supply 22 heat exchangers.

Unit-2 is at full power with 21 Plant Air Compressor in Standby when a leak causes Instrument Air header pressure to decrease to 85 psig. Plant Air header pressure is 95 psig. No operator actions have been performed.

Which list is composed of all the air compressors that will be running?

- A. 21 and 22 Instrument Air Compressors, 11 and 21 Plant Air Compressors, 21 and 22 Saltwater Air Compressors
- B. 21 and 22 Instrument Air Compressors, 11 Plant Air Compressor, 21 and 22 Saltwater Air Compressors
- C. 21 Instrument Air Compressor and 11 Plant Air Compressor
- ✓D. 21 and 22 Instrument Air Compressors and 11 Plant Air Compressor

A is incorrect, 21 Plant Air Compressor will not start until PA header pressure is less than 91 psig, the SW air compressors do not start automatically on low air pressure

B is incorrect, the SW air compressors do not start on low air pressure.

C is incorrect, 22 Instrument Air Compressor will start at 93 psig.

D is correct for the given pressures per AOP-7D and the ARM.

Basis: AUTO BACKUP FEATURES FOR INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM References:
AOP-7D 41.7

Group 5 CEAs were being withdrawn from 120.5" to 128.0" using Manual Sequential. CEA-1 dropped to 124.25" by secondary indication after CEDS was turned off. Primary and secondary position indication for all other CEAs in the group is 127.25" to 128.0".

What is the expected primary position indication for CEA-1?

- ✓A. 127.25" to 128.0"
- B. 124.25
- C. 120.5"
- D. 0"

A is correct. The primary (computer) indication is a pulse counting system, CEA-1 would get the same signals as the other CEAs within the group in Manual Sequential.

B is incorrect, the stem of the question stated that the CEA dropped, not that it did not move above 124.25".

C is incorrect. This indication would be correct if the CEA did not move at all. If this were the case, the operator would have received alarms by 125" and stopped CEA motion.

D is incorrect, primary position is reset to zero by the rod bottom reedswitch.

Basis: CEA Indicator Post-trip Reset

References: 55.41:2,6 55.43KA1: 060K4.08KA2: 014000K1.01

Given the following conditions:

Unit-2 is on Shutdown Cooling, RCS temperature is 120°F

RCS pressure is 14.7 PSIA

The reactor vessel head is fully tensioned

Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers are open

One of two operable WRNI channels has failed low

What action is required immediately?

- A. Commence boration of at least 40 GPM until RCS boron is 2300 PPM or greater.
- ✓B. Suspend all operations involving positive reactivity additions.
- C. Commence actions to restore two WRNI channels to operable status.
- D. Perform SDM verification per Surveillance requirement 3.1.1.1.

A is incorrect, SDM margin verification is not required for 4 hours, which would leak to the boration, if required.

B is correct per Technical Specifications (3.3.12 action A) referenced in ARM D-41.

C is incorrect, but is a specific requirement if 2 Channels are OOS in Mode 6.

D is incorrect. SDM margin verification is not required for 4 hours per TS 3.3.12

Basis: WR NI Requirements

References: 55.41:10 55.43:2 / Tech Spec 3.3.1.1KA1: 057K8.1KA2: K8.2,K8.4

Which of the following would be classified as a fuel handling incident per AOP-6D?

- ✓A. A large object was dropped in the Spent Fuel Pool and is laying on top of a spent fuel assembly .
- B. During refueling of the core, a fuel assembly was placed in an incorrect core location.
- C. A new fuel assembly was dropped when being moved from the New Fuel Storage Area to the New Fuel Inspection Platform.
- D. A portable light pole hanging off the refueling machine bridge was damaged when performing the refueling machine operational checks per OI-25C.

A is correct per AOP-6D, rev.15, I.B.2.

B-D are incorrect, the procedure is written to address an incident where there is a possibility of damage to an irradiated fuel assembly which could result in damage to a fuel pin.

"RMS PANEL 1C26" alarm at 1C18 has annunciated.
2-RI-7010, Unit-2 BAST room Area Radiation Monitor is reading off-scale, high.
No other indications of abnormal conditions are present.

What action is directed by plant procedures?

- A. Contact Chemistry to obtain samples of the BASTs, VCT and RCS.
- B. Recommend Radiation Safety Supervision post the area.
- ✓C. Obtain CRS permission to bypass the alarm to clear the alarm at 1C18.
- D. Sound the emergency alarm, evacuate the immediate area and declare a Radiological Event per ERPIP 3.0.

A is incorrect, there is no direction nor need to have chemistry take samples on an Area RMS alarm.

B is incorrect, Rad Safety should be called to take surveys.

C is correct per OI-35, rev.26

D is incorrect. The indications stated are indications of an instrument failure, a Rad Event should not be declared unless actual rad levels are high.

During a severe fire in the Control Room, (AOP-9A), why are the Fairbanks Diesel Generators shutdown?

- A. To prevent overloading the Diesel Generators when equipment starts, as the sequencers may not be operable.
- B. To ensure fuel is conserved for continued extended operation of the OC Diesel Generator
- ✓C. To protect the engine from damage due to loss of cooling
- D. To ensure MCCs 104 and 114 are de-energized to keep PORVs from failing open

A is incorrect, Diesel loading is not a concern in this condition.

B is incorrect, enough fuel is available for the all diesels to operate within the bounds of this procedure.

C is correct per AOP-9A Unit 1 Bases, rev.8 page 2 of 11.

D is incorrect, but is the basis for opening the Load Center breakers for the MCCs.

Basis: AOP-9A Control Room evacuation positions

References: NO-1-200 Att. 2 41.5, 41.10

On Unit-2 PAMS, what does a single "?" next to a CET temperature indication signify?

- ✓A. The indication is outside the quality check parameters.
- B. The CET is the highest reading CET in it's quadrant.
- C. The CET has been "bypassed", and the value is an old, non-updated indication.
- D. The indication is a calculated value, not an actual temperature measurement.

A is correct, per design documents, CCNPP-PAMS-0003-03.

B is incorrect, this would be indicated by ?? in the CET number and 0 for value on the C05 default screen.

C is incorrect, bypassed CET indications are preceded by a 'B' and have a blue background and does not revert to an old indication.

D is incorrect, the calculated value associated with the CET temperature is Tcrep.

Ref. CCNPP-PAMS-0003-03; CFR 41.7

Which phrase describes the relationship of RCS activity to the Process Rad Monitor?
The Process Radiation Monitor:

- ✓A. detects increases in specific isotopes due to fuel failures
- B. detects only increases in RCS activity specifically related to CRUD bursts
- C. measures RCS activity changes associated with Severe Accident Mitigation scenarios
- D. measures dose rates in the Letdown HX room at power due to CRUD bursts or fuel failures.

