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ITSB1 - IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS MANUAL BASES UNIT 1

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TSB

**APPROVED AMENDMENT TO THE
UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES MANUAL
REVISION 46**

Replace the following pages of the Technical Specifications Bases Manual with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Revision Number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

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SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)

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BASES

BACKGROUND
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6. Shutdown Cooling System Isolation

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function receives input from four reactor vessel water level channels. The outputs from the reactor vessel water level channels are connected to two two-out-of-two trip systems. The Reactor Vessel Pressure—High Function receives input from two channels, with each channel in one trip system using a one-out-of-one logic. Each of the two trip systems is connected to one of the two valves on each shutdown cooling penetration.

7. Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Isolation Function receives input from two reactor vessel water level channels. The Drywell Pressure-High Isolation Function receives input from two drywell pressure channels. The outputs from the reactor vessel water level channels and drywell pressure channels are connected into one two-out-of-two logic trip system.

When either Isolation Function actuates, the TIP drive mechanisms will withdraw the TIPs, if inserted, and close the inboard TIP System isolation ball valves when the proximity probe senses the TIPs are withdrawn into the shield. The TIP System isolation ball valves are only open when the TIP System is in use. The outboard TIP System isolation valves are manual shear valves.

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The isolation signals generated by the primary containment isolation instrumentation are implicitly assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2 to initiate closure of valves to limit offsite doses. Refer to LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)," Applicable Safety Analyses Bases for more detail of the safety analyses.

Primary containment isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. (Ref. 8) Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
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(continued)**

The OPERABILITY of the primary containment instrumentation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Each channel must also respond within its assumed response time, where appropriate.

Allowable Values are specified for each Primary Containment Isolation Function specified in the Table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter reaches the setpoint, the associated device changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 consistent with the Applicability for LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment." Functions that have different Applicabilities are discussed below in the individual Functions discussion.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

(continued)

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The penetrations which are isolated by the below listed functions can be determined by referring to the PCIV Table found in the Bases of LCO 3.6.1.3, "Primary Containment Isolation Valves."

Main Steam Line Isolation

1.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1

Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of the MSIVs and other interfaces with the reactor vessel occurs to prevent offsite dose limits from being exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Function is one of the many Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of providing isolation signals. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Function associated with isolation is assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1). The isolation of the MSLs on Level 1 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded for a DBA.

Reactor vessel water level signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to be the same as the ECCS Level 1 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1) to ensure that the MSLs isolate on a potential loss of coolant accident (LOCA) to prevent offsite doses from exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits.

(continued)

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1.b. Main Steam Line Pressure—Low

Low MSL pressure indicates that there may be a problem with the turbine pressure regulation, which could result in a low reactor vessel water level condition and the RPV cooling down more than 100°F/hr if the pressure loss is allowed to continue. The Main Steam Line Pressure—Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the pressure regulator failure (Ref. 2). For this event, the closure of the MSIVs ensures that the RPV temperature change limit (100°F/hr) is not reached. In addition, this Function supports actions to ensure that Safety Limit 2.1.1.1 is not exceeded. (This Function closes the MSIVs prior to pressure decreasing below 785 psig, which results in a scram due to MSIV closure, thus reducing reactor power to < 25% RTP.)

The MSL low pressure signals are initiated from four instruments that are connected to the MSL header. The instruments are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, each instrument is able to detect low MSL pressure. Four channels of Main Steam Line Pressure—Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Main Steam Line Pressure—Low trip will only occur after a 500 milli-second time delay to prevent any spurious isolations.

The Allowable Value was selected to be high enough to prevent excessive RPV depressurization. The Main Steam Line Pressure—Low Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 since this is when the assumed transient can occur (Ref. 2).

1.c. Main Steam Line Flow—High

Main Steam Line Flow—High is provided to detect a break of the MSL and to initiate closure of the MSIVs. If the steam were allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor would depressurize and the core could uncover. If the RPV water level decreases too far, fuel damage could occur. Therefore, the isolation is initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The Main Steam Line Flow—High Function is

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1.c. Main Steam Line Flow—High (continued)

directly assumed in the analysis of the main steam line break (MSLB) (Ref. 1). The isolation action, along with the scram function of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46 and offsite doses do not exceed the 10 CFR 100 limits.

