

Ronald B. Clary
Manager, Nuclear Licensing
345-4757



February 6, 2004
RC-04-0032

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555


Dear Sir / Madam:

Subject: VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS)
DOCKET NO. 50/395
OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12
TRANSMITTAL OF EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE

In compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix E(V), South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, acting for itself and as agent for South Carolina Public Service Authority, transmits one controlled copy of EPP-001, Revision 25, Change A, "Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan".

Should you have any questions, please contact Mrs. Donna Railey at (803) 345-4107.

Very truly yours,


Ronald B. Clary

DWR/RBC/dr
Attachment

c: L. A. Reyes (With 2 Attachments)

(Without Attachment)
NRC Resident Inspector
RTS (L-99-0354)
File (810.10-2, RR 6000)
DMS (RC-04-0032)

A045

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

COPY NO. 157

EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE

EPP-001

ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
EMERGENCY PLAN

REVISION 25

SAFETY RELATED

Original signed by R. E. Williamson
DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR

7/14/03
DATE

Original signed by Greg Halnon
APPROVAL AUTHORITY

7/16/03
DATE

RECORD OF CHANGES

CHANGE LETTER	TYPE CHANGE	APPROVAL DATE	CANCELLATION DATE	CHANGE LETTER	TYPE CHANGE	APPROVAL DATE	CANCELLATION DATE
A	P	12/1/03					

INFORMATION USE

Procedure may Be Performed From Memory.
User Retains Accountability For Proper Performance.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

COPY NO. _____

SAP-139
ATTACHMENT II
PAGE 1 OF 3
REVISION 21

PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT FORM - A





i. DATE: <u>8-18-03</u> PROC.# <u>ERP-001</u> REV.# <u>25</u> CHG. <u>A</u> COMM.# <u>—</u>	
TITLE: <u>ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN</u>	
NEW PROCEDURE _____ REVISION _____	SAFETY RELATED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
CHANGE: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PERMANENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RESTRICTED _____ FROM _____ TO _____	QUALITY RELATED _____
NON-SAFETY RELATED _____	
ii. DESCRIPTION: <u>ATTACHMENT II, INITIATING CONDITIONS 202 AND 302, DELETE THE WORD "SUBSEQUENT."</u> <u>THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE SCOPE OF THIS PROCEDURE.</u>	
REASON FOR CHANGE: <u>REMOVE THE LIMITING EFFECT OF THE WORD "SUBSEQUENT" AND TO SATISFY CER-03-2361.</u>	
 Originator - Sign and PRINT Name <u>CM COUNTS</u>	
iii. REQUIRED REVIEWS: Check ALL selections in first 3 columns for SAPs (except for minor changes)	
<input type="checkbox"/> MCHS <input type="checkbox"/> MNPS <input type="checkbox"/> MPO <input type="checkbox"/> GMES <input type="checkbox"/> CHS <input type="checkbox"/> IST <input type="checkbox"/> NOET <input type="checkbox"/> QC <input type="checkbox"/> MDE <input type="checkbox"/> MNT <input type="checkbox"/> MPSE <input type="checkbox"/> GMNPO <input type="checkbox"/> CWPS <input type="checkbox"/> MNTS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NPS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> QR <input type="checkbox"/> MHPS <input type="checkbox"/> MOD&P <input type="checkbox"/> MBFS <input type="checkbox"/> GMNSS <input type="checkbox"/> DE <input type="checkbox"/> MPR <input type="checkbox"/> NTET <input type="checkbox"/> RC <input type="checkbox"/> MMPR <input type="checkbox"/> MOPS <input type="checkbox"/> QA <input type="checkbox"/> GMOE <input type="checkbox"/> FFD <input type="checkbox"/> MQS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPS <input type="checkbox"/> RE <input type="checkbox"/> MMS <input type="checkbox"/> MPLE <input type="checkbox"/> RMS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HPS <input type="checkbox"/> NL&OE <input type="checkbox"/> PSE <input type="checkbox"/> TU	Other Reviews: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <u>SCHWARTZ</u> <input type="checkbox"/> _____ <input type="checkbox"/> _____ <input type="checkbox"/> _____
IV. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR AUTHORIZATION TO PROCESS PROPOSED CHANGES:	
TRAINING REQUIRED? YES _____ NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prior to implementation? YES _____ NO _____	 Discipline Supervisor _____ Date <u>8/18/03</u>
V. TEMPORARY APPROVAL:	
QUALIFIED REVIEWER _____ DATE <u>N/A</u> TELECON BY _____ SHIFT SUPERVISOR _____ DATE _____	QA REVIEW _____ DATE _____ TELECON BY _____ FINAL APPROVAL REQUIRED BY: DATE _____
VI. DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR FINAL REVIEW:	
PSRC REVIEW REQUIRED? YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IF YES, PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION? YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TRAINING COMPLETED? YES _____ NO _____ N/A <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IF NO, Enter CER # _____ P/CAP AFFECTED? YES _____ NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COMMENTS RESOLVED:  <u>10/14/03</u> Discipline Supervisor _____ Date _____	VII. P/CAP ACCEPTABLE? C. YES _____ NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NL&OE _____ Date _____ N. YES _____ NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RESP. MGR <u>9/1/03</u> Date _____ VIII. FINAL QA REVIEW (If Applicable) <u>N/A</u> QA Concurrence _____ Date _____
IX. APPROVAL AUTHORITY:	
Procedure Approval/Concurrence  <u>12/1/03</u> Date _____	X. PSRC REVIEW: CER # _____ (if applicable) A. REVIEWED BY: PSRC Chairman _____ Date _____ COMMENTS: YES _____ NO _____
B. PSRC COMMENTS RESOLVED:	
Responsible Manager _____ Date _____ PSRC Chairman _____ Date _____	_____ Date _____

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ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT I- - Emergency Action Level Cross Reference Guide

ATTACHMENT II - Emergency Action Levels

ATTACHMENT III - Considerations for a Security Emergency

1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

- 1.1 To define the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) that will activate and implement the Emergency Plan and to provide a means of classifying the emergency.
- 1.2 Changes and revisions to this procedure must ensure compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50.54.q, 10CFR50 Appendix B, and SAP-630. A 10CFR50.59 review is not required.

