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Energy to Serve Your World™

NL-03-2577

December 22, 2003

Docket No.: 50-425

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555-0001


**Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
Licensee Event Report 2-2003-001
Technical Specification Required Shutdown
Not Performed Following Issuance of NOED**

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby submits a Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Licensee Event Report (LER) for a condition that occurred on November 5, 2003.

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please advise.

Sincerely,


Jeffrey T. Gasser

JTG/KWK/daj

Enclosures: LER 2-2003-001

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Mr. J. D. Woodard, Executive Vice President
Mr. W. F. Kitchens, General Manager – Plant Vogtle
Mr. M. Sheibani, Engineering Supervisor – Plant Vogtle
Document Services RTYPE: CVC7000

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator
Mr. S. D. Bloom, NRR Project Manager – Vogtle
Mr. J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector – Vogtle

IE22

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to,

1. FACILITY NAME
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant – Unit 2

2. DOCKET NUMBER
05000-425

3. PAGE
1 OF 4

4. TITLE
TECH. SPEC. REQUIRED SHUTDOWN NOT PERFORMED FOLLOWING ISSUANCE OF NOED

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
11	05	2003	2003	001	00	12	22	03		05000
										05000

9. OPERATING MODE	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § : (Check all that apply)							
1	20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)				
10. POWER LEVEL 100	20.2201(d)	20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)				
	20.2203(a)(1)	50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	73.71(a)(4)				
	20.2203(a)(2)(i)	50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	73.71(a)(5)				
	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	OTHER				
	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.46(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A				
	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)					
	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)					
	20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
	20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER
 NAME: Mehdi Sheibani, Nuclear Safety and Compliance
 TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code): (706) 826-3209

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
B	JG	HS	G223	N					

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED: YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) | NO
 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE: MONTH 07, DAY 01, YEAR 2004

16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On October 26, 2003, personnel were performing Technical Specification (TS) surveillances on the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). A switch in the test circuit that is used to test memories logic functions would not operate properly in all positions. This prevented successful completion of the surveillance testing for some functions, which was due by November 5, 2003. After this time, following completion of a 24-hour TS Required Action Completion Time, a unit shutdown would have been required to be initiated per the action requirements of the TS. A telephone conversation with NRC personnel was conducted on November 4, 2003. During this conversation, the NRC granted a notice of enforcement discretion (NOED) allowing the TS surveillance requirements to be late without enforcement for a period of 28 days. The 28 days represented a reasonable period of time for a written request, to change the TS, to be processed by the NRC. The TS change allowed the required surveillance testing to be delayed until after the end of the fuel cycle in Spring 2004, or until the next unit shutdown to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), whichever comes first. On December 3, 2003, the requested TS change was approved.

The cause of the test switch failure will be determined after it is replaced and further corrective action(s) will be taken, if needed.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL YEAR	REVISION NUMBER	
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 2	05000-425	2003	-- 001	-- 00	2 OF 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B). The performance of a Technical Specification (TS) surveillance was missed and, although the NRC has utilized their discretion in agreeing not to exercise enforcement of the TS requirements for this event, it represented operation of the unit in a condition prohibited by the TS.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of this event, Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (Power Operations) at 100% of rated thermal power. Other than that described herein, there was no inoperable equipment that contributed to the occurrence of this event.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On October 26, 2003, personnel were performing TS surveillances on the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). A switch in the test circuit that is used to test memories logic functions would not operate properly in all positions. This prevented successful completion of the surveillance testing for the following functions:

1. Memory test for feedwater isolation
2. Actuation logic test for feedwater isolation on safety injection or P-14 permissive
3. Permissive P-10 block of source range trip

The surveillance absolute late date was November 5, 2003. After this time, and following expiration of a 24-hour TS Required Action Completion Time, a unit shutdown would have been required to be initiated per the action requirements of TS 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.0.3. A telephone conversation with NRC personnel was conducted on November 4, 2003. During this conversation, the NRC granted a notice of enforcement discretion (NOED) to allow the TS surveillance requirement to be late without enforcement for a period of 28 days. The 28 days represented a reasonable period of time for a written request, to change the TS, to be processed by the NRC. The TS change allowed the required surveillance testing to be delayed until after the end of the fuel cycle in Spring 2004, or until the next unit shutdown to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), whichever comes first. On December 3, 2003, the requested TS change was approved.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The direct cause of this event was the failure of the test switch to operate properly in all positions. The root cause of the failure of the test switch will be determined after its removal.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

The switch involved is part of the test circuit only and has no effect on the operation of the SSPS.

There were four options to address this issue. The first was to replace the faulty switch during power operation. This would have involved taking Train B SSPS out of service for at least 36 hours, thus incurring an increase in risk while one train of SSPS is out of service plus the attendant trip risk while working on the SSPS while at power. This alternative was ruled out because of the additional time required beyond the current 24-hour Completion Time to restore a train of SSPS logic and the trip risk. The second option was to shut the unit down to Mode 5 to replace the faulty switch. This would have involved an increase in risk associated with shutting the unit down, plus an additional thermal cycle on the reactor coolant pressure boundary. A third alternative was to complete the required testing using jumpers to mimic the operation of the faulty switch. This would have involved entering the logic cabinet during power operation and installing jumpers which posed a potential trip risk as well as the potential for error. The fourth alternative was to remain at power until the refueling outage scheduled for April 2004. The very small increase in risk associated with this alternative was offset by compensatory actions, and there was no net increase in risk to the health and safety of the public. The compensatory actions included briefing control room operators on the circuits in the Train B SSPS that have not been tested due to the failure of this switch, directing them as to appropriate actions to take in the event of a failure of one of these untested circuits, and increasing operator surveillances of plant parameters indicative of precursors that could challenge the untested functions.

Based on these considerations, there is no adverse effect on plant safety or on the health and safety of the public as a result of this condition.

The event does not represent a safety system functional failure.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTION

- 1) The failed switch will be replaced following the next time the unit enters Mode 5.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

2) An investigation into the cause of the switch failure will be conducted and further corrective actions will be taken, if appropriate. This may include additional testing or replacing of similar test switches in both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1) Failed Component:

Memories test switch manufactured by Grayhill, Inc. / Westinghouse Corp.
Westinghouse Part # 2384A22H10.

1) Previous Similar Events:

None

3) Energy Industry Identification System Code:

Solid State Protection System – JG
Main Feedwater System – SJ
Safety Injection System – BQ
Nuclear Instrumentation System - JD