The MSL flow signals are initiated from 16 instruments that are connected to the four MSLs. The instruments are arranged such that, even though physically separated from each other, all four connected to one MSL would be able to detect the high flow. Four channels of Main Steam Line Flow—High Function for each unisolated MSL (two channels per trip system) are available and are required to be OPERABLE so that no single instrument failure will preclude detecting a break in any individual MSL.

1.d. Condenser Vacuum—Low

The Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded due to the break.

The Condenser Vacuum—Low Function is provided to prevent overpressurization of the main condenser in the event of a loss of the main condenser vacuum. Since the integrity of the condenser is an assumption in offsite dose calculations, the Condenser Vacuum—Low Function is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating closure of the MSIVs. The closure of the MSIVs is initiated to prevent the addition of steam that would lead to additional condenser pressurization and possible rupture of the diaphragm installed to protect the turbine exhaust hood, thereby preventing a potential radiation leakage path following an accident.

Condenser vacuum pressure signals are derived from four pressure instruments that sense the pressure in the condenser. Four channels of Condenser Vacuum-Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

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1.d. Condenser Vacuum—Low (continued)

The Allowable Value is chosen to prevent damage to the condenser due to pressurization, thereby ensuring its integrity for offsite dose analysis. As noted (footnote (a) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), the channels are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 when all main turbine stop valves (TSVs) are closed, since the potential for condenser overpressurization is minimized. Switches are provided to manually bypass the channels when all TSVs are closed.

1.e. Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature—High

Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel temperature is provided to detect a leak in the RCPB and provides diversity to the high flow instrumentation. The isolation occurs when a very small leak has occurred. If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. However, credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the FSAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks, such as MSLBs.

Area temperature signals are initiated from thermocouples located in the area being monitored. Four channels of Reactor Building Main Steam Tunnel Temperature—High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The reactor building main steam tunnel temperature trip will only occur after a one second time delay.

The temperature monitoring Allowable Value is chosen to detect a leak equivalent to approximately 25 gpm of water.

1.f. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the MSL isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

(continued)

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1.f. Manual Initiation (continued)

There are four push buttons for the logic, two manual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the MODES in which the MSL isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

Primary Containment Isolation

2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since isolation of these valves is not critical to orderly plant shutdown.

(continued)

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2.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 2 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA.

2.c. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1

Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 1 supports actions to ensure the offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

(continued)

BASES:

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

2.c. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 (continued)

Reactor vessel water level signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to be the same as the ECCS Level 1 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1) to ensure that the associated penetrations isolate on a potential loss of coolant accident (LOCA) to prevent offsite doses from exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits.

2.d. Drywell Pressure—High

High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment. The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Drywell Pressure—High Function, associated with isolation of the primary containment, is implicitly assumed in the FSAR accident analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure instruments that sense the pressure in the drywell. Four channels of Drywell Pressure—High per Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure—High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

(continued)

BASES:

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

2.e. SGTS Exhaust Radiation—High

High SGTS Exhaust radiation indicates possible gross failure of the fuel cladding. Therefore, when SGTS Exhaust Radiation High is detected, an isolation is initiated to limit the release of fission products. However, this Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis in the FSAR because other leakage paths (e.g., MSIVs) are more limiting.

The SGTS Exhaust radiation signals are initiated from radiation detectors that are located in the SGTS Exhaust. Two channels of SGTS Exhaust Radiation—High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value is low enough to promptly detect gross failures in the fuel cladding.

2.f. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the primary containment isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the MODES in which the Primary Containment Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation
Cooling Systems Isolation

3.a., 4.a. HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Δ Pressure—High

Steam Line Δ Pressure High Functions are provided to detect a break of the RCIC or HPCI steam lines and initiate closure of the steam line isolation valves of the appropriate system. If the steam is allowed to continue flowing out of the break, the reactor will depressurize and the core can uncover. Therefore, the isolations are initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The isolation action, along with the scram function of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Specific credit for these Functions is not assumed in any FSAR accident analyses since the bounding analysis is performed for large breaks such as recirculation and MSL breaks. However, these instruments prevent the RCIC or HPCI steam line breaks from becoming bounding.

The HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Δ Pressure — High signals are initiated from instruments (two for HPCI and two for RCIC) that are connected to the system steam lines. Two channels of both HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Δ pressure—High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The steam line Δ Pressure - High will only occur after a 3 second time delay to prevent any spurious isolations.

The Allowable Values are chosen to be low enough to ensure that the trip occurs to prevent fuel damage and maintains the MSLB event as the bounding event, and high enough to be above the maximum transient steam flow during system startup.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

3.b., 4.b. HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Δ Pressure—Low

Low MSL pressure indicates that the pressure of the steam in the HPCI or RCIC turbine may be too low to continue operation of the associated system's turbine. These isolations are for equipment protection and are not assumed in any transient or accident analysis in the FSAR. However, they also provide a diverse signal to indicate a possible system break. These instruments are included in Technical Specifications (TS) because of the potential for risk due to possible failure of the instruments preventing HPCI and RCIC initiations (Ref. 3).

The HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure—Low signals are initiated from instruments (four for HPCI and four for RCIC) that are connected to the system steam line. Four channels of both HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Pressure—Low Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are selected to be high enough to prevent damage to the system's turbine.

3.c., 4.c. HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure—High

High turbine exhaust diaphragm pressure indicates that a release of steam into the associated compartment is possible. That is, one of two exhaust diaphragms has ruptured. These isolations are to prevent steam from entering the associated compartment and are not assumed in any transient or accident analysis in the FSAR. These instruments are included in the TS because of the potential for risk due to possible failure of the instruments preventing HPCI and RCIC initiations (Ref. 3).

The HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure-High signals are initiated from instruments (four for HPCI and four for RCIC) that are connected to the area between the rupture diaphragms on each system's turbine exhaust line. Four channels of both HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure-High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

3.c., 4.c. HPCI and RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure—High
(continued)

The Allowable Values is low enough to identify a high turbine exhaust pressure condition resulting from a diaphragm rupture, or a leak in the diaphragm adjacent to the exhaust line and high enough to prevent inadvertent system isolation.

3.d., 4.d. Drywell Pressure—High

High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB. The HPCI and RCIC isolation of the turbine exhaust vacuum breaker line is provided to prevent communication with the wetwell when high drywell pressure exists. A potential leakage path exists via the turbine exhaust. The isolation is delayed until the system becomes unavailable for injection (i.e., low steam supply line pressure). The isolation of the HPCI and RCIC turbine exhaust vacuum breaker line by Drywell Pressure—High is indirectly assumed in the FSAR accident analysis because the turbine exhaust vacuum breaker line leakage path is not assumed to contribute to offsite doses and is provided for long term containment isolation.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure instruments that sense the pressure in the drywell. Four channels of both HPCI and RCIC Drywell Pressure—High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure—High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since this is indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

3.e., 3.f., 3.g., 4.e., 4.f., 4.g., HPCI and RCIC Area and Emergency Cooler Temperature—High

HPCI and RCIC Area and Emergency Cooler temperatures are provided to detect a leak from the associated system steam piping. The isolation occurs when a small leak has occurred and is diverse to the high flow instrumentation. If the small leak is allowed to continue without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. These Functions are not assumed in any FSAR transient or accident analysis, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as recirculation or MSL breaks.

Area and Emergency Cooler Temperature-High signals are initiated from thermocouples that are appropriately located to protect the system that is being monitored. Two Instruments monitor each area. Two channels for each HPCI and RCIC Area and Emergency Cooler Temperature-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The HPCI and RCIC Pipe Routing area temperature trips will only occur after a 15 minute time delay to prevent any spurious temperature isolations due to short temperature increases and allows operators sufficient time to determine which system is leaking. The other ambient temperature trips will only occur after a one second time delay to prevent any spurious temperature isolations.