A is correct per system description #41

B is incorrect, the PRM will detect increases in RCS activity, the specific isotope (I) distinguishes fuel failures from crud burst activity

C is incorrect, letdown would be isolated in a SAM condition.

D is incorrect, the PRM does not measure dose rates.

Basis: Boron Concentration High Alarm

References: 55.41:10 55.43:5 / ARP C07 F-19KA1: 006K5.16KA2: 004000GEN8

Using provided references, given the following Unit-2 information:

Reactor Power:	100%
Tc:	547.7°F and steady
Letdown flow:	30 GPM
Charging flow:	135 GPM
PZR level:	Lowering at 2.5 inches/minute
RCS pressure:	2210 PSIA and slowly lowering
Total CBO flow:	6 GPM

What is the approximate RCS leak rate, in GPM?

- A. 135
- ✓B. 146
- C. 152
- D. 172

B is correct, $2.5 \text{ inches/minute}(18.9 \text{ GPM}) = 47.25 \quad + (135 - 36) = 146.25$
 References: AOP-2A attachment 1. 41.7

Which one of the following conditions would allow you to exit EOP-8?

- A. A plant cooldown has been completed, shutdown cooling flow has been established, and Core/RCS Heat Removal and Pressure/Inventory safety function status checks for EOP-8 are met.
- ✓B. All the safety function acceptance criteria for success paths implemented are being met, a single event diagnosis can be made and intermediate safety function status checks for single event are being met.
- C. The CRS or STA has analyzed plant conditions and has verified that steps in an optimal recovery procedure, or an Operating Procedure, will address the safety functions such that EOP-8 final acceptance criteria for all the safety functions will be met.
- D. In the case of multiple events, one event has been terminated, (such as a when the affected S/G goes dry during an ESDE) and all intermediate safety function status checks for EOP-8 are being satisfied.

A is incorrect, EOP-8 will direct SDC operations, all safety functions must be met for the procedure you are transitioning to, or all EOP-8 criteria are satisfied.

B is correct per EOP-8, V.B. rev.26

C and D are incorrect, conflict with EOP-8 requirements.

Basis: EOP-8 exit conditions

References: EOP-8 Rev. 3 Step F 41.5, 41.10

When restoring forced circulation it is necessary to verify the 4KV bus voltage greater than 4100 volts prior to starting the RCPs.

What is the basis for this requirement?

- ✓A. To prevent the 4KV degraded voltage relays from actuating upon RCP start.
- B. To prevent tripping the oil lift pumps on low voltage when the first RCP is started.
- C. Ensures that the running component cooling pump will operate within its design voltage limits.
- D. Ensures that excessive starting current is not developed which could damage RCP windings.

A is correct per OI-1A Precaution L, rev.26

B is incorrect, lift pumps do not have undervoltage protection, and this is not listed as a concern.

C is incorrect, not part of the design limitations.

D is incorrect, not listed as a basis for the limit.

Basis: RCP RESTART CRITERIA/BASIS FOR ENSURING 4KV VOLTAGE > 3950 VOLTS References: AOP-3F KA1: 02005A6.10KA2: 41.10, 43.2

Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit One has tripped due to a Loss of Offsite Power
- 11 and 14 4KV busses are energized from the EDGs
- Pzr level is 100" and slowly lowering

How does this affect charging pump operation to restore Pzr level?

- A. One charging pump starts automatically, the other charging pumps must be manually started and will stop automatically when Pzr level reaches +13 inches above program.
- B. All 3 charging pumps must be started manually and will receive no signals to stop on Pzr level deviations from program.
- ✓C. All 3 charging pumps must be started manually and the backup pumps will stop automatically when Pzr level reaches +13 inches above program.
- D. One charging pump starts automatically the other charging pumps must be operated manually to control pressurizer level.

A is incorrect, none of the charging pumps will automatically start with the normal and alternate 4 KV bus feeder bkr open.

B is incorrect, backup pumps will stop at +13" from program.

C is correct per Lesson Plan LOI-107-1 and electrical print 61075, sh23

D is incorrect, none of the charging pumps will automatically start with the normal and alternate 4 KV bus feeder bkr open.

References: 41.7

Which of the following is a possible cause when the following alarm has actuated?

--On panel 1C19 **"U-1 4KV Eng SF Motor Overload"**

- A. 152-1204 (11 Condensate Booster Pump breaker) tripped
- B. 152-1114 (U-440-11A high side Feeder) tripped
- ✓C. 152-1104 (11 LPSI Pump breaker) tripped
- D. 152-2107 (21 Containment Spray Pump breaker) tripped

A is incorrect, Condensate Booster pumps are not ESF loads

B is incorrect, this is a service transformer feeder breaker and does not supply an ESF motor

C is correct per 1C18 ARM M-04

D is incorrect, this is a Unit-2 load.

Basis: "U-1 4KV Eng. Sf. Fdr. Bkr Trip" Alarm on 1C19

References: 41.7

During recovery from a LOCA on U-2, you are directed by the U-2 CRS to reset SIAS from the control room using the implemented EOP. Containment pressure is 2.0 psig and PZR pressure is 800 psia. What sequence of actions must occur to complete this action?

- ✓A. Match required handswitches per the EOP attachment, block PZR pressure SIAS, and depress both SIAS channel reset pushbuttons.
- B. Block PZR pressure SIAS and depress either SIAS channel reset pushbutton.
- C. Match required handswitches and depress both SIAS channel reset pushbuttons.
- D. Block the PZR pressure SIAS and depress both SIAS channel reset pushbuttons.

A is correct per EOP-5 and basis

B is incorrect, without matching handswitches, SIAS cannot be reset from the Control Room, also, both reset pushbuttons must be depressed.

C is incorrect, without blocking PZR pressure signals, SIAS will not stay reset.

D is incorrect, without matching handswitches, SIAS cannot be reset from the Control Room.

Basis: Steps for Evolution Requirement for Resetting SIAS

References: 55.41:7,10 55.43: 5KA1: 063K4.03KA2: A4.02

Unit 2 is in Mode 1 at 100% power when a loss of Component Cooling occurs. Which condition from this event alone would require a manual Reactor trip?

- A. Main Generator gas temperature of greater than 48°C for at least 15 minutes.
- ✓B. RCP bleed off temperature of 200°F.
- C. Component Cooling heat exchanger outlet temperature of 175°F.
- D. Letdown is automatically isolated due to high temperature.

A is incorrect, this system is cooled by SRW and 48°C is not a trip criteria for Unit-2.

B is correct per 2C07 A&B ARM

C and D are incorrect, these are not trip criteria in any procedure.

