



Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region I

J.W. McCormack Post Office &
Court House Building, Room 442
Boston, MA 02109

OCT 30 2003

Hubert J. Miller, Regional Administrator
NRC, Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Miller:

Attached is the final drill report for the September 27, 2003, Host Community/Reception Center Drill for Windham, CT and Millstone Power Station. This report addresses the evaluation of the plans and preparedness for Connecticut Office of Emergency Management and the Emergency Response Plan of Windham, CT. The final drill report was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I staff. Copies of this report will be forwarded to NRC Headquarters and the Connecticut Office of Emergency Management.

There were no Deficiencies and two Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified during the drill. Based on the results of the September 27, 2003, drill, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the Connecticut Office of Emergency Management and Windham, CT, site-specific for the Millstone Power Station, can be implemented and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site.

If you have any questions, please contact Deborah S. Bell, RAC Chair, at 617-223- 4444.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Kenneth Horak".

Kenneth Horak
Acting, Regional Director



FEMA

**STATE OF CONNECTICUT, WINDHAM, CONNECTICUT
HOST COMMUNITY RECEPTION CENTER DRILL**

MILLSTONE POWER STATION

Licensee: ***Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.***

Exercise Date: ***September 27, 2003***

Report Date: ***October 27, 2003***

**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
REGION I
JOHN W. McCORMACK POST OFFICE AND COURTHOUSE
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02109**



Windham Public Safety Complex



Windham High School Reception Center

TABLE OF CONTENTS
WINDHAM HOST COMMUNITY RECEPTION CENTER DRILL

	Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	1
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	2
II. INTRODUCTION.....	3
III. DRILL EVALUATION AND RESULTS.....	5
A. WINDHAM EOC.....	5
B. RECEPTION CENTER.....	6
C. CONGREGATE CARE	7

List of Appendices

APPENDIX 1 - DRILL EVALUATORS.....	8
APPENDIX 2 - EXTENT OF PLAY	10
APPENDIX 3 - DRILL SCENARIO.....	29

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On September 27, 2003, a Host Community Reception Center Drill was conducted at Windham, Connecticut. The purpose of this drill was to assess the capability of the Windham, Connecticut Emergency Management Personnel to respond to a radiological incident involving the Millstone Power Station. This drill was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in this drill.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the drill participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this drill.

This report contains the final evaluation of the Host Community Reception Center Drill and Congregate Care Facilities.

The Host Community emergency management personnel, fire department personnel and volunteers demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were no deficiencies and two Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified as a result of this drill.

II. INTRODUCTION

On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of Tribal, State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

- FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
 - Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments;
 - Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;
 - Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993); and
 - Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
 - U.S. Department of Commerce,
 - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
 - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
 - U.S. Department of Energy,
 - U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
 - U.S. Department of Transportation,
 - U.S. Department of Agriculture,
 - U.S. Department of the Interior, and
 - U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region I Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the Millstone Power Station (PS) to FEMA Region I by the State of Connecticut and involved local jurisdictions occurred on September 4, 1981. Formal approval of the RERP was granted by FEMA on October 9, 1984, under 44 CFR 350.

A Host Community Reception Center Evaluated Drill was conducted on September 27, 2003, by FEMA Region I, REP Staff to assess the capabilities of the Emergency Management Personnel of Windham, CT, to demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees of a Millstone Power Station incident. The purpose of this drill report is to present the drill results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region I RAC Chairperson, and approved by the Regional Director.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;
- "Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology," published in the Federal Register on September 12, 2001, and amended April 25, 2002.

Section III of this report, entitled "Drill Evaluation and Results," presents information on the demonstration of applicable exercise objectives at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions for each identified exercise issue, and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them.

III. DRILL EVALUATION AND RESULTS

Participating Agencies:

First Selectman
Willimantic Health District
Department of Public Works
Windham Police Department
Windham Fire Department
Windham Volunteer Fire Department
Windham School Department
RACES Amateur Radio
American Red Cross

Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of the Windham, CT Host Community Reception Center Drill conducted on September 27, 2003. The purpose of this evaluated drill was to test the readiness capabilities of the Windham Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the Windham Host Reception Center to be able to respond to an incident involving Millstone Power Station (PS).

Each functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria delineated in the exercise criterion contained in the "Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology," published in the Federal Register on September 12, 2001, and amended April 25, 2002.

The following is the status of functional entities evaluated.

A. Windham EOC

The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in the Windham Public Safety Complex is not a dedicated facility. Despite that fact the EOC was set up in a short period of time. The Emergency Management Director (EMD) immediately took control of the EOC. When staff was present he briefed the staff of the situation at Millstone Power Station and stated that they were to begin preparations to open and establish the Reception Center at the Windham High School. The EMD tasked the staff to review their plan and procedures for the activation of the Reception Center. The EMD periodically briefed the staff as the event progressed; in turn he required the staff to back brief him at to the particular current status when asked. The EMD and staff clearly demonstrated their use of the plan and procedures and displayed a positive can do attitude throughout the drill.

