



*Pacific Gas and
Electric Company*

Diablo Canyon Power Plant
P.O. Box 56
Avila Beach, CA 93424

800.545.6000

November 10, 2003

PG&E Letter DCL-03-145

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80
Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Update

Dear Commissioners and Staff:


In accordance with Section V, "Implementing Procedures," of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, enclosed is an update to the Emergency Plan (EP) implementing procedures for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 as indicated in Enclosure 1.

As provided under 10 CFR 50.54(q), the changes have been made without prior NRC approval since they do not decrease the effectiveness of the EP. The EP, as changed, continues to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

This update contains privacy/proprietary information that has been bracketed in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 81-27. Enclosure 2 provides the location of the privacy/proprietary information.

If there are any questions regarding this update, please contact Mr. Mark Lemke of my staff at (805) 545-4787.

Sincerely,



James E. Tomkins
Director - Site Services

ddm/1345

Enclosures

cc: David L. Proulx
Girija S. Shukla

cc/enc: Bruce S. Mallett
Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector (RGN-IV/DRS)

A045

**LOCATION OF PRIVACY/PROPRIETARY INFORMATION IN
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
FOR DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2**

Procedure Number	Privacy/ Proprietary Information	Title/Location of Privacy/Proprietary Information
EP G-1, Revision 33	No	Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation
EP G-2, Revision 27	Yes	Interim Emergency Response Organization Attachment 6.3, page 1 of 1
EP RB-8, Revision 17	Yes	Instructions for Field Monitoring Teams Attachment 7.6, page 1 of 2
EP EF-1, Revision 31	Yes	Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center Attachment 6.20, page 1 of 2
EP EF-3, Revision 24	Yes	Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility Attachment 5.6, page 1 of 5 Attachment 5.7, page 1 of 1 Attachment 5.8, page 1 of 1 Attachment 5.12, page 1 of 1 Attachment 5.17, page 1 of 1

DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

Table of Contents - Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures
Volume 1A (OM10.ID3 only), Volume 1B (OM10.DC1 only), and Volume 3B

Proc. No.	Rev.	Title
OM10.DC1	2A	Emergency Preparedness Drills and Exercises
EP G-1*	33	Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation
EP G-2*	27	Interim Emergency Response Organization
EP G-3	41	Notification of Off-Site Agencies and Emergency Response Organization Personnel
EP G-4	21	Assembly and Accountability
EP G-5	9A	Evacuation of Nonessential Site Personnel
EP R-2	21	Release of Airborne Radioactive Materials Initial Assessment
EP R-3	8C	Release of Radioactive Liquids
EP R-7	13A	Off-Site Transportation Accidents
EP OR-3	6A	Emergency Recovery
EP RB-1	5B	Personnel Dosimetry
EP RB-2	5	Emergency Exposure Guides
EP RB-3	4	Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking
EP RB-4	4A	Access to and Establishment of Controlled Areas Under Emergency Conditions
EP RB-5	5	Personnel Decontamination
EP RB-8*	17	Instructions for Field Monitoring Teams
EP RB-9	11A	Calculation of Release Rate
EP RB-10	10	Protective Action Recommendations
EP RB-11	12	Emergency Offsite Dose Calculations
EP RB-12	6	Plant Vent Iodine and Particulate Sampling During Accident Conditions
EP RB-14	7A	Core Damage Assessment Procedure
EP RB-15	11	Post Accident Sampling System
EP EF-1*	31	Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center
EP EF-2	27	Operational Support Center
EP EF-3*	24	Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility
EP EF-4	14	Activation of the Off-Site Emergency Laboratory
EP EF-9	8	Backup Emergency Response Facilities
EP EF-10	5	Joint Media Center Activation and Operation

* Procedure included in this submittal

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION
DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

NUMBER EP G-1
REVISION 33
PAGE 1 OF 3
UNITS

TITLE: Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation

1 AND 2

10/10/03
EFFECTIVE DATE

PROCEDURE CLASSIFICATION: QUALITY RELATED

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1. SCOPE

1.1 This procedure describes accident classification guidelines and Emergency Plan activation responsibilities.

2. DISCUSSION

2.1 The steps required by this procedure are in addition to the steps required to maintain the plant in, or restore the plant to, a safe condition.

