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Summary

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# FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

for the Production

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of Tritium in a

Commercial Light Water Reactor

United States Department of Energy  
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs  
Washington, D.C. 20585



### **AVAILABILITY OF THE CLWR FINAL EIS**

Copies of the CLWR Final EIS may be obtained by calling DOE's Office of Defense Programs at 1-800-332-0801.

General questions concerning the NEPA process, under which EISs are prepared, may be addressed to:

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## COVER SHEET

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**Cooperating Agency:** Tennessee Valley Authority

**Title:** Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor

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**Abstract:** The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for providing the nation with nuclear weapons and ensuring that these weapons remain safe and reliable. Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, is an essential component of every weapon in the current and projected U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Unlike other materials utilized in nuclear weapons, tritium decays at a rate of 5.5 percent per year. Accordingly, as long as the nation relies on a nuclear deterrent, the tritium in each nuclear weapon must be replenished periodically. Currently the U.S. nuclear weapons complex does not have the capability to produce the amounts of tritium that will be required to continue supporting the nation's stockpile. The *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling* (Final Programmatic EIS), DOE/EIS-0161, issued in October 1995, evaluated the alternatives for the siting, construction, and operation of tritium supply and recycling facilities at five DOE sites for four different production technologies. This Programmatic EIS also evaluated the impacts of using a commercial light water reactor (CLWR) without specifying a reactor location. In the Record of Decision for the Final Programmatic EIS (60 FR 63878), issued December 12, 1995, DOE decided to pursue a dual-track approach on the two most promising tritium supply alternatives: (1) to initiate purchase of an existing commercial reactor (operating or partially complete) or reactor irradiation services; and (2) to design, build, and test critical components of an accelerator system for tritium production. At that time, DOE announced that the final decision would be made by the Secretary of Energy at the end of 1998.

On December 22, 1998, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson announced that the CLWR would be DOE's primary option for tritium production, and the proposed linear accelerator at the Savannah River Site would be the back-up option. The Secretary designated the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants as the Preferred Alternative for CLWR tritium production. The Secretary's announcement that the CLWR would be the primary tritium supply technology reaffirms the 1995 Record of Decision for the Final Programmatic EIS to construct and operate a new tritium extraction capability at the Savannah River Site.

This *Environmental Impact Statement for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor* (CLWR EIS) evaluates the environmental impacts associated with producing tritium at one or more of the following five CLWRs: (1) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Spring City, Tennessee); (2) Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Soddy Daisy, Tennessee); (3) Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (Soddy Daisy, Tennessee); (4) Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Hollywood, Alabama); and (5) Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (Hollywood, Alabama). Specifically, this EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with fabricating tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs); transporting nonirradiated TPBARs from the fabrication facility to the reactor sites; irradiating TPBARs in the reactors; and transporting irradiated TPBARs from the reactors to the proposed tritium extraction facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.

The public comment period on the CLWR Draft EIS extended from August 28 to October 27, 1998. During the comment period, public hearings were held in North Augusta, South Carolina; Rainsville, Alabama; and Evensville, Tennessee. An additional public meeting was held in Evensville, Tennessee, on December 14, 1998. The CLWR Draft EIS was made available through mailings and requests to DOE's CLWR Office and at DOE's Public Reading Rooms. In preparing the CLWR Final EIS, DOE considered comments received via mail, fax, submission at public hearings, recorded telephone messages, and the Internet. In addition, comments and concerns identified during discussions at the public hearings were recorded by a court reporter and were transcribed for consideration by DOE.

The CLWR Final EIS contains revisions and new information in response to the comments on the CLWR Draft EIS and technical details disclosed since the Draft EIS was issued. These revisions and new information are indicated by a double underline for minor word changes or by a sidebar in the margin for sentence or larger changes. Volume 2 (Comment Response Document) of the CLWR Final EIS contains the comments received during the public review of the CLWR Draft EIS and DOE's responses to these comments.

No sooner than 30 days after the notice of filing this EIS with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, DOE expects to issue a Record of Decision.

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## PREFACE

The *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling* (Final Programmatic EIS) (DOE/EIS-0161), which was completed in October 1995, assessed the potential environmental impacts of technology and siting alternatives for the production of tritium for national security purposes. On December 5, 1995, DOE issued a Record of Decision for the Final Programmatic EIS that selected the two most promising alternative technologies for tritium production and established a dual-track strategy that would, within 3 years, select one of those technologies to become the primary tritium supply technology. The other technology, if feasible, would be developed as a backup tritium source. Under the dual-track strategy, DOE would: (1) initiate the purchase of an existing commercial reactor (operating or partially complete) or irradiation services with an option to purchase the reactor for conversion to a defense facility; and (2) design, build, and test critical components of an accelerator system for tritium production. Under the Final Programmatic EIS Record of Decision, any new facilities that might be required, i.e., an accelerator and/or a tritium extraction facility to support the commercial reactor alternative, would be constructed at DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina.

The Final Programmatic EIS described a two-phase strategy for compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The first phase included completion of the Final Programmatic EIS and subsequent Record of Decision. The second phase included the preparation of site-specific NEPA documents tiered from the Final Programmatic EIS. These EISs address the environmental impacts of specific project proposals. As a result of the Final Programmatic EIS and the Record of Decision, DOE determined to prepare three site-specific EISs: the *Environmental Impact Statement, Accelerator Production of Tritium at the Savannah River Site* (APT) (DOE/EIS-0270), the *Environmental Impact Statement for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor* (CLWR) (DOE/EIS-0288), and the *Environment Impact Statement, Construction and Operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility at Savannah River Site* (TEF) (DOE/EIS-0271). Each of these EISs presents an analysis of alternatives which do not affect the alternatives in the other EISs, with one exception. This exception is one alternative in the TEF EIS which would require the use of space in the APT. For this alternative to be viable, the APT would have to be selected as the primary source of tritium.

On December 22, 1998, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson announced that commercial light water reactors (CLWR) will be the primary tritium supply technology. The Secretary designated the Watts Bar Unit 1 reactor near Spring City, Tennessee, and the Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 reactors near Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee, as the preferred commercial light water reactors for tritium production. These reactors are operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), an independent government agency. The Secretary designated the APT as the "backup" technology for tritium supply. As a backup, DOE will continue with developmental activities and preliminary design, but will not construct the accelerator. Finally, selection of the CLWR reaffirms the December 1995 Final Programmatic EIS Record of Decision to construct and operate a new tritium extraction capability at the Savannah River Site.

DOE has completed the final EISs for the APT, CLWR, and TEF. No sooner than 30 days after publication in the *Federal Register* of the Environmental Protection Agency's Notice of Availability of the final EISs for APT, CLWR, and TEF, DOE intends to issue a consolidated Record of Decision to: (1) formalize the programmatic announcement made on December 22, 1998; and (2) announce project-specific decisions for the three EISs. These decisions will include, for the selected CLWR technology, the selection of specific CLWRs to be used for tritium supply and the location of a new tritium extraction capability at the Savannah River Site. For the backup APT technology, technical and siting decisions consistent with its backup role will be made.

# Table of Contents

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Cover Sheet .....	iii
Preface .....	v
Table of Contents .....	ix
List of Figures .....	x
List of Tables .....	x
Acronyms and Abbreviations .....	xiii

### SUMMARY ..... S-1

S.1	Introduction and Background .....	S-1
S.1.1	General .....	S-1
S.1.2	Proposed Action and Scope .....	S-1
S.1.3	Development of the CLWR EIS .....	S-3
S.1.4	The CLWR Procurement Process .....	S-3
S.1.5	Background .....	S-4
S.1.5.1	Defense Programs Mission .....	S-4
S.1.5.2	Brief History of the Production of Tritium .....	S-7
S.1.5.3	Production of Tritium in a CLWR .....	S-7
S.1.5.4	Nonproliferation .....	S-8
S.1.5.5	Background on the Tennessee Valley Authority .....	S-9
S.1.6	NEPA Strategy .....	S-10
S.1.6.1	Completed NEPA Actions .....	S-11
S.1.6.1.1	Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling .....	S-11
S.1.6.1.2	Lead Test Assembly Environmental Assessment .....	S-11
S.1.6.1.3	EISs for the Operation of Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 and for Construction of Bellefonte 1 and 2 .....	S-12
S.1.6.2	Ongoing NEPA Actions .....	S-12
S.1.6.2.1	Environmental Impact Statement, Accelerator Production of Tritium at the Savannah River Site .....	S-12
S.1.6.2.2	Environmental Impact Statement, Construction and Operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility .....	S-12
S.1.6.2.3	Environmental Assessment for the Tritium Facility Modernization and Consolidation Project at the Savannah River Site .....	S-12
S.1.6.2.4	Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bellefonte Conversion Project .....	S-13
S.1.7	Public Comment Period .....	S-13
S.1.8	Changes from the Draft Environmental Impact Statement .....	S-16
S.2	Purpose and Need .....	S-19
S.3	Commercial Light Water Reactor Program Alternatives .....	S-21
S.3.1	Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor .....	S-21
S.3.1.1	Impacts of Tritium Production on Reactor Operations .....	S-21
S.3.2	Development of Alternatives .....	S-24
S.3.2.1	Major Planning Assumptions and Basis for Analysis .....	S-24
S.3.2.2	Reasonable Alternatives .....	S-25
S.3.2.3	No Action Alternative .....	S-25
S.3.2.4	The Preferred Alternative .....	S-26
S.3.2.5	Reactor Options .....	S-27
S.3.2.5.1	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 .....	S-27

## Table of Contents

S.3.2.5.2	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 .....	S-27
S.3.2.5.3	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 .....	S-30
S.3.2.6	Environmental Consequences .....	S-33
S.3.2.6.1	No Action Alternative .....	S-33
S.3.2.6.2	<u>Impacts Associated with Tritium Production</u> .....	S-34
AVAILABILITY OF THE CLWR <u>Final</u> EIS .....		S-54

## List of Figures

Figure S-1	Schematic of Process for Producing Tritium in CLWRs .....	S-2
Figure S-2	Locations of Candidate CLWRs for Tritium Production .....	S-5
Figure S-3	Estimated Tritium Inventory and Reserve Requirements .....	S-20
Figure S-4	Typical TPBAR Assembly .....	S-22
Figure S-5	Sketch of TPBAR Components .....	S-23
Figure S-6	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant .....	S-28
Figure S-7	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant .....	S-29
Figure S-8	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant .....	S-31

## List of Tables

Table S-1	CLWR Tritium Production Program Reasonable Alternatives .....	S-26
Table S-2	Summary of Environmental Consequences of CLWR Reactor Alternatives .....	S-40
Table S-3	Summary Comparison of Environmental Impacts Between CLWR Reactor Alternatives and the APT .....	S-48

# Acronyms and Abbreviations



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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APT	Accelerator Production of Tritium
BEIR	Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation
Bellefonte 1	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 1
Bellefonte 2	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 2
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CLWR	Commercial light water reactor
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EIS	Environmental impact statement
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FR	Federal Register
HEPA	High-efficiency particulate air
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ISFSI	Independent spent fuel storage installation
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NPDES	National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
P.L.	Public Law
Sequoyah 1	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1
Sequoyah 2	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TPBAR	Tritium-producing burnable absorber rod
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
U.S.C.	United States Code
Watts Bar 1	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1
Watts Bar 2	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2

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# SUMMARY

## S.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

### S.1.1 General

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for providing the nation with nuclear weapons and ensuring those weapons remain safe and reliable. Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, is an essential component of every weapon in the current and projected U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Unlike other nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, tritium decays at a rate of 5.5 percent per year. Accordingly, as long as the nation relies on a nuclear deterrent, the tritium in each nuclear weapon must be replenished periodically.

At present, the U.S. nuclear weapons complex does not have the capability to produce the amounts of tritium that will be required to support the nation's current and future stockpile. Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4321 *et seq.*) and the DOE regulations implementing NEPA (10 CFR 1021), this *Environmental Impact Statement for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor* (CLWR EIS) analyzes the potential consequences to the environment associated with the production of tritium using one or more Commercial Light Water Reactors (CLWRs).

Concurrent with the preparation of this EIS, DOE evaluated the feasibility of various CLWR alternatives through its standard procurement process (see Section S.1.4). This EIS evaluates the environmental impacts associated with tritium production for all Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reactor plants that were offered by TVA during the procurement process. DOE is considering only the purchase of irradiation services, not the purchase of a reactor. Purchase of a reactor is no longer considered because, based on the proposals offered during the procurement process, no reactors were offered for sale.

### S.1.2 Proposed Action and Scope

DOE proposes to use one or more CLWRs to provide tritium in sufficient quantities to support the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for at least the next 40 years. The proposed action includes: the manufacture of tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) at a commercial facility; irradiation of the TPBARs at one or more of five operating or partially constructed TVA nuclear reactors; the possible completion of TVA's nuclear reactors; transportation of nonirradiated and irradiated materials; and the management of spent nuclear fuel and low-level radioactive waste.

As depicted in Figure S-1, this EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with: (1) fabricating TPBARs; (2) transporting nonirradiated TPBARs from the fabrication facility to the reactor sites; (3) irradiating TPBARs in the reactors; and, (4) transporting irradiated TPBARs from the reactors to the proposed Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. This EIS further analyzes

#### *What is Tritium?*

*Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen that occurs naturally in the environment in small quantities. However, it must be manufactured to obtain useful quantities. Tritium is not a fissile material and cannot be used by itself to construct a nuclear weapon. It is, however, an essential component of every warhead in the current and projected nuclear weapons stockpile. These warheads depend on tritium to perform as designed. Tritium decays at about 5.5 percent per year; therefore, it requires periodic replacement.*

## System for Producing Tritium in Commercial Light Water Reactors




Figure S-1 Schematic of Process for Producing Tritium in CLWRs

the potential environmental impacts associated with both the management of spent nuclear fuel and the transportation and management of low-level radioactive waste generated from CLWR tritium production.

In addition, this EIS evaluates the environmental impacts of the No Action Alternative. Under the No Action Alternative, the stockpile requirements for tritium would have to be met by the construction and operation of an accelerator at DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina (see Section S.1.6.2.1). For the purpose of this EIS a No Action Alternative (i.e., no tritium production at that CLWR) has been evaluated for each candidate reactor facility.

### S.1.3 Development of the CLWR EIS

The CLWR EIS is a tiered document that follows the December 1995 Record of Decision (60 Federal Register 63878) for the *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling* (Final Programmatic EIS). In that Programmatic EIS, DOE considered a range of reasonable alternatives for obtaining the required quantities of tritium. In the December 1995 Record of Decision, DOE decided to pursue a dual-track approach on the two most promising tritium-supply alternatives: (1) to initiate purchase of an existing commercial reactor (operating or partially complete) or irradiation services with an option to purchase the reactor for conversion to a defense facility; and (2) to design, build, and test critical components of an accelerator system for tritium production (the Savannah River Site was selected as the location for an accelerator, should one be built).

#### What is a CLWR?

A CLWR is a nuclear reactor designed and constructed to produce electric power for commercial use. Tritium can be produced during normal operation of a CLWR. The process uses TPBARs which, like the burnable absorber rods that they replace, absorb excess neutrons and help control the power in a reactor. Pressurized water reactors are well suited for the production of tritium because the TPBARs can be inserted into the nonfuel positions of the fuel assemblies. Tritium is generated within the TPBARs as they are irradiated during normal reactor operation.

DOE committed to selection of one of these approaches by the end of 1998 to serve as the primary source of tritium. The other alternative, if feasible, would continue to be developed as a backup tritium source. Production of tritium in an accelerator is analyzed in the *Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Accelerator Production of Tritium at the Savannah River Site* (APT Draft EIS), DOE/EIS-0270 (see Section S.1.6.2.1).

On December 22, 1998, U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Bill Richardson announced that tritium production in one or more CLWRs would be the primary tritium supply technology and that the accelerator would be developed, but not constructed, as a backup to CLWR tritium production. Secretary Richardson further stated that the Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactors have been designated as the Preferred Alternative for CLWR tritium production. The Secretary's announcement that the CLWR would be the primary tritium supply technology reaffirms the 1995 Record of Decision for the Final Programmatic EIS to construct and operate a new tritium extraction capability at the Savannah River Site.

### S.1.4 The CLWR Procurement Process

The production of tritium in a CLWR would require a contract/interagency agreement between DOE and the owner/operator of the CLWR. Accordingly, on June 3, 1997, DOE issued in final form a Request for Proposals from owners/operators for irradiation services or sale of a CLWR. In September 1997, DOE received proposals for producing tritium using operating or partially completed reactors. The proposals for the Watts Bar and Bellefonte Nuclear Plants received from TVA were the only proposals determined to be responsive to the requirements of the procurement request. Under Federal Procurement Law, a proposal is "responsive" if it meets the criteria set forth in the agency's Request for Proposals. In addition to the responsive bids discussed in this EIS, DOE received one nonresponsive bid. That bid did not offer to produce tritium. TVA initially offered Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Watts Bar 1) and Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Bellefonte 1). Since Bellefonte 1 was a partially completed unit, in the event that it could not be completed and licensed in time to support DOE's requirements for tritium production, TVA, through the

procurement process, offered to make Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (Sequoyah 1 and 2) available to meet the need for tritium. In addition, Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (Bellefonte 2) was considered a reasonable alternative. These reactors, the location of which are shown in Figure S-2, are owned by the U.S. Government and operated by TVA. They are as follows:

- Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Watts Bar 1), Spring City, Tennessee (operating)
- Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Sequoyah 1), Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee (operating)
- Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (Sequoyah 2), Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee (operating)
- Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Bellefonte 1), Hollywood, Alabama (partially complete)
- Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (Bellefonte 2), Hollywood, Alabama (partially complete)

Because both TVA and DOE are Federal agencies, an interagency agreement between them could be reached via the Economy Act (31 U.S.C. 1535). The Economy Act is a Federal law that allows two government agencies to enter into an interagency agreement similar to the contractual agreement that a Federal agency would enter with a nonfederal party through the competitive procurement process. The Federal procurement process for the CLWR program explicitly allows for an interagency agreement via the Economy Act.

Subsequent to the initial TVA proposals, in May 1998 TVA allowed its initial procurement proposal for selling irradiation services at the Sequoyah and Watts Bar reactors to expire. However, because the TVA proposals are also subject to the Economy Act, this action did not affect the TVA reactor alternatives. Thus, the CLWR Draft EIS assessed all five of the TVA reactors as reasonable alternatives for tritium production. In November 1998, Energy Secretary Richardson asked TVA to submit a revised proposal for irradiation services at the Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactors, as well as final proposals for completion of Bellefonte, so that he would have a comprehensive set of options on which to base the technology decision. In December 1998, TVA submitted revised proposals for both the Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactors, as well as Bellefonte. Consequently, all of the alternatives that were evaluated in the CLWR Draft EIS remain as reasonable alternatives in the CLWR Final EIS.

DOE may enter into an interagency agreement with TVA, contingent on completion of the NEPA process, for production of tritium required to support the nuclear weapons stockpile. Only those actions that are determined not to have an adverse effect and not to limit the choice of reasonable alternatives would be permitted prior to the completion of the NEPA process. However, before completion of the CLWR EIS and its associated Record of Decision, DOE and TVA will have taken and will continue to take appropriate actions (e.g., studies, analyses) related to the potential submission of licensing documents to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC must approve the use of TPBARs in licensed reactors.

### **S.1.5 Background**

#### **S.1.5.1 Defense Programs Mission**

Since the inception of the nuclear weapons program in the 1940s, DOE and its predecessor agencies have been responsible for designing, manufacturing, maintaining, and retiring the nuclear weapons in the nation's stockpile. In response to the end of the Cold War and changes in the world political regime, the emphasis of the United States' nuclear weapons program has shifted dramatically over the past few years from producing weapons to dismantling weapons. Accordingly, the nuclear weapons stockpile is being greatly reduced; the United States is no longer producing new-design nuclear weapons; and DOE has closed or consolidated many former weapons production facilities.




Figure S-2 Locations of Candidate CLWRs for Tritium Production


### Tritium Use in a Nuclear Weapon

The figure below presents a simplified diagram of a modern nuclear weapon. An actual U.S. nuclear weapon is much more complicated, consisting of many thousands of parts.

The nuclear weapon primary is composed of a central core called a pit, which is usually made of plutonium-239 and/or highly enriched uranium. This is surrounded by a layer of high explosive, which, when detonated, compresses the pit initiating a nuclear reaction. This reaction is generally thought of as the nuclear fission "trigger" which activates the secondary assembly component to produce a thermonuclear hydrogen fusion reaction. The remaining nonnuclear components consist of everything from arming and firing systems, to batteries and parachutes. The assembly of these components into a weapon or the dismantlement of an existing weapon are done at the weapons assembly/disassembly facility.

Tritium is not a fissile material and cannot be used by itself to construct a nuclear weapon. However, tritium is a key component of all nuclear weapons presently in the nation's nuclear weapons arsenal. Tritium enables weapons to produce a larger yield while reducing the overall size and weight of the warhead. This process is called "boosting." Boosting is accomplished by injecting a mixture of tritium gas and deuterium gas, a naturally occurring, nonradioactive hydrogen isotope, into the pit. The deuterium and tritium are stored in reservoirs (which is depicted as the "gas transfer system" in the figure) until the gas transfer system is initiated. The implosion of the pit along with the onset of the fissioning process heats the deuterium-tritium mixture to the point that the atoms undergo fusion. The fusion reaction releases large quantities of very high energy neutrons which flow through the compressed pit material and produce additional fission reactions. Such boosting has allowed for the development of today's sophisticated delivery systems. The key function of tritium is to enhance the fission yield of a nuclear weapon.

Diagram of a Modern Nuclear Weapon



Additionally, in 1991 President Bush declared a moratorium on underground nuclear testing, and in 1995 President Clinton decided to pursue a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Despite these significant changes, DOE's responsibilities for the nuclear weapons stockpile continue, and the President and Congress have directed DOE to continue to maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile and to provide the tritium necessary to satisfy national security requirements. As explained in Section S.2, the United States will need a new tritium production source by approximately 2005.

In the absence of new weapons designs and the total redesign of all warheads and delivery systems, the nation requires a reliable source of tritium to maintain a nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, total redesign of all warheads would require nuclear testing, which would be contrary to the President's pursuit of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

#### **S.1.5.2 Brief History of the Production of Tritium**

Tritium is so rare in nature that useful quantities must be manufactured. DOE has constructed and operated over a dozen nuclear reactors for the production of nuclear materials at the Savannah River Site, South Carolina, and the Hanford Site, Washington, starting with the early part of the Manhattan Project during World War II. None of these reactors is currently operational. The last one, the K-Reactor at the Savannah River Site, was shut down in 1988 for major environmental, safety, and health upgrades to comply with today's stringent standards. DOE discontinued the K-Reactor Restart Program in 1993 when smaller stockpile requirements delayed the need for tritium. As explained in the *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling*, the K-Reactor is not a reasonable alternative for tritium production.

In recent years, international arms control agreements have caused the nuclear weapons stockpile to be reduced in size. Reducing the stockpile has allowed DOE to recycle the tritium removed from dismantled weapons for use in supporting the remaining stockpile. However, due to the decay of tritium, the current inventory of tritium will not meet national security requirements past approximately 2005. Therefore, the most recent Presidential direction, contained in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan and an accompanying Presidential Decision Directive, mandates that new tritium be available by approximately 2005.

#### **S.1.5.3 Production of Tritium in a CLWR**

The production of tritium in a CLWR is technically straightforward and requires no elaborate, complex engineering development and testing program. All the nation's supply of tritium, as mentioned previously, has been produced in reactors. Most existing commercial pressurized water reactors utilize 12-foot-long rods containing an isotope of boron (boron-10) in ceramic form. These rods are sometimes called burnable absorber rods. The rods are inserted in the reactor fuel assemblies to absorb excess neutrons produced by the uranium fuel in the fission process for the purpose of controlling power in the core at the beginning of an operating cycle. DOE's tritium program has developed another type of burnable absorber rod in which neutrons are absorbed by a lithium aluminate ceramic rather than boron ceramic. These TPBARs would be placed in the same locations in the reactor core as the standard burnable absorber rods. There is no fissile material (uranium or plutonium) in the TPBARs.

While the two types of rods function in a very similar manner to absorb excess neutrons in the reactor core, there is one notable difference: when neutrons strike the lithium aluminate ceramic material in a TPBAR, tritium is produced. This tritium is captured almost instantaneously in a solid zirconium material in the rod, called a "getter." The solid material that captures the tritium as it is produced in the rod is so effective that the rod will have to be heated in a vacuum at much higher temperatures than normally occur in the operation of



a light water reactor to extract the tritium for eventual use in the nuclear weapons stockpile. Depending upon tritium needs, as many as 3,400 TPBARs could be placed in a CLWR for irradiation.

#### **S.1.5.4 Nonproliferation**

Nuclear proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear weapons states. In an effort to limit nuclear proliferation, the United States, along with other signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, has sought to preclude nonnuclear-weapons states from acquiring fissile materials (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) for weapons or explosive use. Under the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States is a weapons state and, as such, is allowed to conduct nuclear weapons activities. The production of tritium is one such activity. Accordingly, the use of a CLWR for the production of tritium is not inconsistent with the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Along with other weapons-state signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States, under Article VI, undertakes to pursue negotiations or nuclear disarmament. Production of tritium in a CLWR in no way conflicts with these commitments. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has significantly reduced the size of its nuclear weapons stockpile. At the present time, the United States is further downsizing the nuclear weapons stockpile consistent with the terms of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I Treaty. The United States has ratified the START II Treaty and is hopeful Russia also will ratify this treaty soon. Additionally, the United States has ceased production of fissile materials and the manufacture of new-design nuclear weapons and has closed several weapons production facilities.

Negotiations required for further reductions in United States nuclear weapons and, ultimately, total nuclear disarmament, will likely stretch well into the next century. United States production of tritium in a CLWR will support the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile during this process. Such support of a decreased nuclear weapons stockpile is not inconsistent with the long-range goal of total nuclear disarmament.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is charged with detecting and deterring the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States has offered its commercial power plants to be inspected by the IAEA as an act of good faith and to encourage other nations to be equally open about their nuclear programs. Commercial reactor tritium production would not change this commitment. The commercial reactors would remain open for IAEA inspection whether they are producing tritium or not. Furthermore, the IAEA has indicated that CLWR production of tritium would not alter the existing IAEA Safeguards Program.

In accordance with the direction provided in the Fiscal Year 1998 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-85) conference report, DOE facilitated a high level interagency review of the policy issues associated with the use of commercial reactors to make tritium for national security purposes. Participants in the interagency review included the NRC, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Department of State Arms Control offices. This process was completed in July 1998 and is documented in the *Interagency Review of the Nonproliferation Implications of Alternative Tritium Production Technologies Under Consideration by the Department of Energy, A Report to the Congress*. The report concluded that the nonproliferation policy issues associated with the use of a CLWR are manageable and that DOE should continue to pursue the reactor option as a viable source for future tritium production. This conclusion was based upon a number of considerations including the following:

1. The use of CLWRs for tritium production is not prohibited by law or international treaty.
2. Historically, there have been numerous exceptions to the practice of differentiating between U.S. civil and military facilities, including the operation of the N-Reactor at Hanford, Washington, the dual use nature of the U.S. enrichment program, the use of defense program plutonium production reactors to produce radioisotopes for civilian purposes, and the sale of tritium produced in the defense reactors in the U.S. commercial market.
3. Although the CLWR alternative raised initial concerns because of its implications for the policy of maintaining separation between U.S. civil and military nuclear activities, these concerns could be adequately addressed, given the particular circumstances involved. These circumstances include the fact that the reactors would remain eligible for IAEA safeguards and the fact that, if TVA were the utility selected for the tritium mission, the reactors used for tritium production would be owned and operated by the U.S. Government, making them roughly comparable to past instances of government-owned dual-purpose nuclear facilities.

In addition to those examples referred to in the *Interagency Review of the Nonproliferation Implications of Alternative Tritium Production Technologies Under Consideration by the Department of Energy*, there are other instances in which military nuclear programs have been commingled with civilian programs. These instances include: (1) Atomic Energy Commission purchase of plutonium separated from commercial reactor spent fuel for unrestricted use, including defense purposes; (2) fabrication of both military and commercial reactor fuel by commercial reactor fuel fabricators; and (3) TVA generation of electricity for use in the production of fissile military materials.

#### **S.1.5.5 Background on the Tennessee Valley Authority**

TVA was established by an Act of Congress in 1933 (16 U.S.C. 831-831dd) as a Federal corporation to improve the navigability of and provide flood control for the Tennessee River; to provide reforestation and ensure the proper use of marginal lands in the Tennessee Valley; to provide agricultural and industrial development of the Tennessee Valley; to provide for the national defense; and for other purposes. Within a few years of its establishment, TVA built a series of multipurpose dams on the Tennessee River system. One of the purposes of these dams was production of abundant, inexpensive electricity. The hydroelectric power generated by these dams met most of the rapidly increasing needs of the region through the 1940s. By the early 1950s, however, the growing demand was quickly outstripping the capacity of the dams and the Watts Bar Fossil Fuel Plant, which began operation in 1942. During the next 20 years, TVA built 11 large, coal-fired, electricity-generating plants to meet the region's growing needs. Some of these plants were the largest, first-of-their-kind coal-fired units in the world. The 1960s brought even greater growth to the region. To meet the anticipated need for more power, TVA began an ambitious program of nuclear plant construction.

Today TVA is one of the largest producers of electricity in the United States, generating 4 to 5 percent of all electricity in the nation. TVA's power system serves almost 8 million people in a seven-state region encompassing some 207,200 square kilometers (80,000 square miles). TVA's electricity is distributed to homes and businesses through a network of 159 power distributors, including municipally owned utilities and electric cooperatives. TVA also sells power directly to approximately 60 large industrial customers and Federal facilities.

TVA's power system, which is self-financed, has a generating capacity of 28,000 megawatts-electric. Its generating system consists of 11 coal-fired plants (53 percent of total generating capacity), 5 nuclear generating units at three sites (20 percent), 29 hydroelectric dams (15 percent), 48 combustion turbine units at four sites (7 percent), and one pumped-storage facility (5 percent). These plants are owned and operated by the U.S.

Government. The TVA power system is linked by 25,750 kilometers (16,000 miles) of transmission lines that carry power to 750 wholesale delivery points, as well as 57 interconnections with 13 neighboring utilities.

In December 1995, with the publication of *Energy Vision 2020, Integrated Resource Plan and Environmental Impact Statement*, TVA projected demands for electricity in the TVA power service area through the year 2020 and evaluated different ways of meeting these projected increases. Since the Integrated Resource Plan was completed in 1995, TVA has continued to evaluate and select the best resource options based on the latest proposals and TVA's forecast of power needs. The total system generating capacity has been increased with the successful completion of Watts Bar 1 and the return to service of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 3. Both units have operated above expectations and have proven to be very reliable.

Current projections show the demand for electricity (including reserves) will exceed TVA's 1998 generating capacity by about 5,200 megawatts-electric in 2005; this projection is slightly less than the 1998-2005 medium load forecast of 5,450 megawatts-electric in *Energy Vision 2020, Integrated Resource Plan and Environmental Impact Statement*. About 2,800 megawatts-electric of additional generating capacity will be needed by the year 2001. A portion of this could be met by the proposed Red Hills Power Project. The remainder will be met by option purchase agreements, forward contracts for delivery of electricity to TVA, and internal TVA projects to increase net dependable capacities for TVA's combustion turbines, fossil plants, and pumped storage units. An additional 2,400 megawatts-electric of capacity will be required between 2001 and 2005. The completion of the Bellefonte unit(s) would offset some of this planned capacity.

Producing tritium in a TVA reactor would be consistent with the Congressional purposes that established TVA—namely, to provide for the industrial development of the Tennessee Valley and for national defense. Producing tritium in a TVA reactor would also enable TVA to maximize the utilization of its resources and potentially increase its electricity generating capacity. TVA, as a Federal agency, in order to fulfill NEPA responsibilities, chose to be a cooperating agency on this EIS. A cooperating agency is defined by Council on Environmental Quality regulations as any Federal agency other than a lead agency having jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental issue involved in a proposal (40 CFR 1508.5).

#### **S.1.6 NEPA Strategy**

DOE's strategy for compliance with NEPA has been to make decisions on programmatic alternatives in the *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling* and the subsequent Record of Decision (60 FR 63878), followed by site-specific analyses to implement the programmatic decisions. The decisions made in the December 12, 1995 *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling* Record of Decision have resulted in DOE preparing this EIS and the following NEPA documents:

1. *Environmental Impact Statement, Construction and Operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site*
2. *Environmental Impact Statement, Accelerator Production of Tritium at the Savannah River Site*
3. *Environmental Assessment, Lead Test Assembly Irradiation and Analysis, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Tennessee and Hanford Site, Richland, Washington*

The relationship of the CLWR EIS with these, as well as other relevant NEPA documents, is explained below.

### S.1.6.1 Completed NEPA Actions

#### S.1.6.1.1 Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling

The *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling*, DOE/EIS-0161, evaluated the alternatives for the siting, construction, and operation of tritium supply and recycling facilities at each of five DOE candidate sites (the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory; the Nevada Test Site; the Oak Ridge Reservation, Tennessee; the Pantex Plant, Texas; and the Savannah River Site, South Carolina) for four different production technologies (heavy water reactor, modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor, advanced light water reactor, and accelerator production of tritium). This Programmatic EIS also evaluated the impacts of using a CLWR, but did not analyze specific locations or reactor sites. Issued in October 1995, the Final Programmatic EIS was followed by a Record of Decision on December 12, 1995 (60 FR 63878). In the Record of Decision, DOE decided to pursue a dual-track approach on the two most promising tritium supply alternatives: (1) to initiate purchase of an existing commercial reactor (operating or partially complete) or reactor irradiation services with an option to purchase the reactor for conversion to a defense facility; and (2) to design, build, and test critical components of an accelerator system for tritium production (the Savannah River Site was selected as the location for an accelerator, should one be built) (60 FR 63878). The Record of Decision also called for the construction of a proposed new Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site. The CLWR EIS is intended to provide the NEPA analysis necessary to implement the Final Programmatic EIS Record of Decision, which will select the technology and specific site for a tritium production facility.

On December 22, 1998, Energy Secretary Richardson announced that tritium production in one or more CLWRs would be the United States' primary tritium supply technology and that the accelerator would be developed, but not constructed, as a backup to CLWR tritium production. Secretary Richardson further stated that the Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactors have been designated as the Preferred Alternative for CLWR tritium production. The Secretary's announcement that the CLWR would be the primary tritium technology reaffirms the 1995 Record of Decision for the Final Programmatic EIS to construct and operate a new tritium extraction capability at the Savannah River Site.

#### S.1.6.1.2 Lead Test Assembly Environmental Assessment

This NEPA analysis addressed the environmental impacts associated with the fabrication of the Lead Test Assembly TPBARs at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Washington; the irradiation of these TPBARs in Watts Bar 1; post-irradiation examination of the TPBARs at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Argonne National Laboratory West, Idaho; and associated impacts of transporting TPBARs to and from the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The purpose of the Lead Test Assembly demonstration is to confirm and provide confidence to regulators and the public that tritium production in a CLWR is technically straightforward and safe. DOE issued a Finding of No Significant Impact in July 1997. Subsequently, the TPBARs were placed in Watts Bar 1 on September 25, 1997, and they are presently being irradiated during the normal 18-month fuel cycle. Following irradiation, the TPBARs will undergo post-irradiation examination. To meet its own NEPA requirements, TVA adopted the Lead Test Assembly Environmental Assessment and issued a Finding of No Significant Impact on August 14, 1997. Additionally, NRC prepared an independent Environmental Assessment and issued its own Finding of No Significant Impact on September 11, 1997 (62 FR 47835).

##### *Lead Test Assembly Program*

*In September 1997, a confirmatory demonstration using the TPBARs began at Watts Bar 1 following approval by DOE and NRC. The purpose of the confirmatory tests is to provide confidence to the NRC, utilities, and the public that tritium production in a CLWR is both technically straightforward and safe. DOE expects TVA to remove these rods in the Spring of 1999, at which time they will be shipped to a DOE laboratory for examination.*

#### **S.1.6.1.3 EISs for the Operation of Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 and for Construction of Bellefonte 1 and 2**

EISs analyzing the environmental impacts associated with operation of the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants and the construction of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant have been completed and serve to a great extent as a baseline on which the environmental impacts associated with tritium production are assessed. For the partially completed Bellefonte 1 and 2, this CLWR EIS evaluates the environmental impacts associated with their completion and their subsequent operation for 40 years.

#### **S.1.6.2 Ongoing NEPA Actions**

##### **S.1.6.2.1 Environmental Impact Statement, Accelerator Production of Tritium at the Savannah River Site**

This EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with the construction and operation of an accelerator for the production of tritium at the Savannah River Site. On a programmatic level, the accelerator for the production of tritium at the Savannah River Site represents the No Action Alternative for the CLWR EIS. A summary of the APT Draft EIS, is included in Volume 1, Section 5.2.11, of the CLWR EIS. The Draft APT EIS was issued in December 1997. The Final EIS was issued concurrently with the CLWR Final EIS. As a result of the decision by Secretary Richardson on December 22, 1998, that the accelerator would be a backup to CLWR tritium production, DOE will continue with developmental activities associated with the accelerator. However, the accelerator will not be constructed. The APT EIS is incorporated in the CLWR EIS by reference.

##### **S.1.6.2.2 Environmental Impact Statement, Construction and Operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility**

This EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with the construction and operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site. The Draft EIS for the Tritium Extraction Facility was issued in May 1998; a Final EIS was issued concurrently with the CLWR EIS. The purpose of the Tritium Extraction Facility would be to extract the tritium from the TPBARs or from targets of similar design. TPBARs irradiated at the selected CLWRs would be sent to the Tritium Extraction Facility for extraction of the tritium-containing gases. A summary of the environmental impacts of the *Environmental Impact Statement, Construction and Operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site*, DOE/EIS-0271, is included in the CLWR EIS. The Tritium Extraction Facility EIS is incorporated in the CLWR EIS by reference.

##### **S.1.6.2.3 Environmental Assessment for the Tritium Facility Modernization and Consolidation Project at the Savannah River Site**

This environmental assessment addresses the potential impacts of consolidating the tritium activities currently performed in Building 232-H into the newer Building 234-H. Tritium extraction functions would be transferred to the Tritium Extraction Facility under the Preferred Alternative. The overall impact would be to reduce emissions by up to 50 percent. Another effect would be to reduce the amount of low-level radioactive waste generated. Effects on other resources would be negligible. Therefore, impacts from these actions were not included in the cumulative impacts of this CLWR EIS.

#### **S.1.6.2.4 Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bellefonte Conversion Project**

This EIS, issued by TVA, addresses the environmental impacts anticipated from: (1) the conversion of the partially completed Bellefonte 1 and 2 to fossil fuel electricity generating facilities, and (2) the No Action Alternative of maintaining the facilities as partially completed nuclear facilities. The EIS was completed in October 1997. The issuance of a Record of Decision on the *Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bellefonte Conversion Project* will not be made until it is determined whether one or both of these reactor plants will be used for tritium production.

#### **S.1.7 Public Comment Period**

In August 1998, DOE issued the CLWR Draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0288D). This document explained the need for a domestic tritium production source to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent and described and analyzed the environmental impacts associated with tritium production at one or more nuclear power plants operated by TVA. The 60-day public comment period on the CLWR Draft EIS began on August 28, 1998, and ended on October 27, 1998.

During the comment period, public hearings were held in North Augusta, South Carolina; Rainsville, Alabama; and Evensville, Tennessee. The public was encouraged to submit comments via the U.S. mail service, e-mail to a special DOE web site on the Internet, a toll-free 800-number phone line, and a toll-free fax line.

The public hearings were conducted using a modified traditional public hearing format that allowed two-way interaction between DOE representatives and members of the public and also encouraged public comments on the document. A neutral facilitator was present at each hearing to direct and clarify discussions and comments. A court reporter was present at each hearing to record the proceedings and provide a transcript of the public comments and the dialogue between the public and the DOE and TVA representatives.

Comments from the public hearings were combined with comments received by other means (mail, e-mail, 800 number, fax, etc.) during the comment period. The written comments were date-stamped and assigned a sequential document number in the order in which they were received. Volume 2 of this CLWR EIS, the Comment Response Document, describes the public comment process in detail (Chapter 1); provides scanned images of all the comment documents received (Chapter 2); summarizes the public hearing comments (Chapter 2); and provides DOE's responses to the public comment summaries (Chapter 3).

Prior to fulfilling the requirement to reach a technology decision by the end of 1998, Energy Secretary Richardson asked TVA to submit final proposals for its Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactors, as well as for completion of its Bellefonte reactor. These proposals were provided to DOE the first week of December 1998, after the October 27, 1998, closing of the public comment period for the CLWR Draft EIS. After receiving these offers, Secretary Richardson directed that this information be presented to the public so they could review the latest TVA offers and provide their comments prior to his reaching the technology decision. To enable this, in spite of the short notice, a public meeting was scheduled and conducted on December 14, 1998. At this meeting, DOE presented information on the new proposals; answered questions; and accepted comments on the proposals, as well as on CLWR tritium production in general. The public was encouraged to comment on the new TVA proposals via U.S. mail, fax, toll-free 800-number phone line, or e-mail. Although the comments received as a result of this December 14, 1998, meeting were submitted after the public comment period, DOE responded to all of these comments as though they were received during the public comment period and they are included in Volume 2, the Comment Response Document.

During the public comment period, approximately 800 comments were received. An additional 230 comments were in conjunction with the December 14, 1998, public meeting. Most of the comments focused on a limited number of major issues. These issues and DOE's responses are summarized below.

By far, a majority of comments supported the completion and operation of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant for tritium production because it would promote economic development in a depressed area and provide other, similar benefits. Other commentors generally opposed the completion of the Bellefonte plant as a nuclear power plant, particularly for tritium production. In response to these comments, DOE acknowledged there is both public support and opposition for the Bellefonte alternative. The CLWR EIS addresses all of the benefits cited by the commentors who favored the Bellefonte alternative, as well as the concerns expressed by opponents. DOE's response to these and other related comments may be found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 7: General Support/Opposition.

The cost-effectiveness of the CLWR and APT tritium production alternatives was another frequent theme among many commentors. Most asked for cost-related information and/or expressed the opinion that cost should be the major determining factor in a tritium production decision. In addition, some commentors questioned the accuracy of the cost information that DOE provided at the public hearings and the December 14, 1998, public meeting, and many believed there was little possibility that TVA could complete the Bellefonte plant for the cost estimates cited. Other commentors stated they felt the large expenditures required for CLWR tritium production would be better spent on other, more urgent social needs such as education and environmental restoration. Some commentors were concerned about possible costs to TVA ratepayers resulting from tritium production.

In response to the cost-related comments, DOE stated that the CLWR EIS was prepared in accordance with NEPA, the Council on Environmental Quality's regulations on implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508), and DOE's NEPA regulations (10 CFR 1021). None of these regulations require the inclusion of a cost analysis in an EIS. As discussed in Volume 1, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1, the basic objective of the CLWR EIS is to provide the public and DOE decisionmakers with a description of the reasonable alternatives for CLWR tritium production and information about their potential impacts on public health and safety and the environment. While costs could be an important factor in the ultimate Record of Decision, the purpose of this and other EISs is to address the environmental consequences of the proposed action. DOE distributed cost information comparing the CLWR and APT alternatives at the public hearings in October 1998, however, and this information is available upon request. In response to comments concerning the accuracy of TVA's cost estimates for completing the Bellefonte plant, DOE considers TVA's cost estimates to be both accurate and conservative, given that the plant is nearly complete and TVA's cost estimates were evaluated by an external reviewer. In response to comments that CLWR funds would be better spent on other, more urgent social needs, DOE noted that Congress determines how funds are allocated, and DOE does not determine Federal spending priorities. Furthermore, such spending priorities are beyond the scope of this EIS. In response to the concerns of TVA ratepayers about potential costs resulting from tritium production, DOE responded that no additional costs to ratepayers are expected. DOE's responses to the cost-related public comments are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 23: Cost Issues.

Many commentors questioned the need for nuclear weapons and/or the present need for tritium. Other commentors expressed a belief that the amount of tritium needed to support current and future nuclear weapons stockpiles is less than the amount stated in the CLWR EIS. In response, DOE cited its responsibilities for maintaining the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the requirements of the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan and accompanying Presidential Decision Directive, which established the size and composition of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and the need for a new tritium production source by approximately 2005. DOE stated that sufficient quantities of tritium no longer can be obtained from weapons being retired from the existing stockpile, as cited in the most recent Presidential

**Decision Directive.** DOE's responses to comments concerning the need for tritium are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 2: Purpose and Need for Tritium.

Several commentors expressed concern that tritium production in a commercial reactor would violate U.S. policy regarding the separation of commercial and military uses of nuclear energy, would hinder nonproliferation efforts, and would encourage other nations to use their own commercial facilities for nuclear weapons purposes. In response to these concerns, DOE cited the conclusions of a high-level study entitled, *Interagency Review of the Nonproliferation Implications of Alternative Tritium Production Technologies Under Consideration by the Department of Energy, A Report to the Congress*. This interagency review concluded that any nonproliferation issues associated with the production of tritium in a CLWR were manageable and that DOE should continue to pursue the CLWR option, as stated in Volume 1, Chapter 1, Section 1.3.5, of the CLWR EIS. DOE also stated that there is no U.S. policy, law, or treaty that prohibits the production of tritium that ultimately will be used in weapons in a commercial reactor. In addition, DOE stated that the United States is a declared weapons state, and the purpose of nonproliferation efforts is to keep nonweapons states from acquiring nuclear weapons while the declared weapons states work toward total disarmament. DOE noted that other nations already operate dual-purpose reactors that serve both civilian and military needs. DOE's responses to comments on nonproliferation, the separation of civilian and military nuclear facilities, and other policy issues are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 1, Policy Issues.

Many commentors were concerned with public and occupational health and safety issues. Some specifically questioned TVA's past history and practices related to plant safety. In response to these concerns, DOE stated that the environmental impacts and potential radiological doses to both workers and the public resulting from tritium production would be well below the limits considered acceptable by Federal and state regulatory authorities. Public and occupational health and safety issues are discussed in Volume 1, Chapter 5, of the CLWR EIS. DOE also stated that prior to irradiation of any TPBARs, an NRC safety evaluation would be required to amend the operating license of the reactors for tritium production. This review specifically would look at all potential health and safety issues. DOE's responses to public and occupational health and safety comments are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 14: Occupational and Public Health and Safety - Normal Conditions.

Several commentors stated that DOE has a history of polluting and contaminating every site they have operated and wanted to know why the proposed action would be any different. In response, DOE acknowledged having a number of older facilities in need of environmental cleanup, and an aggressive cleanup program is underway to upgrade these facilities and ensure their continued compliance with Federal and state regulations. All of the CLWR tritium production alternatives involve the use of state-of-the-art TVA reactors. These reactors have excellent environmental compliance records and exemplary environmental, health, and safety programs to ensure their continued compliance with Federal and state regulations. In addition, DOE expressed confidence that tritium production in a CLWR would be safe and is technically straightforward. To commentors who expressed concern that CLWR tritium production expenditures would drain DOE's budget for its facility cleanup activities, DOE responded that the funding for both of these programs would come from separate Congressional appropriations. Funding for CLWR tritium production would not be obtained from funding already allocated for facility cleanup activities. DOE's responses to comments about past DOE practices and conflicts between DOE's cleanup activities and tritium production are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 8: Past DOE Practices.

Some commentors suggested that the CLWR EIS was deficient and inadequate as a NEPA document. In response, DOE stated that it believes that the EIS is adequate and fully complies with NEPA. The EIS evaluates all reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts for all reasonable alternatives, in accordance with the requirements of the Council on Environmental Quality's regulations (40 CFR 1500-1508) and DOE's



NEPA regulations (10 CFR 1021) and procedures. DOE's responses to NEPA-related comments are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 5: NEPA Process.

Other commentors stated that the relationship between the CLWR, APT, and Tritium Extraction Facility EISs was not clearly explained in the CLWR Draft EIS. In response, DOE added a Preface to the CLWR Final EIS to better describe the relationship between the CLWR EIS, the APT EIS, and the Tritium Extraction Facility EIS. This Preface also addresses Energy Secretary Richardson's December 22, 1998, announcement that the CLWR would be the primary tritium supply technology. DOE's response to comments concerning the relationship between the CLWR, APT, and Tritium Extraction Facility EISs is found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 5: NEPA Process (Comment Summary 05.01).

Several commentors were concerned about the additional spent nuclear fuel that would be generated by tritium production. DOE responded that additional spent nuclear fuel would be generated if more than 2,000 TPBARs were irradiated in a single reactor, as stated in Section 3.2.1, Volume 1, of the CLWR Final EIS. DOE also stated that the CLWR EIS evaluates the environmental impacts of additional spent fuel generation resulting from a maximum number of 3,400 TPBARs. DOE stated that it would manage the tritium production process to minimize, to the extent practicable, the generation of additional spent nuclear fuel. In the event a suitable repository is not available, as required by law, the additional spent nuclear fuel generated as a result of tritium production would be stored on site in a dry cask independent spent fuel storage installation. DOE's responses to spent nuclear fuel comments are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 17: Spent Fuel Management.

Several commentors suggested that the production of tritium in a CLWR would make TVA reactors an attractive target for terrorists and that DOE should address the consequences of such an attack in the EIS. In response, DOE stated that, prior to loading TPBARs in TVA's Watts Bar reactor as part of the Lead Test Assembly Program, a thorough security review was conducted. This review found existing security provisions to be adequate to protect against such a threat. Prior to utilizing Watts Bar or other TVA reactors for tritium production, additional DOE and NRC reviews would be required to ensure safeguard and security provisions are adequate. DOE's responses to these and other security-related comments are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 22: Safeguards and Security.

### **S.1.8 Changes from the Draft Environmental Impact Statement**

In response to comments on the CLWR Draft EIS and as a result of information that was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the Draft, Volume 1 of the CLWR Final EIS contains revisions and new information. These revisions and new information are indicated by a double underline for minor word changes or by a sidebar in the margin for sentence or larger additions. Volume 2, Comment Response Document, contains the comments received during public review of the CLWR Draft EIS and DOE's responses to those comments. A brief discussion of the most important changes is provided in the following paragraphs.

#### **TPBAR Failures**

In analyzing the potential releases of tritium to the environment from the proposed action, the CLWR Draft EIS assumed that two of the TPBARs under irradiation would fail and the entire inventory of tritium would be available to be released to the environment under normal operating conditions. The same two-TPBARs failure assumption was made in the analysis of transportation accidents. The assumption was based on the failure statistics of standard burnable absorber rods, i.e., two failures out of 29,700 rods through July 1980. Since the issuance of the CLWR Draft EIS, additional information obtained from Westinghouse revealed that both failures were attributed to early manufacturing defects that have been corrected. The failures were attributed to slumping of the absorber material—a condition that cannot occur in the TPBARs. Since the two

early failures, more than 500,000 Westinghouse burnable absorber rods have been used without a single observed failure. Consequently, the CLWR Final EIS still analyzes the impacts to the health and safety of the public from the potential failure of two TPBARs, but characterizes the event of such a failure as an abnormal event during an irradiation cycle, rather than a continuous, normal-operation occurrence. This change in assumptions results in changes in the potential tritium releases and estimated doses to the public under normal reactor operation and some accident conditions (i.e., the nonreactor design-basis accident) for all reactor alternatives.

### **The Secretary's Technology Announcement**

The CLWR Draft EIS was issued in August 1998. At the time, the decision on the primary and backup technologies to be used for tritium production had not been made. On December 22, 1998, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson announced that the CLWR would be DOE's primary option for tritium production and the proposed linear accelerator at the Savannah River Site would be the backup option. In addition, the Secretary designated TVA's Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants as the preferred CLWR facilities. The CLWR Final EIS was revised to reflect the Secretary's announcement and include the Preferred Alternative. Changes were made primarily in the introductory sections of the CLWR Final EIS for accuracy. The evaluation of the impacts was not affected.

### **Clarification of TVA Proposals**

In response to public comments about the status of the TVA proposals to provide irradiation services or the sale of a CLWR, Section 1.1.4 was revised. The discussion of the procurement process clarifies that DOE is considering only the purchase of irradiation services, not the purchase of a reactor. Additionally, the section clarifies that TVA submitted several proposals to DOE during the ongoing negotiations. An earlier TVA proposal for the use of Watts Bar expired. However, in December 1998, TVA submitted to DOE another offer to provide irradiation services at Watts Bar and Sequoyah, as well as additional proposals for Bellefonte. TVA's offer to provide irradiation services at one or more of the three proposed sites is still viable.