The Allowable Values are set low enough to detect a leak equivalent to 25 gpm, and high enough to avoid trips at expected operating temperature.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

3.h., 4.h. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the HPCI and RCIC systems' isolation logics that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for these Functions. They are retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis

There is one manual initiation push button for each of the HPCI and RCIC systems. One isolation pushbutton per system will introduce an isolation to one of the two trip systems. There is no Allowable Value for these Functions, since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of both HPCI and RCIC Manual Initiation Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 since these are the MODES in which the HPCI and RCIC systems' Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation

5.a. RWCU Differential Flow—High

The high differential flow signal is provided to detect a break in the RWCU System. This will detect leaks in the RWCU System when area temperature would not provide detection (i.e., a cold leg break). Should the reactor coolant continue to flow out of the break, offsite dose limits may be exceeded. Therefore, isolation of the RWCU System is initiated when high differential flow is sensed to prevent exceeding offsite doses. A 45 second time delay is provided to prevent spurious trips during most RWCU operational transients. This Function is not assumed in any FSAR transient or accident analysis, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as MSLBs.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

5.a. RWCU Differential Flow—High (continued)

The high differential flow signals are initiated from instruments that are connected to the inlet (from the recirculation suction) and outlets (to condenser and feedwater) of the RWCU System. Two channels of Differential Flow—High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Differential Flow—High Allowable Value ensures that a break of the RWCU piping is detected.

5.b, 5.c, 5.d RWCU Area Temperatures—High

RWCU area temperatures are provided to detect a leak from the RWCU System. The isolation occurs even when small leaks have occurred and is diverse to the high differential flow instrumentation for the hot portions of the RWCU System. If the small leak continues without isolation, offsite dose limits may be reached. Credit for these instruments is not taken in any transient or accident analysis in the FSAR, since bounding analyses are performed for large breaks such as recirculation or MSL breaks.

Area temperature signals are initiated from temperature elements that are located in the area that is being monitored. Six thermocouples provide input to the Area Temperature—High Function (two per area). Six channels are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The area temperature trip will only occur after a one second time to prevent any spurious temperature isolations.

The Area Temperature—High Allowable Values are set low enough to detect a leak equivalent to 25 gpm.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

5.e. SLC System Initiation

The isolation of the RWCU System is required when the SLC System has been initiated to prevent dilution and removal of the boron solution by the RWCU System (Ref. 4). SLC System initiation signals are initiated from the two SLC pump start signals.

There is no Allowable Value associated with this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the SLC System initiation switch.

Two channels (one from each pump) of the SLC System Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE-only in MODES 1 and 2, since these are the only MODES where the reactor can be critical, with the exception of Special Operations LCO 3.10.8, and these MODES are consistent with the Applicability for the SLC System (LCO 3.1.7).

As noted (footnote (b) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), this Function is only required to close the outboard RWCU isolation valve trip systems.

5.f. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of some interfaces with the reactor vessel occurs to isolate the potential sources of a break. The isolation of the RWCU System on Level 2 supports actions to ensure that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with RWCU isolation is not directly assumed in the FSAR safety analyses because the RWCU System line break is bounded by breaks of larger systems (recirculation and MSL breaks are more limiting).

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

5.f. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 (continued)

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

5.g. RWCU Flow - High

RWCU Flow—High Function is provided to detect a break of the RWCU System. Should the reactor coolant continue to flow out of the break, offsite dose limits may be exceeded. Therefore, isolation is initiated on high flow to prevent or minimize core damage. The isolation action, along with the scram function of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Specific credit for this Function is not assumed in any FSAR accident analyses since the bounding analysis is performed for large breaks such as recirculation and MSL breaks.

The RWCU Flow—High signals are initiated from two instruments. Two channels of RWCU Flow—High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The RWCU flow trip will only occur after a second time delay to prevent spurious trips.

The Allowable Value is chosen to be low enough to ensure that the trip occurs to prevent fuel damage and maintains the MSLB event as the bounding event.

5.h. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the RWCU System isolation logic that are redundant to

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

5.h. Manual Initiation (continued)

the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function, since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 since these are the MODES in which the RWCU System Isolation automatic Functions are required to be OPERABLE.

Shutdown Cooling System Isolation

6.a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—High

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—High Function is provided to isolate the shutdown cooling portion of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. This interlock is provided only for equipment protection to prevent an intersystem LOCA scenario, and credit for the interlock is not assumed in the accident or transient analysis in the FSAR.

