

# Performance of Commercial Zircaloy-Clad Fuel Assemblies

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Tae:

Here are the slides  
that EPRI gave at  
YMP on 8/19/99

SAND 90-2406: <sup>Eric H.</sup>frumpath

EPRI

8/19/99

main/legacy-70

# *Background*

- Meeting at EPRI on July 20 to discuss “Cladding Performance of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel”
- EPRI invited to make a presentation at an internal meeting involving M&O staff


## *Background (cont.'d)*

- Summary (Stahl's Presentation, July 1999)
  - “The failure fraction of Zircaloy cladding received at the repository is expected to be low based on utility and DOE experience
  - The NRC, EPRI and others believe that cladding performance can be assumed if degradation mechanism uncertainties are reduced
  - An approach to utilizing cladding performance in the MGR performance analyses have been developed and tests are underway or have been initiated to support the approach”

## *Background (cont.'d)*

- General Comments by EPRI Staff
  - Strongly supportive for including cladding performance, to the maximum possible extent, in the License Application
  - Use, or develop, best-estimate understanding of fuel rod parameters/properties that are important for predicting cladding performance

%  
Rod  
Population



Parameter  
"X"

## *Background (cont.'d)*

- Topics of Interest
  - Condition of the spent fuel cladding as the fuel is received at the repository
    - Fraction of (un)failed fuel
    - Fraction of fuel with incipient cladding defects or wall thinning
    - Properties of the cladding (mechanical, microstructural characteristics)

## *Background (cont.'d)*

- Topics of Interest (cont.'d)
  - Expected behavior of the cladding during the initial thermal pulse and during subsequent storage
    - Possible degradation modes prior to waste package failure (creep, delayed hydrogen cracking, etc...)
    - Degradation modes after waste package failure (contact with concentrated J-13 water) including localized corrosion and clad unzipping
    - Fraction of fuel expected to remain (un)failed during storage

# *Condition of the Spent Fuel As It Is Received at the Repository*

- Information exists with regard to fuel rod failure types and failure rates
  - PWR
    - Debris
    - Baffle-Jetting
    - Grid Fretting
    - Primary Hydriding
    - Fabrication Defects
    - Excessive Oxidation
    - ...



# *Condition of the Spent Fuel As It Is Received at the Repository*

- Information exists with regard to fuel rod failure types and failure rates
  - BWR
    - Crud-Induced Localized Corrosion (CILC)
    - Pellet-Cladding Interactions
    - Fabrication
    - ...

# *Condition of the Spent Fuel As It Is Received at the Repository*

- Generally, failures are the result of:
  - Presence of a “threshold” feature or event such as fabrication defect, excessive power ramp, presence of debris, assembly resonance, gaps between baffle plates, excessive residual moisture in the pellets, ...
  - Acceleration of waterside corrosion (CILC in BWRs; accelerated uniform corrosion in PWRs)

# *Condition of the Spent Fuel As It Is Received at the Repository*


- Incipient defects (cracks) do not appear to be much of an issue
  - Failure rates do not trend up with rod burnup, but cladding wastage does
  - Principal in-reactor fuel performance concern is cladding oxidation, assuming that assembly design (flow-induced vibration) and fabrication (vacuum drying, welding) are not issues
  - Special consideration needs to be given to hydrogen concentration in cladding

# *Condition of the Spent Fuel As It Is Received at the Repository*

- Cladding wastage (wall thinning)
  - Fuel-cladding interaction layer
    - Fuel-cladding interaction layer starts to appear at pellet average burnup of  $\sim 35$  GWd/t and is fully defined by 50 GWd/t
      - Consists of an inner zirconium oxide layer ( $\sim 10$   $\mu\text{m}$ ) and U-Cs-Zr compounds
  - Waterside corrosion
    - In PWRs, peak oxide corrosion thicknesses are kept (well) below  $100$   $\mu\text{m}$ , or below threshold thickness resulting in oxide spallation

## *Condition of the Spent Fuel As It Is Received at the Repository*

- Waterside corrosion reaction produces hydrogen:



- Approximately 15% of the hydrogen produced by the oxidation reaction ends up in the cladding
- Hydrogen distribution and subsequent hydride precipitation and orientation leads to the consideration of “incipient” defects