(a) MET: Criterion 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 3.d.1

(b) DEFICIENCIES: NONE

(c) AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: NONE

(d) NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

(e) PRIOR ARCAs RESOLVED: NONE

(f) PRIOR ARCAs UNRESOLVED: NONE

B. Host Community - Reception Center

The staff of the Windham Reception Center was made up of full time firefighters, volunteer firefighters and civilian volunteers. This reception team demonstrated their cohesiveness immediately after the Incident Commander gave the safety briefing and task assignments. They immediately departed to retrieve their necessary supplies and equipment. In a timely manner the reception center was set up and operational. All reception center personnel referred to their plan and procedures, asked questions of their supervisors if they were unsure of the next step. They communicated with one another as well as worked together as a team.

(a) MET: Criterion: 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.b.1

(b) DEFICIENCIES: NONE

(c) AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (ARCAs): 6.a.1

ISSUE No.: 38-03-6.a.1-11

Description: A greeter in the vehicle monitoring area was observed placing a hand on two of the first three vehicles coming into the vehicle monitoring area. Although he realized what he had done he took no action to determine if he was contaminated or not. A vehicle monitoring team member logging contaminated vehicles placed a clipboard on the hood of a contaminated vehicle in the contaminated vehicle parking lot.

RECOMMENDATION: Additional training to insure that procedures are followed and an awareness established of potential cross contamination causes while working with potentially contaminated vehicles and equipment.

Schedule of Corrective Action: Demonstrate at a future drill.

ISSUE No.: 38-03-6.a.1-12

Description: Due to the need for personnel to direct vehicles along an elongated route into the vehicle monitoring area, personnel from the clean vehicle parking area, were reassigned. This left only one person in the "Clean Parking Lot" to register vehicles. A line began to form and was beginning to affect the ability of additional vehicles to exit the portal monitor. There was no actual obstruction during the drill but sufficient personnel need to be assigned to the "Clean Parking Lot" so that vehicle information can be recorded at the parking space. This will free up the area leading into the lot and not cause a backup during a true event.

Recommendation: Review the reception center plan, vehicle traffic and monitoring sections to ensure that sufficient personnel are allocated to those operations.

Schedule of Corrective Actions: Demonstrate at a future drill.

(d) NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

(e) PRIOR ARCAs RESOLVED: NONE

(f) PRIOR ARCAs UNRESOLVED: NONE

C. Congregate Care:

Windham Technical School, 210 Birch Street.
Eastern Connecticut State University, Sports Center, High Street
Eastern Connecticut State University, Student Union, High Street
Eastern Connecticut State University, Hurley Hall, High Street
Windham Center School, Rte 14, 45 North Road
Sweeney Elementary School, Oak Hill Drive
North Windham Elementary School Jordan Lane Rte 203
Windham High School (Reception Center), High Street

(a) MET: Criterion: 6.c.1

(b) DEFICIENCIES: NONE

(c) AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: NONE

(d) NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

(e) PRIOR ARCAs RESOLVED: NONE

(f) PRIOR ARCAs UNRESOLVED: NONE

APPENDIX 1

DRILL EVALUATORS

The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Windham, CT Host Community Reception Center Drill for the Connecticut Office of Emergency Management and the Millstone Power Station.

<u>EVALUATION SITE</u>	<u>OBJECTIVE</u>	<u>EVALUATOR</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
<u>September 23, 2003</u>			
Congregate Care Centers	6.c.1. - Temp. Care of Evacuees	Robert Swartz	FEMA Region I
Windham Regional Technical School			
Eastern CT State University			
Windham Middle School			
Sweeney Elementary School			
Windham High School			
Windham Regional Technical School			
Eastern CT State University			
Windham Middle School			
Sweeney Elementary School			
Windham High School			
<u>September 27, 2003</u>			
Windham EOC	1.a.1 - Mobilization 1.b.1 - Facilities 1.c.1 - Direction and Control 1.d.1 - Communications 1.e.1 - Equipment and Support 3.d.1 - Traffic Control Points	Wanda Gaudet	FEMA Region I
Reception Center	1.b.1 - Facilities 1.e.1 - Equipment and Support 1.c.1 - Direction and Control 1.d.1 - Communications 6.a.1 - Portal Monitoring	Robert Swartz	FEMA Region I
Reception Center	3.d.1 - TCP's 3.a.1 - Implement. of Emerg. Worker Exp. Control 6.a.1 - Male Decon	Jim Gibbons	FEMA Region I

Reception Center	3.b.1 - Implement. KI Decision 6.a.1/ 6.b.1 - Monit. & Decon of Evacuees & Emerg. Workers	Deborah Bell	FEMA Region I
Reception Center	6.a.1/ 6.b.1 - Monit. & Decon of Evacuees & Emerg. Workers	Robert Waters	FEMA Region I
Reception Center	6.a.1/ - Monit. & 6.b.1 - Decon of Evacuees & Emerg. Workers	Lauren Demarco	FEMA Region I
Reception Center	6.a.1 - Female Decon	Wanda Gaudet	FEMA Region I

APPENDIX 2 EXTENT OF PLAY

Evaluation Area 1 – Emergency Operations Management

Sub-element 1.a.1. Mobilization.

