

Lew W. Myers  
Chief Operating Officer419-321-7599  
Fax: 419-321-7582Docket Number 50-346  
License Number NPF-3  
Serial 1-1327

September 13, 2003

Mr. James E. Dyer, Administrator  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III  
801 Warrenville Road  
Lisle, IL 60532-4351Subject: Submittal of Revision 6 of the Nuclear Operating Business Practice, Restart  
Readiness Review Extended Plant Outage (DBBP-VP-0002)

Dear Mr. Dyer:

On July 30, 2003 (Serial 1-1323), the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) submitted Revision 5 of the Nuclear Operating Business Practice DBBP-VP-0002, Restart Readiness Review Extended Plant Outage. This business practice provides the review process to ensure Davis-Besse's materiel condition, programs and processes, and organization, including the organization's safety culture, are ready for plant restart and safe, reliable operation.

This Business Practice was subsequently revised to enhance and refine the Restart Readiness Review process. The purpose of this letter is to submit Revision 6 of the Nuclear Operating Business Practice DBBP-VP-0002, Restart Readiness Review Extended Plant Outage, dated August 20, 2003 as an enclosure to this letter. This revision supercedes Revision 5 in its entirety.

It should be noted that FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company may periodically update this document in the future. If you have any questions or require further information, please contact Mr. Kevin L. Ostrowski, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (419) 321-8450.

Sincerely yours,



RJS

Attachment/Enclosure

cc: USNRC Document Control Desk  
DB-1 Senior NRC/NRR Project Manager  
DB-1 Senior NRC Resident Inspector  
Utility Radiological Safety Board

SEP 17 2003

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COMMITMENT LIST

The following list identifies those actions committed to by the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by the DBNPS. They are described only for information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Manager - Regulatory Affairs (419-321-8450) at the DBNPS of any questions regarding this document or associated regulatory commitments.

COMMITMENTS

DUE DATE

None

N/A

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Enclosure

Revision 6 of the Nuclear Operating Business Practice  
Restart Readiness Review Extended Plant Outage  
(DBBP-VP-0002)

(60 pages to follow)

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## RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE

Approved:   
Vice President

Approved:   
Chief Operating Officer

Effective Date AUG 20 2003

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1.0 PURPOSE

The purpose of this Business Practice is to provide assurance that the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station is ready to restart following the extended plant outage. The framework detailed here establishes a review process for areas not addressed by the Restart Test Plan and DB startup procedures to ensure that Davis-Besse's materiel condition, programs and processes, and organization, including the organization's safety culture are ready for plant restart and safe, reliable operation.

2.0 APPLICABILITY

This Business Practice applies to the first plant startup following the extended plant outage which began on February 16, 2002. It also applies to subsequent startups from this same outage and therefore shall be re-performed if the startup is halted resulting in an entry into a lower mode.

Adherence to this Business Practice is mandatory.

3.0 RESPONSIBILITY

The Vice President-Nuclear is responsible for initiating the Restart Readiness Review Process.

Each Section Manager and 0350 Restart List Responsible Individual is responsible for the accuracy and adequacy of the reviews performed, actions taken and action plans developed during the review process.

The Section Managers of Plant Engineering and Operations and the Director-Work Management (Maintenance) are responsible for ensuring plant walk-down inspections are conducted prior to power ascension.

The Manager-Operations is responsible for affirming: 1) the Operations Section has completed a review of operational readiness and is ready to support the safe and reliable startup and operation of the plant through the next operating cycle; 2) that the plant is in a condition of materiel readiness to support safe and reliable startup and operation and the operating crews are prepared and ready to startup and operate the plant in a safe and reliable manner through the next operating cycle.

The Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering is responsible for: 1) following movement of fuel in the reactor core, changes to reactivity control components in the reactor core and/or changes to nuclear instrumentation in the reactor core, verifying that the reactor core is configured to support safe and reliable operation through the cycle. This affirmation is required prior to installation of the reactor head; 2) prior to reactor startup, verifying that the required conditions exist to support a safe startup and power ascension.

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Each Director is responsible for the final review of the assessment and action plans developed during the review process by the sections in his department.

The Chief Operating Officer is responsible for final approval prior to plant restart.

#### 4.0 DETAILS

1. The review process shall be initiated early enough to ensure it is completed prior to entry into Modes 6, 4 and 2. The review shall be completed by the milestone date as determined by the responsible Shift Outage Director. All Sections and 0350 Checklist Responsible Individuals, shall submit restart readiness reviews by the milestone dates; not all items have to be complete, provided bullet (4) in Step 3 is appropriately addressed.
2. The process consists of the review and assessment of the specified Restart Readiness Review Indicators. The matrix on Attachment 2 designates the minimum indicators from Attachment 1 that are applicable to each Section and/or 0350 Checklist Item. Each Section and 0350 Checklist Responsible Individual, shall address applicable indicators and should participate in the review and assessment of any indicator for which meaningful input can be provided.
3. The methodology for the review process consists of the following steps:
  - Monitor plant system/component work activity progress during the outage
  - Monitor emergent work/issues during the outage for shutdown concerns
  - Monitor personnel and administrative issues during the outage for restart concerns
  - Assess Restart Readiness Review Indicators as identified on Attachment 1, as applicable per Attachment 2.
  - Assess Safety Culture as identified on Attachment 9, Page 18
  - Identify items to be complete prior to the designated Mode (6, 4 or 2) that have not been completed as of the Shift Outage Director milestone date. Ensure a reference is associated with each incomplete item that addresses completion of that item before needed in that mode.
4. Results of the individual indicator assessments, including the status of action plans to support plant restart, will be indicated on Attachment 1, and acknowledged by the signature of the Section Manager or 0350 Checklist Responsible Individual. Indicator assessments should be marked as Final (all conditions are acceptable to support plant restart) or Preliminary (one or more indicators are not currently complete or acceptable and action plans will support

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plant restart when complete). Details on incomplete items and the status of action plans to eliminate them shall be attached.

5. The signed original Restart Readiness Review Indicators (Attachment 1) should be provided to the Restart Action Process Administrator at the end of the Readiness meetings for inclusion in the Mode Readiness notebook
6. Restart Readiness Review Indicators shall be reviewed by the Senior Leadership Team and approved by the Vice President-Nuclear or Chief Operating Officer, as provided on Attachment 3.
7. Completed Attachments 1 and 3 shall be included with the documentation package assembled in accordance with this Business Practice.
8. Walk down inspections shall be completed prior to power ascension as described in this document and in accordance with EN-DP-01503, System Walkdowns or Plant Engineering Policy PE-02, System Walkdown Checklist. Results of walkdown inspections shall be documented in Attachment 4 and submitted to the on-shift Engineering Manager.
9. The Shift Manager of each crew should:
  - a. Conduct reasonable and appropriate activities to accomplish the objective of attaining, demonstrating and affirming operational readiness. The Shift Manager should consider the following to support the affirmation of operating crew readiness:
    - adequacy of staffing levels, personnel experience and qualification levels.
    - assure Operations personnel believe the Station can be operated safely by eliciting any outstanding safety concerns from shift personnel and ensuring that the concerns are resolved.
    - completion of appropriate personnel refresher training of shift personnel, including training on plant, procedures and process changes.
    - completion of training of shift personnel on the startup and power ascension plan. This training shall include discussion on the expected behavior and characteristics of the core for this startup.
  - b. Affirm to the best of their knowledge and judgment that the plant is in a condition of materiel readiness to support safe and reliable startup and operation. The Shift Manager should consider the following:

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-adequacy of the materiel condition of the plant, including the current status of operator work-arounds, to support safe and reliable restart and operation during the next operating cycle.

-all outage-related temporary fire suppression systems removed and fire protection requirements or commitments ready to support startup.

-temporary modifications, temporary power feeds, removed/MCCs restored, installed temporary power feeds, if applicable, reviewed to ensure they will not affect safety or operations.

c. Complete Attachment 5.

10. The Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering shall, following movement of fuel, changes to reactivity control components and/or changes to nuclear instrumentation in the reactor core, verify that the reactor core is configured to support safe and reliable operation through the cycle. This affirmation is required prior to installation of the reactor head. Attachment 6, Core Configuration Affirmation Form, details the required review areas and documents the affirmation.
11. The Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering, shall, prior to a reactor startup, verify that the required conditions exist to support a safe startup and power ascension. Attachment 7, Reactor Startup Affirmation Form, details the required review areas and documents that affirmation.
12. Each System Engineer and 0350 Program Owner shall complete Attachment 8, System Engineer/Program Owner Readiness Affirmation Form. The System Engineer forms shall be part of the Plant Engineering Manager's presentation for restart readiness. The 0350 Program Owner's form will be used as part of their readiness discussion. Selected systems (System Engineers) will be identified by the Manager-Operations, Manager-Plant Engineering and Plant Manager to be discussed during the Restart Readiness Review Meetings.

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ATTACHMENT 1: RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATORS

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Plant Section or 0350 Checklist Item \_\_\_\_\_ Acceptable to Support Restart? Yes/No/NA  
Mode \_\_\_\_\_

- |    |   |       |
|----|---|-------|
| 1  | All assigned outage work activities are complete to support plant restart and operations. This includes a reconfirmation that previous dispositions of nonconforming conditions or Preventive Maintenance deferrals continue to provide a justification for continued operation. (Attachment 2, Column a)                               | _____ |
| 2  | Outstanding Operability Evaluations, CR corrective actions and new CRs generated during the shutdown have been evaluated for operability concerns are either closed or determined to have no impact on operability. (Attachment 2, Column b)  | _____ |
| 3  | Regulatory and internal commitments have been evaluated for operability concerns or restart restraints and are either closed or determined to have no impact on operability. (Attachment 2, Column c)   | _____ |
| 4  | Housekeeping walkdowns utilizing the guidelines of NG-DB-00215, Material Readiness and Housekeeping Inspection Program are complete. (Attachment 2, Column d)   | _____ |
| 5  | The Power Ascension Schedule has been reviewed for accuracy and adequacy ensuring: (Attachment 2, Column e) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Post maintenance retest and special testing are identified and scheduled correctly with instructions in place.</li> <li>• Planned walkdowns are scheduled appropriately</li> </ul> | _____ |
| 6  | Personnel, materials and special test equipment necessary to support power ascension retest and walkdown activities have been identified and availability is ensured during power ascension. (Attachment 2, Column f)   | _____ |
| 7  | Contingency plans are established for immediate response to plan and repair steam leaks or high-risk test failures. (Attachment 2, Column g)  | _____ |
| 8  | Standing orders have been reviewed for continued applicability and system status sheets completed as required by DB-OP-06911, Pre-Startup Checklist. (Attachment 2, Column h)   | _____ |
| 9  | System walkdowns have been performed by Plant Engineering and Maintenance, as directed by Operations, to ensure system readiness for restart.   | _____ |
| 10 | Operating Experience reports have been reviewed to ensure no potential operability concerns.  | _____ |
| 11 | Procedure alterations/PCRs are ready for mode change or restart.  | _____ |
| 12 | Work around and burdens identified prior to or during shutdown and not corrected have been confirmed acceptable. (Attachment 2, Column i)   | _____ |

