(WOG-107, Rev. 0)

TSTF-273, Rev. 2

Industry/TSTF Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler

SFDP Clarifications		·							
Classification: 1) Corre	ct Spec	ifications					_		_
NUREGS Affected: 🔽	1430	Z 1431	Z	1432	¥	1433	N.	1434	
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Description:

Add to LCO 3.0.6 Bases clarification of "appropriate LCO for loss of function" and clarify in the requirements for the SFDP that consideration does not have to be made for a loss of power in determining loss of function.

Justification:

The NUREGs were developed such that the Actions for a single support system inoperability would be addressed by that support system's Actions - without cascading to the supported system; even if both trains of the support system were inoperable resulting from a loss of function. This intent is clarified in the LCO 3.0.6 Bases. Without this clarification, supported systems with a single support system (such as both Containment Spray and ECCS trains supported by the Refueling Water Tank) would be declared inoperable when the support system is inoperable under the provisions of LCO 3.0.6 even though the support system Actions were designed to provide the appropriate response.

Also the NUREGs were developed with the appropriate "loss of function" (i.e., cross-train) check for electrical power inoperabilities contained within the LCO 3.8.1 Actions, without reliance on the SFDP. The NUREG Bases for LCO 3.8.1, Required Actions A.2 and B.2 (last paragraph in each) were added during development to attempt to clarify this issue. However, the actual requirements for the SFDP in Chapter 5.0 are sufficiently ambiguous to have resulted in misinterpretation. Therefore, clarification is added to the requirements for the SFDP, consistent with the intent of the NUREGs.

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NRC Contact:	Tjader, Bob	301-314-1187	trt@nrc.gov
Revision Histo	ry		
OG Revision 0	Revision St	atus: Closed	
Revision	Proposed by: WOG MiniGroup		•
Revision Original I	Description: ssue		
Owners	Group Review Information	l	
Date Orig	inated by OG: 14-Jan-97		
Owners G (No Com	roup Comments nents)		
Owners G	roup Resolution: Approved	Date: 19-Mar-97	•
TSTF R	eview Information		
TSTF Rec	eived Date: 27-Mar-97	Date Distributed for Rev	iew 06-Jan-98
OG Revie	w Completed: 😿 BWOG 😿 WC	og $\overline{\mathbf{v}}$ ceog $\overline{\mathbf{v}}$ bwr	ROG
TSTF Cor	nments:		
	distributed on 4/8/97 mments from 4/24/97: Applicable.	accepts.	

OG Revision 0

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Revision Status: Closed

2/5/98 - make changes to insert. Applicable to all OGs.

TSTF Resolution: Approved Date: 05-Feb-98

NRC Review Information

NRC Received Date: 29-May-98

NRC Comments:

7/16/98 - The proposed additions are not necessary; what "misinterpretations" have resulted from the current wording of LCO 3.0.6 and the SFDP? The SFDP should take into consideration a complete loss of power. The proposed additions to the SFDP do not appear to be incorrect, though they also do not appear to be necessary. Likewise the first paragraph of the LCO 3.0.6 insert appears correct. However, the second paragraph of the LCO 3.0.6 insert is incorrect; it is not true for all circumstances. The following two sentences are not always true: "Where a loss of function is solely due to a single TS support system . . . The appropriate LCO is the LCO for the support system. The ACTIONS for a support systems LCO adequately addresses the inoperabilites of that system. . . " For a loss of function, the above two sentences contradict LCO 3.0.6.

9/24/98 - NRC agrees to reconsider rejection.

11/12/98 - NRC still reviewing. B. Tjader will contact B. Ford on 11/19/98 in afternoon to provide status or approval.

05/23/99 - Superceded to incorporate clarification of loss of function.

12/16/98 - There was discussion of both of the proposed changes of TSTF-273 and the NRC agreed conceptually with both changes. However, the NRC Technical Specifications Branch would like the proposed change regarding single LCO systems not triggering the SFDP to be addressed in the specification addressing the SFDP and in the Bases. The TSTF agreed to provide wording to the SFDP program to incorporate the agreed to concepts based on the initial wording of the SFDP and as agreed to by the TSB and TSTF during the discussion. TSTF will provide a revision to TSTF 273 to the NRC by 2/1/99 which addresses the agreements reached during this meeting.

1/13/99 - Recommendation is revised to modify TSTF-273 to change the SFDP A/C TS to reflect the original "Rev 0" meaning, and to make the Bases consistent with the revised TS.