### **Nonproliferation Policy Issues**

In response to public comments requesting DOE to provide examples of the commingling of civilian nuclear programs with military nuclear programs, Section 1.3.5 was revised. The discussion of nonproliferation now includes an explanation and some background information on the issue, as well as examples of the commingling of civilian and military uses of nuclear power.

### **Water Quality Analysis**

In response to public comments expressing concern about impacts to public water withdrawals downstream of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, sections of Chapters 4 and 5 were revised. The discussion of surface water use for Bellefonte (Section 4.2.3.4) identifies nearby intakes downstream. The discussions of potential impacts to surface water near the three reactor sites (Sections 5.2.1.4, 5.2.2.4, and 5.2.3.4) include the tritium concentration at various locations downstream. In addition, Section 5.2.3.4 was revised to include potential chemical concentrations downstream of Bellefonte.

### **Accident Analysis**

During the preparation of the CLWR Final EIS, data related to the design and fabrication of the TPBARs indicated that the release of tritium from an accidental breach of a TPBAR more likely would be time-dependent than instantaneous and finite, as was assumed in the Draft EIS. Consequently, the analysis for the

TPBAR handling accident and the transportation cask handling accident at the reactor site (Appendix D), and the transportation cask accident en route (Appendix E), were revised to reflect the more recent data.

### **Environmental Justice**

Figures in Appendix G were revised to improve their quality. New figures were added to show the location of minority and low-income populations within a 16.1-kilometer (10-mile) radius. In addition, a representative average individual dose at 40.2 kilometers (25 miles) to each of the 16 principal directions has been overlaid onto the 80.5-kilometer (50-mile) radius to show the potential dose to minority and low-income populations.

### **Tritium Requirements and Supply**

In response to public comments expressing concerns about the disparity between the amount of tritium needed and the amount that could be supplied by one CLWR, Section 3.2.1 was revised. The discussion explains that the exact amount of tritium needed is classified information, however, for the purposes of analysis, it is not expected to exceed 3 kilograms per year (6.6 pounds per year). It further clarifies that one reactor with 3,400 TPBARs would be expected to satisfy a steady state tritium requirement in most years.

### **Comparison of the APT and CLWR Alternatives**

In response to public comments requesting additional information about the No Action Alternative, Section 3.2.6 was expanded to include a table comparing the impacts of producing tritium under the accelerator and CLWR options. A document comparing the costs of the technology options is available upon request from DOE.

### **Source of Uranium-235 for Tritium Production**

In response to public comments concerning the source of blended-down uranium-235 that could be used as nuclear fuel for tritium production, Section 5.2.7 was revised for clarification. A discussion of the environmental impacts resulting from blending-down activities of highly enriched uranium was also added.

### **Mitigation Measures**

The CLWR Draft EIS discusses the need for mitigation measures, if such a need were warranted, right after the presentation of the impacts for each environmental resource. A new Section 5.5 was added to the CLWR Final EIS to summarize these discussions.

### **Sensitivity Analysis**

An additional variation from the baseline analysis has been included in Section 5.2.9 of the CLWR EIS, that is, the possibility of producing tritium at some date later than 2005.

### **Miscellaneous Revisions and Editorial Changes**

Several sections in the CLWR Final EIS were revised to reflect the availability of more recent data, or to include corrections on erroneous information, improvements in the presentation, and other editorial changes. None of these revisions affect the environmental impact assessment of the EIS.

## **S.2 PURPOSE AND NEED**


Since nuclear weapons came into existence in 1945, a nuclear deterrent has been a cornerstone of the nation's defense policy and national security. Both President Clinton and the Congress have reiterated this principle in public statements and through legislation. The President has stated on a number of occasions his commitment to maintaining a nuclear deterrent capability. Most recently, in May 1997, the President stated in *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* that, "... our nuclear deterrent posture is one of the most visible and important examples of how U.S. military capabilities can be used effectively to deter aggression and coercion. Nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitments to allies, and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons."

U.S. strategic nuclear systems are based on designs that use tritium gas. Since tritium decays at a rate of about 5.5 percent per year (i.e., every 12.3 years one-half of the tritium has decayed), periodic replacement is required as long as the United States relies on a nuclear deterrent. The nation, therefore, requires a reliable source of tritium to maintain its nuclear weapons stockpile.

The size of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile is determined by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy who, in coordination with the Nuclear Weapons Council, jointly sign and submit to the President the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. This Memorandum transmits the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan to the President for final approval. Many factors are considered in the development of the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, including the status of the currently approved stockpile, arms control negotiations and treaties, Congressional constraints, and the status of the nuclear material production and fabrication facilities. Under this plan, DOE can determine the amount of tritium necessary to support the approved stockpile.

Over the past 40 years, DOE has built and operated over a dozen nuclear reactors (five of them at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina) to produce tritium and other nuclear materials for weapons purposes. Today, none of these reactors are operational, and DOE has not produced tritium for addition to the stockpile since 1988. According to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, however, DOE is responsible for developing and maintaining the capability to produce the nuclear materials, such as tritium, that are necessary for the defense of the United States (40 U.S.C. 2011).

Until a new tritium supply source is operational, DOE will continue to support tritium requirements by recycling tritium from weapons retired from the nation's stockpile. However, because of the tritium decay rate, recycling can only meet the tritium demands for a limited time, even with the reduction in stockpile requirements and no identified need for new-design weapons in the foreseeable future. Current projections, derived from the most recently approved, classified projections of future stockpile scenarios, indicate that recycled tritium will support the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile adequately until approximately 2005 (see Figure S-3).



**Figure S-3 Estimated Tritium Inventory and Reserve Requirements**

Even with a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile and no identified requirement for new nuclear weapons production in the foreseeable future, an ensured long-term tritium supply and recycling capability will be required to maintain the weapons determined to be needed for national defense under the prevailing Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. Presently, no U.S. source of new tritium is available. The effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability depends not only on the nation's current stockpile of nuclear weapons or the effectiveness of those it can produce, but also on its ability to reliably and safely provide the tritium needed to maintain these weapons.

To meet requirements mandated by the President and supported by the Congress, the United States will need a new source of tritium production by approximately 2005. For planning purposes, the operational life of the new production source would be about 40 years. Without a new supply source, after 2005 the United States would have to use its five-year reserve of tritium to maintain the readiness of the nuclear weapons stockpile. The five-year reserve contains a quantity of tritium maintained for emergencies and contingencies. In such a scenario, the complete depletion of the five-year tritium reserve would degrade the nuclear deterrent capability because not all weapons in the stockpile would be able to function as designed. Eventually, the United States would lose its nuclear deterrent. The purpose of DOE's action is to produce in one or more commercial light water reactors, the tritium needed to maintain the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.

TVA's purpose and need relative to this EIS is to maximize the utilization of its resources while simultaneously providing support to national defense. National defense support has been one of TVA's historic multi-purpose missions (see Section S.1.5.5).

### **S.3 COMMERCIAL LIGHT WATER REACTOR PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES**

#### **S.3.1 Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor**

To produce tritium in a CLWR, TPBARs would be inserted into the reactor core. The TPBARs are long, thin tubes that contain lithium-6, a material that produces tritium when it is exposed to neutrons in the reactor core. The exterior dimensions of the TPBARs are similar to the burnable absorber rods, so that they can be installed in fuel assemblies where burnable absorber rods are normally placed. To ease the insertion and removal from fuel assemblies, the TPBARs would be attached to a base plate. See Figures S-4 and S-5 for a sketch of a typical TPBAR assembly and components. In addition to producing tritium, TPBARs would fill the same role as burnable absorber rods in the operation of the reactor.

The neutron absorber material in the TPBARs would be enriched in the isotope lithium-6, instead of the boron usually used in the burnable absorber rods. When the TPBARs are inserted into the reactor core, neutrons would be absorbed by the lithium-6 isotope, thereby initiating a nuclear process that would turn it into lithium-7. The new isotope would then split to form helium 4 and tritium (see Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of this process). The tritium then would be captured in a solid metal nickel-plated zirconium material in the TPBAR called a "getter." The tritium would be chemically bound in the TPBAR "getter" until the TPBAR is removed from the reactor during refueling and transported to the proposed Tritium Extraction Facility at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Savannah River Site in South Carolina. There the tritium would be extracted by heating the TPBARs in a vacuum to temperatures in excess of 1,000 degrees Centigrade (°C) (1,800 degrees Fahrenheit [°F]). Following extraction, the tritium would be purified.

##### **S.3.1.1 Impacts of Tritium Production on Reactor Operations**

The replacement of burnable absorber rods with TPBARs should have few impacts on the normal operation of the reactor. The normal power distribution within the core and reactor coolant flow and its distribution within the core would remain within existing technical specification limits. Some tritium is expected to permeate through the TPBARs during normal operation, which would increase the quantity of tritium in the reactor's coolant water system. Since tritium is a type, or isotope, of the hydrogen atom, once the tritium is in the reactor's coolant water system, it could combine with oxygen to become part of a water molecule and could eventually be released to the environment.

The operational differences between a tritium production reactor and a nuclear power plant without tritium production were determined by evaluating each environmental resource area and identifying the operational parameters that would change in a typical CLWR as a result of operating in a tritium production mode. The summarized operational differences are:

- **Accident conditions**—The physical changes to the reactor core would involve replacing some burnable absorber rods with TPBARs. This change would increase the estimated quantity of radionuclides assumed to be released in the analysis.
- **Personnel**—Additional TPBAR handling and shipping activities would create new jobs and possibly require the hiring of extra personnel at the CLWR sites.
- **Effluent**—The tritium content in the liquid effluent and gaseous emissions is expected to increase as a result of the presence of TPBARs in the reactor.
- **Waste**—Additional activities associated with handling, processing, and shipping TPBAR assemblies are expected to increase low-level radioactive waste generation rates.





Figure S-4 Typical TPBAR Assembly



**Figure S-5 Sketch of TPBAR Components**

- **Spent fuel**—Additional spent fuel could be generated when a reactor operates in a tritium-producing mode. Depending on existing spent fuel capacity, additional storage for spent fuel could be required.
- **Public and worker exposure**—The increased levels of tritium in the reactor coolant and the additional activities required in the handling and processing of TPBARs would result in increased radiation exposure for the public, operations workers, and maintenance personnel.
- **Transportation and handling**—Irradiated TPBAR assemblies would be packaged and transported from the CLWR sites to the Savannah River Site for tritium extraction and purification. Some additional risks of an accident en route would be expected. In addition, low-level radioactive waste associated with the TPBARs would be packaged and transported for disposal at the Barnwell disposal facility or the Savannah River Site.



### **S.3.2 Development of Alternatives**

#### **S.3.2.1 Major Planning Assumptions and Basis for Analysis**

The major planning assumptions and considerations that form the basis of the analyses and impact assessments presented in this EIS are listed below.

- The purpose of DOE's action is to produce tritium in a CLWR. Tritium is needed to maintain the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. For the purposes of analysis in this EIS, DOE assumed that the CLWR program would be designed to produce up to 3 kilograms of tritium per year. Three kilograms of tritium represents an unclassified maximum requirement that only would be required if the tritium reserve, which is maintained for emergencies and contingencies, were ever lost or used (see Figure S-3). Considering the current design of the TPBARs and the efficiency of the tritium extraction process, this would involve the irradiation of up to 6,000 TPBARs in an 18-month refueling cycle (4,000 TPBARs per year). The maximum number of TPBARs that could be irradiated at each reactor unit without significantly disturbing the normal electricity-producing mode of reactor operation is approximately 3,400 TPBARs; the exact number depends on the specific design of the reactor. Steady-state tritium requirements, which are classified and would vary depending upon the specific requirements of the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, are less than 3 kilograms of tritium per year. This EIS evaluates the impacts at each reactor site by considering a range of 1,000 to 3,400 TPBARs. A sensitivity analysis of the irradiation of fewer than 1,000 TPBARs is included in Volume 1, Section 5.2.9 of the CLWR EIS.

Producing 3 kilograms of tritium per year likely would be a short-term requirement to reconstitute the tritium reserve. In such a case, as explained in Appendix A of this EIS, it is technically feasible to produce larger quantities of tritium in a single reactor by changing some of the design parameters of the TPBARs and/or some technical parameters of the host reactor core, including shortening the refueling cycle. DOE does not foresee the implementation of this mode of production in any of the reactor units considered in this CLWR EIS. For the purpose of completeness, however, the sensitivity analysis in Volume 1, Section 5.2.9 of the CLWR EIS also addresses the environmental impacts of changing the existing design parameters of the TPBARs and some of the operating parameters of the host reactors to maximize tritium production.

- The EIS assesses the environmental impacts of tritium production in CLWRs for a period of 40 years, starting with the delivery of irradiated TPBARs at the Tritium Extraction Facility in approximately the year 2005. For alternatives involving the partially completed reactor(s), it is assumed that any construction activities needed for the completion of Bellefonte 1 (and any other start-up tests and activities) would take place during the time period between 1999 and 2004, at which time the completed reactor would be fully operational. In the event Bellefonte 2 was also selected for completion, Bellefonte 1 would come on line in approximately 2005, while Bellefonte 2 would begin operation in approximately 2007.
- CLWRs are licensed by NRC to operate for 40 years. Currently operating reactors are not in a position to continue operation beyond 40 years without NRC approval for "life extension." Some of the environmental impacts associated with life extension activities would be attributable to tritium production. The NRC has addressed the generic impacts of life extension in the *Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants*. The life extension impacts associated with alternatives involving the currently operating units are based on this publication and are addressed generically in the EIS. Tritium production is not expected to affect relicensing. Life extension impacts for a partially completed reactor would not be an issue, since it would be expected to operate for 40 years after its completion.

- Tritium production in a currently operating reactor would not be expected to affect the radiological condition of the reactor at the end of its life. Therefore, environmental impacts associated with decommissioning and decontamination activities would be attributed to the normal operation of the reactor as an electricity-producing unit. For a partially completed reactor, the impacts from decommissioning and decontamination activities are evaluated in this EIS. Decommissioning and decontamination impacts are based on the generic EIS issued by the NRC entitled *Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities*.
- Fabrication of the TPBARs would take place in a commercial facility that normally fabricates and assembles the components for the fresh fuel used in the CLWRs.
- Production of tritium in a CLWR would increase the generation rate of spent fuel if more than approximately 2,000 TPBARs are irradiated in a fuel cycle. Normally (i.e., during normal operation with no tritium production), fuel assemblies are used in more than one cycle. However, in order to maximize tritium production, TPBARs would be inserted in fresh fuel assemblies. In accordance with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, DOE is planning to manage all spent nuclear fuel at a national repository. Siting and development of a repository is ongoing, and the location and opening date for a suitable repository has not been determined. Accordingly, for the purposes of this EIS, the initial management of any additional spent nuclear fuel that may be generated as a result of tritium production is assumed to be stored on site in a generic dry cask independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) pending the availability of a suitable repository. The environmental impacts from the construction and operation of an ISFSI are addressed in this EIS. However, no decision will be made to either construct or operate an ISFSI as a result of this EIS. Appropriate NEPA documentation would be prepared prior to the construction of a dry cask ISFSI.

### S.3.2.2 Reasonable Alternatives

As discussed in Section S.1.4, DOE issued a Request for Proposals for the CLWR production of tritium. DOE stated in the Request for Proposals its intent to select one or both of two approaches: (1) the acquisition of CLWR irradiation services for tritium production, or (2) the purchase of an operating CLWR by DOE for production of tritium. The only qualified response to DOE's solicitation came from TVA, the operator of Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2. TVA also maintains the partially completed units of Watts Bar 2 and Bellefonte 1 and 2. With the exception of Watts Bar 2, which was considered and dismissed, these units form the basis for the Reasonable Alternatives.

To supply tritium to meet national security requirements, DOE could use one or more reactors. Considering that a maximum number of 3,400 TPBARs could be irradiated in a single reactor, at least two reactors would be needed for the 6,000 TPBARs based on an 18-month refueling cycle. Considering also that additional spent nuclear fuel generation attributed to tritium production starts approximately with the irradiation of approximately 2,000 TPBARs in a single reactor, DOE could use as many as three reactors to irradiate 6,000 TPBARs without increasing the amount of spent nuclear fuel. Mathematically, DOE has the option of selecting 1 of the 18 combinations of reactor units presented in Table S-1. These 18 combinations form the Reasonable Alternatives of the irradiation element of the project.

### S.3.2.3 No Action Alternative

On December 22, 1998, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson announced that CLWRs would be the primary tritium supply technology for tritium and that the accelerator would be developed—but not constructed as a backup to CLWR tritium production. Based on this announcement, if tritium is not produced in a CLWR, it will be produced in an accelerator. Accordingly, for purposes of analysis in this EIS, the No Action

Alternative assumes the continued operation of Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 for the generation of electricity and the deferral of construction activities necessary for completion of Bellefonte 1 and 2 as nuclear units. Consequently, this No Action alternative entails the production of tritium in an accelerator. A summary of the environmental impacts associated with the production of tritium in an accelerator is contained in Volume 1, Section 5.2.11 of the CLWR EIS. A comparison between the environmental impacts of the CLWR EIS reactor alternatives and those for accelerator production is presented in Table S-3 at the end of this summary. Since the APT EIS was developed in parallel with the CLWR EIS, the impacts in Table S-3 represent the conclusions of the APT Draft EIS. These impacts are not expected to change in the APT Final EIS.

**Table S-1 CLWR Tritium Production Program Reasonable Alternatives**

Alternative	Watts Bar 1 Operation	Sequoyah 1 Operation	Sequoyah 2 Operation	Bellefonte 1 Complete Construction and Operation	Bellefonte 2 Complete Construction and Operation <sup>a</sup>
<b>One Reactor<sup>b</sup></b>					
1	●				
2		●			
3			●		
4				●	
<b>Two Reactor Combinations</b>					
5	●	●			
6	●		●		
7	●			●	
8		●	●		
9		●		●	
10			●	●	
11				●	●
<b>Three Reactor Combinations</b>					
12	●	●	●		
13	●	●		●	
14	●		●	●	
15	●			●	●
16		●	●	●	
17		●		●	●
18			●	●	●

- <sup>a</sup> Construction on Bellefonte 2 may be completed only if Bellefonte 1 is completed and operated.
- <sup>b</sup> The one-reactor alternative could not produce 3 kilograms of tritium per year on an 18-month refueling cycle.

#### S.3.2.4 The Preferred Alternative

The Council on Environmental Quality regulations require that an agency identify its Preferred Alternative(s) in the Final EIS (40 CFR 1502.14e). The Preferred Alternative is defined as the alternative that the agency believes would fulfill its statutory mission, giving consideration to environmental, economic, technical, and

other factors. This EIS provides information on the environmental impacts. Cost, schedule, and technical analyses will be discussed in the Record of Decision for the EIS. DOE has identified the purchase of irradiation services from the Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactor facilities as the Preferred Alternative for the production of tritium in a CLWR. Under the Preferred Alternative, no more than 3,400 TPBARs would be irradiated in a single reactor per each refueling cycle. In implementing the Preferred Alternative, DOE and TVA would minimize, to the extent practicable, the generation of additional spent nuclear fuel.

### **S.3.2.5 Reactor Options**

#### **S.3.2.5.1 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1**

Watts Bar 1 is located on a 716-hectare (1,770-acre) site in Rhea County, Tennessee, on the Tennessee River at Tennessee River Mile 528, approximately 80 kilometers (50 miles) northeast of Chattanooga, Tennessee. The general arrangement of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant is shown in Figure S-6.

Watts Bar 1 began commercial power operation in May 1996. The Watts Bar 1 structures include a reactor containment building, a turbine building, an auxiliary building, a service building, a water pumping station for circulating water in the condenser, a diesel generator building, a river intake pumping station, a natural-draft cooling tower, a transformer yard, a 500-kilovolt switchyard and a 161-kilovolt switchyard, a spent nuclear fuel storage facility, and sewage treatment facilities. The reactor containment building houses a pressurized water reactor designed and manufactured by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation. No modifications are expected to be necessary for Watts Bar 1 to irradiate TPBARs. Design equipment and facilities are sufficient to load and unload the TPBAR assemblies. During normal operation with tritium production, the plant could employ a few more workers (less than 10) in addition to the 809 presently employed. The spent nuclear fuel storage capacity is not sufficient for 40 years of operation with or without TPBARs.

#### **S.3.2.5.2 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2**

Sequoyah 1 and 2 are operating, pressurized CLWR nuclear power plants. The units are located on a 212-hectare (525-acre) site in Hamilton County, Tennessee, on the Tennessee River at Tennessee River Mile 484.5, approximately 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) northeast of the nearest city limit of Chattanooga, Tennessee. The general arrangement of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant is shown in Figure S-7.

Sequoyah 1 began commercial operation in July 1981, and Sequoyah 2 began commercial operation in June 1982. The nuclear steam supply systems, designed and manufactured by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, include the reactor vessel, steam generators, and associated piping and pumps. These are housed in two reactor containment buildings. The balance of the nuclear power plant includes: a turbine building, an auxiliary building, a service and office building, a control building, a condenser circulating water pumping station, a diesel generator building, a river intake pumping station, two natural draft cooling towers, a transformer yard, a 500-kilovolt switchyard and a 161-kilovolt switchyard, spent nuclear fuel storage facilities, and sewage treatment facilities. No modifications are expected to be needed for Sequoyah 1 and 2 to irradiate TPBARs. Equipment and facilities are sufficient to load and unload the TPBAR assemblies. Tritium production could require the addition of a few more employees (fewer than 10 per unit) to the 1,120 employees currently employed at the two-unit site. The spent nuclear fuel storage capacity is not sufficient for 40 years of operation with or without TPBARs.




Figure S-6 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant




Figure S-7 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

### **S.3.2.5.3 Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2**

Bellefonte 1 and 2 are partially completed reactors. They are situated on approximately 607 hectares (1,500 acres) on a peninsula at Tennessee River Mile 392, on the west shore of Guntersville Reservoir, about 11.3 kilometers (7 miles) northeast of Scottsboro, Alabama. The main land uses of the surrounding area are forestry and agriculture; however, urban-industrial development has grown over the past several years around the plant along the Guntersville Reservoir. The affected environment at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site is described in Section 4.2.3. The general arrangement of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant is shown in Figure S-8.

The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (now NRC) issued the construction permit for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant in December 1974, and construction started in February 1975. On July 29, 1988, TVA notified NRC that Bellefonte was being deferred as a result of a lower load forecast for the near future. After three years of extensive study, TVA notified NRC on March 23, 1993, of its plans to complete Bellefonte 1 and 2. In December 1994, TVA announced that Bellefonte would not be completed as a nuclear plant without a partner and put further activities on hold until a comprehensive evaluation of TVA's power needs was completed. On April 29, 1996, TVA issued a Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS for the proposed conversion of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant to a fossil fuel facility. The *Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bellefonte Conversion Project*, which analyzed alternatives for such a conversion, was issued in October 1997. A Record of Decision for that EIS will not be made until it is determined whether Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 will be used for tritium production.

The plant structures presently consist of two reactor containment buildings: a control building; a turbine building; an auxiliary building; a service building; a condenser circulating water pumping station; two diesel generator buildings; a river intake pumping station; two natural-draft cooling towers; a transformer yard; a 500-kilovolt switchyard and 161-kilovolt switchyard; a spent nuclear fuel storage pool; and sewage treatment facilities.

Additionally, there are office buildings to house engineering and other department personnel. Entrance roads, parking lots, railroad spurs, and a helicopter landing pad are in place and are capable of supporting a construction project.

No modifications to the original design would be necessary to complete Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 for operation, with or without TPBARs.

The plant systems and structures are maintained through active layup and preservation. Program activities include the following:

- Each unit's main turbine generators are rotated every other week.
- The diesel fire pumps are maintained in an operational status and are run monthly.
- The shell and tube sides of the main condensers (heat exchangers) are kept dry, and the tube side is maintained with a flow of warm, dehumidified air.
- The reactor coolant system is kept dry using a flow of warm, dehumidified air.

A workforce of approximately 80 personnel supports layup and preservation of the plant. Of that number, 38 are involved in operations and maintenance.




Figure S-8 Bellefonte Nuclear Plant



To complete Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2, additional engineering and construction activities would be required. These activities are summarized in the following paragraphs.

**Engineering**—Engineering for the original Bellefonte Nuclear Plant design is substantially complete. The additional engineering effort consists of completing analysis and design modifications that were not completed prior to deferral; updating the design basis documentation to current industry standards; and supporting construction, start up, and licensing of the plant. More specifically, the remaining engineering effort for Bellefonte 1 and 2 includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- Issuing detailed design modifications for certain mechanical and electrical systems to meet current requirements
- Updating the main control room drawings into computer-aided design electronic format
- Reviewing the control room design and upgrading the simulator and plant computers
- Reanalyzing piping and pipe supports
- Resolving industry issues (e.g., fire protection, electrical equipment qualification, station blackout, site security, communications, motor-operated valves) that were either not completed prior to deferral in 1988 or have arisen since deferral
- Developing fuel assembly and fuel cycle designs to facilitate the production of tritium
- Supporting submittals of the Final Safety Analysis Report and completing previous NRC position papers
- Supporting field change requests by the constructor

**Construction**—Construction activities required to complete Bellefonte 1 and 2 include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Completing the application of protective coatings to structures, piping, and components, and the installation of piping insulation
- Installing the Bellefonte 2 reactor coolant pump internals and motors [Some (less than 10 percent) of Bellefonte 1 reactor coolant instrumentation and pipe supports would have to be installed.]
- Installing limited major piping and components in the balance of the plant for Bellefonte 2
- Installing the steam piping for Bellefonte 2
- Installing and energizing a limited amount of the electric power equipment within the plant [The 161-kilovolt and 500-kilovolt offsite transmission lines are terminated in the switchyard, which is complete and energized.]
- Completing the Bellefonte 2 main control room [Substantial work would be required because the Bellefonte 1 main control room, although not complete, is functional and manned to monitor the ongoing preservation activities. The recommendations of the Control Room Design review would be factored into efforts to complete construction of both control rooms.]
- Preparing the intake structure for operation by desilting the intake water pump

- Constructing some new support buildings and installing additional equipment

### S.3.2.6 Environmental Consequences

For the five TVA reactors being considered for tritium production (Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, Sequoyah 2, Bellefonte 1, and Bellefonte 2), impacts are presented for the bounding case (i.e., the maximum number of TPBARs that could be irradiated in a reactor). For those resources where impacts would be significantly different for a lesser number of TPBARs, explanation is provided. The impacts of utilizing more than one CLWR for tritium production can be determined by adding the impacts of each individual CLWR together. The impacts of not producing tritium at any of these five reactors (the No Action Alternative) are presented first, as a baseline against which to compare the impacts of producing tritium. The summary of the environmental consequences is presented in Table S-2 at the end of this summary.

#### S.3.2.6.1 No Action Alternative

##### Construction

**Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2.** Under the No Action Alternative, Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 would continue to produce electricity, and no construction impacts would occur.

**Bellefonte 1 and 2.** Under the No Action Alternative, Bellefonte 1 and 2 would remain in deferred status, and no construction impacts would occur. TVA could also convert Bellefonte 1 and 2 to a fossil fuel plant, as described in the *Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bellefonte Conversion Project* (see Volume 1, Section 1.5.2.4). Such conversion would be independent of this EIS and would not occur until a decision is made regarding the role of Bellefonte 1 and 2 in tritium production.

##### Operation

**Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2.** Under the No Action Alternative, Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 would continue to produce electricity for the foreseeable future, and there would be no changes in the type and magnitude of environmental impacts that currently occur. In producing electricity, these reactor plants would continue to comply with all Federal, state, and local requirements. Impacts associated with the continued operation of Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 are described in the following paragraphs.

Under the No Action Alternative, water requirements at all three plants would continue to be met by existing water resources with no additional impacts, and water quality would not change, but would remain within regulatory limits. Air quality would also remain unchanged and stay within regulatory limits. Worker employment should remain steady at each of the sites, with no major changes to the regional economic areas as a result of plant operation. Worker exposure to radiation should remain well under the regulatory limit of 5 rem per year, with the average worker dose at approximately 90 to 100 millirems per year. Radiation exposure of the public from normal operations would also remain well within regulatory limits (3 rem per year) for each of the reactor sites. At Watts Bar 1, the total dose to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) would be approximately 0.55 person-rem per year. Statistically, this equates to one fatal cancer approximately every 3,570 years from operation of Watts Bar 1. At Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2, the total dose to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) would be approximately 1.6 person-rem per year. Statistically, this equates to one fatal cancer approximately every 1,250 years from the operation of Sequoyah 1 or 2. Risks of accidents would remain unchanged.

Under the No Action Alternative, all categories of wastes would continue to be generated at each of the reactor plants, and they would be managed in accordance with regulations. Low-level radioactive wastes would

continue to be generated at a rate of approximately 40 (Watts Bar 1) to 389 (Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2) cubic meters per year and would be disposed of at the Barnwell disposal facility. For each of the reactors, spent fuel would also continue to be generated at a rate of approximately 80 fuel assemblies per year. Spent fuel would continue to be managed at each of the reactor plants in compliance with all regulatory requirements.

***Bellefonte 1 and 2.*** Under the No Action Alternative, Bellefonte 1 and 2 would remain uncompleted nuclear reactors, and impacts on the environment would not change.

#### **S.3.2.6.2 Impacts Associated with Tritium Production**

##### **Construction**

***Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2.*** Because this EIS assumes that long-term spent fuel storage would take place at each of the reactor plants, an ISFSI could eventually be required for Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2 to support tritium production. This could be the only construction necessary for tritium production. If such a facility were to be constructed, it would consist of three reinforced concrete slabs covering approximately 3.5 acres. Approximately 60-80 horizontal storage modules, each made of reinforced concrete, could be housed on the slabs. These horizontal storage modules would have a hollow internal cavity to accommodate a stainless steel cylindrical cask that would contain the spent nuclear fuel. Constructing such a facility would disturb approximately 5 acres and require approximately 50 construction workers. Premixed concrete would be used, and impacts to air quality, water, and biotic resources are expected to be small. Appropriate NEPA documentation would be prepared prior to the construction of a dry cask spent fuel storage facility.

***Bellefonte 1 and 2.*** All major structures (e.g., containment buildings, cooling towers, turbine buildings, support facilities) have been constructed, so construction activities would largely consist of internal modifications to the existing facilities. No additional land would be disturbed in completing construction, and there would be no impacts on visual resources, biotic resources (including threatened and endangered species), geology and soils, and archaeological and historic resources. Because this EIS assumes that long-term spent fuel storage would take place at each of the reactor plants, a dry cask spent fuel storage facility would eventually be required at Bellefonte 1 and 2. The impacts of constructing such a spent fuel storage facility would be similar to those described above for Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2. Appropriate NEPA documentation would be prepared before the construction.

Completing construction of Bellefonte 1 would have the greatest impact on socioeconomics, with construction activities taking place between 1999 and 2004. During the peak year of construction (2002), approximately 4,500 direct jobs could be created. As many as 4,500 secondary jobs (indirect jobs) would also be created. The total new jobs (9,000) would cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to decrease to approximately 4 percent from the current rate of 8.2 percent. Public finance expenditures/revenues would increase by over 30 percent in Scottsboro and about 15 percent in Jackson County. Rental vacancies would decline to near zero, and demand for all types of housing would increase substantially. Rents and housing prices could increase at double-digit percentage levels.

If Bellefonte 2 were also selected for completion, construction activities for both units would be drawn out, taking place between 1999 and 2005. The peak year of construction would shift, but the total number of direct and indirect jobs would be the same. The effects, therefore, on unemployment, public finance, rents, and housing prices would be the same as for the construction completion of Bellefonte 1.

## Operation

**Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2.** In a tritium production mode, these operating reactors would continue to comply with all Federal, state, and local requirements. Tritium production would have little or no effect on land use, visual resources, water use and quality, air quality, archaeological and historic resources, biotic resources (including threatened and endangered species), and socioeconomics. It could, however, have some incremental impacts in the following areas: radiation exposure (worker and public), spent fuel generation, and low-level radioactive waste generation. Tritium production could also change the accident and transportation risks associated with these reactors. Each of these areas is discussed below.

**Radiation Exposure** Tritium production could increase average annual worker radiation exposure by approximately 0.82-1.1 millirem per year. The resultant dose would be well within regulatory limits. Radiation exposure to the public from normal operations could also increase, but would still remain well within regulatory limits at each of the reactor sites. At either Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2, the total dose to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) could increase by a maximum of 1.9 person-rem per year. Statistically, this equates to one additional fatal cancer approximately every 1,000 years from the operation of Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2.

**Spent Fuel Generation** Given irradiation of 3,400 TPBARs (the maximum number of TPBARs without changing the reactor's fuel cycle), additional spent fuel would be generated at Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2. In the average 18-month fuel cycle, spent fuel generation could increase from approximately 80 spent fuel assemblies up to a maximum of 140, a 71

### Health Effects Risk Factors Used in this EIS

Health impacts of radiation exposure, whether from sources external or internal to the body, are generally identified as "somatic" (i.e., affecting the exposed individual), or "genetic" (i.e., affecting descendants of the exposed individual). Radiation is more likely to produce somatic effects than genetic effects. Except for leukemia, which can have an induction period (time between exposure to carcinogen and cancer diagnosis) of as little as 2 to 7 years, most cancers have an induction period of more than 20 years.

For a uniform irradiation of the body, the incidence of cancer varies among organs and tissues; the thyroid and skin demonstrate a greater sensitivity than other organs. Such cancers, however, also produce comparatively low mortality rates because they are relatively amenable to medical treatment. Because of the readily available data for cancer mortality rates, somatic effects leading to cancer fatalities, rather than cancer incidence, are presented in this EIS. The numbers of cancer fatalities can be used to compare the risks of various alternatives.

Risk factors are used to calculate the statistical expectation of the effects of exposing a population to radiation. For example, in a population of 100,000 people exposed only to natural background radiation (300 millirem per year), about 15 latent cancer fatalities per year would be expected ( $100,000 \text{ persons} \times 0.3 \text{ rem per year} \times 0.0005 \text{ latent cancer fatalities per person-rem} = 15 \text{ latent cancer fatalities per year}$ ).

The number of latent cancer fatalities corresponding to a single individual's exposure over a presumed 72-year lifetime to 0.3 rem per year is 0.011 ( $1 \text{ person} \times 0.3 \text{ rem per year} \times 72 \text{ years} \times 0.0005 \text{ latent cancer fatality per person-rem} = 0.011 \text{ latent cancer fatality}$ ). Presented another way, this method estimates that approximately 1.1 percent of the population might die of cancers induced by background radiation. The same calculations apply to workers with one difference: the risk factor for workers is 0.004 latent cancer fatalities per person-rem instead of 0.005 cancer fatalities per person-rem for the general public.

The health consequences of exposure to radionuclides from normal operation and accidents are converted to estimates of cancer fatality risks using dose conversion factors recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection. For individuals, the estimated probability of a latent cancer fatality occurring is reported for the noninvolved worker, the maximally exposed individual, and an average individual in the general population. These categories are defined as follows:

**Noninvolved Worker:** An individual 640 meters (0.4 mile) from the radioactive material release point.

**Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual:** A hypothetical individual who could potentially receive the maximum dose of radiation from hazardous chemicals.

**General Population:** Individuals within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the facility.

percent increase in spent fuel generation over the No Action Alternative. Because this EIS assumes that long-term spent fuel storage would take place at each of the reactor plants, a dry cask spent fuel storage facility would eventually be needed. Storing the additional spent fuel should have minor impacts. Radiation exposures would remain below regulatory limits for both workers and the public, and less than 4 cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste would be generated annually. The impacts of accidents associated with dry cask spent fuel storage would be small. As previously mentioned, appropriate NEPA documentation would be prepared before the construction of a dry cask spent fuel storage facility at Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2. If fewer than approximately 2,000 TPBARs were irradiated, there would be no change in the amount of spent fuel produced by the reactors.

**Low-Level Radioactive Waste Generation** Compared to the No Action Alternative, tritium production at Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2 would generate approximately 0.43 additional cubic meter per year of low-level radioactive waste. This would be a 0.1 (Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2) to 1.0 (Watts Bar 1) percent increase in low-level radioactive waste generation over the No Action Alternative. Such an increase would amount to less than 1 percent of the low-level radioactive waste disposed of at the Barnwell disposal facility. The EIS also analyzes the impacts of this low-level radioactive waste disposal at the Savannah River Site. Disposing of 0.43 cubic meter per year of low-level radioactive waste would amount to less than 1 percent of the low-level radioactive waste disposed of at the Savannah River Site and less than 1 percent of the landfill's capacity.

**Accident Risks** Tritium production could change the potential risks associated with accidents at Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2. As described in the following text, these changes would be small. Potential impacts from accidents were determined using computer modeling. If a limiting design-basis accident occurred, tritium production at the 3,400 TPBAR level would increase the individual risk of a fatal cancer by  $1.4 \times 10^{-9}$  to an individual living within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of Watts Bar 1. Statistically, this equates to a risk to the individual of one fatal cancer approximately every 710 million years from tritium production. For an individual living within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2, there would be a  $2.1 \times 10^{-9}$  increased likelihood of a cancer fatality to an individual from a design-basis accident as a result of tritium production. Statistically, this equates to a risk to an individual of one additional fatal cancer approximately every 490 million years from tritium production. For a beyond design-basis accident (an accident that has a

### Spent Fuel Storage

*The need for additional spent fuel storage is based on the assumption that 3,400 TPBARs would be irradiated in a reactor core for 18-month fuel cycles. However, if approximately 2,000 TPBARs or fewer were irradiated in each fuel cycle, no additional spent fuel would be generated.*

*The additional spent fuel generated from the tritium production over the duration of the program, would be accommodated at the site at an independent dry cask spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). The EIS presents the environmental impacts of the construction, operation, and postulated accidents associated with a generic dry cask ISFSI at each of the sites.*

*The majority of operating ISFSIs are in the form of concrete casks. Concrete casks consist of either a vertical or horizontal concrete structure that houses a metal cask that confines the spent nuclear fuel. A horizontal storage module consists of a rectangular reinforced concrete block that has a hollow internal cavity to accommodate a stainless steel cylindrical cask that contains the spent nuclear fuel. The concrete block is 5.79 meters (19 feet) long, 2.96 meters (9.7 feet) wide, and 4.6 meters (15 feet) high.*

*The decay heat released from the stored spent fuel would be equal to the heat released to the atmosphere from two to six average cars. NRC regulations require that a minimum distance of 100 meters (328 feet) be maintained as a controlled area around the spent fuel casks. At 100 meters, the direct-scattered total dose rate to an individual was calculated to be in the range of 0.01 to 0.1 mrem/hr.*

*The environmental consequences of the construction and operation of a generic dry cask storage facility are minor.*

probability of occurring approximately once in a million years or less), tritium production would result in small changes in the consequences of an accident. This is due to the fact that the potential consequences of such an accident would be dominated by radionuclides other than tritium.

**Transportation** Tritium production at either Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2 would necessitate additional transportation to and from the reactor plants. Most of the additional transportation would involve nonradiological materials. Impacts would be limited to toxic vehicle emissions and traffic fatalities. At each of these reactors, the transportation risks would be less than one fatality per year. Radiological materials transportation impacts would include routine and accidental doses of radioactivity. The risks associated with radiological materials transportation would be less than one fatality per 100,000 years.

**Bellefonte 1 and 2.** Because neither Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 are currently operating, this EIS assesses the impacts of completing construction and operating these units for tritium production. Consequently, environmental impacts would occur in the following resources: visual resources, water use, biotic resources, socioeconomics, radiation exposure (worker and public), spent fuel generation, and low-level radioactive waste generation. Tritium production would also change the accident and transportation risks associated with these reactors.

During operations, Bellefonte 1 and 2 would produce vapor plumes from cooling towers that would be visible up to 10 miles away. These plumes could create an aesthetic impact on the towns of Pisgah, Hollywood, and Scottsboro, Alabama.

During operation, Bellefonte 1 and 2 each would use less than 0.5 percent of the river flow from Guntersville Reservoir and would not have any adverse impacts on other users. Discharges from the plants would be treated and monitored before release and would comply with NPDES permits. Impacts on water quality would be minimal, and no standards would be exceeded as a result of Bellefonte operations.

Operation of either Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 for tritium production would have some effects on ecological resources typical to the operation of a nuclear power plant, regardless of tritium production. Impacts on ecological resources from the operation of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2

### Transportation

DOE takes many precautions to ensure the safe transportation of both its radioactive and nonradioactive shipments. These precautions satisfy U.S. Department of Transportation Regulations, NRC regulations, and DOE Orders. DOE would use Type A packages to transport materials with relatively low levels of radioactivity and Type B packages to transport materials with the highest levels of radioactivity. Type A packages are designed and tested to protect and retain their content under normal transportation conditions. They are tested to survive water spray, dropping during handling, compression by other packages, and penetration by falling objects. Type B packages are designed to protect and retain their contents in both normal and severe accident conditions. In addition, the U.S. Department of Transportation has stringent routing requirements for these shipments. These requirements include reducing the time in transit and the distance traveled, using interstate highways unless the state has designated a preferred alternative, and using beltways around cities where possible. The following are a few of the key safety measures the CLWR project will take to ensure safe shipment.

- The fuel assemblies with the inserted TPBARs (or the TPBARs themselves) would be transported to the selected reactor(s) according to the fuel manufacturer's current operating practices. The nuclear containers used for fresh fuel shipment would be NRC-certified Type A packages and due to security requirements would have an escort.
- The transportation of irradiated TPBARs entails very stringent safety measures established by the NRC, the U.S. Department of Transportation, and DOE. TPBARs would be transported from the reactors to DOE's Savannah River Site in Type B packages that meet the NRC's stringent test requirements.
- Low-level radioactive waste would be transported in either certified Type A or Type B packages, depending on the level of the radioactivity of the contents.

would result from radioactive and nonradioactive emissions of air pollutants to the atmosphere; thermal, chemical and radioactive effluent releases to surface waters; increases in human activity; and increases in noise levels. These impacts would be small considering that the units would operate in compliance with all Federal, state, and local requirements specifically promulgated to protect environmental resources. The estimated radiological doses to terrestrial and aquatic organisms are well below levels that could have any impact on plants or terrestrial and aquatic animals at the site. Other possible environmental impacts on the aquatic ecosystem of Guntersville Reservoir due to operation of the Bellefonte units would include fish losses at the cooling water intake screens, almost total loss of unscreened entrained organisms, and effects of thermal and chemical discharges. The effects of both thermal and chemical discharges would be small, as these discharges would comply with NPDES limitations.

**Socioeconomics** During operations, approximately 800 direct jobs would be created at Bellefonte 1, along with approximately an equal number of indirect jobs. The total new jobs (approximately 1,600) would cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to decrease to approximately 6.2 percent. Public finance expenditures/revenues would decline from the levels achieved during construction, but would remain 10 to 15 percent higher than they would be otherwise at Scottsboro and 5 to 10 percent higher in Jackson county. Housing prices would decline and could fall below the precompletion prices, depending on how much new construction of permanent housing took place during the completion period and how many construction workers chose to remain in the area once construction was completed. If Bellefonte 2 were also completed, a total of approximately 1,000 direct jobs would be created along with approximately 1,000 indirect jobs.

**Radiation Exposure** Reactor operations to produce tritium would cause worker radiation exposure to increase from 0 to approximately 105 millirem per year. This resultant dose would be well within regulatory limits of 5,000 millirem per year. Radiation exposure to the maximally exposed individual from normal operations would increase from 0 to 0.28 millirem. The total dose to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) would increase from approximately 0 to

### Accident Scenarios

The accident analysis assessment considers a spectrum of potential accident scenarios. The range of accidents considered includes reactor design basis accidents, nonreactor design basis accidents, TPBAR-handling accidents, transportation cask-handling accidents, and beyond design basis accidents (i.e., severe reactor accidents).

**Reactor Design basis Accident:** A reactor design basis accident is designated a Condition IV occurrence. Condition IV occurrences are faults that are not expected to take place, but are postulated because they have the potential to release significant amounts of radioactive material. The postulated reactor design basis accident for this EIS is a large-break loss-of-coolant accident.

**Nonreactor Design basis Accident:** A nonreactor design basis accident is designated a Condition III occurrence. The consequences of a Condition III occurrence would be less severe than those of a Condition IV occurrence. The release of radioactivity would not be sufficient to interrupt or restrict public use of those areas beyond the exclusion area. The postulated nonreactor design basis accident is an unexpected, uncontrolled release of the gases contained in a single gas decay tank due to the failure of the tank or associated piping.

**TPBAR-Handling Accident:** The postulated TPBAR-handling accident scenario postulated that a TPBAR assembly containing 24 TPBARs was dropped when removing the assembly from an irradiated fuel assembly during the TPBAR consolidation process. The evaluation postulated that all TPBARs would be unprotected and would breach when they impacted the spent fuel pool floor.

**Transportation Cask-Handling Accident:** Scenarios include loading a truck cask under water in the spent fuel pool cask loading pit with a single TPBAR consolidation container containing a maximum of 289 TPBARs, and loading a rail cask under water in the spent fuel pool cask loading pit with 3 to 12 TPBAR consolidation containers.

**Beyond Design Basis Accident:** The beyond design basis accident is limited to severe reactor accidents. Severe reactor accidents are less likely than reactor design basis accidents. However, the consequences of these accidents could be more serious if no mitigative actions were taken. In the reactor design basis accidents, the mitigative systems are assumed to be available. The beyond design basis accidents analyzed are reactor core disruptive accidents with containment failure or bypass.



approximately 2.3 person-rem per year for Bellefonte 1. If Bellefonte 2 were also operating, this dose would be approximately 4.6 person-rem per year. Statistically, this equates to one fatal cancer approximately every 435 years from the operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2.

**Spent Fuel Generation** Given production of the maximum amount of tritium in the average 18-month fuel cycle, spent fuel generation would increase from 0 up to a maximum of 141 spent fuel assemblies (i.e., 69 fuel assemblies over the normal refueling size). Because this EIS assumes that long-term spent fuel storage would take place at each of the reactor plants, a dry cask spent fuel storage facility could eventually be needed to store the additional assemblies. The impacts of storing the spent fuel in a dry cask spent fuel storage facility are described above for the existing operating reactor plants. As previously mentioned, appropriate NEPA documentation would be prepared before the construction of a dry cask spent fuel storage facility.

**Low-Level Radioactive Waste Generation** Compared to the No Action Alternative, reactor operation to produce tritium at Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 would generate approximately 40 cubic meters (80 cubic meters for both units) of low-level radioactive waste. This quantity would be a small fraction of the landfill capacity at the Barnwell disposal facility or the Savannah River Site's low-level radioactive waste disposal facility.

**Accident Risks** Compared to the No Action Alternative, there is a significant change in potential risks from tritium production. Risks due to accidents would increase during the construction and operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2, and during the operation of these units for production of tritium. Similar to Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2, the potential impacts from the accidents at Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 were determined using computer modeling. If a limiting design-basis accident occurred, tritium production would increase the individual risk of a fatal cancer by  $8.0 \times 10^{-10}$  additional fatal cancers to an individual living within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the units. Statistically this means that, for one individual, one fatal cancer would occur approximately every 1.3 billion years from tritium production at Bellefonte. If a beyond design-basis accident occurred (an accident that has a probability of occurring approximately once in a million years or less), tritium production would increase the risk of a fatal cancer by 0.00010 additional fatal cancers to an individual living within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant.

**Transportation** Tritium production at either Bellefonte 1 or 2 would necessitate transportation of workers, construction material, and radiological and nonradiological material to and from the reactor plants. Most of the additional transportation would involve nonradiological materials. Impacts of this transportation are limited to toxic vehicle emissions and traffic fatalities. For Bellefonte 1 or 2, the transportation risks would be significantly lower than one fatality per year. Radiological materials transportation impacts would occur as a result of routine and accidental doses. In all instances the risks associated with radiological materials transportation would be less than one fatality per 100,000 years.



Table S-2 Summary of Environmental Consequences for the CLWR Reactor Alternatives

Resource/Material Categories	Watts Bar 1	Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2	Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2
<b>No Action</b>			
All Resource/Material Categories	No construction or operational changes. Reactor unit continues to produce electricity. No change in environmental impacts.	No construction or operational changes. Reactor units continue to produce electricity. No change in environmental impacts.	No construction or operational changes. Reactor units remain uncompleted. No change in environmental impacts.
<b>Annual Tritium Production</b>			
Land Resources Land Use	<i>Construction:</i> Potential land disturbance - 5.3 acres for dry cask ISFSI if constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> Potential permanent land requirement - 3.1 acres for an ISFSI if constructed.	<i>Construction:</i> Potential land disturbance - 5.47 acres for ISFSI if constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> Potential permanent land requirement - 3.2 acres for an ISFSI if constructed.	<i>Construction:</i> Potential land disturbance - 4.9 acres for ISFSI if constructed and additional land for support buildings.  <i>Operation:</i> Potential permanent land requirement - 3.4 acres for an ISFSI if constructed and additional land for support buildings.
Visual Resources	<i>Construction and Operation:</i> No additional impact to visual resources.	<i>Construction and Operation:</i> No additional impact to visual resources.	<i>Construction:</i> No additional impact to visual resources.  <i>Operation:</i> Cooling tower vapor plumes would be visible up to 10 miles away.
Noise	<i>Construction:</i> No change from current levels. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> No change from current levels.	<i>Construction:</i> No change from current levels. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> No change from current levels.	<i>Construction:</i> No change from current levels except for construction vehicle traffic. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> Increase in noise levels from 50 dBA (decibels A-weighted) to 51 dBA at nearest receptor. Increase in traffic noise onsite access roads from 50 dBA to 57 dBA due to commuter traffic and truck deliveries.