# *Condition of the Spent Fuel As It Is Received at the Repository*

- Hydrogen distribution within the cladding is influenced by the presence of temperature gradients (Soret effect)
- Hydrogen distribution within the cladding may be influenced by the presence of stress gradients (especially in the presence of thermal cycling)
- Upon cooling, zirconium hydrides precipitate, typically in a circumferencial orientation

# *Condition of the Spent Fuel As It Is Received at the Repository*

- Mechanical Properties
  - Irradiation effects
  - Hydrogen content effects (hydride distribution and orientation)
- Microstructural Properties
  - In-reactor corrosion results in a memory effect affecting subsequent out-of-reactor oxidation rate

# *Condition of the Spent Fuel As It Is Received at the Repository*

- In addition to in-reactor service, fuel assemblies experience:
  - Handling (unloading/reloading)
  - Wet Storage
  - Dry Inert Storage (handling, vacuum drying, transfer, dry storage)
  - Transportation (handling, transfer, re-packaging, truck or rail transport, ...)



## *Condition of the Spent Fuel As It Is Received at the Repository*

- Few data points exist that would form a basis for justifying a meaningful increase in the number of rod failures
  - Reasonable confidence that at-reactor operational practices lead to fuel failures (even in unusual circumstances), although there have been events leading to an increase in the severity of the failure

# *Condition of the Spent Fuel As It Is Received at the Repository*

- Few data points exist ...
  - Feedback from experience with dry storage operations is limited (DOE/EPRI/VEPCO Program at INEEL)
    - Surry fuel in CastorV/21 cask
    - Dry consolidation operations resulted in a small number of failures
    - Ongoing NRC/EPRI/DOE project expected to provide much needed data on the evolution of hydrogen in the cladding during dry, inert storage

# *Condition of the Spent Fuel As It Is Received at the Repository*

- Few data points exist ...
  - Experience with transportation of irradiated assemblies or rods under inert conditions does not indicate much cause for concern at this time
    - SAND90-2406 estimates the failure probability per rod, under normal transport conditions, at  $2 \times 10^{-7}$  (pinhole failure) and  $2 \times 10^{-12}$  (rod breakage)

# *Condition of the Spent Fuel As It Is Received at the Repository*

- Expectations are that the condition of the spent fuel received at the repository is expected to be pretty much the same as when it was discharged from the reactor
- Potential incipient defects to consider:
  - hydride platelets with radial orientation
    - presence or absence of re-orientation of hydride platelets due to dry storage (NRC/EPRI/DOE project)
  - hydride clusters due to spalling are not likely to be significant
  - high-burnup (>60 GWd/t) fuel designs (?)

# *Cladding Behavior During the Initial Thermal Pulse and Subsequent Storage*

- Potential Degradation Modes
  - Intact Waste Package
    - Creep
    - Delayed Hydrogen Cracking
    - (DCCG/PCI/...)
  - Degraded Waste Package
    - Uniform corrosion
    - Localized corrosion
    - Failures due to impact loads
    - ...

# *Cladding Behavior During the Initial Thermal Pulse and Subsequent Storage*

- Primary parameters to consider
  - Hoop stress [internal rod pressure, cladding thickness)
  - Temperature
  - Time at temperature
- Materials Properties
  - Cladding fracture toughness
  - Creep behavior
  - Rupture mode

# *Cladding Behavior During the Initial Thermal Pulse and Subsequent Storage*

- Temperature history during the initial pulse:  
the lower, the better
  - 300°C and below generally regarded as the temperature regime at which creep deformation is not likely to be significant
- Value of the hoop stress (in combination with high enough temperatures) will impact creep deformation rate, critical flaw size (DHC), hydride re-orientation
  - Assumed fission gas release is a key issue (PWR)

# *Cladding Behavior During the Initial Thermal Pulse and Subsequent Storage*

- Advocate a better understanding of the fuel rod parameters/properties that are important for predicting cladding performance
  - especially, fission gas release for PWR rods
- Confident that uniform corrosion is unlikely to be an issue, but offer no comments on localized corrosion (low pH, ferric solutions?), clad unzipping (fuel oxidation?), and mechanical failure by rockfall