Basis: Loss of CC with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100% Power

References: 41.4, 41.7

Unit 1 is in Mode 5, preparing for a plant heatup.
E01, QUENCH TK TEMP LVL PRESS is in alarm on 1C06.

Given the following Quench Tank parameters:

- 1) Pressure is 12 PSIG
- 2) Temperature is 105°F
- 3) Level is 29 inches

What action is required?

- ✓A. Open WGS CNTMT ISOL valves, WGS-2180, 2181-CVs and open QT VENT, 1-RC-400-CV.
- B. Place PORV handswitches, 1-HS-1402 and 1-1404 in "OVERRIDE"
- C. Open Quench Tank Drain, 1-RC-401-CV
- D. Open Containment Nitrogen Supply Valve, 0-N₂-238.

A is correct per OI-1B and 1C06 ARM, E-01

B is incorrect, in Mode 5, no PORV leakage would go to the QT

C is incorrect, level is normal

D is incorrect, this would pressurize the QT even more.

Basis: Data on Quench Tank References: 55.41:10 55.43 / OI-1BKA1:
005K5.08KA2: 007000K1.03

Unit-1 was initially at 100% power when a major plant transient occurred. The following conditions exist:

The 500 KV Red Bus was lost (P-13000-2 is de-energized)

RCS pressure is 1600 PSIA

Tc is 532.4°F

Containment pressure is 2.2 PSIG

No other malfunctions occurred.

How many Component Cooling Pumps would be running, assuming no operator actions?

A. 0

B. 1

✓C. 2

D. 3

A is incorrect, but would be true if only a loss of offsite power existed

B is incorrect, but reflects normal conditions with no SIAS condition present

C is correct, the SIAS will start 11 and 12 CC pumps, 1B diesel will pick up 14 4KV bus. LD-58A and 61080 sh 15

D is incorrect, 13 CC pump would only start if the pump aligned to the same electrical bus failed to start.

References: 41.7

RCS pressure is initially 2250 PSIG.

Spray Valve Controller, 1-HIC-100 fails to a 0% output.

What is a direct result of this failure?

A. All Backup Heaters will energize if in "Auto".

B. Spray Valves 1-RC-100E and F will fully open.

C. All Backup heaters will deenergize.

✓D. Proportional heaters will receive full power

A is incorrect, Backup heater operation is controlled by PIC-100X or Y

B is incorrect, spray valves will be fully open at 100% output

C is incorrect, Backup heater operation is controlled by PIC-100X or Y

D is correct per SD-64D, and FSAR fig. 7-13

References: 41.7

Unit-2 is at 16% power, with the Turbine Generator having just been paralleled with the grid.

A malfunction in RPS channel B causes the Power Trip Test Interlock (PTTI) to actuate.

How is the Turbine Generator affected?

- A. A turbine trip will result due to ESFAS B logic cabinet initiating a turbine trip signal.
- ✓B. Trip logic will be reduced to 1 out of 3, since channel B Loss of Load trip unit will actuate.
- C. The Turbine Generator will not be affected since the Loss of Load Trip is disabled.
- D. RPS will initiate a Turbine Trip signal, but the signal is bypassed at ESFAS due to low reactor power.

A is incorrect, only one input is satisfied, so no trip signal is generated.

B is correct, power is greater than 15%, so loss of load is enabled, and PTTI will trip channel B loss of load trip unit. FSAR chapter 7 and lesson plan LOI-058-1

C is incorrect, Loss of Load is enabled at 15% or greater.

D is incorrect, RPS is in 1/3 logic, ESFAS signal to trip the turbine is not affected by power level.

references: 41.7

Using provided references:

If 1Y03 were de-energized, which RPS matrix power supply lights at 1C15 would be extinguished?

- A. 5 and 15
- B. 5,9 and 7
- ✓C. 8,12 and 15
- D. 9 and 10

C is correct per FSAR figure 7-2

All distractors are other power supplies but not affected by loss of 1Y03

References: 41.10, 43.2

A S/G tube rupture has been diagnosed, the correct EOP has been implemented and the following conditions exist:

RCS pressure is 1280 PSIA
RCS temperature is 485°F
PZR level is 85"
11A and 12B RCPs are running
Cooldown rate is 95°F/hr, using TBVs
The affected S/G has been isolated and pressure is 700 PSIG

What action is required?

- A. Secure the remaining RCPs to prevent exceeding pump curve limits.
- B. Throttle HPSI flow to allow for backflow from the affected S/G as RCS depressurization continues.
- ✓C. Lower TBV controller output to avoid exceeding cooldown rate limits when HPSI injection begins.
- D. Increase RCS depressurization using Main Spray to lower the leak rate into the affected S/G.

A is incorrect, at 485°F, pumps can be run to 850 PSIA.

B is incorrect, HPSI throttling is not permitted below 101" PZR level.

C is correct, HPSI injection will start at about 1270 PSIA and will increase RCS cooldown rate as Cooler RWT water is injected.

D is incorrect, although depressurization is a main goal of the procedure, with these conditions, the RCS cooldown rate would be exceeded if injection occurs before steaming rate is reduced. Also, with 2 RCPs running Main Spray is not effective, EOP-6 directs the use of Aux. spray if depressurization is desired.

References: EOP-6, 41.5

Part of the 2003 modification to the LOCI sequencer advanced the start of the Service Water pumps from step 4 to step 0.

Why was this modification made?

- A. Prevents overloading the Emergency Diesel Generators
- B. Prevents tripping the supply breakers for the safety related 4 KV buses
- C. Prevents damage to the Service Water Pump motors caused by excessively high starting currents
- ✓D. Prevents a rupture of the Service Water system caused by water hammer in the Containment Air Coolers

D is correct per ES199700364 and lesson plan LOR-344-1-03.

Distractors are reasons for previous changes to sequencers or for other modifications to equipment.

References: 41.2-41.9

2A Diesel Generator is being taken out of service for routine maintenance.

Which component is also potentially affected? **ASSUME NORMAL SYSTEM LINEUPS**

- ✓A. 21 Containment Spray Pump
- B. 22 Charging Pump
- C. 12 SFP Cooling Pump
- D. 23 Saltwater Pump

A is correct, powered from 2A EDG fed 21 4KV bus, per OI-27C

B is incorrect, powered from 24 480 volt bus, fed by 2B EDG

C is incorrect, powered from 24 480 volt bus, fed by 2B EDG

D is incorrect, powered from 24 4KV bus, fed by 2B EDG

References: 41.7

A LOCA has occurred, SIAS initiated and RWT level is 7 feet and lowering.

What actions are directed by the applicable EOP to prevent or mitigate cavitation of the Containment Spray Pumps?