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ATTACHMENT 1: RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATORS (Continued)

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Plant Section or 0350 Checklist Item _____ Mode _____	Acceptable to Support Restart? Yes/No/NA
13 All Management and Human Performance Improvement Plan items required for restart are complete. (Attachment 2, Column j)	_____
14 All 0350 Discovery Action Plan milestones identified as required for restart are complete. (Attachment 2, Column k)	_____
15 All 0350 Implementation Action Plan milestones identified as required for restart are complete. (Attachment 2, Column l)	_____
16 All Section Corrective Action Program Improvement Plan activities required for restart have been validated as ready to support restart. (Attachment 2, Column ii)	_____
17 All Condition Reports and corrective actions, work orders, modifications (including EWRs and ECRs) categorized as 0350 are completed. (Attachment 2, Columns m, n, o)	_____
18 All Condition Reports and corrective actions, work orders, and modifications (including EWRs and ECRs) designated as required for restart by the Restart Station Review Board are complete. (Attachment 2, Columns q, r, s)	_____
19 Any required for restart Condition Report or corrective action, work order or modification (including EWRs and ECRs), which cannot be completed prior to restart, has a written exemption from the RSRB. (Attachment 2, Column u)	_____
20 All pending allegations have been reviewed and determined not to affect the restart of the plant. (Attachment 2, Column v)	_____
21 Integrated Restart Report per NG-VP-00100 signed by the SMT. (Attachment 2, Column w)	_____

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**Check one**

<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Preliminary:</b> I have reviewed the assessment of the Restart Readiness Review Indicators as indicated above and confirm that the attached plans will support plant restart when complete.
<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Final:</b> I have reviewed the assessment of the Restart Readiness Review Indicators as indicated above and concur that the current conditions support plant restart.

Section Manager or 0350 Checklist Individual \_\_\_\_\_  
(Please Print Your Name)

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
Section Manager or 0350 Checklist Individual

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**ATTACHMENT 2: PLANT RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX**  
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	a. Work Scope	b. CR's, OEs	c. Commitments	d. Housekeeping	e. Startup Schedule	f. Resources	g. Contingency	h. Standing Orders	i. Workarounds/Burdens	ii. Section CAP Improvement Plan Activities	j. M&HPE Improvement Plan Activities
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<b>Plant</b>											
Operations	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
RP	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X
Chemistry	X	X		X	X	X	X			X	X
Outage Management and Work Control	X		X		X	X	X			X	X
FIN	X			X		X	X			X	X
Mechanical	X	X		X		X	X			X	X
E&C	X	X		X		X	X			X	X
Maint. Serv.	X			X		X	X			X	X
<b>Engineering</b>											
Plant Engineering	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X
Design Engineering	X	X	X			X				X	X
Project Management	X	X	X			X				X	X
RRT	X	X				X					X
Reactor Engineering	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X
<b>Support Services</b>											
Regulatory Affairs	X	X	X		X	X				X	X
Quality Services		X				X				X	X
Security						X				X	X
<b>Organizational Development</b>											
Training		X				X				X	X
Safety		X		X		X					X
Emergency Preparedness			X			X	X				X
<b>Other Sections</b>											
OPID/QA/QC	X	X	X			X					X
Supply Chain					X	X				X	X
Client Services						X					X
Business Services						X					X
Human Resources						X				X	X

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**ATTACHMENT 2: PLANT RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX**  
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**0350 CHECKLIST ITEM RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX**

	k. 0350 Discovery Action Plan	l. 0350 Implementation Action Plan	m. 0350 Condition Reports	n. 0350 Work Orders	o. 0350 MODs, EWRs, & ECRs
<b>0350 Checklist Item</b>					
1. Adequacy of Root Cause Determinations— S. Loehlein, M. Roder, D. Gudger, J. Powers, D. Eshelman, F. von Ahn, L. Myers*	X		X	X	X
2. Adequacy of Safety Significant Structures, Systems and Components—D. Baker, A. Stallard, T. Chambers, R. Hovland, J. O'Neill*	X	X	X	X	X
3. Adequacy of Safety Significant Programs--A. McAllister, L. Dohrmann, S. Loehlein, M. Shepherd, J. Grabnar, R. Farrell, J. Lee, R. Perry, K. Ostrowski*	X	X	X		
4. Adequacy of Organizational Effectiveness and Human Performance—R. Fast, J. Powers*	X	X	X	X	X
5. Readiness for Restart—C. Price, F. VonAhn, R. Hovland, R. Schrauder, A. Stallard, J. Hirsch*		X	X		
6. Licensing Issue Resolution--J. Powers, K. Ostrowski*		X	X		
7. Confirmatory Action Letter Resolution--L. Myers, C. Price K. Ostrowski*			X		

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\* Or an approved designated alternate

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ATTACHMENT 2: PLANT RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX  
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**REQUIRED FOR RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX**

	q. Required for Restart CRs and CAs	r. Required for Restart MODs, EWRs, ECRs	s. Required for Restart Work Orders	t. Procedure Alterations	u. RSRB Exemptions	v. Allegations	w. Recommendation for Restart
Restart Station Review Board	X	X	X		X		
Quality Services				X			
Employee Concerns Program						X	
Station Review Board (Plant Operating Review Committee)							X
Company Nuclear Review Board							X
Restart Overview Panel							X

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ATTACHMENT 3: RESTART READINESS REVIEW FOR PLANT STARTUP

**Restart/Mode Change Recommended By:**

Mode \_\_\_\_\_

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\_\_\_\_\_  
Plant Manager—Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director-Davis-Besse Nuclear Engineering Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director-Davis-Besse Work Management Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director-Davis-Besse Support Services Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director-Davis-Besse Restart Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director-Davis-Besse Organizational Development Date

**RESTART /MODE CHANGE APPROVAL:**

\_\_\_\_\_  
Vice President-Nuclear Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Chief Operating Officer Date



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ATTACHMENT 5: OPERATIONAL READINESS AFFIRMATION FORM

Shift Designator: \_\_\_\_\_

Shift Manager: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Please Print)

Mode \_\_\_\_\_

Review Summary:

*The Shift Manager should initial each item below to affirm that he/she and the operating crew have completed the required actions:*

- \_\_\_\_\_ Shift staffing levels, including personnel experience and qualification levels, are adequate.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Operations personnel believe the station can be operated safely. All safety concerns have been identified and addressed.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Appropriate refresher training of shift personnel, including training on plant, procedure and process changes, has been completed.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Appropriate training of shift personnel on the startup and power ascension plan, have been completed, including discussions on core behavior and characteristics for this startup.
- \_\_\_\_\_ The materiel condition of the plant, including the current status of operator work-arounds, is adequate to support safe and reliable restart and operation.

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Affirmation:

*Based upon an evaluation of the considerations set forth in Details, 4.0, and to the best of my knowledge and judgment, the plant is in a condition of materiel readiness to support the safe and reliable startup and power operation through the next operating cycle and the operating crew is ready to startup and operate the plant in a safe and reliable manner.*

Shift Manager:  
Print/Signature/Date \_\_\_\_\_

Reviews and Approvals:  
Manager-Operations:  
Print/Signature/Date \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks: (Attach a continuation sheet if applicable)

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ATTACHMENT 6: CORE CONFIGURATION AFFIRMATION FORM

Mode \_\_\_\_\_

Review Summary:

*The Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering, should initial each item below to affirm that the required conditions exist following movement of fuel in the reactor core, changes to reactivity control components and/or changes to nuclear instrumentation in the reactor core. This affirmation is required prior to installation of the reactor head.*

- \_\_\_\_\_ All new fuel assemblies loaded into the reactor core were inspected, as required, to ensure that the manufacturing and design specifications were met.
- \_\_\_\_\_ All irradiated fuel assemblies present in the reactor core were inspected, as required, and dispositioned as acceptable for operation through the cycle.
- \_\_\_\_\_ No fuel assemblies in the reactor core are known leaking assemblies.
- \_\_\_\_\_ A 10CFR50.59 Reload Safety Evaluation governing reactor core operation has been approved by the Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC)
- \_\_\_\_\_ The reactor core loading has been verified.
- \_\_\_\_\_ All reactivity control components in the reactor core will meet their design functions.
- \_\_\_\_\_ All nuclear instrumentation in the reactor core will meet their design functions.

Affirmation:

*Based on my knowledge and judgment, the required conditions exist and the reactor core is configured to support safe and reliable operation through the cycle.*

Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering  
 Print/Signature/Date \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks: (Attach a continuation sheet if appropriate)

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ATTACHMENT 7: REACTOR STARTUP AFFIRMATION FORM

Mode \_\_\_\_\_

Review Summary:

*The Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering should initial each item below to affirm that the required conditions exist prior to reactor startup.*

\_\_\_\_\_ Estimated Critical Conditions have been prepared and independently verified.

\_\_\_\_\_ Preparations are complete for any necessary Low Power Physics Testing (i.e. equipment, procedures, calculations, training)

\_\_\_\_\_ Personnel are available, as required, to support reactor startup and power ascension to 100%.

\_\_\_\_\_ Required training has been completed for Nuclear Fuels personnel.

\_\_\_\_\_ Reactivity plans are available, as required, to support reactor startup and power ascension to 100%. These plans include expectations for reactor behavior with emphasis on any behavior that is different from recent plant operation.

\_\_\_\_\_ The Core Monitoring System is operable.

\_\_\_\_\_ All reactivity control systems will meet their design functions.

\_\_\_\_\_ Sufficient nuclear instrumentation is available to safely startup and operate the reactor core.

\_\_\_\_\_ There are no outstanding reactivity management issues impacting the safe operation of the reactor core.

Affirmation:

*Based on my knowledge and judgment, the required conditions exist and the reactor core is ready to support a safe startup and power ascension.*

Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering

Print/Signature/Date \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks: (Attach a continuation sheet if appropriate)

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ATTACHMENT 8: SYSTEM ENGINEER/PROGRAM OWNER READINESS AFFIRMATION FORM

Mode \_\_\_\_\_

1. Name of System/Program:
2. The status of the system/program is (For systems, a brief description of the physical status of the system including System Health status and Maintenance Rule status. For programs, a brief status of the program):
3. System/Program is ready for Mode \_\_\_\_\_: Yes\_\_\_ or No\_\_\_
4. The system/program is ready for Mode \_\_\_\_\_ because: (if not ready, skip to #5)
5. The system/program is not ready for Mode \_\_\_\_\_ because:  

and the following actions are in place to address these issues:

The system/program will be ready for Mode \_\_\_ by: \_\_\_\_\_(Date)
6. Items in abnormal status or configuration (workarounds, temporary modifications, Control Room deficiencies) identified and not corrected have been reviewed and determined to be acceptable: Yes\_\_\_ or No\_\_\_ (Attach a list of the above items)
7. Housekeeping issues associated with this system/program have been addressed for Mode \_\_\_\_\_: Yes\_\_\_ or No\_\_\_ (Attach a list of those not resolved)
8. I have the following concerns about my system and its readiness for Mode \_\_\_\_\_:  
*Briefly identify concerns. (The Restart Readiness Review process will not resolve these concerns at the meeting. They should be scheduled for presentation to the Plant Support Center if there is a concern relative to this mode change.)*
9. Open CRs, CAs, Work Orders or Engineering modifications required for Mode \_\_\_\_\_ (Attach a list).