2.2 Events not meeting the minimum classification criteria contained in this procedure should be reviewed for reportability in XI1.ID2, "Regulatory Reporting Requirements and Reporting Process."

3. DEFINITIONS

3.1 Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs)

3.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) - characterized by off-normal conditions that:

- a. May not in themselves be particularly significant from an emergency preparedness standpoint, but could reasonably indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant if proper action is not taken or if circumstances beyond the control of the operating staff render the situation more serious from a safety stand point. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT

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TITLE: Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation

- 3.1.2 Alert - events in progress or having occurred, involving an actual or potentially substantial degradation of the plant safety level.
- a. Small releases of radioactivity may occur (greater than Technical Specification limits for normal operation, but only a small fraction of the EPA Protective Action Guideline (PAG) exposure levels at the site boundary). It is the lowest level where emergency offsite response may be anticipated.
 - b. The lowest classification level where off-site emergency response is anticipated.
- 3.1.3 Site Area Emergency (SAE) - events which are in progress or have occurred involving actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public, but a core meltdown situation is not indicated based on current information.
- a. Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guides except near the site boundary. However, because the possible release is significant, care must be taken in alerting offsite authorities to distinguish whether the release is merely potential, likely, or actually occurring. Response of offsite authorities will be guided initially by this determination.
- 3.1.4 General Emergency (GE) - event(s) in progress or having occurred which indicate:
- a. Imminent substantial core degradation or melting.
 - b. Potential for containment loss.
 - c. Radioactive releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAGs off-site for more than the immediate area.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES

- 4.1 Interim Site Emergency Coordinator (Interim SEC or ISEC) - Control room shift manager is responsible for initial event classification and emergency plan activation. The ISEC may upgrade the event classification until relieved by either the SEC or RM. In addition, the ISEC may downgrade a NUE to no ECL.
- 4.2 Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) - The SEC may upgrade the classification of an event until relieved by the recovery manager.
- 4.3 Recovery Manager (RM) - The RM, once staffed, is responsible for upgrading or downgrading ECLs, and may direct the SEC to change ECLs.

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UNITS 1 AND 2

TITLE: Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation

5. INSTRUCTIONS

5.1 The Interim Site Emergency Coordinator shall:

5.1.1 Initially classify and declare the event using ONLY the guidance in Attachment 7.1 of this procedure.

NOTE: Simultaneous EALs that increase the probability of release require escalation of the ECL to one level above the higher EAL.

5.1.2 Formally announce all emergency classification declarations to the control room, TSC, or EOF, respectively.

5.2 The ISEC or SEC may:

5.2.1 Upgrade the event to a higher ECL until the recovery manager arrives at and assumes responsibility in the EOF. However, the ISEC and SEC shall not downgrade an event classified at the Alert or higher level at any time. The ISEC may downgrade a NUE to no ECL.

5.2.2 Only the recovery manager may downgrade an ECL at the Alert or higher level according to the most current controlling EAL.

6. RECORDS

6.1 There are no quality or nonquality records generated by this procedure.

7. ATTACHMENTS

7.1 "Emergency Action Level Classification Chart," 10/1/03

8. REFERENCES

8.1 EP EF-1, "Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center."

8.2 EP EF-2, "Activation and Operation of the Operational Support Center."

8.3 EP EF-3, "Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility."

8.4 EP OR-3, "Emergency Recovery."

8.5 EP G-3, "Emergency Notification of Off-Site Agencies."

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DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT
EP G-1
ATTACHMENT 7.1