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1</i>	<i>Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2</i>
<b>Air Quality</b> Nonradioactive Emissions	<p><i>Construction:</i> No change from current air quality conditions. Small impacts if ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No change from current air quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No change from current air quality conditions. Small impacts if ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No change from current air quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential temporary dust emissions during construction. Small impacts if ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> The increase in nonradioactive <u>air pollutant concentrations</u> would be well within established standards.</p>
<b>Air Quality</b> Radioactive Emissions	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radioactive emissions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 100 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 340 Curies.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radioactive emissions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 100 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 340 Curies.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radioactive emissions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 106 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 346 Curies, of which 5.6 Curies would be from normal operation without tritium production. The release of other radioactive emissions would be 283 Curies.</p>
<b>Water Resources</b> Surface Water	<p><i>Construction:</i> No change to current surface water requirements, discharge, or water quality conditions. Small impacts if ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No change to current surface water requirements, discharge, or water quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No change to current surface water requirements, discharge, or water quality conditions. Small impacts if ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No change to current surface water requirements, discharge, or water quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential for increased storm water runoff. Small amount of surface water requirements. Small impacts if ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Increased surface water requirements and discharge. Water usage less than 1 percent of Tennessee River flow per year. All water quality parameters within <u>established limits</u>.</p>
Radioactive Effluent	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radioactive <u>effluents</u>.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive tritium effluents would be 900 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 3,060 Curies.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radioactive <u>effluents</u>.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive tritium effluents would be 900 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 3,060 Curies.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radioactive <u>effluents</u>.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive tritium effluents would be 1,539 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 3,699 Curies, of which 639 Curies would be from normal operation without tritium production. The release of other radioactive effluents would be 1.32 Curies.</p>

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1</i>	<i>Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2</i>
Groundwater	<p><i>Construction:</i> No groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Groundwater would not be used during construction.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions.</p>
Ecological Resources	<p><i>Construction:</i> No additional impacts on ecological resources. Small impacts if ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Small or no impacts to ecological resources from additional tritium releases.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No additional impacts on ecological resources. Small impacts if ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Small or no impacts to ecological resources from additional tritium release.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential impacts to ecological resources due to the small amount of land disturbance. Small impacts if ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Additional impacts on ecological resources including fish impingement and entrainment of aquatic biota during normal plant operation. Small impacts to ecological resources from tritium and other radioactive releases during normal plant operations.</p>
Socioeconomics	<p><i>Construction:</i> No measurable impact.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> &lt;1 percent impact on regional economy.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No measurable impact.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> &lt;1 percent impact on regional economy.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> 4,500 peak new direct jobs due to plant completion. Short-term increased costs and traffic for local jurisdictions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> 800 to 1,000 workers per day. Increase in payment-in-lieu of taxes to state and local jurisdictions (approximately \$5.5 to \$8 million annually), decrease in the unemployment rate (from <u>8.2</u> percent to approximately <u>6.2</u> percent), and minor impacts to school resources.</p>

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1</i>	<i>Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2</i>
Public and Occupational Health and Safety Normal Operation	<p>Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs: <i>Workers:</i> Average dose increase by <u>0.33</u> millirem.</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.013</u> millirem.</p> <p><i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.34</u> person-rem.</p> <p>Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs: <i>Workers:</i> Average dose increase by <u>1.1</u> millirem.</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.05</u> millirem <i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by <u>1.3</u> person-rem.</p>	<p>Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs: <i>Workers:</i> Average dose increase by <u>0.24</u> millirem.</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.017</u> millirem.</p> <p><i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.60</u> person-rem.</p> <p>Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs: <i>Workers:</i> Average dose increase by <u>0.82</u> millirem.</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.057</u> millirem <i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by <u>1.2</u> person-rem.</p>	<p>Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs: <i>Workers:</i> Average dose increase by <u>104.33</u> millirem, of which 104 millirem would be from normal operations without tritium production. <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.263</u> millirem, of which 0.26 millirem would be from normal operations without tritium production. <i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by <u>1.6</u> person-rem, of which 1.4 person-rem would be from normal operations without tritium production.</p> <p>Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs: <i>Workers:</i> Average dose increase by <u>105.1</u> millirem, of which 104 millirem would be from normal operations without tritium production. <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.28</u> millirem. <i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by <u>2.3</u> person-rem.</p>
Design-Basis Accident Risks	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production.</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs: <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <u><math>3.4 \times 10^{-8}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>29</u> million years). <i>Average individual in population:</i> <u><math>4.0 \times 10^{-10}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>2.5</u> billion years). <i>Exposed population:</i> <u>0.000074</u> (1 fatality in <u>13</u> thousand years). <i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <u><math>4.2 \times 10^{-10}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>2.4</u> billion years).</p>	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production.</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs: <i>Maximally Exposed Individual :</i> <u><math>7.9 \times 10^{-9}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>130</u> million years). <i>Average individual in population:</i> <u><math>6.1 \times 10^{-10}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>1.6</u> billion years). <i>Exposed population:</i> <u>0.00015</u> (1 fatality in <u>6.6</u> thousand years). <i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <u><math>1.3 \times 10^{-10}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>7.7</u> billion years).</p>	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production.</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs: <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <u><math>3.5 \times 10^{-7}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>2.9</u> million years). <i>Average individual in population:</i> <u><math>2.6 \times 10^{-10}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>3.8</u> billion years). <i>Exposed population:</i> <u>0.000070</u> (1 fatality in <u>14</u> thousand years). <i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <u><math>1.2 \times 10^{-12}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>83</u> billion years).</p>

Resource/Material Categories	Watts Bar 1	Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2	Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2
	<p><i>Involved worker, reactor design-basis accident:</i> In the highly unlikely event that workers are in containment at the time of the accident they will die due to the energy (steam) released to the containment. Evacuation from containment is not considered feasible.</p> <p><i>Involved worker, nonreactor design-basis accident:</i> In the highly unlikely event that involved workers are in the immediate area of a rupture of the waste gas decay tank or associated piping, they could be injured by debris or the stream of gas from the rupture. In addition, involved workers could receive a radiation dose while evacuating the area. If the accident is initiated by a valve failure or human error, the release will be vented out of the auxiliary building stack. The involved worker is not at risk of injury or an additional radiation dose.</p> <p>For 3,400 TPBARs: <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <u><math>1.1 \times 10^{-7}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>9.1</u> million years). <i>Average individual in population:</i> <u><math>1.4 \times 10^{-9}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>710</u> million years). <i>Exposed population:</i> <u>0.00026</u> (1 fatality in <u>3.8</u> thousand years). <i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <u><math>1.5 \times 10^{-9}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>670</u> million years).</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Same as for 1,000 TPBARs.</p>	<p><i>Involved worker, reactor design-basis accident:</i> In the highly unlikely event that workers are in containment at the time of the accident they will die due to the energy (steam) released to the containment. Evacuation from containment is not considered feasible.</p> <p><i>Involved worker, nonreactor design-basis accident:</i> In the highly unlikely event that involved workers are in the immediate area of a rupture of the waste gas decay tank or associated piping, they could be injured by debris or the stream of gas from the rupture. In addition, involved workers could receive a radiation dose while evacuating the area. If the accident is initiated by a valve failure or human error, the release will be vented out of the auxiliary building stack. The involved worker is not at risk of injury or an additional radiation dose.</p> <p>For 3,400 TPBARs: <i>Maximally Exposed Individual :</i> <u><math>2.7 \times 10^{-8}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>37</u> million years). <i>Average individual in population:</i> <u><math>2.1 \times 10^{-9}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>480</u> million years). <i>Exposed population:</i> <u>0.00052</u> (1 fatality in <u>1.9</u> thousand years). <i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <u><math>4.5 \times 10^{-10}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>2.2</u> billion years).</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Same as for 1,000 TPBARs.</p>	<p><i>Involved worker, reactor design-basis accident:</i> In the highly unlikely event that workers are in containment at the time of the accident they will die due to the energy (steam) released to the containment. Evacuation from containment is not considered feasible.</p> <p><i>Involved worker, nonreactor design-basis accident:</i> In the highly unlikely event that involved workers are in the immediate area of a rupture of the waste gas decay tank or associated piping, they could be injured by debris or the stream of gas from the rupture. In addition, involved workers could receive a radiation dose while evacuating the area. If the accident is initiated by a valve failure or human error, the release will be vented out of the auxiliary building stack. The involved worker is not at risk of injury or an additional radiation dose.</p> <p>For 3,400 TPBARs: <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <u><math>3.6 \times 10^{-7}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>2.8</u> million years). <i>Average individual in population:</i> <u><math>8.0 \times 10^{-10}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>1.3</u> billion years). <i>Exposed population:</i> <u>0.00022</u> (1 fatality in <u>4.6</u> thousand years). <i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <u><math>4.3 \times 10^{-12}</math></u> (1 fatality in <u>230</u> billion years).</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Same as for 1,000 TPBARs.</p>

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1</i>	<i>Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2</i>
Beyond Design-Basis Accident Risks	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production.</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Due to accuracy limitations in the accident analysis computer code, the incremental risk of tritium production is not discernable from the risk of operation without tritium production.</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i> Due to accuracy limitations in the accident analysis computer code, the incremental risk of tritium production is not discernable from the risk of operation without tritium production.</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i> Due to accuracy limitations in the accident analysis computer code, the incremental risk of tritium production is not discernable from the risk of operation without tritium production.</p> <p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> Not applicable. Noninvolved worker has evacuated the plant before a release. Evacuation warning to noninvolved worker is at least one hour before a release.</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Most of the postulated accident sequences have adequate time for workers to evacuate the containment before there is a radioactive release to the containment. If the accident sequence is initiated by a large break loss-of-coolant accident or another high energy release mechanism, workers in containment will die due to the energy (steam) released to the containment. Evacuation from containment is not considered feasible during a high energy steam release accident scenario.</p>	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production.</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual :</i> Due to accuracy limitations in the accident analysis computer code, the incremental risk of tritium production is not discernable from the risk of operation without tritium production.</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i> Due to accuracy limitations in the accident analysis computer code, the incremental risk of tritium production is not discernable from the risk of operation without tritium production.</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i> Due to accuracy limitations in the accident analysis computer code, the incremental risk of tritium production is not discernable from the risk of operation without tritium production.</p> <p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> Not applicable. Noninvolved worker has evacuated the plant before a release. Evacuation warning to noninvolved worker is at least one hour before a release.</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Most of the postulated accident sequences have adequate time for workers to evacuate the containment before there is a radioactive release to the containment. If the accident sequence is initiated by a large break loss-of-coolant accident or another high energy release mechanism, workers in containment will die due to the energy (steam) released to the containment. Evacuation from containment is not considered feasible during a high energy steam release accident scenario.</p>	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production.</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <math>3.3 \times 10^{-8}</math> (1 fatality in 30 million years).</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>1.4 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 7.1 billion years).</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i> 0.00017 (1 fatality in 5.8 thousand years).</p> <p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> Not applicable. Noninvolved worker has evacuated the plant before a release. Evacuation warning to noninvolved worker is at least one hour before a release.</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Most of the postulated accident sequences have adequate time for workers to evacuate the containment before there is a radioactive release to the containment. If the accident sequence is initiated by a large break loss-of-coolant accident or another high energy release mechanism, workers in containment will die due to the energy (steam) released to the containment. Evacuation from containment is not considered feasible during a high energy steam release accident scenario.</p>

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1</i>	<i>Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2</i>
	<p>For 3,400 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i>  <math>1.0 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 10 billion years).</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i>  <math>1.0 \times 10^{-11}</math> (1 fatality in 100 billion years).</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i>  0.000011 (1 fatality in 88 thousand years).</p> <p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> Same as for 1,000 TPBARs.</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Same as for 1,000 TPBARs.</p>	<p>For 3,400 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual :</i>  <math>1.0 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 10 billion years).</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i>  <math>1.1 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 9.1 billion years).</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i>  0.00014 (1 fatality in 7.1 thousand years).</p> <p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> Same as for 1,000 TPBARs.</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Same as for 1,000 TPBARs.</p>	<p>For 3,400 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i>  <math>3.3 \times 10^{-8}</math> (1 fatality in 30 million years).</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i>  <math>1.5 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 6.6 billion years).</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i>  0.00018 (1 fatality in 5.5 thousand years).</p> <p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> Same as for 1,000 TPBARs.</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Same as for 1,000 TPBARs.</p>
<b>Waste Management</b>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential non-hazardous waste if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Low-level radioactive waste increase by approximately 0.43 cubic meters per year. Other waste types would be unaffected by tritium production.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential non-hazardous waste if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Low-level radioactive waste increase by approximately 0.43 cubic meters per unit per year. Other waste types would be unaffected by tritium production.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Minor amounts of non-hazardous construction material waste generated during the completion of the plant. Potential non-hazardous waste if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Low-level radioactive waste increase by approximately 41 cubic meters per unit per year, of which 40 cubic meters would be from normal operations without tritium production.</p>
<b>Spent Nuclear Fuel Management</b>	<p><i>Operation:</i> No increase if less than 2,000 TPBARs are irradiated. If 3,400 TPBARs are irradiated, the amount of spent fuel generated would increase by a <u>maximum of</u> 56 fuel assemblies per fuel cycle.</p>	<p><i>Operation:</i> No increase if less than 2,000 TPBARs are irradiated. If 3,400 TPBARs are irradiated, the amount of spent fuel generated would increase by a maximum of 60 fuel assemblies per fuel cycle.</p>	<p><i>Operation:</i> The amount of spent fuel would increase from 0 to approximately 72 spent fuel assemblies for less than 2,000 TPBARs. For 3,400 TPBARs, the amount of spent fuel generation could increase from 0 to a maximum of 141 spent fuel assemblies per fuel cycle, of which 72 would be from normal operation without tritium production.</p>
<b>Transportation</b>	<p>The risk associated with radiological materials transportation would be less than one fatality per 100,000 years.</p>	<p>The risk associated with radiological materials transportation would be less than one fatality per 100,000 years.</p>	<p>The risk associated with radiological materials transportation would be less than one fatality per 100,000 years. Traffic volumes on local roads could increase during construction and operations.</p>

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1</i>	<i>Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2</i>
<b>Fuel Fabrication</b>	Not applicable for the reactor site.	Not applicable for the reactor site.	Not applicable for the reactor site.
<b>Decontamination and Decommissioning</b>	Decontamination and decommissioning would be required but not because of tritium production.	Decontamination and decommissioning would be required but not because of tritium production.	Decontamination and decommissioning would be required. For a generic discussion on impacts from decontamination and decommissioning, see Section 5.2.5.
<b>License Renewal</b>	Licensing renewal would be required. For a generic discussion on impacts from licensing renewal, see Section 5.2.4.	Licensing renewal would be required. For a generic discussion on impacts from licensing renewal, see Section 5.2.4.	Licensing renewal would not be required.

MEI = Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual

ISFSI = Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation



Table S-3 Summary Comparison of Environmental Impacts Between CLWR Reactor Alternatives and the APT

<b>Resource/Material Categories</b>	<b>Watts Bar 1 or Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</b>	<b>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2</b>	<b>CLWR No Action (APT at the Savannah River Site)*</b>
<b>Land Resources</b> Land Use	<i>Construction:</i> Potential land requirement—5.3 acres (Watts Bar) or 5.47 acres (Sequoyah) of previously disturbed industrial land for a dry cask ISFSI if constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> Potential permanent land requirement - 3.1 to 3.2 acres, respectively, of previously disturbed industrial land for an ISFSI if constructed.	<i>Construction:</i> Potential land requirement—4.9 acres of previously disturbed industrial land for an ISFSI, if constructed, and additional small amounts of land for support buildings.  <i>Operation:</i> Potential permanent land requirement - 3.4 acres of previously disturbed industrial land for an ISFSI, if constructed, and additional small amounts of land for support buildings.	<i>Construction and Operation:</i> 250 acres of land converted to industrial use. Additional lands for new roads, bridge upgrades, rail lines, and construction landfill. Additional 12 acres required for modular design, if selected. Additional land required for electric power generating facility, if constructed (e.g., 110 acres for a natural gas-fired facility and 290 acres for a coal-fired facility).
<b>Visual Resources</b>	<i>Construction and Operation:</i> No additional impact to visual resources.	<i>Construction:</i> No additional impact to visual resources.  <i>Operation:</i> Vapor plumes under certain meteorological conditions would be visible up to 10 miles away.	<i>Construction:</i> No additional impact to visual resources.  <i>Operation:</i> Vapor plumes under certain meteorological conditions would be visible.
<b>Noise</b>	<i>Construction:</i> No change from current levels. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> No change from current levels.	<i>Construction:</i> No change from current levels except for construction vehicle traffic. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> Increase in noise emissions from the plant from 50 dBA to 51 dBA at nearest receptor. Increase in traffic noise on site access roads from 50 dBA to 57 dBA due to commuter traffic and truck deliveries.	<i>Construction:</i> No change from current levels except for construction vehicle traffic.  <i>Operation:</i> Increase in noise emissions from the new APT facility, electric power generating facility (if constructed), and support facilities.
<b>Air Quality</b> Non-radiological Emissions	<i>Construction:</i> No change from current air quality conditions. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> No change from current air quality conditions.	<i>Construction:</i> Potential temporary dust emissions during construction. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> The increase in nonradioactive emissions would be within established standards.	<i>Construction:</i> Potential temporary dust emissions during construction.  <i>Operation:</i> The increase in nonradiological emissions would be within standards. Large increase in carbon dioxide emissions from any electric power generating facility.

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1 or Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2</i>	<i>CLWR No Action (APT at the Savannah River Site)*</i>
Radioactive Emissions	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radiological emissions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 100 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 340 Curies.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radiological emissions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 106 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 346 Curies, of which 5.6 Curies would be from normal operation without tritium production. The release of other radioactive emissions would be 283 Curies.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radiological emissions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> The maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 30,000 Curies in oxide form and 8,600 Curies in elemental form. The release of other radioactive emissions would be 2,250 Curies. Potential for an additional 2,000 Curies from electric power generating facility if power is acquired through market transaction (APT Final EIS p. C-46 &amp; Draft EIS p. 4-80).</p>
Water Resources Surface Water	<p><i>Construction:</i> No change to current surface water requirements, discharge, or water quality conditions. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No change to current surface water requirements, discharge, or water quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential for increased storm water runoff. Small amount of surface water requirements. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Increased surface water requirements and discharge. Water usage less than 1 percent of Tennessee River flow per year. All water quality parameters within established limits.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Increased storm water runoff and impacts from dewatering. Surface water requirements.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Increased surface water requirements and discharge. Potential for additional water requirements from an electric power generating facility, if constructed—4.7 billion gallons per day (coal-fired) and 1.4 billion gallons per day (natural gas-fired). All water quality parameters within established limits (APT Draft EIS p. 4-81).</p>
Water Resources Radioactive Effluent	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radiological effluent.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 900 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 3,060 Curies.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radiological effluent.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 1,539 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs 3,699 Curies, of which 639 Curies from normal operation without tritium production. The release of other radioactive effluents would be 1.32 Curies.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radiological effluent.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> The maximum potential increase in annual radioactive tritium effluents would be 3,000 Curies and 0.0031 Curies from other radioactive emissions. Potential for an additional 19,000 Curies from the electric power generating facility if power is acquired through market transaction (APT Final EIS p. C-43 &amp; Draft EIS 4-80).</p>
Groundwater	<p><i>Construction and Operation:</i> No groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Groundwater would not be used during construction.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Due to below-ground construction of the APT, groundwater would be withdrawn and discharged to surface water.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Potential for a 6,000 gallons per minute withdrawal of groundwater for APT cooling water (APT Draft EIS p. 4-3).</p>

<b>Resource/Material Categories</b>	<b>Watts Bar 1 or Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</b>	<b>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2</b>	<b>CLWR No Action (APT at the Savannah River Site)*</b>
<b>Ecological Resources</b>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No additional impacts on ecological resources. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Small or no impacts to ecological resources from tritium production.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential impacts to ecological resources due to the small amount of land disturbance. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Impacts on ecological resources, including fish impingement and entrainment of aquatic biota during normal plant operation. Small impacts to ecological resources from tritium and other radioactive releases during normal plant operations.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential impacts to ecological resources due to land disturbance.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Impacts on ecological resources, including fish impingement and entrainment of aquatic biota during normal plant operation. Small impacts to ecological resources from tritium and other radioactive releases during normal operations. Potential additional impacts on ecological resources from electric power generating plant, if constructed.</p>
<b>Socioeconomics</b>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No measurable impact.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> less than 1 percent impact on regional economy.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> 4,500 peak new direct jobs due to plant completion. Short-term increased costs and traffic for local jurisdictions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> 800 to 1,000 workers per day. Increase in payment-in-lieu of taxes to state and local jurisdictions (approximately \$5.5 to \$8 million annually), decrease in the unemployment rate (from 8.2 percent in 1997 to approximately 6.2 percent), and minor impacts to school resources.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> 1,400 peak new direct jobs. Short-term increased costs and traffic for local jurisdictions. Additional 1,100 peak jobs associated with new electric power generating facility, if constructed (APT Draft EIS p. 4-80).</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> 500 workers per day. Increase in payment-in-lieu of taxes to state and local jurisdictions, decrease in the unemployment rate, and minor impacts to school resources. Additional 200 jobs associated with new electric power generating facility, if constructed (APT Draft EIS p. 4-80).</p>

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1 or Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2</i>	<i>CLWR No Action (APT at the Savannah River Site)*</i>
Public and Occupational Health and Safety Normal Operation	<p>Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs:  <i>Workers:</i> Total dose - 112.35 person-rem (Watts Bar) and 132.35 person-rem (Sequoyah).  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by 0.013 millirem (Watts Bar) and 0.017 millirem (Sequoyah).</p> <p><i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by 0.34 person-rem (Watts Bar) and 0.60 person-rem (Sequoyah).</p> <p>Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs:  <i>Workers:</i> Total dose 113.2 person-rem (Watts Bar) and 133.2 person-rem (Sequoyah).  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by 0.05 millirem (Watts Bar) and 0.057 millirem (Sequoyah).</p> <p><i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by 1.2 person-rem (Watts Bar) and 1.9 person-rem (Sequoyah).</p>	<p>Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs:  <i>Workers:</i> Total dose—112.35 person-rem per unit; 112 person-rem per unit from normal operations without tritium production.  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by 0.263 millirem per unit, of which 0.26 millirem per unit would be from normal operation without tritium production.  <i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by 1.6 person-rem per unit, of which 1.4 person-rem per unit would be from normal operation without tritium production.</p> <p>Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs:  <i>Workers:</i> Total dose—113.2 person-rem; 112 person-rem from per unit normal operations without tritium production.  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by 0.28 millirem per unit, of which 0.26 millirem per unit would be from normal operation without tritium production.  <i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by 2.3 person-rem per unit, of which 1.4 person-rem per unit would be from normal operation without tritium production.</p>	<p>Annual dose  <i>Workers:</i> Total dose - 72 person-rem (APT Draft EIS p. 4-39).</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by 0.053 millirem (APT Final EIS p. C-52).</p> <p><i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by 3.1 person-rem (APT Final EIS p. C-52).</p>

<b>Resource/Material Categories</b>	<b>Watts Bar 1 or Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</b>	<b>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2</b>	<b>CLWR No Action (APT at the Savannah River Site)*</b>
Design-Basis Accident Risks	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production.</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs:  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <math>3.4 \times 10^{-8}</math> (1 fatality in 29 million years - Watts Bar) and <math>7.9 \times 10^{-9}</math> (1 fatality in 130 million years - Sequoyah).  <i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>4.0 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 2.5 billion years - Watts Bar) and <math>6.1 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 1.6 billion years - Sequoyah).  <i>Exposed population:</i> 0.000074 (1 fatality in 13 thousand years - Watts Bar) and 0.00015 (1 fatality in 6.6 thousand years).  <i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <math>4.2 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 2.4 billion years - Watts Bar) and <math>1.3 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 7.7 billion years - Sequoyah).</p> <p>For 3,400 TPBARs:  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <math>1.1 \times 10^{-7}</math> (1 fatality in 9.1 million years - Watts Bar) and <math>2.7 \times 10^{-8}</math> (1 fatality in 37 million years - Sequoyah).  <i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>1.4 \times 10^{-9}</math> (1 fatality in 710 million years - Watts Bar) and <math>2.1 \times 10^{-9}</math> (1 fatality in 480 million years - Sequoyah).  <i>Exposed population:</i> 0.00026 (1 fatality in 3.8 thousand years - Watts Bar) and 0.00052 (1 fatality in 1.9 thousand years).  <i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <math>1.5 \times 10^{-9}</math> (1 fatality in 670 million years - Watts Bar) and <math>4.5 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 2.2 billion years - Sequoyah).</p>	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production.</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs:  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <math>3.5 \times 10^{-7}</math> (1 fatality in 2.9 million years).    <i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>2.6 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 3.8 billion years).    <i>Exposed population:</i> 0.000070 (1 fatality in 14 thousand years).    <i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <math>1.2 \times 10^{-12}</math> (1 fatality in <u>830</u> billion years).</p> <p>For 3,400 TPBARs:  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <math>3.6 \times 10^{-7}</math> (1 fatality in 2.8 million years).    <i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>8.0 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 1.3 billion years).    <i>Exposed population:</i> 0.00022 (1 fatality in 4.6 thousand years).    <i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <math>4.3 \times 10^{-12}</math> (1 fatality in 230 billion years).</p>	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production.</p> <p>Design-basis seismic event: 2.6 fatalities every 2,000 years.</p>

<b>Resource/Material Categories</b>	<b>Watts Bar 1 or Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</b>	<b>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2</b>	<b>CLWR No Action (APT at the Savannah River Site)*</b>
<b>Waste Management</b>	<p><b>Construction:</b> Potential nonhazardous waste if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><b>Operation:</b> Low-level radioactive waste increase by approximately 0.43 cubic meters per unit per year. Other waste types would be unaffected by tritium production.</p>	<p><b>Construction:</b> Minor amounts of nonhazardous construction material waste generated during the completion of the plant. Potential for additional nonhazardous waste material generated if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><b>Operation:</b> Low-level radioactive waste increase by approximately 41 cubic meters per unit per year, of which 40 cubic meters would be from normal operation without tritium production. Other waste types would also be generated due to tritium production.</p>	<p><b>Construction:</b> 30,000 cubic meters of construction material generated and deposited in onsite landfill. Potential for additional nonhazardous waste material generated if new electric power generating facility is constructed.</p> <p><b>Operation:</b> Low-level radioactive waste increase by approximately 1,400 cubic meters per year. Potential for additional 10,000 units of nuclear solid waste if power is acquired through market transaction (APT Draft EIS p. 4-80). Other waste types would also be generated due to tritium production and electric power generation (APT Draft EIS p. 4-26).</p>
<b>Spent Nuclear Fuel Management</b>	<p><b>Operation:</b> No increase if less than 2,000 TPBARs are radiated. If 3,400 TPBARs are irradiated, the amount of spent fuel generated would increase by <u>a maximum of 60</u> (Sequoyah), and 56 (Watts Bar) fuel assemblies per fuel cycle.</p>	<p><b>Operation:</b> The amount of spent fuel would increase from 0 to approximately 72 spent fuel assemblies for less than 2,000 TPBARs. For 3,400 TPBARs, the amount of spent fuel generation could increase from zero to a maximum of 141 spent fuel assemblies per fuel cycle, of which 72 would be from normal operation without tritium production.</p>	<p><b>Operation:</b> Spent nuclear fuel would be generated under the market transaction/existing capacity alternative for electric power generation.</p>
<b>Transportation</b>	<p>The risk associated with radiological materials transportation would be less than one fatality per 100,000 years.</p>	<p>The risk associated with radiological materials transportation would be less than one fatality per 100,000 years. Traffic volumes on local roads could increase during construction and operations.</p>	<p>Transportation within the Savannah River Site only.</p>
<b>Fuel Fabrication</b>	<p>Not applicable for reactor site.</p>	<p>Not applicable for reactor site.</p>	<p>Not applicable for APT facility. Yes for electric-generating facility.</p>
<b>Decontamination and Decommissioning</b>	<p>Decontamination and decommissioning would be required but not because of tritium production.</p>	<p>Decontamination and decommissioning would be required. For a generic discussion on impacts from decontamination and decommissioning, see Section 5.2.5.</p>	<p>Decontamination and decommissioning would be required.</p>
<b>License Renewal</b>	<p>Licensing renewal would be required. For a generic discussion on impacts from licensing renewal, see Section 5.2.4.</p>	<p>Licensing renewal would not be required.</p>	<p>Licensing renewal is not applicable.</p>

- \* Based on tritium production of 3 kilograms of tritium per year.

**AVAILABILITY OF THE CLWR Final EIS**

Copies of the CLWR Final EIS may be obtained by calling DOE's Office of Defense Programs at 1-800-332-0801.

General questions concerning the NEPA process, under which EISs are prepared, may be addressed to:

Ms. Carol Borgstrom  
Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-42)  
U.S. Department of Energy  
1000 Independence Avenue, SW  
Washington DC 20585  
Telephone (202) 586-4600, or leave message at 1-800-472-2756

DOE/EIS - 0288

March 1999

Volume 1

# FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

*for the Production*

*of Tritium in a*

*Commercial Light Water Reactor*

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United States Department of Energy  
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs  
Washington, D.C. 20585





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## COVER SHEET

**Responsible Agency:** United States Department of Energy

**Cooperating Agency:** Tennessee Valley Authority

**Title:** Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor

**Contact:** For additional information on this Final Environmental Impact Statement, write or call:

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For copies of the CLWR Final EIS call: 1-800-332-0801

For general information on the DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, write or call:

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**Abstract:** The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for providing the nation with nuclear weapons and ensuring that these weapons remain safe and reliable. Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, is an essential component of every weapon in the current and projected U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Unlike other materials utilized in nuclear weapons, tritium decays at a rate of 5.5 percent per year. Accordingly, as long as the nation relies on a nuclear deterrent, the tritium in each nuclear weapon must be replenished periodically. Currently the U.S. nuclear weapons complex does not have the capability to produce the amounts of tritium that will be required to continue supporting the nation's stockpile. The *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling* (Final Programmatic EIS), DOE/EIS-0161, issued in October 1995, evaluated the alternatives for the siting, construction, and operation of tritium supply and recycling facilities at five DOE sites for four different production technologies. This Programmatic EIS also evaluated the impacts of using a commercial light water reactor (CLWR) without specifying a reactor location. In the Record of Decision for the Final Programmatic EIS (60 FR 63878), issued December 12, 1995, DOE decided to pursue a dual-track approach on the two most promising tritium supply alternatives: (1) to initiate purchase of an existing commercial reactor (operating or partially complete) or reactor irradiation services; and (2) to design, build, and test critical components of an accelerator system for tritium production. At that time, DOE announced that the final decision would be made by the Secretary of Energy at the end of 1998.

On December 22, 1998, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson announced that the CLWR would be DOE's primary option for tritium production, and the proposed linear accelerator at the Savannah River Site would be the back-up option. The Secretary designated the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants as the Preferred Alternative for CLWR tritium production. The Secretary's announcement that the CLWR would be the primary tritium supply technology reaffirms the 1995 Record of Decision for the Final Programmatic EIS to construct and operate a new tritium extraction capability at the Savannah River Site.

This *Environmental Impact Statement for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor* (CLWR EIS) evaluates the environmental impacts associated with producing tritium at one or more of the following five CLWRs: (1) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Spring City, Tennessee); (2) Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Soddy Daisy, Tennessee); (3) Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (Soddy Daisy, Tennessee); (4) Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Hollywood, Alabama); and (5) Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (Hollywood, Alabama). Specifically, this EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with fabricating tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs); transporting nonirradiated TPBARs from the fabrication facility to the reactor sites; irradiating TPBARs in the reactors; and transporting irradiated TPBARs from the reactors to the proposed tritium extraction facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.

The public comment period on the CLWR Draft EIS extended from August 28 to October 27, 1998. During the comment period, public hearings were held in North Augusta, South Carolina; Rainsville, Alabama; and Evensville, Tennessee. An additional public meeting was held in Evensville, Tennessee, on December 14, 1998. The CLWR Draft EIS was made available through mailings and requests to DOE's CLWR Office and at DOE's Public Reading Rooms. In preparing the CLWR Final EIS, DOE considered comments received via mail, fax, submission at public hearings, recorded telephone messages, and the Internet. In addition, comments and concerns identified during discussions at the public hearings were recorded by a court reporter and were transcribed for consideration by DOE.

The CLWR Final EIS contains revisions and new information in response to the comments on the CLWR Draft EIS and technical details disclosed since the Draft EIS was issued. These revisions and new information are indicated by a double underline for minor word changes or by a sidebar in the margin for sentence or larger changes. Volume 2 (Comment Response Document) of the CLWR Final EIS contains the comments received during the public review of the CLWR Draft EIS and DOE's responses to these comments.

No sooner than 30 days after the notice of filing this EIS with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, DOE expects to issue a Record of Decision.

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## PREFACE

The *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling* (Final Programmatic EIS) (DOE/EIS-0161), which was completed in October 1995, assessed the potential environmental impacts of technology and siting alternatives for the production of tritium for national security purposes. On December 5, 1995, DOE issued a Record of Decision for the Final Programmatic EIS that selected the two most promising alternative technologies for tritium production and established a dual-track strategy that would, within 3 years, select one of those technologies to become the primary tritium supply technology. The other technology, if feasible, would be developed as a backup tritium source. Under the dual-track strategy, DOE would: (1) initiate the purchase of an existing commercial reactor (operating or partially complete) or irradiation services with an option to purchase the reactor for conversion to a defense facility; and (2) design, build, and test critical components of an accelerator system for tritium production. Under the Final Programmatic EIS Record of Decision, any new facilities that might be required, i.e., an accelerator and/or a tritium extraction facility to support the commercial reactor alternative, would be constructed at DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina.

The Final Programmatic EIS described a two-phase strategy for compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The first phase included completion of the Final Programmatic EIS and subsequent Record of Decision. The second phase included the preparation of site-specific NEPA documents tiered from the Final Programmatic EIS. These EISs address the environmental impacts of specific project proposals. As a result of the Final Programmatic EIS and the Record of Decision, DOE determined to prepare three site-specific EISs: the *Environmental Impact Statement, Accelerator Production of Tritium at the Savannah River Site* (APT) (DOE/EIS-0270), the *Environmental Impact Statement for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor* (CLWR) (DOE/EIS-0288), and the *Environment Impact Statement, Construction and Operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility at Savannah River Site* (TEF) (DOE/EIS-0271). Each of these EISs presents an analysis of alternatives which do not affect the alternatives in the other EISs, with one exception. This exception is one alternative in the TEF EIS which would require the use of space in the APT. For this alternative to be viable, the APT would have to be selected as the primary source of tritium.

On December 22, 1998, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson announced that commercial light water reactors (CLWR) will be the primary tritium supply technology. The Secretary designated the Watts Bar Unit 1 reactor near Spring City, Tennessee, and the Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 reactors near Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee, as the preferred commercial light water reactors for tritium production. These reactors are operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), an independent government agency. The Secretary designated the APT as the "backup" technology for tritium supply. As a backup, DOE will continue with developmental activities and preliminary design, but will not construct the accelerator. Finally, selection of the CLWR reaffirms the December 1995 Final Programmatic EIS Record of Decision to construct and operate a new tritium extraction capability at the Savannah River Site.

DOE has completed the final EISs for the APT, CLWR, and TEF. No sooner than 30 days after publication in the *Federal Register* of the Environmental Protection Agency's Notice of Availability of the final EISs for APT, CLWR, and TEF, DOE intends to issue a consolidated Record of Decision to: (1) formalize the programmatic announcement made on December 22, 1998; and (2) announce project-specific decisions for the three EISs. These decisions will include, for the selected CLWR technology, the selection of specific CLWRs to be used for tritium supply and the location of a new tritium extraction capability at the Savannah River Site. For the backup APT technology, technical and siting decisions consistent with its backup role will be made.

# Table of Contents

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### VOLUME 1

	<i>Page</i>
Cover Sheet .....	iii
Preface .....	v
Table of Contents .....	ix
List of Figures .....	xvii
List of Tables .....	xix
Acronyms and Abbreviations .....	xxvii
<b>1. INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1-1</b>
1.1 Overview .....	1-1
1.1.1 General .....	1-1
1.1.2 Proposed Action and Scope .....	1-1
1.1.3 Development of the CLWR EIS .....	1-2
1.1.4 The CLWR Procurement Process .....	1-2
1.2 Commercial Light Water Reactor Facilities Analyzed in this CLWR EIS .....	1-4
1.3 Background .....	1-6
1.3.1 Defense Programs Mission .....	1-6
1.3.2 Nuclear Weapons .....	1-6
1.3.3 Brief History of the Production of Tritium .....	1-9
1.3.4 Production of Tritium in a CLWR .....	1-9
1.3.5 Nonproliferation .....	1-9
1.3.6 Background on the Tennessee Valley Authority .....	1-11
1.4 NEPA Strategy .....	1-12
1.5 Other Relevant NEPA Reviews .....	1-12
1.5.1 Completed NEPA Actions .....	1-12
1.5.1.1 Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling .....	1-12
1.5.1.2 Lead Test Assembly Environmental Assessment .....	1-13
1.5.1.3 EISs for the Operation of Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 and for Construction of Bellefonte 1 and 2 .....	1-13
1.5.2 Ongoing NEPA Actions .....	1-13
1.5.2.1 Environmental Impact Statement, Accelerator Production of Tritium at the Savannah River Site .....	1-13
1.5.2.2 Environmental Impact Statement, Construction and Operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site .....	1-14
1.5.2.3 Environmental Assessment for the Tritium Facility Modernization and Consolidation Project at the Savannah River Site .....	1-14
1.5.2.4 Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bellefonte Conversion Project .....	1-14
1.6 Organization of this EIS .....	1-14
1.7 Public Scoping Process .....	1-15
1.8 Public Comment Period .....	1-16
1.9 Changes from the Draft Environmental Impact Statement .....	1-20
<b>2. PURPOSE AND NEED .....</b>	<b>2-1</b>

<b>3. COMMERCIAL LIGHT WATER REACTOR PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES .....</b>	<b>3-1</b>
3.1 Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor .....	3-1
3.1.1 Generation of Electric Power in Nuclear Power Plants .....	3-1
3.1.2 Description of Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rods .....	3-2
3.1.3 Impacts of Tritium Production on Reactor Operations .....	3-7
3.2 Development of Alternatives .....	3-8
3.2.1 Planning Assumptions and Basis for Analysis .....	3-8
3.2.2 Reactor Options Considered .....	3-10
3.2.3 Reasonable Alternatives .....	3-11
3.2.4 No Action Alternative .....	3-13
3.2.5 Reactor Options .....	3-13
3.2.5.1 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 .....	3-13
3.2.5.2 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 .....	3-17
3.2.5.3 Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 .....	3-20
3.2.6 Comparison of Alternatives .....	3-25
3.2.6.1 No Action Alternative Impacts .....	3-26
3.2.6.2 <u>Impacts Associated with Tritium Production</u> .....	3-26
3.2.7 Preferred Alternative .....	3-30
 <b>4. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT .....</b>	 <b>4-1</b>
4.1 Introduction .....	4-1
4.2 Affected Environment .....	4-2
4.2.1 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 .....	4-2
4.2.1.1 Land Resources .....	4-3
4.2.1.2 Noise .....	4-6
4.2.1.3 Air Quality .....	4-7
4.2.1.4 Water Resources .....	4-10
4.2.1.5 Geology and Soils .....	4-14
4.2.1.6 Ecological Resources .....	4-15
4.2.1.7 Archaeological and Historic Resources .....	4-19
4.2.1.8 Socioeconomics .....	4-20
4.2.1.9 Public and Occupational Health and Safety .....	4-24
4.2.1.10 Waste Management .....	4-28
4.2.1.11 Spent Fuel Management .....	4-29
4.2.2 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 .....	4-30
4.2.2.1 Land Resources .....	4-31
4.2.2.2 Noise .....	4-34
4.2.2.3 Air Quality .....	4-34
4.2.2.4 Water Resources .....	4-38
4.2.2.5 Geology and Soils .....	4-41
4.2.2.6 Ecological Resources .....	4-42
4.2.2.7 Archaeological and Historic Resources .....	4-46
4.2.2.8 Socioeconomics .....	4-47
4.2.2.9 Public and Occupational Health and Safety .....	4-52
4.2.2.10 Waste Management .....	4-55
4.2.2.11 Spent Fuel Management .....	4-56
4.2.3 Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 .....	4-57
4.2.3.1 Land Resources .....	4-58
4.2.3.2 Noise .....	4-61
4.2.3.3 Air Quality .....	4-62
4.2.3.4 Water Resources .....	4-64
4.2.3.5 Geology and Soils .....	4-68
4.2.3.6 Ecological Resources .....	4-68
4.2.3.7 Archaeological and Historic Resources .....	4-75
4.2.3.8 Socioeconomics .....	4-76
4.2.3.9 Public and Occupational Health and Safety .....	4-88

4.2.3.10	Waste Management .....	4-88
4.2.3.11	Spent Fuel Management .....	4-89
<b>5.</b>	<b>ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES .....</b>	<b>5-1</b>
5.1	Introduction .....	5-1
5.1.1	Methodology .....	5-1
5.1.2	Assumptions .....	5-2
5.2	Environmental Consequences .....	5-3
5.2.1	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 .....	5-3
5.2.1.1	Land Resources .....	5-3
5.2.1.2	Noise .....	5-4
5.2.1.3	Air Quality .....	5-4
5.2.1.4	Water Resources .....	5-5
5.2.1.5	Geology and Soils .....	5-7
5.2.1.6	Ecological Resources .....	5-7
5.2.1.7	Archaeological and Historic Resources .....	5-8
5.2.1.8	Socioeconomics .....	5-8
5.2.1.9	Public and Occupational Health and Safety .....	5-9
5.2.1.9.1	Normal Operation .....	5-9
5.2.1.9.2	Facility Accidents .....	5-12
5.2.1.10	Environmental Justice .....	5-15
5.2.1.11	Waste Management .....	5-16
5.2.1.12	Spent Fuel Management .....	5-16
5.2.2	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 .....	5-16
5.2.2.1	Land Resources .....	5-16
5.2.2.2	Noise .....	5-17
5.2.2.3	Air Quality .....	5-18
5.2.2.4	Water Resources .....	5-19
5.2.2.5	Geology and Soils .....	5-20
5.2.2.6	Ecological Resources .....	5-21
5.2.2.7	Archaeological and Historic Resources .....	5-22
5.2.2.8	Socioeconomics .....	5-22
5.2.2.9	Public and Occupational Health and Safety .....	5-23
5.2.2.9.1	Normal Operations .....	5-23
5.2.2.9.2	Facility Accidents .....	5-26
5.2.2.10	Environmental Justice .....	5-29
5.2.2.11	Waste Management .....	5-30
5.2.2.12	Spent Fuel Management .....	5-30
5.2.3	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 .....	5-31
5.2.3.1	Land Resources .....	5-31
5.2.3.2	Noise .....	5-33
5.2.3.3	Air Quality .....	5-36
5.2.3.4	Water Resources .....	5-42
5.2.3.5	Geology and Soils .....	5-50
5.2.3.6	Ecological Resources .....	5-51
5.2.3.7	Archaeological and Historic Resources .....	5-56
5.2.3.8	Socioeconomics .....	5-57
5.2.3.8.1	Bellefonte 1 .....	5-57
5.2.3.8.2	Bellefonte 1 and 2 .....	5-63
5.2.3.9	Public and Occupational Health and Safety .....	5-69
5.2.3.9.1	Normal Operation .....	5-69
5.2.3.9.2	Facility Accidents .....	5-76
5.2.3.10	Environmental Justice .....	5-82
5.2.3.11	Waste Management .....	5-83
5.2.3.12	Spent Fuel Management .....	5-85
5.2.4	Licensing Renewal .....	5-85
5.2.4.1	Background .....	5-86



5.2.4.2	Environmental Effect of Renewing the Operating License of a Nuclear Power Plant ..	5-87
5.2.5	Decontamination and Decommissioning .....	5-90
5.2.5.1	Background .....	5-90
5.2.5.2	Decontamination and Decommissioning Options .....	5-90
5.2.5.3	Decommissioning Activities .....	5-91
5.2.5.4	Decontamination and Decommissioning Impacts .....	5-91
5.2.6	Spent Fuel Storage .....	5-93
5.2.7	Fabrication of TPBARs and Blend-Down of Highly Enriched Uranium .....	5-103
5.2.8	Transportation of TPBARs .....	5-105
5.2.9	Sensitivity Analysis .....	5-107
5.2.10	Safeguards and Security .....	5-112
5.2.11	Programmatic No Action .....	5-113
5.2.12	CLWR Facility Accident Impact to Involved Workers .....	5-117
5.2.13	Secondary Impact of CLWR Facility Accidents .....	5-118
5.3	Cumulative Impacts .....	5-118
5.3.1	TPBAR Fabrication .....	5-119
5.3.2	TPBAR Irradiation .....	5-119
5.3.3	TPBAR Transportation .....	5-123
5.3.4	Impacts at the Tritium Extraction Facility .....	5-124
5.4	Resource Commitments .....	5-128
5.4.1	Unavoidable Adverse Environmental Impacts .....	5-128
5.4.2	Relationship Between Local Short-Term Uses of the Environment and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity .....	5-129
5.4.3	Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources .....	5-129
5.5	Mitigation Measures .....	5-130
6.	<b>APPLICABLE LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS .....</b>	<b>6-1</b>
6.1	Introduction and Background .....	6-1
6.2	Statutes and Regulations Requiring Licenses or Permits .....	6-2
6.2.1	Nuclear Regulatory Commission Permits and Licenses .....	6-3
6.2.2	Environmental Protection Permits .....	6-3
6.3	Other Requirements Related to Environmental Protection, Emergency Planning, and Worker Safety and Health .....	6-6
6.3.1	Environmental Protection .....	6-6
6.3.2	Emergency Planning and Response .....	6-8
6.3.3	Worker Safety and Health .....	6-9
6.4	DOE Regulations and Orders .....	6-9
6.5	Compliance History .....	6-9
6.5.1	Compliance Indicators .....	6-10
6.5.1.1	Systematic Assessments of License Performance .....	6-10
6.5.1.2	NRC Notices of Violations and Enforcement Actions .....	6-10
6.5.1.3	Performance Indicators .....	6-11
6.5.2	Watts Bar 1 .....	6-11
6.5.2.1	NRC Performance .....	6-11
6.5.2.2	Environmental, Safety & Health (Nonnuclear) Performance .....	6-14
6.5.3	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 .....	6-14
6.5.3.1	<u>NRC</u> Performance .....	6-14
6.5.3.2	Environmental, Safety & Health (Nonnuclear) Performance .....	6-17
6.5.4	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 .....	6-18
6.5.4.1	Performance .....	6-18
6.5.4.2	Environmental, Safety & Health (Nonnuclear) Performance .....	6-18

7. REFERENCES .....	7-1
8. LIST OF PREPARERS .....	8-1
9. DISTRIBUTION LIST .....	9-1
10. GLOSSARY .....	10-1
11. INDEX .....	11-1

## APPENDIX A

### TRITIUM PRODUCTION OPERATIONS—APPLICATION TO PRODUCTION OF TRITIUM IN COMMERCIAL LIGHT WATER REACTORS .....

A.1	Nuclear Fission Reactors .....	A-1
A.1.1	Nuclear Fission .....	A-1
A.1.2	Control of Nuclear Reactions in a Reactor .....	A-2
A.2	Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Descriptions .....	A-5
A.2.1	Commercial Nuclear Reactors .....	A-5
A.2.2	Reactor Core Description .....	A-7
A.2.3	Reactor Refueling .....	A-12
A.2.4	Commercial Light Water Reactor Systems Important to Environmental Impacts .....	A-14
A.2.4.1	Cooling and Auxiliary Water Systems .....	A-14
A.2.4.2	Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems .....	A-15
A.2.4.3	Nonradioactive Waste Systems .....	A-17
A.3	Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rods .....	A-17
A.3.1	Nucleonics of Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rods .....	A-17
A.3.2	Physical Description of the Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rod .....	A-19
A.3.3	Handling of Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rods .....	A-21
A.4	Impact of Tritium Production on the Fuel Cycle .....	A-22
A.5	References .....	A-24

## APPENDIX B

### METHODS FOR ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS—APPLICATION TO PRODUCTION OF TRITIUM IN COMMERCIAL LIGHT WATER REACTORS .....