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Extension: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Please Print)

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

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ATTACHMENT 9: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE

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**ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE**

**Assessment Summary:**

Improving safety culture is a long-term activity that will be constantly monitored by Davis-Besse senior management. For Restart Readiness, it is important to show an improving safety culture. The individual indicators that make up the Commitment Areas may be green, white, yellow or red. Some of the Commitment Areas may be yellow (Policy or Corporate Commitment Area, Plant Management Commitment Area or Individual Commitment Area) however restart will not be approved if any of the three are red.

Remedial actions will be taken for any red indicators. Condition Reports will be written for all red and yellow indicators at the site and/or section level, with corrective actions to identify an existing or new plan for improvement. Corrective Actions may take credit for already existing activities. Red indicator corrective actions will be formally presented to the Senior Leadership Team. If a Condition Report is written at the site level for a red or yellow Commitment Area or indicator, it will encompass any red or yellow section Commitment Area or indicator and that section need not write a Condition Report. If there is no site wide red or yellow Commitment Area or indicator, then the Section Manager will write a Condition Report for his red or yellow Commitment Area or indicator.

The criteria for ratings of the attributes that comprise each indicator are provided in Appendix A. These criteria are guidelines. Management may consider other factors and adjust the ratings accordingly. Management judgment is a key factor that cannot be removed or quantified. The purpose of the collegial group review is to challenge, seek alternative input and to facilitate dialogue. If other factors are considered, they shall be documented in an attachment to the Rating sheet. The ratings are based on convergent assessment such as: performance indicators, management observations, demonstrated performance during critical plant conditions surveys and interviews, training and feedback from independent safety culture reviews and Nuclear Quality Assurance Assessments.

The ratings for an individual attribute will reflect recent activities or the most recent assessment data. If no applicable activities or assessments have been conducted within the past 12 months (i.e., there is no information applicable to the review period), the attribute shall be marked "NA", (Not Applicable). If both objective and subjective data are available, differences in data will be evaluated and decisions on use of data made.

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**Safety Culture Commitment Area/Indicator Ratings:**

- Green: all major indicators/attributes are acceptable with a few minor indicator deviations
- White: all major indicators/attributes are acceptable with a few indicators requiring management attention
- Yellow: all major indicators/attributes are acceptable with several indicators requiring prompt management action
- Red: several major indicators/attributes do not meet acceptable standards and require immediate management action

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## ATTACHMENT 9: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE

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Each Section Manager will provide a Rating sheet (ATTACHMENT 9, Page 19,) with the Final Restart Readiness Indicators. For any individual attribute where only site-wide numbers are available (e.g. 4Cs surveys, ECP etc.), or for any individual attribute not applicable to a section (e.g. operator work-arounds for other than Operations), the Manager will NA that attribute on his backup sheets and that attribute will not be used as part of the site-wide tally for the indicator. For any attribute where "surveys and/or interviews" are used as the basis for the rating, these surveys must be written but may be anonymous. Interview results will also be documented as to results although they may also be anonymous. The results for surveys or interviews will be maintained by the Manager until after restart. Documentation for Attachment 9 may be in the form of a tally for these survey or interview results

At the final Restart Readiness Review meeting for any mode, a site-wide Rating sheet will be prepared by the management team using the individual section ratings as a guideline. The final Rating sheet will be signed by the Vice President-Nuclear and maintained with the other Restart Readiness documentation.

Preliminarily, determination of the Commitment Area/indicator color will be based on a calculation of the average of the ratings of the associated indicators/attributes using the following:

Red=0 points  
Yellow=1 point  
White=2 points  
Green= 3 points

Greater than one red attribute or indicator means the indicator or Commitment Area can be no better than yellow. If more than two or more than 1/3 (whichever is greater) of the attributes or indicators are red, the indicator or Commitment Area shall be red.

Red =  $\leq .75$   
Yellow =  $>.75$  to  $<1.75$   
White =  $\geq 1.75$  to  $<2.5$   
Green =  $\geq 2.5$

For the overall plant ratings for Commitment Areas/indicators, management will consider whether the problems taken collectively indicate a more significant concern than indicated by the averages. For example, one section may perform more activities related to safety with respect to an indicator than other sections, and management may adjust the color to give greater weight to that section in determining the final color rating. Similarly, if percentages or averages alone indicate a positive rating but there were several associated safety-significant events or conditions, management may provide a more negative color rating to reflect those events or conditions. If such an adjustment is made, it shall be documented. Generally, if all sections have similar rating, the overall rating for the plant will be the same as the ratings for the individual sections. During group review, senior management will seek to verify that the entire Restart Readiness Review team not only concurs, but also aligns behind the assessment.

At the completion of the Safety Culture Assessment, an evaluation of the significance of the overall assessment ratings for indicators to focus on the process and organization will be completed using Attachment 10 at the end of the document.

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ATTACHMENT 9: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE

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**Rating Safety Culture**

Mode \_\_\_\_\_

Item

Color

**1. Policy or Corporate Commitment Area**

- a. Policies on Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment clearly state that safety is a core value and are understood by the organization \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Management values are clearly reflected in the Business Plan and are understood by the organization \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Resources are available or can be obtained to ensure safe, reliable operations \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Self-Assessment is a tool used to monitor, assess and improve our performance \_\_\_\_\_
- e. Independent Oversight is a tool used to validate acceptable performance and identify areas for improvement or corrective action \_\_\_\_\_

**2. Plant Management Commitment Area**

- a. There is a visible commitment to safety: nuclear, industrial, radiological and environmental \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Goals and roles are clear and teamwork is reinforced \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Ownership and accountability is evident \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Training and Qualification are valued \_\_\_\_\_
- e. Commitment to continuous improvement is evident \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Cross-functional work management and communication \_\_\_\_\_
- g. Creating an environment of engagement and commitment \_\_\_\_\_

**3. Individual Commitment Area**

- a. Drive for excellence—nuclear assets of people and plant are continuously improved to enhance margins of safety \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Questioning attitude—challenges are welcomed \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Rigorous work control and prudent approach—performing activities in a quality manner is the standard \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Open communications—associates are comfortable in voicing opinions, issues and concerns \_\_\_\_\_
- e. Nuclear Professionalism—persistence and urgency in identification and resolution of problems is prevalent \_\_\_\_\_

	I have reviewed the Rating of Safety Culture as indicated above and concur that the current conditions support readiness for mode change.
--	---

Section Manager \_\_\_\_\_  
(Please Print Your Name)

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
Section Manager

Adjustments to ratings from the standard criteria should be documented and attached to this page.

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**APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA**

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**1. POLICY COMMITMENT AREA**

**1a. CRITERIA RELATED TO STATEMENT OF SAFETY POLICY**

Policies on Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment clearly state that safety is a core value and are understood by the organization

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Policy statement on Safety Culture*</i>	Policy statement is issued but it is not reinforced by management	Policy statement is issued but only occasionally reinforced by management.	Policy statement is issued and is frequently reinforced by management.	Policy statement is issued and is continuously reinforced by management.
<i>Policy statement on Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE)*</i>	Policy statement is issued but it is not reinforced by management.	Policy statement is issued but only occasionally reinforced by management.	Policy statement is issued and is frequently reinforced by management.	Policy statement is issued and it is a strong statement of safety conscious work environment and often reinforced.
<i>Making employees aware of policy statements*</i>	Policy statements simply issued as part of FENOC Business Plan.	Policy statements distributed separately to employees in memo.	Policy statements are communicated by at least two means. (e.g., hard copy distribution, newsletters, group meetings, training, stand down).	Policy statements are communicated to employees and emphasized regularly in meetings and face to face communication.
<i>Employee understanding of policies</i>	Surveys/interviews indicate less than 70% of employees in the section understand the policies.	Surveys/interviews indicate that 70-80% of the employees in the section understand the policies and consider safety a FE value.	Surveys/interviews indicate that 80-90% of employees in the section understand the policies and consider safety a FE value.	Surveys/interviews indicate that more than 90% of employees in the section understand the policies and consider safety a FE value and the normal way to do business.
<i>Worker understanding of responsibility to raise safety concerns</i>	Surveys/interviews indicate that less than 85% of workers in the section understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.	Surveys/interviews indicate that between 85-90% of workers in the section understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.	Surveys/interviews indicate that between 90-95% of workers in the section understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.	Surveys/interviews indicate that more than 95% of workers in the section understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

\* Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Senior Management

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**APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA**

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**1. POLICY COMMITMENT AREA**

**1b. CRITERIA RELATED TO MANAGEMENT VALUES**

Management values are clearly reflected in the Business Plan and are understood by the organization

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Corporate values*</i>	There is no corporate level statement of safety values. FirstEnergy management does not express its safety values to plant personnel.	There is a corporate level statement of commitment to safety. FirstEnergy management meets infrequently with plant personnel to express its safety values.	There is a corporate level statement of commitment to safety. FirstEnergy management meets occasionally with plant personnel to express its safety values.	There is a corporate level statement of commitment to safety. FirstEnergy management meets frequently with plant personnel to express its safety values.
<i>Statement of mission, vision, and values*</i>	There is no statement of Mission, Vision, and Values and employees believe focus is on production and profits.	The statement of Mission, Vision, and Values places weight on safety and often employees believe the overriding focus is safety	The statement of Mission, Vision, and Values places greater weight on safety than on production/profits and most employees agree that the overriding priority is on safety	The statement of Mission, Vision, and Values emphasizes safety first, then allows consideration of production and profits and over 90% of employees agree based on surveys.
<i>FENOC Business Plan*</i>	Business Plan contains no Strategic Objective Measures on safety.	Business Plan contains few Strategic Objective Measures on safety but no implementation plans	Business Plan contains Strategic Objective Measures on safety with implementation plans.	Business Plan contains Strategic Objective Measures on safety and all are being fully implemented.
<i>Incentive program (FENOC Safety Culture Performance Indicator)*</i>	The Safety Culture Assessment value is 40 points or less.	The Safety Culture Assessment value is 40-60 points.	The Safety Culture Assessment value is 60-80 points.	The Safety Culture Assessment Value is above 80 points.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Senior Management