Criterion 1.a.1: Off-site Response organization use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4., D.3., 4., E.1., 2., H.4)

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 which provides that OROs should have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and to activate and staff emergency facilities.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an emergency situation from the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner. In addition, responsible OROs should demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive to begin emergency operations. Activation of facilities should be completed in accordance with the plan and/or procedures. Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the extent of play agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. Further, pre-positioning of staff for an out-of-sequence demonstration is appropriate in accordance with the extent of play agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. The Host Community EOC and Reception Center will be pre-positioned and demonstrated off-line at Windham on September 27, 2003.
2. Drill play will be initiated by a phone call from Area 4 to the Windham EMD. Fire Service and Civilian personnel manning various facilities will respond to a simulated call-up and be on-site at approximately 0800 for the EOC and at approximately 0900 for the Reception Center. A copy of the sign-in roster and a copy of the second shift roster will be provided to the evaluator/s.
3. Activation of Congregate Care facilities (shelters) will be simulated.
4. Immediate correction of issues relating to direction and control where re-mediation is possible will be allowed.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

(None)

Evaluation Area 1 – Emergency Operations Management

Sub-element 1.b.1. Facilities

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654, H)

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have facilities to support emergency response.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

Facilities will only be specifically evaluated for this criterion if they are new or have substantial changes in structure or mission. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the availability of facilities that support the accomplishment of emergency operations. Some of the areas to be considered are: adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, backup power and/or alternate facility (if required to support operations).

Facilities must be set up based on the ORO's plans and procedures and demonstrated, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. The facility activation will be appropriate for a one-shift operation.
2. A source of backup power and maintenance logs, if available, will be discussed.
3. Immediate correction of issues relating to displays and equipment where re-mediation is possible will be allowed.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

(None)

Evaluation Area 1 – Emergency Operations Management

Sub-element 1.c.1. Direction and Control

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the Off-Site Response Organization provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. NUREG-0654, A.1.d., 2.a.,b.)

Intent

This sub-element provides that the ORO have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential functions of the response effort, for example; keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other appropriate OROs and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.

All activities associated with direction and control must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

(No site-specific modifications.)

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

(None)

Evaluation Area 1 – Emergency Operations Management
Sub-element 1.d.1. Communications and Equipment

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1., 2.)

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should establish reliable primary and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as the following: appropriate contiguous governments within the emergency planning zone (EPZ), Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, emergency operations centers (EOC), and field teams.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

ORO's will demonstrate that a primary, and at least one backup system, are fully functional at the beginning of an exercise. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed. Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units should be used as needed for the transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities and field teams should have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations. OROs should ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exist.

The specific communications capabilities of OROs should be commensurate with that specified in the response plan and/or procedures. Exercise scenarios could require the failure of a communications system and the use of an alternate system.

All activities associated with the management of communications capabilities must be demonstrated based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. Communications will be demonstrated as follows by the Windham Host Community organization since it is the first evaluation using the new criteria:
 - A communications check will be conducted between the OEM Area 4 office and the Windham EOC and also between the Reception Center and the Windham EOC.
 - Other Communications will be limited to the Reception Center.

(Continued)

Sub-element 1.d.1. Communications and Equipment.(Continued)

- Radio Communications is primary with cell-phone and/or regular telephone as back-up.
- Separate power sources for communications equipment are not required.
- Immediate correction of issues relating to communications and equipment where re-mediation is possible will be allowed.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

(None)

Evaluation Area 1 – Emergency Operations Management
Sub-element 1.e.1. Equipment And Supplies To Support Operations.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k., 11, K.3.a.)

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

Equipment within the facility(ies) should be sufficient and consistent with the role assigned to that facility in the ORO's plans and/or procedures in support of emergency operations. Use of maps and displays is encouraged.

All instruments, including air sampling flow meters (field teams only), should be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. They should be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations (or at least annually for the unmodified CDV-700 series or if there are no manufacturer's recommendations for a specific instrument; modified CDV-700 instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the modification manufacturer.). A label indicating such calibration should be on each instrument or verifiable by other means. Note: Field team equipment is evaluated under 4.a.1; radiological laboratory equipment under 4.c.1; reception center and emergency worker facilities' equipment is evaluated under 6.a.1; and ambulance and medical facilities' equipment is evaluated under 6.d.1.

Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers should be available for issuance to all categories of emergency workers that could be deployed from that facility. **Appropriate direct-reading dosimeters should allow individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.**

Dosimeters should be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced, if necessary. CDV-138s, due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems, should be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced if necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the Annual Letter of Certification, and/or through a staff-assistance visit.

(Continued)

Sub-element 1.e.1. Equipment And Supplies To Support Operations.(Continued)

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by emergency workers, as indicated on rosters; institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and, where stipulated by the plan and/or procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ.

Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the Annual Letter of Certification submission, and/or verified during a Staff Assistance Visit. Available supplies of KI should be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from FEMA indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance. FEMA issues these letters based upon the findings of the certified independent laboratory that performed the analysis at the ORO's request and expense.

At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, etc.) should be available or their availability described.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. Displays applicable to the Host Community Reception Center:
 - Shelter Status,
 - Shelter Locations
2. Dosimetry will only be issued to radiological emergency workers at the Reception Center and not to other emergency workers such as Registration, Red Cross and etc. that are not exposed to potential contamination. These packets include: a Permanent Reading Dosimeter or PRD (in lieu of a thermoluminescent dosimeter) and two self-reading dosimeters (SRD) in the 0R (Roentgen) to 5R and the 0R to 200R ranges. However, the 0R to 200R dosimeter is not used at the reception center.
3. Each Direct Reading Dosimeter has a sticker with the date of the last calibration/electrical leakage test.
4. Immediate Correction will be allowed if after initially not being able to show proper equipment, supplies or documentation, the issue is corrected with further effort/instruction.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

(None)

Evaluation Area 3 – Protective Action Implementation

Sub-element 3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control.

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.)

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of direct-reading dosimeters and permanent record dosimeters; provide for direct-reading dosimeters to be read at appropriate frequencies by emergency workers; maintain a radiation dose record for each emergency worker; and provide for establishing a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess of protective action guides, always applying the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) principle as appropriate.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

ORO's should demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimetry chargers, and instructions on the use of dosimetry to emergency workers. **For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits (that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure limits (for those emergency workers involved in life saving activities) contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.**

Each emergency worker should have the basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and to manage radiological exposure control should be demonstrated.

During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers should demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached. The emergency worker should report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans and procedures. OROs should demonstrate the actions described in the plan and/or procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, to authorize the worker to incur additional exposures or to take other actions. If scenario events do not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators should interview at least two emergency workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in the event authorization is needed and at what exposure levels. Emergency workers may use any available resources (e.g. written procedures and/or co-workers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission and adequate control of exposure can be effected for all members of the team by one dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, e.g., at reception centers, counting laboratories, emergency operations centers, and communications centers, may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work area. It should be noted that, even in these situations, each team member must still have their own permanent record dosimeter.

Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as farmers for animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public who must re-enter an evacuated area following or during the plume passage, should be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. The host community has been provided with 50 emergency worker dosimetry packets. These packets include: a Permanent Record dosimeter (PRD), and two self-reading dosimeters (SRD) in the 0R (Roentgen) to 5R and the 0R to 200R ranges.
2. Dosimetry packets will be issued to all Reception Center radiological emergency workers. Evaluators will observe dosimetry turn-in and necessary paperwork.
3. Radiological emergency worker exposure control training, including a basic knowledge of exposure control procedures (turn-back values, call-in values and periodic monitoring), will be demonstrated through evaluator interviews.
4. Host Community emergency workers do not need to use or wear the 0R to 200R self-reading dosimeters.
5. Dosimetry will only be issued to radiological emergency workers at the Reception Center and not to other emergency workers such as Registration, Red Cross and etc. that are not exposed to potential contamination.
6. Immediate Correction will be allowed for issues relating to the issuing of dosimetry, briefing and, subsequently, the demonstration by emergency worker knowledge of radiation control.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

(None)

Evaluation Area 3 – Protective Action Implementation
Sub-element 3.b – Implementation of KI Decision

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, E. 7., J. 10. e., f.)

INTENT

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the capability to provide radio-protective drugs for emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plan and/or procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI to emergency workers and institutionalized individuals, the provision of KI to the general public is an ORO option, reflected in ORO's plans and procedures. Provisions should include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of the distribution of radioprotective drugs.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

OROs should demonstrate the capability to make KI available to emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in the ORO plan and/or procedures, to members of the general public. OROs should demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made. Organizations should have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers and institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. The ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI is **not** necessary. OROs should demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate appropriate instructions on the use of KI for those advised to take it. If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information should be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of procedures for the use of KI whether or not the scenario drives the use of KI. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. The supply of general public (evacuee) KI will be available for evaluator inspection, only a representative number of packets will be used for simulated distribution during the evaluated exercise.
2. Reception center staff will demonstrate the process, procedures and equipment for KI distribution and direction to ingest KI through discussion to a sample size (2) of simulated evacuees at the facility. KI will not actually be ingested by any drill participants.
3. Immediate correction of issues relating to evacuee KI implementation where re-mediation is possible will be allowed.