1 AND 2

TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
I. FIRE (All Modes)	1. Fire <u>not</u> under control within 15 minutes of initiating fire fighting efforts <u>AND</u> affecting plant equipment or power supplies in or near the Protected Area(s).	1. Fire <u>not</u> under control within 15 minutes of initiating fire fighting efforts <u>AND</u> threatening the loss of function of any of the following Safety Related systems required for safe shutdown: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Vital Power Supplies: D/Gs, DFOT, Vital 4kV, 480V, 120VAC, or 125VDC - Primary Systems and Auxiliaries: RCS, CCW, RHR, or Charging and Boration - Heat Sinks: AFW, ASW, 10% Dumps, SIG Safeties, or MSIVs - Control Room, Cable Spreading Rooms, or HSDP. 	1. Fire causing the complete loss of function of any one of the following safety related systems required for safe shutdown: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Vital Power Supplies: D/Gs, DFOT, Vital 4kV, 480V, 120VAC, or 125VDC - Primary Systems and Auxiliaries: RCS, CCW, RHR, or Charging and Boration - Heat Sinks: AFW, ASW, 10% Dumps, SIG Safeties, or MSIVs - Control Room, Cable Spreading Rooms, or HSDP. 	1. Site Emergency Coordinator judges that a fire could cause common damage to plant systems which is determined to have the potential to release radioactive material in quantities sufficient to cause exposures comparable to General Emergency #4.
II. FUEL DAMAGE OR VESSEL DAMAGE (Modes 1-4)	2. Indication of Fuel Damage as shown by: Confirmed RCS sample shows $> 100/\bar{E}$ $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$ specific activity (Tech Spec 3.4.8) <u>OR</u> Confirmed RCS sample shows dose equivalent I-131 activity $>$ Tech Spec limit for Iodine Spike (Tech Spec Fig. 3.4-1). Category II Continued on next page.	2. Indication of Fuel Damage as shown by: Confirmed RCS sample $> 300 \mu\text{Ci/cc}$ of equivalent I-131 specific activity <u>OR</u> equivalent fuel failure is measured by exposure rate from systems carrying reactor coolant per EP RB-14 Category II Continued on next page.	See SAE #14 for Steam Line Break Category II Continued on next page.	2. Degraded core with possible loss of coolable geometry as indicated by: 5 or more thermocouple readings > 1200 deg. F. <u>OR</u> LOCA with no indication of ECCS flow <u>AND</u> indication of fuel damage (See Alert #2) <u>OR</u> LOCA with containment rad levels $>$ values for 100% gap release in EP RB-14. Category II Continued on next page.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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EP G-1 (UNITS 1 AND 2)
ATTACHMENT 7.1

TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
II. FUEL DAMAGE OR VESSEL DAMAGE (Modes 1-4) (Continued)	3. Pressurized Thermal Shock is verified by entry into EOP FR-P.1 AND Left of Limit A curve (EOP F-0).			3. Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers: A) Indication of fuel damage (See Alert #2) AND Determination of a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) which requires entry into EOP E-3 AND Steam release from ruptured S/G, either used for plant cooldown purposes or due to a steamline break. B) Indication of Fuel Damage (See Alert #2) AND Determination of a SGTR requiring entry into EOP E-3 AND Indication of a steam line break inside containment AND High potential for loss of containment integrity (e.g., loss of function of both Containment Spray trains OR loss of function of one Containment Spray train and four CFCUs).

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
II. FUEL DAMAGE OR VESSEL DAMAGE (Modes 1-4) (Continued)	3. Pressurized Thermal Shock is verified by entry into EOP FR-P.1 <u>AND</u> Left of Limit A curve (EOP F-0). (Continued)			C) Indication of Fuel Damage (See Alert #2) <u>AND</u> Determination of a SGTR which requires entry into EOP E-3 <u>AND</u> Indication of a steam line break outside containment with inability to isolate the break. D) Potential fuel damage indicated by 5 or more thermocouple readings > 700 deg. F or RVLIS < 32% <u>AND</u> LOCA as indicated by RCS leakage and SI <u>AND</u> Loss of containment integrity.
III. FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT (All Modes)		3. Fuel Handling Accident causing a release in Containment or the Fuel Handling Building <u>WITH</u> The potential to exceed the criteria listed in Alert #4 or #5.	2. Fuel Handling Accident causing a release in Containment or the Fuel Handling Building <u>WITH</u> The potential to exceed the criteria listed in SAE #3.	
IV. LOSS OF CONTROL OR RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (All Modes)	4. Projected dose rate at the Site Boundary (800 meters) is ≥ 0.057 mRem/hr TEDE <u>OR</u> ≥ 0.170 mRem/hr Thyroid CDE for actual or expected release. Category IV Continued on next page.	4. Projected dose rate at the Site Boundary (800 meters) is ≥ 0.57 mRem/hr TEDE <u>OR</u> ≥ 1.7 mRem/hr Thyroid CDE for actual or expected release. Category IV Continued on next page.	3. Projected dose at the Site Boundary (800 meters) is ≥ 100 mRem TEDE <u>OR</u> ≥ 500 mRem Thyroid CDE for actual or expected release. Category IV Continued on next page.	4. Projected dose at the Site Boundary (800 meters) is ≥ 1,000 mRem TEDE <u>OR</u> ≥ 5,000 mRem Thyroid CDE for actual or expected release. Category IV Continued on next page.