- A. Align a HPSI pump to the suction of a CS PP if discharge pressure lowers and amps fluctuate.
- ✓B. Verify Containment Sump level rises as RWT level lowers and, after RAS has initiated, place a second CC HX in service.
- C. Prior to RAS, place both CS PPs in PULL TO LOCK. Verify sump level is greater than 28". When RAS actuates, place a second CC HX in service.
- D. When RWT level lowers to 4 feet, throttle CS PP discharge valves per EOP attachments. After RAS has initiated, verify flow less than 1300 GPM.

A is incorrect, but aligning a CS PP to the suction of a HPSI PP is directed in the EOP if a HPSI is cavitating.

B is correct per EOP 5, Rev.19 Section IV, steps P and S.

C is incorrect, but there is direction to verify the sump has at least 28" of water in it.

D is incorrect, but the procedure directs CS PPs to be placed in PTL if RWT level is 4 feet and CSAS has not initiated. It also directs throttling HPSI valves per an attachment.

References: EOP-5, 41.5, 43.5

With reactor power at 25%, what indication is available to the operator to monitor a S/G tube leak of 5 GPD?

- A. Only S/G sample results reported by Chemistry
- B. N-16 monitors and Condenser Off Gas RMS
- ✓C. Condenser Off Gas RMS and Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors
- D. N-16 monitors only

A is incorrect, newer instrumentation has allowed CCNPP to detect S/G tube leakage on the order of a few GPD.

B is incorrect, the N-16 indication is only accurate above 50% power, note in OI-35 states that below 50%, N-16 may indicate 0.00 GPD leak rate.

C is correct, the condenser off gas RMS has a reactor power input that is used in calculating the leakrate. The main steam line RMS will indicate a difference in the affected steam header vs. non-affected header, since it indicates actual steam line radiation levels. The Recorder would also be used to show trends.

D is incorrect, the N-16 indication is only accurate above 50% power, note in OI-35 states that below 50%, N-16 may indicate 0.00 GPD leak rate.

References: 41.5

The following conditions exist on Unit 2:

Reactor/Turbine trip has just occurred
(Power prior to trip--100%)
S/G pressures are currently 850 psig

What operator action (in the Control Room) must initially be taken to prevent an overcooling of the RCS per EOP-0?

- A. Press "Close Valves" button on the turbine control panel.
- ✓B. Press "Reset" button on the MSR control panel.
- C. Shut the MSIVs.
- D. Press the BFV "reset" buttons.

B is correct per EOP-0, Unit-2 basis.

Distractors are actions which are not directed by the procedures

Basis: Reactor Trip With Unit 2 at 800 MWE and MSRs in Service References: 41.7

Unit 1 is operating at 50% power.

An electrical system malfunction occurs resulting in the loss of 12 and 13 Condensate Pumps.

What is the effect of this transient, and what action must be taken?

- A. Reduced feed flow to the S/Gs and lowering levels will result. Bias feed pumps as required to maintain S/G levels.
- B. Lower SGFP suction pressure will exist. Verify a Condensate Booster Pump automatically starts.
- C. Reduced feed flow to the S/Gs and lowering levels will result. Trip the reactor and implement EOP-0.
- ✓D. Low suction pressure to the SGFPs and runout of the operating Condensate Pump will result. Reduce power to maintain condensate header flow less than 8,000 GPM.

A is incorrect, biasing feed pumps will cause additional loss of NPSH to the SGFPs.

B is incorrect, Per AOPs-3G and 7I, a main concern is runout of the condensate pump and increased wear and cavitation, so power must be reduced.

C is incorrect, a trip should only be required if greater than 70% per AOP-7I.

D is correct. This guidance is available in both AOP-7I and AOP-3G

References: 55.41:4 55.43.5 /

Unit-1 is at 100% power. Both feedwater flow transmitter signals from 12 S/G to DFWCS fail low (out of range).

How is 12 FRV, 1-FW-1121-CV, affected?

- A. The last good feed flow input is used and 12 FRV control is shifted to the Backup CPU.
- B. Both CPUs fail and 12 FRV controller is shifted to "MANUAL".
- C. An "11/12 S/G FW CONTR XFER INHIBIT" alarm is received, a shift from high power to low power control mode will not occur and 12 FRV will be controlled by the Backup CPU.
- ✓D. Steam flow/feed flow error signal is not used and the Main CPU operates the FRV in single element control.

A is incorrect, with both signals out of range, a deviation alarm is sent, and the main CPU continues to operate the system in single element control.

B is incorrect, main continues to operate in Auto.

C is incorrect, the system would not shift to High Power Mode if in low power mode, but low power mode is unaffected.

D is correct, single element control is used with the loss of both steam flow channels or both feed flow channels.

See LOR LP 301-1-98, or ES-199602497

Basis: Failure of a Feed Flow input signal offscale LOW

References: OI-12A 41.7

Unit-2 was initially at 100% power when a major plant transient occurred. The following conditions exist:

RCS pressure is 1800 PSIA

Containment pressure is 0.4 PSIG

21 S/G pressure is 865 PSIG

22 S/G pressure is 680 PSIG

Which list correctly identifies Main Feedwater/Condensate system automatic actions?

- A. Both SGFPs trip, all Condensate Pumps trip, both Heater Drain Pumps trip, only 22 Main Feed MOV and 22 MSIVs shut.
- ✓B. Both SGFPs trip, all Condensate Booster Pumps trip, both Heater Drain Pumps trip, both Main feed MOVs shut and both MSIVs shut.
- C. Both SGFPs trip, all Condensate Booster Pumps trip, both Heater Drain Pumps trip, only 22 Main Feed MOV and 22 MSIV shut.
- D. Both SGFPs trip, all Condensate Pumps trip, all Condensate Booster Pumps trip, both Heater Drain Pumps trip, both Main Feed MOVs shut and both MSIVs shut.

A is incorrect, Condensate Pumps do not receive SGIS

B is correct per 2C03 ARM and 2-LD58A.

C is incorrect, both MSIVs and MOVs shut.

D is incorrect, Condensate Pumps do not receive SGIS.

References: 41.5, 43.5

What is the basis for the AFW flow controller automatic setpoints of 150 GPM?

- A. S/G levels will be restored to EOP-1 limits within 10 minutes of AFAS actuation with MFW isolated, and AFW suction piping flow limits are not exceeded.
- B. EDG ratings are not exceeded on SIAS with a Loss of Offsite Power, and S/G inventory is adequate for worst case decay heat with 2 trains of AFW operating.
- ✓C. AFW flow will be adequate with one AFW train to remove highest decay heat, but low enough to prevent initiating SIAS due to RCS overcooling with 2 trains operating.
- D. AFW flow will be adequate to maintain S/G level in the unaffected S/G in the event of AFAS Block to the affected S/G with no operator action, yet low enough to prevent RCS cooldown to less than 525°F with one train operating.

