

**Mitigating Systems Performance Index Pilot
Working Group Public Meeting
October 22, 2003**

Ongoing Research Activities

by

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Activities

- **Completed Preliminary Draft Report on Pilot Results**
- **Assessing MSPI PRA Adequacy Issues**
 - Sensitivity studies of the effect of PRA model differences on MSPI
 - Development of concept of MSPI pre-implementation checklist
 - Error analysis
- **Evaluating various options to account for the effect of common cause on Fussell-Vesely importance**
- **Future task to benchmark MSPI and SDP results**

Plant MSPI Results 4th Quarter 2002

Year 2000 Baselines, 8-hr EDG Mission Time, No CCF, No Risk Cap

| Licensees' Plant PRA Model | Mitigating System | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | EAC | HPI | HRS | RHR | SWS/CCW |
| Braidwood 1 | 9.60E-08 | 4.39E-08 | 2.28E-06 | 1.51E-08 | 2.82E-09 |
| Braidwood 2 | 1.63E-07 | 2.00E-08 | 1.22E-07 | 1.71E-07 | 1.32E-08 |
| Hope Creek | 1.90E-07 | 5.61E-07 | 4.88E-07 | 1.73E-09 | 8.25E-08 |
| Limerick 1 | 5.87E-08 | 5.88E-08 | 6.60E-08 | 3.96E-08 | 1.87E-08 |
| Limerick 2 | 1.00E-07 | 6.45E-08 | 5.74E-08 | 9.65E-08 | 1.33E-08 |
| Millstone 2 | 4.59E-07 | 2.65E-07 | 3.91E-07 | 3.75E-10 | 6.37E-07 |
| Millstone 3 | 1.12E-06 | 5.64E-07 | 1.72E-06 | 1.46E-07 | 7.70E-08 |
| Palo Verde 1 | 1.10E-07 | 2.42E-08 | 5.37E-07 | 6.30E-09 | 3.00E-08 |
| Palo Verde 2 | 5.23E-08 | 1.35E-08 | 3.02E-06 | 6.01E-09 | 1.02E-07 |
| Palo Verde 3 | 1.79E-07 | 2.38E-08 | 3.59E-07 | 4.01E-09 | 1.49E-07 |
| Prairie Island 1 | 2.04E-07 | 8.48E-09 | 1.14E-07 | 7.65E-08 | 3.52E-07 |
| Prairie Island 2 | 3.62E-07 | 1.03E-08 | 1.90E-08 | 2.59E-08 | 2.65E-07 |
| Salem 1 | 2.84E-06 | 8.34E-09 | 2.03E-07 | 3.30E-07 | 1.14E-07 |
| Salem 2 | 3.18E-06 | 4.20E-08 | 2.51E-07 | 9.79E-08 | 1.44E-07 |
| San Onofre 2 | 1.49E-08 | 2.05E-08 | 4.35E-07 | 2.77E-10 | 9.53E-08 |
| San Onofre 3 | 3.03E-09 | 1.73E-07 | 5.58E-07 | 4.28E-10 | 4.81E-07 |
| South Texas 1 | 1.00E-07 | 5.71E-08 | 5.96E-07 | 4.58E-08 | 1.07E-08 |
| South Texas 2 | 6.02E-08 | 2.02E-07 | 2.74E-07 | 5.21E-08 | 1.66E-07 |
| Surry 1 | 3.91E-07 | 5.95E-09 | 3.16E-08 | 7.91E-09 | 1.97E-07 |
| Surry 2 | 4.00E-07 | 3.42E-09 | 3.40E-08 | 1.92E-10 | 3.62E-07 |

Possible Sensitivity Study Outcomes

- **Large impact**
 - Factor of 10 or more on MSPI numerical result, and
 - Will change color (e.g. WHITE to GREEN, WHITE to YELLOW, etc.)
- **Medium impact**
 - Affects first significant figure of MSPI numerical result, and change > 1E-7
 - Possible change in color depending on how close to threshold
- **Low or no impact**
 - Affects second significant figure (or lower) of MSPI numerical result, or change < 1E-7
 - Unlikely to or will not change color

