<u>ES-303</u>

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Operator License Examination Report

Form ES-303-1

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	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OPERATOR LICENSE EXAMINATION REPORT							
APPI	ICA	IT'S NAME K. 6	DOCKET NUMBER 55- XXXX					
I	R	EXAMINATION TYPE (INITIAL OR RETAKE)	FACILITY NAME - BENP					
×	· ·	REACTOR OPERATOR SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR (SRO) INSTANT SRO UPGRADE SRO LIMITED TO FUEL HANDLING	× HOT COLD FACILITY × BWR PWR					

WRITTEN EXAMINATION SUMMARY									
WRITTE	N BY Bin			TOTAL EXAMINATION POINTS 100					
GRADED	BY Bin	. ~	·	TOTAL A	TOTAL APPLICANT POINTS 85				
DATE A	DMINISTERED >	x /xx /x	×	APPLICA	APPLICANT GRADE 8				
OPERATING TEST SUMMARY									
ADMINISTERED BY John DATE ADMINISTERED X/XX/XX									
A. ADMINISTRATIVE TOPICS									
B. CONTROL ROOM SYSTEMS AND FACILITY WALK-THROUGH 5									
C. INTEGRATED PLANT OPERATIONS (SIMULATOR TEST)									
EXAMINER RECOMMENDATIONS									
CHECK BLOCKS PASS			FAIL	WAIVE	SIGNATURE	DATE			
WRITTEN EXAMINATION X					Bal	X/x/xx			
OPERATING TEST			X		John	XXXX			
FINAL RECOMMENDATION			X		Gene				
LICENSE RECOMMENDATION									
	ISSUE LICENSE			SIGNATURE - SECTION CHIEF					
X	✓ DENY LICENSE			Larry Xx/					

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APPL	APPLICANT DOCKET NUMBER: 55- XXXX PAGE 2 OF 7						
Å.	ADMINISTRATIVE TOPICS	EVALUATION (S OR U)	COMMENT PAGE NUMBER				
1	CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS	<u>.</u>	•••				
2.	EQUIPMENT CONTROL	S	•				
·3.	RADIATION CONTROL	5*	P.4				
4.	EMERGENCY PLAN	5*	ρ.4				

B.1 CONTROL ROOM SYSTEMS	SAFETY FUNCTION		JPM GRADE (S OR U)		
			QUESTION GRADE (S OR U)		
SYSTEM/JPM TITLE				SYSTEM GRADE (S OR U)	COMMENT PAGE MUMBER
1. Start and Load EDGfrom CR	.ZII	5	. 5*	5	P.5
2.					
3.					
4.					
5					
6.	5				
7. 4					
B.2 FACILITY WALK-THROUGH					
1. 7					
2.					
3.					

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APPLICANT DOCKET NUMBER: 55- PAGE 3 OF 7									
C: REACTOR OPERATOR INTEGRATED PLANT OPERATIONS (SIMULATOR TEST) GRADING SUMMARY									
COMPETENCIES/	WEIGHT	3.0	- 2.0	/ . 1.0	TOTAL	SCENARIOS C OBSERVED P		CONHENT PAGE NO.	
1. ALARHS/ANNUNCIATORS						1.	2	3	
A. NOTICE/ACKNOWLEDGE	0.30	0,90	0.60	0.30		<u>~</u>			
B. INTERPRET/VERIFY	0.40	1.20	0.80	0.40		<u>~</u>			
C. PRIORITIZE	0.30	6.00	0.60	0.30	(30)				
2. DIAGHOSIS						1	2	3	
A. RECOGNIZE	0.40	1.20	0.80	0.40		_	<u>~</u>		
B. USE OF REFERENCE MATERIAL	0.20	0.60	0.40	0.20		<u>~</u>			
C. DIAGNOSE	0.40	1.20	0.80	0.40	(3:0)		\leq	<u>بر</u>	
3. SYSTEM RESPONSE						1	2	3	•
A. LOCATE/INTERPRET	0.33	1.00	0.67	0.33		<u>~</u>		≤	6
B. SYSTEM OPERATION KNOWLEDGE	0.33	1.00	0.67	0.33			\leq		ف_
C. EFFECT OF ACTIONS	0.33	1.00	<u>(667</u>)	0.33	(1.67)		· <u> </u>	<u>م</u> د	ユ
4. PROCEDURES/TECH SPECS						1	2	3	
A. REFERENCE	0.20	Q.60	0.40	0.20		~		\leq	_
B. EOP ENTRY/IMMEDIATE ACTIONS	0.40	(1.20)	0.80	0.40			\leq		
C. PROCEDURE COMPLIANCE	0.20	0.60	0.40	0.20		<u>_</u>	レ	_	
D. TECH SPEC ENTRY	0.20	0.60	0.40	0.20	(3,D)		\leq	\checkmark	
5. CONTROL BOARD OPERATIONS						1	z	3	
A. LOCATE	0.25	(0.75)	0.50	0.25		$\underline{\checkmark}$	÷	\leq	
B. MANIPULATE	0.25	(T.)	0.50	0.25		\leq	\leq		·
C. RESPONSE	0.25 .	6.75)	0.50	0.25		—	\leq	\leq	
D. MANUAL CONTROL	0. 25	0.75	0.50	0.25	(3.0)	<u> </u>	ビ	\leq	
6. COMMUNICATIONS						1	2	3	
A. PROVIDE INFORMATION	0.33	1.00	0.67	0.33		~		<u> </u>	
B. RECEIVE INFORMATION	0.33	0	0.67	0.33		4	\leq		
C. CARRY OUT INSTRUCTIONS	0.33	(1.00	0.67	0.33	(30)	_	\leq	\leq	