A is incorrect, the suction header flow limit is 600 GPM , there is no requirement to meet EOP-1 conditons in 10 minutes.

B is incorrect, no EDG limit exists and 1 train of AFW is adequate.

C is correct.per SD-36A/B

D is incorrect, these criteria are not specified anywhere.

References: 41.5

A Loss of Offsite Power exists with Unit-1 previously at 100% power and Unit-2 in Mode 5. Unit-2 has been unable to restore Shutdown Cooling and is using 13 AFW Pump to restore S/G levels.

Unit-1 is using 11 AFW Pump to feed 11 and 12 S/Gs at 150 GPM per S/G.

What is the flow limit for 13 AFW pump to supply Unit-2?

- A. 275 GPM
- ✓B. 300 GPM
- C. 600 GPM
- D. 900 GPM

Per OI-32A, Rev.19, Unit-1 6.3.C.1, total AFW flow should be less than 600 GPM when feeding both units from a single AFW System.

$600 - 300 = 300$, so B is correct..

A is incorrect, but represents the Motor limit of 575 GPM, minus the 300 GPM to Unit-1 carried by the steam pump.

C is the total flow limit for one system.

D is the 1200 two system limit minus, 300 GPM used on Unit-1

Basis: AFW flow limitsReferences: 10CFR55.41: 7 - SD-34 - OI-32KA1:

02034K6.02KA2: 061000K4.04

Unit-1 is at 100% power when 13B 480 Volt Bus is lost.

What is the major affect to the plant, and what action must be taken?

- A. Boration via the RWT from all operable Charging Pumps causes power to decrease. Place 2 Charging Pumps in Pull-To-Lock and shift suction back to the VCT.
- B. All Circulating Water Pumps lose excitation. Trip the Reactor and implement EOP-0.
- C. Feedwater Heater Level Dump Valves fail open, reactor power increases. Reduce Reactor power, match HLDV handswitches and tie 1Y09 and 1Y10.
- ✓D. 12 and 13 Condensate Pumps' bearing temperatures rise due to loss of lube oil cooling. Tie MCCs 106T and 116T.

A is incorrect, this describes a loss of MCC-104 or 14A 480 Volt Bus.

B is incorrect, this describes a loss of 15 480 Volt Bus.

C is incorrect, this describes a loss of MCC-114 or 11A 480 Volt Bus.

D is correct per AOP-7I.

References: AOP-7I, 41.5, 43.5

The 13 HPSI pump breaker charging spring has failed to charge after securing the pump for an STP. How will this condition be detected in the control room?

- A. 13 HPSI PP BKR L/U IMPR alarm
- ✓B. 13 HPSI PP SIAS BLOCKED AUTO START alarm
- C. U-1 4KV ESF MOTOR OVERLOAD alarm
- D. ACTUATION SIGNAL BLOCKED alarm

A is incorrect. This alarm is caused by any combination other than its disconnect shut with the breaker racked in. Charging spring will not affect it.

B is correct per ARM H-19

C is incorrect, but would actuate if 13 HPSI supply breaker tripped.

D is incorrect, this alarm is caused by vital 4 KV feeders being open with a UV on the bus.

Basis: 13 HPSI Pump Breaker Charging Spring Failed to Charge
References: 55.41:7
55.43 / C09 Alarm Manual
KA1: 07K4.01
KA2: 006000K6.03

1A Diesel Generator is out of service for maintenance when a Loss of Offsite Power occurs.

2B Diesel Generator did not load due to a faulted 4 KV bus.

What affect does this have on the DC electrical distribution system as indicated at 1C24A?

- A. 11 DC bus will be supplied only by 11 battery.
- B. 21 DC bus will be supplied by 21 battery charger.
- C. 12 DC bus will be supplied by 24 battery charger.
- ✓D. 22 DC bus will be supplied by 22 battery charger.

A is incorrect, 11 bus will have power from 23 battery charger

B is incorrect, 21 battery charger is powered from 24A 480 volt bus, which remained deenergized.

C is incorrect, 24 battery charger is powered from 24B 480 volt bus which remained deenergized

D is correct, 22 battery charger is powered from 21B 480 volt bus, carried by 2A Diesel Generator

References: 41.2- 41.9

What type of radiation do the Component Cooling, Service Water and S/G Blowdown Recovery (process rad. monitors) detect?

- A. Alpha
- B. Beta
- ✓C. Gamma
- D. Neutron

C is correct per SD-77.

References: 41.5

During normal operation at 100% power, what is the largest heat load on the Service Water system?

- ☒ A. Main Generator Hydrogen Coolers.
- B. Hydrogen Seal Oil Coolers
- C. Containment Air Coolers
- D. 1B Diesel Generator

A is correct per AOP-7B, loss of SRW.

Basis: Largest Heat Load(s) on Service Water System During A Trip of SW

References: 41.5

After a SIAS actuation, what is the source of Instrument Air supplied to the AFW flow control valves?

- A. Saltwater Air Compressors
- ☒ B. The opposite unit's Plant Air Compressor
- C. Auxiliary Feedwater system air accumulators
- D. Nitrogen backup to Instrument Air

A is incorrect, a manual valve, 1-IA-728 or 2-IA-314 (or 317) must be opened. and header pressure must be less than 85 PSIG

B is correct, the PA/IA cross connect opens at 88 PSIG and will return pressure to normal.

C is incorrect. The accumulators will supply air if the header pressure is less than 85 PSIG

D is incorrect, nitrogen backup requires manual valve operation and lower instrument air header pressure.

References: SD. 41.7

Which of the following is a requirement for a containment entry at power?

- ✓A. Containment airlock door seals must be tested within 7 days after the last entry
- B. Someone must be stationed outside the airlock door while it is open
- C. A containment vent must be performed prior to containment entry
- D. An FME log (MN-1-109 att.5) is required

A is correct per EN-4-105 and NO-1-104

B is incorrect, there is no requirement to have anyone at the containment door while open.

C is incorrect, there is no requirement to vent containment prior to entry.

D is incorrect, MN 1-109 does not require the log. FME concerns are addressed by NO-104 checklists.

References: EN-4-105, NO-1-104 41.5, 43.5

Under which condition can CEAs be WITHDRAWN in the manual sequential mode?
(without using CMI bypass features)

- ✓A. Tavg-Tref deviation alarm.
- B. Group 5 CEAs below the PDIL.
- C. 2 out of 4 TM/LP channel pretrips at RPS.
- D. A misaligned CEA 7.5 inches from its group.