B.1	Land Resources .....	B-2
B.1.1	Land Use .....	B-2
B.1.2	Visual Resources .....	B-2
B.2	Air Quality and Noise .....	B-2
B.2.1	Air Quality .....	B-2
B.2.2	Noise .....	B-3
B.3	Water Resources .....	B-3
B.4	Geology and Soils .....	B-4
B.5	Ecology .....	B-4
B.6	Archaeological and Historic Resources .....	B-5
B.7	Socioeconomics .....	B-5
B.8	Public and Occupational Health and Safety .....	B-5
B.8.1	Emergency Preparedness .....	B-7
B.9	Waste Management .....	B-7
B.10	Transportation .....	B-7
B.11	Spent Fuel Management .....	B-7
B.12	Environmental Justice .....	B-8
B.13	Applicable Environmental Laws, Regulations, and Guidance .....	B-8
B.14	References .....	B-14

**APPENDIX C**

<b>EVALUATION OF HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS FROM NORMAL OPERATIONS</b>	<b>C-1</b>
C.1 Introduction	C-1
C.2 Radiological Impacts on Human Health	C-1
C.2.1 Background Information	C-2
C.2.1.1 Nature of Radiation and Its Effects on Humans	C-2
C.2.1.2 Health Effects	C-7
C.2.2 Tritium Characteristics and Biological Properties	C-10
C.2.2.1 Tritium Characteristics	C-10
C.2.2.2 Biological Properties of Tritium	C-10
C.2.2.3 Genetic Effects of Tritium	C-12
C.3 Methodology for Estimating Radiological Impacts	C-13
C.3.1 GENII Computer Code	C-13
C.3.2 Data and General Assumptions	C-14
C.3.3 Uncertainties	C-18
C.3.4 Radiological Releases to the Environment and Associated Impact	C-19
C.4 Impacts of Exposures to Hazardous Chemicals on Human Health	C-23
C.5 References	C-27

**APPENDIX D**

<b>EVALUATION OF HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS FROM FACILITY ACCIDENTS</b>	<b>D-1</b>
D.1 Radiological Accident Impacts on Human Health	D-1
D.1.1 Accident Scenario Selection and Description	D-1
D.1.1.1 Accident Scenario Selection	D-1
D.1.1.2 Reactor Design-Basis Accident	D-2
D.1.1.3 Nonreactor Design-Basis Accident	D-3
D.1.1.4 TPBAR Handling Accident	D-4
D.1.1.5 Truck Transportation Cask Handling Accident at the Reactor Site	D-5
D.1.1.6 Truck Transportation Cask Handling Accident at the Tritium Extraction Facility	D-6
D.1.1.7 Rail Transportation Cask Handling Accident at the Reactor Site	D-6
D.1.1.8 Rail Transportation Cask Handling Accident at the Savannah River Site Rail Transfer Station	D-7
D.1.1.9 Rail Transportation Cask Handling Accident at the Tritium Extraction Facility	D-8
D.1.1.10 Beyond Design-Basis Accident	D-8
D.1.2 Methodology for Estimating Radiological Impacts	D-16
D.1.2.1 Introduction	D-16
D.1.2.2 MACCS2 Computer Code	D-16
D.1.2.3 Data and General Assumptions	D-18
D.1.2.4 Health Effects Calculations	D-20
D.1.2.5 Deterministic Calculations	D-21
D.1.2.5.1 Introduction	D-21
D.1.2.5.2 Large Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident	D-21
D.1.2.5.3 Waste Gas Decay Tank Accident	D-24
D.1.2.6 Uncertainties	D-25
D.1.3 Accident Consequences and Risks	D-26
D.1.3.1 Reactor Design-basis Accident	D-26
D.1.3.2 Nonreactor Design-Basis Accident	D-26
D.1.3.3 TPBAR Handling Accident	D-31
D.1.3.4 Truck Transportation Cask Handling Accident	D-32
D.1.3.5 Rail Transportation Cask Handling Accident	D-33
D.1.3.6 Beyond Design-Basis Accident	D-34
D.2 Hazardous Chemical Accident Impacts on Human Health	D-37
D.2.1 Accident Scenario Selection and Description	D-37
D.2.1.1 Accident Scenario Selection	D-37
D.2.1.2 Accident Scenario Descriptions	D-38

D.2.2	Chemical Accident Analysis Methodology .....	D-39
D.2.2.1	Receptor Description .....	D-39
D.2.2.2	Analysis Computer Code Selection .....	D-40
D.2.2.3	Description of the Model .....	D-40
D.2.2.4	Weather Condition Assumptions .....	D-41
D.2.3	Human Health Impacts .....	D-41
D.2.3.1	Impacts to Noninvolved Workers .....	D-41
D.2.3.2	Offsite Impacts .....	D-43
D.2.3.3	Uncertainties in the Dispersion Analyses .....	D-43
D.3	References .....	D-44

## APPENDIX E

### EVALUATION OF HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS OF OVERLAND TRANSPORTATION .....

E.1	Introduction .....	E-1
E.2	Scope of Assessment .....	E-1
E.3	Packaging and Representative Shipment Configurations .....	E-3
E.3.1	Packaging Overview .....	E-3
E.3.2	Regulations Applicable to Type B Casks .....	E-3
E.3.2.1	Cask Design Regulations .....	E-4
E.3.2.2	Design Certification .....	E-7
E.3.2.3	Transportation Regulations .....	E-7
E.3.2.4	Communications .....	E-9
E.3.3	Ground Transportation Route Selection Process .....	E-9
E.4	Methods for Calculating Transportation Risks .....	E-10
E.5	Alternatives, Parameters, and Assumptions .....	E-12
E.5.1	Description of Alternatives .....	E-12
E.5.2	Representative Routes .....	E-13
E.5.3	Material Inventory .....	E-16
E.5.4	External Dose Rates .....	E-18
E.5.5	Health Risk Conversion Factors .....	E-18
E.5.6	Accident Involvement Rates .....	E-18
E.5.7	Container Accident Response Characteristics and Release Fractions .....	E-18
E.5.7.1	Development of Conditional Probabilities .....	E-18
E.5.7.2	Transportation Risk Analyses Assumptions .....	E-21
E.5.7.2.1	Cask Response to Impact and Thermal Loads .....	E-21
E.5.7.2.2	TPBARs Response to Impact and Thermal Loads .....	E-22
E.5.7.3	Accident Matrix Category Descriptions .....	E-23
E.5.7.3.1	Elastomeric Seals .....	E-23
E.5.7.3.2	Metallic Seals .....	E-23
E.5.7.3.3	Accident Category Release Fractions for Tritium, Nontarget-Bearing Components, and Crud .....	E-24
E.5.7.3.4	Accident Category Severity Fractions .....	E-26
E.5.8	Nonradiological Risk (Vehicle-Related) .....	E-26
E.6	Risk Analysis Results .....	E-26
E.7	Conclusions and Long-Term Impacts of Transportation .....	E-32
E.7.1	Conclusions .....	E-32
E.7.2	Long-Term Impacts of Transportation .....	E-32
E.8	Uncertainty and Conservatism in Estimated Impacts .....	E-33
E.8.1	Uncertainties in TPBAR and Radioactive Waste Inventory and Characterization .....	E-34
E.8.2	Uncertainties in Containers, Shipment Capacities, and Number of Shipments .....	E-34
E.8.3	Uncertainties in Route Determination .....	E-34
E.8.4	Uncertainties in the Calculation of Radiation Doses .....	E-34
E.9	References .....	E-37

**APPENDIX F**

<b>THE PUBLIC SCOPING PROCESS .....</b>	<b>F-1</b>
F.1 Scoping Process Description .....	F-1
F.2 Scoping Process Results .....	F-2
F.3 Comment Disposition and Issue Identification .....	F-3
F.4 References .....	F-13

**APPENDIX G**

<b>ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ANALYSIS .....</b>	<b>G-1</b>
G.1 Introduction .....	G-1
G.2 Definitions and Approach .....	G-1
G.3 Methodology .....	G-2
G.3.1 Spatial Resolution .....	G-2
G.3.2 Population Projections .....	G-3
G.4 Environmental Justice Assessment .....	G-4
G.5 Results for the Sites .....	G-4
G.5.1 Watts Bar Site .....	G-4
G.5.2 Sequoyah Site .....	G-4
G.5.3 Bellefonte Site .....	G-4
G.6 Results for Transportation Routes .....	G-14
G.7 Other Environmental Impacts .....	G-14
G.8 Cumulative Impacts .....	G-15
G.9 References .....	G-17

**APPENDIX H**

<b>CONTRACTOR DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .....</b>	<b>H-1</b>
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## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1	Schematic of Process for Producing Tritium in CLWRs .....	1-3
Figure 1-2	Locations of Candidate CLWRs for Tritium Production .....	1-5
Figure 1-3	Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum and Plan Process .....	1-7
Figure 1-4	Diagram of a Modern Nuclear Weapon .....	1-8
Figure 2-1	Estimated Tritium Inventory and Reserve Requirements .....	2-2
Figure 3-1	Typical Pressurized Water Reactor Schematic .....	3-3
Figure 3-2	Typical Fuel Assembly Cross-Sections .....	3-4
Figure 3-3	Typical TPBAR Assembly .....	3-5
Figure 3-4	Sketch of TPBAR Components .....	3-6
Figure 3-5	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant .....	3-14
Figure 3-6	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant .....	3-18
Figure 3-7	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant .....	3-21
Figure 4-1	Location of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site .....	4-4
Figure 4-2	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site .....	4-5
Figure 4-3	National Wetlands Inventory Map of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site Vicinity .....	4-16
Figure 4-4	Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Minority Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of Watts Bar 1 Projected for the Year 2025 .....	4-22
Figure 4-5	Low-Income Households Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of Watts Bar 1 (1990) .....	4-22
Figure 4-6	Transportation Routes in the Vicinity of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site .....	4-25
Figure 4-7	Location of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site .....	4-32
Figure 4-8	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site .....	4-33
Figure 4-9	Wetlands Map of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site Vicinity .....	4-43
Figure 4-10	Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Minority Population Residing in Counties Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Projected for the Year 2025 .....	4-49
Figure 4-11	Low-Income Households Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (1990) .....	4-49
Figure 4-12	Transportation Routes in the Vicinity of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site .....	4-51
Figure 4-13	Location of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site .....	4-59
Figure 4-14	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site .....	4-60
Figure 4-15	Wetlands Map of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site Vicinity .....	4-70
Figure 4-16	Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Minority Population Residing in Counties Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Projected for the Year 2025 .....	4-80
Figure 4-17	Low-Income Households Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (1990) .....	4-80
Figure 4-18	Transportation Routes in the Vicinity of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site .....	4-85
Figure 4-19	Jackson County Tax Revenue Distributions by Recipient FY 1997 .....	4-86
Figure 5-1	Staffing for Completion and Operation of Bellefonte 1, Compared to No Action from First Year of Construction .....	5-58
Figure 5-2	Scottsboro School Board Projected Budget, Completion of Bellefonte 1 Versus the No Action Alternative (FY 1999-2002) .....	5-62
Figure 5-3	Jackson County School Board Projected Budget, Completion of Bellefonte 1 Versus the No Action Alternative (FY 1999-2002) .....	5-62

Figure 5-4	Staffing for Completion and Operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2, Compared to No Action from First Year of Construction .....	5-64
Figure A-1	Fission of Uranium-235 Atom .....	A-3
Figure A-2	Critical Chain Reaction .....	A-3
Figure A-3	Boiling Water Reactor Schematic .....	A-6
Figure A-4	Pressurized Water Reactor Schematic .....	A-6
Figure A-5	Representative Four-Loop Reactor Coolant System .....	A-7
Figure A-6	Typical 17 x 17 Reactor Fuel Assembly .....	A-9
Figure A-7	Representative Reactor Control Element Assembly .....	A-10
Figure A-8	General Arrangement of a Possible Reactor Core Fuel Loading Pattern .....	A-11
Figure A-9	Typical Fuel Transfer System .....	A-13
Figure A-10	TPBAR Transverse Cross Section .....	A-19
Figure A-11	TPBAR Longitudinal Cross Section .....	A-20
Figure A-12	TPBAR Hold-Down Assembly .....	A-21
Figure E-1	Typical Type B Legal Weight Track Shipping Cask .....	E-5
Figure E-2	Typical Type B Rail Shipping Cask .....	E-6
Figure E-3	Standards for Transportation Casks .....	E-8
Figure E-4	Overland Transportation Risk Assessment .....	E-11
Figure E-5	Representative Overland Truck Routes .....	E-14
Figure E-6	Conditional Probability Matrix for Modal Study Truck Cask .....	E-20
Figure E-7	Conditional Probability Matrix for Modal Study Rail Cask .....	E-20
Figure E-8	Conditional Probability Matrix for Truck Cask Transported by Rail .....	E-21
Figure E-9	Accident Matrix for Truck and Rail Casks Using Elastomeric Seals .....	E-24
Figure E-10	Accident Matrix for Truck and Rail Casks Using Metallic Seals .....	E-24
Figure F-1	NEPA Process .....	F-1
Figure F-2	Public Scoping Meeting Locations and Dates (1998) .....	F-2
Figure G-1	Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Minority Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Watts Bar Site .....	G-5
Figure G-2	Minority Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Watts Bar Site .....	G-6
Figure G-3	Minority Population Residing Within 16 Kilometers (10 Miles) of the Watts Bar Site .....	G-6
Figure G-4	Low-Income Populations Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Watts Bar Site .....	G-7
Figure G-5	Low-Income Population Residing Within 16 Kilometers (10 Miles) of the Watts Bar Site .....	G-7
Figure G-6	Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Minority Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Sequoyah Site .....	G-8
Figure G-7	Minority Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Sequoyah Site .....	G-9
Figure G-8	Minority Population Residing Within 16 Kilometers (10 Miles) of the Sequoyah Site .....	G-9
Figure G-9	Low-Income Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Sequoyah Site .....	G-10
Figure G-10	Low-Income Population Residing Within 16 Kilometers (10 Miles) of the Sequoyah Site .....	G-11
Figure G-11	Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Minority Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Bellefonte Site .....	G-11
Figure G-12	Minority Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Bellefonte Site .....	G-12
Figure G-13	Minority Population Residing Within 16 Kilometers (10 Miles) of the Bellefonte Site .....	G-13
Figure G-14	Low-Income Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Bellefonte Site .....	G-13
Figure G-15	Low-Income Population Residing Within 16 Kilometers (10 Miles) of the Bellefonte Site .....	G-14

## LIST OF TABLES

	<i>Page</i>
Table 3-1 Comparison of TPBAR with Typical Burnable Absorber Rod Characteristics .....	3-6
Table 3-2 CLWR Tritium Production Program Reasonable Alternatives .....	3-12
Table 3-3 General Design Specifications of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 .....	3-13
Table 3-4 Annual Liquid Releases to the Environment from Operation of Watts Bar 1 .....	3-15
Table 3-5 Summary of Annual Watts Bar 1 Gaseous Emissions .....	3-16
Table 3-6 Summary of Annual Watts Bar 1 Waste and Spent Fuel Generation Rates .....	3-16
Table 3-7 General Design Specifications of Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 .....	3-17
Table 3-8 Annual Liquid Releases to the Environment from Operating Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 .....	3-19
Table 3-9 Summary of Annual Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 Gaseous Emissions .....	3-20
Table 3-10 Summary of Annual Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 Waste and Spent Fuel Generation Rates .....	3-20
Table 3-11 Summary of Resources Required to Complete Construction of Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and 2 .....	3-24
Table 3-12 General Design Specifications of Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 .....	3-24
Table 3-13 Summary of Environmental Consequences for the CLWR Reactor Alternatives .....	3-31
Table 3-14 Summary Comparison of Environmental Impacts Between CLWR Reactor Alternatives and the APT .....	3-40
Table 4-1 Comparison of Baseline Watts Bar 1 Ambient Air Concentrations with Most Stringent Applicable Regulations and Guidelines .....	4-7
Table 4-2 Annual Radioactive Gaseous Emissions at Watts Bar 1 .....	4-9
Table 4-3 Summary of Surface Water Quality Monitoring in the Vicinity of the Watts Bar Site .....	4-12
Table 4-4 Annual Chemical and Radioactive Liquid Effluents Released to the Environment from Operation of Watts Bar 1 .....	4-13
Table 4-5 Listed Threatened or Endangered Species Potentially On or Near the Watts Bar Site .....	4-18
Table 4-6 General Demographic Characteristics of Spring City, Rhea County, and the Watts Bar 1 Region of Influence 1990 .....	4-20
Table 4-7 Population Distribution by Ethnic Group in Spring City, Rhea County, and the Watts Bar 1 Region of Influence (1990 U.S. Census) .....	4-21
Table 4-8 Income Data Summary for Spring City and Rhea County (1989) .....	4-23
Table 4-9 Sources of Background Radiation Exposure to Individuals in the Vicinity of the Watts Bar Site .....	4-24
Table 4-10 Annual Doses to the General Public During 1997 From Normal Operation at Watts Bar 1, (Total Effective Dose Equivalent) .....	4-26
Table 4-11 Annual Worker Doses from Normal Operation of Watts Bar 1 During 1997 .....	4-26
Table 4-12 Annual Waste Generation at Watts Bar 1 .....	4-28
Table 4-13 Comparison of Baseline Sequoyah 1 and 2 Ambient Air Concentrations with Most Stringent Applicable Regulations and Guidelines .....	4-35
Table 4-14 Annual Radioactive Gaseous Emissions from Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 .....	4-37
Table 4-15 Summary of Surface Water Quality Monitoring in the Vicinity of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site .....	4-39
Table 4-16 Annual Chemical and Radioactive Liquid Effluents from Operation of Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 .....	4-40
Table 4-17 Listed Threatened or Endangered Species Potentially On or Near the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site .....	4-45
Table 4-18 General Demographic Characteristics of Soddy Daisy, Hamilton County, and the Sequoyah Region of Influence (1990 U.S. Census) .....	4-47
Table 4-19 Population Distribution by Ethnic Group in Soddy Daisy, Hamilton County, and the Sequoyah Region of Influence (1990 U.S. Census) .....	4-48
Table 4-20 Income Data Summary for Soddy Daisy and Hamilton County (1989) .....	4-50
Table 4-21 Sources of Background Radiation Exposure to Individuals in the Vicinity of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site .....	4-52



Table 4-22	Annual Doses to the General Public During 1997 from Normal Operation at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 (Total Effective Dose Equivalent) .....	4-53
Table 4-23	Annual Worker Doses from Normal Operation at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 During 1996 .....	4-53
Table 4-24	Annual Waste Generation at Sequoyah 1 and 2 .....	4-55
Table 4-25	Comparison of Baseline Bellefonte 1 and 2 Ambient Air Concentrations With the Most Stringent Applicable Regulations and Guidelines .....	4-63
Table 4-26	Summary of Surface Water Quality Monitoring in the Vicinity of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site .....	4-65
Table 4-27	Public and Industrial Surface Water Supplies From the Tennessee River Near Bellefonte .....	4-66
Table 4-28	Federally and State-Listed Threatened or Endangered Species On or Near the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site .....	4-74
Table 4-29	Unemployment Percentages in Jackson County (1991-1997) .....	4-76
Table 4-30	Per Capita and Household Income in the City of Scottsboro and Jackson County (Estimates for 1997) .....	4-77
Table 4-31	Industrial Occupation Distribution for Jackson County, Alabama, and the United States (1996 Main Occupations as a Percentage of Total Employment Only) .....	4-77
Table 4-32	General Demographic Characteristics of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site Region of Influence and Jackson County (1990 Census) .....	4-78
Table 4-33	Population Distribution by Race and Hispanic Origin in Jackson County, the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site Region of Influence, and the United States .....	4-79
Table 4-34	Scottsboro School System Breakdown by Academic Year (1991-1998) .....	4-82
Table 4-35	Fire Protection Services Available in the City of Scottsboro, Jackson County, and the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site Region of Influence (April 1998) .....	4-84
Table 4-36	Jackson County Revenue Distributions by Recipient (Selected Recipients Only) and Tax and Fee Revenue Sources, Fiscal Year 1997 (October 1996 Through September 1997) .....	4-87
Table 4-37	Sources of Radiation Exposure to Individuals in the Vicinity of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site .....	4-88
Table 5-1	Annual Radioactive Gaseous Emissions at Watts Bar 1 .....	5-5
Table 5-2	Annual Radioactive Liquid Effluents at Watts Bar 1 .....	5-6
Table 5-3	Tritium Concentration in the Tennessee River from Tritium Production at Watts Bar 1 .....	5-6
Table 5-4	Annual Radiological Impacts to the Public from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Watts Bar 1 .....	5-10
Table 5-5	Annual Radiological Impacts to Workers from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Watts Bar 1 .....	5-10
Table 5-6	Radiological Impacts to the Public from the Failure of 2 TPBARs at Watts Bar 1 .....	5-11
Table 5-7	Radiological Impacts to Workers from the Failure of 2 TPBARs at Watts Bar 1 .....	5-11
Table 5-8	Design-Basis Accident Consequence Margin to Site Dose Criteria at Watts Bar 1 .....	5-12
Table 5-9	Annual Accident Risks at Watts Bar 1 .....	5-13
Table 5-10	Accident Frequencies and Consequences at Watts Bar 1 .....	5-14
Table 5-11	Annual Radioactive Gaseous Emissions at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 .....	5-18
Table 5-12	Annual Radioactive Liquid Effluent at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 .....	5-20
Table 5-13	Tritium Concentration in the Tennessee River from Tritium Production at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 .....	5-20
Table 5-14	Annual Radiological Impacts to the Public from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 .....	5-23
Table 5-15	Annual Radiological Impacts to Workers from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 .....	5-24
Table 5-16	Radiological Impacts to the Public from the Failure of 2 TPBARs at Sequoyah 1 or 2 .....	5-25
Table 5-17	Radiological Impacts to Workers from the Failure of 2 TPBARs at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 ...	5-25
Table 5-18	Design-Basis Accident Consequence Margin to Site Dose Criteria at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 .....	5-26
Table 5-19	Annual Accident Risks at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 .....	5-27
Table 5-20	Accident Frequencies and Consequences at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 .....	5-28
Table 5-21	General Construction Equipment Noise Levels .....	5-34

Table 5-22	Annual Nonradioactive Gaseous Emissions from Bellefonte 1 or Both Bellefonte 1 and 2 During Construction .....	5-37
Table 5-23	Annual Air Pollutant Concentrations from Bellefonte 1 and 2 During Construction .....	5-38
Table 5-24	Nonradioactive Gaseous Emissions from Bellefonte 1 and 2 During Operations .....	5-39
Table 5-25	Annual Air Pollutant Concentrations from Bellefonte 1 and 2 During Operations .....	5-40
Table 5-26	Annual Radioactive Gaseous Emissions from Tritium Production at Bellefonte 1 .....	5-42
Table 5-27	Potential Changes to Water Resources from Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and 2 .....	5-45
Table 5-28	Summary of "Added" Inorganic Chemical Discharges to Guntersville Reservoir from Operation of Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 1 and 2 .....	5-46
Table 5-29	Summary of Observed Trace Metal Concentrations and Expected Trace Metal Concentrations in the Discharge Stream and at the Edge of the Mixing Zone from Operation of Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 1 and 2 .....	5-47
Table 5-30	Annual Radioactive Liquid Effluents from Tritium Production at Bellefonte 1 .....	5-50
Table 5-31	Tritium Concentration in the Tennessee River from Tritium Production at Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 .....	5-50
Table 5-32	Staffing for Completion and Operation of Bellefonte 1 .....	5-58
Table 5-33	Staffing For Completion And Operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2 .....	5-64
Table 5-34	Annual Radiological Impacts from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Bellefonte 1 .....	5-70
Table 5-35	Annual Radiological Impacts to Workers from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Bellefonte 1 .....	5-71
Table 5-36	Radiological Impacts to the Public from the Failure of 2 TPBARs at Bellefonte 1 .....	5-72
Table 5-37	Radiological Impacts to Workers from the Failure of 2 TPBARs at Bellefonte 1 .....	5-72
Table 5-38	Cancer and Noncancer Adverse Health Impacts from Exposure to Hazardous Chemicals at Bellefonte 1 and 2 During Construction .....	5-73
Table 5-39	Cancer and Noncancer Adverse Health Impacts from Exposure to Hazardous Chemicals at Bellefonte 1 and 2 During Normal Operation .....	5-74
Table 5-40	Design-Basis Accident Consequence Margin to Site Dose Criteria at Bellefonte 1 .....	5-77
Table 5-41	Annual Accident Risks at Bellefonte 1 .....	5-78
Table 5-42	Accident Frequencies and Consequences at Bellefonte 1 .....	5-79
Table 5-43	Emergency Response Planning Guideline Values for Hydrazine and Ammonia .....	5-81
Table 5-44	Summary of Impacts Data for Release Scenarios at Bellefonte 1 .....	5-81
Table 5-45	Total Amounts of Wastes Generated During Construction to Complete Bellefonte 1 or Both Bellefonte 1 and 2 .....	5-83
Table 5-46	Annual Waste Generation at Bellefonte 1 .....	5-84
Table 5-47	Summary of Findings on NEPA Issues for License Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants .....	5-88
Table 5-48	Data for Number of ISFSI Cask Determination for Each Nuclear Power Plant .....	5-94
Table 5-49	Environmental Impact of ISFSI Construction .....	5-95
Table 5-50	Environmental Impact of ISFSI Operation .....	5-98
Table 5-51	Environmental Impact of Accidents at ISFSI .....	5-101
Table 5-52	Materials Required for TPBAR Production .....	5-104
Table 5-53	Additional Fuel Requirements .....	5-105
Table 5-54	Risks of Transporting the Hazardous Materials .....	5-106
Table 5-55	Sensitivity Analysis Key Parameters .....	5-109
Table 5-56	Sensitivity Analysis Summary for a Single Reactor Site .....	5-110
Table 5-57	Estimated Accelerator Production of Tritium Carbon Dioxide Emissions .....	5-116
Table 5-58	Accident Impacts on Involved Workers .....	5-117
Table 5-59	Cumulative Impacts at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site .....	5-119
Table 5-60	Cumulative Impacts at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site .....	5-120
Table 5-61	Announced Major Recent and Future Expansions and New Industrial Facilities for Jackson County (1997 and 1998) .....	5-121
Table 5-62	Cumulative Impacts at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site .....	5-122
Table 5-63	Cumulative Transportation-Related Radiological Collective Doses and Latent Cancer Fatalities (1943 to 2035) .....	5-124
Table 5-64	Summary of Environmental Impacts, Tritium Extraction Facility .....	5-124
Table 5-65	Resources Consumed During Construction-Bellefonte 1 and 2 .....	5-130

Table 6-1	Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance Results for the Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant .....	6-12
Table 6-2	Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance Results for the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant .....	6-15
Table A-1	Summary of Increase in Spent Fuel Generation From 40 Years of Tritium Production with Maximum Number of TPBARs .....	A-23
Table B-1	Federal Environmental Statutes, Regulations, and Executive Orders .....	B-9
Table B-2	Relevant DOE Orders and NRC Guides .....	B-13
Table C-1	Exposure Limits for Members of the Public and Radiation Workers .....	C-7
Table C-2	Nominal Health Effects Coefficients (Risk Factors) from Ionizing Radiation .....	C-8
Table C-3	GENII Exposure Parameters to Plumes and Soil Contamination (Normal Operations) .....	C-16
Table C-4	GENII Usage Parameters for Consumption of Terrestrial Food .....	C-17
Table C-5	GENII Usage Parameters for Consumption of Animal Products .....	C-17
Table C-6	GENII Liquid Pathway Parameters .....	C-18
Table C-7	Annual Increase in Tritium Releases to the Environment at Each Site .....	C-19
Table C-8	Increases in Tritium Releases to the Environment from Two Failed TPBARs in an 18-Month Operating Cycle .....	C-20
Table C-9	Average (1996-1997) Annual Radioactivity Releases to the Air and Liquid at Watts Bar 1 .....	C-20
Table C-10	Average (1995-1997) Annual Radioactivity Releases to the Air and Liquid at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 .....	C-21
Table C-11	Annual Radiological Impacts to the Public from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Watts Bar 1 .....	C-24
Table C-12	Annual Radiological Impacts to the Public from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 .....	C-24
Table C-13	Annual Radiological Impacts to the Public from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Bellefonte 1 .....	C-25
Table D-1	Reactor Design-Basis Accident Tritium Inventory .....	D-3
Table D-2	Reactor Design-Basis Accident Tritium Source Term Released to Environment .....	D-3
Table D-3	Reactor Design-Basis Accident Frequency Estimates for Large Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident .....	D-3
Table D-4	Nonreactor Design-Basis Accident Tritium Source Term .....	D-4
Table D-5	TPBAR Handling Accident Frequency Estimates .....	D-5
Table D-6	Truck Transportation Cask Handling Accident Frequency Estimates .....	D-6
Table D-7	Rail Transportation Cask Handling Accident Frequency Estimates .....	D-7
Table D-8	Definition and Causes of Containment Failure Mode Classes .....	D-10
Table D-9	Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 Core Inventory .....	D-11
Table D-10	Release Category Timing and Source Terms .....	D-12
Table D-11	Release Category Frequencies and Related Accident Sequences for the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants .....	D-12
Table D-12	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Reactor Core Inventory .....	D-14
Table D-13	Release Category Timing and Source Term .....	D-15
Table D-14	Release Category Frequencies and the Related Accident Sequences for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant .....	D-15
Table D-15	NUREG/CR-4551 Protection Factors .....	D-19
Table D-16	GENII-Generated Reactor Design-Basis Accident Consequences .....	D-27
Table D-17	Reactor Design-Basis Accident Annual Risks .....	D-27
Table D-18	Reactor Design-Basis Accident Consequences Using the NRC Analysis Approach .....	D-27
Table D-19	Reactor Design-Basis Accident Consequence Margin to Site Dose Criteria .....	D-28
Table D-20	GENII-Generated Nonreactor Design-Basis Accident Consequences .....	D-29

Table D-21	Nonreactor Design-Basis Accident Annual Risks .....	D-29
Table D-22	Nonreactor Design-Basis Accident Consequences Using the NRC Analysis Approach .....	D-30
Table D-23	Nonreactor Design-Basis Accident Consequence Margin to Site Dose Criteria .....	D-30
Table D-24	TPBAR Handling Accident Consequences .....	D-33
Table D-25	TPBAR Handling Accident Annual Risks .....	D-33
Table D-26	Truck Transportation Cask Handling Accident Consequences .....	D-33
Table D-27	Truck Transportation Cask Handling Accident Annual Risks .....	D-33
Table D-28	Rail Transportation Cask Handling Accident Consequences .....	D-34
Table D-29	Rail Transportation Cask Handling Accident Annual Risks .....	D-34
Table D-30	Beyond Design-Basis Accident Consequences .....	D-35
Table D-31	Beyond Design-Basis Accident Annual Risks .....	D-36
Table D-32	Chemical Inventory at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site .....	D-37
Table D-33	Emergency Response Planning Guide Values for Hydrazine and Ammonia .....	D-39
Table D-34	Airborne Concentration Estimates for Ammonium Hydroxide (NH <sub>3</sub> ) Release Scenarios .....	D-42
Table D-35	Airborne Concentration Estimates for Hydrazine Release Scenarios .....	D-42
Table D-36	Summary of Impacts Data for Release Scenarios .....	D-42
Table E-1	Potential Shipping Routes Evaluated for the CLWR EIS .....	E-15
Table E-2	Irradiated Hardware and TPBAR Inventory .....	E-17
Table E-3	Release Fractions for Truck and Rail Casks with No Prefailed TPBARs .....	E-25
Table E-4	Release Fractions for Truck Casks with Two Prefailed TPBARs .....	E-25
Table E-5	Release Fractions for Rail Casks with Two Prefailed TPBARs .....	E-26
Table E-6	Accident Category Severity Fractions .....	E-26
Table E-7	Radiological Risk Factors for Single Shipments .....	E-28
Table E-8	Nonradiological Risk Factors per Shipment .....	E-30
Table E-9	Risks of Transporting the Hazardous Materials .....	E-31
Table E-10	Estimated Dose to Exposed Individuals During Incident-Free Transportation Conditions .....	E-32
Table E-11	Cumulative Transportation-Related Radiological Collective Doses and Latent Cancer Fatalities (1943 to 2035) .....	E-33
Table F-1	Issues Already Included in the EIS (In Scope) .....	F-4
Table F-2	Issues Added to the Scope of the EIS .....	F-5
Table F-3	Issues Considered to be Out of Scope or Raised But Not Analyzed .....	F-5
Table G-1	Minority Populations Residing Near Highway Routes from Potential Sites to the Savannah River Site .....	G-16
Table G-2	Racial and Ethnic Composition of Minority Populations (2025) Residing Within 1.6 Kilometers (1 Mile) Along Highway from Potential Sites to the Savannah River Site .....	G-16
Table G-3	Low-Income Populations Residing Near Highway Routes from Potential Sites to the Savannah River Site .....	G-16

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APT	Accelerator Production of Tritium
BEIR	Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation
Bellefonte 1	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 1
Bellefonte 2	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 2
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CLWR	Commercial light water reactor
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
EIS	Environmental impact statement
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FR	Federal Register
HEPA	High-efficiency particulate air
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ISFSI	Independent spent fuel storage installation
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NPDES	National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
P.L.	Public Law
Sequoyah 1	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1
Sequoyah 2	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TPBAR	Tritium-producing burnable absorber rod
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
U.S.C.	United States Code
Watts Bar 1	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1
Watts Bar 2	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) commercial light water reactor proposal. This chapter discusses the scope and development of the *Environmental Impact Statement for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor*, the reactor procurement process, and the reactor alternatives. Chapter 1 also includes background information on nuclear weapons; the Tennessee Valley Authority, operator of the candidate commercial light water reactors; the role of tritium in the weapons; and DOE's compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act for the Commercial Light Water Reactor program. The chapter concludes with a section on the organization of the document, the public scoping and hearings process used to obtain public input on the issues addressed in this environmental impact statement, a summary of the major public comments, and a description of the changes made to the Commercial Light Water Reactor Draft Environmental Impact Statement.

### 1.1 OVERVIEW

#### 1.1.1 General

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for providing the nation with nuclear weapons and ensuring those weapons remain safe and reliable. Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, is an essential component of every weapon in the current and projected U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Unlike other nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, tritium decays at a rate of 5.5 percent per year. Accordingly, as long as the nation relies on a nuclear deterrent, the tritium in each nuclear weapon must be replenished periodically.

At present, the U.S. nuclear weapons complex does not have the capability to produce the amounts of tritium that will be required to support the nation's current and future stockpile. Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), as amended (42 U.S.C. 4321 *et seq.*), and the DOE regulations implementing NEPA (10 CFR 1021), this *Environmental Impact Statement for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor* (CLWR EIS) analyzes the potential consequences to the environment associated with the production of tritium using one or more commercial light water reactors (CLWR). In the Record of Decision for this CLWR EIS, DOE anticipates selecting one or more reactors for tritium production.

Concurrent with the preparation of this environmental impact statement (EIS), DOE evaluated the feasibility of various CLWR alternatives through its standard procurement process (see Section 1.1.4). This EIS evaluates the environmental impacts associated with tritium production for all Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reactor plants offered by TVA during the procurement process (see Section 1.2 for a list of these reactors). DOE is considering only the purchase of irradiation services, not the purchase of a reactor. Purchase of a reactor is no longer being considered because none were offered for sale during the procurement process.

#### 1.1.2 Proposed Action and Scope

The CLWR EIS evaluates the potential direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental impacts associated with producing tritium in one or more CLWRs for a 40-year period. In addition, this EIS evaluates the environmental impacts of the No Action Alternative. Under the No Action Alternative, the stockpile requirements for tritium would have to be met by the construction and operation of an accelerator at DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina (see Section 1.5.2.1). For the purpose of this EIS, a No Action Alternative (i.e., no tritium production would occur at the CLWR) was evaluated for each candidate CLWR.



DOE proposes to use one or more CLWRs to provide tritium in sufficient quantities to support the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for at least the next 40 years. The proposed action includes: the manufacture of tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) at a commercial facility; the irradiation of the TPBARs at one or more of five operating or partially constructed TVA nuclear reactors; the possible completion of TVA's nuclear reactors; the transportation of nonirradiated and irradiated materials; and the management of spent nuclear fuel and low-level radioactive waste.

More specifically, as depicted in Figure 1-1, this EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with the proposed action: (1) fabricating TPBARs; (2) transporting nonirradiated TPBARs from the fabrication facility to the reactor sites; (3) irradiating TPBARs in the reactors; and (4) transporting irradiated TPBARs from the reactors to the proposed Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site. This EIS further analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with both the management of spent nuclear fuel and the transportation and management of low-level radioactive waste generated from CLWR tritium production.

### **1.1.3 Development of the CLWR EIS**

The CLWR EIS is a tiered document that follows the December 1995 Record of Decision (60 FR 63878) for the *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling* (Final Programmatic EIS) (DOE 1995b). In that Programmatic EIS, DOE considered a range of reasonable alternatives for obtaining the required quantities of tritium. In the December 1995 Record of Decision, DOE decided to pursue a dual-track approach on the two most promising tritium-supply alternatives: (1) to initiate purchase of an existing commercial reactor (operating or partially complete) or irradiation services with an option to purchase the reactor for conversion to a defense facility; and (2) to design, build, and test critical components of an accelerator system for tritium production (the Savannah River Site was selected as the location for an accelerator, should one be built). DOE committed to selection of one of these approaches by the end of 1998 to serve as the primary source of tritium. The other alternative, if feasible, would continue to be developed as a backup tritium source. Production of tritium in an accelerator is analyzed in the *Environmental Impact Statement, Accelerator Production of Tritium at the Savannah River Site* (APT EIS), DOE/EIS-0270 (DOE 1997e, DOE 1999a) (see Section 1.5.2.1).

On December 22, 1998, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson announced that tritium production in one or more CLWRs would be the primary tritium supply technology and that the accelerator would be developed, but not constructed, as a backup to CLWR tritium production (DOE 1998f). Secretary Richardson further stated that the Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactors have been designated as the Preferred Alternative for CLWR tritium production. The Secretary's announcement that the CLWR would be the primary tritium supply technology reaffirms the 1995 Record of Decision for the Final Programmatic EIS (60 FR 63878) to construct and operate a new tritium extraction capability at the Savannah River Site.

### **1.1.4 The CLWR Procurement Process**

The production of tritium in a CLWR would require a contract/interagency agreement between DOE and the owner/operator of the CLWR. Accordingly, on June 3, 1997, DOE issued in final form a request for proposals from owners/operators for irradiation services or sale of a CLWR (DOE 1997a). In September 1997, DOE received proposals for producing tritium using operating or partially completed reactors. The proposals for the Watts Bar and Bellefonte Nuclear Plants received from TVA were the only proposals determined to be responsive to the requirements of the procurement request. Under Federal procurement law, a proposal is "responsive" if it meets the criteria set forth in the agency's request for proposals. In addition to the responsive

## System for Producing Tritium in Commercial Light Water Reactors




Figure 1-1 Schematic of Process for Producing Tritium in CLWRs

bids discussed in this EIS, DOE received one nonresponsive bid. That bid did not offer to produce tritium. TVA initially offered Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Watts Bar 1) and Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Bellefonte 1). Since Bellefonte 1 is a partially completed unit, in the event that it could not be completed and licensed in time to support DOE's requirements for tritium production, TVA, through the procurement process, also offered to make Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (Sequoyah 1 and 2) available to meet the need for tritium. In addition, Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (Bellefonte 2) was considered a reasonable alternative. These reasonable reactor alternatives are identified in Section 1.2. A description of each of these reactor facilities is presented in Section 3.2.5 of this EIS.

Because both TVA and DOE are Federal agencies, an interagency agreement between them could be reached via the Economy Act (31 U.S.C. 1535). The Economy Act is a Federal law that allows two government agencies to enter into an interagency agreement similar to the contractual agreement that a Federal agency would enter with a nonfederal party through the competitive procurement process. The Federal procurement process for the CLWR program explicitly allows for an interagency agreement via the Economy Act.

Subsequent to the initial proposals from TVA, in May 1998 TVA allowed its initial procurement proposal for selling irradiation services at the Sequoyah and Watts Bar reactors to expire. However, because the TVA proposals are also subject to the Economy Act, this action did not affect the TVA reactor alternatives. Thus, the CLWR Draft EIS assessed all five of the TVA reactors as reasonable alternatives for tritium production. In November 1998, Secretary Richardson asked TVA to submit a revised proposal for irradiation services at the Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactors, as well as final proposals for completion of Bellefonte, so that he would have a comprehensive set of options on which to base the technology decision. In December 1998, TVA submitted revised proposals for both the Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactors, as well as for Bellefonte. Consequently, all of the alternatives that were evaluated in the CLWR Draft EIS remain as reasonable alternatives in the CLWR Final EIS.

DOE may enter into an interagency agreement with TVA, contingent on completion of the NEPA process, for production of the tritium required to support the nuclear weapons stockpile. Only those actions that are determined not to have an adverse effect and not to limit the choice of reasonable alternatives would be permitted prior to the completion of the NEPA process. However, before completion of the CLWR EIS and its associated Record of Decision, DOE and TVA have taken and will continue to take appropriate actions (e.g., studies, analyses) related to the potential submission of licensing documents to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC must approve the use of TPBARs in licensed reactors.

## **1.2 COMMERCIAL LIGHT WATER REACTOR FACILITIES ANALYZED IN THIS CLWR EIS**

This EIS evaluates the environmental impacts associated with producing tritium at one or more of the following reactor facilities:

- Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Watts Bar 1), Spring City, Tennessee (operating)
- Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Sequoyah 1), Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee (operating)
- Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (Sequoyah 2), Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee (operating)
- Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Bellefonte 1), Hollywood, Alabama (partially complete)
- Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (Bellefonte 2), Hollywood, Alabama (partially complete)

These reactors, whose locations are shown in Figure 1-2, are owned and operated by the U.S. Government. Because tritium production could occur in one or more of these reactor facilities, this EIS evaluates each reactor for the maximum number of TPBARs that could be irradiated in the reactor. This bounds potential environmental impacts associated with any of the reactor facilities. This EIS also qualitatively evaluates the irradiation of a lesser number of TPBARs and a TPBAR design with higher tritium production and shorter refueling cycles (see Section 5.2.9).




Figure 1-2 Locations of Candidate CLWRs for Tritium Production

In accordance with Council on Environmental Quality regulations, this EIS also evaluates the No Action Alternative. Under the No Action Alternative, DOE would not produce tritium in a CLWR. Consistent with Energy Secretary Bill Richardson's announcement on December 22, 1998 (DOE 1998f), the stockpile demands for tritium would have to be met by the backup technology option, which is the construction and operation of an accelerator at the Savannah River Site (see Section 1.5.2.1).

### **1.3 BACKGROUND**

#### **1.3.1 Defense Programs Mission**

Since the inception of the nuclear weapons program in the 1940s, DOE and its predecessor agencies have been responsible for designing, manufacturing, maintaining, and retiring the nuclear weapons in the nation's stockpile. In response to the end of the Cold War and changes in the world political regime, the emphasis of the United States' nuclear weapons program has shifted dramatically over the past few years from producing weapons to dismantling weapons. Accordingly, the nuclear weapons stockpile is being greatly reduced; the United States is no longer producing new-design nuclear weapons; and DOE has closed or consolidated many former weapons production facilities.

Additionally, in 1991 President Bush declared a moratorium on underground nuclear testing, and in 1995 President Clinton decided to pursue a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Despite these significant changes, DOE's responsibilities for the nuclear weapons stockpile continue, and the President and Congress have directed DOE to continue to maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile and to provide the tritium necessary to satisfy national security requirements. As explained in Chapter 2, the United States will need a new tritium production source by approximately 2005.

The size of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile is determined by the President through a classified process. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy, in coordination with the Nuclear Weapons Council, jointly sign and submit the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. The Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum transmits the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan to the President for final approval. Figure 1-3 depicts this process. The Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan covers an 11-year period, specifies the types and quantities of weapons required, and sets limits on the size and nature of stockpile changes that can be made without additional approval from the President. As such, the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan is the basis for all weapons planning in DOE. The President takes the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum under advisement and issues a National Security Directive to DOE and the U.S. Department of Defense approving the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan for implementation. Based upon this Presidential directive, DOE determines the tritium requirements. The most recent Presidential direction, which is contained in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan and an accompanying Presidential Decision Directive, mandates that new tritium must be available by approximately 2005 if a CLWR is the selected option for tritium production. Chapter 2 provides a description of the tritium requirements this EIS is intended to support.

#### **1.3.2 Nuclear Weapons**

A general understanding of a nuclear weapon, including the components that make up the weapon and the physical processes involved, is helpful in understanding the purpose and need addressed in this EIS. Figure 1-4 presents a simplified diagram of a modern nuclear weapon. An actual U.S. nuclear weapon is much more complicated, consisting of many thousands of parts.




Figure 1-3 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum and Plan Process




Figure 1-4 Diagram of a Modern Nuclear Weapon

The nuclear weapon primary is composed of a central core called a pit, which is usually made of plutonium-239 and/or highly enriched uranium. This is surrounded by a layer of high explosive which, when detonated, compresses the pit and initiates a nuclear reaction. This reaction is generally thought of as the nuclear fission "trigger" that activates the secondary assembly component to produce a thermonuclear hydrogen fusion reaction. The remaining nonnuclear components consist of everything from arming and firing systems to batteries and parachutes. The assembly of these components into a weapon or the dismantlement of an existing weapon is done at the weapons assembly/disassembly facility.

Tritium is not a fissile material and cannot be used by itself to construct a nuclear weapon. However, tritium is a key component of all nuclear weapons presently in the nation's nuclear weapons arsenal. Tritium enables weapons to produce a larger fission yield while reducing the overall size and weight of the warhead. This process is called "boosting." Boosting is accomplished by injecting a mixture of tritium gas and deuterium gas, a naturally occurring, nonradioactive hydrogen isotope, into the pit. The deuterium and tritium are stored in reservoirs (depicted as the "gas transfer system" in Figure 1-4) until the gas transfer system is initiated. The implosion of the pit along with the onset of the fissioning process heats the deuterium-tritium mixture to the point that the atoms undergo fusion. The fusion reaction releases large quantities of very high energy neutrons that flow through the compressed pit material and produce additional fission reactions. Such boosting has allowed the development of today's sophisticated delivery systems.

In the absence of new weapons designs and the total redesign of all warheads and delivery systems, the nation requires a reliable source of tritium to maintain a nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, total redesign of all warheads would require nuclear testing, which would be contrary to the President's pursuit of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

### 1.3.3 Brief History of the Production of Tritium

Tritium is so rare in nature that useful quantities must be manufactured. DOE has constructed and operated over a dozen nuclear reactors for the production of nuclear materials at the Savannah River Site, South Carolina, and the Hanford Site, Washington, starting with the early part of the Manhattan Project during World War II. None of these reactors is currently operational. The last one, the K-Reactor at the Savannah River Site, was shut down in 1988 for major environmental, safety, and health upgrades to comply with today's stringent standards. DOE discontinued the K-Reactor Restart Program in 1993 when smaller stockpile requirements delayed the need for tritium. As explained in the Final Programmatic EIS, the K-Reactor is not a reasonable alternative for tritium production.

In recent years, international arms control agreements have caused the nuclear weapons stockpile to be reduced in size. Reducing the stockpile has allowed DOE to recycle the tritium removed from dismantled weapons for use in supporting the remaining stockpile. However, due to the decay of tritium, the current inventory of tritium will not meet national security requirements past approximately 2005. Therefore, the most recent Presidential direction, contained in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan and an accompanying Presidential Decision Directive, mandates that new tritium be available by approximately 2005 if a CLWR is the selected option for tritium production. If the accelerator is the selected option for tritium production, the Presidential directive mandates that new tritium must be available by 2007. Tritium needs during the period 2005-2007 would be met by using the five-year tritium reserve or by a contingency tritium supply source.

### 1.3.4 Production of Tritium in a CLWR

The production of tritium in a CLWR is technically straightforward and requires no elaborate, complex engineering development and testing program. All the nation's supply of tritium, as mentioned previously, has been produced in reactors. Most existing commercial pressurized water reactors utilize 12-foot-long rods containing an isotope of boron (boron-10) in ceramic form. These rods are sometimes called burnable absorber rods. The rods are inserted in the reactor fuel assemblies to absorb excess neutrons produced by the uranium fuel in the fission process for the purpose of controlling power in the core at the beginning of an operating cycle. DOE's tritium program has developed another type of burnable absorber rod in which neutrons are absorbed by a lithium aluminate ceramic rather than boron ceramic. These TPBARs would be placed in the same locations in the reactor core as the standard burnable absorber rods. There is no fissile material (uranium or plutonium) in the TPBARs.

While the two types of rods function in a very similar manner to absorb excess neutrons in the reactor core, there is one notable difference: when neutrons strike the lithium aluminate ceramic material in a TPBAR, tritium is produced. This tritium is captured almost instantaneously in a solid zirconium material in the rod, called a "getter." The solid material that captures the tritium as it is produced in the rod is so effective that the rod will have to be heated in a vacuum at much higher temperatures than normally occur in the operation of a light water reactor to extract the tritium for eventual use in the nuclear weapons stockpile. Depending upon tritium needs, as many as 3,400 TPBARs could be placed in a CLWR for irradiation.

### 1.3.5 Nonproliferation

Nuclear proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear weapons states. In an effort to limit nuclear proliferation, the United States, along with other signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, has sought to preclude nonnuclear weapons states from acquiring fissile materials (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) for weapons or explosive use. Under the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States is a weapons state and, as such, is allowed to conduct nuclear weapons activities. The production of tritium is one such activity. Accordingly, the use of a CLWR for the production of tritium is not inconsistent with the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.



Along with other weapons-state signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States, under Article VI, undertakes to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Production of tritium in a CLWR in no way conflicts with these commitments. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has significantly reduced the size of its nuclear weapons stockpile. At the present time, the United States is further downsizing the nuclear weapons stockpile consistent with the terms of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I. The United States has ratified the START II Treaty and is hopeful Russia also will ratify this treaty soon. Additionally, the United States has ceased production of fissile materials and the manufacture of new-design nuclear weapons and has closed several weapons production facilities.

Negotiations required for further reductions in United States nuclear weapons and, ultimately, total nuclear disarmament, likely will stretch well into the next century. United States production of tritium in a CLWR will support the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile during this process. Such support of a decreased nuclear weapons stockpile is not inconsistent with the long-range goal of total nuclear disarmament.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is charged with detecting and deterring the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States has offered its commercial power plants for inspection by the IAEA as an act of good faith and to encourage other nations to be equally open about their nuclear programs. Commercial reactor tritium production would not change this commitment. The commercial reactors would remain open for IAEA inspection whether they are producing tritium or not. Furthermore, the IAEA has indicated that CLWR production of tritium would not alter the existing IAEA Safeguards Program.

In accordance with the direction provided in the Fiscal Year 1998 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-85) conference report, DOE facilitated a high-level interagency review of the policy issues associated with the use of commercial reactors to make tritium for national security purposes. The participants in the interagency review included the NRC, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Department of State Arms Control offices. This process was completed in July 1998 and is documented in the *Interagency Review of the Nonproliferation Implications of Alternative Tritium Production Technologies Under Consideration by the Department of Energy, A Report to the Congress* (DOE 1998d). The report concluded that the nonproliferation policy issues associated with the use of a CLWR are manageable and that DOE should continue to pursue the reactor option as a viable source for future tritium production. This conclusion was based upon a number of considerations including the following:

1. The use of CLWRs for tritium production is not prohibited by law or international treaty.
2. Historically, there have been numerous exceptions to the practice of differentiating between U.S. civil and military facilities, including the operation of the N-Reactor at Hanford, Washington; the dual-use nature of the U.S. enrichment program; the use of defense program plutonium production reactors to produce radioisotopes for civilian purposes; and the sale of tritium produced in the defense reactors in the U.S. commercial market.
3. Although the CLWR alternative raised initial concerns because of its implications for the policy of maintaining separation between U.S. civil and military nuclear activities, these concerns could be adequately addressed, given the particular circumstances involved. These circumstances include the fact that the reactors would remain eligible for IAEA safeguards and the fact that, if TVA were the utility selected for the tritium mission, the reactors used for tritium production would be owned and operated by the U.S. Government, making them roughly comparable to past instances of government-owned dual-purpose nuclear facilities.

In addition to those examples referred to in the *Interagency Review of the Nonproliferation Implications of Alternative Tritium Production Technologies Under Consideration by the Department of Energy, A Report to the Congress* (DOE 1998d), there are other instances in which military nuclear programs have been

commingled with civilian programs. These instances include: (1) Atomic Energy Commission purchase of plutonium separated from commercial reactor spent fuel for unrestricted use, including defense purposes; (2) fabrication of both military and commercial reactor fuel by commercial reactor fuel fabricators; and (3) TVA generation of electricity for use in the production of fissile military materials.

### 1.3.6 Background on the Tennessee Valley Authority

TVA was established by an Act of Congress in 1933 (U.S.C. 831-831dd) as a Federal corporation to improve the navigability of and provide flood control for the Tennessee River; to provide reforestation and ensure the proper use of marginal lands in the Tennessee Valley; to provide agricultural and industrial development of the Tennessee Valley; to provide for the national defense; and for other purposes. Within a few years of its establishment, TVA built a series of multipurpose dams on the Tennessee River system. One of the purposes of these dams was production of abundant, inexpensive electricity. The hydroelectric power generated by these dams met most of the rapidly increasing needs of the region through the 1940s. By the early 1950s, however, the growing demand was quickly outstripping the capacity of the dams and the Watts Bar Fossil Fuel Plant, which began operation in 1942. During the next 20 years, TVA built 11 large, coal-fired, electricity-generating plants to meet the region's growing needs. Some of these plants were the largest, first-of-their-kind coal-fired units in the world. The 1960s brought even greater growth to the region. To meet the anticipated need for more power, TVA began an ambitious program of nuclear plant construction.

Today TVA is one of the largest producers of electricity in the United States, generating 4 to 5 percent of all electricity in the nation. TVA's power system serves almost 8 million people in a seven-state region encompassing some 207,200 square kilometers (80,000 square miles). TVA's electricity is distributed to homes and businesses through a network of 159 power distributors, including municipally owned utilities and electric cooperatives. TVA also sells power directly to approximately 60 large industrial customers and Federal facilities.

TVA's power system, which is self-financed, has a generating capacity of 28,000 megawatts-electric. Its generating system consists of 11 coal-fired plants (53 percent of total generating capacity), 5 nuclear generating units at three sites (20 percent), 29 hydroelectric dams (15 percent), 48 combustion turbine units at four sites (7 percent), and one pumped-storage facility (5 percent). These plants are owned and operated by the U.S. Government. The TVA power system is linked by 25,750 kilometers (16,000 miles) of transmission lines that carry power to 750 wholesale delivery points, as well as 57 interconnections with 13 neighboring utilities.

In December 1995, with the publication of *Energy Vision 2020, Integrated Resource Plan/Environmental Impact Statement* (TVA 1995d), TVA projected demands for electricity in the TVA power service area through the year 2020 and evaluated different ways of meeting these projected increases. Since the Integrated Resource Plan was completed in 1995, TVA has continued to evaluate and select the best resource options based on the latest proposals and TVA's forecast of power needs. The total system generating capacity has been increased with the successful completion of Watts Bar 1 and the return to service of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 3 in Athens, Alabama. Both units have operated above expectations and have proven to be very reliable.

Current projections show the demand for electricity (including reserves) will exceed TVA's 1998 generating capacity by about 5,200 megawatts-electric in 2005; this projection is slightly less than the 1998-2005 medium load forecast of 5,450 megawatts-electric in *Energy Vision 2020, Integrated Resource Plan/Environmental Impact Statement* (TVA 1995d). About 2,800 megawatts-electric of additional generating capacity will be needed by the year 2001. A portion of this could be met by the proposed Red Hills Power Project. The remainder will be met by option purchase agreements, forward contracts for delivery of electricity to TVA, and internal TVA projects to increase net dependable capacities for TVA's combustion turbines, fossil plants, and

pumped-storage units. An additional 2,400 megawatts-electric of capacity will be required between 2001 and 2005. The completion of the Bellefonte unit(s) would offset some of this planned capacity.

Producing tritium in a TVA reactor would be consistent with the Congressional purposes that established TVA—namely, to provide for the industrial development of the Tennessee Valley and for national defense. Producing tritium in a TVA reactor would also enable TVA to maximize the utilization of its resources and potentially increase its electricity-generating capacity. TVA, as a Federal agency, in order to fulfill NEPA responsibilities, chose to be a cooperating agency on this EIS. A cooperating agency is defined by Council on Environmental Quality regulations as any Federal agency other than a lead agency having jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental issue involved in a proposal (40 CFR 1508.5).

#### **1.4 NEPA STRATEGY**

DOE's strategy for compliance with NEPA has been to make decisions on programmatic alternatives in the Final Programmatic EIS (DOE 1995b) and the subsequent Record of Decision (60 FR 63878), followed by site-specific analyses to implement the programmatic decisions. The decisions made in the December 12, 1995, Final Programmatic EIS Record of Decision have resulted in DOE preparing this EIS and the following NEPA documents:

1. *Environmental Impact Statement, Construction and Operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site* (DOE 1998c, DOE 1999b)
2. *Environmental Impact Statement, Accelerator Production of Tritium at the Savannah River Site* (DOE 1997e, DOE 1999a)
3. *Environmental Assessment, Lead Test Assembly Irradiation and Analysis, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Tennessee, and Hanford Site, Richland, Washington* (DOE 1997c)

The relationship of the CLWR EIS with these, as well as other relevant NEPA documents, is explained in Section 1.5.

#### **1.5 OTHER RELEVANT NEPA REVIEWS**

This section explains the relationship between the CLWR EIS and other relevant NEPA documents. Completed NEPA actions are addressed in Section 1.5.1; ongoing actions are discussed in Section 1.5.2.

##### **1.5.1 Completed NEPA Actions**

###### **1.5.1.1 Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling**

The Final Programmatic EIS DOE/EIS-0161, (DOE 1995b) evaluated the alternatives for the siting, construction, and operation of tritium supply and recycling facilities at each of five DOE candidate sites (the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory; the Nevada Test Site; the Oak Ridge Reservation, Tennessee; the Pantex Plant, Texas; and the Savannah River Site, South Carolina) for four different production technologies (heavy water reactor, modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor, advanced light water reactor, and accelerator production of tritium). This Final Programmatic EIS also evaluated the impacts of using a CLWR, but did not analyze specific locations or reactor sites. Issued in October 1995, the Final Programmatic EIS was followed by a Record of Decision on December 12, 1995 (60 FR 63878). In the Record of Decision, DOE decided to pursue a dual-track approach on the two most promising tritium supply alternatives: (1) to initiate purchase of an existing commercial reactor (operating or partially complete) or reactor irradiation services with an option to purchase the reactor for conversion to a defense facility; and (2) to design, build,

and test critical components of an accelerator system for tritium production (the Savannah River Site was selected as the location for a tritium production accelerator, should one be built) (60 FR 63878). The Record of Decision also called for the construction of a proposed new Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site. The CLWR EIS is intended to provide the NEPA analysis necessary to implement the 1995 Final Programmatic EIS Record of Decision, which will select the technology and specific site for a tritium production facility.

On December 22, 1998, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson announced that tritium production in one or more CLWRs would be the United States' primary tritium supply technology and that the accelerator would be developed, but not constructed, as a backup to CLWR tritium production (DOE 1998f). Secretary Richardson further stated that the Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactors have been designated as the Preferred Alternative for CLWR tritium production. The Secretary's announcement that the CLWR would be the primary tritium supply technology reaffirms the 1995 Record of Decision for the Final Programmatic EIS to construct and operate a new tritium extraction capability at the Savannah River Site.