Evaluation Area 3 – Protective Action Implementation

Sub-element 3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control –TCP/ACP are established.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.10.g., j., k.)

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs have the capability to implement protective action plans, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated areas. This sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

ORO should demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with evacuation/sheltering decisions (for example evacuating, sheltering and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff should demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities. This capability may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview in accordance with the extent of play agreement.

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (rail, water, and air traffic), they should demonstrate the capability to contact the State or Federal agencies with authority to control access.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless specified above or indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. The Willimantic Police Department representative, at the Town EOC, will discuss traffic control assigned to the Willimantic Police Department. Actual traffic Control points designated in the plan will not be posted by the police.
2. The Windham Vol. F.D. will provide traffic control at the Reception center entrance, monitoring and parking areas.
3. Immediate correction of issues relating to evacuee KI implementation where re-mediation is possible will be allowed.

Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

(None)

Evaluation Area 6 – Support Operations/Facilities

Sub-element 6.a.1. Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees.

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h.; K.5.b.)

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and emergency workers, while minimizing contamination of the facility, and registration of evacuees at reception centers.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees/ emergency workers should be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the extent of play agreement. This would include adequate space for evacuees' vehicles. Expected demonstration should include 1/3 of the monitoring teams/portal monitors required to monitor 20% of the population allocated to the facility within 12 hours. Prior to using a monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.

Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees should demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20% emergency planning zone (EPZ) population planning base within about 12 hours. This monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored per hour by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate monitoring procedure. A minimum of six individuals per monitoring station should be monitored, using equipment and procedures specified in the plan and/or procedures, to allow demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators in order to determine whether the twelve-hour requirement can be met. Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the twelve-hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers.

Decontamination of evacuees/emergency workers may be simulated and conducted by interview. The availability of provisions for separately showering should be demonstrated or explained. The staff should demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs and appropriate means (e.g. partitions, roped-off areas) to separate clean from

(Continued)

Sub-element 6.a.1. Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees.(Continued)

potentially contaminated areas. Provisions should also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals, provide changes of clothing for individuals whose clothing is contaminated, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any individual found to be contaminated, procedures should be discussed concerning the handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings.

Monitoring personnel should explain the use of action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They should also explain the procedures for referring evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow up in accordance with the ORO's plans and procedures. Contamination of the individual will be determined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level radiation source.

The capability to register individuals upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities should be demonstrated. The registration activities demonstrated should include the establishment of a registration record for each individual, consisting of the individual's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination, if any, or as otherwise designated in the plan. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. Windham will activate its Reception Center for demonstration of this objective. These activities will take place out of sequence from a regular exercise scenario. Demonstration is off-line on September 27, 2003.
2. The following monitoring capability will be demonstrated by the Reception Center:
 - At least one portal monitor for personnel monitoring will be demonstrated
 - At least one staff radiological monitor will demonstrate hand-held instrument monitoring techniques for personnel at the Secondary Monitoring Station.
 - Contamination control measures and decontamination techniques for at least one male and one female subject will be demonstrated.
 - Vehicle monitoring will be demonstrated.
3. A representative sample of replacement clothing resources available for decontaminated individuals will be shown in both Male and Female Decontamination areas.
4. Immediate correction of issues will be allowed relating to setup of facilities, actual monitoring (including time concerns) and decontamination procedures and registration of personnel. This also will include monitoring of vehicles.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

(None)

Evaluation Area 6 – Support Operations/Facilities

Sub-element 6.b.1. Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Worker equipment.

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to monitor equipment, including vehicles, for contamination in accordance with the ORO's plans and procedures. Specific attention should be given to equipment, including vehicles, that was in contact with individuals found to be contaminated. The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of equipment including vehicles based on guidance levels and procedures stated in the plan and/or procedures.

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings instrumentation, record keeping and contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as air intake systems, radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles should be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that were in contact with individuals found to be contaminated should also be checked.

Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be decontaminated, may be simulated and conducted by interview.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

(Continued)

Sub-element 6.b.1. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker equipment.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. Procedures for collection of dosimetry from one emergency worker will be demonstrated as well as monitoring, decontamination and registration of that individual.
2. Vehicle monitoring will be demonstrated under criteria sub-element 6.a.1.
3. Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be decontaminated, will be simulated and demonstrated by discussion.
4. Immediate Correction of issues will be allowed relating to setup of facilities and monitoring procedures. This also would include the discussion of decontamination of vehicles.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

(None)

Evaluation Area 6 – Support Operations/Facilities

Sub-element 6.c.1. Temporary Care of evacuees.