Final Resolution: Superceded by Revision

TSTF Revision 1	Revision Status: Active	Next Action:
Revision Proposed by: TS	TF	
Revision Description: Added statement to SFDP to system (from TSTF-Weber)	•	ne inoperability of a single TS support
TSTF Review Informa	ition	
TSTF Received Date: 28-	May-99 Date Distributed f	or Review 15-Jun-99
OG Review Completed: $\overline{\mathbf{x}}$	BWOG $\overline{\mathbf{z}}$ WOG $\overline{\mathbf{z}}$ CEOG $\overline{\mathbf{z}}$	BWROG
TSTF Comments:		
(No Comments)		
TSTF Resolution: Approv	ved Date: 15-Jun-99	

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Final Resolution Date: 16-Dec-98

	•	(WOG-107, Rev. 0)	TSTF-273, Rev. 2
TSTF Revision 1	Revision Status:	Active Next A	ction:
NRC Review	Information		
NRC Received D	Date: 23-Jun-99		
NRC Comments:	•		
Received reword	ling suggestion for Insert 1 from NR	KC.	
Final Resolution:	: Superceded by Revision	Final Reso	lution Date: 17-Jul-99
TSTF Revision 2	Revision Status:	Active Next A	ction: NRC
Revision Propose	ed by: NRC		
Revision Descrip Made wording ch	ntion: nanges to Insert 1 per NRC suggestion	on.	
TSTF Review	/ Information		
TSTF Received I	Date: 17-Jul-99 Date I	Distributed for Review 17-Ju	1-99
OG Review Com	pleted: $\overline{\mathbf{y}}$ BWOG $\overline{\mathbf{y}}$ WOG $\overline{\mathbf{y}}$	CEOG 😨 BWROG	
TSTF Comments		WOG-ED-23 revis	ed this Traveler. Th
(No Comments)	•	affected pages are	
TSTF Resolution	: Approved Date: 17-Jul-99		
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This loss of safety function does not require the assumption of additional single failures or loss of offsite power. Since operation is being restricted in accordance with the ACTIONS of the support system, any resulting temporary loss of redundancy or single failure protection is taken into account. Similarly, the ACTIONS for inoperable offsite circuit(s) and inoperable diesel generator(s) provide the necessary restriction for cross train inoperabilities. This explicit cross train verification for inoperable AC electrical power sources also acknowledges that supported system(s) are not declared inoperable solely as a result of inoperability of a normal or emergency electrical power source (refer to the definition of OPERABILITY).

When a loss of safety function is determined to exist, and the SFDP requires entry into the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists, consideration must be given to the specific type of function affected. Where a loss of function is solely due to a single Technical Specification support system (e.g., loss of automatic start due to inoperable instrumentation, or loss of pump suction source due to low tank level) the appropriate LCO is the LCO for the support system. The ACTIONS for a support system LCO adequately addresses the inoperabilities of that system without reliance on entering its supported system LCO. When the loss of function is the result of multiple support systems, the appropriate LCO is the LCO for the supported system.

Insert 2

When a loss of safety function is caused by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions to enter are those of the support system.

LCO Applicability B 3.0 INSERT 1 TSTF-273, Rev 2 BASES LCO 3.0.6 Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety (continued) function exists are required to be entered. LCO 3.0.7 There are certain special tests and operations required to be performed at various times over the life of the unit.

be performed at various times over the life of the unit. These special tests and operations are necessary to demonstrate select unit performance characteristics, to perform special maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions. Test Exception LCOs [3.1.9, 3.1.10, 3.1.11, and 3.4.19] allow specified Technical Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performances of these special tests and operations, which otherwise could not be performed if required to comply with the requirements of these TS. Unless otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the MODE or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect.

The Applicability of a Test Exception LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of the TS. Compliance with Test Exception LCOs is optional. A special operation may be performed either under the provisions of the appropriate Test Exception LCO or under the other applicable TS requirements. If it is desired to perform the special operation under the provisions of the Test Exception LCO, the requirements of the Test Exception LCO shall be followed.

5.5 Programs and Manuals (continued)

TSTF-273 Rev 2

5.5.15 <u>Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)</u>

This program ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions may be identified to be taken as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Condition and Required Actions. This program implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6. The SFDP shall contain the following:

a. Provisions for cross train checks to ensure a loss of the capability to perform the safety function assumed in the accident analysis does not go undetected;

b. Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a loss of function condition exists;

- c. Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support system inoperabilities; and
- d. Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions.

