



Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37384-2000

September 2, 2003

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555


10 CFR 73.71

Gentlemen:

**TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1
AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING
LICENSE DPR-77 AND DPR-79 - 30-DAY REPORT 50-327/2003-S01-00**

The enclosed report provides details concerning an uncontrolled security weapon in the protected area. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(a)(4) and 10 CFR 73 Appendix G.I(a)(3)(d).

Sincerely,



Pedro Salas
Licensing and Industry Affairs Manager

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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cc (Enclosure):

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) UNIT 1	2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000327	3. PAGE 1 OF 4
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4. TITLE
Uncontrolled Security Weapon in the Protected Area

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MO	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	MO	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
08	04	2003	2003	S01	00	09	02	2003	SQN Unit 2	05000328
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

9. OPERATING MODE 1	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)																						
10. POWER LEVEL 100	20.2201(b)	20.2201(d)	20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(2)(i)	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	20.2203(a)(2)(v)	20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	73.71(a)(4)	73.71(a)(5)	OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

NAME J. Bajraszewski	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (423) 843-7749
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13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED				15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE			MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO							

16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Unit 1	05000327	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION	2 OF 4
		2003	- S01	- 00	

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

At 1548 Eastern daylight time (EDT) on August 4, 2003, two maintenance mechanics discovered an uncontrolled security weapon within the protected area on turbine building floor Elevation 706. After the weapon was secured, it was determined that this was the same weapon that was identified as missing on July 1, 2003. An investigation was initiated and is ongoing.

On July 1, 2003, a rifle was determined to be missing from a security post storage locker located outside the protected area, within the owner-controlled area. A document review determined that a periodic inventory that was performed on June 18, 2003, indicated that the rifle had been in place. Interviews with security personnel indicate that the weapon was most likely still in its storage locker on June 30, 2003. An accountability inventory was performed immediately after discovery that the rifle was missing. This inventory did not identify any other weapons as missing.

1. Date and Time of Event:

The event (i.e., uncontrolled security weapon) was identified at 1548 hours EDT on August 4, 2003, when the weapon was found.

2. Location:

The event location was within the protected area, in the turbine building, on floor Elevation 706.

3. Operating Phase:

Units 1 and 2 were in power operation at approximately 100 percent power.

4. Safety Systems Affected or Threatened:

The event did not affect or threaten any safety-related equipment.

5. Type of Security Force Onsite:

The security force at SQN consists of TVA and contract employees. Contract employees are employed by Pinkerton Government Services.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
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NARRATIVE (if more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

6. Number and Type of Personnel Involved:

The number of security personnel involved in the event is indeterminate. Two TVA Maintenance personnel discovered the security weapon.

7. Method of Discovery:

Two instrument mechanics discovered the security weapon behind an instrument panel while preparing to perform scheduled maintenance of instruments on the panel.

8. Procedural Errors Involved:

Plant procedures were not followed in that the security weapon was unattended.

9. Immediate Action Taken in Response to the Event:

The area was secured and quarantined to facilitate event investigation. Site security personnel took control of the weapon and turned the weapon over to TVA Police for further investigation.

10. Corrective Actions Taken or Planned:

After discovery of the uncontrolled security weapon, an investigation was initiated that included State and Federal law enforcement. The condition was placed into the Corrective Action Program. The investigation is ongoing, and any identified action(s) developed from the investigation will be placed into the corrective action program.

Following discovery that a security weapon was missing, the condition was placed into the Corrective Action Program and investigated. As a result of the investigation, weapon accountability was improved by performing accountability verifications at each shift turnover and control of weapons, that are not assigned to a specific individual or post, was centralized. Additionally, the security shift supervisors perform weapons accountability verifications randomly with officers on shift.

11. Local, State, or Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Contacted:

The TVA Police was contacted to support the investigation. The TVA Police notified the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and the Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms Agency.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Unit 1	05000327	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION	4 OF 4
		2003	- S01	- 00	

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

12. Description of Media Interest and Press Release:

Various members of the media contacted TVA requesting information on the missing security weapon on July 3, 2003. Various members of the media made calls to TVA requesting event status on July 7-10, 2003, and July 18, 2003. TVA provided general information of the missing weapon incident.

Upon discovery of the uncontrolled security weapon inside the protected area, various members of the media contacted TVA on August 5, 2003, requesting information. In each media inquiry, TVA provided a general overview of the event described in this special report.

13. Indication of Previous Similar Events:

A review of past Special Reports was performed, and no previous similar events were identified.

14. Knowledgeable Contact:

Individuals involved with the event investigation are:

Bonnie Schnetzler, Site Security Manager or Michael Tipton, Security Coordinator at telephone number 423-843-6548.

II. COMMITMENTS

None.