

October 31, 2003


L-PI-03-097
10 CFR 73, App G
10 CFR 50.73

U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
DOCKET NOS. 50-282 AND 50-306
LICENSE NOS. DPR-42 AND DPR-60
LER 1-03-03, UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO A PROTECTED AREA

The Licensee Event Report for this occurrence is attached. This event was reported via the Emergency Notification System in accordance with 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix G, Section I, on September 10, 2003. Please contact us if you require additional information related to this event.

This letter and attached report contain no new NRC commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.



Joseph M. Solymossy
Site Vice President, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant

CC Regional Administrator, USNRC, Region III
Director, Division of Nuclear Security, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
Project Manager, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, USNRC, NRR
NRC Resident Inspector – Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Glenn Wilson, State of Minnesota

Attachment

Pen correction
made per Jeff
Kivi on page 1 of 4
on form 366 via
telecon with
J. McKnight-DGD
IE 74

NRC FORM 366 (1-2001)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION		APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 6-30-2001						
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)						Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.				
FACILITY NAME (1) Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1				DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000 282		PAGE (3) 1 OF 4				
TITLE (4) UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO A PROTECTED AREA										
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
09	10	03	03	- 03 -	00	10	31	03	Prairie Island Unit 2	05000 306
OPERATING MODE (9)		1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		100	20.2201(b)			20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
			20.2201(d)			20.2203(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
			20.2203(a)(1)			50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	73.71(a)(4)
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)			50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	73.71(a)(5)
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	✓ OTHER
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			50.46(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(vi)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
			20.2203(a)(3)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)										
NAME Jeff Kivi								TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 651-388-1121		
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)								EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).						✓ NO				
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) On September 10, 2003 at 1458 CDT with both units operating at 100% power, an outage worker was granted unescorted access. At 1502 the worker entered the Prairie Island protected area in an unescorted status. At 1730 information in the worker's access authorization file was discovered that warranted denial of unescorted access. At 1743 the worker was removed from the protected area. The individual made no keycard entries into vital or security-controlled areas. An evaluation of the cause of this event attributed this event to: the NMC Site Access Specialist not correctly interpreting information received from the psychological services provider; and similarity in format of favorable/unfavorable communications from the psychological services provider. Corrective actions to prevent recurrence have been entered into the NMC corrective action process.										

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1	05000 282	03 - 03 - 00			2 OF 4

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

Between August 18, 2003, and September 8, 2003, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, (NMC) Security initiated unescorted access authorization (UAA) processing on an applicant that Prairie Island had requested in support of the Fall 2003 outage. Initial UAA processing was initiated in accordance with NMC Access Authorization Program. Elements of initial UAA include:

- 3-year employment check
- 5-year education verification
- Credit check
- Criminal history check
- Psychological assessment
- Reference checks

Except for the psychological assessment, all UAA elements for the applicant had been completed as of September 8, 2003.

On September 9, 2003, at 0943 CDT, NMC received fax results of the psychological assessment on the applicant, which completed initial access authorization elements for the applicant. Results of the psychological assessment recommended against the granting of UAA. At 1830 CDT the same day, the NMC Site Access Specialist (SAS) for Prairie Island misread the letter from the psychological services provider and incorrectly entered the information into the plant inprocessing system – indicating the individual successfully completed the assessment.

On September 10, 2003, at 0559 CDT, the SAS ran an audit checklist for the applicant indicating the applicable elements for UAA were complete. Because the results of the psychological assessment were incorrectly entered, the audit report indicated the applicant met applicable UAA requirements. At 1458 CDT the same day, the Prairie Island Site Access Coordinator (SAC) granted unescorted access in the security computer activating the applicant's badge for protected area access. At 1502 CDT, the applicant entered the Prairie Island protected area in an unescorted status. At 1730 CDT, the SAS identified the error in reading and entering the information into the plant inprocessing system. At 1743 CDT, the applicant was removed from the protected area. The individual made no keycard entries into vital or security-controlled areas.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1	05000 282		03 - 03 - 00		3 OF 4

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

An apparent cause evaluation conducted by the NMC Access Manager attributed this event to two causes:

1. The SAS did not demonstrate the appropriate attention to detail to correctly interpret the information received from the psychological services provider.
2. Similarity in the format of favorable/unfavorable communications from the psychological services provider. At the time of the event, the letters for screen-in versus screen-out were similarly formatted, with header, applicant identifying information, and lead-in paragraph exactly alike. The type in the letter indicating screen-out is similar to the font in the screen-in letter, but the language is distinct and does clearly state the individual is not recommended for UAA.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

This event resulted in an actual entry of an unauthorized person into a protected area and, thus, is reportable per 10CFR 73, Appendix G, Section I.(b).

Impact on Safety System Functional Failure Performance Indicator

This event is not equipment related and thus has no impact on the Safety System Functional Failure Performance Indicator.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS**Immediate**

1. The worker who was inappropriately granted unescorted access to the protected area was removed from the protected area.
2. An unfavorable termination was entered in the inprocessing system indicating denied access status. The inprocessing system automatically transfers the same information to the Personnel Access Data System (PADS) utilized by the nuclear industry to share access authorization status. The denied individual did not have access at any other nuclear sites at the time of denial at Prairie Island.

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Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1	05000 282	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	4 OF 4
		03 - 03 - 00			

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Subsequent

3. The NMC Access Manager immediately directed peer reviews for all initial and update screening to minimize risk of error recurrence. Audit checklists for initial and update UAA have been revised to require documented peer review prior to granting UAA.
4. NMC Security worked with the psychological services provider to revise the method for reporting psychological recommendations against UAA to more clearly distinguish such letters from those recommending UAA. The formats for the letters are now significantly more distinct.
5. A Plant Personnel Tracking Report was generated from the security computer to verify the individual had not entered any security-controlled areas. Follow-up interviews with the individual's supervisor and a co-worker confirmed the individual did not perform any acts adverse to plant safety or security.

Long Term

6. The fleet Access Authorization Program procedure will be revised to reflect to enhanced peer check as a required action fleet-wide.

FAILED COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION

None.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

None.