A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

- a. A required system redundant to the system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or
- A required system redundant to the system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or
- c. A required system redundant to the support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered. \clubsuit

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BASES	LCO Applicability B 3.0 TSTF-273	3,f
LCO 3.0.6 (continued)	system are OPERABLE, thereby ensuring safety function is retained. If this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.	
LCO 3.0.7	There are certain special tests and operations required to be performed at various times over the life of the unit. These special tests and operations are necessary to demonstrate select unit performance characteristics, to perform special maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions. Test Exception LCOs [3.1.9, 3.1.10, 3.1.11, and 3.4.19] allow specified Technical Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performances of these special tests and operations, which otherwise could not be performed if required to comply with the requirements of these TS. Unless otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the MODE or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect.	
	The Applicability of a Test Exception LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of the TS. Compliance with Test Exception LCOs is optional. A special operation may be performed either under the provisions of the appropriate Test Exception LCO or under the other applicable TS requirements. If it is desired to perform the special operation under the provisions of the Test Exception LCO, the requirements of the Test Exception LCO shall be followed.	

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5.5 Programs and Manuals (continued)

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5.5.15 <u>Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)</u>

This program ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other appropriate actions may be taken as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Condition and Required Actions. This program implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6. The SFDP shall contain the following:

a. Provisions for cross train checks to ensure a loss of the capability to perform the safety function assumed in the accident analysis does not go undetected;

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- Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a loss of function condition exists;
- c. Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support system inoperabilities; and
- d. Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions.

A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure; a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

- a. A required system redundant to the system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or
- A required system redundant to the system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or
- c. A required system redundant to the support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered. \uparrow

	LCO Applicability B 3.0
BASES	TSTF-273, Rev2
LCO 3.0.6 (continued)	retained. If this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

LCO 3.0.7 Special tests and operations are required at various times over the unit's life to demonstrate performance characteristics, to perform maintenance activities, and to perform special evaluations. Because TS normally preclude these tests and operations, special test exceptions (STEs) allow specified requirements to be changed or suspended under controlled conditions. STEs are included in applicable sections of the Specifications. Unless otherwise specified, all other TS requirements remain unchanged and in effect as applicable. This will ensure that all appropriate requirements of the MODE or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed or suspended to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect.

The Applicability of an STE LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of the TS. Compliance with STE LCOs is optional.

A special test may be performed under either the provisions of the appropriate STE LCO or the other applicable TS requirements. If it is desired to perform the special test under the provisions of the STE LCO, the requirements of the STE LCO shall be followed. This includes the SRs specified in the STE LCO.

Some of the STE LCOs require that one or more of the LCOs for normal operation be met (i.e., meeting the STE LCO requires meeting the specified normal LCOs). The Applicability, ACTIONS, and SRs of the specified normal LCOs, however, are not required to be met in order to meet the STE LCO when it is in effect. This means that, upon failure to meet a specified normal LCO, the associated ACTIONS of the STE LCO apply, in lieu of the ACTIONS of the normal LCO. Exceptions to the above do exist. There are instances when the Applicability of the specified normal LCO must be met, where its ACTIONS must be taken, where certain of its Surveillances must be performed, or where all of

(continued)

		Programs and Manuals 5.5
5.5	Programs and Manuals	TSTF-273, Rev2

- 5.5.14 <u>Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program</u> (continued)
 - c. The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the FSAR.
 - d. Proposed changes that meet the criteria of Specification 5.5.14b above shall be reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to implementation. Changes to the Bases implemented without prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e).

5.5.15 <u>Safety Functions Determination Program (SFDP)</u>

This program ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions may be identified to be taken as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Condition and Required Actions. This program implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6. The SFDP shall contain the following:

- a. Provisions for cross train checks to ensure a loss of the capability to perform the safety function assumed in the accident analysis does not go undetected;
- b. Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a loss of function condition exists;
- c. Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support system inoperabilities; and
- d. Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions.

A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

a. A required system redundant to system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or

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5.5 Programs and Manuals	TSTF- 273, Rev.2

5.5.15 <u>Safety Functions Determination Program</u> (continued)

- b. A required system redundant to system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or
- c. A required system redundant to support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered. \uparrow



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LCO 3.0.6 (continued)	the LCO in which the los required to be entered.	ss of safety function exists are

LCO 3.0.7 There are certain special tests and operations required to be performed at various times over the life of the unit. These special tests and operations are necessary to demonstrate select unit performance characteristics, to perform special maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions. Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.10 allow specified TS requirements to be changed to permit performances of these special tests and operations, which otherwise could not be performed if required to comply with the requirements of these TS. Unless otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the MODE or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect.