Plant PRA
use MAPPY

Braidwood Sensitivity Study

| Change Set Group | Basic Event Affected or Description of Change | SPAR Enhanced Model Value or Description | Change |
|---------------------------|--|--|--|
| 1. PORV Success Criterion | PORV success criterion change for feed and bleed | 2 of 2 PORVs required for feed and bleed | 1 of 2 PORVs required for feed and bleed |
| 2. RCP Seal | RCS-MDP-LK-SEALS | 1.9E-1 | True |
| 3. DC Bus Initiator | IE-LDCA | 2.4E-7/h | 7.3E-8/h |
| | DCP-BDC-LP-1A | 9.0E-5 | 9.0E-6 |
| | DCP-BDC-LP-1B | 9.0E-5 | 9.0E-6 |
| | DCP-BDC-LP-2A | 9.0E-5 | 9.0E-6 |
| | DCP-BDC-LP-2B | 9.0E-5 | 9.0E-6 |
| 4. ESW Initiator | IE-LOESW | 1.1E-7/h | 6.0E-9/h |
| | ESW-MDP-FS-1A | 3.0E-3 | 1.4E-3 |
| | ESW-MDP-FS-1B | 3.0E-3 | 1.4E-3 |
| | ESW-MDP-FS-2A | 3.0E-3 | 1.4E-3 |
| | ESW-MDP-FS-2B | 3.0E-3 | 1.4E-3 |
| | ESW-MDP-TM-1A | 9.8E-3 | 5.9E-3 |
| | ESW-MDP-TM-1B | 9.8E-3 | 5.9E-3 |
| | ESW-MDP-TM-2B | 9.8E-3 | 5.9E-3 |

Braidwood Sensitivity Study (cont.)

| | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|----------------------------|--------|
| 5. Feed & Bleed Initiation | HPI-XHE-XM-FB2 | 1.6E-1 | 5.1E-1 |
| 6. AFW Basic Events | AFW-MDP-FS-1A | 2.8E-3 (*0.21 nonrecovery) | 1.6E-3 |
| | AFW-MDP-FR-1A | 7.6E-4 (*0.75 nonrecovery) | 3.2E-3 |
| | AFW-MDP-TM-1A | 1.1E-3 | 5.2E-3 |
| | AFW-DDP-FS-1B | 2.3E-2 (*0.25 nonrecovery) | 1.3E-2 |
| | AFW-FMP-CF-ALL | 6.2E-8 | 3.3E-4 |
| | AFW-XHE-XL-MDPFS | 2.1E-1 | True |
| | AFW-XHE-XL-MDPFR | 7.5E-1 | True |
| | AFW-XHE-XL-EDPFS | 2.5E-1 | True |
| 7. MFW/PCS | MFW-SYS-UNAVAIL | 1.0E-1 | Ignore |
| | MFW-XHE-ERROR | 1.0E-2 | 5.3E-3 |
| | PCS-XHE-XO-SEC | 2.0E-1 | True |
| | PCS-XHE-XO-SECL | 3.4E-1 | True |

Preliminary Results for Braidwood - 1
(4th QTR 2002 Pilot results)

Large Impact

- PORV success criterion: HRS changes from WHITE to YELLOW

Medium Impact

- loss of DC Initiator frequency: HRS becomes a higher WHITE
- AFW basic events: HRS becomes higher WHITE

Low or no impact

- RCP seal model
- ESW initiator frequency
- feed & bleed HRA (special case)
- MFW/PCS values
- effect on all other MSPI systems

MSPI Pre-Implementation Checklist

| | Attribute | Expectation | Base/Staff Guidance | List Value Used and Any Reasons for Significant Deviation | For NRC Staff Review and Disposition |
|---|--|--|---|---|--------------------------------------|
| 1 | LOOP Occurrences | List and describe site-specific LOOP initiating events considered in the PRA | Provides insight as to the appropriate LOOP frequency. No events tend to reduce estimated LOOP frequency. Occurrence of LOOP events would tend to increase frequency. | | |
| 2 | Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) Frequency | 1.71E-02/yr | Latest from Industry Trends Program | | |
| 3 | Emergency Diesel Mission Time | 24 hours | ASME PRA Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, Supporting Requirement SC-A5. | | |
| 4 | Failure Data: EDG Fails to Start EDG Fails to Run | 1E-02 2E-4/hr | From MSPI Baseline data. Significant deviations shall be explained. | | |
| 5 | EDG Unavailability | 0.0049 to 0.0196 | Range from MSPI Pilot (1999-2002) | | |
| N | Barabara for EDG FTS -Two EDGs -Three EDGs -Four EDGs | 1E-5 to 1E-4 5E-6 to 5E-5 1E-6 to 1E-5 | Highly dependent on numerous factors such as Alternate AC, battery life, CCF modeling, RCP seal failure model, AC-independent heat removal systems, and so on. | | |
| | | | | | |

Alternate Approach To Account for Common Cause

- Use of generic multipliers on FV based on observed ratios

$$[\sum FV_{ind} + FV_{cc}] / \sum FV_{ind}$$

Independence

- Preliminary values from SPAR model results for Pilot Plants:

2 EDG trains ~ 1.25x
 3 EDG trains ~ 2.0x
 4 EDG trains ~ 5x

multipliers

- Diverse alternate power supplies would lower these factors
- Develop multipliers for the various component failure modes
- Consolidate as appropriate.

Another Alternate Approach To Account for Common Cause