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1. POLICY COMMITMENT AREA

**1c. CRITERIA RELATED TO RESOURCES**

Resources are available or can be obtained to ensure safe, reliable operations

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Adequacy of management resources*</i>	More than five supervisor or above positions are not filled with ANSI qualified FENOC individuals.	More than three supervisor or above positions are not filled with ANSI qualified FENOC individuals.	Three or less supervisor or above positions are filled with ANSI qualified FENOC individuals.	All management positions are filled with ANSI qualified FENOC individuals.
<i>Adequacy of personnel resources#</i>	More than four sections do not have sufficient personnel to perform their assigned responsibilities with or without contractor support (identify with or without)	Three or four sections do not have sufficient personnel to perform their assigned responsibilities with or without contractor support (identify with or without)	One or two sections do not have sufficient personnel to perform their assigned responsibilities with or without contractor support (identify with or without)	Each section has a full complement of personnel (minus normal attrition) to perform its assigned responsibilities.
<i>Adequacy of funding**</i>	Necessary activities, to improve nuclear safety, as defined by the Senior Leadership Team and Project Review Committee (PRC) are not being funded in a timely manner and funding was requested and rejected by FENOC Executive Management.	Most identified improvements to nuclear safety, as identified by the PRC in the plant, programs, or other activities, are funded in a timely manner.	The majority of identified improvements to nuclear safety, as identified by the PRC in the plant, programs, or other activities, are funded in a timely manner.	Sufficient funding exists to perform all improvements, as identified by the PRC in plant, programs and other activities to improve nuclear safety.

\* Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources

#Significance evaluation regarding resources will be discussed depending on contractor support by section

\*\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by the chairman of the PRC

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APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA

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1. POLICY COMMITMENT AREA

**1c. CRITERIA RELATED TO RESOURCES (continued)**

Resources are available or can be obtained to ensure safe, reliable operations

<i>Adequacy of tools, material and equipment to complete site tasks*</i>	More than 30% of scheduled tasks (PMs, Work Orders, ECRs and projects) are not being completed by the site in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.	More than 25% of scheduled tasks (PMs, Work Orders, ECRs and projects) are not being completed by the site in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.	More than 20% of scheduled tasks (PMs, Work Orders, ECRs and projects) are not being completed by the site in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.	More than 10% of scheduled tasks PMs, Work Orders, ECRs and projects) are not being completed by the site in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.
<i>Adequacy of tools, material and equipment to complete Section tasks</i>	More than 30% of key scheduled tasks are not being completed by the section in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.	More than 25% of key scheduled tasks are not being completed by the section in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.	More than 20% of key scheduled tasks are not being completed by the section in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.	More than 10% of key scheduled tasks are not being completed by the section in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Outage Management and Work Control

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**APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA**

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**1. POLICY COMMITMENT AREA**

**1d. CRITERIA RELATED TO SELF-ASSESSMENT**

Self-Assessment is a tool used to monitor, assess and improve our performance

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Use of Nuclear Quality Assurance to supplement the self-assessment process</i>	Less than 60% of the sections have used NQA input to supplement the self-assessment process as defined in NOBP-LP-2001	Between 60-75% of the sections have used NQA input to supplement the self-assessment process as defined in NOBP-LP-2001	Between 75-90% of the sections have used NQA input to supplement the self-assessment process as defined in NOBP-LP-2001	More than 90% of the sections have used NQA to supplement the self-assessment process as defined in NOBP-LP-2001
<i>Self-assessments in accordance with NOBP-LP-2001, FENOC Focused Self-Assessment Guideline*</i>	Less than 50% of sections (<12) have scheduled any self-assessments for 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2003 and 1 <sup>st</sup> quarter 2004.	Between 50-65% of sections (12-15) have scheduled any self-assessments for 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2003 and 1 <sup>st</sup> quarter 2004.	Between 65-80% of sections (16-20) have scheduled any self-assessments for 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2003 and 1 <sup>st</sup> quarter 2004.	More than 80% of sections (>20) have scheduled any self-assessments for 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2003 and 1 <sup>st</sup> quarter 2004.
<i>Section Performance Indicators</i>	Performance indicators related to safety and quality exist for the section	Section performance indicators exist for important activities affecting quality and safety but less than 75% of goals are met	Section performance indicators exist for important activities affecting quality and safety and more than 75% of goals are met	Section performance indicators exist and are appropriate and are being regularly updated for important activities affecting safety and quality, with more than 90% of goals met.
<i>Personnel Performance Appraisals**</i>	The performance appraisal program does not include assessments of safety or quality of performance.	The performance appraisal program includes assessments of safety or quality of performance but most employee appraisals have not been performed.	The performance appraisal program includes assessments of safety or quality of performance but some appraisals have not been performed in timely manner and some employees do not have a current appraisal.	The performance appraisal program includes assessments of safety and quality of performance and the appraisals are being performed in timely manner and all employees have a current appraisal.

\*Site wide assessment made after Sections report

\*\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources

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1. POLICY COMMITMENT AREA

**1e. CRITERIA RELATED TO INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT**

Oversight is a tool used to show acceptable performance and identify areas for improvement and corrective actions.

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Nuclear Committee of Board of Directors*</i>	The Nuclear Committee of the Board has little focus on safety performance in the agenda.	The Nuclear Committee occasionally discusses safety performance as a topic in the agenda.	The Nuclear Committee routinely has safety performance as a part of the agenda	The Nuclear Committee has safety performance as a part of the agenda every meeting and requests additional presentations relative to specific issues to monitor performance
<i>Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB)+</i>	The CNRB has a safety performance assessment discussion on the agenda.	The CNRB agenda has a safety discussion and monitors safety performance	The CNRB agenda has a safety discussion at meetings and reviews presentations on safety focus issues	The CNRB agenda has a safety discussion every meeting and is proactive in providing safety focus actions for FENOC
<i>Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA)**</i>	NQA is performing audits or assessments of important safety activities and there are many areas of concern causing Significant Conditions Adverse to Quality	A number of NQA audits or assessments were performed when required and a number of areas of concern were identified for important safety activities causing Significant Conditions Adverse to Quality	NQA audits or assessments were performed when required, for important safety activities and no Significant Conditions Adverse to Quality were noted	NQA is regularly performing audits and assessments of important safety activities and identifying key issues for improvement that are below the Significant Condition Adverse to Quality threshold.
<i>Learning from the experience of the industry</i>	Personnel in the section do not participate in industry committees, visit other sites or host personnel from other sites	Personnel in the section seldom participate in industry committees, visit other sites or host personnel from other sites	Personnel in the section occasionally participate in industry committees, visit other sites or host personnel from other sites	Personnel in the section routinely participate in industry committees, visit other sites or host personnel from other sites

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Senior Management

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by NQA Manager or VP Oversight

\*\*This item is assessed by NQA only.

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2a. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO SAFETY**

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There is a visible commitment to safety: nuclear, industrial, radiological and environmental

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Management observations performed as scheduled with proper coaching*</i>	There is a management observation program and less than 65% of the observations are performed as scheduled and >90% indicate no coaching required.	There is a management observation program and more than 65% of management observations are performed as scheduled and greater than 10% were rated coaching unsat.	There is a management observation program and more than 75% are performed as scheduled and less than 10% rated as coaching unsat.	There is a management observation program and more than 90% are performed as scheduled and less than 5% rated as coaching unsat.
<i>Management observations are self critical*</i>	Most management observations are not self-critical.	More than 50% of the management observations performed are self-critical and corrective actions implemented.	More than 75% of the management observations performed are self-critical and corrective actions implemented.	More than 90% of the management observations performed are self-critical and corrective actions implemented.
<i>Management emphasis on safety to employees; questioning attitude</i>	No method has been used in the last month to provide emphasis on safety to employees in the section (e.g., town hall, 4Cs, or All Hands meetings, standdowns, newsletters, and training).	One method has been used in the last month to provide emphasis on safety to employees in the section (e.g., town hall, 4Cs or All Hands meetings, standdowns, newsletters, and training).	Two means have been used in the last month to provide emphasis on safety to employees in the section (e.g., town hall, 4Cs or All Hands meetings, standdowns, newsletters, and training).	Multiple means have been used by management in the last month to provide emphasis on safety to employees in the section (e.g., town hall, 4Cs or All Hands meetings, standdowns, newsletters, and training).

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2a. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO SAFETY (continued)**

There is a visible commitment to safety: nuclear, industrial, radiological and environmental

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Leadership in Action*</i>	Leadership in Action includes discussions on safety culture.*  And Employee feedback indicates it was not effective.**  And Leadership in Action training has been available for less than 75% of supervisors and above within 12 months of new appointment.*	Leadership in Action includes discussions on safety culture.*  And Employee feedback indicates it was effective.**  And Leadership in Action training has been available for more than 75% of supervisors and above within 12 months of new appointment.*	Leadership in Action includes discussions on safety culture.*  And Employee feedback indicates it was very effective.**  And Leadership in Action training has been available for more than 80% of supervisors and above within 12 months of new appointment.*	Leadership in Action includes discussions on safety culture.*  And Employee feedback indicates it was very effective.**  And Leadership in Action training has been available for more than 85% of supervisors and above within 12 months of new appointment.*
<i>Problem solving</i>	A problem solving process exists but there is no use of the document in the section and CRs were written to document the failure to use the process during the previous quarter.	In more than 5 cases, the problem solving process NOP-EN-3001 has not been properly implemented in the section for applicable conditions and CRs were written in the previous quarter.	In all but one case, the problem solving process, NOP-EN-3001 has been properly implemented in the section for applicable conditions during the previous quarter.	The problem solving process, NOP-EN-3001 has been properly implemented in the section for applicable conditions during the previous quarter.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources

\*\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided through 4Cs program

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2a. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO SAFETY (continued)**

There is a visible commitment to safety: nuclear, industrial, radiological and environmental

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Decision making</i>	A Safety significant Condition Adverse to Quality indicates that decisions were made in the section in isolation without adequate information, management oversight, involvement and peer checking during the past month.	A Safety significant Condition Adverse to Quality indicates that decisions are made in the section with minimal information, management oversight, involvement and peer checking during the past two months.	Safety significant decisions, with few exceptions, were made in the section with adequate information, management oversight, involvement and peer checking during the quarter as indicated by no SCAQs.	Safety significant decisions were made in the section with adequate information, management oversight, involvement and peer checking during the past six months as indicated by no SCAQs.
<i>Improvements in safety margin*</i>	None of the improvements in safety margin required for restart are complete for this mode change.	Between 70 and 80% of the improvements in safety margin required for restart for this mode change are complete.	Between 80 and 90% of the improvements in safety margin required for restart for this mode change are complete.	All improvements in safety margin required for restart for this mode change are complete).
<i>Plant activities receive proper management attention and safety focus</i>	A significant plant event, associated with the section, occurred during the previous quarter and a lack of a management attention or safety focus was indicated and an SCAQ written.	Less than 2 Condition Adverse to Quality CRs associated with the section were written due to lack of management attention or lack of safety focus during the previous quarter.	Significant plant activities associated with the section had management oversight scheduled for the duration of the activity and only one CAQ event occurred indicating a lack of management attention during the previous quarter.	Significant plant activities associated with the section had a management plan with a management sponsor and management oversight scheduled for the duration of the activity and no CAQ events occurred during the previous quarter.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Outage Management and Work Control