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—High signals are initiated from two instruments. Two channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. The Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since these are the only MODES in which the reactor can be pressurized with the exception of Special Operations LCO 3.10.1; thus, equipment protection is needed. The Allowable Value was chosen to be low enough to protect the system equipment from overpressurization.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY
(continued)**

6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, isolation of some reactor vessel interfaces occurs to begin isolating the potential sources of a break. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function associated with RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation is not directly assumed in safety analyses because a break of the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is bounded by breaks of the recirculation and MSL.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that the RPV water level does not drop below the top of the active fuel during a vessel draindown event caused by a leak (e.g., pipe break or inadvertent valve opening) in the RHR Shutdown Cooling System.

Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. As noted (footnote (c) to Table 3.3.6.1-1), only two channels of the Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 (and must input into the same trip system), provided the RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity is maintained. System integrity is maintained provided the piping is intact and no maintenance is being performed that has the potential for draining the reactor vessel through the system.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5 to prevent this potential flow path from lowering the reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low, Level 3 (continued)

In MODES 1 and 2, another isolation (i.e., Reactor Steam Dome Pressure—High) and administrative controls ensure that this flow path remains isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventory via this flow path.

6.c Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals to RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation logic that is redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific FSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are two push buttons for the logic, one manual initiation push button per trip system. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Two channels of the Manual Initiation Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5, since these are the MODES in which the RHR Shutdown Cooling System Isolation automatic Function are required to be OPERABLE.

Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation

7.a Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3

Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission products. The isolation of the primary containment on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that offsite dose limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function associated with isolation is implicitly assumed in the FSAR analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

(continued)

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY**

7.a Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 (continued)

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can initiate an inadvertent isolation actuation. The isolation function is ensured by the manual shear valve in each penetration.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since isolation of these valves is not critical to orderly plant shutdown.

7.b. Drywell Pressure - High

High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the RCPB inside the primary containment. The isolation of some of the primary containment isolation valves on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that offsite does limits of 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded. The Drywell Pressure - High Function, associated with isolation of the primary containment, is implicitly assumed in the FSAR accident analysis as these leakage paths are assumed to be isolated post LOCA.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell. Two channels of Drywell Pressure - High per Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can initiate an inadvertent actuation. The isolation function is ensured by the manual shear valve in each penetration.

The Allowable Value was selected to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure - High Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since this may be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by two Notes. Note 1 allows penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated. Note 2 has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to primary containment isolation instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation channel.

A.1

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours for Functions 2.a, 2.d, 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b and 24 hours for Functions other than Functions 2.a, 2.d; 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b has been shown to be acceptable (Refs. 5 and 6) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capability (refer to Required Action B.1 Bases). If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action A.1. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue with no further restrictions. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation), Condition C must be entered and its Required Action taken.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1 and B.2

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic isolation capability being lost for the associated penetration flow path(s). The MSL Isolation Functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that both trip systems will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. The other isolation functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that one trip system will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. This ensures that one of the two PCIVs in the associated penetration flow path can receive an isolation signal from the given Function. For Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.d, and 1.e, this would require both trip systems to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. For Function 1.c, this would require both trip systems to have one channel, associated with each MSL, OPERABLE or in trip. Therefore, this would require both trip systems to have one channel per location OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, 3.b, 3.c, 3.d, 4.b, 4.c, 4.d, 5.f, and 6.b, this would require one trip system to have two channels, each OPERABLE or in trip. For Functions 2.e, 3.a, 3.e, 3.f, 3.g, 4.a, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g, 5.a, 5.b, 5.c, 5.d, 5.e, 5.g, and 6.a, this would require one trip system to have one channel OPERABLE or in trip. The Condition does not include the Manual Initiation Functions (Functions 1.f, 2.f, 3.h, 4.h, 5.h, and 6.c), since they are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 24 hours (as allowed by Required Action A.1) is allowed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1

Required Action C.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1. The applicable Condition specified in Table 3.3.6.1-1 is Function and MODE or other specified condition dependent and may change as the Required Action of a previous Condition is completed. Each time an inoperable channel has not met any Required Action of Condition A or B and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition C will be entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours (Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2). Alternately, the associated MSLs may be isolated (Required Action D.1), and, if allowed (i.e., plant safety analysis allows operation with an MSL isolated), operation with that MSL isolated may continue. Isolating the affected MSL accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channel. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E.1

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 2 within 6 hours.