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart

UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY	
IV. LOSS OF CONTROL OR RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (All Modes) (Continued)	5. A valid reading in excess of the isolation setpoint, which fails to isolate the release on any of the Radiological Process Effluent Monitors: RE-18 OR RE-23 During discharge <u>only</u> .	5. Valid alarm on plant vent high range noble gas monitor RE-29. <u>NOTE: ALARMS AT STATE OES SACRAMENTO.</u>		
	6. An actual liquid release which exceeds the limits of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 2, Col. 2 per CY2.ID1.	6. An actual liquid release which exceeds 10x the limits of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 2, Col. 2 per CY2.ID1.		
	7. Radiological Effluent Process Monitor High Radiation Alarm with valid reading in excess of alarm setpoint on any of the following monitors: RE-14/14R RE-24/24R RE-28/28R.	7. Unplanned or unanticipated increase of 1 R/hr or greater in any of the following areas: Passageways, <u>OR</u> Normally occupied areas, <u>OR</u> Accessible areas normally < 100 mR/hr, <u>OR</u> Outside boundaries of Radiologically Controlled Areas <u>AND</u> , for any area above, a potential exists for <u>EITHER</u> an uncontrolled release to the environment <u>OR</u> a loss of ability to maintain plant safety functions.		
	8. Unplanned or uncontrolled release to the environment exceeding alarm setpoints on RE-3.	8. Unexplained increase of 50 X DAC in airborne radioactivity outside the boundary of the Radiologically Controlled Areas, but within the Plant Protected Area.		

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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EP G-1 (UNITS 1 AND 2)
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TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
V. LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM (All Modes)		9. Entry into OP AP-8A, "Control Room Accessibility," <u>AND</u> controls established within 15 minutes.	4. Entry into OP AP-8A, "Control Room Accessibility," <u>AND</u> controls <u>not</u> established within 15 minutes.	
VI. LOSS OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE	9. Plant is <u>not</u> brought to required operating Mode within any applicable Tech Spec Action Statement time limit (Modes 1-4).		5. Complete loss for greater than 15 minutes of any of the following functions needed to reach or maintain Hot Shutdown (while in Modes 1-4): AFW capability Steam Dump System and S/G Safety Valves Loss of the capability to maintain RCS inventory as evidenced by a loss of all charging pumps coincident with the inability to depressurize and inject with the Safety Injection pumps Loss of capability to increase the Boric Acid concentration sufficient to maintain Keff less than .99 in Mode 4 with a loss of capability to trip control rods ASW or CCW Systems Loss of electrical power or I&C for any of the above listed systems, causing a complete loss of function.	5. Loss of Heat Sink indicated by: Entry into EOP FR H.1 <u>AND</u> Loss of water inventory in 3 S/Gs (< 23% [34%] Wide Range).
	10. Loss of function of both RHR trains for greater than 15 minutes while in Mode 5 or 6.	10. Loss of function of both RHR trains for greater than 15 minutes in Modes 1-4.		
	11. A loss of function of all charging pumps for greater than 15 minutes when normally used for RCS inventory control (Modes 1-4).	11. An unplanned shutdown of the RHR System (while in Mode 5 or 6) for > 1 hour with no other normal means of decay heat removal available (e.g., flooded reactor cavity or steam generators with loops filled).		
		12. An unplanned loss of function of the RHR System (Mode 5 or 6) for greater than 15 minutes <u>AND</u> RCS thermocouple temperature is projected to exceed 200 deg.F within 1 hour of RHR loss (see Appendix B of OP AP SD series) <u>OR</u> RCS thermocouple temperature exceeds 200 deg.F.		