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APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA

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**2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA**

**2.b CRITERIA RELATED TO ROLES AND TEAMWORK**

Goals and roles are clear and teamwork is reinforced

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Understanding that safety is highest priority</i>	Station surveys and/or interviews show that less than 70% of employees in the section understand that safety is the highest priority.	Station surveys and/or interviews, show that 70-80% of employees in the section, understand that safety is the highest priority.	Station surveys and/or interviews show that 80-90% of employees in the section, understands that safety is the highest priority.	Station surveys and/or interviews show that more than 90% of employees in the section understand that safety is the highest priority.
<i>Program ownership*</i>	Five of the 61 Phase 1 programs in the program review do not have assigned owners and five CRs were written against different programs in the past quarter.	All 61 Phase 1 programs in the program review have assigned owners and more than three CRs were written on different programs in the past quarter.	All 61 Phase 1 programs in the program review have assigned owners. With several exceptions, program owners are implementing their assigned responsibilities and less than 3 CRs were written on different programs in the past quarter.	All 61 Phase 1 programs in the program review have assigned owners. In general, program owners are implementing their assigned responsibilities and no CRs were written against programs in the last quarter.
<i>Ownership of corrective actions</i>	More than 5% of SCAQ remedial and preventive restart required corrective actions and more than 10% of CAQ remedial and preventive restart required corrective actions for the section have required more than 4 extensions for the previous quarter.	5% of SCAQ remedial or preventive restart required corrective actions and 10% of CAQ remedial and preventive restart required corrective actions for the section, have received more than 2 extensions for the previous quarter.	Less than 5% of SCAQ remedial or preventive restart required corrective actions and 10% of CAQ remedial and preventive restart required corrective actions for the section, have received 2 extensions for the previous quarter.	Less than 5% of SCAQ remedial and preventive restart required corrective actions and less than 10% of CAQ remedial and preventive restart required corrective actions for the section have received less than 2 extensions for the previous quarter.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Plant Engineering Manager.

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2b. CRITERIA RELATED TO ROLES AND TEAMWORK (continued)**

Goals and roles are clear and teamwork is reinforced

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Ownership of engineering products as measured by the Engineering Assessment Board (EAB)*</i>	The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is greater than 3.0.	The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is between 3.0 and 2.1.	The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is between 2.0 and 1.1.	The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 1.0 or less.
<i>Effectiveness of supervision of individuals**</i>	The individual error rate is >0.30 individual errors per 10,000 hours worked.	The individual error rate is <0.31 individual errors per 10,000 hours worked.	The individual error rate is <0.29 individual errors per 10,000 hours worked.	The individual error rate is <0.26 individual errors per 10,000 hours worked.
<i>Intra-department teamwork and alignment ((Some unit supervisors will input to this attribute, such as Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Engineering and RRT.)</i>	As a Manager, I believe there is no alignment and little teamwork among my Department's managers.	As a Manager, I believe there is minimal alignment and some teamwork among my Department's managers.	As a Manager, I believe alignment is improving and teamwork can be seen in some key activities among my Department's managers.	As a Manager, I believe alignment and teamwork are obvious among managers in all activities of my department.
<i>Expectations</i>	There are statements of expectations for less than 75% of sections and employees routinely ignore them.	Less than 85% of sections have statements of expectations and most employees are not familiar with them.	More than 85% of sections have statements of expectations and all employees meet them..	There are statements of expectations for all sections and managers are reinforcing them and employees understand and implement them.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Director-Nuclear Engineering

\*\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Performance

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2b. CRITERIA RELATED TO ROLES AND TEAMWORK (continued)**

Goals and roles are clear and teamwork is reinforced

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Trust, openness and focused commitment**</i>	4Cs surveys show less than 50% of employees feel that work groups display high levels of trust, openness and commitment.	4Cs surveys show 50-70% of employees feel that work groups display high levels of trust, openness and commitment.	4Cs surveys show 70-90% of employees feel that work groups display high levels of trust, openness and commitment.	4Cs surveys show more than 90% of employees feel that work groups display high levels of trust, openness and commitment.
<i>Clear goals and priorities</i>	No clear goals and priorities have been established for the section	Goals and priorities exist for the section but are not adequately understood and owned by employees.	Goals and priorities exist for the section and some employees understand and own them.	Most employees are clear about goals and priorities for the section as well as how their role contributes to achieving them.
<i>Input and involvement</i>	No employee input and involvement occurs in the setting of department goals and establishing work priorities.	Only managers and supervisors are involved in the setting of department goals and establishing work priorities.	Managers and supervisors occasionally request input/involvement in the s, setting of department goals and establishing work priorities.	Employees are appropriately involved in setting department goals and establishing work priorities.

\*\* Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Chief Operating Officer

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2c. CRITERIA RELATED TO OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

Ownership and accountability is evident

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Performance reviews in accordance with Ownership for Excellence*</i>	Less than 70% of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence.	Between 70-80% of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence.	Between 80-90% of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence.	More than 90% of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence
<i>Development plans*</i>	Less than 70% of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR	Between 70-80% of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR	Between 80-90% of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR	More than 90% of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR
<i>Restart Readiness Reviews**</i>	There is no restart readiness review process.	A restart readiness review process exists but implementation is poor as shown by lack of management participation.	A restart readiness review process exists and is implemented with the majority of management participation.	A restart readiness review process exists and is implemented efficiently and with strong management participation.
Worker understanding of their responsibility to raise safety concerns	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that less than 80% of workers in the section understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that between 80-90% of workers in the section, understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that between 90-95% of workers in the section, understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that more than 95% of workers understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources

\*\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided through discussion at the Restart Readiness Review meeting

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2c. CRITERIA RELATED TO OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY(continued)**

Ownership and accountability is evident

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<i>Willingness to raise safety concerns*</i>	Surveys show that less than 85% of personnel are willing to raise safety concerns through their supervisor, a CR or ECP.	Surveys show that between 85-90% of personnel are willing to raise safety concerns through their supervisor, a CR or ECP.	Surveys show that between 90-95% of personnel are willing to raise safety concerns through their supervisor, a CR or ECP.	Surveys show that more than 95% of personnel are willing to raise safety concerns through their supervisor, a CR or ECP.
<i>SRO reviews for Operability are performed in a timely manner for the identified period of this review**</i>	Less than 80 % were completed within 24 hours.	Between 80-85% were completed within 24 hours.	Between 85-95% were completed within 24 hours.	More than 95% were completed within 24 hours.
<i>System assessments+</i>	Less than 70% of restart required improvements in safety for this mode change are complete	Between 70 and 80% of the restart required improvements in safety for this mode change are complete	Between 80-90% of the restart required improvements in safety for this mode change are complete	More than 90% of the restart required improvements in safety for this mode change are complete.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Employee Concerns Program

\*\*This item assessed by Operations only

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Outage Management and Work Control

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2c. CRITERIA RELATED TO OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY (continued)**

Ownership and accountability is evident

<i>NQA field assessments**</i>	NQA field assessments show that managers and supervisors are generally ineffective.	NQA field assessments show that managers and supervisors are generally effective, with several noteworthy exceptions.	NQA field assessments show that managers and supervisors are generally effective, with a few exceptions.	NQA field assessments show that managers and supervisors are generally effective.
<i>Management observations leading to coaching+</i>	Less than 50% of management participating in the Management Observation Program, has held a coaching session in the last month.	Between 50-74% of management participating in the Management Observation Program, has held a coaching session in the last month.	Between 75-89% of management participating in the Management Observation Program, has held a coaching session in the last month.	More than 90% of management participating in the Management Observation Program has held a coaching session in the last month.
<i>Timeliness of corrective actions</i>	Less than 50% of my section's corrective actions for this mode designated as required for restart are complete.	Between 50% and 74% of my section's corrective actions for this mode designated as required for restart are complete.	Between 75% and 89% of my section's corrective actions for this mode, designated as required for restart, are complete.	More than 90% of my section's corrective actions for this mode, designated as required for restart, are complete.

\*\* This item assessed by NQA only

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program

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**2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA**

**2d. CRITERIA RELATED TO TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION**

Training and Qualification are valued

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Supervisory evaluations*</i>	Most supervisors and managers have not been evaluated to assess their competence for their current positions.	Between 50-74% of supervisors and managers have been evaluated to assess their competence for their current positions.	Between 75-89% of supervisors and managers have been evaluated to assess their competence for their current positions.	More than 90% of supervisors and managers have been evaluated to assess their competence for their current positions.
<i>Restart training</i>	Most required restart training for the section is not complete.	Between 50-74% of required restart for the section training is complete.	Between 75-99% of required restart training for the section is complete.	100% of required restart training for the section is complete.
<i>Initial Operator training**</i>	Less than 70% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.	Between 70-84% of new operators passed their initial license for the most recent class examination.	Between 85-95% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.	More than 95% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.
<i>Requalification training**</i>	Less than 70% of licensed operators have passed their requalification training.	Between 70-84% of the licensed operators have passed their requalification training.	Between 85-95% of the licensed operators have passed their requalification training.	More than 95% of the licensed operators have passed their requalification training.
<i>Root cause training+</i>	Less than 50% of root cause evaluation personnel have received training on TapRoot.	Between 50% and 74% of root cause evaluation personnel have received training on TapRoot.	Between 75% and 89% of root cause evaluation personnel have received training on TapRoot.	More than 90% of root cause evaluation personnel have received training on TapRoot.

\* Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources

\*\*This item assessed by Operations only

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Nuclear Training

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**2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA**

**2d. CRITERIA RELATED TO TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION (continued)**

Training and Qualification are valued

<i>Operability determination training*</i>	Less than 50% of applicable operators and engineers have received training on operability determinations.	Between 50-74% of applicable operators and engineers have received training on operability determinations.	Between 75-90% of applicable operators and engineers have received training on operability determinations.	More than 90% of applicable operators and engineers have received training on operability determinations.
<i>Training on SCWE **</i>	Less than 70% of managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.	Between 70-79% of managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.	Between 80-89% of managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.	More than 90% of managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.
<i>Training on decision making process**</i>	Less than 70 % of applicable personnel have received training on the decision making process.	Between 70-80% of applicable personnel have received training on the decision making process.	Between 80-90% of applicable personnel have received training on the decision making process.	More than 90% of applicable personnel have received training on the decision making process.
<i>Training on standards and expectations</i>	Less than 70% of applicable personnel in the section have received training on standards and expectations.	Between 70-80% of applicable personnel in the section have received training on standards and expectations.	Between 80-90% of applicable in the section personnel have received training on standards and expectations.	More than 90% of applicable personnel in the section, have received training on standards and expectations.
<i>Continuing training identified by Curriculum Review Committee (CRC)**</i>	Less than 70% of scheduled training identified by the CRC is completed in a timely manner.	Between 70-80% of scheduled training identified by the CRC is completed in a timely manner.	Between 80-90% of scheduled training identified by the CRC is completed in a timely manner.	More than 90% of scheduled training identified by the CRC is completed in a timely manner.

\*This item assessed by Operations and Engineering only

\*\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Nuclear Training

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2e. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT**

Commitment to continuous improvement is evident

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Improvements in management staffing*</i>	Most requisitions for management positions (all exempt employees) have not been filled in the past month.	About 50% of open requisitions for management (all exempt employees) positions have been filled in the past month.	About 75% of open requisitions for management positions (all exempt employees) have been filled in the past month.	At least 85% of open requisitions for management positions (all exempt employees) have been filled in the past month.
<i>Restart Overview Panel (ROP)**</i>	The ROP does not believe DB is ready to restart.	The ROP has expressed concerns over DB restart.	The ROP has expressed some minor concerns and believes DB can restart.	The ROP is satisfied with DB progress to restart.
<i>Corrective Action Review Board (CARB)+</i>	There are no directors on the CARB.  The backlog of documents awaiting CARB review is more than four weeks.	The CARB has been enhanced with director-level personnel.  The backlog of documents awaiting CARB review is less than four weeks.	The CARB has been enhanced with director-level personnel.  The backlog of documents awaiting CARB review is less than two weeks.	The CARB has been enhanced with director-level personnel.  The backlog of documents awaiting CARB review is less than one week.
<i>Engineering Assessment Board (EAB)++</i>	The backlog of documents awaiting EAB review is greater than four weeks.	The backlog of documents awaiting EAB review is less than four weeks.	The backlog of documents awaiting EAB review is less than two weeks.	The backlog of documents awaiting EAB review is less than one week.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources

\*\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Chief Operating Officer or Executive Vice President

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance Improvement

++Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Director-Nuclear Engineering

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2e. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT  
(continued)**

Commitment to continuous improvement is evident

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Benchmarking against industry standards</i>	Less than 50% (<12) of sections have scheduled any benchmarking in accordance with NOBP-LP-2002 or NG-EN-00385 for 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2003 and 1 <sup>st</sup> quarter 2004.	Between 50-65% (12-15) of sections have scheduled any benchmarking in accordance with NOBP-LP-2002 or NG-EN-00385 for 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2003 and 1 <sup>st</sup> quarter 2004.	Between 65-80% of sections (16-20) have scheduled any benchmarking in accordance with NOBP-LP-2002 or NG-EN-00385 for 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2003 and 1 <sup>st</sup> quarter 2004.	More than 80% of sections (>20) have scheduled any benchmarking in accordance with NOBP-LP-2002 or NG-EN-00385 for 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2003 and 1 <sup>st</sup> quarter 2004.
<i>Management observations**</i>	A management observation program has been established. Less than 70% of management observations are performed as scheduled, and observations are weak.	A management observation program has been established. More than 70% of management observations are performed as scheduled, and observations are weak.	A management observation program has been established. More than 80% of management observations are performed as scheduled and most are considered acceptable.	A management observation program has been established. More than 90% of management observations are performed as scheduled and contain quality information.
<i>Temporary modifications+#</i>	There are more than 11 temporary modifications.	There are 11 or less temporary modifications.	There are 8 or less temporary modifications.	There are 5 or less temporary modifications.
<i>Number of Operator work-arounds*#</i>	There are more than 2 operator workarounds.	There are 2 operator workarounds.	There is 1 operator workarounds.	There are no operator workarounds.
<i>Number of Control Room deficiencies*#</i>	There are more than 4 Control Room deficiencies.	There are 4 Control Room deficiencies.	There are 1-3 Control Room deficiencies.	There are no Control Room deficiencies.

\*This item assessed by Operations only

\*\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation program

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Plant Engineering

#Significance evaluation will be discussed during the Restart Readiness Review Safety Culture Assessment and the outcome of this discussion may affect any or all of the attribute ratings.

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2e. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT  
(continued)**

Commitment to continuous improvement is evident

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ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Training on SCWE*</i>	Less than 70% of managers, supervisors and operators have received training on SCWE.	Between 70-79% of managers, supervisors and operators have received training on SCWE.	Between 80-90% of managers, supervisors and operators have received training on SCWE.	More than 90% of managers, supervisors and operators have received training on SCWE.
<i>Licensed operator pipeline**</i>	Less than 70% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.	Between 70-84% of new operators passed their initial license for the most recent class examination.	Between 85-95% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.	More than 95% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Nuclear Training

\*\*This item assessed by Operations only.

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2e. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT  
(continued)**

Commitment to continuous improvement is evident

SAFETY CONSCIOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT (SCWE)

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Use of SCWERT*</i>	More than 4 CRs issued within the past six months related to failure to properly conduct SCWERT review of Davis-Besse work disciplinary actions prior to the action.	Between 4-2 CRs issued within the past six months related to failure to properly conduct SCWERT review of Davis-Besse work disciplinary actions prior to the action.	Less than 2 CRs issued within the past six months related to failure to properly conduct SCWERT review of Davis-Besse work disciplinary actions prior to the action.	No CRs issued within the past six months related to failure to properly conduct SCWERT review of Davis-Besse work disciplinary actions prior to the action.
<i>Effectiveness of SCWERT in avoiding discrimination claims*</i>	There are more than 5 NRC allegations or ECP concerns of discrimination submitted within the past six months	There are 5 NRC allegations or ECP concerns of discrimination submitted within the past six months.	There are 4 NRC allegations or ECP concerns of discrimination submitted within the past six months.	There are 2 or fewer NRC allegations or ECP concerns of discrimination submitted within the past six months
<i>Effectiveness in avoiding NRC or ECP substantiated discrimination claims*</i>	There is more than one substantiated NRC or ECP discrimination claim within the past six months.	There is one substantiated NRC or ECP discrimination claim within the past six months	There are no substantiated NRC or ECP discrimination claims within the past six months.	There are no substantiated NRC or ECP discrimination claims within the past year.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Employee Concerns Program

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2f. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CROSS-FUNCTIONAL WORK  
MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATION**

Commitment to cross functional work management and communication is evident

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Cross-functional teamwork</i>	No cross-functional teamwork is evident among sections	Some cross-functional teamwork among sections exists but work is sub-optimized.	Cross-functional teamwork frequently occurs among sections, enabling efficient and effective workflow.	Cross-functional teams among sections are constantly forming/reforming around the best way to get work done.
<i>Department interfaces</i>	Many process breakdowns occur within the Department with extensive amounts of rework needed.	Some process breakdowns occur within the Department with frequent amounts of rework needed.	Minimal process breakdowns and rework occur within the Department with effective and efficient resolution of emergency issues.	Department interfaces are seamless; work flows efficiently between departments throughout the entire organization.
<i>Performance to schedule*</i>	Less than 70% of work is completed on time, as scheduled, causing major consequences to overall site performance.	Between 70-80% of work is completed on time, as scheduled, with major adjustments to resource capacity required to improve performance.	Between 80 -90% of work is completed on time, as scheduled, with minimal adjustments to resource capacity required to improve performance.	More than 90% of work is completed on time, as scheduled, within current resource capacity.
<i>Interdepartmental communication</i>	Information that impacts downstream implementation is not shared, causing significant negative consequences to other departments.	Information that impacts downstream implementation is inconsistently shared, which keeps other departments in a reactive mode.	Information that impacts downstream implementation is frequently shared on a timely basis, enabling departments to proactively plan and respond.	Information that impacts downstream implementation is communicated as soon as it's known, enabling departments to work proactively on a consistent basis.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Outage Management and Work Control

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2f. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CROSS-FUNCTIONAL WORK  
MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATION (continued)**

Commitment to cross functional work management and communication is evident

<i>Interdepartmental problem solving and decision making</i>	Problem solving and decision making occurs in isolation; non-involvement of other Departments or stakeholders.	Cross-functional sections, Departments or stakeholders are seldom involved when problems are being solved and decisions are made.	Cross-functional sections, Departments or stakeholders are frequently involved when problems are being solved and decisions are made.	Cross-functional sections, Departments or stakeholders are consistently involved when problems are being solved and decisions are made.
<i>Systemic learning</i>	Things are broken down, focus is on the pieces and discrete problems are fixed within the section with no understanding of interdependencies.	Discrete problems are fixed within the section with minimal understanding of interdependencies	Attention is focused on learning and discovering fundamental solutions to resolving long-standing and/or complex problems within the section	Streamlining and improving systems and process is constant to resolve long-standing and/or complex problems within the section
<i>Incorporating industry Operating Experience*</i>	Industry operating experience is not consistently fully utilized to enhance site performance.	There is less than full utilization and minimal compliance to our Operating Experience Program	There is full utilization and compliance with the Operating Experience Program	Operating Experience is consistently and fully utilized in every department and is well-integrated into everyday activities to enhance plant performance.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Operating Experience Program

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2.MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2g. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT OF ENGAGEMENT AND COMMITMENT**

An environment of engagement and commitment is evident

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>FENOC values, basic principles and leadership strategies</i>	FENOC values, basic principles and leadership strategies are not used by management personnel within the section	FENOC values, basic principles and leadership strategies are inconsistently demonstrated by some management personnel within the section	FENOC values, basic principles and leadership strategies are frequently demonstrated by some management personnel within the section	Most management personnel in the section have internalized and are living the FENOC values, basic principles and leadership strategies as demonstrated in their day to day actions.
<i>Quality of management and employee relationships*</i>	Employee Concerns Program, Quality Assessment and 4Cs survey data indicates that employees openly express fear of retaliation and will not raise safety concerns with management.	Employee Concerns Program, Quality Assessment and 4Cs survey data indicates that more than 70% of employees will bring safety concerns to management.	Employee Concerns Program, Quality Assessment and 4Cs survey data indicates that more than 80% of employees will bring concerns to management.	Employee Concerns Program, Quality Assessment and 4Cs survey data indicate more than 90% of employees raise issues directly with management, work collaboratively to resolve issues and reflect favorable improvement.
<i>Organizational commitment and shared success criteria</i>	Section management focuses on what is in the best interest of their section at the expense of what is in the best interest of the whole organization.	Section management occasionally supports what is in the best interest of their section without consideration to what is in the best interest of the whole organization.	Section management frequently supports doing what is in the best interest of the whole organization rather than what is in the best interest of their section.	Section management consistently supports doing what is in the best interest for the whole organization rather than what is in the best interest for their section.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by ECP, NQA and 4Cs