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CARE-Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h., 12.)

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs demonstrate the capability to establish relocation centers in host areas. Congregate care is normally provided in support of OROs by the American Red Cross under existing letters of agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL

Under this criterion, demonstration of congregate care centers may be conducted out of sequence with the exercise scenario. The evaluator should conduct a walk-through of the center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are consistent with ARC 3031 **In this simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations, as they would be in an actual emergency.** Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this criteria, exercise demonstration expectations should be clearly specified in extent-of-play agreements.

Congregate care staff should also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination, have been decontaminated as appropriate, and have been registered before entering the facility. This capability may be determined through an interview process.

If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically available at the facility(ies). However, availability of such items should be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

(Continued)

Sub-element 6.c.1. Temporary Care of evacuees.(Continued)

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. Activation of Congregate Care (shelter) facilities will be simulated on the day of the exercise.
2. A walk-through of Windham Host Community Congregate Care facilities will be scheduled with dates TBD by advance coordination between FEMA, the American Red Cross and Windham. The Red Cross retains shelter survey documentation and a copy will be provided to FEMA.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)

(None)

APPENDIX 3
WINDHAM HOST COMMUNITY DRILL SCENARIO

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
<p>SHELTER EVALUATION: The following shelter facilities will be demonstrated out-of-sequence on September 23, 2003.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. WINDHAM TECH. BIRCH ST. 2. ECSU HIGH ST. 3. KRAMER MIDDLE PROSPECT 4. WINDHAM CENTER SCH. RT 14 5. SWEENEY SCH. OAK HILL DR. 6. NATCHAUG ELE. JACKSON ST. 7. WINDHAM H.S. HIGH ST. 8. N. WINDHAM F.D. RT 6 				
EOC PHASE: September 27, 2003				
0815	1.a.1 Mobilization	Dispatch Center	#1 (Initial Notification) Area 4 Coordinator To Windham EMD	<p>Message from Area 4 Coordinator (control cell) to notify Host Community via telephone call.</p> <p>Windham Dispatch (911), receives call from Area 4 Coordinator, takes message and makes notification calls per procedure.</p>
0815-0820	1.a.1 Mobilization	Dispatch Center		<p>Windham Fire/Police Dispatcher makes call to EMD. EMD reports to EOC and begins calling staff from call-out list. (EOC staff will actually be pre-positioned in building and notified of EOC activation.)</p>
0830	1.a.1 Mobilization 1.b.1 Facilities	EOC		<p>Staff begins to arrive at EOC, located in 2nd level of the Town Hall on Main Street. The EOC is not a dedicated facility. Some components, i.e. telephones may be set up in advance.</p>

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
0830-0900	1.d.1 Comm. & Equip	EOC	#2 (Command) Area 4 Coordinator To Windham EOC	Following EOC activation, communication check is conducted with Area 4 Office. A phone, radio and FAX operational check is conducted with the Area 4 Office and communication is maintained with Area 4 Coordinator.
0900	1.c.1 Direction & Control	EOC	#3 (Command) Area 4 Coordinator To Windham EOC	Area 4 Coordinator provides update information on radiation release and evacuation of EPZ zones. State directs Windham to prepare Reception Center.
0900-0915	1.a.1 Mobilization	EOC		The EMD requests Dispatcher to notify Fire Department staff to activate the Reception Center. A call-out is also made for mutual aide from the Windham Vol. F.D. Fire personnel will be staged at the Willimantic Fire Station (these are off-shift fire staff). They will be deployed to the Windham High School, which serves as the Reception Center to prepare the Reception Center for evacuees.
0915	1.a.1 Mobilization	RECEPTION CENTER (Windham H.S.gymnasium)		All participating fire personnel arrive with supplies to set up a monitoring area at the Windham H.S. (Reception Center). The Social Services staff will be dispatched by the EOC to set up a registration area at the high school
0915 or earlier	3.d.1 Traffic Control	EOC	#4 (Contingency) EOC Controller To Windham PD EOC Rep.	The Police Dept. is responsible for Traffic Control from entry point to Reception Center. Discuss implementation of traffic control from including Traffic Control points and potential impediments to traffic flow.