2.0 REFERENCES

- 2.1 Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station FSAR, Appendix 13A, "South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Radiation Emergency Plan".
- 2.2 NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.
- 2.3 10CFR50, Appendix E.
- 2.4 10CFR50.54 (x) and (y), Applicability of License Conditions and Technical Specifications in an Emergency.
- 2.5 EPP-001.1, Notification of Unusual Event.
- 2.6 EPP-001.2, Alert.
- 2.7 EPP-001.3, Site Area Emergency.
- 2.8 EPP-001.4, General Emergency.
- 2.9 SAP-1131, Corrective Action Program.
- 2.10 NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73.
- 2.11 SCP-113, Two Person Rule.
- 2.12 SAP-1110, Emergency Preparedness.

3.0 DEFINITIONS

3.1 Definitions

- 3.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event - Off normal events which could indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
- 3.1.2 Alert - Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
- 3.1.3 Site Area Emergency - Events which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.
- 3.1.4 General Emergency - Events which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity.

3.2 Abbreviations

- 3.2.1 EAL - Emergency Action Level
- 3.2.2 NUE - Notification of Unusual Event
- 3.2.3 IED - Interim Emergency Director
- 3.2.4 ED - Emergency Director
- 3.2.5 EPP - Emergency Plan Procedure
- 3.2.6 EOP - Emergency Operating Procedure
- 3.2.7 TEDE - Total Effective Dose Equivalent
- 3.2.8 CDE - Committed Dose Equivalent

4.0 CONDITIONS AND PREREQUISITES

- 4.1 The Emergency Plan shall be implemented whenever an "Initiating Condition" (as identified in Attachment II) has occurred.

NOTE 4.2

The implementation of any specific Emergency Plan Procedure (except this procedure) does not necessarily implement the Emergency Plan, but may do so at the discretion of the IED/ED. For example: a small chlorine leak would implement the toxic release procedure but not necessitate implementation of the Emergency Plan, whereas a large release with the potential of affecting the level of safety of the plant would implement the toxic release procedure and the Emergency Plan due to the declaration of a NUE.

- 4.2 The "Initiating Condition" and "Detection Method" shall be used to determine the applicable EAL. The Detection Methods are intended to be a guide for the proper classification of an emergency. The judgment of the IED/ED may take precedence in determining if the Initiating Condition has been met or exceeded.
- 4.3 The 3 digit number in parenthesis associated with EALs on Attachment II is the Emergency Information System (EIS) Emergency Type Code.

NOTE 4.4

When the plant is in a security related event, deviation from the guidance in the Emergency Plan Procedures is allowed when the safety of plant personnel and/or plant equipment must be considered. See Attachment III for additional guidance.

- 4.4 The Duty Shift Supervisor must concur with any actions that depart from a license condition or technical specification in an emergency when such actions are immediately needed to protect the public health and safety (Reference 2.4).
- 4.5 Attachment I provides a cross reference for the EAL Classification and should only be used as a guide to locate the "EAL Topic" and the "Initiating Condition" in Attachment II, Emergency Action Levels.

5.0 PROCEDURE

- 5.1 Upon recognition of an abnormal plant or site condition, the observer shall notify the Duty Shift Supervisor of the potential emergency plan condition.

NOTE 5.2

When the TSC is activated, the ED is responsible for determining the appropriate EAL and emergency classification.

- 5.2 The IED/ED shall:

- A. Using Attachment I for guidance, locate the appropriate "EAL Topic" and "Initiating Condition" and turn to the referenced page in Attachment II.
- B. Determine the EAL by comparing the verified plant parameters or conditions to the detection method for each emergency condition.
- C. Declare the appropriate EAL classification. Perform additional actions in accordance with the EOPs and the appropriate EPPs.

Notification of Unusual Event	-	EPP-001.1
Alert	-	EPP-001.2
Site Area Emergency	-	EPP-001.3
General Emergency	-	EPP-001.4

- 5.3 Undeclared or Misclassified Events

- C01→ A. When it is discovered that an event or condition had existed which met the criteria for Emergency Plan activation but no emergency had been declared and the basis for the EAL classification no longer exists, the IED/ED shall ensure that an ENS notification to the NRC and ESSX notification to the State and local governments is made within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared or misclassified event. No "after-the-fact" emergency declaration is necessary.

6.0 RECORDS

- 6.1 There are no records generated by this procedure.

7.0 REVISION SUMMARY

- 7.1 Incorporated Changes A through F.
- 7.2 Revised Attachment I to match Attachment II.
- 7.3 Revised Attachment II to provide clarification to the Detection Methods via format changes, reference to EOPs and/or addition of clarifying remarks.

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CROSS REFERENCE GUIDE

**NOTE: This Attachment is not to be used for EAL Classification.
Refer to Attachment II.**

<u>EAL TOPIC</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
A. Reactor Coolant System Leakage or LOCA	
1. RCS Leakage	1, 2, 3
2. LOCA.....	1, 2, 3
3. Failure of Pressurizer or Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve to Reseat	2
4. Loss of Fission Product Barriers	2
B. Steam Generator Tube Leak or Rupture	4
C. Secondary System	
1. Main Steam Line Break or Secondary System Depressurization.....	5
2. Stuck Open Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve	5
3. Loss of Heat Sink.....	6
4. Turbine or Generator Failure	7
D. Nuclear Fuel	
1. Fuel Damage	8
2. Fuel Handling Accident.....	9
E. Engineered Safety Feature (Failure of Reactor to Trip).....	10
F. Loss of Station Power	
1. Station AC Power.....	11
2. Station DC Power	12
G. Radiological Effluents.....	13,14
H. Fire.....	15
I. Security	16
J. Natural Phenomenon	
1. Earthquake	17
2. Tornado or Wind	18
3. Hurricane	18

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CROSS REFERENCE GUIDE

**NOTE: This Attachment is not to be used for EAL Classification.
Refer to Attachment II.**

<u>EAL TOPIC</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
K. Manmade Phenomenon	
1. Aircraft Crash.....	19
2. Train Derailment	19
3. Missile Impacts or Explosion.....	20
4. Toxic or Flammable Gas.....	21
L. Loss of RHR at Half Pipe	22
M. Loss of Plant Annunciators.....	23
N. Control Room Evacuation	23
O. Emergency Director Discretion.....	24
P. Other	
1. Loss of Communications.....	25
2. Loss of Functions for Cold Shutdown	25
3. Loss of Functions for Hot Shutdown	25

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE OR LOCA (1 of 3)