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
VII. LOSS OF POWER OR ALARMS OR ASSESSMENT OR COMMUNICATIONS	12. Loss of <u>all</u> off-site power for greater than 15 minutes <u>AND</u> at least 2 D/Gs are supplying their vital busses (Modes 1-4).	13. Loss of <u>all</u> off-site power for greater than 15 minutes <u>AND</u> only 1 D/G is supplying its vital bus (Modes 1-4).	6. Loss of all on-site <u>AND</u> off-site AC power for > 15 minutes (Modes 1-4).	See General Emergency Condition #5 under LOSS OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE.
	13. Loss of <u>all</u> off-site power for greater than 15 minutes <u>AND</u> at least 1 D/G is supplying its vital bus (Modes 5 and 6).	14. Loss of <u>all</u> off-site and on-site AC power for greater than 15 minutes in Modes 5 or 6.		
	14. Loss of all vital DC power as indicated by DC Bus 11(21), 12(22), and 13(23) undervoltage for > 15 minutes (Modes 5 and 6)	15. Loss of all vital DC power as indicated by DC Bus 11(21), 12 (22) and 13 (23) undervoltage for < 15 minutes (Modes 1-4).	7. Loss of all vital DC power as indicated by DC Bus 11 (21), 12 (22) and 13 (23) undervoltage for > 15 minutes (Modes 1-4).	
	15. Loss of assessment capabilities as indicated by a total loss of SPDS in the Control Room <u>AND</u> simultaneous loss of all displays for any "Accident Monitoring" variable in Tech Spec Table 3.3.3-1 for > 1 hour while in Modes 1, 2 or 3. *			
	16. Main Control Room Annunciators PKs 1 through 5 <u>AND</u> display capabilities <u>AND</u> the seismically qualified annunciator display all do not respond to an alarm condition in Modes 1-4 for over 15 minutes.	16. Main Control Room Annunciators PKs 1 through 5 <u>AND</u> display capabilities <u>AND</u> the seismically qualified annunciator display all do not respond to an alarm condition in MODES 1-4 for over 15 minutes <u>AND</u> the plant is in a significant transient (plant trip, SI, or generator runback >25 Mw/min), nonannunciating systems available.	8. Main Control Room Annunciators PKs 1 through 5 <u>AND</u> display capabilities <u>AND</u> the seismically qualified annunciator display all do not respond to an alarm condition in MODES 1-4 for over 15 minutes <u>AND</u> the plant is in a significant transient <u>AND</u> backup, nonannunciating systems are not available (PPC, SPDS).	

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
VII. LOSS OF POWER OR ALARMS OR ASSESSMENT OR COMMUNICATIONS (Continued)	17. Total loss of communication capability with off-site agencies (all Modes) as indicated by the inability to communicate with SLO County (by telephone and radio) OR the NRC Operations Center.			
VIII. NATURAL PHENOMENA (All Modes)	18. Ground motion felt and recognized as an earthquake by a consensus of Control Room operators on duty <u>AND</u> measuring greater than 0.01g on the Earthquake Force Monitor.	17. Earthquake > 0.2 g verified by Seismic Monitors.	9. Earthquake > 0.4 g verified by Seismic Monitors.	6. Site Emergency Coordinator's judgment that major internal or external events (e.g., earthquakes, wind damage, explosions, etc.) which could cause massive common damage to plant systems which is determined to have the potential to release radioactive material in quantities sufficient to cause exposures comparable to General Emergency #4.
	19. Flooding of any plant structure that causes initiation of entry to Mode 3 due to a Tech Spec action statement.	18. High water exceeding Intake Structure main deck elevation or low water causing cavitation and shutdown of both ASW pumps for < 15 minutes.	10. High water causing flooding of ASW pump compartments or low water causing the shutdown of both ASW pumps for > 15 minutes.	
	20. Tsunami or Hurricane Warning from the State, NOAA, NWS, Coast Guard or System Dispatcher OR Observation of low or high water levels at the Intake Structure indicative of a Tsunami or Hurricane.	19. Sustained wind of 85 mph (38 m/sec) at any elevation on the Met. Tower.	11. Sustained wind speed > 100 mph (45 m/sec). at any elevation on the Met. Tower.	
	21. A tornado sighted within Site Boundary.	20. Tornado strikes the plant protected area.		