A is correct, per 1C05 ARM, all other conditions result in a CWP

Basis: Withdrawing of CEAs in Manual Sequential Mode References: 55.41:2,6
55.43KA1: 060K4.06KA2: K11.01

The reactor is at steady state conditions and turbine load has been adjusted to maintain Tc on program.

Given the following:

T cold is 538°F

T hot is 556°F

What is reactor power?

A. 18%

B. 34.5%

✓C. 37.5%

D. 40.5%

Tc @0% is 532, @100% is 548, $16/100=6/x$ so, $x=37.5\%$

Or delta T at 0% is 0, delta T at 100% is 48, existing delta T is 18, $18/48=x/100=37.5$

References: 41.5

Which statement satisfies the requirements for minimum operable position indication channels for a CEA?

- A. CEA voltage divider reed switch position indicator channel capable of determining the absolute CEA position within ± 6 inches
and
CEA pulse counting position indicator channel.
- B. CEA voltage divider reed switch position indicator channel capable of determining the absolute CEA position within ± 7.5 inches
or
CEA "Full Out" reed switch position indicator channel only if the CEA is fully withdrawn as verified by actuation of the applicable position indicator.
- ✓C. CEA voltage divider reed switch position indicator channel
and
CEA pulse counting position indicator channel in agreement within 4.5 inches.
- D. CEA voltage divider reed switch position indicator channel capable of determining the absolute CEA position within ± 1.75 inches of absolute position
or
CEA "Full Out" reed switch position indicator channel only if the CEA is fully withdrawn as verified by actuation of the applicable position indicator.

A is incorrect, no requirement exists for the 6" limit.

B is incorrect, 7.5 inches is the T.S. limit for deviation between CEAs within a group, and 2 position indicator channels are required.

C is correct, reflects wording in TNC 15.1.5

D is incorrect, the statement involving 1.75 inches was deleted, and 2 channels are required, not one.

Basis: CEA Position Channels References: 55.41:2,6,10 55.43:2

Which condition would cause **audible** WRNI count rate to rise?

- A. Pulling CEAs to criticality when performing the first reactor startup following a refueling outage
- ✓B. Reinserting a once-burned fuel assembly in a new core location
- C. During RCS drain down to reduced inventory for RCP seal replacement
- D. Withdrawing CEA #1 from a fuel assembly while swapping CEAs

A is incorrect, audio count rate is only available on the refueling cart, which is disconnected before startup.

B is correct, this is a positive reactivity addition, it is normal during refueling

C is incorrect, draining should add no positive activity, and audio count rate may not be available as it is only required during core alterations.

D is incorrect, **all** CEAs are not credited for refueling SDM, also, the CEA is in the center of the core, away from the excore detectors and would have no effect on count rate.

References: 41.7

How are the **sample locations** indicated on the Hydrogen Analyzer recorders on 1(2)C10 selected?

- A. Manually at the recorder
- B. Automatically or manually by the plant computer
- ✓C. Automatically or manually from sample panels in the Aux. Building
- D. Automatically at the recorder

C is correct per SD-38B and Chemistry Procedures

References: 41.7

Refueling operations are in progress and Containment Purge is in operation. While taking logs in the Cable Spreading Room, the CRO notices that channel ZF of CRS is bypassed.

How does this affect Containment Purge?

- A. Containment Purge will be automatically secured if any other channel of CRS actuates.
- B. In the event of a valid CRS signal, one Containment Purge CV will remain open.
- ✓C. Containment Purge must be secured (or fuel movement suspended), per Technical Specification requirements.
- D. The remaining channels of CRS must be verified operable to allow Containment Purge to remain in operation

A is incorrect, with one sensor bypassed, it requires 2 channels to trip.

B is incorrect, bypassing a sensor will not effect how the components reposition on a valid signal.

C is correct. TS 3.3.7 requires all sensors to be operable during fuel movement.

D is incorrect per TS 3.3.7

References: 55.41.7, 55.43.2. **Related to Calvert Cliffs LER involving refueling with one channel of CRS inoperable during 2001 refueling outage**

High Spent Fuel Pool temperature is corrected by what action?

- A. Adjusting spent fuel pool temperature controller setpoint.
- B. Throttling 11A/B SRW heat exchanger Saltwater outlet valves open.
- C. Adjusting SFP CLR OUT THROTTLE valve to obtain a discharge pressure of greater than 120 psig.
- ✓D. Throttling open SFP CLR DISCH HDR stop valve.

A is incorrect, there is no controller for SFP cooling.

B is incorrect, no spent fuel pool cooler is cooled by 11 SRW header.

C is incorrect, but is the method for controlling SFP cooling system flowrate to prevent pump runout.

D is correct per 1C13 ARM and OI-24A

References: 41.7

Performing which evolution poses the highest radiological risk to the operator?

- A. Discharging the contents of 12 RCW Monitor Tank
- ✓B. Filling 21 RCW Degassifier Vacuum Pump reference leg
- C. Filling 11 RCW Ion Exchanger with resin
- D. Recirculating 11RCWMT through a MWS prefilter

A is incorrect, no breach of the system is required, no entry into a contaminated area is required.

B is correct, OI-17C-1 contains cautions for the operator to help avoid a radiogas contamination.

C is incorrect, the areas requiring access to fill the ion exchangers are radioactively clean, and do not handling of contaminated equipment for the most part.

D is incorrect, no breach of the system is required, no entry into a contaminated area is required.

References: 41.5

Control Room Vent RMS, 0-RI-5350 is in alarm.

How is the Control Room HVAC system affected?

- A. Outside air dampers open to purge the Control Room, and the air conditioning unit is shutdown
- ✓B. Control Room ventilation is in recirculation with Post-LOCI filter fans in operation and the kitchen exhaust fan secured.
- C. The Control Room HVAC shifts to winter mode of operation with Post-LOCI filter fans in operation.
- D. Control Room air handling unit is secured. Only outside air dampers open.

A is incorrect, outside flow paths are secured.

B is correct per LP 134 and system description.

C is incorrect, outside air dampers remain open in winter mode.

D is incorrect, outside air dampers remain shut.

Basis: Automatic Action of The Control Room HVAC on High Rad Signal

References: 55.41:4 55.43 / SD 43BKA1: 43BK4.09KA2: 072000K4.03

What condition will start the diesel fire pump?

- A. Fire main header pressure less than 105 PSIG
- B. A smoke detector or temperature detector actuation
- ✓C. Both electric fire pump feeder breakers being open
- D. Preaction solenoid valve or sprinkler alarm check valve actuation

A is an incorrect setpoint, pressure must be less than 85 PSIG

B and D are incorrect, but will cause "FIRE PROT PANEL 1C24B" alarm

C is correct, per 1C17 ARM L-06

References; 41.7

Which category of deficient equipment status should be annotated on the Shift Turnover Information-Sheet to communicate the status of 21 Condensate Pump which has a broken lube oil pump?