#### **1.5.1.2 Lead Test Assembly Environmental Assessment**

This NEPA analysis addressed the environmental impacts associated with the fabrication of the TPBARs at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Washington; the irradiation of these TPBARs in Watts Bar 1; post-irradiation examination of the TPBARs at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Washington, and Argonne National Laboratory-West, Idaho; and impacts of transporting TPBARs to and from Watts Bar 1 (DOE 1997c). In the past, the United States produced all necessary tritium in government-owned nuclear reactors. The purpose of the Lead Test Assembly demonstration is to confirm and provide confidence to regulators and the public that tritium production in a CLWR is technically straightforward and safe. DOE issued a Finding of No Significant Impact in July 1997 (DOE 1997d). Subsequently, the TPBARs were placed in Watts Bar 1 on September 25, 1997, and they are presently being irradiated during the normal 18-month fuel cycle. Following irradiation, the TPBARs will undergo post-irradiation examination. To meet its own NEPA requirements, TVA adopted the Lead Test Assembly Environmental Assessment and issued a Finding of No Significant Impact on August 19, 1997 (TVA 1998a). Additionally, NRC prepared an independent environmental assessment and issued its own Finding of No Significant Impact on September 11, 1997 (62 FR 47835).

#### **1.5.1.3 EISs for the Operation of Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 and for Construction of Bellefonte 1 and 2**

EISs analyzing the environmental impacts associated with operation of the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants and the construction of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (AEC 1974, NRC 1978, TVA 1971, TVA 1972, TVA 1974a, TVA 1974b, TVA 1978, TVA 1993, TVA 1994b, TVA 1995a,) have been completed and serve to a great extent as a baseline on which the environmental impacts associated with tritium production are assessed. For the partially completed Bellefonte 1 and 2, the CLWR EIS also evaluates the environmental impacts associated with the completion and subsequent operation of these units for 40 years.

### **1.5.2 Ongoing NEPA Actions**

#### **1.5.2.1 Environmental Impact Statement, Accelerator Production of Tritium at the Savannah River Site**

This EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with the construction and operation of an accelerator for the production of tritium at the Savannah River Site. On a programmatic level, the accelerator for the production of tritium at the Savannah River Site represents the No Action Alternative for the CLWR EIS. A summary of the APT EIS, DOE/EIS-0270 (DOE 1997e, DOE 1999a), is presented in Section 5.2.11,

Volume 1, of this CLWR EIS. The APT Draft EIS was issued in December 1997. The APT Final EIS for the accelerator was issued concurrently with the CLWR EIS. As a result of the announcement by Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson on December 22, 1998 (DOE 1998f), that the accelerator would be a backup to CLWR tritium production, DOE will continue with developmental activities associated with the accelerator. However, the accelerator will not be constructed. The APT EIS is incorporated in the CLWR EIS by reference.

#### **1.5.2.2 Environmental Impact Statement, Construction and Operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site**

This EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated with the construction and operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site. The Draft EIS for the Tritium Extraction Facility was issued in May 1998; a Final EIS was issued concurrently with the CLWR EIS. The purpose of the Tritium Extraction Facility would be to extract the tritium from the TPBARs or from targets of similar design. TPBARs irradiated at the selected CLWRs would be sent to the Tritium Extraction Facility for extraction of the tritium-containing gases. A summary of the environmental impacts of the *Environmental Impact Statement, Construction and Operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site*, DOE/EIS-0271 (DOE 1998c, DOE 1999b), is presented in Section 5.3.4, Volume 1, of this CLWR EIS. The Tritium Extraction Facility EIS is incorporated in the CLWR EIS by reference.

#### **1.5.2.3 Environmental Assessment for the Tritium Facility Modernization and Consolidation Project at the Savannah River Site**

This environmental assessment (DOE 1998a) addresses the potential impacts of consolidating the tritium activities currently performed in Building 232-H into the newer Building 234-H. Tritium extraction functions would be transferred to the Tritium Extraction Facility under the Preferred Alternative. The overall impact would be to reduce emissions by up to 50 percent. Another effect would be to reduce the amount of low-level radioactive waste generated. Effects on other resources would be negligible. Therefore, impacts from these actions were not included in the cumulative impacts of the CLWR EIS.

#### **1.5.2.4 Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bellefonte Conversion Project**

This EIS, issued by TVA, addresses the environmental impacts anticipated from: (1) the conversion of partially completed Bellefonte 1 and 2 to fossil fuel electricity-generating facilities, and (2) the No Action Alternative of maintaining the facilities as partially completed nuclear facilities. The EIS was completed in October 1997. The issuance of a Record of Decision on the *Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bellefonte Conversion Project* (TVA 1997f) will not be made until it is determined whether one or both of these reactor plants will be used for tritium production. The No Action Alternative of the CLWR EIS involves the continued deferral of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 while TVA explores arrangements with outside entities to complete the units as nuclear facilities. If these reactor plants will not be utilized in the CLWR program, one of the five alternatives addressed in the *Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bellefonte Conversion Project* could be selected in the Record of Decision for that EIS. If the CLWR EIS Record of Decision indicates that Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 will be used for tritium production, then the construction of the reactor(s) would be completed and the reactor(s) would be operated for both tritium production and electricity production.

### **1.6 ORGANIZATION OF THIS EIS**

This CLWR Final EIS comprises two volumes. Volume 1 contains the main text; Volume 2 contains the comments received on the Draft EIS during the public review period and the DOE responses. Volume 1 contains 11 chapters and 8 appendices. The main analyses are included in the chapters, and additional project information is provided in the appendices. A summary also is available.

The 11 chapters in Volume 1 provide the following information:

Chapter 1—Introduction: CLWR EIS background and the NEPA process

Chapter 2—Purpose and Need: Reasons why the action is needed and the proposed objectives of the action

Chapter 3—CLWR Program Alternatives: Proposed ways to meet the specified need and achieve the objectives; basic assumptions; the development of the reasonable alternatives; and descriptions of the No Action and Preferred Alternatives [The chapter also includes a summary of the potential environmental impacts of the reactor alternatives, as well as a comparison of the environmental impacts between the CLWR alternatives and the accelerator option.]

Chapter 4—Affected Environment: Aspects of the environment that could be affected by the EIS alternatives

Chapter 5—Environmental Consequences: Analyses of the potential impacts of the EIS alternatives on the environment

Chapter 6—Regulatory Requirements: Environmental, safety, and health regulations that would apply for this EIS's alternatives and the agencies consulted for their expertise [The chapter also contains the regulatory history of TVA's reactors.]

Chapters 7-11—References; a list of preparers; a list of agencies, organizations, and persons to whom copies of this EIS are being sent; a glossary; and an index

The eight appendices of technical information contain the following information: CLWR tritium production operations, methods for assessing environmental impacts, normal operational impacts on human health, facility accident impacts on human health, evaluation of human health effects of overland transportation, the public scoping process, environmental justice, and contractor disclosure.

## 1.7 PUBLIC SCOPING PROCESS

Scoping is a process by which the public and stakeholders provide comments directly to the Federal agency on the scope of the EIS. This process is initiated by the publication of the Notice of Intent in the *Federal Register*.

On January 21, 1998, DOE published in the *Federal Register* a notice of intent to prepare the CLWR EIS (63 FR 3097). In this notice of intent, DOE invited public comment on the CLWR EIS proposal. Subsequent to this notice, DOE held public scoping meetings in Rainsville, Alabama, on February 24, 1998, and in Evensville, Tennessee, on February 26, 1998. The 700 comments received both orally and in writing at these meetings or via letters, fax, the Internet, or the 1-800 phone line during the public comment period were reviewed by DOE for consideration in preparing this EIS. A summary of the comments received during the public scoping process, as well as DOE's consideration of these comments, is provided as Appendix F of this EIS.

Of the approximately 700 comments received from citizens, interested groups, and Federal, state, and local officials during the public scoping period, 156 were verbal comments made during the public meetings. The remainder of the comments (513) were submitted at the public meetings in written form or via mail, Internet, fax, or phone over the entire scoping period. Commentors who spoke at the public meetings often read from written statements that were later submitted during or after the meetings. Where this occurred, each comment provided by an individual commentor in both verbal and written form was counted as a single comment. In

addition to the comments, four petitions totaling 1,586 signatures were submitted in support of completing the Bellefonte plant for tritium production purposes.

The majority of the verbal and written comments received during the public scoping period favored producing tritium at one or more of TVA's nuclear power plants. Comments from residents of northern Alabama were particularly supportive of completing the Bellefonte plant for tritium production. Reasons given for this support mostly involved potential socioeconomic benefits such as job creation, a greater abundance of inexpensive electricity, attraction of new businesses to the area, and increased local revenues.

Many of the comments received from residents of the local areas near the TVA plants also communicated an understanding that the United States will begin producing tritium in the near future—either at the Savannah River Site (the accelerator option) or at one of TVA's nuclear power plants. These commentators expressed confidence in the safety of the TVA plants and the capabilities of area workers to provide the skills needed for tritium production. They also said they believe nuclear power plants are a more sensible choice for tritium production because reactors are a proven technology and the total project cost would be less than the cost of building an accelerator.

A significant number of other comments received during the scoping period opposed tritium production in general and the use of a nuclear power plant for this purpose in particular. This group disagreed with the Presidential and Congressional decision to produce tritium and denied there is any real defense-related need for new tritium production because they believe other options are available. Among the options cited were unilateral disarmament, commercial purchases, recycling the material from deactivated nuclear weapons, and/or extending the half-life of tritium.

Several commentators voiced concerns about the environmental, health, and safety risks they believe are inherent to tritium production. DOE representatives were urged to thoroughly evaluate the potential consequences of the proposed action on local water resources and the health and safety of area residents and wildlife. Concerns also were raised about the safety of TVA's nuclear power plants and how the security of the plants would be managed if tritium production were to begin.

Waste production and disposal were other issues. Some commentators correctly stated that tritium production in a nuclear reactor would increase the amount of spent fuel wastes generated. Questions were posed as to how this additional waste would be dealt with, both on site and in the long term.

Many commentators also viewed the U.S. Government's decision to produce tritium as a violation of its own policies and commitments under the International Nonproliferation and Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties. They accused the U.S. Government of hypocrisy and asserted that tritium production in a commercial light water reactor would blur the historical line between U.S. civilian and military nuclear programs. This action, they warned, would encourage other countries to use their own commercial plants to produce weapons materials and to increase their weapons stockpiles.

The public comments and materials submitted during the scoping period were carefully logged as they were received and placed in the Administrative Record of this EIS. Their disposition is described in Appendix F of this EIS.

## **1.8 PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD**

In August 1998, DOE issued the CLWR Draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0288D). This document explained the need for a domestic tritium production source to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent and described and analyzed the environmental impacts associated with tritium production at one or more nuclear power plants operated by

TVA. The 60-day public comment period on the CLWR Draft EIS began on August 28, 1998, and ended on October 27, 1998.

During the comment period, public hearings were held in North Augusta, South Carolina; Rainsville, Alabama; and Evensville, Tennessee. The public was encouraged to submit comments via the U.S. mail service, e-mail to a special DOE web site on the Internet, a toll-free 800-number phone line, and a toll-free fax line.

The public hearings were conducted using a modified traditional public hearing format that allowed two-way interaction between DOE representatives and members of the public and also encouraged public comments on the document. A neutral facilitator was present at each hearing to direct and clarify discussions and comments. A court reporter was present at each hearing to record the proceedings and provide a transcript of the public comments and the dialogue between the public and the DOE and TVA representatives.

Comments from the public hearings were combined with comments received by other means (mail, e-mail, 800 number, fax, etc.) during the comment period. The written comments were date-stamped and assigned a sequential document number in the order in which they were received. Volume 2 of this CLWR EIS, the Comment Response Document, describes the public comment process in detail (Chapter 1); provides scanned images of all the comment documents received (Chapter 2); summarizes the public hearing comments (Chapter 2); and provides DOE's responses to the public comment summaries (Chapter 3).

Prior to fulfilling the requirement to reach a technology decision by the end of 1998, Energy Secretary Richardson asked TVA to submit final proposals for its Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactors, as well as for completion of its Bellefonte reactor. These proposals were provided to DOE the first week of December 1998, after the October 27, 1998, closing of the public comment period for the CLWR Draft EIS. After receiving these offers, Secretary Richardson directed that this information be presented to the public so they could review the latest TVA offers and provide their comments prior to his reaching the technology decision. To enable this, in spite of the short notice, a public meeting was scheduled and conducted on December 14, 1998. At this meeting, DOE presented information on the new proposals; answered questions; and accepted comments on the proposals, as well as on CLWR tritium production in general. The public was encouraged to comment on the new TVA proposals via U.S. mail, fax, toll-free 800-number phone line, or e-mail. Although the comments received as a result of this December 14, 1998, meeting were submitted after the public comment period, DOE responded to all of these comments as though they were received during the public comment period and they are included in Volume 2, the Comment Response Document.

During the public comment period, approximately 800 comments were received. An additional 230 comments were in conjunction with the December 14, 1998, public meeting. Most of the comments focused on a limited number of major issues. These issues and DOE's responses are summarized below.

By far, a majority of comments supported the completion and operation of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant for tritium production because it would promote economic development in a depressed area and provide other, similar benefits. Other commentors generally opposed the completion of the Bellefonte plant as a nuclear power plant, particularly for tritium production. In response to these comments, DOE acknowledged there is both public support and opposition for the Bellefonte alternative. The CLWR EIS addresses all of the benefits cited by the commentors who favored the Bellefonte alternative, as well as the concerns expressed by opponents. DOE's response to these and other related comments may be found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 7: General Support/Opposition.

The cost-effectiveness of the CLWR and APT tritium production alternatives was another frequent theme among many commentors. Most asked for cost-related information and/or expressed the opinion that cost should be the major determining factor in a tritium production decision. In addition, some commentors questioned the accuracy of the cost information that DOE provided at the public hearings and the December



14, 1998, public meeting, and many believed there was little possibility that TVA could complete the Bellefonte plant for the cost estimates cited. Other commentors stated they felt the large expenditures required for CLWR tritium production would be better spent on other, more urgent social needs such as education and environmental restoration. Some commentors were concerned about possible costs to TVA ratepayers resulting from tritium production.

In response to the cost-related comments, DOE stated that the CLWR EIS was prepared in accordance with NEPA, the Council on Environmental Quality's regulations on implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508), and DOE's NEPA regulations (10 CFR 1021). None of these regulations require the inclusion of a cost analysis in an EIS. As discussed in Volume 1, Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1, the basic objective of the CLWR EIS is to provide the public and DOE decision-makers with a description of the reasonable alternatives for CLWR tritium production and information about their potential impacts on public health and safety and the environment. While costs could be an important factor in the ultimate Record of Decision, the purpose of this and other EISs is to address the environmental consequences of the proposed action. DOE distributed cost information comparing the CLWR and APT alternatives (DOE 1998e) at the public hearings in October 1998, however, and this information is available upon request. In response to comments concerning the accuracy of TVA's cost estimates for completing the Bellefonte plant, DOE considers TVA's cost estimates to be both accurate and conservative, given that the plant is nearly complete and TVA's cost estimates were evaluated by an external reviewer. In response to comments that CLWR funds would be better spent on other, more urgent social needs, DOE noted that Congress determines how funds are allocated, and DOE does not determine Federal spending priorities. Furthermore, such spending priorities are beyond the scope of this EIS. In response to the concerns of TVA ratepayers about potential costs resulting from tritium production, DOE responded that no additional costs to ratepayers are expected. DOE's responses to the cost-related public comments are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 23: Cost Issues.

Many commentors questioned the need for nuclear weapons and/or the present need for tritium. Other commentors expressed a belief that the amount of tritium needed to support current and future nuclear weapons stockpiles is less than the amount stated in the CLWR EIS. In response, DOE cited its responsibilities for maintaining the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the requirements of the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan and accompanying Presidential Decision Directive, which established the size and composition of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and the need for a new tritium production source by approximately 2005. DOE stated that sufficient quantities of tritium no longer can be obtained from weapons being retired from the existing stockpile, as cited in the most recent Presidential Decision Directive. DOE's responses to comments concerning the need for tritium are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 2: Purpose and Need for Tritium.

Several commentors expressed concern that tritium production in a commercial reactor would violate U.S. policy regarding the separation of commercial and military uses of nuclear energy, would hinder nonproliferation efforts, and would encourage other nations to use their own commercial facilities for nuclear weapons purposes. In response to these concerns, DOE cited the conclusions of a high-level study entitled, *Interagency Review of the Nonproliferation Implications of Alternative Tritium Production Technologies Under Consideration by the Department of Energy, A Report to the Congress* (DOE 1998d). This interagency review concluded that any nonproliferation issues associated with the production of tritium in a CLWR were manageable and that DOE should continue to pursue the CLWR option, as stated in Volume 1, Chapter 1, Section 1.3.5, of the CLWR EIS. DOE also stated that there is no U.S. policy, law, or treaty that prohibits the production of tritium that ultimately will be used in weapons in a commercial reactor. In addition, DOE stated that the United States is a declared weapons state, and the purpose of nonproliferation efforts is to keep nonweapons states from acquiring nuclear weapons while the declared weapons states work toward total disarmament. DOE noted that other nations already operate dual-purpose reactors that serve both civilian and military needs. DOE's responses to comments on nonproliferation, the separation of civilian and military

nuclear facilities, and other policy issues are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 1, Policy Issues.

Many commentors were concerned with public and occupational health and safety issues. Some specifically questioned TVA's past history and practices related to plant safety. In response to these concerns, DOE stated that the environmental impacts and potential radiological doses to both workers and the public resulting from tritium production would be well below the limits considered acceptable by Federal and state regulatory authorities. Public and occupational health and safety issues are discussed in Volume 1, Chapter 5, of the CLWR EIS. DOE also stated that prior to irradiation of any TPBARs, an NRC safety evaluation would be required to amend the operating license of the reactors for tritium production. This review specifically would look at all potential health and safety issues. DOE's responses to public and occupational health and safety comments are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 14: Occupational and Public Health and Safety - Normal Conditions.

Several commentors stated that DOE has a history of polluting and contaminating every site they have operated and wanted to know why the proposed action would be any different. In response, DOE acknowledged having a number of older facilities in need of environmental cleanup, and an aggressive cleanup program is underway to upgrade these facilities and ensure their continued compliance with Federal and state regulations. All of the CLWR tritium production alternatives involve the use of state-of-the-art TVA reactors. These reactors have excellent environmental compliance records and exemplary environmental, health, and safety programs to ensure their continued compliance with Federal and state regulations. In addition, DOE expressed confidence that tritium production in a CLWR would be safe and is technically straightforward. To commentors who expressed concern that CLWR tritium production expenditures would drain DOE's budget for its facility cleanup activities, DOE responded that the funding for both of these programs would come from separate Congressional appropriations. Funding for CLWR tritium production would not be obtained from funding already allocated for facility cleanup activities. DOE's responses to comments about past DOE practices and conflicts between DOE's cleanup activities and tritium production are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 8: Past DOE Practices.

Some commentors suggested that the CLWR EIS was deficient and inadequate as a NEPA document. In response, DOE stated that it believes that the EIS is adequate and fully complies with NEPA. The EIS evaluates all reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts for all reasonable alternatives, in accordance with the requirements of the Council on Environmental Quality's regulations (40 CFR 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA regulations (10 CFR 1021) and procedures. DOE's responses to NEPA-related comments are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 5: NEPA Process.

Other commentors stated that the relationship between the CLWR, APT, and Tritium Extraction Facility EISs was not clearly explained in the CLWR Draft EIS. In response, DOE added a Preface to the CLWR Final EIS to better describe the relationship between the CLWR EIS, the APT EIS, and the Tritium Extraction Facility EIS. This Preface also addresses Energy Secretary Richardson's December 22, 1998, announcement (DOE 1998f) that the CLWR would be the primary tritium supply technology. DOE's response to comments concerning the relationship between the CLWR, APT, and Tritium Extraction Facility EISs is found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 5: NEPA Process (Comment Summary 05.01).

Several commentors were concerned about the additional spent nuclear fuel that would be generated by tritium production. DOE responded that additional spent nuclear fuel would be generated if more than 2,000 TPBARs were irradiated in a single reactor, as stated in Section 3.2.1 of the CLWR Final EIS. DOE also stated that the CLWR EIS evaluates the environmental impacts of additional spent fuel generation resulting from a maximum number of 3,400 TPBARs. DOE stated that it would manage the tritium production process to minimize, to the extent practicable, the generation of additional spent nuclear fuel. In the event a suitable repository is not available, as required by law, the additional spent nuclear fuel generated as a result of tritium production would

be stored on site in a dry cask independent spent fuel storage installation. DOE's responses to spent nuclear fuel comments are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 17: Spent Fuel Management.

Several commentors suggested that the production of tritium in a CLWR would make TVA reactors an attractive target for terrorists and that DOE should address the consequences of such an attack in the EIS. In response, DOE stated that, prior to loading TPBARs in TVA's Watts Bar reactor as part of the Lead Test Assembly Program, a thorough security review was conducted. This review found existing security provisions to be adequate to protect against such a threat. Prior to utilizing Watts Bar or other TVA reactors for tritium production, additional DOE and NRC reviews would be required to ensure safeguard and security provisions are adequate. DOE's responses to these and other security-related comments are found in Volume 2, Chapter 3 of this EIS, under Category 22: Safeguards and Security.

## **1.9 CHANGES FROM THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT**

In response to comments on the CLWR Draft EIS and as a result of information that was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the Draft, Volume 1 of the CLWR Final EIS contains revisions and new information. These revisions and new information are indicated by a double underline for minor word changes or by a sidebar in the margin for sentence or larger additions. Volume 2, Comment Response Document, contains the comments received during public review of the CLWR Draft EIS and DOE's responses to those comments. A brief discussion of the most important changes is provided in the following paragraphs.

### **TPBAR Failures**

In analyzing the potential releases of tritium to the environment from the proposed action, the CLWR Draft EIS assumed that two of the TPBARs under irradiation would fail and the entire inventory of tritium would be available to be released to the environment under normal operating conditions. The same two-TPBARs failure assumption was made in the analysis of transportation accidents. The assumption was based on the failure statistics of standard burnable absorber rods, i.e., two failures out of 29,700 rods through July 1980. Since the issuance of the CLWR Draft EIS, additional information obtained from Westinghouse (WEC 1998b) revealed that both failures were attributed to early manufacturing defects that have been corrected. The failures were attributed to slumping of the absorber material—a condition that cannot occur in the TPBARs. Since the two early failures, more than 500,000 Westinghouse burnable absorber rods have been used without a single observed failure. Consequently, the CLWR Final EIS still analyzes the impacts to the health and safety of the public from the potential failure of two TPBARs, but characterizes the event of such a failure as an abnormal event during an irradiation cycle, rather than a continuous, normal-operation occurrence. This change in assumptions results in changes in the potential tritium releases and estimated doses to the public under normal reactor operation and some accident conditions (i.e., the nonreactor design-basis accident) for all reactor alternatives.

### **The Secretary's Technology Announcement**

The CLWR Draft EIS was issued in August 1998. At the time, the decision on the primary and backup technologies to be used for tritium production had not been made. On December 22, 1998, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson announced that the CLWR would be DOE's primary option for tritium production and the proposed linear accelerator at the Savannah River Site would be the backup option (DOE 1998f). In addition, the Secretary designated TVA's Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants as the preferred CLWR facilities. The CLWR Final EIS was revised to reflect the Secretary's announcement and include the Preferred Alternative. Changes were made primarily in the introductory sections of the CLWR Final EIS for accuracy. The evaluation of the impacts was not affected.

### **Clarification of TVA Proposals**

In response to public comments about the status of the TVA proposals to provide irradiation services or the sale of a CLWR, Section 1.1.4 was revised. The discussion of the procurement process clarifies that DOE is considering only the purchase of irradiation services, not the purchase of a reactor. Additionally, the section clarifies that TVA submitted several proposals to DOE during the ongoing negotiations. An earlier TVA proposal for the use of Watts Bar expired. However, in December 1998, TVA submitted to DOE another offer to provide irradiation services at Watts Bar and Sequoyah, as well as additional proposals for Bellefonte. TVA's offer to provide irradiation services at one or more of the three proposed sites is still viable.

### **Nonproliferation Policy Issues**

In response to public comments requesting DOE to provide examples of the commingling of civilian nuclear programs with military nuclear programs, Section 1.3.5 was revised. The discussion of nonproliferation now includes an explanation and some background information on the issue, as well as examples of the commingling of civilian and military uses of nuclear power.

### **Water Quality Analysis**

In response to public comments expressing concern about impacts to public water withdrawals downstream of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, sections of Chapters 4 and 5 were revised. The discussion of surface water use for Bellefonte (Section 4.2.3.4) identifies nearby intakes downstream. The discussions of potential impacts to surface water near the three reactor sites (Sections 5.2.1.4, 5.2.2.4, and 5.2.3.4) include the tritium concentration at various locations downstream. In addition, Section 5.2.3.4 was revised to include potential chemical concentrations downstream of Bellefonte.

### **Accident Analysis**

During the preparation of the CLWR Final EIS, data related to the design and fabrication of the TPBARs indicated that the release of tritium from an accidental breach of a TPBAR more likely would be time-dependent than instantaneous and finite, as was assumed in the Draft EIS (PNNL 1999). Consequently, the analysis for the TPBAR handling accident and the transportation cask handling accident at the reactor site (Appendix D), and the transportation cask accident en route (Appendix E), were revised to reflect the more recent data.

### **Environmental Justice**

Figures in Appendix G were revised to improve their quality. New figures were added to show the location of minority and low-income populations within a 16.1-kilometer (10-mile) radius. In addition, a representative average individual dose at 40.2 kilometers (25 miles) to each of the 16 principal directions has been overlaid onto the 80.5-kilometer (50-mile) radius to show the potential dose to minority and low-income populations.

### **Tritium Requirements and Supply**

In response to public comments expressing concerns about the disparity between the amount of tritium needed and the amount that could be supplied by one CLWR, Section 3.2.1 was revised. The discussion explains that the exact amount of tritium needed is classified information, however, for the purposes of analysis, it is not expected to exceed 3 kilograms per year (6.6 pounds per year). It further clarifies that one reactor with 3,400 TPBARs would be expected to satisfy a steady state tritium requirement in most years.

## **Comparison of the APT and CLWR Alternatives**

In response to public comments requesting additional information about the No Action Alternative, Section 3.2.6 was expanded to include a table comparing the impacts of producing tritium under the accelerator and CLWR options. A document comparing the costs of the technology options is available upon request from DOE (DOE 1998e).

## **Source of Uranium-235 for Tritium Production**

In response to public comments concerning the source of blended-down uranium-235 that could be used as nuclear fuel for tritium production, Section 5.2.7 was revised for clarification. A discussion of the environmental impacts resulting from blending-down activities of highly enriched uranium was also added.

## **Mitigation Measures**

The CLWR Draft EIS discusses the need for mitigation measures, if such a need were warranted, right after the presentation of the impacts for each environmental resource. A new Section 5.5 was added to the CLWR Final EIS to summarize these discussions.

## **Sensitivity Analysis**

An additional variation from the baseline analysis has been included in Section 5.2.9 of the CLWR EIS, that is, the possibility of producing tritium at some date later than 2005.

## **Miscellaneous Revisions and Editorial Changes**

Several sections in the CLWR Final EIS were revised to reflect the availability of more recent data, or to include corrections on erroneous information, improvements in the presentation, and other editorial changes. None of these revisions affect the environmental impact assessment of the EIS. The sections with these types of revisions are:

3.2.3	Reasonable Alternatives
4.2.1.1	Affected Environment, Land Resources, Watts Bar
4.2.1.3	Affected Environment, Air Quality, Watts Bar
4.2.1.8	Affected Environment, Socioeconomics, Watts Bar
4.2.2.1	Affected Environment, Land Resources, Sequoyah
4.2.2.3	Affected Environment, Air Quality, Sequoyah
4.2.2.4	Affected Environment, Water Resources, Sequoyah
4.2.2.6	Affected Environment, Ecological Resources, Sequoyah
4.2.2.8	Affected Environment, Socioeconomics, Sequoyah
4.2.3.3	Affected Environment, Air Quality, Bellefonte
4.2.3.4	Affected Environment, Water Resources, Bellefonte
4.2.3.6	Affected Environment, Ecological Resources, Bellefonte
5.2.1.8	Environmental Consequences, Socioeconomics, Watts Bar
5.2.3.6	Environmental Consequences, Ecological Resources, Bellefonte
5.2.3.8	Environmental Consequences, Socioeconomics, Bellefonte
5.2.3.9	Environmental Consequences, Public and Occupational Health and Safety, Chemical Hazards, Bellefonte
	Environmental Consequences, Public and Occupational Health and Safety, Energizing Transmission Lines, Bellefonte
5.2.7	Fabrication of TPBARs

5.3	Cumulative Impacts
6.2.2	Environmental Protection Permits
6.3.1	Environmental Protection, Endangered Species Act
	Environmental Protection, National Historic Preservation Act
6.3.3	Worker Safety and Health
6.4	DOE Regulations and Orders
6.5.2.1	NRC Performance, Civil Penalties—Watts Bar 1
6.5.3.1	NRC Performance, NRC Notices of Violation and Enforcement Action, Sequoyah
Chapter 7	References
A.3.2	Physical Description of the TPBAR
Appendix B	Methods for Assessing Environmental Impact
C.3.4	Radiological Releases to the Environment and Associated Impacts
D.1.1.10	Beyond Design-Basis Accidents
G.5	Environmental Justice Analysis, Results for the Sites

## **Chapter 2**

### **Purpose and Need**

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## 2. PURPOSE AND NEED

Chapter 2 discusses the U.S. Department of Energy's purpose and need to provide a tritium supply capability. The purpose of the Department's action is to produce, in one or more commercial light water reactors, the tritium required to maintain the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.

Since nuclear weapons came into existence in 1945, a nuclear deterrent has been a cornerstone of the nation's defense policy and national security. Both President Clinton and the Congress have reiterated this principle in public statements and through legislation. The President has stated on a number of occasions his commitment to maintaining a nuclear deterrent capability. Most recently, in May 1997, the President stated in *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (White House 1997) that, "... our nuclear deterrent posture is one of the most visible and important examples of how U.S. military capabilities can be used effectively to deter aggression and coercion. Nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitments to allies, and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons."

U.S. strategic nuclear systems are based on designs that use tritium gas. Since tritium decays at a rate of about 5.5 percent per year (i.e., every 12.3 years one half of the tritium has decayed), periodic replacement is required as long as the United States relies on a nuclear deterrent. The nation, therefore, requires a reliable source of tritium to maintain its nuclear weapons stockpile.

As explained in Section 1.3.1, the size of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile is determined by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy who, in coordination with the Nuclear Weapons Council, jointly sign and submit to the President the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. This Memorandum transmits the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan to the President for final approval. Many factors are considered in the development of the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, including the status of the currently approved stockpile, arms control negotiations and treaties, Congressional constraints, and the status of the nuclear material production and fabrication facilities. Under this plan, the Department of Energy (DOE) can determine the amount of tritium necessary to support the approved stockpile.

Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen and an essential component of every warhead in the current and projected U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. These warheads depend on tritium so they can perform as designed. Tritium's relatively short radioactive half-life necessitates the periodic replenishment of tritium in nuclear weapons to ensure that they will function as designed. Over the past 40 years, DOE has built and operated over a dozen nuclear reactors (five of them at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina) to produce tritium and other nuclear materials for weapons purposes. Today, none of these reactors are operational, and DOE has not produced tritium for addition to the stockpile since 1988. According to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, however, DOE is responsible for developing and maintaining the capability to produce the nuclear materials, such as tritium, that are necessary for the defense of the United States (40 U.S.C. 2011).

Until a new tritium supply source is operational, DOE will continue to support tritium requirements by recycling tritium from weapons retired from the nation's stockpile. However, because of the tritium decay rate, recycling can only meet the tritium demands for a limited time, even with the reduction in stockpile requirements and no identified need for new-design weapons in the foreseeable future. Current projections, derived from the most recently approved, classified projections of future stockpile scenarios, indicate that



recycled tritium will support the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile adequately until approximately 2005 (Figure 2-1).




Figure 2-1 Estimated Tritium Inventory and Reserve Requirements

Even with a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile and no identified requirement for new nuclear weapons production in the foreseeable future, an ensured long-term tritium supply and recycling capability will be required to maintain the weapons determined to be needed for national defense under the prevailing Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. Presently, no U.S. source of new tritium is available. The effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability depends not only on the nation's current stockpile of nuclear weapons or the effectiveness of those it can produce, but also on its ability to reliably and safely provide the tritium needed to maintain these weapons.

To meet requirements mandated by the President and supported by the Congress, the United States will need a new source of tritium production by approximately 2005. For planning purposes, the operational life of the new production source would be about 40 years. Without a new supply source, after 2005 the United States would have to use its five-year reserve of tritium to maintain the readiness of the nuclear weapons stockpile. The five-year reserve contains a quantity of tritium maintained for emergencies and contingencies. In such a scenario, the complete depletion of the five-year tritium reserve would degrade the nuclear deterrent capability because not all weapons in the stockpile would be able to function as designed. Eventually, the United States would lose its nuclear deterrent. The purpose of DOE's action is to produce, in one or more commercial light water reactors, the tritium needed to maintain the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.

The Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) purpose and need relative to this environmental impact statement are to maximize the use of its resources while simultaneously providing support to national defense. National defense support has been one of TVA's historic multipurpose missions (see Section 1.3.6).

## **Chapter 3**

### **Commercial Light Water Reactor Program Alternatives**

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### 3. COMMERCIAL LIGHT WATER REACTOR PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES

Chapter 3 describes the physical process used to produce tritium in a commercial light water reactor, the proposed action, the planning assumptions and basis for the environmental impact analysis, and the development of reasonable alternatives. The chapter also describes each of the candidate commercial light water reactors, explains the No Action Alternative and the Preferred Alternative, and summarizes the environmental impacts associated with the alternatives.

#### 3.1 PRODUCTION OF TRITIUM IN A COMMERCIAL LIGHT WATER REACTOR

A commercial light water reactor (CLWR) is a nuclear reactor designed and constructed to produce electric power for commercial sale. As discussed in Section 1.3.4, tritium can be produced during the normal operation of a CLWR. The process uses tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs), which are specially fabricated rods that replace standard burnable absorber rods in the reactor core. Burnable absorber rods absorb excess neutrons and help control the power in a reactor to ensure an even distribution of heat and extend the reactor's fuel cycle. Tritium is produced when the TPBAR is exposed to radiation during the normal operation of the CLWR.

This section provides a general description of the process of producing tritium using a CLWR. It includes: (1) a brief description of the normal process of generating electric power in a typical CLWR plant; (2) a description of the TPBARs that are inserted in the reactor and the standard burnable absorber rods that they replace; and (3) a summary of the operational differences this replacement introduces—differences that would give rise to environmental impacts in addition to those associated with the normal operation of the reactor. A more detailed description of the process of producing tritium in a CLWR and some background information on the operation of CLWRs in a tritium-producing mode are included in Appendix A.

##### 3.1.1 Generation of Electric Power in Nuclear Power Plants

Nuclear, coal-fueled, and oil-fueled power plants all generate electricity by heating water to create steam, which is used to turn a turbine that powers a generator. The principal difference between nuclear and fossil-fueled power plants is that, instead of using a boiler to heat water for steam, a nuclear power plant heats the water with heat generated in the core of the reactor during nuclear fission.

Nuclear fission is the process of splitting fissionable atoms. When an atom is forced to split, energy is released. Some of this energy is converted to heat. In a nuclear reactor, certain types of uranium atoms are made to fission, or split, and release heat. The amount of heat generated (the power) is controlled by two types of control rods, movable and fixed. The movable control rods are used to start or stop the reactor. The fixed control rods, also called burnable absorber rods, ensure an even distribution of heat and extend the fuel cycle. The term "burnable" in this context means "capable of being consumed," rather than "flammable," the conventional definition.

Water is pumped through the reactor core to carry away the heat produced by the nuclear fission. Power reactors in the United States are called light water reactors because they are cooled by ordinary or "light" water. There are two types of light water reactors—boiling water reactors and pressurized water reactors. In boiling water reactors, the water boils to steam in the reactor vessel and goes directly to the turbine.

In pressurized water reactors, the water is pressurized to prevent it from boiling. The pressurized water (the primary coolant) is heated as it passes through the pressurized core. Next, the pressurized water is pumped to a steam generator where it passes through tubes (heat exchangers) and heats water in a "secondary" system. When this secondary water boils, steam is created. The steam then passes through the turbine, which powers the generator and produces electricity. With both types of reactor plants, the steam, after passing through the turbine, is cooled and condensed by another water system, which is usually supplied from a lake, river, or ocean. See Figure 3-1 for a schematic drawing of a typical pressurized water reactor.

Light water reactor fuel consists of pellets of uranium dioxide stacked in approximately 12-foot long tubes called fuel rods. Fuel rods are grouped together as fuel assemblies, where they are held side-by-side at fixed distances by metal grids. Although power reactor fuel assemblies differ somewhat, depending on the design of the reactor, a typical fuel assembly for a pressurized water reactor contains 289 positions: 264 fuel rod and 25 nonfuel rod positions in a 17 x 17 array. The nonfuel positions are used for moveable control rods, instrumentation, neutron source rods, or burnable absorber rods. Pressurized water reactors are suited for the production of tritium because the TPBARs can be inserted into the nonfuel positions of the fuel assemblies to replace standard burnable absorber rods. For this reason, only pressurized water reactors have been considered for the production of tritium in CLWRs. Figure 3-2 shows cross-sections of a fuel assembly.

### **3.1.2 Description of Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rods**

To produce tritium in a CLWR, TPBARs would be inserted into the reactor core. The TPBARs are long, thin tubes that contain lithium-6, a material that produces tritium when it is exposed to neutrons in the reactor core. The exterior dimensions of the TPBARs are similar to the burnable absorber rods (see Table 3-1), so that they can be installed in fuel assemblies where burnable absorber rods are normally placed. To ease the insertion and removal from fuel assemblies, the TPBARs would be attached to a base plate. See Figures 3-3 and 3-4 for a sketch of a typical TPBAR assembly and components. In addition to producing tritium, TPBARs would fill the same role as burnable absorber rods in the operation of the reactor.

The neutron absorber material in the TPBARs would be enriched in the isotope lithium-6, instead of the boron usually used in the burnable absorber rods. When the TPBARs are inserted into the reactor core, neutrons would be absorbed by the lithium-6 isotope, thereby initiating a nuclear process that would turn it into lithium-7. The new isotope would then split to form helium 4 and tritium (see Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of this process). The tritium then would be captured in a solid metal nickel-plated zirconium material in the TPBAR called a "getter." The tritium would be chemically bound in the TPBAR "getter" until the TPBAR is removed from the reactor during refueling and transported to the proposed Tritium Extraction Facility at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Savannah River Site in South Carolina. There the tritium would be extracted by heating the TPBARs in a vacuum to temperatures in excess of 1,000°C (1,800°F). Following extraction, the tritium would be purified. More details on the design of the TPBARs are included in Appendix A.

The current DOE TPBAR design is based on the numerous studies and tests performed for an original design to be used in Washington Nuclear Plant Unit 1, a Babcock and Wilcox (now Framatome Technologies, Inc.) reactor design, as part of new production reactor efforts in the early 1990s. The characteristics of a TPBAR design, as shown in Table 3-1, show that TPBAR assemblies can be used in either a Westinghouse (Watts Bar or Sequoyah) or a Babcock and Wilcox (Bellefonte) reactor design. The TPBARs, as currently designed, are being irradiated at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The final TPBAR design has been completed and is being reviewed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (63 FR 43732). The analyses of environmental impacts presented in this Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) are based on design parameters for tritium production and a maximum leakage rate of tritium for each TPBAR. These parameters are independent of the type of reactor design used.





Figure 3-1 Typical Pressurized Water Reactor Schematic

The complete process of producing tritium in a CLWR can be explained in the following way. Nuclear reactors require periodic refueling. In a tritium-producing CLWR, spent fuel would be removed during periodic reactor refueling, and fresh fuel assemblies and TPBARs would be inserted in the reactor core. These new TPBARs would be transported from the TPBAR fabrication facility to the reactor site inside fresh fuel assemblies as part of the regular fresh fuel supply. During the reactor's normal operations cycle (approximately 18 months), the TPBARs would be irradiated, and the tritium generated would be chemically bound in the tritium "getter." During the subsequent refueling period, the fuel assemblies containing the TPBARs would be removed from the reactor core and transferred to the spent fuel pool, where the irradiated TPBAR assemblies would be removed from the fuel assemblies. After removal from the fuel assemblies, the TPBARs would be mechanically separated from the hold-down assembly (see Figure 3-3) and placed in a 12-foot long consolidation container. The consolidation container, which in cross-section resembles the  $17 \times 17$  array matrix of the fuel assembly, provides 289 positions for individual TPBARs. The consolidation container with the 289 TPBARs, separated from their hold-down assemblies, would be placed in a shipping cask, sealed, placed on a truck or train, and transported to the proposed Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site. The tritium would be extracted in a high-temperature heating/vacuum process. The base plates and any other low-level radioactive waste attributed to tritium production would be placed in a different transportation package and transported to the Barnwell disposal facility for commercial low-level



**Figure 3-2 Typical Fuel Assembly Cross-Sections**




Figure 3-3 Typical TPBAR Assembly






Figure 3-4 Sketch of TPBAR Components

radioactive waste or the Savannah River Site's low-level radioactive waste facility, both in South Carolina. The cycle from TPBAR fabrication and assembly through reactor irradiation and shipment to the Savannah River Site's proposed Tritium Extraction Facility is depicted in Figure 1-1.

Table 3-1 Comparison of TPBAR with Typical Burnable Absorber Rod Characteristics

Parameter	Burnable Absorber Rod 17×17 Fuel Assembly	TPBAR 17×17 Fuel Assembly
Overall length (inches)	152	152
Total weight (pounds)	1.8	2.26
Absorber length (inches)	142	~142
Absorber outside diameter (inches)	[ ]*	0.303
Thickness (inches)	[ ]*	0.040
Absorber material	Silicon-boron oxides ( $\text{SiO}_2\text{-B}_2\text{O}_3$ )	Lithium aluminate ( $\text{LiAlO}_2$ )
Outer cladding outside diameter (inches)	0.381	0.381
Cladding material	Stainless steel type 304SS	Stainless steel type 316SS

\* Denotes proprietary data of burnable absorber rod vendor.

Source: PNNL 1997a.

### 3.1.3 Impacts of Tritium Production on Reactor Operations

The replacement of burnable absorber rods with TPBARs should have few impacts on the normal operation of the reactor. The normal power distribution within the core and reactor coolant flow and its distribution within the core would remain within existing technical specification limits. Some tritium is expected to permeate through the TPBARs during normal operation, which would increase the quantity of tritium in the reactor's coolant water system. Since tritium is a type, or isotope, of the hydrogen atom, once the tritium is in the reactor's coolant water system, it could combine with oxygen to become part of a water molecule and could eventually be released to the environment.

The operational differences between a tritium production reactor and a nuclear power plant without tritium production were determined by evaluating each environmental resource area and identifying the operational parameters that would change in a typical CLWR as a result of operating in a tritium production mode. The summarized operational differences are:

- **Accident conditions**—The physical changes to the reactor core would involve replacing some burnable absorber rods with TPBARs. This change would increase the estimated quantity of radionuclides assumed to be released in the analysis.
- **Personnel**—Additional TPBAR handling and shipping activities would create new jobs and possibly require the hiring of extra personnel at the CLWR sites.
- **Effluent**—The tritium content in the liquid effluent and gaseous emissions is expected to increase as a result of the presence of TPBARs in the reactor.
- **Waste**—Additional activities associated with handling, processing, and shipping TPBAR assemblies are expected to increase low-level radioactive waste generation rates.
- **Spent fuel**—Additional spent fuel could be generated when a reactor operates in a tritium-producing mode. Depending on existing spent fuel capacity, additional storage for spent fuel could be required.
- **Public and worker exposure**—The increased levels of tritium in the reactor coolant and the additional activities required in the handling and processing of TPBARs would result in increased radiation exposure for the public, operations workers, and maintenance personnel.
- **Transportation and handling**—Irradiated TPBAR assemblies would be packaged and transported from the CLWR sites to the Savannah River Site for tritium extraction and purification. Some additional risks of an accident en route would be expected. In addition, low-level radioactive waste associated with the TPBARs would be packaged and transported for disposal at the Barnwell disposal facility or the Savannah River Site.

The environmental impacts associated with these operational differences are evaluated in Chapter 5 of the CLWR EIS as they affect each environmental resource area (e.g., land resources, air resources, water resources, socioeconomics). In addition, this EIS evaluates the environmental impacts associated with any construction necessary to complete the currently unfinished Bellefonte 1 and 2.

## 3.2 DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVES

### 3.2.1 Planning Assumptions and Basis for Analysis

The *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling* (Final Programmatic EIS) (DOE 1995b) identified two options for producing tritium in a CLWR: (1) DOE purchase of an existing operating or partially completed CLWR and conversion of the facility to tritium production for defense purposes; and (2) DOE purchase of irradiation services from an operating CLWR to produce tritium using DOE-supplied TPBARs. Pursuing these options, on June 3, 1997, DOE issued a request for proposal (DOE 1997a) to all pressurized water reactor operators in the United States, delineating the technical requirements and financial conditions necessary for implementing these options.

Under this EIS, DOE proposes to produce, in one or more CLWRs, the tritium needed to maintain the nation's nuclear stockpile. The CLWRs were identified through a procurement process. The procurement process discussed in Section 1.1.4 identified the following CLWRs where tritium could be produced: the Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 (Watts Bar 1); the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and/or 2 (Sequoyah 1 and/or 2); and the Bellefonte Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and/or 2 (Bellefonte 1 and/or 2). All of these reactor units are owned and operated by the U.S. government. Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 are currently operating units, while Bellefonte 1 and 2 are partially completed units that would have to be completed before tritium could be produced. Based on the procurement process, DOE considers this set of five TVA reactor units to be suitable alternatives for tritium production. Descriptions of these reactor plants are included in Section 3.2.5.

This EIS evaluates the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts associated with fabrication of the TPBARs, the irradiation and handling of the TPBARs at the reactor facility, and the transportation of all nonirradiated and irradiated materials (including wastes associated with tritium production) to and from the appropriate facilities. The planning assumptions and considerations that form the basis of the analyses and impact assessments presented in this EIS are listed below:

- The purpose of DOE's action is to produce tritium in a CLWR. Tritium is needed to maintain the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. For the purposes of analysis in this EIS, DOE assumed that the CLWR program would be designed to produce up to 3 kilograms of tritium per year. Three kilograms of tritium represent a production goal applicable if the tritium reserve, which is maintained for emergencies and contingencies, were ever lost or used (see Figure 2-1). Considering the current design of the TPBARs and the efficiency of the tritium extraction process, this would involve the irradiation of up to 6,000 TPBARs (DOE 1996c) in an 18-month refueling cycle (4,000 TPBARs per year). The maximum number of TPBARs that could be irradiated at each reactor unit without significantly disturbing the normal electricity-producing mode of reactor operation is approximately 3,400 TPBARs; the exact number depends on the specific design of the reactor. Steady-state tritium requirements, which are classified and would vary depending upon the specific requirements of the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, are less than 3 kilograms of tritium per year. This EIS evaluates the impacts at each reactor site by considering a range of 1,000 to 3,400 TPBARs. A sensitivity analysis of the irradiation of fewer than 1,000 TPBARs is included in Section 5.2.9.

Producing 3 kilograms of tritium per year likely would be a short-term objective to reconstitute the tritium reserve. In such a case, it is technically feasible to produce larger quantities of tritium in a single reactor by changing some of the design parameters of the TPBARs and/or some technical parameters of the host reactor core, including shortening the refueling cycle. DOE does not foresee the implementation of this mode of production in any of the reactor units considered in this CLWR EIS. For the purpose of completeness, however, the sensitivity analysis in Section 5.2.9 also addresses the environmental impacts of changing the existing design parameters of the TPBARs and some of the operating parameters of the host reactors to maximize tritium production.

- For alternatives involving currently operating reactor units, this EIS assesses the environmental impacts of the changes to existing operations resulting from the insertion of the TPBARs into the reactors. These environmental impact changes would be additional to the normal environmental impacts of the ongoing operation of the reactors. For alternatives involving partially completed reactors, the EIS assesses the impacts resulting from construction to complete the reactors and from operation of the reactors.
- The EIS addresses the impacts of the No Action Alternative for each of the reactor units by assuming the continuation of the current status and current activities at each site. Because the TVA units are the only potential CLWR units considered as a result of the procurement process, the No Action Alternative means that no tritium would be produced in any CLWR. For this reason, this EIS, consistent with the Record of Decision on the Final Programmatic EIS (60 FR 63878), summarizes the impacts of producing tritium in a linear accelerator. The impacts of constructing and operating the accelerator are described in detail in the *Environmental Impact Statement, Accelerator Production of Tritium at the Savannah River Site* (APT EIS) (DOE 1997e, DOE 1999a) (see Section 5.2.11).
- The EIS assesses the environmental impacts of tritium production in CLWRs for a period of 40 years, starting with the delivery of irradiated TPBARs at the Tritium Extraction Facility in approximately the year 2005. For alternatives involving the partially completed reactor(s), it is assumed that any construction activities needed for the completion of Bellefonte 1 (and any other startup tests and activities) would take place during the time period between 1999 and 2004, at which time the completed reactor would be fully operational. In the event Bellefonte 2 was also selected for completion, Bellefonte 1 would come on line in approximately 2005, while Bellefonte 2 would begin operation in approximately 2007.
- CLWRs are licensed by the NRC to operate for 40 years. Currently operating reactors are not in a position to continue operation beyond 40 years without NRC approval for "life extension." Some of the environmental impacts associated with life extension activities would be attributable to tritium production. The NRC has addressed the generic impacts of life extension in the *Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants* (NRC 1996a). The life extension impacts associated with alternatives involving the currently operating units are based on this publication and are discussed in Section 5.2.4 of this EIS. Tritium production is not expected to affect relicensing. Life extension impacts for a partially completed reactor would not be an issue, since it would be expected to operate for 40 years after its completion.
- Tritium production in a currently operating reactor would not be expected to affect the radiological condition of the reactor at the end of its life. Therefore, environmental impacts associated with decommissioning and decontamination activities would be attributed to the normal operation of the reactor as an electricity-producing unit. For alternatives involving a partially completed reactor, the impacts from decommissioning and decontamination activities are evaluated in this EIS. Decommissioning and decontamination impacts are discussed in Section 5.2.5 of the EIS and are based on the generic EIS issued by the NRC entitled *Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities* (NRC 1988).
- Fabrication of the TPBARs would take place in a commercial facility that normally fabricates and assembles the components for the fresh fuel used in the CLWRs. A description of the fabrication process and any differences between fabricating standard burnable absorber rods versus TPBARs and material resources are included in Section 5.2.7. Impacts of the transportation of the nonirradiated TPBARs to the reactor facilities are evaluated in this EIS by considering a number of possible commercial fabrication and assembly facilities.

- An analysis of the environmental impacts of the transportation of nonirradiated and irradiated materials is presented in Section 5.2.8. The analysis for the transportation impacts assumes that 4,000 irradiated TPBARs per year are transported from the tritium production sites to the Savannah River Site. This EIS assumes that the transportation of irradiated TPBARs would be made by truck-sized casks of the type used to transport spent nuclear fuel in the United States. In addition to the transportation of irradiated TPBARs, the CLWR EIS considers the transportation of the irradiated TPBAR hardware, which would be separated from the rods at the reactor site, and other low-level radioactive waste directly attributed to tritium production. The CLWR EIS assumes that this low-level radioactive waste is transported in separate packages to either the Savannah River Site, where it would be disposed at the low-level radioactive waste facility, or the Barnwell disposal facility, where the low-level radioactive waste of the TVA reactor facilities is normally transported and disposed. Both truck routes and rail routes are evaluated. Details on the assumptions, method, and consequences of the transportation of TPBARs and low-level radioactive waste are presented in Appendix E.
- The radiological exposures from normal operation and accident conditions are evaluated for the general public and the workers at the reactor sites. For alternatives involving currently operating reactors, the CLWR EIS assesses the exposures from any additional radioactive releases that would result from the irradiation and consolidation of the TPBARs at the reactor. [Note: Consolidation occurs when the TPBARs from several fuel assemblies are inserted into a container for shipment off site in a transportation cask.] For alternatives involving a partially completed reactor, in addition to irradiation and consolidation of TPBARs, this EIS also assesses the exposures from all radioactive releases that could result from both normal operation and accident conditions. Details on the assumptions used for radiological releases are included in Appendix C for normal operation and in Appendix D for accidents.
- Production of tritium in a CLWR would increase the generation rate of spent fuel if more than approximately 2,000 TPBARs are irradiated in a fuel cycle (WEC 1999). Normally (i.e., during normal operation with no tritium production), fuel assemblies are used in more than one cycle. However, in order to maximize tritium production, TPBARs would be inserted in fresh fuel assemblies. In accordance with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, DOE is planning to manage all spent nuclear fuel at a national repository. Siting and development of a repository is ongoing, and the location and opening date for a suitable repository has not yet been determined. Accordingly, for the purposes of this EIS, the initial management of any additional spent nuclear fuel that may be generated as a result of tritium production is assumed to be stored on site in a generic dry cask independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) pending the availability of a suitable repository. The environmental impacts from the construction and operation of an ISFSI are addressed in Section 5.2.6. However, no decision will be made to either construct or operate an ISFSI as a result of this EIS. Appropriate National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documentation would be prepared prior to the construction of an ISFSI.
- The methodology used to assess the environmental impacts of tritium production in CLWRs is described in Appendix B.