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart

	UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
IX. OTHER HAZARDS (All Modes)	22. Report of airplane crash within the Site Boundary or unusual airplane activity threatening the plant.	21. Confirmed missile, airplane crash or explosion involving a plant structure in the protected area.	12. Missile, airplane crash or explosion causing complete loss of a safety system function that causes entry into a Tech Spec Action Statement.	See General Emergency #6 above.
	23. Confirmed explosion on-site.			
	24. Turbine failure causing casing penetration <u>OR</u> damage to turbine or generator seals	22. Turbine failure generating missiles that cause visual damage to other safety related structures, equipment, controls <u>OR</u> power supplies.		
	25. Significant release of flammable <u>OR</u> toxic gas <u>OR</u> liquid that prevents, even with SCBAs, operations inside the power block <u>OR</u> intake structure (ref. CP M-9a).	23. Release of flammable <u>OR</u> toxic gas <u>OR</u> liquid that jeopardizes operation of safety related systems by either preventing required access <u>OR</u> by threatening imminent damage.		
X. PRIMARY OR PRI/SEC OR SECONDARY LEAK) (Modes 1-4	26. RCS unidentified <u>OR</u> pressure boundary leakage that exceeds 10 gpm <u>OR</u> identified leakage that exceeds 25 gpm.	24. Primary leak rate > 50 gpm.	13. Known primary system LOCA during which RCS subcooling cannot be maintained >20°F <u>OR</u> PZR level cannot be maintained >4% (28% with adverse containment).	See General Emergency #3 under Fuel or Vessel Damage.
	27. SI Actuation with ECCS injection into the RCS resulting from a valid signal based on actual plant conditions. NOTE: SI ACTUATION ALSO ALARMS AT OES IN SACRAMENTO.	25. Determination of a SGTR which results in entry into EOP E-3.		
	28. Steam line break which results in SI actuation.	26. Determination of a steam line break with > 10 gpm Primary to Secondary leakage.		
	29. Failure of a PZR PORV <u>AND</u> Block Valve <u>OR</u> Safety Valve fails to reseal, excluding allowable leakage, following a pressure reduction below the reset point.			

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

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ATTACHMENT 7.1

TITLE: Emergency Action Level Classification Chart

UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
<p>XI. REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILURE (Modes 1-4)</p>	<p>27. Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) as indicated by: Failure of an automatic reactor trip to trip the reactor.</p>	<p>15. An ATWS condition with no fuel damage evident AND An additional failure of a system required for Hot Shutdown (See SAE #5) to actuate.</p>	<p>7. ATWS with Fuel Damage indications (see Alert Condition #2 under FUEL DAMAGE) OR ATWS with potential Core Melt indicated by 5 or more thermocouple readings > 700 deg. F AND RVLIS < 32%.</p>
<p>XII. SECURITY THREAT (All Modes)</p>	<p>30. Security reports the notification of a credible site-specific security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage.</p>	<p>28. Security reports ongoing security threat involving physical attack on the facility or a sabotage device has been detected that threatens the operability of safety related equipment (see Alert #1).</p>	<p>16. Security reports ongoing physical attack on the facility or a sabotage device causing a confirmed loss of function of any one of the following safety related systems required for safe shutdown:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Vital Power Supplies: D/Gs, DFOT, Vital 4kV, 480V, 120VAC, or 125VDC - Primary Systems and Auxiliaries: RCS, CCW, RHR, or Charging and Boration - Heat Sinks: AFW, ASW, 10% Dumps, SIG Safeties, or MSIVs - Control Room, Cable Spreading Rooms, or HSDP.
<p>XIII. SITE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR'S JUDGMENT (All Modes)</p>	<p>31. Site Emergency Coordinator determines conditions warrant increased awareness on the part of off-site authorities of initiation of a plant shutdown per Tech Spec LCOs or involve other than normal controlled shutdown.</p>	<p>29. Site Emergency Coordinator judges plant conditions exist that warrant precautionary activation of the TSC and placing the EOF and other key emergency personnel on stand-by.</p>	<p>17. Site Emergency Coordinator judges that conditions exist that warrant activation of the emergency centers and monitoring teams or a precautionary notification to the public near the site.</p>
			<p>8. Security reports ongoing security threat which causes loss of control of the operations of the plant to hostile forces.</p> <p>9. Site Emergency Coordinator judges conditions exist which have a potential to release radioactive material in quantities sufficient to cause exposures comparable to General Emergency #4.</p>