- ✓A. (OOS) Out Of Service
- B. (I/F) Inoperable But Functional
- C. (D) Degraded
- D. (O) Inoperable

A is correct, although the pump could be run until bearing temperatures rise, this would not be prudent and AOP-7I directs a power reduction when power is lost to these pumps. NO-1-207 rev. 34 page 13

B is incorrect, this designation is for TS equipment only.

C is incorrect, degraded implies that the equipment can perform it's designed function.

D is incorrect, this designation is for TS equipment only.

Basis: Complete the Shift Turnover Information Sheet References: NO-1-207 41.10

What is the condenser differential temperature (condenser delta T) limit, as stated in the facility license?

- A. The calculated flow weighted hourly average of the temperature rise across both condensers is limited to 12°F
- B. The calculated flow weighted hourly average of the temperature rise across each condenser is limited to 12°F.
- ✓C. The calculated average of the 24 flow weighted hourly readings of both units for a calendar day is limited to 12°F.
- D. The calculated average of the 24 flow weighted hourly readings of each unit for a calendar day is limited to 12°F.

A is incorrect, the limit is not an hourly average.

B is incorrect, the limit is not an hourly average, and is for both units.

C is correct per OI-14A, rev 15, precaution A.

D is incorrect, the limit is for both units, not each unit.

References: 43.1

Given Nuclear Plant Operations Section Standing Order 03-03:

A known Component Cooling system leak is causing a Unit-2 sump frequency of 3.4 hours.

Sump frequency changes to 95 minutes with a corresponding increase in unidentified RCS leak rate.

Which method of informing the GS-NPO is required per administrative procedures?

- A. Voicemail
- B. Alpha-page
- C. Alpha-page and detailed voicemail
- ✓D. Talk directly

A is incorrect, this is only allowed for RCS Leakage condition 1.

B is incorrect, this is for RCS Leakage Condition 2

C is incorrect, this is the method to be used to contact **OTHER** site management.

D is correct, with containment sump frequency less than 4 hours, Condition 3 exists, per the first action, direct communication with GS-NPO and PE-PSE is required.

References: 41.10, 43.5

Which condition requires that the Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation charcoal filters be placed in service?

- A. Spent fuel is being loaded into an ISFSI storage cask.
- B. New fuel is being loaded into the Spent Fuel Pool.
- C. A dummy fuel assembly is being transferred from the Spent Fuel Pool to the Refueling Pool for RFM testing.
- ✓D. Refueling is in progress which does not include a complete core offload.

A is incorrect, fuel loaded into the cask has not been in a critical core within the previous 32 days.

B is incorrect, new fuel has not been irradiated

C is incorrect, the dummy is not recently irradiated fuel as defined in OI-22D (and in A, above).

D is correct, refueling involves the transport of "recently irradiated fuel"--part of a critical core within the last 32 days-- unless in an extended outage.

References: OI-22D, 41.7, 41.8, 41.10, 43.7

Where is the regulating group CEA "All Rods Out" (ARO) position stated?

- ✓A. NEOP-13 (23)
- B. COLR figure 3.1.6
- C. System 55 (CEDS) setpoint manual
- D. OI-42, CEDM System Operation

A is correct. Figure IV.B.1

B is incorrect, not in COLR

C is incorrect, setpoint manual has CEDS setpoints, but not CEA position

D is incorrect, the OI is not updated each RFO to reflect CEA ARO position.

References: 41.10, 43.6

What documents, used by Operations personnel to run the plant, are updated to communicate the core reactivity effect changes due to core age or fuel composition?

- A. USFSAR and NFM Operator Surveillance Procedures (NEOP-301/302)
- B. TRM and Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
- ✓C. COLR and Technical Data Book (NEOPs)
- D. Calvert Cliffs Operating Manual and Technical Specification LCOs

A is incorrect, the UFSAR is not used to operate the plant, and NEOP-301/302 defines the processes which usually do not change from cycle to cycle.

B is incorrect, the TRM and ODCM are not cycle specific.

C is correct, both documents are reviewed and updated for every refueling cycle.

D is incorrect, operations procedures and the LCOs are reviewed for possible impact by refueling, but are not routinely updated due to changes in reactivity effects associated with the core.

References: 41.10, 43.6

The Shift Manager has declared an Alert per ERPIP 3.0
The Operational Support Center is not yet staffed.

A plant operator is required to perform a task in the Auxiliary Building where dose rates are unknown.

What is required prior to the operator being sent to perform the task?

- A. The 2-person rule must be invoked, the operator is not allowed to work alone.
- B. The Shift Manager must approve the action and the selection of personnel to perform the task.
- ✓C. The Shift Radiation Technician must be contacted to assess radiological conditions and preferred access and egress routes.
- D. A pre-evolution brief must be held with the Interim Radiation Protection Director and the CRS in attendance.

A is incorrect. 2-person rule is for a security threat, not an unknown radiation hazard.

B is incorrect. There is no requirement for the SM to provide this oversight, and it is not a task for the SEC.

C is correct per ERPIP-108 and ERPIP-103 6.2.B.2.c

D is incorrect, Security and CRS attendance is not a requirement.

References: 41.10, 41.12 43.4

Which operation always requires an approved Discharge Permit?

- A. Dumping Condensate to the Circulating Water System after system cleanup
- B. Discharging S/G sludge lancing water
- C. Dewatering the Saltwater side of a Component Cooling Heat exchanger
- ✓D. Initiating S/G Blowdown to Circulating Water

A is incorrect, a sample is required, but not a permit

B is incorrect, a sample is required, but not a permit.

C is incorrect, no permits are required.

D is correct, per OI-8A.

References: 4.1.10, 41.12

Which one of the following defines the term "success path" as it applies to EOP-8?

- ✓A. A course of action based on plant conditions used to address a safety function.
- B. A series of actions which, if performed correctly, will allow the CRS to make a single event diagnosis.
- C. A table which directs the operator to a set of actions to assess a safety function.
- D. A form which provides criteria for the STA to use in evaluating safety function status.

Basis: Definition of success pathsReferences: EOP-8 Rev. 3 Basis document page 3KA1: KA2:

11 Saltwater pump tripped due to a motor overload and reactor trip criteria were reached before the system could be recovered. The RO manually tripped the reactor from 100% and all systems responded normally.

Which Control Room panel would have **no** alarms annunciated?