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OPERATING TEST COMMENTS

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lpha/Numeric Reference	Comments
A.3/	QUESTION: Define a Radiation Area.
	CANDIDATE'S RESPONSE: An area where you can get greater than five mrem in one hour.
	EXFECTED RESPONSE: Any area where an individual can receive greater that five mrem in any one hour -OR- greater than 10 mrem in five consecutive days.
	QUESTION: What is meant by a "Low Dose Area"?
	CANDIDATE'S RESPONSE: Not familiar with that term.
	EXFECTED RESPONSE: A Low Dose Area is used on radiation maps to indicate areas used for minimizing radiation exposure.
	This demonstrated a weakness in knowledge of radiation control and aspects of ALARA. This could result in unnecessary radiation exposure.
	KA: 194001 K1.04 - Knowledge of facility ALARA program. (3.3/3.5)
A.4: .:	QUESTION: What actions would be taken if, during implementation of the Emergency Flan, Accountability identified someone as missing?
	CANDIDATE'S RESPONSE: It would be Security's responsibility for finding the person.
	EXPECTED RESPONSE: Search and Rescue (PEP-394) would be implemented.
	Candidate was not familiar with the procedures within the Emergency Flan. Although an RD is not responsible for the implementation of the Emergency Flan, a lack of familiarity could result in a delay or omission of required actions.
	KA: 194001 A1.16 - Ability to take actions called for in the Facility Emergency Plan, including (if required) supporting or acting as the Emergency Coordinator. (3.1/4.4

P 5 . F7

CANDIDATE DOCKET NO. 55->+++

OPERATING TEST COMMENTS								
ALPHA/NUMERIC REFERENCE	COMMENTS							
B.1.1'	QUESTION:	The EDG is operating in "parallel" mode during a periodic load test when an SI signal is received. How will the EDG respond?						
	RESPONSE:	The EDG will continue to run in parallel with the output breaker closed.						
	ANSWER:	The EDG output breaker will open and the EDG will continue to run in the unit mode.						
	к/а:	064000002.16 3.3/3.7						

CANDIDATE DOCKET NO. 55-XXXX

OPERATING TEST COMMENTS

ALPHA/NUMERIC	COMMENTS	
REFERENCE		

During scenario 3-2, event 8, the candidate reported to the SRO that a main turbine bypass valve had opened. After the scenario was over, the candidate was asked why this had happened. He responded to the examiner's question after approximately 5 minutes and stated that he did not know why the valve had opened. The candidate made no attempt to analyze the condition of the simulator (which was still in freeze) to assist him in answering the question. The examiner continued the questioning until the candidate looked up to the annunciator alarm panel and realized that the turbine had tripped. He was then asked, with the conditions of the simulator in mind, what caused the turbine to trip and he again responded that he did not know. The turbine had tripped on reverse power as a result of the candidate's actions to reduce reactor power.

This illustrates a fundamental weakness in the candidate's understanding of system interaction and response.

K/A 245000K3.08 3.7/3.8 K/A 241000K4.01 3.8/3.8 K/A 241000A1.05 3.5/3.6

C. 3.C

During scenario 3-2, event 8 (ATWS) the SRO directed the RO and BOP to commence lowering reactor water level by terminating and preventing all injection into the vessel except for SLC and CRD until power was below 4% or level reached -161" or all SRVs were shut (per the Level/power control procedure - T-117). As a result of these actions reactor power was decreased to the point where it could no longer sustain reactor vessel pressure and pressure actually . began to decrease. The candidate had failed to properly secure the condensate system flow path into the vessel, so when reactor pressure decreased to the shutoff head of the condensate pumps, relatively cold, unborated water began to refill the reactor vessel. This added a large amount of positive reactivity and caused reactor power to increase rapidly, clearing the APRM downscale alarms and repressurizing the vessel.

K/A 295037EK3.03 4.1/4.5; 295037EA2.06 4.0/4.1