NOTE: SIMULTANEOUS EALS THAT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE REQUIRE ESCALATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION TO ONE LEVEL ABOVE THE HIGHER EAL.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION
DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

NUMBER EP G-2
REVISION 27
PAGE 1 OF 3
UNITS

TITLE: Interim Emergency Response Organization

1 AND 2

10/23/03

EFFECTIVE DATE

1. SCOPE

This procedure provides emergency response actions to be taken by the interim emergency response organization in the control room during a declared emergency.

This procedure was rewritten; therefore, revision bars are not included.

2. DISCUSSION

The checklists are intended to provide quick reference to all possible emergency response actions and require judgment in prioritizing activities based upon available resources and unforeseen circumstances.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES

Interim Site Emergency Coordinator (ISEC)

Shift manager assumes the duties of the ISEC and takes command and control of the emergency response effort until relieved. The ISEC has the responsibility and authority to:

- Declare emergency classifications. per EP G-1.
- Notify off-site authorities of the event and make protective action recommendations per EP G-3.
- Conduct assembly and accountability on-site, at the Site Area Emergency Level, per EP G-4.
- Authorize extraordinary emergency measures such as authorizing emergency response personnel to exceed normal established dose limits.
- Provide direction for all emergency response operations.
- Maintain liaison with off-site authorities.
- Authorize the evacuation of the plant site per EP G-5.
- Approve press releases.
- Initiate on-site and off-site radiological monitoring.

Emergency Operations Coordinator

The shift foreman of the affected unit assumes this position to manage control room operational activities and advise the ISEC of needed event reclassifications.

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Control Room Communicator #1

This position is assumed by the shift foreman of the unaffected unit.

- Ensures completion of the Emergency Notification Form 69-20596.
- Ensures completion of offsite emergency notifications to: San Luis Obispo County, California State Office of Emergency Services (OES), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) until relieved.

Control Room Communicator #2

- The control room Communicator #2 is responsible for VANS activation to notify the emergency response organization and management personnel.
- The Communicator #2 is also responsible for control room accountability, if required.

Emergency Evaluation Coordinator (EEC)

The EEC performs technical evaluations of plant response, dose assessments, and protective action recommendations (PARs) for approval by the ISEC.

4. INSTRUCTIONS

4.1 Interim Site Emergency Coordinator (ISEC)

- 4.1.1 Upon declaration of an emergency, use the ISEC Emergency Checklist, form 69-20644.

4.2 Emergency Evaluation Coordinator (EEC)

- 4.2.1 Perform EP R-2 calculations and dose assessments.
- 4.2.2 Provide technical evaluations of plant response, dose assessments, and protective action recommendations (PARs).
- 4.2.3 Use Emergency Evaluation Coordinator Checklist, form 69-20645.

4.3 Emergency Operations Coordinator

- 4.3.1 Manage the control room operational activities.

4.4 Communicator #1

- 4.4.1 Communicator #1 shall ensure offsite emergency telephone notifications to San Luis Obispo County and the California State Office of Emergency Services (OES) are completed within 15 minutes of a declared emergency.
- 4.4.2 Communicator #1 shall ensure the NRC is notified within 60 minutes of a declared emergency.
- 4.4.3 Follow up notifications should be completed approximately every 45 minutes.
- 4.4.4 Use Communicator #1 Checklist, Form 69-20646.