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (101) RCS LEAKAGE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ANY</u> of the following exceeded (1 <u>OR</u> 2 <u>OR</u> 3):</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. Unidentified Leakage greater than 10 gpm.</p> <p>----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>2. Pressure Boundary Leakage greater than 10 gpm.</p> <p>----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>3. Identified Leakage greater than 25 gpm.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (201) REACTOR COOLANT LEAKAGE RATE EXCEEDS 50 GALLONS PER MINUTE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Evaluation of the following to determine leakage rate:</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Note: This excludes SG Tube Leakage. (See Specific Table for SG Tube Leakage)</p> <p>1. Excessive Makeup to the Volume Control Tank.</p> <p>2. IPCS CHG_{NET}.</p> <p>3. STP-114.002, Operational Leak Test.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (301) KNOWN LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT GREATER THAN CHARGING PUMP CAPACITY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ANY</u> of the following indications (1 <u>OR</u> 2 <u>OR</u> 3):</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. Evaluate the following indications to determine if a LOCA condition exists (similar to EOP-1.0):</p> <p>a. Pressurizer low pressure reactor trip. b. Pressurizer low pressure safety injection. c. Reactor Building pressure \geq 1.5 psig. d. Abnormal Reactor Building sump level. e. RBCU Drain Flow High. f. Abnormal radiation levels on RM-A2 or RM-G7, or RM-G18.</p> <p>----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>2. Stuck Open and Unisolable Pressurizer PORV or Safety Valve Leading to Pressurizer Relief Tank Rupture.</p> <p>----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>3. Initiating Bleed and Feed per EOP-15.0. (Refer to Initiating Condition 411 for possible escalation.)</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (401) SMALL OR LARGE LOSS OF COOLING ACCIDENT WITH FAILURE OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM TO PERFORM, LEADING TO SEVERE CORE DEGRADATION OR MELT.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Failure of <u>BOTH</u> of the following after depressurizing the RCS to < 140 psig per EOP-14.0.</p> <p>Failure of (1 <u>AND</u> 2)</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. High Head Injection Flow.</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>2. Low Head Injection Flow.</p>

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE OR LOCA (2 of 3)

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (102) FAILURE OF A PRESSURIZER OR STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY OR RELIEF VALVE TO RESEAT (EXCEEDING NORMAL WEEPAGE)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> Pressurizer or Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve opens and then fails to reseat as indicated by:</p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:</u></p> <hr/> <p>1. Valid open indication on <u>ANY</u> of the following: <u>EITHER</u> (a <u>OR</u> b <u>OR</u> c)</p> <p>a) Unisolable Pressurizer Relief Valve</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>b) Pressurizer Safety Valve</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>c) Valid Acoustical Monitor Indication</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <hr/> <p>2. Visual or audible indication at vent stacks of open Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve.</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <hr/> <p>3. Excess feedwater flow to and steam flow from the affected Steam Generator.</p>			<p>INITIATING CONDITION (402) SMALL LOSS OF COOLING ACCIDENT WITH INITIALLY SUCCESSFUL EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM, FOLLOWED BY SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REACTOR BUILDING HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS THAT COULD LEAD TO CORE MELT</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> <u>ALL</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2 <u>AND</u> 3):</p> <hr/> <p>1. Loss of primary or secondary coolant in progress.</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <hr/> <p>2. Failure to establish <u>EITHER</u> of the following after depressurizing the RCS to < 140 psig per EOP-14.0.</p> <p>a) High Head Injection Flow</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>b) Low Head Injection Flow</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <hr/> <p>3. RB Spray <u>AND</u> RBCU Cooling fails to function.</p>

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE OR LOCA (3 of 3)

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
			<p>INITIATING CONDITION (403) LOSS OF TWO OF THREE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS WITH POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE THIRD BARRIER (e.g., LOSS OF FUEL INTEGRITY AND PRIMARY COOLANT BOUNDARY AND HIGH POTENTIAL FOR RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE FROM CONTAINMENT)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:</u></p> <p>-----OR-----</p> <p>1. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ AND LOCA in progress AND Reactor Building pressure ≥ 30 psig for at least 2 minutes.</p> <p>-----OR-----</p> <p>2. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ AND breach of containment integrity and <u>EITHER</u> a OR b:</p> <p>a. RCS leakage greater than Technical Specification allowable.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>b. RCS pressure ≥ 2335 psig.</p> <p>-----OR-----</p> <p>3. LOCA AND breach of containment integrity and <u>EITHER</u> a OR b:</p> <p>a. Dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 1 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$ in primary coolant.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>b. Core Exit temperature $\geq 700^\circ \text{F}$.</p>

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

MAIN STEAM LINE BREAKS OR SECONDARY DEPRESSURIZATION

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (104) RAPID SECONDARY SYSTEM DEPRESSURIZATION</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> Rapid decrease in S/G pressure resulting in: <u>ALL</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1 Safety Injection Actuation</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>2. <u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b:</p> <p>a. Steamline pressure < 675 psig</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>b. Steamline differential pressure greater than 97 psid.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (204) MAJOR STEAM LINE BREAK (e.g., GREATER THAN 6 INCHES EQUIVALENT DIAMETER) WITH A SIGNIFICANT PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>BOTH</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. The EOP Network has determined a faulted Steam Generator exists.</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>2. Primary to Secondary Leakage exceeds 10 gpm as determined by <u>ANY</u> of the following:</p> <p>a. Pre-event analysis, b. RM-G19 A, B, or C, c. RM-A9, d. RM-L3, RM-L7, or RM-L10, or e. SG Sample Analysis.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (303) MAJOR STEAM LINE BREAK WITH GREATER THAN 50 GALLONS PER MINUTE PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAKAGE <u>AND</u> INDICATION OF FUEL DAMAGE.</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ALL</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2 <u>AND</u> 3):</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. The EOP Network has determined a faulted Steam Generator exists.</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>2. Primary to Secondary Leakage Exceeds 50 gpm as determined by <u>ANY</u> of the following:</p> <p>a. Pre-event analysis, b. RM-G19 A, B, or C, c. RM-A9, d. RM-L3, RM-L7, or RM-L10, or e. SG Sample Analysis.</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p>	
<p>NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT</p> <p>FOR STUCK OPEN STEAM GENERATOR SAFETIES OR RELIEF VALVES SEE INITIATING CONDITION 102.</p>		<p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>3. There is failed fuel indicated as determined by <u>BOTH</u> of the following:</p> <p>a. RM-L1 High Range Valid Alarm. b. RCS dose equivalent I-131 ≥ 300 $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

LOSS OF HEAT SINK

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE/AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
		<p>SEE INITIATING CONDITION 301 (REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOCA)</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (411) TRANSIENT INITIATED BY LOSS OF FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS (PRINCIPLE HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM) FOLLOWED BY FAILURE OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM FOR EXTENDED PERIOD. CORE MELTING POSSIBLE IN SEVERAL HOURS</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ALL</u> of the following exists (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. Inability to Establish Bleed and Feed Cooling when required per EOP-15.0.</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>2. Core Exit Temperatures \geq 700°F.</p>