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
0915	3.b.1 Implement KI	EOC	#5	EMD is notified by Area Coordinator that KI is being recommended to evacuees from New London and F.I., N.Y.
0900-0930	6.c.1 Temp Care of Evacuees	EOC		Red Cross and school administrative personnel discuss plan for opening shelter(s). These will be posted on the EOC shelter board. Determine shelter needs for population expected. ARC representative and Director may determine order of shelter opening based on availability, location and capacity of each facility.
0900-0930	1.a.1 Mobilization 6.c.1 Temp Care of Evacuees	EOC		Red Cross calls out for Reception Center representative. (Shelters will not be staffed for this demonstration.) Red Cross prepares shelter management roster/plan. At least one representative assists registration staff with information on shelter availability at the reception center.
RECEPTION CENTER SET-UP PHASE:		RECEPTION CENTER		
0930	1.d.1 Comm. & Equip 1.e.1 Equip & Supplies	RECEPTION CENTER		Reception Center staff begins to set-up monitoring, decontamination and registration areas. Arriving staff are briefed and assigned tasks by the Reception Center Manager and/or Radiological Officer and/or Registration Coordinator.

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
0945 - 1045	1.d.1 Comm. & Equip	RECEPTION CENTER EOC		<p>Communications check is conducted. The Reception Center Manager is the main contact with EOC and remote Reception Center locations. Primary communications is via radio.</p> <p>Radio check is conducted between Reception Center and the EOC. Communications check at Reception Center between Reception Center Manager and remote locations throughout RC is also conducted.</p>
0945 - 1045	1.e.1 Equip & Supplies 3.a.1 Exposure Control	RECEPTION CENTER		<p>Dosimetry is prepared and issued to emergency workers in accordance with procedures. Briefings are conducted as each station is called to receive their instruments.</p> <p>Dosimetry is zeroed and paperwork is completed for all emergency workers in radiological areas. A PRD and 0-5R Self-reading dosimeter are issued. The 0-200 R Dosimeter contained within the packet is not issued to host E-workers per procedure.</p>
0945 - 1045	6.a.1 Mon/Decon/Register Workers & Evacuees	RECEPTION CENTER		<p>Preparation/set up of monitoring instruments (CDV-700 survey meters, a Bicon portal monitor and one NRC portal monitor) are set up and operationally checked per procedure.</p> <p>The portal monitor team will set up and operationally check the portal with check source.</p> <p>Survey meters (CDV-700) will be operationally checked per range-of-reading posted on each meter.</p> <p>Survey Meters will be issued to staff ready for use.</p>

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
0945 1045	6.a.1 Mon/Decon/Register Workers & Evacuees	RECEPTION CENTER		Set up of a Secondary Monitoring Area is staffed to monitor evacuees or emergency workers who alarm the portal monitors. The secondary monitoring staff is responsible for providing hand-surveys using CDV-700 meters for those individuals who alarm the portal monitor. Secondary monitoring station may be expanded as needed.
0945 - 1045	1.b.1 Facilities 6.a.1 Mon/Decon/Register Workers & Evacuees	RECEPTION CENTER		Set up of two decontamination areas, one male and one female, per procedure and diagram. Separate decontamination areas are provided for contaminated males and females. A representative sample of temporary replacement clothing will be located at each decon area.
0945-1045	3.b.1 Implement KI	RECEPTION CENTER		KI Issue is set up.
0945 - 1045	1.b.1 Facilities 6.b.1 Mon/Decon/Register Equipment & Vehicles	RECEPTION CENTER		A portal monitor will be set up for vehicle monitoring. Vehicle Monitoring lane and clean/contaminated parking areas are established per the Extent of Play.
0945 - 1045	1.b.1 Facilities 6.a.1. Mon/Decon/Register Workers & Evacuees 3.b.1 Implement KI	RECEPTION CENTER		A registration area is set up and staffed according to the plan in the field house gymnasium per procedure. Registration area staff will provide means for registration of evacuees. A representative supply of KI tablets will be available for distribution, but will not be issued.

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
1000-1100	1.a.1 Mobilization 1.c.1 Direction & Control 1.d.1 Comm. & Equip	RECEPTION CENTER EOC		<p>Radiological Reception Center units report readiness to Radiological Officer. Registration units report readiness to Registration Coordinator. Radiological Officer and Registration Coordinator Report readiness to Reception Center Manager.</p> <p>Reception Center Manager notifies EOC when Reception Center is fully staffed and operational.</p> <p>EOC receives updates on status of Reception Center and reports to Area 4 when Reception Center is operational.</p>
1100		RECEPTION CENTER		<p>Start demonstration once Reception Center is operational and EOC has been notified.</p> <p>A Controller will notify the staged evacuees to proceed to Reception Center vehicle monitoring area when the Reception Center (Operations) Manager declares the facility operational.</p>
RECEPTION CENTER DEMONSTRATION PHASE:		EOC		<p>At this point, there may be a reduction of EOC play and non-essential staff at the EOC will be released.</p>
1100		RECEPTION CENTER		<p>The Controller will give the message to start the incoming vehicles.</p> <p>Incoming vehicles will drop off passengers at the Reception Center and proceed to the vehicle monitoring area (parking lot).</p>