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

**2g. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT OF ENGAGEMENT AND COMMITMENT (continued)**

An environment of engagement and commitment is evident

<i>Performance reviews in accordance with Ownership for Excellence*</i>	Less than 70% of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence.	Between 70-80% of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence.	Between 80-90% of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence.	More than 90% of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence
<i>Ownership for Excellence Development Plans*</i>	Less than 70% of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR	Between 70-80% of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR	Between 80-90% of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR	More than 90% of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR

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\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources

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3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA

**3a. CRITERIA RELATED TO DRIVE FOR EXCELLENCE**

Nuclear assets of people and plant are continuously improved to enhance margins of safety

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ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Systems*</i>	There are more than 3 Red (a)(1) systems.	There are 2 Red (a)(1) systems.	There is one Red (a)(1) system.	There are zero Red (a)(1) systems.
<i>Number of Operator workarounds**#</i>	There are more than 2 operator workarounds.	There are 2 operator workarounds.	There is 1 operator workarounds.	There are no operator workarounds.
<i>Number of Control Room deficiencies**#</i>	There are more than 4 Control Room deficiencies.	There are 4 Control Room deficiencies.	There are 1-3 Control Room deficiencies.	There are no Control Room deficiencies.
<i>Number of temporary modifications+#</i>	There are more than 11 temporary modifications.	There are 11 or less temporary modifications.	There are 8 or less temporary modifications.	There are 5 or less temporary modifications.
<i>Individual Error Rate++</i>	The individual error rate is > 0.30 individual errors per 10,000 hours worked.	The individual error rate is <0.31 individual errors per 10,000 hours worked.	The individual error rate is <0.29 individual errors per 10,000 hours worked.	The individual error rate is <0.26 individual errors per 10,000 hours worked.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Plant Engineering

\*\*This item assessed by Operations only

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Engineering

++Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Performance

#Significance evaluation will be discussed during the Restart Readiness Review Safety Culture Assessment and the outcome of this discussion may affect any or all of the attribute ratings.

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**3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA**

**3a. CRITERIA RELATED TO DRIVE FOR EXCELLENCE (continued)**

Nuclear assets of people and plant are continuously improved to enhance margins of safety

6

<i>Percent of self-identified Condition Reports (CRs)*</i>	Less than 80% of the CRs originated are self-identified.	80% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.	90% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.	95% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.
<i>Number of open Condition Report evaluations*</i>	Less than 80% of SCAQ evaluations and less than 70% of CAQ evaluations were completed on schedule for the previous quarter.	At least 80-90% of SCAQ evaluations and 70-80% of CAQ evaluations were completed on schedule for the previous quarter.	At least 90% of SCAQ evaluations and 80-90% of CAQ evaluations were completed on schedule for the previous quarter.	All SCAQ evaluations and 90% of CAQ evaluations were completed on schedule for the previous quarter.
<i>Engineering Assessment Board (EAB) index**</i>	The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is greater than 3.0.	The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 3.0 or less.	The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 2.0 or less.	The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 1.0 or less.
<i>Performance during major plant evolutions+</i>	More than one significant event has occurred during a plant evolution in the past month	One significant event has occurred during a plant evolution in the past month	Major plant evolutions have been performed in the past month with some less than significant challenges or transients.	Major plant evolutions have been performed in the past month as planned.
<i>Addressing Operating Experience</i>	Less than 70% of operating experience reports applicable to the section are completed on time	Between 70-80% of operating experience reports applicable to the section are completed on time	Between 80-90% of operating experience reports applicable to the section are completed on time	More than 90% of operating experience reports applicable to the section are completed on time.

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Operational transient is defined by INPO as a plant transient that occurs (reactor critical or while shutdown) and results in significant changes in primary or secondary plant parameters or results in significant changes in mechanical or electrical lineups.

Significant is defined by INPO as an event which caused or had the potential to cause an appreciable reduction in plant safety or reliability, excessive radiation exposure, the discharge of radioactivity offsite or serious harm to individuals. The significance of a particular event (including the discovery of a serious deficiency, lies in the actual or potential consequences of the event or in the likelihood that it is a precursor to a more serious event.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance Improvement

\*\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Director-Nuclear Engineering

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Operations

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3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA

**3b. CRITERIA RELATED TO QUESTIONING ATTITUDE**

Challenges are welcomed

6

<b>ATTRIBUTE</b>	<b>RED</b>	<b>YELLOW</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>GREEN</b>
<i>Quality of pre-job briefs*</i>	Management observations and QA field observations show that most pre-job briefs are not acceptable.	Management observations and QA field observations show that most pre-job briefs are acceptable.	Management observations and QA field observations show that, with some exceptions, pre-job briefs are acceptable.	Management observations and QA field observations show that pre-job briefs in general are acceptable.
<i>Percent of CRs per person per group**</i>	Less than 13% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.	Between 13-15% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.	Between 15-17% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.	More than 17% of individuals wrote CRs during the past month.
<i>Number of programmatic CRs**</i>	The number of programmatic CRs indicates that individuals in general are reluctant to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.	The number of programmatic CRs indicates that most individuals are willing to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.	The number of programmatic CRs indicates that a large majority of individuals are willing to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.	The number of programmatic CRs indicates that individuals in general are willing to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.
<i>Program and process error rate+</i>	>0.48 program and process errors per 10,000 hours worked.	<0.48 program and process errors per 10,000 hours worked.	<0.30 program and process errors per 10,000 hours worked.	<0.27 program and process errors per 10,000 hours worked.
<i>Raising problems*</i>	Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are not raising problems encountered in the field.	Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are raising problems encountered in the field.	Management observations and NQA field observations show that a large majority of individuals are raising problems encountered in the field.	Management observations and NQA field observations show that individuals in general are raising problems encountered in the field.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program and NQA.

\*\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance Improvement.

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Performance

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3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA

**3c. CRITERIA RELATED TO RIGOROUS WORK CONTROL AND PRUDENT APPROACH**

Performing activities in a quality manner is the standard

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Event Free Clock*</i>	The event free clock is less than 20 days on average.	The event free clock is between 20 and 30 days on average.	The event free clock is 30 to 39 days on average.	The event free clock is greater than 40 days on average.
<i>Industrial safety performance**</i>	There are 11 or more OSHA recordables per year.	There are between 8 and 10 OSHA recordables per year.	There are 4 to 7 OSHA recordables per year.	There are no more than 3 OSHA recordables per year.
<i>Individual error rate*</i>	The individual error rate is >0.30 individual errors per 10,000 hours worked.	The individual error rate is <0.31 individual errors per 10,000 hours worked.	The individual error rate is <0.29 individual errors per 10,000 hours worked.	The individual error rate is <0.26 individual errors per 10,000 hours worked.
<i>Program and process error rate*</i>	>0.48 program and process errors per 10,000 hours worked.	<0.48 program and process errors per 10,000 hours worked.	<.30 program and process errors per 10,000 hours worked.	<0.27 program and process errors per 10,000 hours worked.
<i>Significant human performance errors resulting in plant transients</i>	There are more than 3 significant human performance errors per year resulting in plant transients.	There are fewer than 3 significant human performance errors per year resulting in plant transients.	There are fewer than 2 significant human performance errors per year resulting in plant transients.	There were no significant human performance errors per year resulting in plant transients.
<i>Backlog of procedure change requests (PCRs)+</i>	There are more than 200 open PCRs.	There are less than 200 open PCRs.	There are less than 150 open PCRs.	There are less than 100 open PCRs.

Operational transient is defined by INPO as a plant transient that occurs (reactor critical or while shutdown) and results in significant changes in primary or secondary plant parameters or results in significant changes in mechanical or electrical lineups.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Performance

\*\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Industrial Safety

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance Improvement

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**3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA**

**3c. CRITERIA RELATED TO RIGOROUS WORK CONTROL AND PRUDENT APPROACH  
(continued)**

Performing activities in a quality manner is the standard

6

<b>ATTRIBUTE</b>	<b>RED</b>	<b>YELLOW</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>GREEN</b>
<i>Deficiency rate for QC holds*</i>	Deficiency rate for QC hold points is more than 25%.	The deficiency rate for QC hold points is less than 25%.	The deficiency rate for QC holds point is less than 15 %.	The deficiency rate for QC hold points is less than 7 %.
<i>Rework rate**</i>	Rework rate is more than 3%.	The rework rate is 2.5-3.0%.	The rework rate is 2.1-2.5%.	The rework rate is ≤2.0%.
<i>Ratio of completed to scheduled works orders per week+</i>	Less than 50% of scheduled work orders are completed.	More than 50% of scheduled work orders are completed.	More than 75% of scheduled work orders are completed.	More than 90% of scheduled work orders are completed.
<i>Number of late preventive maintenance (PM) activities+</i>	Less than 50% of scheduled work orders are completed.	More than 50% of scheduled PMs are completed.	More than 75% of scheduled PM are completed.	More than 90% of scheduled PMs are completed.
<i>Backlog of corrective maintenance (CM) activities+</i>	There are more than 230 CM activities outstanding.	There are between 229 and 150 CM activities outstanding.	There are between 149 and 134 CM activities outstanding.	There are less than 134 CM activities outstanding.
<i>Number of Maintenance Rule (a)(1) systems++</i>	There are more than 3 Red (a)(1) systems.	There are 2 Red (a)(1) systems.	There is one Red are one or two (a)(1) systems.	There are zero Red (a)(1) systems.

\*This item assessed by QC only.

\*\*This item assessed by Maintenance only

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Outage Management and Work Control

++Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Plant Engineering

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**3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA**

**3c. CRITERIA RELATED TO RIGOROUS WORK CONTROL AND PRUDENT APPROACH  
(continued)**

Performing activities in a quality manner is the standard

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Performance during major plant evolutions @</i>	More than one significant event has occurred during a plant evolution in the past month. There are more than three transients during major plant evolutions prior to restart.	One significant event has occurred during a plant evolution in the past month. There are three or fewer transients during major plant evolutions prior to restart.	Major plant evolutions have been performed with some transients or one significant event during major plant evolutions prior to restart.	Major plant evolutions have been performed as planned. There are no transients or significant events during major plant evolutions prior to restart.
<i>Use of procedures and work orders*</i>	Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are not using procedures or work orders.	Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are using procedures or work orders.	Management observations and NQA field observations show that a large majority of individuals are using procedures or work orders.	Management observations and NQA field observations show that individuals in general are using procedures or work orders.