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

TURBINE OR GENERATOR FAILURE

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE/AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (105) OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY</p> <p>(TURBINE-GENERATOR ROTATING COMPONENT FAILURE CAUSING RAPID PLANT SHUTDOWN)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 AND 2):</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. Turbine Trip,</p> <p>-----</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AND</p> <p>-----</p> <p>2. Observation of Failure of <u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b:</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">a. Turbine Rotating Assembly.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><u>OR</u></p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">b. Generator Rotating Assembly.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (292) OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY</p> <p>(TURBINE-GENERATOR FAILURE CAUSING CASING PENETRATION)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>All of the following (1 AND 2):</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. Turbine Trip,</p> <p>-----</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AND</p> <p>-----</p> <p>2. Observation of penetration of the turbine casing.</p>		

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

FUEL

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (106) FUEL DAMAGE INDICATION</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ALL</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <hr/> <p>1. RM-L1 High Range Alarm,</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 30 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (221) POSSIBLE FUEL DAMAGE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ALL</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <hr/> <p>1. RM-L1 High Range Alarm,</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (321) DEGRADED CORE WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF COOLABLE GEOMETRY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ALL</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2 <u>AND</u> 3):</p> <hr/> <p>1. RM-L1 High Range off scale ($>10^9$ cpm) with primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$,</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>2. Core Exit Temperatures $\geq 700^\circ\text{F}$,</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>3. No Indication of forced or natural circulation.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

FUEL HANDLING

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (222) FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT WITH RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY TO REACTOR <u>OR</u> FUEL HANDLING BUILDING</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2:</u></p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. In the Reactor Building:</p> <p>a. Observation of damage to one spent fuel assembly.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. RM-G5, RM-G17A and RM-G17B high alarms.</p> <p>----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>2. In the Fuel Handling Building:</p> <p>a. Observation of damage to one spent fuel assembly.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. RM-A6 high alarm, or RM-G8 high alarm.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (322) MAJOR DAMAGE TO MORE THAN ONE SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY IN REACTOR BUILDING <u>OR</u> FUEL HANDLING BUILDING LEADING TO CLAD RUPTURE (e.g., LARGE OBJECT DAMAGES FUEL OR WATER LOSS BELOW FUEL LEVEL)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2:</u></p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. In the Reactor Building:</p> <p>a. Observation of major damage to more than one spent fuel assembly or water level below the tops of spent fuel assemblies,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. RM-G5, G17A and G17B high alarms.</p> <p>----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>2. In the Fuel Handling Building:</p> <p>a. Observation of major damage to more than one spent fuel assembly or water level below the tops of spent fuel assemblies,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>AND</u></p> <p>b. RM-A6 or RM-G8 high alarm.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (FAILURE OF REACTOR TO TRIP)

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE/AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (231) FAILURE OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM TO INITIATE AND COMPLETE A TRIP WHICH BRINGS THE REACTOR SUBCRITICAL</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ALL</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. An automatic reactor trip fails when required,</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>2. A manual reactor trip from either MCB handswitch <u>is successful.</u></p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (331) TRANSIENT REQUIRING OPERATION OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS WITH FAILURE TO TRIP (CONTINUED GENERATION, NO FUEL DAMAGE EVIDENT)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Entry into EOP-13.0 from EOP-1.0, Step 1.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (431) TRANSIENT REQUIRING OPERATION OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS WITH FAILURE TO TRIP WHICH RESULTS IN CORE DAMAGE OR ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF CORE COOLING AND MAKEUP SYSTEMS WHICH COULD LEAD TO CORE MELT</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ALL</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. Entry into EOP-13.0 from EOP-1.0, Step 1.</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>2. <u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b:</p> <p>a. RM-L1 alarm, with primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity $\geq 300 \mu\text{Ci/gm}$,</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>OR</u></p> <p>b. Inability to successfully complete "Initiate Emergency Boration of the RCS" when required per EOP-13.0. (With the reactor not tripped.)</p>

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

LOSS OF STATION DC POWER

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (242) LOSS OF ALL ONSITE DC POWER FOR A PERIOD GREATER THAN 5 MINUTES</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ALL</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2 <u>AND</u> 3): (Lost for a period of from 5 to 15 minutes)</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. DC bus undervoltage alarms on all ESF buses.</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>2. 480 V ESF Channel A or B Loss of DC Alarm.</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>3. DG A or B Loss of DC Alarm.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (342) LOSS OF ALL VITAL ONSITE DC POWER FOR MORE THAN 15 MINUTES</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ALL</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2 <u>AND</u> 3): (Lost for a period greater than 15 minutes)</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. DC bus undervoltage alarms on all ESF buses,</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>2. 480V ESF Channel A or B Loss of DC Alarm,</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>3. DG A or B Loss of DC Alarm.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS (1 of 2)

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (108) GASEOUS EFFLUENT INSTANTANEOUS RELEASE RATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS EXCEEDED FOR 1 HOUR (APPENDIX B TABLE II, COLUMN 1 10CFR20)</p> <p>Detection Method: EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3 OR 4:</p> <hr/> <p>1. RM-A3 (Gas) increases $> 1 \times 10^5$ cpm above bkgd in any 1 hour.</p> <p>-----OR-----</p> <p>2. RM-A3 (Iodine) increases $> 8 \times 10^4$ cpm above bkgd in any 1 hour.</p> <p>-----OR-----</p> <p>3. RM-A4 (Gas) exceeds 4 times the high alarm setpoint for more than 1 hour.</p> <p>-----OR-----</p> <p>4. RM-A4 (Iodine) in valid high alarm for more than 1 hour.</p> <p>Classification for gaseous radiological effluents can also be determined using EPP-005.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (261) SUSTAINED HIGH RADIATION LEVELS OR HIGH AIRBORNE CONTAMINATION WHICH INDICATES A SEVERE DEGRADATION IN THE CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (e.g., INCREASE BY A FACTOR OF 1000 IN DIRECT RADIATION READINGS)</p> <p>Detection Method: EITHER 1 OR 2:</p> <hr/> <p>1. Unexpected valid RMG readings as follows:</p> <p>a. RM-G2-4, 8-13, or 16; greater than 2.5 R/hr OR</p> <p>b. RM-G7, 17A, 17B, or 18 greater than 100 R/hr OR</p> <p>c. RM-G1 greater than 1 R/hr.</p> <p>-----OR-----</p> <p>2. Unexpected plant area iodine or particulate airborne concentration greater than 1000 DAC (as per 10CFR20 Appendix B, Table 1).</p> <p>Classification for gaseous radiological effluents can also be determined using EPP-005.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (361) PROJECTED DOSE GREATER THAN 50 MILLIREM TEDE (WHOLE BODY)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>GREATER THAN 250 MILLIREM CDE (THYROID) AT OR BEYOND THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY</p> <p>Detection Method:</p> <hr/> <p>Non-routine release(s) cause an alarm of RM-A3, A4, A13, A14, or RM-G19 (or detection by other means) warrant an offsite dose assessment and the results indicate projections exceeding the above doses at or beyond the exclusion area boundary.</p> <p>Classification for gaseous radiological effluents can also be determined using EPP-005.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (461) EFFLUENT MONITORS DETECT LEVELS CORRESPONDING TO 1 REM TEDE (WHOLE BODY)</p> <p>OR</p> <p>5 REM CDE (THYROID) AT THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY UNDER ACTUAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS</p> <p>Detection Method: ALL of the following (1 AND 2):</p> <hr/> <p>1. Radiation Monitor levels exceed those specified for Site Area Emergency,</p> <p>-----AND-----</p> <p>2. Calculation on Dose Assessment Forms indicates levels exceeding 1 Rem TEDE (whole body) or 5 Rem CDE (thyroid) at the exclusion area boundary using radiation monitor readings and effluent stream flow rates (measured or assumed) for actual meteorological conditions; or using field measurements.</p> <p>Classification for gaseous radiological effluents can also be determined using EPP-005.</p>