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
1100 - 1130	6.b.1 Mon/Decon/Register Equipment & Vehicles	RECEPTION CENTER	#6 (Command) Vehicle Controller To Vehicle Monitor Lead	At least three vehicles will be externally monitored, one per each of the three monitoring lanes and directed to park in a designated "clean" or "contaminated" area as appropriate. One of the vehicles will be designated "contaminated" by controller inject. Contaminated vehicle(s) are tagged and directed to contaminated parking area. (Same vehicle/s can be used for three lanes.)
1100 - 1130	6.a.1 Mon/Decon/Register Workers & Evacuees	RECEPTION CENTER	#7 (Command) Portal Monitor Controller To Portal Monitor Attendants	At least two individuals (one female, one male) will be "contaminated" per controller inject. At least one of these individuals is an evacuated EPZ Emergency Worker who will be wearing dosimetry. Evacuees who alarm a portal monitor are directed to secondary monitoring station for a whole-body survey. Evacuees who don't alarm the portal receive a green hand stamp and are directed to registration.
1100-1145	6.b.1 Mon/Decon/Register Equipment & Vehicles	RECEPTION CENTER		The contaminated emergency workers' dosimetry is returned, read and recorded prior to the emergency worker leaving the reception center.
1115 - 1200	6.a.1 Mon/Decon/Register Workers & Evacuees 6.b.1 Mon/Decon/Register Equipment & Vehicles	RECEPTION CENTER	#9 (Command) Secondary Monitor Controller to Secondary Monitor	Secondary Monitoring will survey individuals with hand-held survey meters. Vehicle monitoring is notified of potential internal contamination of their vehicle. Evacuees who are found to be "clean" receive a green hand stamp and are directed to registration. Personnel Monitoring Form will be initiated once contamination is detected and provided to each individual directed to the decontamination area.

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
1130 - 1200	6.a.1 Mon/Decon/Register Workers & Evacuees	RECEPTION CENTER	#8 (Command) Portal Monitor Controller To Portal Monitor Attendants	<p>Portal Monitoring demonstration:</p> <p>Six individuals are assembled and consecutively monitored through each portal monitors per controller inject when sufficient number of "evacuees" are available. This demonstration will take place after the "normal" evacuees have gone through.</p> <p>The controller will direct six individuals through each portal monitor, one monitor at a time for evaluation purposes. <u>A controller and evaluator must be present for this portion of the demonstration.</u></p> <p>Portal monitor attendants should provide clear direction for entering and exiting the monitors and ensure that step-off to clean areas are maintained.</p>
1200 - 1215	6.a.1 Mon/Decon/Register Workers & Evacuees	RECEPTION CENTER	#10 a, b (Command) Decon Area Controller To Decon Area Monitor	<p>Each of the two decontamination areas will demonstrate/discuss contamination control measures, decontamination and radiological monitoring techniques.</p> <p>Evacuees are directed from decontamination stations to registration area via clean path</p> <p>Decontamination Area staff review Personnel Monitoring Forms and advise/assist with decontamination via discussion.</p> <p>Following proper demonstration of contamination control/decon., the evacuee will be remonitored with results provided by controller inject.</p> <p>The Personnel Monitoring Form brought in by the "evacuee/E-Worker" will be completed and the individuals directed, via clean pathway, to the registration area.</p> <p>Decontaminated evacuees receive a green hand stamp and copy of completed form to present to registration staff.</p>

APPROX. TIME OF DEMONSTRATION	EVAL. AREA Sub element	LOCATION	CONTROLLER MESSAGE to PLAYER	SCENARIO EVENT
1215 - 1230	6.a.1 Mon/Decon/Register Workers & Evacuees	RECEPTION CENTER		<p>Each "evacuee" will proceed to the registration area, outside of male decon in smaller gymnasium. An elevator is available for those females who can not physically manage this.</p> <p>Evacuees are registered by registrars at the registration. A green stamp on the hand or completed Personnel Monitoring Form is proof of "clean", previously monitored evacuees.</p> <p>Registration is completed by hand written form with assistance from a registrar. A computer may be used to record information from the written form to create a database of information. An information area would be set up to post messages given to registrars for reunification of family members.</p> <p>Shelter information is provided by a Red Cross Liaison.</p> <p>All evacuees are provided with decontamination advisory information either verbally or on a printed card.</p>
1230 - 1300		RECEPTION CENTER	#11 (Command) Reception Center Controller To Reception Center Manager	<p>When all Reception Center objectives have been demonstrated to the satisfaction of evaluators, a controller message is issued to the Reception Center Manager.</p> <p>Exercise is terminated. Play ends and all areas are returned to normal condition.</p>
POST DEMONSTRATION PHASE:				
1230 - 1300		RECEPTION CENTER		<p>Players will be directed to return their areas to a normal condition and report to a specified area for their comments.</p> <p>The Lead Controller will lead the player critique.</p>