KEY TECHNICAL ISSUE (KTI)

REPOSITORY DESIGN AND THERMAL MECHANICAL EFFECTS (RDTME)



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PRE-LICENSING ISSUE RESOLUTION STATUS APRIL 25-26, LAS VEGAS, NV

Legacy/main - no

RDTME KTI SUBISSUES AND RESOLUTION STATUS

- Subissue 1: Implementation of an effective design control process within the overall quality assurance program: CLOSED
- Subissue 2: Design of the geologic repository operations area for the effects of seismic events and direct fault disruption: CLOSED PENDING CONFIRMATORY INFORMATION
- Subissue 3: Thermal-mechanical effects on underground facility design and performance: OPEN
- Subissue 4: Design and long-term contribution of seals to performance: CLOSED PENDING CONFIRMATORY INFORMATION

Component 1: Design Control Process for the ESF: (CLOSED)

Component 2: Design control process for the GROA: (CLOSED)

Need for Continued Evaluation

- NRC staff to evaluate DOE implementation of design control process through audit observations
- DOE to inform NRC of any changes to its Design Control Process

Progress in Implementation:

- Document Hierarchy Simplified and In Place
- Design Control Process Appears to be Transparent and Traceable
- Effectiveness of Implementation Monitored Through Periodic Audit Observations and design reviews

Component 1: Seismic Hazard Assessment Methodology: (CLOSED -- SEE SDS IRSR)

Component 2: Seismic Design Methodology: (CLOSED -- SEE RDTME IRSR)

Component 3: Seismic and Fault Displacement Inputs for Design and Performance Assessment: (CLOSED PCI i.e., TR-3 OR OTHER ALTERNATIVE)

- DOE Repository Safety Strategy (RSS) Principal Factors:
 - Seepage Into Drifts
 - Performance of Drip Shield
 - Performance of Waste Package
- NRC Abstractions:
 - Mechanical Disruption of Engineered Barriers
 - Spatial and Temporal Distribution of Flow
 - Quantity and Chemistry of Water Contacting Waste Packages and Waste Forms
 - Degradation of Engineered Barriers

Need for Additional Data/Rationale

• Seismic and Fault Displacement input data that are consistent with the seismic design methodology and Performance Assessment Methodology along with technical bases.

R-3 lalso input

Thermal-mechanical (TM) effects on underground facility design and performance

- DOE RSS Principal Factors:
 - Seepage Into Drifts
 - Performance of Drip Shield
 - Performance of Waste Package
 - Coupled Processes-Effects on Seepage
 - Environments on the Drip Shield and on/within Waste Package
- NRC Abstractions:
 - Mechanical Disruption of Engineered Barriers
 - Spatial and Temporal Distribution of Flow
 - Quantity and Chemistry of Water Contacting Waste Packages and Waste Forms
 - Degradation of Engineered Barriers
 - Radionuclide Release Rates and Solubility Limits

Component 1: Consideration of TM effects on Underground Facility Design/Performance (OPEN)

Need for Additional Data

- Intact-rock thermal and mechanical properties for TSw2 lithophysal unit
- Rock-mass properties for TSw2 lithophysal unit

Need for Additional Analysis

Applicability of available empirical equations -> may induce to YM site

Degradation of rock properties under repository environment function angle

- Design analysis of emplacement drift stability needs to:
 - Consider appropriate combination of models
 - Consider site-specific fracture patterns in discontinuum analysis
 - Use site-specific frequency content and duration of ground motion data
 - Consider effects of lithophysae on rock bolt performance/effectiveness

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Component 2: Consideration of TM effects and Resulting Rock-fall on the Design and Performance of Engineered Barriers (OPEN)

Need for Additional Analysis (SEE CLST KTI PRESENTATION)

down delails of design

- Rock-fall impact analysis needs to consider the following:
 - Appropriate mechanical properties for the EB component materials (consistent with emplacement drift conditions, e.g., temperature effects)
 - Effects of flaws and cracks that are created during the fabrication process when assessing the capability of the EB component to withstand rock block impact(s)
 - Integrity of waste package pedestal support
 - Thermal load and ground motion on predicting rock-fall
 - Design and fabrication details for the Individual EB components
 - Appropriate failure criteria for the different EB components
 - Effects of seismic ground motion on the relative velocity between the EB component and rock block during impact
 - Effects of residual stresses and potential loss of material ductility in the region of the closure welds
 - Effect of multiple rock blocks falling in unison
 - Potential creep rupture of the Titanium (Grade 7) drip shield due to the sustained load of supporting a seismically dislodged rock block after impact

Component 3: Consideration of TM effects in Estimating Quantities of Seepage and Dripping Characteristics into Emplacement Drifts (OPEN)

Need for Additional Analysis

- Evaluation of long-term TM effects should consider:
 - Changes in geometry of emplacement drifts
 - Changes in permeability around emplacement drifts

Design and contribution of seals to long-term performance (CLOSED PCI)

- No specific design/performance requirements for Borehole/Shaft/Ramp Seals in Part 63
- DOE to establish criteria for Seal Design to meet long-term performance needs
- DOE to establish material/construction specifications to meet its design goals
- DOE to evaluate contribution of Seals to overall repository performance
- NRC to review Seal Design in the context of repository long-term performance

SUMMARY

SUBISSUE 1

DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS FOR THE GROA TO BE MONITORED BY NRC THROUGH PERIODIC OBSERVATIONS OF DOE AUDITS AND DESIGN REVIEWS

SUBISSUE 2

DOE SUBMITS TR-3, NRC REVIEWS TR-3 AND CONSIDERS TR-1, TR-2 AND TR-3 IN PREPARING SER, TR'S WILL BECOME AN ACCEPTED REFERENCE TO DOE'S LA.

SUBISSUE 3

DOE TO RESPOND TO NRC QUESTIONS ON DATA AND ANALYSES, NRC TO REVIEW AND CONSIDER NEW INFORMATION IN SUBSEQUENT REVISIONS TO RDTME KTI IRSR.

SUBISSUE 4

RISK-INFORMED PERFORMANCE-BASED PART 63 APPROACH RESULTS IN RETHINKING OF SEALS SUBISSUE. DOE TO PROVIDE AN EVALUATION OF SEAL DESIGN AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE. NRC TO REVIEW SEAL DESIGN IN THE CONTEXT OF LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE

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