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS (2 of 2)

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (109) LIQUID EFFLUENT CONCENTRATIONS, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LIMITS EXCEEDED FOR 15 MINUTES (APPENDIX B TABLE II COLUMN 2 10CFR20)</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ALL</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. <u>ANY</u> of the following liquid effluent monitors in valid High Alarm for longer than 15 minutes: RM-L5 or RM-L7 or RM-L9</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>2. The associated isolation valve(s) fail to close.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (262) RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT RELEASE RATE EXCEEDING 10 TIMES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INSTANTANEOUS LIMITS</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ANY</u> of the following valid radiation monitor readings for longer than 15 minutes (1 <u>OR</u> 2 <u>OR</u> 3 <u>OR</u> 4 <u>OR</u> 5):</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. RM-A3 (Gas) is off scale high. ----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>2. RM-A3 (Iodine) is off scale high. ----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>3. RM-A4 (Gas) exceeds 40 times high alarm setpoint. ----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>4. RM-A4 (Iodine) exceeds 10 times high alarm setpoint. ----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>5. RM-L5, RM-L7, or RM-L9 exceeds 10 times high alarm setpoint <u>and</u> isolation valve(s) fail to close.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (362) DOSE RATES LISTED BELOW ARE PROJECTED BASED ON GAMMA RADIATION MONITOR (RMG) READINGS AND/OR OTHER PLANT PARAMETERS OR ARE MEASURED AT THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>EITHER</u> 1 <u>OR</u> 2 <u>OR</u> 3:</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. Reactor Building leak rate results in calculated dose rate at exclusion area boundary greater than <u>EITHER</u> (a <u>OR</u> b):</p> <p>a. 50 mrem/hr whole body for 0.5 hour. ----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>b. 500 mrem/hr whole body for 2 minutes. ----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>2. Radiation Monitoring Teams measure dose rates at one mile or greater from the plant at greater than <u>EITHER</u> (a <u>OR</u> b):</p> <p>a. 50 mrem/hr for 0.5 hour. ----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>b. Greater than 500 mrem/hr for 2 minutes (beta + gamma) ----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>3. Radiation Monitoring Teams measure thyroid dose rates (equivalent I-131 concentrations) at one mile or greater from the plant at greater than <u>EITHER</u> (a <u>OR</u> b):</p> <p>a. 250 mrem/hr (1.3x10⁻⁷ μCi/cc) for 0.5 hour. ----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>b. 2500 mrem/hr (1.3x10⁻⁶ μCi/cc) for 2 minutes.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

FIRE

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE/AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (110) FIRE WITHIN THE PROTECTED AREA OR THE SWITCHYARD LASTING MORE THAN 15 MINUTES</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Observation of Fire lasting more than 15 minutes within:</p> <p>EITHER 1 OR 2:</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. Protected Area</p> <p>-----OR-----</p> <p>2. Switchyard</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (271) FIRE POTENTIALLY AFFECTING SAFETY SYSTEMS</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Observation of a fire that has the potential for rendering one or more safety systems inoperable per the Technical Specifications.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (371) FIRE AFFECTING SAFETY TRAINS OR FUNCTIONS</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Observation of a fire that renders both trains of a safety system or function inoperable per the Technical Specifications.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

SECURITY

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (111) SECURITY THREAT OR ATTEMPTED ENTRY OR ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Report to the Control Room by Security or observer.</p> <p>See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (281) ONGOING SEVERE SECURITY THREAT</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Security safeguards contingency event which results in adversaries commandeering or causing significant damage to a Non-Vital area within the <u>Protected Area</u>.</p> <p>See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (381) SECURITY THREAT INVOLVING IMMINENT LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE PLANT</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Security safeguards contingency event which results in adversaries commandeering or causing significant damage to a <u>Vital Area</u> of the Plant.</p> <p>See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (481) SECURITY THREAT RESULTING IN LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE FACILITY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Physical attack on the Plant has resulted in occupation of:</p> <p><u>EITHER 1 OR 2:</u></p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. Control Room.</p> <p>----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>2. Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>See EPP-001 Attachment III for additional guidance.</p>

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

EARTHQUAKE

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE/AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (112) EARTHQUAKE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>BOTH 1 AND 2:</p> <hr/> <p>1. Seismic Recording System Start Indication.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">- AND -</p> <p>2. Confirmation of a seismic event through observation (felt or heard) in the Control Room.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (291) EARTHQUAKE GREATER THAN THE 2/3 OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE LEVEL</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>BOTH 1 AND 2:</p> <hr/> <p>1. Seismic Event Annunciator 2/3 OBE exceeded (one or more yellow lights lit).</p> <p style="text-align: center;">- AND -</p> <p>2. Confirmation of a seismic event through observation (felt or heard) in the Control Room.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (391) EARTHQUAKE GREATER THAN OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE LEVEL BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>BOTH 1 AND 2:</p> <hr/> <p>1. Observation of the event (felt or heard) lasting >2 seconds.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">- AND -</p> <p>2. <u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b:</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">a. RB Foundation Seismic Switch OBE exceeded.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">OR</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">b. Seismic Event Annunciator OBE exceeded (one or more red lights lit).</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