> The Applicability of a Special Operations LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of the TS. Compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional. A special operation may be performed either under the provisions of the appropriate Special Operations LCO or under the other applicable TS requirements. If it is desired to perform the special operation under the provisions of the Special Operations LCO, the requirements of the Special Operations LCO shall be followed. When a Special Operations LCO requires another LCO to be met, only the requirements of the LCO statement are required to be met regardless of that LCO's Applicability (i.e., should the requirements of this other LCO not be met, the ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO apply, not the ACTIONS of the other LCO). However, there are instances where the Special Operations LCO ACTIONS may direct the other LCOs' ACTIONS be met. The Surveillances of the other LCO are not required to be met, unless specified in the Special Operations LCO. If conditions exist such that the Applicability of any other LCO is met, all the other LCO's requirements (ACTIONS and SRs) are required to be met concurrent with the requirements of the Special **Operations LCO.**

Programs	and	Manuals
_		5.5

TSTF-273, Rev 2

5.5 Programs and Manuals

5.5.11 <u>Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program</u> (continued)

- c. The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the FSAR.
- d. Proposed changes that meet the criteria of Specification 5.5.11b above shall be reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to implementation. Changes to the Bases implemented without prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e).

5.5.12 <u>Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)</u>

This program ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions may be identified to be taken as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Condition and Required Actions. This program implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6. The SFDP shall contain the following:


- a. Provisions for cross division checks to ensure a loss of the capability to perform the safety function assumed in the accident analysis does not go undetected;
- b. Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a loss of function condition exists;
- c. Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support system inoperabilities; and
- d. Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions.

<u>A loss of safety</u> function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

a. A required system redundant to system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or

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The annotated changes are from WOG-ED-23.



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5.5 Prog	rams and Manuals TSTF-273 Rev 2
5.5.12	<u>Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)</u> (continued)
	b. A required system redundant to system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or
	c. A required system redundant to support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.
	The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

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	LCO Applicability B 3.0
BASES	TSTF-273, Rev Z
LCO 3.0.6 (continued)	Cross division checks to identify a loss of safety function for those support systems that support safety systems are required. The cross division check verifies that the supported systems of the redundant OPERABLE support system are OPERABLE, thereby ensuring safety function is retained.
IN SERT 1	If this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

LCO 3.0.7 There are certain special tests and operations required to be performed at various times over the life of the unit. These special tests and operations are necessary to demonstrate select unit performance characteristics, to perform special maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions. Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.10 allow specified TS requirements to be changed to permit performances of these special tests and operations, which otherwise could not be performed if required to comply with the requirements of these TS. Unless otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the MODE or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect.

> The Applicability of a Special Operations LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of the TS. Compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional. A special operation may be performed either under the provisions of the appropriate Special Operations LCO or under the other applicable TS requirements. If it is desired to perform the special operation under the provisions of the Special Operations LCO, the requirements of the Special Operations LCO shall be followed. When a Special Operations LCO requires another LCO to be met, only the requirements of the LCO statement are required to be met regardless of that LCO's Applicability (i.e., should the requirements of this other LCO not be met, the ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO apply. not the ACTIONS of the other LCO). However, there are instances where the Special Operations LCO ACTIONS may direct the other LCOs' ACTIONS be met. The Surveillances of

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TSTF-273, Rev 2

5.5 Programs and Manuals

5.5.11 <u>Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program</u> (continued)

prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e).

5.5.12 <u>Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)</u>

This program ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions taken. Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions may be identified to be taken as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Condition and Required Actions. This program implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6. The SFDP shall contain the following:

- a. Provisions for cross division checks to ensure a loss of the capability to perform the safety function assumed in the accident analysis does not go undetected;
- b. Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a loss of function condition exists;
- c. Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support system inoperabilities; and
- d. Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions.

<u>A loss of safety</u> function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

- a. A required system redundant to system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or
- b. A required system redundant to system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or

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		Programs and Manuals 5.5
5.5 Programs and Manuals		TSTF-273 Rev.2
5.5.12	<u>Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP)</u> (continued)	
	c. A required system redundant to support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.	
	The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be	

entered.

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