4.5 Communicator #2

- 4.5.1 Communicator #2 shall ensure VANS is activated within 10 minutes of a declared emergency to notify appropriate emergency response organization and management personnel.

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- 4.5.2 If VANS is unavailable, the paging phone shall be used in conjunction with the manual call out of personnel using the recall roster.
- 4.5.3 Communicator #2 shall ensure the assembly and accountability process is initiated, if appropriate, in accordance with EP G-4.
- 4.5.4 Use Communicator #2 Checklist, Form 69-20647.

5. RECORDS

Documents generated by this procedure are non-quality good business records and are maintained for a period of three years, in accordance with AD10.ID2.

6. ATTACHMENTS

- 6.1 Form 69-20644, "ISEC Checklist," 10/20/03
- 6.2 Form 69-20645, "Emergency Evaluation Coordinator," 10/20/03
- 6.3 Form 69-20646, "Communicator #1 Checklist," 10/20/03
- 6.4 Form 69-20647, "Communicator #2 Checklist," 10/20/03
- 6.5 Form 69-20649, "VANS Manual Operation," 10/20/03
- 6.6 Form 69-20648, "Paging Phone Activation," 10/20/03

7. REFERENCES

None

DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT
EP G-2
ATTACHMENT 6.1

1 AND 2

TITLE: ISEC Checklist

Print Name _____ Date _____

- 1. Declare the appropriate emergency classification within 15 minutes of meeting EP G-1 EAL criteria.
- 2. Direct the control room staff to assume emergency response roles and obtain their position binders.
- 3. For an Unusual Event:
 - Direct Communicator #2 to activate VANS as soon as possible. This notifies senior management only.
 - Direct Communicator #1 to fill out the notification form and complete off-site agency notifications within 15 minutes of classification. (For closeout of an Unusual Event, go to Step 10)
- 4. For an ALERT or higher:
 - Direct Communicator #2 to activate VANs within 10 minutes of the ALERT (even if already activated at the UE level). This will activate the ERO.
 - Direct Communicator #1 to fill out the notification form and complete off-site agency notifications within 15 minutes of classification.
- 5. If an ALERT has been declared, make the following PA announcement.

Attention, all plant personnel, _____ has been declared for Unit _____,
(Emergency classification)

All emergency response personnel report to your assigned emergency response facilities.

- 6. For a Site Area Emergency or higher, or if assembly and accountability is required,
 - Sound the Site Emergency Signal for 60 seconds, and make the following PA Announcement.

Attention, all plant personnel, _____ has been declared for Unit _____,
(Emergency Classification)

All emergency response personnel report to your assigned emergency response facilities. The Assembly and Accountability process has been activated. All non-essential personnel, place your work in a safe condition, leave the power block, and return to your normal desks.

- Refer to G-4 and direct Communicator #2 to complete On-shift accountability and fax the form to the Security Watch Commander.
- 7. Evaluate initiation of early work release or site evacuation. Refer to EP G-5.
- 8. Authorize KI administration if required. Refer to EP RB-3.

EP G-2 (UNITS 1 AND 2)
ATTACHMENT 6.1

TITLE: ISEC Checklist

9. When ready to turn over to the SEC or the RM, activate the Video Conference Unit, and use form 69-20437, ISEC/SEC/RM Turnover Checklist to turnover ISEC responsibilities.
-

Unusual Event Termination - When plant conditions no longer meet any Unusual Event criteria:

10. Ensure offsite notifications are made in accordance with EP G-3.
11. Ensure an AT REPT action request is initiated with 24 hours of termination.

DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT

EP G-2

ATTACHMENT 6.2

1 AND **2**

TITLE: Emergency Evaluation Coordinator

Print Name _____ **Date** _____

- 1. If a radiological release is indicated, perform an assessment of site boundary dose rate in accordance with EP R-2 and notify the ISEC.
- 2. Compare the EP R-2 calculation results with EP G-1 EALs and assist the ISEC with emergency classifications.
- 3. Activate ERDS on SPDS within 30 minutes of emergency classification.
- 4. If the EOF is activated, contact the UDAC radiological manager to provide a briefing of plant status, radiological conditions, status of field monitoring teams, and the status of KI administration.