



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

JAN 14 1971

P. A. Morris, Director
Division of Reactor Licensing

BIG ROCK POINT - OVERFLIGHTS

The following report concerning overflights at Big Rock Point is forwarded for your information. This information was obtained from the Station Superintendent at Big Rock Point during a telephone inquiry by Region III (Chicago) on January 14, 1971:

The Military Tracking Station at Bay Shore, Michigan, approximately 5 miles from the Big Rock site, provided the Plant Superintendent with the following data - averaged over a 6 month period:

- a. 300 overflights per month at an altitude of 1920 feet.
- b. 8 overflights per month at an altitude of 500 feet.

Overflights are on a north-south pattern, approximately 8 miles wide, with the center off-set approximately 100 yards from Big Rock.

In addition to the above information, the Plant Superintendent stated that Mr. Campbell, Vice President, Consumers Power Company, sent a letter to Congressman Ford, Michigan, on December 16, 1970. This letter requested assistance in stopping the overflights or limiting them to a 12-1/2 mile off-set from the site.

If you desire further specific information on this problem, please let me know.

Lawrence D. Low, Director
Division of Compliance

- cc: C. K. Beck, DR
- M. M. Mann, DR
- S. H. Hanauer, DR
- E. G. Case, DRS
- A. Giambusso, CO
- D. J. Skovholt, DRL
- R. H. Engelken, CO
- L. Kornblith, Jr., CO
- B. H. Grier, CO:III

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS 31ST TACTICAL FIGHTER WING (TAC)
HOMESTEAD AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33030



REPLY TO 31 TAC FTR WG (DO)
ATTN OF:


26 Feb 71

SUBJECT: Helicopter Flights at Turkey Point, Florida

to: Florida Power & Light Company
ATTN: Mr. S. A. (Bud) Crostic, Jr.

1. This letter reconfirms the policy regarding helicopter flights at Turkey Point, Florida.

2. Helicopters from Homestead AFB, Florida, flying in the vicinity of Turkey Point in support of the 4550 School Squadron (Sea Survival) will continue to avoid direct over flight of the Florida Power & Light Generating Facility.


GEORGE D. VAN HUSS, JR., Lt Col, USAF
Director of Operations

Cy to: DET 1, 44ARRS
DOH

James H. Campbell
President



General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201 • Area Code 517 788-0605

April 12, 1971

Col. Charles Clark
HQ USAF (XO0SS)
Washington, D. C. 20330

Colonel Clark:

I would like to express our appreciation for the briefing you gave our representatives, and representatives of AEC and the nuclear insurance pools, Tuesday in Washington concerning the Big Rock Point B-52 overflights.

As I understand the SAC proposal made at that meeting, you would attempt to secure approval for two things: (1) rerouting by the summer of 1972 of the Bayshore OB-9 low-level all-weather practice bombing route to a location at Empire, Michigan so that the planes would avoid the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant by at least 14 or 15 nautical miles; and (2) pending such relocation, use of a temporary new route at Bayshore which would call for the planes to avoid Big Rock Point laterally by at least 5.5 nautical miles. I further understand that you believe your equipment and procedures to be such that no plane flying the temporary route could approach closer than 1.5 nautical miles to the Plant.


The first part of your proposal appears to offer adequate protection, and is acceptable to us, on the basis of the minimum distance and maximum lead time stated above. We are not yet able to respond with respect to the interim rerouting at Bayshore. If you will send us an analysis of the chances of one of your B-52s or FB-111s straying off course and endangering the Plant, given your proposed frequency of flights, the capabilities of your equipment, your procedures, and any other relevant variables, we will gladly review it and respond as quickly as we can. Please know, however, that no proposed route will be acceptable to us unless [the inherent risk that a plane flying that route will strike the Plant is so negligible as to be nonexistent for all practicable purposes.] The prospect that a plane might approach the Plant as close as 1.5 nautical miles while flying the "temporary route" does not excite enthusiasm.

Col. Charles Clark
April 12, 1971

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You appear to be making a sincere effort to satisfy our concerns and I am hopeful that we will be able to resolve the matter in a satisfactory way at an early date. I shall expect to hear from you soon.

Yours very truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "James H. Campbell". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name "James H. Campbell".

JHC/kw

CC: Hon. Gerald R. Ford



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

MAR 22 1971

Mr. Ralph Nader
1156 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Nader:

This is in reply to your letter of March 1, 1971, concerning low-level flights near nuclear power stations.

The proximity of the Air Force's Bay Shore bomb scoring site to the Big Rock Point plant near Charlevoix, Michigan, and the associated use of the plant in connection with training flights, came to the attention of the AEC in 1963. At that time it was the AEC's understanding that the plant was being used as a practice target and the AEC requested the Department of Defense to remove the plant from the Air Force practice target list. The AEC was then informed by DOD that the plant would not be used by the Air Force for this purpose. We were subsequently informed by DOD that the use of the plant as a practice target had been discontinued, but that low-level flights near the plant continued with the target for these runs being in Lake Michigan, several miles offshore. Subsequent to the January 7, 1971 crash, low-level training flights were suspended and plans are being made to reroute the training flight path away from the plant site.

The Commission's regulatory staff has met with DOD representatives in regard to low-level military flights. The staff is preparing a list of site coordinates for all nuclear power plants for use by the Department of Defense. DOD, in turn, is preparing information on existing low-level flight paths for use by the staff. We plan further discussions on this matter with DOD and believe that a program can be developed, consistent with military requirements, that will avoid low-level flights near these plants.

It is the practice of the AEC regulatory staff to evaluate potential hazards presented by air traffic in the vicinity of airports which may be near a proposed nuclear power plant site before recommending

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approval of the site and plant design. An atomic safety and licensing board reviews these matters in public hearings at which the conclusions of the Commission's regulatory staff and the views of other parties are considered before a decision is made on issuance of a permit to construct a plant.

In the case of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, which is about 4-3/4 miles from the Calverton Airport on Long Island, the Commission's regulatory staff concluded that the proposed site is sufficiently far away from the Calverton Airport that the probability of a crash at the site is essentially that associated with general overflights and that the proposed plant need not be designed or operated with special provisions to protect the facility against the effects of an aircraft crash. This conclusion, as well as other matters bearing on plant design and location, is presently being considered by an atomic safety and licensing board. Since the Shoreham proceeding is now in the AEC adjudication process, it would not, of course, be appropriate for me to discuss the merits of any of these points. I am enclosing a copy of the staff Safety Evaluation for the proposed Shoreham Nuclear Power Station which was filed in that proceeding. Appendix A thereto discusses the matter of proximity of the site to the Calverton Airport.

In another case, that of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2, additional protection against aircraft impact was provided in the design because of the proximity of the plant to Olmstead State Airport (about 2-1/2 miles).

In all cases, during site review meetings, the staff examines the matter of airport proximity to the proposed site. In one case, a utility which had made a tentative selection of a site near an Air Force base elected to change the site location before submitting a formal application.

The Commission's staff has had under development for some time explicit criteria concerning the design and location of nuclear power plants in relation to nearby airports. Factors which are being considered in the development of these criteria include probability of aircraft crashes, potential consequences of such crashes on or near a nuclear power plant, distance and orientation of the nuclear power plant from aircraft runways, type of aircraft using the runways, and frequency of runway use.

Mr. Ralph Nader

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MAR 22 1971

When completed, these criteria will be published for public comments and we will also send you a copy. Your request for a public hearing on these matters will be considered at that time.

Cordially,

[Faint signature]

Chairman

Enclosure:
Staff Safety Evaluation
for Shoreham