TORNADO OR WIND

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (112) TORNADO ONSITE</p> <p><u>Detection Method</u> Observation of Tornado in Exclusion Area.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (291) TORNADO STRIKING FACILITY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> Observation of a Tornado within:</p> <p><u>EITHER a OR b:</u> ----- a. Protected Area ----- <u>OR</u> ----- b. Switchyard.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (391) SUSTAINED WINDS IN EXCESS OF 100 MILES PER HOUR ONSITE BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> Sustained winds in excess of <u>100 mph</u> onsite:</p> <p>As measured by <u>EITHER a OR b:</u> ----- a. Onsite meteorological instrumentation ----- <u>OR</u> ----- b. The National Weather Service.</p>	

HURRICANE

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (112) HURRICANE NEAR SITE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> Sustained winds in excess of <u>50 mph</u> onsite due to a hurricane:</p> <p>As measured by <u>EITHER a OR b:</u> a. Onsite meteorological instrumentation ----- <u>OR</u> ----- b. The National Weather Service.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (291) SUSTAINED HURRICANE WINDS GREATER THAN 75 MILES PER HOUR NEAR SITE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> Sustained winds in excess of <u>75 mph</u> onsite due to a hurricane:</p> <p>As measured by <u>EITHER a OR b:</u> a. Onsite meteorological instrumentation ----- <u>OR</u> ----- b. The National Weather Service.</p>	<p>SAME AS TORNADO ABOVE</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

AIRCRAFT CRASH

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (113) ONSITE AIRCRAFT CRASH BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Observation of Aircraft Crash within the Exclusion Area.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (292) AIRCRAFT CRASH ON FACILITY BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAS A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Observation of a Aircraft Crash within:</p> <p><u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b:</p> <p>-----</p> <p>a. Protected Area</p> <p>----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>b. Switchyard.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (392) AIRCRAFT CRASH INTO VITAL STRUCTURES BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Aircraft crash causing damage or fire in <u>ANY</u> of the following areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Reactor Building. b. Control Building c. Auxiliary Building. d. Fuel Handling Building. e. DG Building. f. Intermediate Building. g. SW Building Structures. 	

TRAIN DERAILMENT

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (113) ONSITE TRAIN DERAILMENT WHICH HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Observation of Train Derailment within the Exclusion Area.</p>			

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

MISSILE IMPACTS OR EXPLOSION

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (292) MISSILE IMPACTS ON FACILITY WITH RESULTANT MAJOR DAMAGE BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> Observation of missile impacts on Plant structures or components with major damage.</p>		
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT		
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (113) ONSITE EXPLOSION (EXCLUDING PLANNED ACTIVITIES) BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> Observation of Explosion within the Exclusion Area.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (292) KNOWN EXPLOSION AT FACILITY RESULTING IN MAJOR DAMAGE TO PLANT STRUCTURES OR EQUIPMENT BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAS A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> Observation of major damage by Explosion.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (392) MISSILE OR EXPLOSION IMPACT ON FACILITY RENDERING SEVERE DAMAGE TO SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> Loss of functions needed for hot shutdown (See specific Initiating Condition 394 for this situation).</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GAS

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE/AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (113) NEAR OR ONSITE TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE OF A MAGNITUDE THAT THREATENS PERSONNEL BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> Observation or credible warning of an unplanned release of toxic or flammable gas within the Exclusion Area.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (292) ENTRY INTO FACILITY ENVIRONS OF TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES IN CONCENTRATION WHICH EXCEEDS THE LIMITS OF FLAMMABILITY OR TOXICITY BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAS A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> Observation or credible warning of an unplanned release of toxic or flammable gas within:</p> <p><u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b:</p> <p>-----</p> <p>a. Protected Area</p> <p>----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>b. Switchyard.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (392) ENTRY OF TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES INTO VITAL AREA WHICH INVOLVES A SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION OF PLANT SAFETY BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> Entry of Toxic or Flammable Gas into <u>ANY</u> of the following areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Control Room, b. Cable Spreading Rooms, c. Reactor Building, d. ESF Switchgear Rooms, e. Control Room Evacuation Panel Rooms or f. Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms. 	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

LOSS OF RHR AT HALF PIPE OPERATIONS

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (297) LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL FLOW FOR MORE THAN 20 MINUTES DURING HALF-PIPE OPERATIONS WITH VESSEL HEAD INSTALLED</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ALL</u> of the following (1 THROUGH 4) For a period of 20 to 40 minutes:</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. Both RHR Loop A FLO LO <u>AND</u> RHR Loop B FLO LO annunciators in alarm,</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>2. <u>NEITHER</u> RHR Pump is running,</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>3. Core exit temperature increasing on core exit thermocouples,</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>4. Reactor Vessel Head is in place and RCS loops are drained to 431'-5" or less,</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (397) LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL FLOW FOR MORE THAN 40 MINUTES DURING HALF-PIPE OPERATIONS WITH VESSEL HEAD INSTALLED <u>AND</u> HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION/CHARGING UNAVAILABLE</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ALL</u> of the following (1 THROUGH 5) For a period greater than 40 minutes:</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. Both RHR Loop A FLO LO <u>AND</u> RHR Loop B FLO LO annunciators in alarm,</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>2. <u>NEITHER</u> RHR pump is running,</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>3. Core exit temperature increasing on core exit thermocouples,</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>4. Reactor Vessel Head is in place and RCS loops are drained to 431'-5" or less,</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>5. <u>NEITHER</u> train of Charging/SI is available.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

LOSS OF PLANT ANNUNCIATORS

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE/AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (296) MOST OR ALL ANNUNCIATOR ALARMS LOST</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Greater than 75% of the MCB annunciators inoperable.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (396) MOST OR ALL ANNUNCIATORS LOST AND PLANT TRANSIENT INITIATED OR IN PROGRESS</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ALL</u> of the following (1 AND 2):</p> <p>-----</p> <p>1. Greater than 75% of the MCB Annunciators inoperable,</p> <p>----- AND -----</p> <p>2. Reactor Trip or Safety Injection actuation initiated or in progress.</p>	

CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE/AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (295) EVACUATION OF CONTROL ROOM ANTICIPATED OR REQUIRED WITH CONTROL OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED FROM LOCAL STATIONS</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Same as Initiating Condition.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (395) EVACUATION OF CONTROL ROOM AND CONTROL OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS NOT ESTABLISHED FROM LOCAL STATIONS IN 15 MINUTES</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Same as Initiating Condition.</p>	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