### **3.2.2 Reactor Options Considered**

Currently, there are 105 CLWRs licensed to operate in the United States, of which 72 are pressurized water reactors. Only pressurized water reactors are suitable for producing tritium with the current TPBAR design. There are also a number of pressurized water reactors for which construction activities have stopped. Construction work on all of the partially completed reactors has been canceled, with the exception of three: Bellefonte 1, Bellefonte 2, and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (Watts Bar 2). For these, construction has been deferred indefinitely.

DOE issued a request for proposals for the CLWR production of tritium. DOE stated in the request for proposals its intent to select one or both of two approaches: (1) the acquisition of CLWR irradiation services for tritium production, or (2) the purchase of an operating CLWR by DOE for production of tritium. As discussed in Section 1.1.4, the only qualified response to DOE's solicitation came from TVA, the operator of Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2. TVA also maintains the partially completed units of Watts Bar 2 and Bellefonte 1 and 2.

As a result of DOE's procurement process, all CLWRs except five of the pressurized water reactor units operated by TVA were eliminated from consideration as reasonable alternative reactor options. A sixth TVA reactor, Watts Bar 2, was considered but eliminated because, compared to the other five TVA reactor units that have a design suitable for tritium production, utilizing Watts Bar 2 would involve significantly higher construction costs. The cost to complete Watts Bar 2 (which is 50 percent complete) has been estimated to be roughly twice the cost to complete Bellefonte 2 (which is 57 percent complete). Much of the difference in costs between finishing Watts Bar 2 and Bellefonte 2 is attributable to the resolution of design and construction issues that exist for Watts Bar 2, but not for Bellefonte 2. Moreover, construction completion plans for Watts Bar 2 have not reached the level of refinement and reliability associated with those plans for Bellefonte 1 and 2. Consequently, relative to the other five TVA reactor units whose impacts are analyzed in this EIS, Watts Bar 2 is not a reasonable alternative reactor option and has been eliminated from detailed study.

Also eliminated from detailed study was the completion and operation of Bellefonte 2 without completion and operation of Bellefonte 1. Bellefonte 1 is 90 percent complete; Bellefonte 2 is only 57 percent complete. The costs associated with completion of Bellefonte 1 include all the necessary systems and equipment that would be shared between the two units—equal to approximately 70 percent of the total cost for completion of both units. Therefore, completion of Bellefonte 2 without completion of Bellefonte 1 is economically impractical.

### 3.2.3 Reasonable Alternatives

The reasonable alternatives presented in the EIS are formed by the options available to DOE in implementing the project. These options include the fabrication facility options, the reactor facility options, and the transportation alternative modes, routes, and destinations.

The fabrication facility options include all commercial facilities that fabricate TPBARs and the pressurized water reactor fuel and its components for the currently operating reactor facilities. These are Framatome-Cogema Fuels, Lynchburg, Virginia; Asea Brown-Boveri/Combustion Engineering, Hematite, Missouri; BWX Technologies, Inc., Lynchburg, Virginia; Siemens Power Corporation, Richland, Washington; and Westinghouse Electric, Columbia, South Carolina. These fuel fabrication facilities could fabricate TPBARs with minimal startup time with some technology transfer on the particular TPBAR components not typically used by the nuclear industry (i.e., tritium getters and aluminized cladding), and with quality assurance standards in place and working. Another commercial facility, General Electric in Wilmington, North Carolina, would only manufacture TPBARs. Following the manufacture of TPBARs, final assembly would take place at one of the other facilities. Environmental impacts of the fabrication of TPBARs are discussed in Section 5.2.7.

To supply tritium to meet national security requirements, DOE could use one or more reactors. Considering that a maximum number of 3,400 TPBARs could be irradiated in a single reactor, at least two reactors would be needed for 6,000 TPBARs based on an 18-month refueling cycle. Considering also that additional spent nuclear fuel generation attributed to tritium production starts with the irradiation of approximately 2,000 TPBARs in a single reactor, DOE could use as many as three reactors to irradiate 6,000 TPBARs without increasing the amount of spent nuclear fuel. Mathematically, DOE has the option of selecting 1 of the 18 combinations of reactor units presented in Table 3-2. These 18 combinations form the reasonable alternatives of the irradiation element of the project. For the purpose of simplicity, the analysis of the

environmental impacts for each reactor site is performed using conditions and assumptions that would bracket the impacts at each site. The impacts for each of the 18 irradiation alternatives would be the sum of the impacts at each of the sites involved. For example, the impacts associated with Alternative #5 in Table 3-2 would be the sum of the impacts of the operation of Watts Bar 1 and the impacts of the operation of Sequoyah 1. The environmental impacts by reactor site are discussed in Section 5.2 and summarized in Section 3.2.6.

**Table 3-2 CLWR Tritium Production Program Reasonable Alternatives**

<i>Alternative</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1 Operation</i>	<i>Sequoyah 1 Operation</i>	<i>Sequoyah 2 Operation</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 Complete Construction and Operation</i>	<i>Bellefonte 2 Complete Construction and Operation<sup>a</sup></i>
<b>One Reactor<sup>b</sup></b>					
1	●				
2		●			
3			●		
4				●	
<b>Two Reactor Combinations</b>					
5	●	●			
6	●		●		
7	●			●	
8		●	●		
9		●		●	
10			●	●	
11				●	●
<b>Three Reactor Combinations</b>					
12	●	●	●		
13	●	●		●	
14	●		●	●	
15	●			●	●
16		●	●	●	
17		●		●	●
18			●	●	●

<sup>a</sup> Construction on Bellefonte 2 may be completed only if Bellefonte 1 is completed and operating.

<sup>b</sup> The one-reactor alternative could not produce 3 kilograms of tritium per year on an 18-month refueling cycle.

The transportation of nonirradiated and irradiated TPBARs presents options in transportation modes (truck versus rail), alternative transportation routes between facilities, alternative fabrication locations, and alternative low-level radioactive waste destinations. The full development of the various transportation options and the associated environmental impacts from these options are discussed in Section 5.2.8 and Appendix E. Transportation impacts are summarized in Section 3.2.6.2.

### 3.2.4 No Action Alternative

On December 22, 1998, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson announced that CLWRs would be the primary tritium supply technology and that the accelerator would be developed, but not constructed, as a backup to CLWR tritium production (DOE 1998f). Based on this announcement, if tritium is not produced in a CLWR, it will be produced in an accelerator. Accordingly, for purposes of analysis in this EIS, the No Action Alternative assumes the continued operation of Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 for the generation of electricity and the deferral of construction activities necessary for completion of Bellefonte 1 and 2 as nuclear units. Consequently, this No Action alternative entails the production of tritium in an accelerator. A summary of the environmental impacts associated with the production of tritium in an accelerator is contained in Section 5.2.11 of the CLWR EIS. That summary is based on the APT EIS. A comparison between the environmental impacts of the CLWR EIS reactor alternatives and those for accelerator production is presented in Table 3-14. Since the APT EIS was developed in parallel with the CLWR EIS, the impacts in Table 3-14 represent the conclusions of the APT Draft EIS. These impacts are not expected to change in the APT Final EIS.

### 3.2.5 Reactor Options

#### 3.2.5.1 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1

Watts Bar 1 is located on a 716-hectare (1,770-acre) site in Rhea County, Tennessee, on the Tennessee River at Tennessee River Mile 528, approximately 80 kilometers (50 miles) northeast of Chattanooga, Tennessee (TVA 1976, TVA 1995c). A second, partially completed unit, Watts Bar 2, also is located at this site. Watts Bar 2 was considered and dismissed as an alternative for tritium production in the CLWR EIS, as described in Section 3.2.2. The main land-use activities of the surrounding area are described in Section 4.2.1.1. The general arrangement of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant is shown in Figure 3-5.

Watts Bar 1 began commercial power operation in May 1996 (NRC 1997a). The Watts Bar 1 structures include a reactor containment building, a turbine building, an auxiliary building, a service building, a water pumping station for circulating water in the condenser, a diesel generator building, a river intake pumping station, a natural-draft cooling tower, a transformer yard, a 500-kilovolt switchyard and a 161-kilovolt switchyard, a spent nuclear fuel storage facility, and sewage treatment facilities (TVA 1976). The reactor containment building houses a pressurized water reactor designed and manufactured by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation. No modifications are expected to be necessary for Watts Bar 1 to irradiate TPBARs. Design equipment and facilities are sufficient to load and unload the TPBAR assemblies. During normal operation with tritium production, the plant could employ a few more workers (less than 10) in addition to the 809 presently employed (TVA 1998a). The spent nuclear fuel storage capacity is not sufficient for 40 years of operation with or without TPBARs. This EIS evaluates the impacts of a generic dry cask spent nuclear fuel storage facility in Section 5.2.6.

The general design specifications of the unit are provided in Table 3-3.

**Table 3-3 General Design Specifications of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1**

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Core thermal power level (megawatts-thermal)	3,411
Plant capacity factor	0.80
Total steam flow rate (pounds per hour)	$1.51 \times 10^7$
Electrical generation (net) (megawatts-electric)	1,160
Normal operating cycle (months)	18
Size of full core fuel load	193 fuel assemblies (89.5 metric tons of uranium)

Sources: TVA 1976, TVA 1995d.






Figure 3-5 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

In a tritium-producing mode of operation, up to 3,400 TPBARs could be placed in the core, occupying the same fuel assembly locations as the burnable absorber rods now in use. The TPBARs would be irradiated on an 18-month refueling-cycle schedule. During operation, heat released from the fissioning fuel is transported by the reactor cooling water to the steam generators. The overall thermal efficiency of the plant is about 34 percent (TVA 1995c). After passing through the turbine, the steam is condensed by moving through a condenser cooled with recirculated water. This recirculated condenser water is then cooled by passing it through a natural-draft (without fans), evaporative cooling tower. Although the cooling system is of the so-called "closed type," makeup water from the Tennessee River is needed to replace water losses due to evaporation, drift, and blowdown. Blowdown is a process to remove excess dissolved solids.

At full power, the temperature of the water flowing through the condenser is raised by approximately 20°C (36°F) (TVA 1995c). To replace water lost through evaporation, minor leaks, and blowdown (mainly associated with cooling tower operation), approximately 156,332 liters per minute (41,300 gallons per minute) (TVA 1976) is withdrawn from the Tennessee River. Blowdown from the natural-draft cooling tower is discharged into the Tennessee River at a normal rate of 106,593 liters per minute (28,160 gallons per minute) (TVA 1976). A diffuser system disperses the blowdown into the river water, thus limiting the rise in temperature to less than 3°C (5°F) (TVA 1976). This water is discharged under a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit (TN DEC 1993b).

The operation of Watts Bar 1 produces radioactive fission products and activates corrosion products in the reactor coolant system. Small amounts of these radioactive products enter the cooling system water. Radionuclides are removed from the cooling water through a chemical water treatment system. The gases and liquids are processed, stored, and monitored within the facility to minimize the radioactive nuclides that could be released to the atmosphere and into the Tennessee River. Radioactive waste is generated in this treatment system. The Watts Bar 1 liquid contaminant releases to the environment during normal operations are identified in Table 3-4.

**Table 3-4 Annual Liquid Releases to the Environment  
from Operation of Watts Bar 1**

<b>Materials</b>	<b>Quantity</b>
Chemicals (kilograms)	1,098,040 <sup>a</sup>
Tritium (Curies)	639 <sup>b</sup>
Other Radionuclides (Curies)	1.32 <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> TVA 1995a.

<sup>b</sup> TVA 1998e.

Radioactive gaseous emission releases are controlled by using a ventilation system consisting of gas decay tanks, filter components, and related piping, ductwork, valves, and fans. The main sources of gaseous radioactive emissions are generated in conjunction with degassing of the primary coolant during letdown depressurization of the reactor cooling water into the various process equipment and tanks associated with the makeup water and purification systems. Gases from the reactor are trapped in holding tanks to allow short-lived radioactive gases to decay before they are released to the shield building vent at a controlled rate through high efficiency particulate air filters and charcoal absorbers. Another source of radioactive gaseous emissions is the purging of the reactor containment building, which is also routed through high efficiency particulate air filters and charcoal absorbers prior to release.

Nonradiological criteria and hazardous air pollutant emissions are based on the operation of equipment at Watts Bar 1 at full power. Air pollutant sources include five diesel generators, one diesel generator used for security power, one diesel pump for firefighting, two auxiliary boilers fired with No. 2 fuel oil (0.5 percent

sulfur), two natural-draft cooling towers, the lube oil system, two fixed-roof tanks for storing No. 2 fuel oil, the paint shop, and the sandblast shop. Emission factors for both nonradiological criteria and hazardous air pollutants are based on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) *Supplement B to Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors, AP-42* (EPA 1996b).

The gaseous waste releases from Watts Bar 1 during normal operations are summarized in Table 3-5.

**Table 3-5 Summary of Annual Watts Bar 1 Gaseous Emissions**

<i>Constituents</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Particulate matter (kilograms)	20,366 <sup>a</sup>
Carbon monoxide (kilograms)	21,802 <sup>a</sup>
Sulfur dioxide (kilograms)	77,634 <sup>a</sup>
Nitrogen dioxide (kilograms)	84,584 <sup>a</sup>
Volatile organic compounds (kilograms)	41,602 <sup>a</sup>
Hazardous air pollutants (kilograms)	126 <sup>a</sup>
Tritium (Curies)	5.6 <sup>b</sup>
Other radionuclides (Curies)	283 <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> TVA 1998a.

<sup>b</sup> TVA 1998e.

Several hazardous substances and chemicals are used on a regular basis in the operation of Watts Bar 1. This results in the generation of hazardous waste that is controlled, stored, and managed in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (40 CFR 260). This waste is disposed of off site at Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-permitted treatment and disposal facilities. Solid waste such as noncontaminated clothing, rags, office paper, boxes, and noncontaminated filters is also generated on a regular basis and is disposed of as solid waste.

The waste and spent fuel generation volumes for Watts Bar 1 during normal operation are summarized in Table 3-6.

**Table 3-6 Summary of Annual Watts Bar 1 Waste and Spent Fuel Generation Rates**

<i>Waste Type</i>	<i>Volume or Mass</i>
Hazardous waste (cubic meters)	1.025
Nonhazardous solid waste (kilograms)	853,438
Low-level radioactive waste (cubic meters)	40
Mixed low-level radioactive waste (cubic meters)	< 1
Spent fuel assemblies (per 18-month operating cycle)	80

Sources: TVA 1976, TVA 1995a, TVA 1995c.

The reactor is shut down for refueling and maintenance as part of a normal fuel cycle of 18 months. During this shutdown period, the irradiated TPBARs/spent fuel assemblies would be removed from the reactor and placed in the spent fuel pool for cooling. After approximately one to two months, the TPBARs would be removed from the fuel assemblies, loaded into transportation casks, and sent to the proposed Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site for tritium extraction and purification.

### 3.2.5.2 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2

Sequoyah 1 and 2 are operating, pressurized CLWR nuclear power plants. The units are located on a 212-hectare (525-acre) site in Hamilton County, Tennessee, on the Tennessee River at Tennessee River Mile 484.5, approximately 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) northeast of the nearest city limit of Chattanooga, Tennessee (TVA 1974a, TVA 1996b). The main land use activities of the surrounding area are described in Section 4.2.2.1. The general arrangement of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant is shown in Figure 3-6.

Sequoyah 1 began commercial operation in July 1981, and Sequoyah 2 began commercial operation in June 1982 (TVA 1996b). The nuclear steam supply systems, designed and manufactured by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, include the reactor vessel, steam generators, and associated piping and pumps. These are housed in two reactor containment buildings. The balance of the nuclear power plant includes: a turbine building, an auxiliary building, a service and office building, a control building, a condenser circulating water pumping station, a diesel generator building, a river intake pumping station, two natural-draft cooling towers, a transformer yard, a 500-kilovolt switchyard and a 161-kilovolt switchyard, spent nuclear fuel storage facilities, and sewage treatment facilities (TVA 1974a). No modifications are expected to be needed for Sequoyah 1 and 2 to irradiate TPBARs. Equipment and facilities are sufficient to load and unload the TPBAR assemblies. Tritium production could require the addition of a few more employees (fewer than 10 per unit) to the 1,120 employees currently employed at the two-unit site (TVA 1998a). The general design specifications of the plant are provided in Table 3-7. The spent nuclear fuel storage capacity is not sufficient for 40 years of operation with or without TPBARs. This EIS evaluates the impacts of a generic dry cask spent fuel storage facility in Section 5.2.6.

**Table 3-7 General Design Specifications of Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2**

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Core thermal power level (megawatts-thermal)	3,411
Plant capacity factor	0.80
Total steam flow rate (pounds per hour)	$1.492 \times 10^7$
Net electrical generation (net) (megawatts-electric)	1,183
Normal operating cycle (months)	18
Size of full core fuel load	193 Fuel Assemblies (89.5 metric tons of uranium)

Source: TVA 1974a, TVA 1996b.

In a tritium-producing mode of operation, approximately 3,400 TPBARs could be placed in the reactor core(s) of Sequoyah 1 and/or 2 in the same fuel assembly guide tube locations that now accommodate standard burnable absorber rods. The TPBARs would be irradiated on an 18-month refueling cycle.

During current operations at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2, heat released from the fissioning fuel is transported by the reactor cooling water to the steam generators. After passing through the turbines, the steam is condensed by moving it through a condenser. The overall thermal efficiency of each unit is about 35 percent (TVA 1996b). The condenser is in turn cooled by a direct open cooling system (or mode) using diffusers supplemented by a helper or closed system (or mode) that uses natural-draft, evaporative cooling towers (TVA 1996b). However, the cooling towers have only been used for approximately 2 percent of the plant's operating time (TVA 1998a) to meet thermal discharge limits. The direct open cooling system uses a diffuser system which discharges cooling water to the Tennessee River from diffuser pipes. One diffuser pipe is




Figure 3-6 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

4.9 meters (16 feet) in diameter and extends 107 meters (350 feet), while the other diffuser pipe is 5.2 meters (17 feet) in diameter and extends 213 meters (700 feet). These two pipes are perforated with about twelve thousand 5-centimeter (2-inch) ports through which water is discharged into the river for maximum thermal mixing. This reduces the average river water temperature rise to less than 5.6°C (10°F) (TVA 1996c).

Cooling towers can be used in the helper mode, in which they discharge water through the diffuser pipes into the river, or in the closed mode. When the supplemental cooling tower system is used in the closed mode of operation, makeup water from the Tennessee River is needed to replace water losses from evaporation, drift, and blowdown. When the cooling towers are used in the closed mode, cooling is accomplished in the same manner as described for Watts Bar 1 in Section 3.2.5.1.

When the reactor is at full power, the temperature of the water flowing through each condenser is raised by approximately 17°C (30°F) (TVA 1996b). The open cooling mode using the diffuser pipes withdraws and returns 4,250,000 liters per minute (1,222,000 gallons per minute) with two units operating (TVA 1974a). In the cooling tower closed-cycle cooling mode, water lost through evaporation, small leaks, drift, and blowdown is made up by withdrawing approximately 249,745 liters per minute (65,978 gallons per minute) (TVA 1974a) from the Tennessee River. Blowdown from a natural-draft cooling tower is discharged into the Tennessee River at a normal rate of 120,000 liters per minute (31,700 gallons per minute) (TVA 1974a). Diffusers are used to mix the blowdown with river water, thus limiting the temperature rise after mixing to less than 5.6°C (10°F) (TVA 1996c). This water is discharged under a NPDES Permit (TN DEC 1993a). Tritium production would not affect the thermal discharge characteristics of the plant.

Operation of the plant produces radioactive fission products and activates corrosion products in the reactor coolant system. Small amounts of these radioactive products enter the plant cooling water. Radionuclides are removed from the cooling water through a chemical water treatment system. The gases and liquids are processed and monitored within the facility to minimize the radioactive nuclides released to the atmosphere and into the Tennessee River. Radioactive waste is produced in this treatment system. The total Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 liquid contaminant release to the environment during normal operation is identified in Table 3-8.

**Table 3-8 Annual Liquid Releases to the Environment  
from Operating Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2**

<i>Materials</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Chemicals (kilograms)	294,012 <sup>a</sup>
Tritium (Curies)	714 <sup>b</sup>
Other Radionuclides (Curies)	1.15 <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> TVA 1996b.

<sup>b</sup> TVA 1998c, TVA 1999.

Gaseous wastes are managed in the same manner as described for Watts Bar 1 in Section 3.2.5.1. Gaseous emissions from the plant are summarized in Table 3-9.

**Table 3-9 Summary of Annual Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 Gaseous Emissions**

<i>Constituent</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Particulate matter (kilograms)	26,225 <sup>a</sup>
Carbon monoxide (kilograms)	22,194 <sup>a</sup>
Sulfur dioxide (kilograms)	11,335 <sup>a</sup>
Nitrogen dioxide (kilograms)	86,928 <sup>a</sup>
Volatile organic compounds (kilograms)	2,377 <sup>a</sup>
Hazardous air pollutants (kilograms)	171 <sup>a</sup>
Tritium (Curies)	25 <sup>b</sup>
Other radionuclides (Curies)	120 <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> TVA 1998a.<sup>b</sup> TVA 1998e, TVA 1999.

Several hazardous substances and chemicals are used regularly during plant operation. This results in the generation of hazardous waste, which is controlled, stored, and managed in accordance with Resource Conservation and Recovery Act guidelines. This waste is disposed of off site at Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-permitted treatment and disposal facilities. Solid waste such as noncontaminated clothing, rags, waste paper, boxes, and uncontaminated filters is also generated regularly and disposed of as solid waste. The waste generation volumes for Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 during normal operation are summarized in Table 3-10.

**Table 3-10 Summary of Annual Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 Waste and Spent Fuel Generation Rates**

<i>Waste Type</i>	<i>Volume or Mass</i>
Hazardous waste (cubic meters)	1.196
Nonhazardous solid waste (kilograms)	1,301,966
Low-level radioactive waste (cubic meters)	383
Mixed low-level radioactive waste (cubic meters)	less than 1
Spent fuel assemblies (per 18-month operating cycle)	80

Sources: TVA 1974a, TVA 1996b.

The reactors are shut down for refueling and maintenance as part of a normal fuel cycle of 18 months. During this shutdown period, the irradiated TPBARs/spent fuel assemblies would be removed from the reactors and placed in the spent fuel pool for cooling. After approximately one to two months, these TPBARs would be removed from the fuel assemblies, loaded into transportation casks, and sent to the proposed Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site for tritium extraction and purification.

### 3.2.5.3 Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2

Bellefonte 1 and 2 are partially completed pressurized water reactors. They are situated on approximately 607 hectares (1,500 acres) (TVA 1997f) on a peninsula at Tennessee River Mile 392, on the west shore of Guntersville Reservoir, about 11.3 kilometers (7 miles) northeast of Scottsboro, Alabama (TVA 1991). The main land uses of the surrounding area are forestry and agriculture; however, urban-industrial development has grown over the past several years around the plant along the Guntersville Reservoir. The affected environment at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site is described in Section 4.2.3. The general arrangement of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant is shown in Figure 3-7.




Figure 3-7 Bellefonte Nuclear Plant



The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (now the NRC) issued the construction permit for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant in December 1974 (NRC 1990), and construction started in February 1975. On July 29, 1988, TVA notified the NRC that Bellefonte was being deferred as a result of a lower load forecast for the near future (TVA 1988). After three years of extensive study, TVA notified the NRC on March 23, 1993, of its plans to complete Bellefonte 1 and 2 (TVA 1994a). In December 1994, TVA announced that Bellefonte would not be completed as a nuclear plant without a partner and put further activities on hold until a comprehensive evaluation of TVA's power needs was completed. On April 29, 1996, TVA issued a Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS for the proposed conversion of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant to a fossil fuel facility. The *Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bellefonte Conversion Project*, which analyzed alternatives for such a conversion, was issued in October 1997 (TVA 1997f). A Record of Decision for that EIS will not be made until it is determined whether Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 will be used for tritium production.

The plant structures presently consist of two reactor containment buildings; a control building; a turbine building; an auxiliary building; a service building; a condenser circulating water pumping station; two diesel generator buildings; a river intake pumping station; two natural-draft cooling towers; a transformer yard; a 500-kilovolt switchyard and a 161-kilovolt switchyard; a spent nuclear fuel storage pool; and sewage treatment facilities (TVA 1991). Additionally, there are office buildings to house engineering and other department personnel. Entrance roads, parking lots, railroad spurs, and a helicopter landing pad are in place and are capable of supporting a construction project.

No modifications to the original design should be necessary to complete Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 for operation, with or without TPBARs.

The plant systems and structures are maintained through active layup and preservation. Program activities include the following:

- Each unit's main turbine generators are rotated every other week.
- The diesel fire pumps are maintained in an operational status and are run monthly.
- The shell and tube sides of the main condensers (heat exchangers) are kept dry, and the tube side is maintained with a flow of warm, dehumidified air.
- The reactor coolant system is kept dry using a flow of warm, dehumidified air.

A workforce of approximately 80 personnel supports layup and preservation of the plant. Of that number, 38 are involved in operations and maintenance (TVA 1998e).

To complete Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2, additional engineering and construction activities would be required (TVA 1998a). These activities are summarized in the following paragraphs.

### **Engineering**

Engineering for the original Bellefonte Nuclear Plant design is substantially complete. The additional engineering effort consists of completing analysis and design modifications that were not completed prior to deferral to update the design-basis documentation to current industry standards, as well as supporting construction, startup, and licensing of the plant. More specifically, the remaining engineering effort for Bellefonte 1 and 2 includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- Issuing detailed design modifications for certain mechanical and electrical systems to meet current requirements

- Updating the main control room drawings into computer-aided design electronic format
- Reviewing the control room design and upgrading the simulator and plant computers
- Reanalyzing piping and pipe supports
- Resolving industry issues (e.g., fire protection, electrical equipment qualification, station blackout, site security, communications, motor-operated valves) that were either not completed prior to deferral in 1988 or have arisen since deferral
- Developing fuel assembly and fuel cycle designs to facilitate the production of tritium
- Supporting submittals of the Final Safety Analysis Report and completing previous NRC position papers
- Supporting field change requests by the constructor

### **Construction**

Construction activities required to complete Bellefonte 1 and 2 include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Completing the application of protective coatings to structures, piping, and components and the installation of piping insulation
- Installing the Bellefonte 2 reactor coolant pump internals and motors [Some (less than 10 percent) of Bellefonte 1 reactor coolant instrumentation and pipe supports would have to be installed.]
- Installing limited major piping and components in the balance of the plant for Bellefonte 2
- Installing the steam piping for Bellefonte 2
- Installing and energizing a limited amount of the electric power equipment within the plant [The 161-kilovolt and 500-kilovolt offsite transmission lines are terminated in the switchyard, which is complete and energized.]
- Completing the Bellefonte 2 main control room [Substantial work would be required because the Bellefonte 1 main control room, although not complete, is functional and manned to monitor the ongoing preservation activities. The recommendations of the Control Room Design review would be factored into efforts to complete construction of both control rooms.]
- Preparing the intake structure for operation by desilting the intake water pump
- Constructing some new support buildings and installing additional equipment

In addition to the engineering and construction activities, completion and operation of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 would require NRC licensing, startup testing, and operations staffing and training.

Estimates of the resources required to complete Bellefonte 1 and both Bellefonte 1 and 2 are provided in Table 3-11. Bellefonte 2 would require fewer resources than Bellefonte 1 because some facilities constructed for Bellefonte 1 are in common with Bellefonte 2.

**Table 3-11 Summary of Resources Required to Complete Construction of Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and 2**

<i>Resources</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 and 2</i>
Employment, peak year	4,500	4,500
Length of time (years)	5	6.5
Electricity (megawatt-hours)	575,000	1,075,000
Water (cubic meters)	280,000	440,000
Concrete (cubic meters)	2,190	3,981
Steel (metric tons)	353	451
Fuel (liters)	$9.7 \times 10^6$	$1.4 \times 10^7$
Industrial gases (cubic meters)	500	1,800

Source: TVA 1995b.

For tritium production, approximately 3,400 TPBARs could be placed in the reactor core(s) of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2, occupying the same fuel assembly guide tube locations that would otherwise have held standard burnable absorber rods.

During normal operation, one unit would employ approximately 800; both units would employ 1,000 (TVA 1998a). Less than 10 additional employees per unit would be needed for normal operations with tritium production. If either or both units were completed, each reactor containment building would house a pressurized water reactor designed and manufactured by Framatome Technologies, Inc. The general design specifications of the plant are provided in Table 3-12.

**Table 3-12 General Design Specifications of Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2**

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Core thermal power level (megawatts-thermal)	3,600
Plant capacity factor	0.80
Total steam flow (pounds per hour)	$1.609 \times 10^7$
Electrical generation (megawatts-electric)	1,212
Normal operating cycle (months)	18
Size of full core fuel load	205 fuel assemblies (93.5 metric tons of uranium)

Source: TVA 1991.

During operation, heat released from the fissioning fuel would be transported by the reactor cooling water to the steam generators. After passing through the turbines, the steam would be condensed by moving it through a condenser cooled by recirculated water. The overall thermal efficiency of an operation unit is expected to be about 34 percent (TVA 1991). This water would in turn be cooled by passing through a natural-draft evaporative cooling tower. Although the cooling system would be of the (so-called) closed type, makeup water from the Tennessee River (Guntersville Reservoir) would be needed to replace water losses due to evaporation, drift, and blowdown. Cooling would be accomplished in the same manner as described for Watts Bar 1 in Section 3.2.5.1.

At full power, the temperature of the water flowing through a condenser would be raised by approximately 20°C (36°F) (ADEM 1992). In the cooling tower closed-cycle cooling mode, water lost (from both units) through evaporation, small leaks, drift, and blowdown would be made up by withdrawing approximately 252,000 liters per minute (66,600 gallons per minute) from the Guntersville Reservoir (TVA 1978).

Blowdown from the natural-draft cooling towers would be discharged into the Guntersville Reservoir at a normal rate of 2.1 cubic meters per second (74 cubic feet per second) (TVA 1974b). A diffuser would be used to mix the blowdown with reservoir water and thus limit the temperature rise after mixing to less than 3°C (5°F) (TVA 1978). This water would be discharged under a NPDES Permit (ADEM 1992).

Operation of the plant would produce radioactive fission products and activate corrosion products in the reactor coolant system. Small amounts of these radioactive products would enter the cooling water of the plant. Radionuclides would be removed from the cooling water through a chemical water treatment system. The gases and liquids would be processed and monitored within the facility to minimize the radioactive nuclides released to the atmosphere and into the Guntersville Reservoir. Radioactive waste would be generated in this treatment system.

The gaseous emissions would be managed in the same manner as described for Watts Bar 1 in Section 3.2.5.1. The projected nonradiological gaseous releases at Bellefonte 1 and 2, with the units at full power, would be similar to those for Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2.

Several hazardous substances and chemicals would be used regularly in the operation of the plant. This is expected to result in the generation of hazardous waste that will be controlled, stored, and managed in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and disposed of off site at Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-permitted treatment and disposal facilities. Solid waste such as noncontaminated clothing, rags, waste paper, boxes, and uncontaminated filters should also be generated regularly and disposed of as solid waste.

The reactors would be shut down for refueling and maintenance after operating for approximately 18 months. During this shutdown period, the irradiated TPBARs would be removed from the reactor and placed in the spent fuel pool for cooling. After one to two months, the TPBARs separated from the hold-down assemblies would be loaded into transportation casks and sent to the proposed Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site for tritium extraction and purification.

### 3.2.6 Comparison of Alternatives

To aid the reader in understanding the differences among the various alternatives, this section presents a comparison of the environmental impacts associated with tritium production at each of the reactor plants. The comparisons concentrate on those resources that would most likely be impacted.

The information in this section is based on the environmental consequences described in Chapter 5 of this EIS. For the five TVA reactors being considered for tritium production (Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, Sequoyah 2, Bellefonte 1, and Bellefonte 2), impacts are presented for the bounding case (i.e., the maximum number of TPBARs that could be irradiated in a reactor). For those cases in which impacts would be significantly different for a lesser number of TPBARs, an explanation is provided. The impacts of using more than one CLWR for tritium production can be determined by adding the impacts of each individual CLWR together. The impacts of not producing tritium at any of these five reactors (the No Action Alternative) are presented first as a baseline against which to compare the impacts of producing tritium. A summary of the environmental consequences is presented in Table 3-13 at the end of this chapter. In addition, Table 3-14 contains a comparison of the environmental impacts between tritium production in a CLWR and the accelerator at the Savannah River Site.

### **3.2.6.1 No Action Alternative Impacts**

#### **Construction**

*Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2.* Under the No Action Alternative, Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 would continue to produce electricity, and no construction impacts would occur.

*Bellefonte 1 and 2.* Under the No Action Alternative, Bellefonte 1 and 2 would remain in deferred status, and no construction impacts would occur. TVA could also convert Bellefonte 1 and 2 to a fossil fuel plant, as described in the *Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bellefonte Conversion Project* (TVA 1997f) (see Section 1.5.2.4). Such conversion would be independent of this EIS and would not occur until a decision is made regarding the role of Bellefonte 1 and 2 in tritium production.

#### **Operation**

*Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2.* Under the No Action Alternative, Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 would continue to produce electricity for the foreseeable future, and there would be no changes in the type and magnitude of environmental impacts that currently occur. In producing electricity, these reactor plants would continue to comply with all Federal, state, and local requirements. Impacts associated with the continued operation of Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 are described in the following paragraphs.

Under the No Action Alternative, water requirements at all three plants would continue to be met by existing water resources with no additional impacts, and water quality would not change, but would remain within regulatory limits. Air quality would also remain within regulatory limits. Worker employment should remain steady at each of the sites, with no major changes to the regional economic areas as a result of plant operation. Worker exposure to radiation should remain well under the regulatory limit of 5 rem per year, with the average worker dose at approximately 90 to 100 millirems per year. Radiation exposure of the public from normal operations would also remain well within regulatory limits (3 rem per year) for each of the reactor sites. At Watts Bar 1, the total dose to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) would be approximately 0.55 person-rem (see Chapter 10, *Glossary*, for definition) per year. Statistically, this equates to one fatal cancer approximately every 3,570 years from operation of Watts Bar 1. At Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2, the total dose to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) would be approximately 1.6 person-rem per year. Statistically, this equates to one fatal cancer approximately every 1,250 years from the operation of Sequoyah 1 or 2. Risks of accidents would remain unchanged.

Under the No Action Alternative, all categories of wastes would continue to be generated at each of the reactor plants, and they would be managed in accordance with regulations. Low-level radioactive wastes would continue to be generated at a rate of approximately 40 (Watts Bar 1) to 383 (Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2) cubic meters per year and would be disposed of at the Barnwell disposal facility. For each of the reactors, spent fuel would also continue to be generated at a rate of approximately 80 fuel assemblies per year. Spent fuel would continue to be managed at each of the reactor plants in compliance with all regulatory requirements.

*Bellefonte 1 and 2.* Under the No Action Alternative, Bellefonte 1 and 2 would remain uncompleted nuclear reactors, and the impacts on the environment would not change.

### **3.2.6.2 Impacts Associated with Tritium Production**

#### **Construction**

*Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2.* Because this EIS assumes that long-term spent fuel storage would take place at each of the reactor plants, an ISFSI eventually could be required for Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or

Sequoyah 2 to support tritium production. This could be the only construction necessary for tritium production. If such a facility were to be constructed, it would consist of three reinforced concrete slabs covering approximately 3.5 acres. Approximately 60-80 horizontal storage modules, each made of reinforced concrete, could be housed on the slabs. These horizontal storage modules would have a hollow internal cavity to accommodate a stainless steel cylindrical cask that would contain the spent nuclear fuel. Constructing such a facility would disturb approximately 5 acres and require approximately 50 construction workers. Premixed concrete would be used, and impacts to air quality, water, and biotic resources are expected to be small. Appropriate NEPA documentation would be prepared prior to the construction of a dry cask spent fuel storage facility.

*Bellefonte 1 and 2.* All major structures (e.g., containment buildings, cooling towers, turbine buildings, support facilities) have been constructed, so construction activities would consist largely of internal modifications to the existing facilities. No additional land would be disturbed in completing construction, and there would be no impacts on visual resources, biotic resources (including threatened and endangered species), geology and soils, and archaeological and historic resources. Because this EIS assumes that long-term spent fuel storage would take place at each of the reactor plants, a dry cask spent fuel storage facility would eventually be required at Bellefonte 1 and 2. The impacts of constructing such a spent fuel storage facility would be similar to those described above for Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2. Appropriate NEPA documentation would be prepared before the construction.

Completing construction of Bellefonte 1 would have the greatest impact on socioeconomics, with construction activities taking place between 1999 and 2004. During the peak year of construction (2002), approximately 4,500 direct jobs could be created. As many as 4,500 secondary jobs (indirect jobs) also could be created. The total new jobs (9,000) could cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to decrease to approximately 4 percent from the current rate of 8.2 percent. Public finance expenditures/revenues could increase by over 30 percent in Scottsboro and about 15 percent in Jackson County. Rental vacancies could decline to near zero, and demand for all types of housing could increase substantially. Rents and housing prices could increase at double-digit percentage levels.

If Bellefonte 2 were also selected for completion, construction activities for both units would be drawn out, taking place between 1999 and 2005. The peak year of construction would shift, but the total number of direct and indirect jobs would be the same. The effects, therefore, on unemployment, public finance, rents, and housing prices would be the same as for the construction completion of Bellefonte 1.

## Operation

*Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2.* In a tritium production mode, these operating reactors would continue to comply with all Federal, state, and local requirements. Tritium production would have little or no effect on land use, visual resources, water use and quality, air quality, archaeological and historic resources, biotic resources (including threatened and endangered species), and socioeconomics. It could, however, have some incremental impacts in the following areas: radiation exposure (worker and public), spent fuel generation, and low-level radioactive waste generation. Tritium production could also change the accident and transportation risks associated with these reactors. Each of these areas is discussed below.

**Radiation Exposure** Tritium production could increase average annual worker radiation exposure by approximately 0.82-1.1 millirem per year. The resultant dose would be well within regulatory limits. Radiation exposure to the public from normal operations could also increase, but still would remain well within regulatory limits at each of the reactor sites. At either Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2, the total dose to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) could increase by a maximum of 1.9 person-rem per year. Statistically, this equates to one additional fatal cancer approximately every 1,000 years from the operation of Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2.

**Spent Fuel Generation** Given irradiation of 3,400 TPBARs (the maximum number of TPBARs without changing the reactor's fuel cycle), additional spent fuel would be generated at Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2. In the average 18-month fuel cycle, spent fuel generation could increase from approximately 80 spent fuel assemblies up to a maximum of 140, a 71 percent increase in spent fuel generation over the No Action Alternative. Because this EIS assumes that long-term spent fuel storage would take place at each of the reactor plants, a dry cask spent fuel storage facility eventually would be needed. Storing the additional spent fuel should have minor impacts. Radiation exposures would remain below regulatory limits for both workers and the public, and less than 4 cubic feet of low-level radioactive waste would be generated annually. The impacts of accidents associated with dry cask spent fuel storage would be small. As previously mentioned, appropriate NEPA documentation would be prepared before the construction of a dry cask spent fuel storage facility at Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2. If fewer than approximately 2,000 TPBARs were irradiated, there would be no change in the amount of spent fuel produced by the reactors.

**Low-Level Radioactive Waste Generation** Compared to the No Action Alternative, tritium production at Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2 would generate approximately 0.43 additional cubic meters per year of low-level radioactive waste. This would be a 0.1 (Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2) to 1.0 (Watts Bar 1) percent increase in low-level radioactive waste generation over the No Action Alternative. Such an increase would amount to less than 1 percent of the low-level radioactive waste disposed of at the Barnwell disposal facility. The EIS also analyzes the impacts of this low-level radioactive waste disposal at the Savannah River Site. Disposing of 0.43 cubic meters per year of low-level radioactive waste would amount to less than 1 percent of the low-level radioactive waste disposed of at the Savannah River Site and less than 1 percent of the landfill's capacity.

**Accident Risks** Tritium production could change the potential risks associated with accidents at Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2. As described in the following text, these changes would be small. Potential impacts from accidents were determined using computer modeling. If a limiting design-basis accident occurred, tritium production at the 3,400-TPBAR level would increase the individual risk of a fatal cancer by  $1.4 \times 10^{-9}$  to an individual living within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of Watts Bar 1. Statistically, this equates to a risk to the individual of one fatal cancer approximately every 710 million years from tritium production. For an individual living within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2, there would be a  $2.1 \times 10^{-9}$  increased likelihood of a cancer fatality to an individual from a design-basis accident as a result of tritium production. Statistically, this equates to a risk to an individual of one additional fatal cancer approximately every 480 million years from tritium production. For a beyond design-basis accident (an accident that has a probability of occurring approximately once in a million years or less), tritium production would result in small changes in the consequences of an accident. This is due to the fact that the potential consequences of such an accident would be dominated by radionuclides other than tritium.

**Transportation** Tritium production at either Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2 would necessitate additional transportation to and from the reactor plants. Most of the additional transportation would involve nonradiological materials. Impacts would be limited to toxic vehicle emissions and traffic fatalities. At each of these reactors, the transportation risks would be less than one fatality per year. Radiological materials transportation impacts would include routine and accidental doses of radioactivity. The risks associated with radiological materials transportation would be less than one fatality per 100,000 years.

**Bellefonte 1 and 2.** Because neither Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 are currently operating, this EIS assesses the impacts of completing construction and operating these units for tritium production. Consequently, environmental impacts would occur in the following resources: visual resources, water use, biotic resources, socioeconomics, radiation exposure (worker and public), spent fuel generation, and low-level radioactive waste generation. Tritium production would also change the accident and transportation risks associated with these reactors.

During operations, Bellefonte 1 and 2 would produce vapor plumes from cooling towers that would be visible up to 10 miles away. These plumes could create an aesthetic impact on the towns of Pisgah, Hollywood, and Scottsboro, Alabama.

During operation, Bellefonte 1 and 2 each would use less than 0.5 percent of the river flow from Guntersville Reservoir and would not have any adverse impacts on other users. Discharges from the plants would be treated and monitored before release and would comply with NPDES permits. Impacts on water quality would be minimal, and no standards would be exceeded. Operation of either Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 for tritium production would have some effects on ecological resources typical to the operation of a nuclear power plant, regardless of tritium production. Impacts on ecological resources from the operation of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 would result from radioactive and nonradioactive emissions of air pollutants to the atmosphere; thermal, chemical, and radioactive effluent releases to surface waters; increases in human activity; and increases in noise levels. These impacts would be small, considering that the units would operate in compliance with all Federal, state, and local requirements specifically promulgated to protect environmental resources. The estimated radiological doses to terrestrial and aquatic organisms are well below levels that could have any impact on plants or terrestrial and aquatic animals at the site. Other possible environmental impacts on the aquatic ecosystem of Guntersville Reservoir due to operation of the Bellefonte units would include fish losses at the cooling water intake screens, almost total loss of unscreened entrained organisms, and effects of thermal and chemical discharges. The effects of both thermal and chemical discharges would be small, as these discharges would comply with NPDES limitations.

**Socioeconomics** During operations, approximately 800 direct jobs would be created at Bellefonte 1, along with approximately an equal number of indirect jobs. The total new jobs (approximately 1,600) would cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to decrease to approximately 6.2 percent. Public finance expenditures/revenues would decline from the levels achieved during construction, but would remain 10 to 15 percent higher than they would be otherwise at Scottsboro and 5 to 10 percent higher in Jackson County. Housing prices would decline and could fall below the precompletion prices, depending on how much new construction of permanent housing took place during the completion period and how many construction workers chose to remain in the area once construction was completed. If Bellefonte 2 were also completed, a total of approximately 1,000 direct jobs would be created along with approximately 1,000 indirect jobs.

**Radiation Exposure** Reactor operations to produce tritium would cause worker radiation exposure to increase from 0 to approximately 105 millirem per year. This resultant dose would be well within regulatory limits of 5,000 millirem per year. Radiation exposure to the maximally exposed individual from normal operations would increase from 0 to 0.28 millirem. The total dose to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) would increase from approximately 0 to approximately 2.3 person-rem per year for Bellefonte 1. If Bellefonte 2 also were operating, this dose would be approximately 4.6 person-rem per year. Statistically, this equates to one fatal cancer approximately every 435 years from the operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2.

**Spent Fuel Generation** Given production of the maximum amount of tritium in the average 18-month fuel cycle, spent fuel generation would increase from 0 up to a maximum of 141 spent fuel assemblies (i.e., 69 fuel assemblies over the normal refueling size). Because this EIS assumes that long-term spent fuel storage would take place at each of the reactor plants, a dry cask spent fuel storage facility could eventually be needed to store the additional assemblies. The impacts of storing the spent fuel in a dry cask spent fuel storage facility are described above for the existing operating reactor plants. As previously mentioned, appropriate NEPA documentation would be prepared before the construction of a dry cask spent fuel storage facility.

**Low-Level Radioactive Waste Generation** Compared to the No Action Alternative, reactor operation to produce tritium at Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 would generate approximately 40 cubic meters (80 cubic meters for both units) of low-level radioactive waste. This quantity would be a small fraction of the landfill capacity at the Barnwell disposal facility or the Savannah River Site's low-level radioactive waste disposal facility.



**Accident Risks** Compared to the No Action Alternative, there is a significant change in potential risks from tritium production. Risks due to accidents would increase during the construction and operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2, and during the operation of these units for production of tritium. Similar to Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2, the potential impacts from the accidents at Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 were determined using computer modeling. If a limiting design-basis accident occurred, tritium production would increase the individual risk of a fatal cancer by  $8.0 \times 10^{-10}$  additional fatal cancers to an individual living within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the units. Statistically this means that, for one individual, one fatal cancer would occur approximately every 1.3 billion years from tritium production at Bellefonte. If a beyond design-basis accident occurred (an accident that has a probability of occurring approximately once in a million years or less), tritium production would increase the risk of a fatal cancer by 0.00010 additional fatal cancers to an individual living within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant.

**Transportation** Tritium production at either Bellefonte 1 or 2 would necessitate transportation of workers, construction material, and radiological and nonradiological material to and from the reactor plants. Most of the additional transportation would involve nonradiological materials. Impacts of this transportation are limited to toxic vehicle emissions and traffic fatalities. For Bellefonte 1 or 2, the transportation risks would be significantly lower than one fatality per year. Radiological materials transportation impacts would occur as a result of routine and accidental doses. In all instances the risks associated with radiological materials transportation would be less than one fatality per 100,000 years.

### **3.2.7 Preferred Alternative**

The Council on Environmental Quality regulations require that an agency identify its Preferred Alternative(s) in the Final EIS (40 CFR 1502.14e). The Preferred Alternative is defined as the alternative that the agency believes would fulfill its statutory mission, giving consideration to environmental, economic, technical, and other factors. This EIS provides information on the environmental impacts. Cost, schedule, and technical analyses will be discussed in the Record of Decision for the EIS. DOE has identified the purchase of irradiation services from the Watts Bar and Sequoyah reactor facilities as the Preferred Alternative for the production of tritium in a CLWR. Under the Preferred Alternative, no more than 3,400 TPBARs would be irradiated in a single reactor per each refueling cycle. In implementing the Preferred Alternative, DOE and TVA would minimize, to the extent practicable, the generation of additional spent nuclear fuel.

Table 3-13 Summary of Environmental Consequences for the CLWR Reactor Alternatives

Resource/Material Categories	Watts Bar 1	Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2	Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2
<b>No Action</b>			
All Resource/Material Categories	No construction or operational changes. Reactor unit continues to produce electricity. No change in environmental impacts.	No construction or operational changes. Reactor units continue to produce electricity. No change in environmental impacts.	No construction or operational changes. Reactor units remain uncompleted. No change in environmental impacts.
<b>Annual Tritium Production</b>			
Land Resources Land Use	<i>Construction:</i> Potential land disturbance - 5.3 acres for dry cask ISFSI if constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> Potential permanent land requirement - 3.1 acres for ISFSI if constructed.	<i>Construction:</i> Potential land disturbance - 5.47 acres for ISFSI if constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> Potential permanent land requirement - 3.2 acres for ISFSI if constructed.	<i>Construction:</i> Potential land disturbance - 4.9 acres for ISFSI if constructed and additional land for support buildings.  <i>Operation:</i> Potential permanent land requirement - 3.4 acres for ISFSI if constructed and additional land for support buildings.
Visual Resources	<i>Construction and Operation:</i> No additional impact to visual resources.	<i>Construction and Operation:</i> No additional impact to visual resources.	<i>Construction:</i> No additional impact to visual resources.  <i>Operation:</i> <u>Cooling tower</u> vapor plumes would be visible up to 10 miles away.
Noise	<i>Construction:</i> No change from current levels. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> No change from current levels.	<i>Construction:</i> No change from current levels. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> No change from current levels.	<i>Construction:</i> No change from current levels except for construction vehicle traffic. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> Increase in noise <u>levels</u> from 50 dBA (decibels A-weighted) to 51 dBA at nearest receptor. Increase in traffic noise on onsite access roads from 50 dBA to 57 dBA due to commuter traffic and truck deliveries.