The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

F.1

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, plant operations may continue if the affected penetration flow path(s) is isolated. Isolating the affected penetration flow path(s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channels.

If it is not desired to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s) (e.g., as in the case where isolating the penetration flow path(s) could result in a reactor scram), Condition H must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for plant operations personnel to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s).

G.1

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, plant operations may continue if the affected penetration flow path(s) is isolated. Isolating the affected penetration flow path(s) accomplishes the safety function of the inoperable channels. The 24 hour Completion Time is acceptable due to the fact that these Functions are either not assumed in any accident or transient analysis in the FSAR (Manual Initiation) or, in the case of the TIP System isolation, the TIP System penetration is a small bore (0.280 inch), its isolation in a design basis event (with loss of offsite power) would be via the manually operated shear valves, and the ability to manually isolate by either the normal isolation valve or the shear valve is unaffected by the inoperable instrumentation. It should be noted, however, that the TIP System is powered from an auxiliary instrumentation bus which has an uninterruptible power supply and hence, the TIP drive mechanisms and ball valve control will still function in the event of a loss of offsite power. Alternately, if it is not desired to isolate the affected penetration flow path(s) (e.g., as in the case where isolating the penetration flow path(s) could result in a reactor scram), Condition H must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

H.1 and H.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, or any Required Action of Condition F or G is not met and the associated Completion Time has expired, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

I.1 and I.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated SLC subsystem(s) is declared inoperable or the RWCU System is isolated. Since this Function is required to ensure that the SLC System performs its intended function, sufficient remedial measures are provided by declaring the associated SLC subsystems inoperable or isolating the RWCU System.

The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for personnel to isolate the RWCU System.

J.1 and J.2

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path should be closed. However, if the shutdown cooling function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the penetration flow path to remain unisolated provided action is immediately initiated to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to isolate the RHR Shutdown Cooling System (i.e., provide alternate decay heat removal capabilities so the penetration flow path can be isolated). Actions must continue until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status or the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is isolated.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 5 and 6) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path(s) when necessary.

SR 3.3.6.1.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria which are determined by the plant staff based on an investigation of a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, may be used to support this parameter comparison and include indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit, and does not necessarily indicate the channel is Inoperable.

The Frequency is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**
(continued)

SR 3.3.6.1.2

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function.

The 92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.2 is based on the reliability analysis described in References 5 and 6.

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 provides a general exception to the definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. This exception is necessary because the design of instrumentation does not facilitate functional testing of all required contacts of the relays which input into the combinational logic. (Reference 11) Performance of such a test could result in a plant transient or place the plant in an undo risk situation. Therefore, for this SR, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST verifies acceptable response by verifying the change of state of the relay which inputs into the combinational logic. The required contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST are tested under the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.6.1.5. This is acceptable because operating experience shows that the contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST normally pass the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and the testing methodology minimizes the risk of unplanned transients.

Note 2 provides a second specific exception to the definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. For Functions 2.e, 3.a, and 4.a, certain channel relays are not included in the performance of the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. These exceptions are necessary because the circuit design does not facilitate functional testing of the entire channel through to the coil of the relay which enters the combinational logic. (Reference 11) Specifically, testing of all required relays would require rendering the affected system (i.e., HPCI or RCIC) inoperable, or require lifting of leads and inserting test equipment which could lead to unplanned transients. Therefore, for these circuits, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST verifies acceptable response by verifying the actuation of circuit devices up to the point where further testing could result in an unplanned transient. (References 10 and 12) The required relays not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST are tested under the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.6.1.5. This exception

(continued)

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.3.6.1.2 (continued)

is acceptable because operating experience shows that the devices not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST normally pass the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and the testing methodology minimizes the risk of unplanned transients.

SR 3.3.6.1.3 and SR 3.3.6.1.4

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.3 is based on the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. The Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.4 is based on the assumption of an 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

It should be noted that some of the primary containment High Drywell pressure instruments, although only required to be calibrated on a 24 month Frequency, are calibrated quarterly based on other TS requirements.

