



D.M. JAMIL
Vice President

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Catawba Nuclear Station
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October 23, 2003

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Duke Energy Corporation
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Docket Numbers 50-413 and 50-414
Proposed Technical Specifications Amendments
3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System
Instrumentation

Reference: Letter from Duke Energy Corporation to NRC, same
subject, dated August 19, 2003

The reference letter transmitted Duke Energy Corporation's proposed license amendment to revise the Catawba Nuclear Station Facility Operating Licenses and Technical Specifications (TS) to modify the requirements for the Containment Pressure Control System (CPCS) in TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Function 9. This change was requested in order to eliminate a problem with CPCS circuit fluctuation as a result of electronic noise.

On September 10, 2003, the NRC issued License Amendments 208 and 202 for Catawba Units 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments modified the TS and Bases for TS 3.3.2 and resulted in revisions to the pages contained in the reference letter. Therefore, the subject pages for the CPCS proposed amendment are being remarked and resubmitted to reflect the currently issued pages.

This resubmittal of the affected TS and Bases pages does not result in changes to the technical discussion associated with the reference letter. Also, no changes to the originally transmitted No Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis or Environmental Analysis are necessary.

There are no NRC commitments contained in this letter or its attachment.

A001

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission


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Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this letter is being sent to the appropriate state official.

Inquiries on this matter should be directed to L.J. Rudy at (803) 831-3084.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Dhiam Jamil', with a large, stylized flourish at the end.

Dhiaa M. Jamil

LJR/s

Attachment


October 23, 2003

Dhiaa M. Jamil, affirms that he is the person who subscribed his name to the foregoing statement, and that all the matters and facts set forth herein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.




Dhiaa M. Jamil, Vice President

Subscribed and sworn to me: 10-23-2003
Date


Notary Public

My commission expires: 7-10-2012
Date



SEAL

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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xc (with attachment):

L.A. Reyes

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Regional Administrator, Region II

Atlanta Federal Center

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E.F. Guthrie

Senior Resident Inspector (CNS)

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Catawba Nuclear Station

S.E. Peters (addressee only)

NRC Senior Project Manager (CNS)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Mail Stop 08-H12

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H.J. Porter, Director

Division of Radioactive Waste Management

Bureau of Land and Waste Management

Department of Health and Environmental Control

2600 Bull St.

Columbia, SC 29201

ATTACHMENT 1

**MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND BASES PAGES FOR
CATAWBA**

Table 3.3.2-1 (page 5 of 5)
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation

FUNCTION	APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS	REQUIRED CHANNELS	CONDITIONS	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS	ALLOWABLE VALUE	NOMINAL TRIP SETPOINT
7. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump						
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	1,2,3,4	2 trains	C	SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.6	NA	NA
b. Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level - Low	1,2,3,4	4	N	SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10	≥ 162.4 inches	177.15 inches
Coincident with Safety Injection	Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.					
8. ESFAS Interlocks						
a. Reactor Trip, P-4	1,2,3	1 per train, 2 trains	F	SR 3.3.2.8	NA	NA
b. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11	1,2,3	3	O	SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9	≥ 1944 and ≤ 1966 psig	1955 psig
c. T _{avg} - Low Low, P-12	1,2,3	1 per loop	O	SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9	≥ 550°F	553°F
9. Containment Pressure Control System						
a. Start Permissive	1,2,3,4	4 per train	P	SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.9	≤ 0.45 psid	0.4 psid
b. Termination	1,2,3,4	4 per train	P	SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.9	≥ 0.25 psid	0.3 psid
10. Nuclear Service Water Suction Transfer - Low Pit Level	1,2,3,4	3 per pit	Q,R	SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.11 SR 3.3.2.12	≥ El. 555.4 ft	El. 557.5 ft

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

decreasing temperature, the P-12 interlock removes the arming signal to the Steam Dump System to prevent an excessive cooldown of the RCS due to a malfunctioning Steam Dump System.

Since T_{avg} is used as an indication of bulk RCS temperature, this Function meets redundancy requirements with one OPERABLE channel in each loop. These channels are used in two-out-of-four logic. This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when a secondary side break or stuck open valve could result in the rapid depressurization of the steam lines. This Function does not have to be OPERABLE in MODE 4, 5, or 6 because there is insufficient energy in the secondary side of the unit to have an accident.

9. Containment Pressure Control System Permissives

The Containment Pressure Control System (CPCS) protects the Containment Building from excessive depressurization by preventing inadvertent actuation or continuous operation of the Containment Spray and Containment Air Return Systems when containment pressure is at or less than the CPCS permissive setpoint. The control scheme of CPCS is comprised of eight independent control circuits (4 per train), each having a separate and independent pressure transmitter and current alarm module. Each pressure transmitter monitors the containment pressure and provides input to its respective current alarm. The current alarms are set to inhibit or terminate containment spray and containment air return systems when containment pressure falls to or below 0.25 psid. The alarm modules switch back to the permissive state (allowing the systems to operate) when containment pressure is greater than or equal to 0.45 psid.

psid

1.0 psid

This function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 when there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressurize containment following a pipe break. In MODES 5 and 6, there is insufficient energy in the primary and secondary sides to significantly pressurize the containment.

10. Nuclear Service Water System Suction Transfer – Low Pit Level

Upon an emergency low pit level signal from either NSWS pit, interlocks isolate the NSWS from Lake Wylie, align NSWS to the standby nuclear service water pond, close particular crossover