EMERGENCY DIRECTOR DISCRETION

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (293) OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT WARRANT ACTIVATION OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER AND PLACING EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY PERSONNEL ON STANDBY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> As determined by IED/ED.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (393) OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT WARRANT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND RADIATION MONITORING TEAMS AND A PRECAUTIONARY PUBLIC WARNING</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> As determined by IED/ED.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (493) OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT WARRANT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PUBLIC</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u> As determined by IED/ED.</p>

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

OTHER

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE/AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>INITIATING CONDITION (115) UNPLANNED LOSS OF ALL ONSITE OR OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Unplanned loss of <u>EITHER 1 OR 2</u>:</p> <hr/> <p>1. <u>ALL</u> of the following onsite communications capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Internal telephone system; b. Gal-Tronics system and c. Radio System. <p>----- <u>OR</u> -----</p> <p>2. <u>All</u> of the following offsite communications capability (when extraordinary means must be used to make communications):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Internal telephone system, b. Bell Lines, c. Fiberoptic Links and d. Radio System. 	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (294) LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONS NEEDED FOR PLANT COLD SHUTDOWN</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ALL</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):</p> <hr/> <p>1. RHR system not functional in Modes 1 to 4,</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>2. Inability to reject heat to the condenser and atmosphere.</p>	<p>INITIATING CONDITION (394) LOSS OF FUNCTIONS NEEDED FOR PLANT HOT SHUTDOWN</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p><u>ALL</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2 <u>AND</u> 3 <u>AND</u> 4):</p> <hr/> <p>1. Inability to establish charging pump injection,</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>2. Inability to establish Emergency Feedwater Flow,</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>3. RHR System not functional (applicable to Modes, 1, 2, and 3 only),</p> <p>----- <u>AND</u> -----</p> <p>4. Inability to reject heat to the condenser <u>AND</u> atmosphere.</p>	
<p>NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT</p> <p>INITIATING CONDITION (114) INABILITY TO REACH REQUIRED SHUTDOWN WITHIN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS</p> <p><u>Detection Method:</u></p> <p>Same as Initiating Condition.</p>			

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

NOTE

Due to the wide range of possible security emergencies, it is not feasible to develop a strategy for every possible situation. Therefore, this general guidance has been provided to help in determining appropriate response. Scripts of plant page announcements contained in this Attachment are examples only and should be modified based on the nature of the emergency.

The Security Team Leader will notify the Control Room of a security emergency. A security emergency may be classified as an **Intrusion** or a **Site-Specific Credible Threat**. See the following considerations for each of these situations. Lines to the left of the considerations are for place keeping and are optional.

Intrusion:

CAUTION

Avoid moving personnel within the Protected Area without consulting the Security Team Leader as to the safety of the personnel.

- _____ 1. Immediately direct an Operator to install the "Ultra Dogs" on the two card reader doors that lead into the Control Room area.
- _____ 2. Make the following plant announcement:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.
The Station is in a Security Emergency. All personnel should remain in their current location and take cover. Do not move to another location unless advised by the Control Room or Security personnel. (Repeat announcement once.)

- _____ 3. DO NOT sound the Radiation Emergency Alarm.
- _____ 4. Maintain contact between the Control Room and the Security Team Leader. The Control Room may monitor the Security frequency on a hand-held radio.
- _____ 5. Declare the appropriate Emergency Classification when the Initiating Conditions are met.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

6. If the ERO is needed, DO NOT activate pagers using the normal method to summon the entire ERO. After working hours, contact the ERO and instruct only the Duty ERO Team to report to the Primary EOF or Backup EOF. Provide the access route, if appropriate (see page 11). The ERO may be contacted using the Dialogics Communicator or the Call Tree as follows:

a. Dialogics Communicator:

1) Dial the Dialogics Communicator at 58716 or dial toll free 1-(877)-262-5585.

2) The Dialogics Communicator System will answer as follows: **"This is the Remote Activation Module. Please enter your scenario activation password followed by the # sign"**. Enter 1234567 and press the # sign.

3) **"To start a scenario, enter the scenario ID followed by the # sign or press # alone for more options"**. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Primary EOF, enter the scenario ID 100200 followed by the # sign. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Backup EOF, enter the scenario ID 100201 followed by the # sign. The text for the current scenarios is as follows:

Primary EOF, Scenario ID 100200:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Primary Emergency Operations Facility at the Nuclear Training Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand by for further instructions".

Backup EOF, Scenario ID 100201:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility at the Palmetto Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand by for further instructions."

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

- _____ 4) After you enter the scenario ID and press the # sign you will hear, **"You may change the current message. Press 1 to listen to the message. Press 2 to record a new message or Press the # sign to continue"**. Press 1 if no supplemental information, such as access routes to the EOF, is needed. Press 2 if supplemental information needs to be provided.
- _____ 5) If 1 is pressed, listen to the message, then press # to continue. If 2 is pressed, record the new message. Press the # sign when completed.
- _____ 6) **"To start the scenario, press 3. To return to the Main Menu press #"**. Press 3. Press the # sign to exit.

OR

b. Call Tree:

The current Call Tree may be found in:
Public Folders/VCS/Emergency Preparedness.

- _____ 7. The IED retains Emergency Plan duties and responsibilities until it is safe to staff the TSC.
- _____ 8. Evacuate Non-essential personnel when it is safe to do so.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

Site-Specific Credible Threat:

CAUTION

Avoid moving personnel inside or outside the Protected Area without consulting the Security Team Leader as to the safety of the personnel.

- _____ 1. Declare a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE), at a minimum, based on Security Threat, EAL #111. A higher initial classification could be made based on the nature and timing of the threat and potential consequences.
- _____ 2. Implement the Radiation Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures. State and local governments should be notified as required. Do not activate the Early Warning Siren System unless directed by the government agencies, per our procedures.
- _____ 3. TSC/OSC staffing and other personnel decisions are made based on the nature of the threat and the timing of the threat. These decisions are independent of the NOUE activities.

Evacuate plant personnel if the information about the threat indicates that time is available. The ERO Duty Team is directed to report to the EOF or Backup EOF as described below. The EOF or Backup EOF is used as a staging area for TSC and OSC personnel. The IED may contact the EOF or Backup EOF to direct specific TSC and OSC personnel to come to the plant site, as necessary. The TSC and OSC should not be fully manned until the threat is resolved.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

- _____ 4. Make one of the following plant announcements:

TAKE COVER:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.
The Station is in a Security Emergency. All personnel should remain in their current location and take cover. Do not move to another location unless advised by the Control Room or Security personnel.