SR 3.3.6.1.5

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed on PCIVs in LCO 3.6.1.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform portions of this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
(continued) SR 3.3.6.1.6

This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. Testing is performed only on channels where the guidance given in Reference 9 could not be met, which identified that degradation of response time can usually be detected by other surveillance tests.

As stated in Note 1, the response time of the sensors for Functions 1.b, is excluded from ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME testing. Because the vendor does not provide a design instrument response time, a penalty value to account for the sensor response time is included in determining total channel response time. The penalty value is based on the historical performance of the sensor. (Reference 13) This allowance is supported by Reference 9 which determined that significant degradation of the sensor channel response time can be detected during performance of other Technical Specification SRs and that the sensor response time is a small part of the overall ISOLATION RESPONSE TIME testing.

Function 1.a and 1.c channel sensors and logic components are excluded from response time testing in accordance with the provisions of Reference 14.

As stated in Note 2, response time testing of isolating relays is not required for Function 5.a. This allowance is supported by Reference 9. These relays isolate their respective isolation valve after a nominal 45 second time delay in the circuitry. No penalty value is included in the response time calculation of this function. This is due to the historical response time testing results of relays of the same manufacturer and model number being less than 100 milliseconds, which is well within the expected accuracy of the 45 second time delay relay.

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME acceptance criteria are included in Reference 7. This test may be performed in one measurement, or in overlapping segments, with verification that all components are tested.

ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on an 24 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience that shows that random failures of instrumentation

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.6.1.6 (continued)

components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.3.
 2. FSAR, Chapter 15.
 3. NEDO-31466, "Technical Specification Screening Criteria Application and Risk Assessment," November 1987.
 4. FSAR, Section 4.2.3.4.3.
 5. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," July 1990.
 6. NEDC-30851P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.
 7. FSAR, Table 7.3-29.
 8. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132)
 9. NEDO-32291-A "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1995.
 10. PPL Letter to NRC, PLA-2618, Response to NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-387/85-28 AND 50-388/85-23, dated April 22, 1986.
 11. NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Part 9900: Technical Guidance, Standard Technical Specification Section 1.0 Definitions, Issue date 12/08/86.
 12. Susquehanna Steam Electric Station NRC REGION I COMBINED INSPECTION 50-387/90-20; 50-388/90-20, File R41-2, dated March 5, 1986.
 13. NRC Safety Evaluation Report related to Amendment No. 171 for License No. NPF-14 and Amendment No. 144 for License No. NPF-22.
 14. NEDO 32291-A, Supplement 1, "System Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," October 1999.
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**Table B 3.6.1.3-1
 Primary Containment Isolation Valve
 (Page 11 of 11)**

Plant System	Valve Number	Valve Description	Type of Valve	Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No. (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
TIP System (continued)	C51-J004 A (Ball Valve)	TIP Ball Valves	Automatic Valve	7.a, 7.b (5)
	C51-J004 B (Ball Valve)	TIP Ball Valves	Automatic Valve	7.a, 7.b (5)
	C51-J004 C (Ball Valve)	TIP Ball Valves	Automatic Valve	7.a, 7.b (5)
	C51-J004 D (Ball Valve)	TIP Ball Valves	Automatic Valve	7.a, 7.b (5)
	C51-J004 E (Ball Valve)	TIP Ball Valves	Automatic Valve	7.a, 7.b (5)

- (a) Isolation barrier remains water filled or a water seal remains in the line post-LOCA, isolation valve is tested with water. Isolation valve leakage is not included in 0.60 L_a total Type B and C tests.
- (b) Redundant isolation boundary for this valve is provided by the closed system whose integrity is verified by the Leakage Rate Test Program.
- (c) Containment Isolation Valves are not Type C tested. Containment bypass leakage is prevented since the line terminates below the minimum water level in the Suppression Chamber. Refer to the IST Program.
- (d) LCO 3.3.3.1, "PAM Instrumentation", Table 3.3.3.1-1, Function 6, does not apply since these are relief valves, check valves, manual valves or deactivated and closed.
- (e) The containment isolation barriers for the penetration associated with this valve consists of two PCIVs and a closed system. The closed system provides a redundant isolation boundary for both PCIVs, and its integrity is required to be verified by the Leakage Rate Test Program.