

DRP
From: Doug Coe
To: Bruce Boger; Michael Johnson; Mindy Landau; William Dean
Date: 10/17/01 7:35AM
Subject: Sensitivity of risk analysis information - going forward

Note to: Mike Johnson, Bill Dean, Bruce Boger, Mindy Landau,
I've been keeping a list of potential risk-information-security-sensitivity issues over the last couple weeks, as I've thought of them. I'm not aware of what initiatives to address the general issues have yet been undertaken or are planned. However, I feel that my list is ripe enough to offer as one contribution to any such effort to determine how we proceed from here.
Doug Coe

CC: Eugene Cobey; F. Mark Reinhart; Mark Rubin; Mark Satorius; Marvin Sykes; Patrick Baranowsky; Peter-Koltay; Peter Wilson; Richard Barrett; Steven Mays

91-16-16

Possible Implications for the ROP of the Increased Terrorist Threat

drafted by NRR/DIPM/IIPB - 10/15/01

CATEGORY I - Possible issues that apply NRC-wide and must have integrated and coordinated solutions

Possible need for restricting or limiting public access to:

1. Plant-specific risk-informed SDP phase 2 notebooks
2. Regulatory Conferences or other meetings during which plant-specific risk analysis information is discussed
3. Phase 2 and phase 3 SDP analysis packages
4. Inspection reports with summaries of risk-informed SDP results
5. Licensee-controlled PRA information
6. SPAR models and related documentation developed by NRC and its contractors
7. ASP or other event analyses results
8. Plant-specific risk information already existing in the public domain, including ADAMS
9. Other plant-specific PRA information held by NRR, RES, ACRS, OGC, OIG, OPA, and all other applicable Offices within NRC
10. Generic PRA insight information (i.e., non-plant-specific) meeting some "sensitivity" criteria

Possible need for designating plant-specific risk-informed information as SGI or OUO or other formal designation, with attendant NRC internal access controls

Possible need for establishing requirements for licensee controls on plant-specific risk-informed information developed or controlled by licensees

Possible need for establishing NRC threshold criteria and procedures for allowing public access to controlled/sensitive risk analysis information when appropriate

Possible need for establishing NRC threshold criteria and procedures for allowing NRC staff access to controlled/sensitive risk analysis information when appropriate

CATEGORY II - Possible issues that apply to the conduct of the ROP

Possible need for revising how plant-specific performance deficiencies are represented by the ROP in public (e.g., Should public descriptions of licensee performance deficiencies be "watered down" to avoid giving out information that could be used against a licensee by terrorists? Should the Physical Protection cornerstone become entirely "invisible" and if so, how should inspection finding and PI inputs to the Action Matrix be represented so as to avoid revealing those plants that have security performance problems in general?)