- A. 1C18
- B. 1C13
- ✓C. 1C08
- D. 1C03

A is incorrect, U-1 ESF MOTOR OVERLOAD would be on given 11 SW pump tripped.

B is incorrect, 11 SW HDR PRESS LO at a minimum, would be on.

C is correct, any alarm on this panel indicates something more severe than an uncomplicated trip is happening and some ESFAS actuation is occurring or required.

D is incorrect, lowering S/G levels due to the trip will cause alarms.

References: 41.5, 41.7, 43.5

What operation requires an approved Discharge Permit?

- ☒ A. Initiating S/G Blowdown to Circulating Water
- B. Pumping the Containment Sump
- C. Dewatering the Saltwater side of a Component Cooling Heat exchanger
- D. Placing 12 RCWMT in recirculation

A is correct, per OI-8A

B is incorrect, no permits are required

C is incorrect, no permits are required.

D is incorrect, a permit is required for the release, but not for the reirc.

References: 4.1.10, 41.12

Per the ERPIP, what is the area that should be considered when applying the Severe Weather Conditions criteria for procedure implementation?

- A. CCNPP Protected Area
- B. CEG service territory within the state of Maryland
- ☒ C. CCNPP or any of the 500 KV tie lines rights of way
- D. Within the ten mile radius of CCNPP

B is correct per ERPIP 3.0, rev. 31 Attachment 20

References: 41.10

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References: 41.5, 41.7, 43.5

Friday, February 20, 2004 @ 09:29 AM

Answer Key

Page: 1

Test Name: 2004RO.TST

Test Date: Thursday, February 19, 2004

Question ID		Type	Pts	Answer(s)									
				0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1:	1	SRO-201-0-2-05	005	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	2	VAPOR SPACE ACC	001	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	3	CONTAINMENT COOLING	001	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	4	SRO-201-5-1-06	006	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	5	RCP MALFUNCTIONS	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	6	LOSS OF RCS MAKEUP	001	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	7	CRO-113-5-5-25	025	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	8	PRESSURIZER PCS MALF	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	9	SRO-201-0-3-29	029	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	10	SRO-201-6-1-30	030	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	11	STEAM LINE RUPTURE	001	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	12	LOSS OF FEEDWATER	001	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	13	STATION BLACKOUT	002	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	14	LOSS OF OFFSITE	001	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	15	LOSS OF VITAL AC	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	16	LOSS OF DC POWER	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	17	LOSS OF SRW	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	18	AOP-7D-11	011	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	19	DROPPED CEA	002	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	20	LOSS OF WRNI	001	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	21	FUEL HANDLING ACCIDE	001	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	22	AREA RAD MON	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	23	CRO-202-9A-2-49	049	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	Di	LOR-114-1-03-08	008	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	25	CRO-107-1-3-55	055	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	26	EXCESS RCS LEAKAGE	001	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	27	SRO-201-8-1-18	018	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	28	AOP-3F-06	006	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	29	CRO-107-1-9-01	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	30	CRO-48-3-0-09	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	31	CRO-63-1-3-18	018	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	32	CRO-113-5-5-19	019	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	33	PZR QUENCH TNK	001	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	34	COMPONENT CLG	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	35	LOSS OF PCS	001	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	36	RPS MALF	001	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	37	RPS POWER SUPPLIES	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	38	ESFAS	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	39	CONTAINMENT COOLING	003	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	40	CONTAINMENT SPRAY	001	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	41	CONTAINMENT SPRAY	002	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	42	MN STM RMS	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	43	CRO-102-2-16	016	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	44	CRO-103-2-4-82	082	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	45	MAIN FEED O4	001	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C

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m.w.
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3/3/04

Test Name: 2004RO.TST

Test Date: Thursday, February 19, 2004

Test Date: Thursday, February 19, 2004

					Answer(s)											
Question ID					Type	Pts	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
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1:	47	AFW 04	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	
1:	48	AFW XCONN	001	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	
1:	49	AC DISTRIBUTION	001	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	
1:	50	CRO-7-1-5-134	134	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	
1:	51	EDG SYS	001	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	
1:	52	CRO-122-1-3-07	009	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	
1:	53	CRO-113-2-5-24	024	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	
1:	54	INSTRUMENT AIR04	002	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	
1:	55	CONTAINMENT 04	012	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	
1:	56	CRO-60-1-04	004	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	
1:	57	CRO-5-2-10-06	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	
1:	58	CRO-60-1-45	045	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	
1:	59	NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS	001	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	
1:	60	H2 ANALYZER	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	
1:	61	CONTAINMENT PURGE	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	
1:	62	CRO-113-4-3-08	008	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	
1:	63	LIQUID RADWASTE	002	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	
1:	64	CRO-134-1-5-45	045	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	
1:	65	FIRE SYSTEM04	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	
1:	66	SHIFT TURNOVER04	001	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	
1:	67	CONDITIONS/LIMITS	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	
1:	68	SYSTEM STATUS COMM	001	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	
1:	69	FUEL MOVES	001	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	
1:	70	CEA PROGRAM	001	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	
1:	71	CORE REACTIVITY	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	
1:	72	RADIATION CONTROL04	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	
1:	73	RADIATION RELEASE	001	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	
1:	74	SRO-201-8-1-15	015	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	
1:	75	VERIFY ALARMS	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	

5/3/04
1/3/04

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Test Name: 04SRO.TST

Test Date: Thursday, February 19, 2004

Test Date: Thursday, February 19, 2004					Answer(s)										
Question ID			Type	Pts	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
1:	1	RCP MALFUNCTIONS	002	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	2	LOSS OF RHR	001	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	3	PZR CONTROL MALF SRO	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	4	ATWS SRO	001	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	5	LOSS OF FW SRO	003	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	6	SRO-201-7-1-03	003	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	7	CRO-54-1-1-25	001	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	8	CRO-107-1-3-28	029	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	9	CRO-202-2A-0-04	004	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	Di	LOR-202	025	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	11	AOP-2A-03	003	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	12	SRO-201-8-1-19	019	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	13	COMP CLG SRO	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	14	CONTAINMENT CLG SRO	001	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	15	CRO-54-1-1-11	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	16	CONTAINMENT SRO	003	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	17	PZR LVL CONT SRO	001	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	18	CRO-113-6-4-20	001	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	19	SRO-204-1-0/3-002	002	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
1:	20	NITE/STANDING ORDRS	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	21	CRO-212-1-1-02	003	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	22	SRO RESPONSIBILITIES	001	MC-SR	1	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B
1:	23	RADWORK PERMIT	001	MC-SR	1	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A
1:	24	EMER PRO	001	MC-SR	1	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1:	25	SRO-201-0-3-08	008	MC-SR	1	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C