Operational transient is defined by INPO as a plant transient that occurs (reactor critical or while shutdown) and results in significant changes in primary or secondary plant parameters or results in significant changes in mechanical or electrical lineups.

Significant is defined by INPO as an event that caused or had the potential to cause an appreciable reduction in plant safety or reliability, excessive radiation exposure, the discharge of radioactivity offsite or serious harm to individuals. The significance of a particular event (including the discovery of a serious deficiency, lies in the actual or potential consequences of the event or in the likelihood that it is a precursor to a more serious event.

@ Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Operations

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program and NQA

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3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA

**3d. CRITERIA RELATED TO OPEN COMMUNICATIONS**

Associates are comfortable in voicing opinions, issues and concerns

6

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Number of CRs per person per group*</i>	Less than 13% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.	Between 13-15% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.	Between 15-17% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.	More than 17% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.
<i>Worker confidence in raising safety concerns</i>	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that less than 80% of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that between 80-90% of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that between 90-95% of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that more than 95% of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.
<i>Feedback from 4Cs meetings+</i>	Feedback from the 4Cs meetings indicates that most individuals are not willing to raise concerns to management.	Feedback from the 4Cs meetings indicates that more than 70% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to management.	Feedback from the 4Cs meetings indicates that more than 80% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to management.	Feedback from the 4Cs meetings indicates that more than 90% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to management.
<i>Keep Improving Performance (KIP) program++</i>	Each month's total Safe behavior is 59% or less.	Each month's total Safe behavior is 60% to 69%.	Each month's total Safe behavior is 70% to 79%.	Each month's total Safe behavior is 80% or higher.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance Improvement

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Chief Operating Officer

++Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Industrial Safety

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**3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA**

**3d. CRITERIA RELATED TO OPEN COMMUNICATIONS (continued)**

Associates are comfortable in voicing opinions, issues and concerns

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Pre-job briefings@</i>	Management observations and QA field observations show that most pre-job briefs are not acceptable.	Management observations and QA field observations show that most pre-job briefs are acceptable.	Management observations and QA field observations show that, with some exceptions, pre-job briefs are acceptable.	Management observations and QA field observations show that pre-job briefs in general are acceptable.
<i>Intra-department information sharing</i>	No formal communication structures exist for sharing information among the sections of the department.	Infrequent information sharing exists among the sections of the department.	Formal communication structures exist and are occasionally used to share information among the sections of the department.	Formal communication structures exist and are consistently used to share information among the sections of the department.
<i>Quality of communication*</i>	4Cs surveys indicate that more than 50% of employees believe that the communication from their Managers is poor	4Cs surveys indicate that more than 50% of employees believe that communication from their Managers is fair	4Cs surveys indicate that more than 70% of employees believe that communication from their Managers is fair.	4Cs surveys indicate that more than 70% of employees believe that communication from their Managers is good.

@Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program and NQA

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Chief Operating Officer

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**3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA**

**3d. CRITERIA RELATED TO OPEN COMMUNICATIONS (continued)  
SAFETY CONSCIOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT (SCWE)**

<b>ATTRIBUTE</b>	<b>RED</b>	<b>YELLOW</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>GREEN</b>
<i>Employee awareness of SCWE policy</i>	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that less than 80% of employees in the section are aware of policy.	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that 80-90% of employees in the section are aware of policy and consider it a FE value.	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that 90-95% of employees in the section are aware of policy and consider it an FE value.	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that more than 95% of employees in the section are aware of policy and consider it an FE value and the normal way to do business.
<i>Training on SCWE *</i>	Less than 70% of managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.	Between 70-79% of managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.	Between 80-89% of managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.	More than 90% of managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.
<i>NQA interviews+</i>	NQA interviews indicate that less than 85% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to their supervisors or ECP.	NQA interviews indicate that between 85-90% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to their supervisors or ECP.	NQA interviews indicate that between 90-95% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to their supervisors or ECP.	NQA interviews indicate that more than 95% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to their supervisors or ECP.
<i>Worker confidence in raising safety concerns</i>	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that less than 80% of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that between 80-90% of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that between 90-95% of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.	Surveys and/or interviews indicate that more than 95% of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Nuclear Training

\*\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Employee Concerns Program

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by NQA

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**3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA**

**3d. CRITERIA RELATED TO OPEN COMMUNICATIONS (continued)**

**EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM (ECP)**

6

<b>ATTRIBUTE</b>	<b>RED</b>	<b>YELLOW</b>	<b>WHITE</b>	<b>GREEN</b>
<i>Ratio of concerns submitted to ECP vs. NRC allegations based on three month rolling average*</i>	There are more NRC allegations than ECP concerns.	There are more ECP concerns than NRC allegations.	There are at least 4 times more ECP concerns than NRC allegations or there are no NRC allegations.	There are at least 8 times more ECP concerns than NRC allegations or there are no NRC allegations or ECP concerns.
<i>Satisfaction of employees using the ECP*</i>	Less than 70% of employees that use the ECP report being satisfied with the process.	Between 70-80 % of employees that use the ECP report being satisfied with the process.	Between 80-90% of employees that use the ECP report being satisfied with the process.	More than 90% of employees that use the ECP report being satisfied with the process.
<i>Complaints of breach of confidentiality of ECP*</i>	There are more than 2 complaints this year.	There are 2 complaints this year.	There is 1 complaint this year.	There are zero complaints this year.
<i>Management support for ECP*</i>	Employee surveys indicate less than 70% of individuals believe management supports ECP.	Employee surveys indicate between 70-80% of individuals believe management supports ECP.	Employee surveys indicate between 80-90% of individuals believe management supports ECP.	Employee surveys indicate more than 90% of individuals believe management supports ECP.

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\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Employee Concerns Program

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3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA

**3e. CRITERIA RELATED TO NUCLEAR PROFESSIONALISM**

Persistence and urgency in identification and resolution of problems is prevalent

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Ownership for Excellence Development Plans</i>	Less than 70% of applicable employees in the section have completed Ownership for Excellence development plans.	Between 70-80 % of applicable employees in the section have completed Ownership for Excellence development plans.	Between 80-90% of applicable employees in the section have completed Ownership for Excellence development plans.	More than 90% of applicable employees in the section have completed Ownership for Excellence development plans.
<i>Training attendance**</i>	Training attendance is less than 85%.	Training attendance is between 85-90%.	Training attendance is between 91-98%.	Training attendance is greater than 98%.
<i>Rework rate+</i>	The rework rate is more than 3%.	The rework rate is 2.5-3.0%.	The rework rate is 2.1-2.5%.	The rework rate is ≤2.0%.
<i>Results of EAB assessments++</i>	The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is greater than 3.0.	The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 3.0 or less.	The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 2.0 or less	The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 1.0 or less.
<i>Training performance score per NOBP-TR-1501#</i>	Overall Training performance score less than 60%	Overall Training performance score between 60-80%.	Overall Training performance score between 80-90%	Overall Training performance score greater than 90%
<i>Radiation Protection events @</i>	There are more than 3 radiation protection events per quarter.	There are 1-3 radiation protection events per quarter.	There is 1 radiation protection event per quarter.	There are no radiation protection events per quarter.

\*\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Nuclear Training

+This item assessed by Maintenance only

++This item assessed by Engineering only. Data provided by Director-Nuclear Engineering

#This item assessed by Nuclear Training only.

@Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Radiation Protection. An RP event is defined as any radiological event that would be included in the NRC Performance Indicator for Radiation Safety Cornerstone.

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3.INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA

**3e. CRITERIA RELATED TO NUCLEAR PROFESSIONALISM (continued)**

Persistence and urgency in identification and resolution of problems is prevalent

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Chemistry Performance Index*</i>	The index is greater than 1.036.	The index is equal to or less than 1.036.	The index is equal to or less than 1.004.	The index is equal to or less than 1.000.
<i>Procedure compliance**</i>	Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are not complying with procedures.	Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are complying with procedures.	Management observations and NQA field observations show that a large majority of individuals are complying with procedures.	Management observations and NQA field observations show that individuals in general are complying with procedures.
<i>Personal initiative</i>	Few employees in the section routinely express why work can't be done or improved.	Employees in the section work hard to do what's expected.	Employees in the section do what it takes to get the job done.	Employees at all levels in the section take personal initiative to invent methods to achieve higher quality and greater efficiency.
<i>Ownership</i>	Employees in the section don't follow through on assigned commitments and seldom volunteer for ownership.	Employees in the section are inconsistent in following through to meet quality and timing of assigned commitments.	Employees in the section follow through and do what is asked of them and do what is defined within their job description.	Most employees in the section regularly volunteer to own/lead project, develop plans, coordinate efforts and see work through to completion.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Chemistry

\*\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program and NQA

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3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA

**3e. CRITERIA RELATED TO NUCLEAR PROFESSIONALISM (continued)**

Persistence in identification and resolution of problems is prevalent

6

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>Implementation of CAP improvements*</i>	Implementation of the CAP improvements designated for restart has not started.	Implementation of the CAP improvements designated for restart is started but none are completed.	Implementation of the CAP improvements for restart is completed but the associated training is not completed.	The CAP improvements designated for restart are completed and associated training is completed.
<i>Root cause evaluation quality*</i>	The root cause evaluation approval rate as determined by the CARB is less than 50%.	The root cause evaluation approval rate as determined by the CARB is between 50-74%.	The root cause evaluation approval rate as determined by the CARB is between 75-90%.	The root cause evaluation approval rate as determined by the CARB is 90% or greater.
<i>CR category accuracy*</i>	The CR category accuracy rate is less than 70% or greater.	The CR category accuracy rate is between 70-80%.	The CR category accuracy rate is between 80-90%.	The CR category accuracy rate is 90% or greater.
<i>CR self-identification rate*</i>	Less than 80% of the CRs originated are self-identified.	80% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.	90% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.	95% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.
<i>Employee survey+</i>	Employee surveys indicate that more than 10 % of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.	Employee surveys indicate that between 10-5% of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.	Employee surveys indicate that between 5-2% of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.	Employee surveys indicate that less than 2% of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance Improvement

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Employee Concerns Program

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3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA

**3e. CRITERIA RELATED TO NUCLEAR PROFESSIONALISM (continued)**

Persistence in identification and resolution of problems is prevalent

ATTRIBUTE	RED	YELLOW	WHITE	GREEN
<i>NQA interviews*</i>	NQA interviews indicate that more than 10% of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.	NQA interviews indicate that between 10-5% of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.	NQA interviews indicate that between - 5-2% of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.	NQA interviews indicate that less than 2 % of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.
<i>Timeliness of corrective actions</i>	Less than 50% of corrective actions for section CRs are completed on schedule without extensions.	Between 50-74% of corrective actions for section CRs are completed on schedule without extensions.	Between 75-89%of corrective actions for section CRs are completed on schedule without extensions.	More than 90% of corrective actions for section CRs are completed on schedule without extensions.

\*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by NQA

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