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1</i>	<i>Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2</i>
<b>Air Quality</b> Nonradioactive Emissions	<p><i>Construction:</i> No change from current air quality conditions. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No change from current air quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No change from current air quality conditions. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No change from current air quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential temporary dust emissions during construction. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> The increase in nonradioactive <u>air pollutant concentrations</u> would be well within established standards.</p>
<b>Air Quality</b> Radioactive Emissions	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radioactive emissions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 100 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 340 Curies.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radioactive emissions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 100 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 340 Curies.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radioactive emissions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 106 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 346 Curies, of which 5.6 Curies would be from normal operation without tritium production. The release of other radioactive emissions would be 283 Curies.</p>
<b>Water Resources</b> Surface Water	<p><i>Construction:</i> No change to current surface water requirements, discharge, or water quality conditions. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No change to current surface water requirements.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No change to current surface water requirements, discharge, or water quality conditions. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No change to current surface water requirements.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential for increased stormwater runoff. Small amount of surface water requirements. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Increased surface water requirements and discharge. Water usage less than 1 percent of Tennessee River flow per year. All water quality parameters within <u>established</u> limits.</p>

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1</i>	<i>Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2</i>
<b>Water Resources (cont'd) Radioactive Effluent</b>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radioactive effluents.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive tritium effluents would be 900 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 3,060 Curies.</p> <p>Tritium concentration will remain well below the EPA limit of 20,000 picocuries per liter.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radioactive effluents.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive tritium effluents would be 900 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 3,060 Curies.</p> <p>Tritium concentration will remain well below the EPA limit of 20,000 picocuries per liter.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radioactive effluents.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive tritium effluents would be 1,539 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 3,699 Curies, of which 639 Curies would be from normal operation without tritium production. The release of other radioactive effluents would be 1.32 Curies.</p> <p>Tritium concentration will remain well below the EPA limit of 20,000 picocuries per liter.</p>
<b>Groundwater</b>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Groundwater would not be used during construction.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions.</p>
<b>Ecological Resources</b>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No additional impacts on ecological resources. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Small or no impacts to ecological resources from additional tritium releases.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No additional impacts on ecological resources. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Small or no impacts to ecological resources from additional tritium release.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential impacts to ecological resources due to the small amount of land disturbance. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Additional impacts on ecological resources, including fish impingement and entrainment of aquatic biota during normal plant operation. Small impacts to ecological resources from tritium and other radioactive releases during normal plant operations.</p>

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1</i>	<i>Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2</i>
<b>Socioeconomics</b>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No measurable impact.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> &lt;1 percent impact on regional economy.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No measurable impact.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> &lt;1 percent impact on regional economy.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> 4,500 peak new direct jobs due to plant completion. Short-term increased costs and traffic for local jurisdictions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> 800 to 1,000 workers per day. Increase in payment-in-lieu of taxes to state and local jurisdictions (approximately \$5.5 to \$8 million annually), decrease in the unemployment rate (from 8.2 percent to approximately 6.2 percent), and minor impacts to school resources.</p>
<b>Public and Occupational Health and Safety</b> Normal Operation	<p>Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs: <i>Workers:</i> Average dose increase by <u>0.33</u> millirem.</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.013</u> millirem.</p> <p><i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.34</u> person-rem.</p> <p>Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs: <i>Workers:</i> Average dose increase by <u>1.1</u> millirem.</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.05</u> millirem. <i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by <u>1.2</u> person-rem.</p>	<p>Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs: <i>Workers:</i> Average dose increase by <u>0.24</u> millirem.</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.017</u> millirem.</p> <p><i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.57</u> person-rem.</p> <p>Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs: <i>Workers:</i> Average dose increase by <u>0.82</u> millirem.</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.057</u> millirem. <i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by <u>1.9</u> person-rem.</p>	<p>Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs: <i>Workers:</i> Average dose increase by <u>104.33</u> millirem, of which 104 millirem would be from normal operations without tritium production. <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.263</u> millirem, of which 0.26 millirem would be from normal operations without tritium production. <i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by <u>1.6</u> person-rem, of which 1.4 person-rem would be from normal operations without tritium production.</p> <p>Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs: <i>Workers:</i> Average dose increase by <u>105.1</u> millirem, of which 104 millirem would be from normal operations without tritium production. <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by <u>0.28</u> millirem. <i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by <u>2.3</u> person-rem.</p>

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1</i>	<i>Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2</i>
Design-Basis Accident Risks	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production:</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i>  <math>3.4 \times 10^{-8}</math> (1 fatality in <u>29</u> million years).</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i>  <math>4.0 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in <u>2.5</u> billion years).</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i>  <u>0.000074</u> (1 fatality in <u>13</u> thousand years).</p> <p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <math>4.2 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in <u>2.4</u> billion years).</p> <p><i>Involved worker, reactor design-basis accident:</i>  In the highly unlikely event the workers are in containment at the time of the accident they will die due to the energy (steam) released to the containment. Evacuation from containment is not considered feasible.</p> <p><i>Involved worker, nonreactor design-basis accident:</i>  In the highly unlikely event that involved workers are in the immediate area of a rupture of the gas decay tank or associated piping, they could be injured by debris or the stream of gas from the rupture. In addition, involved workers could receive a radiation dose while evacuating the area. If the accident is initiated by a valve failure or human error, the release will be vented out of the auxiliary building stack. The involved worker is not at risk of injury or an additional radiation dose.</p>	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production:</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i>  <math>7.9 \times 10^{-9}</math> (1 fatality in <u>130</u> million years).</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i>  <math>6.1 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in <u>1.6</u> billion years).</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i>  <u>0.00015</u> (1 fatality in <u>6.6</u> thousand years).</p> <p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <math>1.3 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in <u>7.7</u> billion years).</p> <p><i>Involved worker, reactor design-basis accident:</i>  In the highly unlikely event the workers are in containment at the time of the accident they will die due to the energy (steam) released to the containment. Evacuation from containment is not considered feasible.</p> <p><i>Involved worker, nonreactor design-basis accident:</i>  In the highly unlikely event that involved workers are in the immediate area of a rupture of the gas decay tank or associated piping, they could be injured by debris or the stream of gas from the rupture. In addition, involved workers could receive a radiation dose while evacuating the area. If the accident is initiated by a valve failure or human error, the release will be vented out of the auxiliary building stack. The involved worker is not at risk of injury or an additional radiation dose.</p>	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production:</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i>  <math>3.5 \times 10^{-7}</math> (1 fatality in <u>2.9</u> million years).</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i>  <math>2.6 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in <u>3.8</u> billion years).</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i>  <u>0.000070</u> (1 fatality in <u>14</u> thousand years).</p> <p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <math>1.2 \times 10^{-12}</math> (1 fatality in <u>830</u> billion years).</p> <p><i>Involved worker, reactor design-basis accident:</i>  In the highly unlikely event the workers are in containment at the time of the accident they will die due to the energy (steam) released to the containment. Evacuation from containment is not considered feasible.</p> <p><i>Involved worker, nonreactor design-basis accident:</i>  In the highly unlikely event that involved workers are in the immediate area of a rupture of the gas decay tank or associated piping, they could be injured by debris or the stream of gas from the rupture. In addition, involved workers could receive a radiation dose while evacuating the area. If the accident is initiated by a valve failure or human error, the release will be vented out of the auxiliary building stack. The involved worker is not at risk of injury or an additional radiation dose.</p>

Resource/Material Categories	Watts Bar 1	Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2	Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2
Beyond Design-Basis Accident Risks	<p>For 3,400 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <math>1.1 \times 10^{-7}</math> (1 fatality in <u>9.1</u> million years).</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>1.4 \times 10^{-9}</math> (1 fatality in <u>710</u> million years).</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i> <u>0.00026</u> (1 fatality in <u>3.8</u> thousand years).</p> <p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <math>1.5 \times 10^{-9}</math> (1 fatality in <u>670</u> million years).</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Same as above for 1,000 TPBARs.</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Same as above for 1,000 TPBARs.</p>	<p>For 3,400 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual :</i> <math>2.7 \times 10^{-8}</math> (1 fatality in <u>37</u> million years).</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>2.1 \times 10^{-9}</math> (1 fatality in <u>480</u> million years).</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i> <u>0.00052</u> (1 fatality in <u>1.9</u> thousand years).</p> <p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <math>4.5 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in <u>2.2</u> billion years).</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Same as above for 1,000 TPBARs.</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Same as above for 1,000 TPBARs.</p>	<p>For 3,400 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <math>3.6 \times 10^{-7}</math> (1 fatality in <u>2.8</u> million years).</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>8.0 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in <u>1.3</u> billion years).</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i> <u>0.00022</u> (1 fatality in <u>4.6</u> thousand years).</p> <p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <math>4.3 \times 10^{-12}</math> (1 fatality in <u>230</u> billion years).</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Same as above for 1,000 TPBARs.</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Same as above for 1,000 TPBARs.</p>
	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production.</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Due to accuracy limitations in the accident analysis computer code, the incremental risk of tritium production is not discernable from the risk of operation without tritium production.</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i> Due to accuracy limitations in the accident analysis computer code, the incremental risk of tritium production is not discernable from the risk of operation without tritium production.</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i> Due to accuracy limitations in the accident analysis computer code, the incremental risk of tritium production is not discernable from the risk of operation without tritium production.</p>	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production.</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual :</i> Due to accuracy limitations in the accident analysis computer code, the incremental risk of tritium production is not discernable from the risk of operation without tritium production.</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i> Due to accuracy limitations in the accident analysis computer code, the incremental risk of tritium production is not discernable from the risk of operation without tritium production.</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i> Due to accuracy limitations in the accident analysis computer code, the incremental risk of tritium production is not discernable from the risk of operation without tritium production.</p>	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production.</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <math>3.3 \times 10^{-8}</math> (1 fatality in 30 million years).</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>1.4 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 7.1 billion years).</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i> <u>0.00017</u> (1 fatality in 5.8 thousand years).</p>

Resource/Material Categories	Watts Bar 1	Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2	Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2
	<p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> Not applicable. Noninvolved worker has evacuated the plant before a release. Evacuation warning to noninvolved worker is at least one hour before a release.</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Most of the postulated accident sequences have adequate time for workers to evacuate the containment before there is a radioactive release to the containment. If the accident sequence is initiated by a large break loss-of-coolant accident or another high energy release mechanism, workers in containment will die due to the energy (steam) released to the containment. Evacuation from containment is not considered feasible during a high energy steam release accident scenario.</p> <p>For 3,400 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <math>1.0 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 10 billion years).</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>1.0 \times 10^{-11}</math> (1 fatality in 100 billion years).</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i> 0.000011 (1 fatality in 88 thousand years).</p> <p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> Same as for 1,000 TPBARs.</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Same as for 1,000 TPBARs.</p>	<p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> Not applicable. Noninvolved worker has evacuated the plant before a release. Evacuation warning to noninvolved worker is at least one hour before a release.</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Most of the postulated accident sequences have adequate time for workers to evacuate the containment before there is a radioactive release to the containment. If the accident sequence is initiated by a large break loss-of-coolant accident or another high energy release mechanism, workers in containment will die due to the energy (steam) released to the containment. Evacuation from containment is not considered feasible during a high energy steam release accident scenario.</p> <p>For 3,400 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual :</i> <math>1.0 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 10 billion years).</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>1.1 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 9.1 billion years).</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i> 0.00014 (1 fatality in 7.1 thousand years).</p> <p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> Same as for 1,000 TPBARs.</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Same as for 1,000 TPBARs.</p>	<p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> Not applicable. Noninvolved worker has evacuated the plant before a release. Evacuation warning to noninvolved worker is at least one hour before a release.</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Most of the postulated accident sequences have adequate time for workers to evacuate the containment before there is a radioactive release to the containment. If the accident sequence is initiated by a large break loss-of-coolant accident or another high energy release mechanism, workers in containment will die due to the energy (steam) released to the containment. Evacuation from containment is not considered feasible during a high energy steam release accident scenario.</p> <p>For 3,400 TPBARs:</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <math>3.3 \times 10^{-8}</math> (1 fatality in 30 million years).</p> <p><i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>1.5 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 6.6 billion years).</p> <p><i>Exposed population:</i> 0.00018 (1 fatality in 5.5 thousand years).</p> <p><i>Noninvolved worker:</i> Same as for 1,000 TPBARs.</p> <p><i>Involved worker:</i> Same as for 1,000 TPBARs.</p>



<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1</i>	<i>Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2</i>
<b>Waste Management</b>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential nonhazardous waste if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Low-level radioactive waste increase by approximately 0.43 cubic meters per year. Other waste types would be unaffected by tritium production.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential nonhazardous waste if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Low-level radioactive waste increase by approximately 0.43 cubic meters per unit per year. Other waste types would be unaffected by tritium production.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Minor amounts of nonhazardous construction material waste generated during the completion of the plant. Potential nonhazardous waste if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Low-level radioactive waste increase by approximately 41 cubic meters per unit per year, of which 40 cubic meters would be from normal operations without tritium production.</p>
<b>Spent Nuclear Fuel Management</b>	<p><i>Operation:</i> No increase if less than 2,000 TPBARs are irradiated. If 3,400 TPBARs are irradiated, the amount of spent fuel generated would increase by a maximum of 56 fuel assemblies per fuel cycle.</p>	<p><i>Operation:</i> No increase if less than 2,000 TPBARs are irradiated. If 3,400 TPBARs are irradiated, the amount of spent fuel generated would increase by a maximum of 60 fuel assemblies per fuel cycle.</p>	<p><i>Operation:</i> The amount of spent fuel would increase from 0 to approximately 72 spent fuel assemblies for less than 2,000 TPBARs. For 3,400 TPBARs, the amount of spent fuel generation could increase from 0 to a maximum of 141 spent fuel assemblies per fuel cycle, of which 72 would be from normal operation without tritium production.</p>
<b>Transportation</b>	<p>The risk associated with radiological materials transportation would be less than one fatality per 100,000 years.</p>	<p>The risk associated with radiological materials transportation would be less than one fatality per 100,000 years.</p>	<p>The risk associated with radiological materials transportation would be less than one fatality per 100,000 years. Traffic volumes on local roads could increase during construction and operations.</p>
<b>Fuel Fabrication</b>	<p>Not applicable for the reactor site.</p>	<p>Not applicable for the reactor site.</p>	<p>Not applicable for the reactor site.</p>
<b>Decontamination and Decommissioning</b>	<p>Decontamination and decommissioning would be required but not because of tritium production.</p>	<p>Decontamination and decommissioning would be required but not because of tritium production.</p>	<p>Decontamination and decommissioning would be required. For a generic discussion on impacts from decontamination and decommissioning, see Section 5.2.5.</p>

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1</i>	<i>Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2</i>
<b>License Renewal</b>	Licensing renewal would be required. For a generic discussion on impacts from licensing renewal, see Section 5.2.4.	Licensing renewal would be required. For a generic discussion on impacts from licensing renewal, see Section 5.2.4.	Licensing renewal would not be required.

MEI = Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual.

ISFSI = Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

Table 3-14 Summary Comparison of Environmental Impacts Between CLWR Reactor Alternatives and the APT

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1 or Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2</i>	<i>CLWR No Action (APT at the Savannah River Site)</i>
<b>Land Resources</b> Land Use	<i>Construction:</i> Potential land requirement—5.3 acres (Watts Bar) or 5.47 acres (Sequoyah) of previously disturbed industrial land for a dry cask ISFSI if constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> Potential permanent land requirement - 3.1 to 3.2 acres, respectively, of previously disturbed industrial land for an ISFSI if constructed.	<i>Construction:</i> Potential land requirement—4.9 acres of previously disturbed industrial land for an ISFSI, if constructed, and additional small amounts of land for support buildings.  <i>Operation:</i> Potential permanent land requirement - 3.4 acres of previously disturbed industrial land for an ISFSI, if constructed, and additional small amounts of land for support buildings.	<i>Construction and Operation:</i> 250 acres of land converted to industrial use. Additional lands for new roads, bridge upgrades, rail lines, and construction landfill. Additional 12 acres required for modular design, if selected. Additional land required for electric power generating facility, if constructed (e.g., 110 acres for a natural gas-fired facility and 290 acres for a coal-fired facility).
<b>Visual Resources</b>	<i>Construction and Operation:</i> No additional impact to visual resources.	<i>Construction:</i> No additional impact to visual resources.  <i>Operation:</i> Vapor plumes under certain meteorological conditions would be visible up to 10 miles away.	<i>Construction:</i> No additional impact to visual resources.  <i>Operation:</i> Vapor plumes under certain meteorological conditions would be visible.
<b>Noise</b>	<i>Construction:</i> No change from current levels. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> No change from current levels.	<i>Construction:</i> No change from current levels except for construction vehicle traffic. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> Increase in noise emissions from the plant from 50 dBA to 51 dBA at nearest receptor. Increase in traffic noise on site access roads from 50 dBA to 57 dBA due to commuter traffic and truck deliveries.	<i>Construction:</i> No change from current levels except for construction vehicle traffic.  <i>Operation:</i> Increase in noise emissions from the new APT facility, electric power generating facility (if constructed), and support facilities.
<b>Air Quality</b> Non-radiological Emissions	<i>Construction:</i> No change from current air quality conditions. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> No change from current air quality conditions.	<i>Construction:</i> Potential temporary dust emissions during construction. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.  <i>Operation:</i> The increase in nonradioactive emissions would be within established standards.	<i>Construction:</i> Potential temporary dust emissions during construction.  <i>Operation:</i> The increase in nonradiological emissions would be within standards. Large increase in carbon dioxide emissions from any electric power generating facility.

<b>Resource/Material Categories</b>	<b>Watts Bar 1 or Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</b>	<b>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2</b>	<b>CLWR No Action (APT at the Savannah River Site)*</b>
<b>Radioactive Emissions</b>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radiological emissions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 100 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 340 Curies.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radiological emissions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 106 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 346 Curies, of which 5.6 Curies would be from normal operation without tritium production. The release of other radioactive emissions would be 283 Curies.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radiological emissions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> The maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 30,000 Curies in oxide form and 8,600 Curies in elemental form. The release of other radioactive emissions would be 2,250 Curies. Potential for an additional 2,000 Curies from electric power generating facility if power is acquired through market transaction (APT Final EIS p. C-46 &amp; Draft EIS p. 4-80).</p>
<b>Water Resources Surface Water</b>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No change to current surface water requirements, discharge, or water quality conditions. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No change to current surface water requirements, discharge, or water quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential for increased storm water runoff. Small amount of surface water requirements. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Increased surface water requirements and discharge. Water usage less than 1 percent of Tennessee River flow per year. All water quality parameters within established limits.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Increased storm water runoff and impacts from dewatering. Surface water requirements.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Increased surface water requirements and discharge. Potential for additional water requirements from an electric power generating facility, if constructed—4.7 billion gallons per day (coal-fired) and 1.4 billion gallons per day (natural gas-fired). All water quality parameters within established limits (APT Draft EIS p. 4-81).</p>
<b>Water Resources Radioactive Effluent</b>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radiological effluent.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 900 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs, 3,060 Curies.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radiological effluent.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Given 1,000 TPBARs, the maximum potential increase in annual radioactive emissions of tritium would be 1,539 Curies; given 3,400 TPBARs 3,699 Curies, of which 639 Curies from normal operation without tritium production. The release of other radioactive effluents would be 1.32 Curies.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No radiological effluent.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> The maximum potential increase in annual radioactive tritium effluents would be 3,000 Curies and 0.0031 Curies from other radioactive emissions. Potential for an additional 19,000 Curies from the electric power generating facility if power is acquired through market transaction (APT Final EIS p. C-43 &amp; Draft EIS 4-80).</p>
<b>Groundwater</b>	<p><i>Construction and Operation:</i> No groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Groundwater would not be used during construction.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> No groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Due to below-ground construction of the APT, groundwater would be withdrawn and discharged to surface water.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Potential for a 6,000 gallons per minute withdrawal of groundwater for APT cooling water (APT Draft EIS p. 4-3).</p>

<b>Resource/Material Categories</b>	<b>Watts Bar 1 or Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</b>	<b>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2</b>	<b>CLWR No Action (APT at the Savannah River Site)*</b>
<b>Ecological Resources</b>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No additional impacts on ecological resources. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Small or no impacts to ecological resources from tritium production.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential impacts to ecological resources due to the small amount of land disturbance. Small impacts if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Impacts on ecological resources, including fish impingement and entrainment of aquatic biota during normal plant operation. Small impacts to ecological resources from tritium and other radioactive releases during normal plant operations.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential impacts to ecological resources due to land disturbance.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Impacts on ecological resources, including fish impingement and entrainment of aquatic biota during normal plant operation. Small impacts to ecological resources from tritium and other radioactive releases during normal operations. Potential additional impacts on ecological resources from electric power generating plant, if constructed.</p>
<b>Socioeconomics</b>	<p><i>Construction:</i> No measurable impact.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> less than 1 percent impact on regional economy.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> 4,500 peak new direct jobs due to plant completion. Short-term increased costs and traffic for local jurisdictions.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> 800 to 1,000 workers per day. Increase in payment-in-lieu of taxes to state and local jurisdictions (approximately \$5.5 to \$8 million annually), decrease in the unemployment rate (from 8.2 percent in 1997 to approximately 6.2 percent), and minor impacts to school resources.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> 1,400 peak new direct jobs. Short-term increased costs and traffic for local jurisdictions. Additional 1,100 peak jobs associated with new electric power generating facility, if constructed (APT Draft EIS p. 4-80).</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> 500 workers per day. Increase in payment-in-lieu of taxes to state and local jurisdictions, decrease in the unemployment rate, and minor impacts to school resources. Additional 200 jobs associated with new electric power generating facility, if constructed (APT Draft EIS p. 4-80).</p>

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1 or Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2</i>	<i>CLWR No Action (APT at the Savannah River Site)*</i>
Public and Occupational Health and Safety Normal Operation	<p>Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs:  <i>Workers:</i> Total dose - 112.35 person-rem (Watts Bar) and 132.35 person-rem (Sequoyah).  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by 0.013 millirem (Watts Bar) and 0.017 millirem (Sequoyah).</p> <p><i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by 0.34 person-rem (Watts Bar) and 0.60 person-rem (Sequoyah).</p> <p>Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs:  <i>Workers:</i> Total dose 113.2 person-rem (Watts Bar) and 133.2 person-rem (Sequoyah).  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by 0.05 millirem (Watts Bar) and 0.057 millirem (Sequoyah).</p> <p><i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by 1.2 person-rem (Watts Bar) and 1.9 person-rem (Sequoyah).</p>	<p>Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs:  <i>Workers:</i> Total dose—112.35 person-rem per unit; 112 person-rem per unit from normal operations without tritium production.  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by 0.263 millirem per unit, of which 0.26 millirem per unit would be from normal operation without tritium production.</p> <p><i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by 1.6 person-rem per unit, of which 1.4 person-rem per unit would be from normal operation without tritium production.</p> <p>Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs:  <i>Workers:</i> Total dose—113.2 person-rem; 112 person-rem from per unit normal operations without tritium production.  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by 0.28 millirem per unit, of which 0.26 millirem per unit would be from normal operation without tritium production.</p> <p><i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by 2.3 person-rem per unit, of which 1.4 person-rem per unit would be from normal operation without tritium production.</p>	<p>Annual dose  <i>Workers:</i> Total dose - 72 person-rem (APT Draft EIS p. 4-39).</p> <p><i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> Dose increase by 0.053 millirem (APT Final EIS p. C-52).</p> <p><i>50-mile population:</i> Dose increase by 3.1 person-rem (APT Final EIS p. C-52).</p>

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1 or Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2</i>	<i>CLWR No Action (APT at the Savannah River Site)*</i>
Design-Basis Accident Risks	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production.</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs:  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <math>3.4 \times 10^{-8}</math> (1 fatality in 29 million years - Watts Bar) and <math>7.9 \times 10^{-9}</math> (1 fatality in 130 million years - Sequoyah).  <i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>4.0 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 2.5 billion years - Watts Bar) and <math>6.1 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 1.6 billion years - Sequoyah).  <i>Exposed population:</i> 0.000074 (1 fatality in 13 thousand years - Watts Bar) and 0.00015 (1 fatality in 6.6 thousand years).  <i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <math>4.2 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 2.4 billion years - Watts Bar) and <math>1.3 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 7.7 billion years - Sequoyah).</p> <p>For 3,400 TPBARs:  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <math>1.1 \times 10^{-7}</math> (1 fatality in 9.1 million years - Watts Bar) and <math>2.7 \times 10^{-8}</math> (1 fatality in 37 million years - Sequoyah).  <i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>1.4 \times 10^{-9}</math> (1 fatality in 710 million years - Watts Bar) and <math>2.1 \times 10^{-9}</math> (1 fatality in 480 million years - Sequoyah).  <i>Exposed population:</i> 0.00026 (1 fatality in 3.8 thousand years - Watts Bar) and 0.00052 (1 fatality in 1.9 thousand years).  <i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <math>1.5 \times 10^{-9}</math> (1 fatality in 670 million years - Watts Bar) and <math>4.5 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 2.2 billion years - Sequoyah).</p>	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production.</p> <p>For 1,000 TPBARs:  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <math>3.5 \times 10^{-7}</math> (1 fatality in 2.9 million years).    <i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>2.6 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 3.8 billion years).    <i>Exposed population:</i> 0.000070 (1 fatality in 14 thousand years).    <i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <math>1.2 \times 10^{-12}</math> (1 fatality in 830 billion years).</p> <p>For 3,400 TPBARs:  <i>Maximally Exposed Individual:</i> <math>3.6 \times 10^{-7}</math> (1 fatality in 2.8 million years).    <i>Average individual in population:</i> <math>8.0 \times 10^{-10}</math> (1 fatality in 1.3 billion years).    <i>Exposed population:</i> 0.00022 (1 fatality in 4.6 thousand years).    <i>Noninvolved worker:</i> <math>4.3 \times 10^{-12}</math> (1 fatality in 230 billion years).</p>	<p>Increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year due to tritium production.</p> <p>Design-basis seismic event: 2.6 fatalities every 2,000 years.</p>

<b>Resource/Material Categories</b>	<b>Watts Bar 1 or Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</b>	<b>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2</b>	<b>CLWR No Action (APT at the Savannah River Site)*</b>
<b>Waste Management</b>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Potential nonhazardous waste if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Low-level radioactive waste increase by approximately 0.43 cubic meters per unit per year. Other waste types would be unaffected by tritium production.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> Minor amounts of nonhazardous construction material waste generated during the completion of the plant. Potential for additional nonhazardous waste material generated if an ISFSI is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Low-level radioactive waste increase by approximately 41 cubic meters per unit per year, of which 40 cubic meters would be from normal operation without tritium production. Other waste types would also be generated due to tritium production.</p>	<p><i>Construction:</i> 30,000 cubic meters of construction material generated and deposited in onsite landfill. Potential for additional nonhazardous waste material generated if new electric power generating facility is constructed.</p> <p><i>Operation:</i> Low-level radioactive waste increase by approximately 1,400 cubic meters per year. Potential for additional 10,000 units of nuclear solid waste if power is acquired through market transaction (APT Draft EIS p. 4-80). Other waste types would also be generated due to tritium production and electric power generation (APT Draft EIS p. 4-26).</p>
<b>Spent Nuclear Fuel Management</b>	<p><i>Operation:</i> No increase if less than 2,000 TPBARs are radiated. If 3,400 TPBARs are irradiated, the amount of spent fuel generated would increase by a maximum of 60 (Sequoyah), and 56 (Watts Bar) fuel assemblies per fuel cycle.</p>	<p><i>Operation:</i> The amount of spent fuel would increase from 0 to approximately 72 spent fuel assemblies for less than 2,000 TPBARs. For 3,400 TPBARs, the amount of spent fuel generation could increase from zero to a maximum of 141 spent fuel assemblies per fuel cycle, of which 72 would be from normal operation without tritium production.</p>	<p><i>Operation:</i> Spent nuclear fuel would be generated under the market transaction/existing capacity alternative for electric power generation.</p>
<b>Transportation</b>	<p>The risk associated with radiological materials transportation would be less than one fatality per 100,000 years.</p>	<p>The risk associated with radiological materials transportation would be less than one fatality per 100,000 years. Traffic volumes on local roads could increase during construction and operations.</p>	<p>Transportation within the Savannah River Site only.</p>
<b>Fuel Fabrication</b>	<p>Not applicable for reactor site.</p>	<p>Not applicable for reactor site.</p>	<p>Not applicable for APT facility. Yes for electric-generating facility.</p>
<b>Decontamination and Decommissioning</b>	<p>Decontamination and decommissioning would be required but not because of tritium production.</p>	<p>Decontamination and decommissioning would be required. For a generic discussion on impacts from decontamination and decommissioning, see Section 5.2.5.</p>	<p>Decontamination and decommissioning would be required.</p>
<b>License Renewal</b>	<p>Licensing renewal would be required. For a generic discussion on impacts from licensing renewal, see Section 5.2.4.</p>	<p>Licensing renewal would not be required.</p>	<p>Licensing renewal is not applicable.</p>

\* Based on tritium production of 3 kilograms of tritium per year.



# **Chapter 4**

## **Affected Environment**

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## 4. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT

Chapter 4 describes the affected environment associated with the production of tritium in commercial light water reactors. The chapter begins with a brief introduction, followed by descriptions of the affected environment at each of the alternative reactor sites being considered for tritium production.

### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

In accordance with Council on Environmental Quality regulations, the affected environment is "interpreted comprehensively to include the natural and physical environment and the relationship of people with that environment," (40 CFR 1508.14).

The descriptions of the affected environment provide bases for understanding the direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of the alternatives. The localities and characteristics of each potentially affected environmental resource are described for each site. The scope of the discussions varies with each resource to ensure that all relevant issues are included. The level of detail in the description of each resource also varies with the expectation of a potential impact to the resource. Resources expected to be impacted by the proposed action are discussed in more detail than those resources that are not likely to be affected. For instance, the descriptions of land resources, geology and soils, and archaeological and historic resources that are not expected to be impacted because of limited, if any, construction activities are less detailed. On the other hand, ambient conditions are described in greater detail for air and water resources that could be affected by the plant's intake and discharges at each site. This information serves as a basis for analyzing key air and water quality parameters to obtain results that can be compared with regulatory standards.

Socioeconomic conditions are described for the counties and communities that could be affected by regional population changes associated with the proposed program. The affected environment discussions include projections of regional growth and related socioeconomic indicators. Each region is large enough to encompass any growth related to direct project employment, as well as any secondary jobs that may be created by the program. As for other environmental resources, the level of detail is commensurate with the expected socioeconomic impacts from the proposed action. For the currently operating units, only the socioeconomic impacts associated with incremental, tritium-related changes to the plants are considered. This environmental impact statement (EIS) provides less detail concerning current conditions for the operating units, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Watts Bar 1) and Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (Sequoyah 1 and 2). However, more detail is provided for the partially constructed Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (Bellefonte 1 and 2).

In addition to the natural and human environmental resources discussed above, the affected environment sections include a number of issues related to the ongoing activities at each site. These issues involve effluents from facility operations; waste and spent nuclear fuel management; and radiological and hazardous impacts during normal operation and from potential accidents.

## **4.2 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT**

### **4.2.1 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1**

As discussed in Section 3.2.5, one of the reactor options under consideration is the irradiation of tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) at Watts Bar 1. This option is based on the assumption that Watts Bar 1 would operate at its licensed full power output for the generation of electricity, with no reduced operability attributable to the production of tritium. The tritium production activity would be considered a secondary mission of the unit.

Preliminary construction of Watts Bar 1 started in spring 1973 (TVA 1995a). The major construction elements were largely completed by 1985. From 1985 to 1992, Watts Bar 1 underwent extensive reviews and modifications. Construction work was put on hold in December 1990. Work was resumed in November 1991 and, after extensive site review, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) gave the site permission to resume full construction activities in May 1992. Watts Bar 1 was granted a full power operating license on February 7, 1996, and began commercial operation in May 1996. In October 1997, four lead test assemblies (fuel assemblies containing TPBARs) were inserted in the Watts Bar 1 reactor core in a demonstration to provide confidence to regulators and confirm that tritium production in a commercial light water reactor (CLWR) is both technically reasonable and safe. The status of this demonstration is described in Section 1.5.1.2.

Watts Bar 1 is described briefly in Section 3.2.5.1. Detailed descriptions of the site, buildings, structures, systems, and operations are provided in the licensing and environmental documents for the plant, which are listed below.

- TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority), *Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Final Safety Analysis Report, through Amendment 91*, (TVA 1995c).
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Regulation), *Final Environmental Statement Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Tennessee Valley Authority* (NRC 1995b).
- NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation), *Final Environmental Statement Related to Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Tennessee Valley Authority* (NRC 1978).

The regional and local climatology and meteorology of the Watts Bar 1 site was described in the *Final Environmental Statement Related to Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2* (NRC 1978) and was re-evaluated in 1995 (NRC 1995b) with consideration of additional data accumulated in the intervening years. It was determined that the records used for the 1978 Final Environmental Statement provide an adequate representation of regional climatic conditions. This information was updated with the inclusion of more recent climatological and meteorological data for Chattanooga, Tennessee.

The following sections describe the affected environment at the Watts Bar 1 site for land resources, air quality, noise, water resources, geology and soils, ecology, cultural resources, and socioeconomics. In addition, the radiation and hazardous chemical environment, the waste management conditions, and the spent nuclear fuel considerations at Watts Bar 1 are described.

#### 4.2.1.1 Land Resources

##### Land Use

Watts Bar 1 is on the Watts Bar Reservation in Rhea County, Tennessee, approximately 80 kilometers (50 miles) northeast of Chattanooga, Tennessee, and 50 kilometers (31 miles) north-northeast of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site (TVA 1995c). The location of the site is shown in Figure 4-1. The Watts Bar Reservation on which Watts Bar 1 is located is a 716-hectare (1,770-acre) area on the west bank of the Chickamauga Reservoir. Watts Bar 1 is on the Tennessee River at River Mile 528 (River Mile refers to the distance along the Tennessee River measured from its mouth). The site layout is shown in Figure 4-2. The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant site already is dedicated to power generation.

The region of influence for land use includes lands within 3.2 kilometers (2 miles) of the Watts Bar Reservation. Land uses in the vicinity of Watts Bar 1 are classified as industrial, agricultural, forest, and recreational. The reservation that encloses the Watts Bar 1 site is maintained by TVA for the U.S. Government. In addition to Watts Bar 1, the reservation contains the Watts Bar Steam Plant, which has not operated since 1983 and has been deleted from the air emission permit for the area; the Watts Bar Dam and Hydroelectric Plant; the TVA Central Maintenance Facility; and the Watts Bar Resort Area (TVA 1995c).

##### Industry

The only significant industrial facility in the vicinity of Watts Bar, although it is not operating at the present time, is the Watts Bar Steam Plant, a 240-megawatt coal-fired power plant that was shut down and placed in standby mode by TVA in 1983.

##### Agriculture

The total area of Rhea County and nearby Meigs County is approximately 1,290 square kilometers (498 square miles), of which about 34 percent, or 440 square kilometers (170 square miles), is unforested and used for agriculture (GISP 1998a, GISP 1998c).

##### Forest

Forests in the two-county area amount to 84,800 hectares (209,500 acres). They tend to be scattered along narrow ridges. Approximately 14 percent of forested land consists of loblolly-shortleaf pine. Hardwood forests of the oak-hickory type cover 62 percent of the forested land. The remainder supports mixtures of oak and pine (DOA 1998a, DOA 1998d).

##### Recreation

The Watts Bar Reservation and the adjacent Watts Bar Resort are major recreation attractions in the immediate vicinity of the plant. In general, the Watts Bar and Chickamauga Reservoirs attract a high level of water-based recreation. The peak usage time is April 15 through October 15 (TVA 1971). Demand for recreation results in a large influx of daytime and overnight users.






Figure 4-1 Location of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site




Figure 4-2 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site

### **Nature Reserves**

The Hiwassee Waterfowl Refuge, Ocoee Wildlife Management Area, and the Yellow Creek Wildlife Management Area are located within 64 kilometers (40 miles) of the Watts Bar Reservation. There are three state forests and one national forest within 48 kilometers (30 miles) of the site: Falls Creek Falls State Park and Forest, Bledsoe State Forest, Mount Roosevelt State Forest, and Cherokee National Forest.

### **Visual Resources**

The region of influence for visual resources includes those lands from which the site is visible. The major visual elements of the plant already exist, including the cooling towers, containment structures, turbine building, and transmission lines. Views of Watts Bar 1 from passing river traffic on the Tennessee River are partially screened by the wooded area east of the plant. Distant glimpses of the plant site can be seen from the coves and hollows along the river, as well as from various area roads such as State Route 68 (TVA 1995c).

Based on the Bureau of Land Management Visual Resource Management method, the existing landscape at the site would be classified as Class 3 or 4. Class 3 includes areas where there has been a moderate change in the landscape and these changes may attract attention, but do not dominate the view of the casual observer. Class 4 includes areas where major modifications to the character of the landscape have occurred. These changes may be both dominant features of the view and the major focus of viewer attention (DOI 1986a).

During operation of Watts Bar 1, the vapor plume associated with the cooling towers can be visible up to 16 kilometers (10 miles) away. The plume length and frequency of occurrence varies with atmospheric conditions, being most visible during cooler months and after the passage of weather fronts. Plumes would be less visible during the summer months, when hazy conditions persist and morning fog is more common. Vapor plumes are visible at times from nearby residential areas, State Route 68, and other nearby roads (TVA 1972).

#### **4.2.1.2 Noise**

The most common measure of environmental noise impact is the day-night average sound level. The day-night average sound level is a 24-hour sound level with a 10-decibels A-weighted (dBA) penalty added to sound levels between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. to account for increased annoyance due to noise during nighttime hours. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has developed noise level guidelines for different land-use classifications based on day-night average and equivalent sound levels. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has established noise impact guidelines for residential areas based on day-night average sound levels. Some states and localities have established noise control regulations or zoning ordinances that specify acceptable noise levels by land-use category. The State of Tennessee has not developed a noise regulation that specifies the numerical community noise levels that are acceptable.

For the purpose of this document, a day-night average sound level of 65 dBA is the level below which noise levels would be considered acceptable for residential land and outdoor recreational uses. Estimated sound levels at the three residences nearest the site boundary at distances between 900 meters (3,000 feet) and 1,800 meters (6,000 feet) from the transformers and cooling towers, including the noise from the plant and background noise, are between day-night average sound levels of 53 and 63 dBA. Intermittent sound levels at these locations range from 84 to 103 dBA as a result of operating air-blast circuit breakers and steam venting (NRC 1995b). Generally the noise levels at these residences are below a day-night average sound level of 65 dBA and are considered acceptable. Watts Bar 1 is a licensed, operating nuclear power reactor. Testing of the emergency warning siren system occurs on a regular basis and results in outdoor noise levels of about 60 dBA in areas within a radius of about 16 kilometers (10 miles) of the site. TVA typically tests siren systems on a given day of the month at noon.

## 4.2.1.3 Air Quality

Watts Bar 1 is located in the Eastern Tennessee/Southwestern Virginia Interstate Air Quality Control Region. Baseline air quality data for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant has been collected since 1969, prior to the start of construction of Watts Bar 1. Ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants, determined by measuring air quality in the vicinity of Watts Bar 1, are shown in Table 4-1 with the applicable National Ambient Air Quality Standards and Tennessee State Ambient Air Quality Standards.

**Table 4-1 Comparison of Baseline Watts Bar 1 Ambient Air Concentrations with Most Stringent Applicable Regulations and Guidelines**

Criteria Pollutant	Averaging Time	Most Stringent Regulation or Guideline <sup>a</sup> ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	Baseline Concentration ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ ) <sup>b</sup>
Carbon monoxide	8-hour	10,000 <sup>c</sup>	1,250
	1-hour	40,000 <sup>c</sup>	1,250
Lead	Calendar quarter	1.5 <sup>c</sup>	0.03
Nitrogen dioxide	Annual	100 <sup>c</sup>	26.3
Ozone	8-hour (4th highest, averaged over 3 years)	157 <sup>cd</sup>	e
Particulate matter <sup>d</sup>	PM <sub>10</sub> Annual	50 <sup>c</sup>	20.3
	24-hour (interim)	150 <sup>c</sup>	39
	24-hour 99th percentile (3-year average)	150 <sup>c</sup>	f
	PM <sub>2.5</sub> Annual (3-year average)	15 <sup>c</sup>	f
	24-hour (98th percentile average over 3-years)	65 <sup>c</sup>	f
Sulfur dioxide	Annual	80 <sup>c</sup>	10.5
	24-hour	365 <sup>c</sup>	65.5
	3-hour	1,300 <sup>c</sup>	204
<b>Other Regulated Pollutants</b>			
Gaseous fluoride (as hydrogen fluoride)	30-day	1.2 <sup>e</sup>	h
	7-day	1.6 <sup>e</sup>	h
	24-hour	2.9 <sup>e</sup>	h
	12-hour	3.7 <sup>e</sup>	h
Total suspended particulates	24-hour	150 <sup>e</sup>	39 <sup>i</sup>

$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  = micrograms per cubic meter.

PM<sub>n</sub> = particulate matter sized less than or equal to n micrometers.

<sup>a</sup> The more stringent of Federal and state standards are presented if both exist for the averaging time. Tennessee State and National Ambient Air Quality Standards are the same for the criteria pollutants. The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (40 CFR 50), other than those for ozone, particulate matter, lead, and those based on annual averages, are not to be exceeded more than once per year. The 1-hour ozone standard is attained when the expected number of days per year with maximum hourly average concentrations above the standard is  $\leq 1$ . The 1-hour ozone standard applies only to nonattainment areas. The 8-hour ozone standard is attained when the 3-year average of the annual fourth-highest daily maximum 8-hour average concentration is less than or equal to 157  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ . The interim 24-hour PM<sub>10</sub> (particulate matter sized less than or equal to 10 micrometers) standard is attained when the expected number of days with a 24-hour average concentration above the standard is  $\leq 1$ . The annual arithmetic mean particulate matter standard is attained when the expected annual arithmetic mean concentration is less than or equal to the standard.

<sup>b</sup> Based on ambient air quality monitoring data at a Loudon County location for 1996 and 1997, except for lead that is from the Rockwood monitor in Roane County (1996) and PM<sub>10</sub> from Bradley County (1994 and 1995). Concentrations shown are maximums for the averaging period.



- ° Federal standard.
- ° EPA recently revised the ambient air quality standards for particulate matter and ozone. The new standards, finalized on July 18, 1997, change the ozone primary and secondary standards from a 1-hour concentration of 235  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  (0.12 parts per million) to an 8-hour concentration of 157  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  (0.08 parts per million). During a transition period while states are developing state implementation plan revisions for attaining and maintaining these standards, the 1-hour ozone standard would continue to apply in nonattainment areas (62 FR pages 38855-38894). For particulate matter, the current  $\text{PM}_{10}$  annual standard is retained and two  $\text{PM}_{2.5}$  (particulate matter size less than or equal to 2.5 micrometers) standards are added. These standards are set at 15  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  for the 3-year annual average arithmetic mean based on community-oriented monitors, and 65  $\mu\text{g}/\text{cubic meters}$  for the 3-year average of the 98th percentile of 24-hour concentrations at population-oriented monitors. The current 24-hour  $\text{PM}_{10}$  standard is revised to be based on the 3-year average of the 99th percentile of 24-hour concentrations. The existing  $\text{PM}_{10}$  standards would continue to apply in the interim period (62 FR 38652).
- ° There is insufficient data to compare to the standard.
- ° Compliance with the new  $\text{PM}_{2.5}$  standards was not evaluated since current emissions data for  $\text{PM}_{2.5}$  are not available.
- ° State standard.
- ° No local monitoring data is available for gaseous fluoride.
- °  $\text{PM}_{10}$  value is presented and would underestimate the total suspended particulates concentration. No monitoring data is available for total suspended particulates.

Source: 62 FR pages 38855-38894, 62 FR 38652, TN DEC 1994, TVA 1998a.

The area in which Watts Bar 1 is located is designated by the EPA as an attainment area with respect to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for criteria pollutants (40 CFR 81). For locations that are in an attainment area for criteria pollutants, prevention of significant deterioration regulations limit pollutant emissions from new sources and establish allowable increments of pollutant concentrations. Class I areas include national wilderness areas, memorial parks larger than 2,020 hectares (5,000 acres), national parks larger than 2,340 hectares (6,000 acres), and any areas redesignated as Class I. The Class I areas closest to Watts Bar 1 are the Joyce Kilmer-Slickrock National Wilderness Area and the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. These Class I areas are located approximately 80 kilometers (50 miles) from Watts Bar 1 (TVA 1998e).

Sources of criteria nonradiological air pollutant emissions at Watts Bar 1 include five diesel-powered emergency generators; two diesel generators for security power and fire protection pumps; site and employee vehicles; two auxiliary boilers; two natural-draft cooling towers; a lube oil system; two fixed-roof, No. 2 fuel oil storage tanks; a paint shop; and a sandblast shop. Small quantities of toxic chemicals and metals are emitted from testing and operation of the diesel fuel-fired equipment, resulting in contributions to offsite concentrations of less than 0.0001 percent of the threshold limit value of any of these pollutants. One-tenth of the threshold limit value often is used as a guideline in identifying pollutants that may be of concern and should be evaluated in more detail. Ozone is produced by corona discharge (ionization of air) in the operation of transmission lines and substations, particularly at the higher voltages, and by operation of electrical equipment such as motors and generators. TVA minimizes corona discharges by optimizing, to the extent practicable, the design and construction of its transmission facilities (TVA 1997c).

The calculated concentrations of carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide resulting from operation of the auxiliary steam boilers are two or more orders of magnitude below the ambient standards shown in Table 4-1 (NRC 1995b). Compliance with the new  $\text{PM}_{2.5}$  standards was not evaluated since current emissions data for  $\text{PM}_{2.5}$  are not available. When the calculated concentrations from onsite sources are combined with concentrations from offsite sources, the ambient air quality standards for carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide compounds, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide continue to be met.

The occurrence of visible plumes has been evaluated for Watts Bar 1. Naturally occurring fog with visibility equal to or less than 0.4 kilometers (0.25 miles) occurs in the vicinity of Watts Bar 1 for about 35 days per year (TVA 1995c). Occurrences of the plume descending to the ground or causing localized surface fogging are expected to be rare. Some localized fog may occur on rare occasions on top of Walden Ridge, about 13 kilometers (8 miles) to the west-northwest (TVA 1995c).

## Gaseous Radioactive Emissions

Watts Bar 1 has three primary sources of gaseous radioactive emissions:

- Discharges from the gaseous waste management system
- Discharges associated with the exhaust of noncondensable gases in the main condenser in the case of a primary to secondary leak exists
- Radioactive gaseous discharges from the building ventilation exhaust, including discharges from the reactor building, reactor auxiliary building, and fuel-handling building

The gaseous waste management system collects fission product gases (mainly noble gases) that accumulate in the primary coolant. A portion of the primary coolant continually is diverted to the primary coolant purification, volume, and chemical control system to remove contaminants and adjust the chemistry and volume. Noncondensable gases are stripped and sent to the gaseous waste management system, a series of gas storage tanks where the extended holdup time allows short half-life radioactive gases to decay, leaving only a small quantity of long half-life radionuclides to be released to the atmosphere. The annual gaseous radioactive emissions from Watts Bar 1 normal operation are shown in Table 4-2.

**Table 4-2 Annual Radioactive Gaseous Emissions at Watts Bar 1**

<i>Emission</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Fission gases (Curies)	283
Tritium (Curies)	5.6

Source: TVA 1998e.

## Meteorology and Climatology

The regional and local climatology and meteorology of the Watts Bar site, described in the *Final Environmental Statement Related to Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2* (NRC 1978), was re-evaluated in 1995 (NRC 1995b) with consideration of additional data accumulated in the intervening years. It was determined that the records used for the 1978 Final Environmental Statement provide an adequate representation of regional climatic conditions. This information has been updated with more recent data for Chattanooga, Tennessee.

### *Regional Climate*

The Great Tennessee Valley, located between the Cumberland Plateau to the west and the Appalachian Mountains to the east, is an area of complex local terrain. This results in localized variations in temperatures and winds.

As a whole, the area experiences a moderate climate with cool winters averaging 1° to 2°C (2° to 4°F) warmer than plateau areas to the west. In the winter, severe weather is rare. Snowfall is variable from year to year, ranging from none to heavy. Appreciable accumulations seldom last more than a few days. Occasional ice storms may be severe enough to cause some damage.

The summer temperature rises to as high as 35°C (95°F). Thunderstorms frequently reduce afternoon temperatures by 6° to 8°C (10° to 15°F). The annual average temperature determined from data recorded

from 1961 to 1990 at the Chattanooga Airport is 15.2°C (59.3°F); the average daily minimum temperature in January is -2.2°C (28°F), and the average daily maximum temperature in July is 31.7°C (89.0°F) (NOAA 1997a).

Precipitation is fairly uniform throughout the year. The average annual precipitation is approximately 133.5 centimeters (52.57 inches). Severe thunderstorms may result in hail and damaging winds. Prevailing winds are from the south-southwest. The average annual wind speed is 1.82 meters per second (4.07 miles per hour) (TVA 1995c).

#### *Severe Weather*

The current estimate of tornado strike probability at the Watts Bar site is 0.00018 per year (18 chances in 100,000 in a given year) with a recurrence interval of 5,400 years (NRC 1995b). The maximum sustained windspeed reported in Chattanooga was 132 kilometers per hour (82 miles per hour).

Thunderstorms occur on approximately 50 days per year. Freezing precipitation occurs, on the average, every other year. Air stagnation within the site area is expected to occur for about 6 days annually (TVA 1995c, TVA 1998e).

#### *Local Meteorological Conditions*

Winds tend to be light. The direction of flow is up and down the Tennessee River Valley. Nighttime stable atmospheric conditions with light winds are driven by local conditions. Neutral atmospheric stability conditions are prevalent during the transition between day and night. The frequencies of calm winds during extremely unstable atmospheric conditions (stability classes A and B) are lower than expected. Although unusual, this shift in stability class is not significant because it occurs infrequently and under conditions associated with relatively good dispersion.

### **4.2.1.4 Water Resources**

#### **Surface Water**

The Watts Bar Reservation is located at Tennessee River Mile 528 at the northern end of the Chickamauga Reservoir (TVA 1998e). Chickamauga Reservoir is TVA's sixth largest reservoir. The reservoir is 95 kilometers (59 miles) long on the Tennessee River and 51 kilometers (32 miles) long on the Hiwassee River, covering an area of 14,300 hectares (35,350 acres) with a volume of 775 million cubic meters (628,000 acre-feet). At the Watts Bar 1 site, the reservoir is about 335 meters (1,100 feet) wide, with cross-sectional depths ranging between 5.5 meters (18 feet) and 7.9 meters (26 feet).

The Tennessee River above Chattanooga is one of the most highly regulated rivers in the United States. The TVA reservoir system is operated for flood control, navigation, and power generation, with flood control a prime purpose. Particular emphasis is placed on protection of Chattanooga, 66 kilometers (41 miles) downstream from the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

During the steam cycle, heat from the Watts Bar 1 turbine is released when the steam passes through a condenser cooled with recirculated water from the Tennessee River. This water is cooled by passing it through a natural-draft evaporative cooling tower. Although the system is designated as a closed type, makeup water from the Tennessee River is needed to replace water losses from evaporation, drift, and blowdown.

At full power, the temperature of the water flowing through the condenser is raised by approximately 20°C (36°F). About 156,000 liters per minute (41,300 gallons per minute) of water are withdrawn from the

Tennessee River to make up for water lost in the cooling system. Blowdown from the natural-draft cooling tower is discharged into the river at a normal rate of 106,593 liters per minute (28,160 gallons per minute). "Blowdown" is a maintenance process to remove excess dissolved solids left after the water evaporates.

On the Watts Bar 1 site, two temporary chemical holding ponds are available for use to retain and treat chemicals from the turbine building. The smaller pond is lined and holds 3,800 cubic meters (1 million gallons). The larger, unlined pond has a volume of 19,000 cubic meters (5 million gallons). The ponds discharge via outfall pipe 103 to the large outdoor holding pond. This discharge is monitored in accordance with the plant's State of Tennessee 1993 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit (TN DEC 1993a).

Blowdown from the natural-draft cooling towers is routed to a multiport diffuser system (outfall pipe 101) in the main channel of the Tennessee River at River Mile 527.9 in accordance with the NPDES Permit. Makeup water and other water supply requirements are taken from an intake channel and pumping station at Tennessee River Mile 528. When there is low flow from the Watts Bar Dam, cooling tower blowdown is routed to a holding pond. The maximum intake pumping flow rate is approximately 4.5 cubic meters per second (160 cubic feet per second) (TVA 1997b). At this flow, the diffuser exit jet velocity would be 2 meters per second (6.6 feet per second). The discharge temperature varies depending on the cooling tower performance, which is a function of the ambient air temperature, from 5°C (41°F) in January to 33°C (91°F) in July. With a 35°C (95°F) maximum blowdown temperature, the average monthly temperature difference between the discharge and the river temperature varies from -5.8°C (-10.5°F) in winter and spring to 22.3°C (40.2°F) during summer and fall (TVA 1998e).

TVA has completed an environmental assessment of a proposed modification to Watts Bar 1 called the supplemental condenser cooling water project (TVA 1997g). As previously discussed, the Watts Bar 1 condenser circulating cooling water system uses a natural-draft cooling tower to reject waste heat from the steam cycle. The cooling capability of the tower is significantly affected by site meteorological conditions. As the ambient temperatures become higher, the tower-cooled water temperature also increases. The warmer water from the tower results in a decrease in the net megawatt-electric power output of Watts Bar 1 due to an increase in the condenser backpressure above the optimum design value. If the temperature of the water to the main condenser could be reduced, the efficiency and output of Watts Bar 1 could be improved. Therefore, TVA investigated the feasibility of supplementing cooling tower thermal performance by routing cooler water from upstream of the Watts Bar Dam to mix with and lower the temperature of the water from the tower.

The proposed project would provide between 435,313 and 511,020 liters per minute (115,000 and 135,000 gallons per minute) of water from the Watts Bar Reservoir to Watts Bar 1, depending on the pool elevation, to supplement the cooling capacity of the existing cooling tower. The proposed project would use some of the existing structures and components at the nonoperational Watts Bar Steam Plant to take advantage of the gravity flow and eliminate the need for new pumps. This project would use the existing intake structure at the Watts Bar Dam and most of the existing large-diameter pipe from the dam to the Watts Bar Steam Plant to supply supplemental cooling water to Watts Bar 1. New pipe between the Watts Bar Steam Plant and the Watts Bar 1 cooling towers would be installed. The discharge structure at the Watts Bar Steam Plant would be integrated into the project.

The environmental assessment of this proposed supplemental condenser cooling water project for Watts Bar 1 concluded that the construction and operation of this system would have no significant adverse environmental impacts with the appropriate implementation of the commitments delineated in the environmental assessment. Special emphasis was placed on the thermal discharge limits, and relevant analyses were performed to demonstrate no significant thermal impacts. TVA has completed most of the work on this project, and the supplemental condenser cooling water system is expected to be in service in April 1999.

## Surface Water Quality

The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation classifies the streams and creeks of Tennessee based on water quality, stream uses, and resident aquatic biota. Classifications are defined in the State of Tennessee's water quality standards. Monitoring data are presented in Table 4-3. Surface water quality measurements made during the period of operation of Watts Bar 1, when compared with preoperational monitoring values, show that Watts Bar 1 operations have no significant effect on surface water quality (TVA 1997b).