OR

EVACUATE:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.
The Station is in a Security Emergency. All non-essential and Off-Duty ERO personnel evacuate the site, proceed to your private residence. All On-Duty ERO personnel report to the EOF. (Provide the exit route, if appropriate, see page 11.)

_____ Sound the Radiation Emergency Alarm.

_____ Repeat the Plant Announcement.

- _____ 5. The Duty Emergency Director should evaluate assuming emergency duties from the IED without a staffed and activated TSC. The Duty Emergency Director should only assume emergency duties from the IED if the Duty Emergency Director is located in the TSC.
- _____ 6. Maintain contact between the Control Room and the Security Team Leader. The Control Room may monitor the Security frequency on a hand-held radio.
- _____ 7. Reactor and plant operational decisions should be as directed by Plant Management.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

8. After working hours, contact the ERO and instruct only the Duty ERO Team to report to the Primary EOF or Backup EOF. Provide the access route, if appropriate (see page 11). The ERO may be contacted using the Dialogics Communicator or the Call Tree as follows:

a. Dialogics Communicator:

- 1) Dial the Dialogics Communicator at 58716 or dial toll free 1-(877)-262-5585.
- 2) The Dialogics Communicator System will answer as follows: **"This is the Remote Activation Module. Please enter your scenario activation password followed by the # sign".** Enter 1234567 and press the # sign.
- 3) **"To start a scenario, enter the scenario ID followed by the # sign or press # alone for more options".** To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Primary EOF, enter the scenario ID 100200 followed by the # sign. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Backup EOF, enter the scenario ID 100201 followed by the # sign. The text for the current scenarios is as follows:

Primary EOF, Scenario ID 100200:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Primary Emergency Operations Facility at the Nuclear Training Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand by for further instructions."

Backup EOF, Scenario ID 100201:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-duty and only the On-duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility at the Palmetto Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand by for further instructions."

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

- _____ 4) After you enter the scenario ID and press the # sign you will hear, "You may change the current message. Press 1 to listen to the message. Press 2 to record a new message or Press the # sign to continue". Press 1 if no supplemental information, such as access routes to the EOF, is needed. Press 2 if supplemental information needs to be provided.
- _____ 5) If 1 is pressed, listen to the message, then press # to continue. If 2 is pressed, record the new message. Press the # sign when completed.
- _____ 6) "To start the scenario, press 3. To return to the Main Menu press #". Press 3. Press the # sign to exit.

OR

- b. Call Tree.
The current Call Tree may be found in:
Public Folders/VCS/Emergency Preparedness.

- _____ 9. Notify Security of the intended routes and direct them to ensure gates are open appropriate.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

Site-Specific Credible Insider Threat:

NOTE

Due to the wide range of possible security emergencies, it is not feasible to develop a strategy for every possible situation. Therefore, this general guidance has been provided to help in determining appropriate response. Scripts of plant page announcements contained in this Attachment are examples only and should be modified based on the nature of the emergency.

- _____ 1. Make the following announcement:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.
The Station is in a Security Emergency. All personnel **except** Operations and Security evacuate the Protected Area. Assemble in the parking lot and await further instructions.

- _____ 2. Sound the Radiation Emergency Alarm.
- _____ 3. Repeat the Plant Announcement.
- CO2 → _____ 4. In close coordination with the Security Team Leader implement the actions in SCP-113, Two Person Rule.
- _____ 5. Establish communications with the MDS and Security management.
- _____ 6. Declare the appropriate Emergency Classification when the Initiating Conditions are met.
- _____ 7. If the ERO is needed during normal working hours, Plant Management will assemble teams in the parking lot and provide direction as to facility manning and activation.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

8. If the ERO is needed after working hours, DO NOT activate pagers using the normal method to summon the entire ERO. Contact the ERO and instruct only the Duty ERO Team to report to the Primary EOF or Backup EOF. Provide the access route, if appropriate (see page 11). The ERO may be contacted using the Dialogics Communicator or the Call Tree as follows:

a. Dialogics Communicator:

- 1) Dial the Dialogics Communicator at 58716 or dial toll free 1-877-262-5585.
- 2) The Dialogics Communicator System will answer as follows:
"This is the Remote Activation Module. Please enter your scenario activation password followed by the # sign". Enter 1234567 and press the # sign.
- 3) **"To start a scenario, enter the scenario ID followed by the # sign or press # alone for more options".** To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Primary EOF, enter the scenario ID 100200 followed by the # sign. To start the scenario for sending the Duty ERO Team to the Backup EOF, enter the scenario ID 100201 followed by the # sign. The text for the current scenarios is as follows:

Primary EOF, Scenario ID 100200:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-Duty and only the On-Duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Primary Emergency Operations Facility at the Nuclear Training Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand by for further instructions."

Backup EOF, Scenario ID 100201:

"The V. C. Summer Nuclear Station has received a security threat. The On-Duty and only the On-Duty Emergency Response Team, including the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility staffs, shall report to the Backup Emergency Operations Facility at the Palmetto Center. All other Emergency Response Personnel should stand by for further instructions."

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

- _____
- 4) After you enter the scenario ID and press the # sign you will hear, "You may change the current message. Press 1 to listen to the message. Press 2 to record a new message or Press the # sign to continue." Press 1 if no supplemental information, such as access routes to the EOF, is needed. Press 2 if supplemental information needs to be provided.
- _____
- 5) If 1 is pressed, listen to the message, then press # to continue. If 2 is pressed, record the new message. Press the # sign when completed.
- _____
- 6) "To start the scenario, press 3. To return to the Main Menu press #". Press 3. Press the # sign to exit.

OR

- b. Call Tree:
The current Call Tree may be found in:
Public Folders/VCS/Emergency Preparedness.

- _____ 9. The IED retains Emergency Plan duties and responsibilities until it is safe to staff the TSC.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SECURITY EMERGENCY

Access/Exit Routes:

As dictated by the events, select one of the below Basic Routes and the closest open bridge(s) to access or exit the plant and the EOF. Contact Security to remove barriers and/or unlock gates for Routes 2 and 3.

Three Basic Routes:

- 1. Normal Route via Highway 215.
- 2. Northern Route via the dirt road over the Fairfield Pumped Storage dam.
- 3. Southern Route via the dirt road from the south end of the plant access road to Parr.

Bridges Across the Broad River:

- 1. Pinner Bridge, Highway 213.
- 2. Northern section of the 10-mile EPZ.
- 3. I-20 Bridge, located in Columbia, west of the junction of I-20 and Monticello Road (Highway 215).