**Table 4-3 Summary of Surface Water Quality Monitoring in the Vicinity of the Watts Bar Site**

<i>Parameter</i>	<i>Unit of Measure</i>	<i>Water Quality Criteria</i>	<i>Average Water Body Concentration</i>
<b>Radiological</b>			
Alpha (gross)	picocuries per liter	15 <sup>a</sup>	0.433
Beta (gross)	picocuries per liter	50 <sup>b</sup>	3.75
Tritium	picocuries per liter	20,000 <sup>c</sup>	less than 300 <sup>d</sup>
<b>Nonradiological</b>			
Manganese	milligrams per liter	0.05 <sup>d</sup>	0.060
Nitrate (as N)	milligrams per liter	10.0 <sup>e</sup>	0.253
Arsenic	milligrams per liter	0.05 <sup>e</sup>	0.001
Barium	milligrams per liter	2.0 <sup>e</sup>	0.142
Cadmium	milligrams per liter	0.005 <sup>e</sup>	0.00014
Chromium	milligrams per liter	0.1 <sup>e</sup>	0.0012
Lead	milligrams per liter	0.005 <sup>e</sup>	0.0046
Mercury	milligrams per liter	0.002 <sup>e</sup>	0.00021
pH (acidity/alkalinity)	pH units	6.0 - 9.0 <sup>e</sup>	7.8

- <sup>a</sup> National Primary Drinking Water Regulations (40 CFR 141).
  - <sup>b</sup> Proposed National Primary Drinking Water Regulation.
  - <sup>c</sup> Below lower limit of detection of 300 picocuries per liter.
  - <sup>d</sup> National Secondary Drinking Water Regulations (40 CFR 143).
  - <sup>e</sup> Tennessee General Water Quality Criteria for Domestic Water Supply (TN DEC 1995).
- Source: TVA 1998e, TVA 1998b, TN DEC 1998a, TVA 1997b.

## Surface Water Use and Rights

There are 20 surface water users within 80 kilometers (50 miles) downstream of the Watts Bar 1 site; 6 are water utility districts and 14 are industrial users. The continued operation of the plant is not expected to affect surface water use.

The Watts Bar 1 site can use a maximum of approximately 389,000 cubic meters (103 million gallons) of process water per day. The average quantity of water flowing by the site is 66,270,000 cubic meters (17,500 million gallons) per day. Under average flow conditions, Watts Bar 1 uses 0.6 percent of the total flow of the Tennessee River (TVA 1997b).

The major public water uses of the Chickamauga Reservoir are water supplies and recreation. There are two municipal drinking water intakes downstream from the Watts Bar site on the Chickamauga Lake. The closest downstream public water supply is Dayton, Tennessee, 39 kilometers (24.2 miles) downstream, which serves 6,900 people.

In Tennessee, the state's water rights laws are codified in the Water Quality Control Act. In effect, the water rights are similar to riparian rights in that the designated usage of a water body cannot be impaired. In order

to construct intake structures for the purpose of withdrawing water from available supplies, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and TVA permits are required.

### Liquid Chemical and Radioactive Effluents

The radionuclide contaminants in the primary coolant are the source of liquid radioactive waste at Watts Bar 1. Liquid radioactive wastes vary considerably in composition. They may include nonradioactive contaminants and chemical constituents depending on the history and collection point of the liquid. Each source of liquid waste receives an individual degree and type of treatment before storage for reuse or discharge to the environment under the Watts Bar 1 NPDES Permit. To increase the efficiency of waste processing, wastes of similar characteristics are grouped together before treatment. The Watts Bar 1 liquid effluents to the environment during normal operation are shown in Table 4-4.

**Table 4-4 Annual Chemical and Radioactive Liquid Effluents Released to the Environment from Operation of Watts Bar 1**

<i>Materials</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Chemicals (kilograms)	1,098,040 <sup>a</sup>
Tritium (Curies)	639 <sup>b</sup>
Other Radionuclides (Curies)	1.32 <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> TVA 1996a.

<sup>b</sup> TVA 1998e.

### Floodplains and Flood Risk

At Watts Bar 1, the 100-year floodplain for the Tennessee River varies from elevation 212.3 meters (696.6 feet) above mean sea level at River Mile 527 to elevation 212.6 meters (697.6 feet) at River Mile 529. The TVA Flood Risk Profile elevation on the Tennessee River varies from elevation 213.5 meters (700.5 feet) at River Mile 527 to elevation 213.8 meters (701.5 feet) at River Mile 529. The Flood Risk Profile is used to control flood damageable development for TVA projects. At this location, the Flood Risk Profile elevation is based on the 500-year flood elevation (TVA 1998e).

The safety-related facilities, systems, and equipment are housed in structures that provide protection from flooding for all flood conditions up to plant grade at 222 meters (728 feet). Rainfall floods exceeding this elevation would require plant shutdown. The situation producing the maximum plant site flood level was determined to be one of two events: (1) a sequence of March storms producing maximum precipitation on the watershed above Chattanooga, or (2) a sequence of March storms centered and producing maximum precipitation in the basin to the west of the Appalachian Divide and above Chattanooga. Seismic and flood events could cause dam failure surges above plant grade elevation 222 meters (728 feet). Flood waves from landslides into upstream reservoirs required no special analysis (TVA 1995c).

### Groundwater

Groundwater at Watts Bar 1 is derived principally from infiltration of local precipitation and from lateral underflow from the area north of the plant site. All groundwater flow from the site is to Chickamauga Lake, either directly or via Yellow Creek. The plant site is located above the Conasauga Shale, a formation made up of about 84 percent shale and 16 percent limestone. The shales and limestones are essentially impervious to water, and the majority of the groundwater flows through the terrace deposits overlying the bedrock.

## **Groundwater Quality**

Preoperational monitoring of groundwater was performed by analyzing data from six wells tapped into the Conasauga Shale aquifer to verify that the flow gradient was toward the Chickamauga Reservoir. The operational groundwater monitoring program uses two wells in the Conasauga Shale aquifer: one upgradient and one downgradient of the plant. Quarterly samples are taken to monitor for the consistency of groundwater constituents (NRC 1995b).

## **Groundwater Availability, Use, and Rights**

Potable water for plant use is obtained from the Watts Bar Utility District. The utility district's water is obtained from three wells located 4 kilometers (2.5 miles) northwest of the plant (TVA 1995c). Single family wells are common in adjacent rural areas not served by the public water supply system. Industrial and drinking water supplies in the area are primarily taken from surface water sources.

Groundwater rights in the State of Tennessee are traditionally associated with the Reasonable Use Doctrine. Under this doctrine, landowners can withdraw groundwater to the extent that they exercise their rights reasonably in relation to the similar rights of others.

### **4.2.1.5 Geology and Soils**

#### **Geology**

The Watts Bar 1 site is located in the Tennessee Section of the Valley and Ridge Province of the Appalachian Highlands (TVA 1995c). The distinguishing geological feature of the province is the series of folded and faulted mountains and valleys that overlie Paleozoic sedimentary formations totaling 12.2 kilometers (40,000 feet) in thickness. The plant is located on alluvial terrace deposits on a bend of the Tennessee River. Below these deposits lies the Middle Cambrian Conasauga, a shale formation of 84 percent shale and interbedded limestone. The shales and limestones are generally low permeability formations. The majority of the groundwater flows through the terrace deposits overlying the bedrock.

The controlling feature of the geologic structure at the site is the Kingston thrust fault that developed 250 million years ago. The fault has been inactive for many millions of years, and recurrence of movement is not expected. The fault lies to the northwest of the site area and is not involved in the foundation of any of the major plant structures (TVA 1995c).

#### **Seismology**

Watts Bar 1 was designed based on the largest historic earthquake to occur in the Southern Appalachian Tectonic Province—the 1897 Giles County, Virginia, earthquake (intensity: Modified Mercalli VIII and Richter magnitude of 6 to 7). The safe-shutdown earthquake for the plant was established at a maximum horizontal acceleration of 0.18 g (g = acceleration due to gravity) and a simultaneous maximum vertical acceleration of 0.12 g (TVA 1995c). The safe-shutdown earthquake is defined as the earthquake that produces the maximum ground vibration for which: (1) the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (2) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in the shutdown mode, and (3) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures are designed to remain functional (10 CFR 100, Appendix A).

## **Soils**

Extensive evaluation was made of the soils on the Watts Bar 1 site, and foundation requirements were devised for all of the plant structures related to the specific location and safety classification of each. The unconsolidated deposits overlying bedrock were primarily alluvial deposits consisting of fine grained, finely sorted soils and clays with micaceous sand and some quartz gravel. The general requirements for Safety Category I structures involve use of in-situ soil, compacted granular fill, or in-situ rock as foundation material (TVA 1995c).

### **4.2.1.6 Ecological Resources**

#### **Terrestrial Resources**

The Watts Bar Reservation is located within the Ridge and Valley Physiographic Province. This province lies between the Blue Ridge Mountains and the Cumberland Plateau and is characterized by prominent, northwest-trending ridges and adjacent valleys. The Tennessee River flows through this province, roughly paralleling the alignment of the valleys. The Watts Bar 1 site is located in an area heavily impacted by agricultural activities. The site was further altered during its conversion to an industrial site. Terrestrial biological communities outside the immediate plant area have not been substantially impacted by the existing power plant. No areas on site are identified as critical areas for terrestrial plant and animal species protected under state or Federal laws.

#### **Terrestrial Wildlife**

The Watts Bar 1 site vicinity, as a result of exclusion control, serves the function of an informal preserve and continues to support a variety of terrestrial plant and animal communities. No further expansion of the current operations area is anticipated. Game species in the vicinity of the site include white-tailed deer, gray squirrel, raccoon, wild turkey, ruffed grouse, cottontail rabbit, and bobwhite quail. Good squirrel populations occur in large stands of hardwoods, while raccoons and rabbits are most common in the wide, rolling valleys between the ridges.

The mixture of forest and open vegetative types of terrain and the large degree of openness within the forest provide an abundance of niches favoring a diverse bird population. The diverse habitat sites surrounding the plant site also support varied and abundant populations of snakes, frogs, salamanders, and other reptiles.

#### **Wetlands**

The potential wetland areas identified in the vicinity of the Watts Bar 1 site are: (1) palustrine, bottomland hardwood deciduous, temporarily flooded wetlands and (2) fringe wetlands. They are indicated in Figure 4-3.







Figure 4-3 National Wetlands Inventory Map of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site Vicinity

## Aquatic Resources

The Watts Bar 1 site (at Tennessee River Mile 528) is in the riverine portion of Chickamauga Reservoir, approximately 3.2 kilometers (2 miles) downstream of Watts Bar Dam. The quality of the water at the Watts Bar 1 intake is generally satisfactory, but negatively influenced, particularly in summer and fall, by water releases from Watts Bar Reservoir, 3.2 kilometers (2 miles) upstream. Water standing at the face (the forebay) of the Watts Bar Dam becomes stratified, particularly in warmer weather, and consequently becomes oxygen deficient. In 1996, an aerator was installed in the forebay of the Watts Bar Reservoir to reduce stratification and provide higher dissolved oxygen levels in reservoir releases.

Watts Bar 1 began commercial generation on May 27, 1996, and operated at an 84 percent capacity factor through its first cycle. Trends and similarities noted during preoperational monitoring and comparisons with operational data were used to determine potential plant-induced effects to aquatic communities and water quality.

### Plankton

Evaluation of the entrainment of ichthyoplankton (fish eggs and larvae) during the first year of operation of Watts Bar 1 revealed the presence of only a few varieties and at low densities (TVA 1997d). Eggs and larvae passing the Watts Bar 1 water intake are primarily spawned in the Watts Bar Reservoir and exposed to passage through the hydroelectric generation turbines at Watts Bar Dam. Very few eggs or larvae of species known to spawn in tailwaters (the downstream side of the dam) were collected, indicating that most spawning in Chickamauga Reservoir occurs downstream of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (TVA 1997d). The entrainment of eggs and larvae at the Watts Bar 1 water intake is characterized as extremely low (counts of 449 and 267 during the period sampled). These low levels are largely attributed to the low use of water (0.6 percent) passing the plant (TVA 1997b).

### Fish Communities

Fish community sampling results after Watts Bar 1 began operation were found to be consistent with the preoperational results (TVA 1997d). The slight differences were attributed to the differences in the sample design. The 1977–1985 data were collected on a monthly basis throughout the year, and the 1990–1995 data were collected only once during the fall of each year. Important species evaluated in the comparison of preoperational and operational conditions were largemouth bass, spotted bass, redear sunfish, white bass, emerald shiner, common carp, brook silversides, log perch, bluegill, smallmouth bass, spotted sucker, and yellow bass.

Results of the first year's monitoring compared with preoperational data indicate that operation of Watts Bar 1 has not adversely impacted the tailwater fish population below Watts Bar Dam. Fish impingement on the Watts Bar 1 water intake traveling screens was virtually nonexistent.

### Aquatic Macrophytes

Aquatic plants in the Watts Bar Reservoir covered 0.04 square kilometers (10 acres) during the late 1970s. Coverage increased to about 2.8 square kilometers during the 1980s, but decreased back to the 1970s levels by the early 1990s. An extended drought in the mid- to late 1980s enhanced conditions for growth of aquatic macrophytes. A return to more normal rainfall and runoff conditions resulted in a return to early 1980s densities. Eurasian watermilfoil, *Myriophyllum spicatum*, and spiny-leafed naiad, *Najas minor*, remain the dominant species. Populations of aquatic macrophyte species in the Chickamauga Reservoir fluctuated similarly over the same period, primarily in response to river flow conditions (NRC 1995b).

### Mussel and Clam Communities

The Tennessee River downstream from Watts Bar Dam is inhabited by a relatively diverse native mussel community. Sampling conducted several times during the last 14 years indicates that 31 species are present; however, the 5 most abundant species account for 90 percent of the total. Many of the mussels present in this part of the Tennessee River are quite old, and most species may not have reproduced successfully in the last 30 or more years. The long-term trend is a reduction in abundance and species richness (TVA 1997b; NRC 1995b).

The 16-kilometer (9.9-mile) reach of the Tennessee River from Watts Bar Dam (Tennessee River Mile 529.9) downstream to Hunter Shoal (Tennessee River Mile 520) has been designated a mollusk sanctuary by the State of Tennessee. While commercial harvest of mussels is prohibited within the sanctuary, the age and species composition of the surviving mussel stocks in this river reach do not support any commercial harvest, even outside of the sanctuary (NRC 1995b).

In addition to the native mussels, this part of the Tennessee River is inhabited by a large population of the Asiatic clam, *Corbicula fluminea*, and an increasing population of the zebra mussel, *Dreissena polymorpha*. The Asiatic clam has been present in the Watts Bar Dam tailwater for at least 25 years, but the zebra mussel was first found there in 1993 (TVA 1997b).

### Threatened and Endangered Species

Several terrestrial and aquatic species that occur in the vicinity of the Watts Bar 1 site are listed as endangered or threatened by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and/or state agencies in Tennessee (Table 4-5). The status and biology of Federally listed species in the vicinity of the Watts Bar site were described in detail in the Biological Assessment included in the 1995 NRC Final EIS (NRC 1995b), which is incorporated here by reference. More current information on the status of the federally listed species is included, where available, in the following discussion.

**Table 4-5 Listed Threatened or Endangered Species Potentially On or Near the Watts Bar Site**

Common Name	Scientific Name	Federal	State
<b>Mollusks</b>			
Dromedary Pearlymussel	<i>Dromus dromas</i>	Endangered	Endangered
Pink Mucket	<i>Lampsilis abrupta/Lampsilis orbiculata</i>	Endangered	Endangered
Rough Pigtoe	<i>Pleurobema Plenum</i>	Endangered	Endangered
Fanshell	<i>Cyprogenia stegaria</i>	Endangered	Endangered
<b>Fish</b>			
Blue Sucker	<i>Cyprogenia stegaria</i>	Not listed	Threatened
Snail Darter	<i>Percina tanasi</i>	Threatened	Threatened
<b>Amphibians</b>			
Eastern Hellbender	<i>Cryptobranchus a. alleganiensis</i>	Not listed	In need of management
<b>Birds</b>			
Bald Eagle	<i>Haliaeetus leucocephalus</i>	Threatened	Threatened
Osprey	<i>Pandion haliaetus</i>	Not listed	Threatened
<b>Mammals</b>			
Gray Bat	<i>Myotis grisescens</i>	Endangered	Endangered

Source: NRC 1995b, TVA 1998a, Tennessee 1994, DOI 1998a.

### Plants

No Federally or state-listed plants are known to occur on or in the immediate vicinity of the Watts Bar site.

### Terrestrial Animals

Bald eagles, listed as threatened, visit the Watts Bar site during the winter, where they roost on trees near the reservoirs and forage for fish. The nearest reported eagle nest is about 6.4 kilometers (4 miles) south-southwest of the plant. This nest site was first used in 1994 and has been inactive since 1996. Gray bats roost in caves throughout the year and primarily feed over water on adult insects. The nearest cave in which gray bats have been found is located about 6 kilometers (3.7 miles) downstream from the Watts Bar site. Because of frequent human visitation, this cave is not regularly occupied by bats. Gray bats have also been reported in three other caves between 15 and 30 kilometers (10 and 20 miles) from the Watts Bar site. Only one of these three caves is, at present, regularly occupied by gray bats. Gray bats may also forage over the reservoir adjacent to and downstream from the plant site.

The State of Tennessee lists the osprey as threatened. Ospreys feed primarily on fish and regularly occur along the Tennessee River adjacent to the Watts Bar site (NRC 1995b). Ospreys also have recently nested in the immediate vicinity of the Watts Bar Dam.

### Aquatic Animals

Five aquatic species found in the Tennessee River near the Watts Bar site are on the Federal lists of endangered or threatened wildlife. Four of these species are endangered mussels (dromedary pearlymussel, pink mucket, rough pigtoe, and fanshell), and the other species is a threatened fish (the snail darter). Of these species, only the pink mucket and snail darter have been observed in this part of the river within the last decade. The State of Tennessee has listed the blue sucker as a threatened species and the hellbender to be "in need of management." Both of these species have been observed only on rare occasions in the Watts Bar Dam tailwater (NRC 1995b).

Three other aquatic species, all Federally listed as endangered, were found in preimpoundment surveys of nearby portions of the Tennessee River. These species are the birdwing pearlymussel, *Conradilla caelata*; white wartyback pearlymussel, *Plethobasus cicatricosus*; and the Cumberland monkeyface pearlymussel, *Quadrula intermedia*. They all inhabit gravel riffles in medium to large rivers and have not been found in the Watts Bar tailwater or in Chickamauga Reservoir for 25 years.

#### 4.2.1.7 Archaeological and Historic Resources

For the past 1,200 years, through changing climates and environmental conditions, the Tennessee River Valley has attracted humans because of its system of water routes and its abundance of natural resources. Surveys of the Watts Bar 1 site and vicinity have identified numerous archaeological resources (Schroedl 1978, Calabrese 1976). Data recovery excavations were undertaken in 1971. Other archaeological sites exist along the reservoir shoreline downstream from the Watts Bar 1 site. However, it is important to note that no systematic archaeological survey was conducted to identify buried sites that could be present in the area of potential effect.

No sites listed in the *National Register of Historic Places* are located at or near the Watts Bar 1 site. Sites that are potentially eligible for listing in the National Register within the Watts Bar Reservation include the Watts Bar Steam Plant and the Watts Bar Dam.

Construction of Watts Bar 1 is complete, and the reactor has operated since May 1996. The operation experience to date indicates that there is no impact on archaeological or historic resources on or near the Watts Bar site.

#### 4.2.1.8 Socioeconomics

Watts Bar 1 is located near the town of Spring City, Rhea County, in eastern Tennessee. The precise location is latitude 35°36'10" north and longitude 84°47'25" west (NRC 1998d). Spring City is about 27 kilometers (17 miles) northeast of Dayton, Tennessee, and 80 kilometers (50 miles) northeast of Chattanooga, Tennessee. Highway access to Spring City is via Route 27 and nearby Route 68. Route 27 links the town to Dayton (Rhea County seat) and Route 68, both to the south; to Chattanooga in the southwest; and to Interstate Highway 40, about 40 kilometers (25 miles) north. Route 68 links Spring City to Interstate Highway 75.

#### Demography

The region of influence had an estimated overall population of about 890,600 in 1990 (DOC 1992). The number of households in the region of influence was about 343,000 in 1990, while the number of families was about 254,000. Table 4-6 shows general demographic data for Spring City, Rhea County, and the Watts Bar 1 region of influence. The Watts Bar region of influence was defined as the area within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

**Table 4-6 General Demographic Characteristics of Spring City, Rhea County, and the Watts Bar 1 Region of Influence 1990**

<i>Demographic Measure</i>	<i>Spring City</i>	<i>Rhea County</i>	<i>Region of Influence</i>
Total population (1990)	2,199	24,344	890,617
Total population (1995/96, as noted)	2,381 (1996)	26,833 (1995)	NA
Families (1990)	614	6,976	<u>254,312</u>
Households (1990)	867	9,128	343,067
Male (1990)	982	11,728	428,137
Female (1990)	1,217	12,616	<u>462,481</u>

Sources: DOC 1992, DOC 1998c.

For Spring City, the population increased approximately 8 percent from 1990 to 1996. Rhea County had an estimated population of 26,833 in 1995, up from 24,344 in 1990 (Dayton/Rhea EDC 1998). The county is projected to continue growing to a population of 30,000 in the year 2000, and to 35,000 in 2010. Table 4-7 shows the population distribution by ethnic group in Spring City, Rhea County, and the Watts Bar region of influence in 1990.


Figure 4-4 shows the racial and ethnic composition of the projected population residing in the affected area projected for the year 2025. Data for low-income households from the 1990 Census are presented in Figure 4-5. Low-income households are those with incomes of 80 percent or lower than the median income for the counties. As indicated in this figure, approximately 40 percent of the total households are low-income households (see also Appendix G).

**Table 4-7 Population Distribution by Ethnic Group in Spring City, Rhea County, and the Watts Bar 1 Region of Influence  
(1990 U.S. Census)**


<i>Ethnic Group or Subgroup (U.S. Census Definitions)</i>	<i>Spring City</i>		<i>Rhea County</i>		<i>Watts Bar 1 Region of Influence</i>	
	<i>Population</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Population</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Population</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Population</i>
White not of Hispanic origin	2,033	92.45	23,472	96.42	806,864	91.10
Black not of Hispanic origin	139	6.32	528	2.17	64,922	7.33
American Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo not of Hispanic origin	10	0.45	72	0.30	2,672	0.30
Asian or Pacific Islander not of Hispanic origin	8	0.36	33	0.14	5,390	0.61
Other race not of Hispanic origin	0	0.00	56	0.23	285	0.05
White of Hispanic origin	0	0.00	103	0.42	4,058	0.46
Black of Hispanic origin	0	0.00	4	0.02	146	0.02
American Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo of Hispanic origin	0	0.00	12	0.05	93	0.01
Asian or Pacific Islander of Hispanic origin	0	0.00	0	0.00	92	0.01
Other race of Hispanic origin	9	0.41	64	0.26	1,146	0.13
Hispanic total	9	0.41	183	0.75	5,535	0.62
Total population (all ethnic groups)	2,199	100.00	24,344	100.00	885,667	100.00

Sources: DOC 1992, DOC 1998c.

Note: Sum of items may not add up to population total due to rounding error.



**Figure 4-4 Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Minority Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of Watts Bar 1 Projected for the Year 2025**



**Figure 4-5 Low-Income Households Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of Watts Bar 1 (1990)**

## Income

Total personal income in Rhea County was \$417 million in 1996, up from \$404 million in 1995 (DOC 1998a). Comparable figures for neighboring Meigs County were \$132 million in 1996 and \$127 million in 1995. Per capita income in Rhea County was \$15,323 in 1996, up from \$15,078 in 1995. Rhea and Meigs counties were respectively ranked seventy-first and eighty-fourth in the State of Tennessee in terms of per capita income in 1996. Table 4-8 summarizes income data for Spring City and Rhea County.

**Table 4-8 Income Data Summary for Spring City and Rhea County (1989)**

<i>Income Measure</i>	<i>Spring City</i>	<i>Rhea County</i>
Per capita income	\$9,412	\$9,333
Median household income	\$19,757	\$19,915
Median family income	\$24,028	\$23,789
Median housing value	\$41,300	\$45,100

Source: DOC 1998c.

## Community Services

Education, public safety, and health care were examined to determine the level of community services for the region of influence.

### Education

There are 418 schools with a capacity for 130,107 students within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the Watts Bar 1 site. The average student-to-teacher ratio is approximately 17:1.

### Public Safety

City, county, and state law enforcement agencies provide police protection to residents of the region of influence. The average officer-to-population ratio is 1.3:1,000 persons. Fire protection services are provided by both paid and volunteer firefighters. The ratio of firefighters to the population is 0.6:1,000.

### Health Care

The region of influence includes 34 hospitals with a total of 4,861 beds. All of the hospitals are operating below capacity.

## Local Transportation

The nearest land transportation route is State Route 68, about 1.6 kilometers (1 mile) north of the site. Other surface roads in the Watts Bar 1 site vicinity are State Route 58, 4.8 kilometers (3 miles) southeast; State Route 30, 9.7 kilometers (6 miles) south; U.S. Highway 27, 11.3 kilometers (7 miles) northwest; and Interstate Highway 75, 12.9 kilometers (8 miles) southeast. A main line of the CNO&TP Railroad (Norfolk Southern Corporation) passes about 11.3 kilometers (7 miles) west of the site. A TVA railroad spur connects with the main line and serves Watts Bar 1. The spur from Spring City to the Watts Bar 1 site would require refurbishment prior to use. On the site, several hundred feet of rail that have been removed would have to be replaced if rail spent fuel shipping casks had to be accommodated (TVA 1998a). The Tennessee River is



navigable past the site and is used as a major barge route (TVA 1995c). These transportation routes are shown in Figure 4-6.

The major surface roads mentioned above and the network of local roads connecting with them adequately serve the needs of the local communities and TVA employees at the Watts Bar 1 site.

#### 4.2.1.9 Public and Occupational Health and Safety

##### Radiation Environment

Background radiation exposure to individuals in the vicinity of the Watts Bar site is presented in Table 4-9. The annual doses to individuals from background radiation are expected to remain constant over time. Thus, any incremental change in the total dose to the population would be a function only of a change in the size of the population.

**Table 4-9 Sources of Background Radiation Exposure to Individuals in the Vicinity of the Watts Bar Site<sup>a</sup>**

<i>Source</i>	<i>Total Effective Dose Equivalent (millirem per year)</i>
<b>Natural Background Radiation</b>	
Cosmic and cosmogenic radiation	28
External terrestrial radiation	28
In the body	39
Radon in homes (inhaled)	200
<b>Total</b>	<b>295</b>
<b>Other Sources of Radiation</b>	
Release of radioactive material in natural gas, mining, ore processing, etc.	5
Diagnostic x-rays and nuclear medicine	53
<u>Nuclear energy</u>	0.28
Consumer and industrial products	0.03
<b>Total</b>	<b>355</b>

<sup>a</sup> Values are based on average national data, not measured values at the Watts Bar site.  
Source: TVA 1998b.

Radionuclides released in emissions and effluents from Watts Bar 1 are a potential source of radiation exposure to individuals in the vicinity of Watts Bar 1 and are additional to the background radiation values listed. Calculations of radiation doses to individuals and the population surrounding the plant were performed by TVA using measurements from the various radiological monitoring points around the plant during operation in 1997, as well as conservative assumptions regarding both individual and population exposure time. The doses are presented in Table 4-10.

Radiation doses to the onsite worker include the background dose plus an additional dose from working in the facility.




Figure 4-6 Transportation Routes in the Vicinity of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site

**Table 4-10 Annual Doses to the General Public During 1997 From Normal Operation at Watts Bar 1, (Total Effective Dose Equivalent)**

Affected Environment	Airborne Releases		Liquid Releases		Total	
	Most Stringent Standard <sup>a</sup>	Based on Actual Measurements	Most Stringent Standard <sup>a</sup>	Calculated on the Basis of Actual Measurements	Most Stringent Standard <sup>a</sup>	Calculated on the Basis of Actual Measurements
Maximally exposed offsite individual (millirem)	5	0.036	3	0.25	25	0.29
Population within 80 kilometers (person-rem) <sup>b</sup>	None	0.068	None	0.44	None	0.51
Average dose to an individual within 80 kilometers (millirem) <sup>c</sup>	None	0.000063	None	0.00042	None	0.00048

- <sup>a</sup> From 10 CFR 50, Appendix I (design objectives for equipment to control releases of radioactive materials in effluents from nuclear power reactors). The standard for the maximally exposed offsite individual (25 millirem per year for the total body from all pathways) is given in 40 CFR 190.
- <sup>b</sup> Population used: 1,066,600.
- <sup>c</sup> The average is obtained by dividing the population dose by the population living within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of Watts Bar 1.

Source: TVA 1998e.

### Direct Radiation

Radiation fields are produced in nuclear plant environments as a result of radioactivity contained within the reactor and its associated components. Doses from sources within the plant are primarily due to nitrogen-16, a radionuclide produced in the reactor core. Since the primary coolant of pressurized water reactors is contained in a heavily shielded area of the plant, dose rates in the vicinity of pressurized water reactors are generally less than 5 millirem per year.

Low-level radioactive storage containers outside the plant are estimated to contribute less than 0.01 millirem per year at the site boundary (NRC 1978).

The plant operator committed to design features and operating practices that ensure that individual occupational radiation doses are within the occupational dose limits defined in 10 CFR 20, and that individual and total plant population doses would be as low as is reasonably achievable. The combined radiation doses received by the onsite worker are shown in Table 4-11.

**Table 4-11 Annual Worker Doses from Normal Operation of Watts Bar 1 During 1997**

Affected Environment	Standard <sup>a</sup>	Dose <sup>b</sup>
Average worker (millirem)	None	104
Maximally exposed worker (millirem)	5,000	1,269
Total workers (person-rem)	None	112

- <sup>a</sup> NRC regulatory limit from 10 CFR 20.
- <sup>b</sup> Based on 1,073 badged workers.

Source: TVA 1998e.

Considerable planning is involved in evacuation planning. Training, education, and practice runs are used to further the probability of successful evacuation in the event it is ever required.

#### **4.2.1.10 Waste Management**

As with any major industrial activity, Watts Bar 1 generates waste as a consequence of its normal operation. The wastes fall into four broad categories: hazardous waste, nonhazardous solid waste, low-level radioactive waste, and sanitary liquid waste. No high-level waste, as it is defined by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1992, is generated at the Watts Bar 1 site. Table 4-12 summarizes the annual amount of waste generated at the Watts Bar 1 site in each category.

**Table 4-12 Annual Waste Generation at Watts Bar 1**

<i>Category</i>	<i>Volume or Mass Per Year</i>
Hazardous waste (cubic meters)	1.025
Non-hazardous solid waste (kilograms)	863,438
Low-level radioactive waste (cubic meters)	40
Mixed waste (cubic meters)	less than 1

Source: TVA 1998e.

#### **Hazardous Waste**

Hazardous wastes typically generated at Watts Bar 1 include paints, solvents, acids, oils, radiographic film and development chemicals, and degreasers. Neutralization is the only waste treatment performed on site. Hazardous wastes are normally stored in polyethylene containment systems during accumulation. An approved storage building is utilized to store hazardous wastes for either 90 or 180 days, depending on the plant's hazardous waste generator status (i.e., small quantity or large quantity generator) at the time. Waste is transported to an offsite hazardous waste storage facility or disposal facility prior to exceeding the 90- or 180-day storage limit.

#### **Low-Level Radioactive Waste**

During the fission process, an inventory of radioactive fission and activation products builds up within the reactor (in the fuel and the materials of construction). A small fraction of these radioactive materials escapes and contaminates the reactor coolant. These contaminants are removed from the coolant by a radioactive waste treatment system. Watts Bar 1 uses separate radioactive waste treatment systems for gaseous, liquid, and solid waste treatment. Residues from the gaseous and liquid waste treatment systems (filters, resins, dewatered solids) are combined and disposed of with the solid, low-level radioactive waste. The other important category of low-level radioactive waste is the solidified and dewatered treated product from gaseous and liquid waste treatment systems. Contaminated protective clothing, paper, rags, glassware, compactible and noncompactible trash, and reactor components and equipment comprise the majority of solid low-level radioactive waste at Watts Bar 1.

Before disposal, compactible trash, with the exception of irradiated metals, is shipped to a commercial processor where it is compacted to a lesser volume and shipped to the Barnwell, South Carolina, low-level radioactive waste disposal facility. Incineratable trash is shipped to a commercial waste incinerator in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where the material is burned to ashes before final disposal at the Barnwell facility. Metal

waste is either decontaminated and recycled or melted to form shielding blocks. TVA does not send irradiated metals for volume reduction due to their excessive dose rate. Instead, this material accumulates until a sufficient amount is on hand to ship directly to the Barnwell disposal facility. Any radioactive waste from these processes is shipped for disposal at the Barnwell disposal facility (TVA 1998a).

### **Mixed Waste**

Mixed waste is material that is both hazardous and radioactive. Typical sources of mixed low-level radioactive waste at Watts Bar 1 are: beta-counting fluids (e.g., zylene, toluene) for use in liquid scintillation detectors, polychlorinated biphenyls susceptible to contact with radioactive contamination as a result of an accidental transformer spill or explosion, isopropyl alcohol used for cleaning radioactive surfaces, chelating agents, and various acids.

### **Waste Minimization Practices**

The Watts Bar 1 site has an active waste minimization program that consists of the following practices:

- Useful portions of construction and demolition materials are salvaged for resale.
- Segregated storage areas are maintained for each type of recoverable material.
- Scrap treated lumber is sold or placed in dumpsters for disposal by the solid-waste disposal contractor at an offsite permitted landfill.
- Inert construction and demolition wastes are collected for disposal at the onsite permitted landfill.
- Waste paper is placed in bins or dumpsters and sold to an offsite recycle facility.
- Aluminum cans are recycled and sold.
- Nonrecoverable solid wastes are placed in dumpsters for disposal by the solid waste disposal contractor.
- Special wastes (e.g., desiccants, oily wastes, insulation) are collected and stored and then disposed of by incineration. Asbestos is sent to an approved special waste landfill for disposal.
- Used oil, fluorescent tubes, and antifreeze are collected and stored in drums and tanks and recycled.
- Medical wastes are collected and disposed of in accordance with the medical waste disposal procedure for TVA medical facilities.
- Plant sanitary wastewater is routed to the sanitary wastewater treatment plant and then treated for release in accordance with the NPDES Permit.
- Metal-cleaning wastewater (e.g., trisodium phosphate, acetic acid, etc.) is discharged into approved storage ponds for future disposal in accordance with the NPDES Permit.
- Wastewater from floor and equipment drains in nonradiation areas is routed through sumps to the turbine building sump for discharge in accordance with the NPDES Permit.
- Surplus chemicals are sold; lead acid batteries are recycled; refrigerant is recovered and recycled; and solvent recovery equipment is used for painting operations.
- Steps to use biodegradable solvents and cleaners to replace hazardous chemicals in various cleaning operations have been incorporated to the extent practical.

#### **4.2.1.11 Spent Fuel Management**

When nuclear reactor fuel has been irradiated to the point that it no longer contributes to the operation of the reactor, or when it is found to have cladding leaks that allow radioactive gaseous emissions, the fuel assembly is termed "spent nuclear fuel" and is removed from the reactor core and stored in the spent fuel storage pool or basin. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, assigned the Secretary of Energy the

responsibility for the development of a repository for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. When such a repository is available, spent nuclear fuel would be transported for disposal from the nuclear power reactors to the repository. Until a repository is available, spent nuclear fuel would be stored in the reactor pools or in other acceptable, NRC-licensed storage locations. Because of the uncertainty associated with opening a repository, this EIS assumes spent fuel would be stored at the reactor facility for the duration of the proposed action (i.e., 40 years).

### **Storage Capacity**

Storage cells have been provided in the Watts Bar 1 spent fuel storage pool to hold 1,383 fuel assemblies. A reserve capacity is required for a full-core discharge (193 fuel assemblies) in the event it becomes necessary to remove fuel from the reactor vessel. The remaining storage capacity is 1,190 fuel assemblies. As of January 1998, the spent fuel inventory at Watts Bar 1 was 84 assemblies, leaving a usable storage capacity of 1,106 fuel assemblies.

### **Management Practice**

The normal (projected equilibrium average) refueling batch size is 80 fuel assemblies, with the refueling frequency established at 18 months. The current capacity for storing spent nuclear fuel is adequate through the year 2016 (fuel cycle number 14). However, Watts Bar 1 already is licensed for a total spent nuclear fuel storage pool capacity of 1,607 fuel assemblies, an increase of 224 fuel assemblies over the present capacity. As it becomes necessary, dry storage facilities can be added to extend the plant life.

#### **4.2.2 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2**

As discussed in Section 3.2.5, one of the reactor options under consideration is the irradiation of TPBARs in Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (Sequoyah 1 and 2). This option is based on the assumption that Sequoyah 1 and 2 would operate at their licensed full power output for the generation of electricity, with no reduced operability attributable to the production of tritium. The tritium production activity would be considered a secondary mission of the units.

The TVA Board authorized the construction of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant in August 1968. On October 15 1968, an application to construct the plant was filed with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. A provisional construction permit was granted on May 27, 1970. Unit 1 began commercial operation on July 1, 1981. Unit 2 began commercial operation on June 1, 1982. The units were shut down in 1985 and resumed operation in 1988. Sequoyah 1 and 2 are described briefly in Section 3.2.5.2. Detailed descriptions of the site, building structures, systems, and operations are provided in the following licensing and environmental documentation:

- TVA, *Final Environmental Statement, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2* (TVA 1974a).
- TVA, *Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment 12* (TVA 1996b).

The following sections describe the affected environment at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site for land resources, noise, air quality, water resources, geology and soils, biotic resources, cultural resources, and socioeconomics. In addition, radiation and hazardous chemical environments and the waste management conditions and spent nuclear fuel considerations at Sequoyah 1 and 2 are described.

#### 4.2.2.1 Land Resources

##### Land Use

The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site is on a 212-hectare (525-acre) site near the center of Hamilton County, Tennessee, on a peninsula on the western shore of Chickamauga Reservoir at River Mile 484.5, as shown in Figure 4-7. A map of the site is shown in Figure 4-8. The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site is approximately 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) northeast of the nearest city limit of Chattanooga, Tennessee. The corridor to the southwest of the site that encompasses the city of Chattanooga is considered a growth area in Hamilton County. The remaining area surrounding the site is rather sparsely settled. Development consists of scattered dwellings and associated small-scale farming. The sectors east of the site and the Chickamauga Reservoir are expected to retain their rural character (TVA 1996b). Land uses in the vicinity of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant are classified as industrial, agricultural, forest, and recreational.

##### Industry

There is no significant industrial development in the immediate vicinity of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site. Chattanooga, an industrial center, lies 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) southwest of the site. A center of diversified light industry, Cleveland, lies 23 kilometers (14 miles) east-southeast of the site (TVA 1996b).

##### Agriculture

Nearly 28 percent of the 224,000 hectares (554,500 acres) that constitute the land area of Hamilton and Bradley Counties, Tennessee, about 62,500 hectares (154,400 acres), is dedicated to farming. Crop land accounts for 33,500 hectares (82,700 acres) of the total agricultural area. (GISP 1998d, GISP 1998e)

##### Forest

The total area of forested land in Hamilton County, Tennessee, is 85,270 hectares (210,700 acres). This area is made up of approximately 19 percent loblolly and short-leaf pine (softwood) forests, 59 percent oak-hickory forests, and the remainder is oak-pine stands (DOA 1998a, DOA 1998d).

##### Recreation

Water-based recreation is supported by the Chickamauga Reservoir, particularly in late spring, summer, and early fall. There are three primary public recreation facilities, Harrison Bay and Booker T. Washington State Parks and the Chester Frost County Park, as well as numerous commercial marinas, group camps, cottage developments, and small formal and informal public access areas along the reservoir shoreline (TVA 1996b).

##### Nature Reserves

The Soddy Creek waterfowl management area is located 4.8 kilometers (3 miles) upstream from the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site. The Hiwassee Island Refuge is located 24 kilometers (15 miles) upstream. The Hiwassee Island Refuge is the principal waterfowl unit on the Chickamauga Reservoir.






Figure 4-7 Location of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site






Figure 4-8 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site

## **Visual Resources**

The major visual elements of the plant already exist, including the cooling towers, containment structures, turbine building, and transmission lines. Views of Sequoyah 1 and 2 from passing river traffic on the Tennessee River are partially screened by the wooded area east of the plant (TVA 1974a). The plant can be viewed from White Oak Mountain on the east side of the river. Distant glimpses of the plant site can be seen from the coves and hollows along the river and from various roads in the area, including U.S. Highway 27.

Based on the Bureau of Land Management Visual Resource Management method, the existing landscape at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site would be classified as Visual Resource Management Class 3 or 4. Class 3 includes areas where there has been a moderate change in the landscape and these changes may attract attention, but do not dominate the view of the casual observer. Class 4 includes areas where major modifications to the character of the landscape have occurred. These changes may be both the dominant features of the view and the major focus of viewer attention (DOI 1986a).

During operation of Sequoyah 1 and 2, the vapor plume associated with the cooling towers may be visible up to 10 miles away. Cooling towers are used approximately 2 percent of the time, usually during periods of low river flow or peak summer temperatures. The plume length and frequency of occurrence with direction varies with atmospheric conditions, being most visible during cooler months and after the passage of weather fronts. Vapor plumes are visible at times from nearby residential areas, U.S. Highway 27, Tennessee State Highway 58, and County Highway 5550 (TVA 1974a).

### **4.2.2.2 Noise**

The most common measure of environmental noise impact is the day-night average sound level. The day-night average sound level is a 24-hour sound level with a 10-dBA penalty added to sound levels between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. to account for increased annoyance due to noise during nighttime hours. The EPA has developed noise level guidelines for different land-use classifications based on day-night average sound levels and equivalent sound levels. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has established noise impact guidelines for residential areas based on day-night average sound levels. Some states and localities have established noise control regulations or zoning ordinances that specify acceptable noise levels by land-use category. The State of Tennessee has not developed a noise regulation that specifies the numerical community noise levels that are acceptable.

For the purpose of this document, noise impacts are assessed using a day-night average sound level of 65 dBA as the level below which noise levels would be considered acceptable for residential land uses and outdoor recreational uses. Generally the noise levels off site are below day-night average sound levels of 65 dBA and are considered acceptable. Testing of the emergency warning siren system occurs on a regular basis and results in outdoor noise levels of about 60 dBA in areas within a radius of about 16 kilometers (10 miles) of the site. TVA typically tests siren systems on a given day of the month at noon.

### **4.2.2.3 Air Quality**

Sequoyah 1 and 2 are located in Hamilton County in south-central Tennessee in the Chattanooga Interstate Air Quality Control Region. Ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants determined by monitoring air quality in the vicinity of Sequoyah 1 and 2 are compared with the applicable National Ambient Air Quality Standards and Tennessee State Ambient Air Quality Standards in Table 4-13.

**Table 4-13 Comparison of Baseline Sequoyah 1 and 2 Ambient Air Concentrations with Most Stringent Applicable Regulations and Guidelines**

Criteria Pollutant	Averaging Time	Most Stringent Regulation or Guideline <sup>a</sup> ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	Baseline Concentration <sup>b</sup> ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )
Carbon monoxide	8-hour	10,000 <sup>c</sup>	1,250
	1-hour	40,000 <sup>c</sup>	1,250
Lead	Calendar quarter	1.5 <sup>c</sup>	0.03
Nitrogen dioxide	Annual	100 <sup>c</sup>	9.4
Ozone	8-hour (4th highest averaged over 3 years)	157 <sup>cd</sup>	e
Particulate matter <sup>d</sup>	PM <sub>10</sub>		
	Annual	50 <sup>e</sup>	20.3
	24-hour (interim)	150 <sup>e</sup>	39
	24-hour 99th percentile (3-year average)	150 <sup>e</sup>	e
	PM <sub>2.5</sub>		
	Annual (3-year average)	15 <sup>e</sup>	f
Sulfur dioxide	Annual	80 <sup>e</sup>	5.24
	24-hour	365 <sup>e</sup>	28.8
	3-hour	1,300 <sup>e</sup>	123
<b>Other Regulated Pollutants</b>			
Gaseous fluoride (as hydrogen fluoride)	30-day	1.2 <sup>f</sup>	h
	7-day	1.6 <sup>f</sup>	h
	24-hour	2.9 <sup>f</sup>	h
	12-hour	3.7 <sup>f</sup>	h
Total suspended particulates	24-hour	150 <sup>g</sup>	39 <sup>i</sup>

$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  = micrograms per cubic meter

PM<sub>n</sub> = particulate matter size less than or equal to n micrometers.

<sup>a</sup> The more stringent of the Federal and state standards is presented if both exist for the averaging time. Tennessee state and National Ambient Air Quality standards are the same for the criteria pollutants. The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (40 CFR 59), other than those for ozone, particulate matter, lead, and those based on annual averages, are not to be exceeded more than once per year. The 1-hour ozone standard is attained when the expected number of days per year with maximum hourly average concentrations above the standard is  $\leq 1$ . The 1-hour ozone standard applies only to nonattainment areas. The 8-hour ozone standard is attained when the 3-year average of the annual fourth-highest daily maximum 8-hour average concentration is less than or equal to  $157 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ . The interim 24-hour PM<sub>10</sub> standard is attained when the expected number of days with a 24-hour average concentration above the standard is  $\leq 1$ . The annual arithmetic mean particulate matter standard is attained when the expected annual arithmetic mean concentration is less than or equal to the standard.

<sup>b</sup> Based on ambient air quality monitoring data at Bradley County location for 1994–1995, except for carbon monoxide from Loudon County (1996) and lead from the Rockwood monitor in Roane County (1996). Concentrations shown are maximums for the averaging period.

<sup>c</sup> Federal standard.

<sup>d</sup> EPA recently revised the air quality standards for particulate matter and ozone. The new standards, finalized on July 18, 1997, change the ozone primary and secondary standards from a 1-hour concentration of  $235 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  (0.12 parts per million) to an 8-hour concentration of  $157 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  (0.08 parts per million). During a transition period while states are developing state implementation plan revisions for attaining and maintaining these standards, the 1-hour ozone standard would continue to apply in nonattainment areas (62 FR 38855). For particulate matter, the current PM<sub>10</sub> (particulate matter size less than or equal to 10 micrometers) annual standard is retained and two PM<sub>2.5</sub> (particulate matter size less than or equal to 2.5 micrometers) standards are added. These standards are set at  $15 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  3-year annual average arithmetic mean based on community-oriented monitors, and  $65 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  3-year average of the 98th percentile of 24-hour concentrations at population-oriented monitors. The current 24-hour PM<sub>10</sub> standard is revised to be based on the 3-year average of the 99th percentile of 24-hour concentrations. The existing PM<sub>10</sub> standards would continue to apply in the interim period (62 FR 38652).

<sup>e</sup> There is insufficient data to compare to the standard.

<sup>f</sup> Compliance with the new PM<sub>2.5</sub> standards is not evaluated since current emissions data for PM<sub>2.5</sub> are not available.

<sup>g</sup> State standard.

<sup>h</sup> No local monitoring data is available for gaseous fluoride.

<sup>i</sup> PM<sub>10</sub> value is presented and would underestimate the total suspended particulates concentration. No monitoring data available for total suspended particulates.

Sources: TN DEC 1994, TVA 1998a.

The area in which Sequoyah 1 and 2 are located, the Chattanooga Interstate Air Quality Control Region, is designated by EPA as an attainment area with respect to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for criteria pollutants (40 CFR 81). The Prevention of Significant Deterioration Class I areas closest to Sequoyah 1 and 2 are the Joyce Kilmer-Slickrock National Wilderness Area and Cohutta National Wilderness Area, Georgia. For locations that are in an attainment area for criteria pollutants, Prevention of Significant Deterioration regulations limit pollutant emissions from new sources and establish allowable increments of pollutant concentrations. Class I areas include national wilderness areas, memorial parks larger than 2,020 hectares (5,000 acres), and national parks larger than 2,340 hectares (6,000 acres). The Class I areas noted above are about 60 kilometers (37 miles) from Sequoyah 1 and 2 (TVA 1998d).

Sources of criteria air pollutant emissions at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site include diesel-powered emergency generators and fire protection pumps; site, trade, and employee vehicles; auxiliary boilers; and cooling towers. Small quantities of toxic chemicals and metals are emitted from the testing and operation of the diesel-fueled equipment, resulting in offsite concentrations of less than 0.0001 percent of the threshold limit value of any of these pollutants. One-tenth of the threshold limit value is often used as a guideline in identifying pollutants that may be of concern. Ozone is produced at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site by corona discharge (ionization of air) in the operation of transmission lines and substations, particularly at high voltages. Operation of electrical motors and generators also produces ozone. TVA minimizes corona discharge by optimizing, to the extent practicable, its design and construction of transmission facilities.

An analysis of the occurrence of visible plumes has been performed for Sequoyah. Naturally occurring fog with visibility equal to or less than 0.4 kilometers (0.25 miles) occurs in the vicinity of Sequoyah about 36 days per year. Occurrences of the plume descending to the ground or causing localized surface fogging or icing are infrequent (TVA 1974a).

Compliance with the new  $PM_{2.5}$  standards was not evaluated since current emissions data for  $PM_{2.5}$  are not available. When the calculated concentrations from onsite sources are combined with concentrations from offsite sources, the ambient air quality standards for carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide compounds, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide continue to be met.

### **Gaseous Radioactive Emission**

Sequoyah 1 and 2 have three primary sources of gaseous radioactive emissions:

- Discharges from the gaseous waste management system
- Discharges associated with the exhaust of noncondensable gases in the main condenser if a primary to secondary leak exists
- Radioactive gaseous discharges from the building ventilation exhaust, including the reactor building, reactor auxiliary building, and the fuel handling building

The gaseous waste management system collects gaseous fission products (mainly noble gases) that accumulate in the primary coolant. A portion of the coolant is continually diverted to the coolant purification, volume, and chemical control system to remove contaminants and adjust the chemistry and volume. Noncondensable gases are stripped and sent to the gaseous waste management system, a series of gas storage tanks where the extended holdup time allows short half-life gases to decay, leaving only a small quantity of long half-life radionuclides to be released to the atmosphere. Table 4-14 shows the annual gaseous radioactive emissions from Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2.

**Table 4-14 Annual Radioactive Gaseous Emissions from Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2**

<i>Emission</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Fission gases (Curies)	120
Tritium (Curies)	25

Source: TVA 1998c, TVA 1999.

### **Meteorology and Climatology**

The regional and local meteorology and climatology of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site described in TVA's *Final Environmental Statement, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2* (TVA 1974a) has been updated with more recent meteorological data from Chattanooga.

#### *Regional Climate*

The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site is in the eastern Tennessee portion of the Southern Appalachian region. The predominant air masses affecting the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site are interchangeably continental and maritime winter and spring—predominantly maritime in the summer and continental in the fall.

Data collected over a 30-year period (1961 to 1990) at the Chattanooga airport indicate the average annual temperature is 15.2°C (59.3°F); the average daily maximum temperature in July is 31.7°C (89°F); and the average daily minimum temperature in January is -2.2°C (28°F) (NOAA 1997a).

Precipitation of 0.025 centimeters (0.01 inches) or more occurs on an average of 117 days per year. The average monthly precipitation is 12.2 centimeters (4.80 inches); the maximum monthly average of 17.2 centimeters (6.76 inches) is reached in March.

#### *Severe Weather*

Wind storms with wind speeds exceeding 56 kilometers per hour (35 miles per hour), and occasionally 97 kilometers per hour (60 miles per hour), occur several times each year, particularly during winter, spring, and summer. High winds also may accompany thunderstorms that occur about 56 days per year, reaching a maximum frequency in July.

The current estimate of tornado strike probability at the Sequoyah site is 0.000044 per year (4.4 chances per 100,000 in a given year).

#### *Local Meteorological Conditions*

The terrain features of the region have some effect on the general climate. The mountain ridge and valley terrain aligned northeast-southwest over eastern Tennessee accounts for the predominant up-valley/down-valley wind flow in lower elevations of 150 to 300 meters (500 to 1,000 feet). The Cumberland Plateau terrain at elevation 460 to 550 meters (1,500 to 1,800 feet) tends to moderate many of the migratory storms that move from the west across the region.

#### **4.2.2.4 Water Resources**

##### **Surface Water**

The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site is located at Tennessee River Mile 484.5 on the Chickamauga Reservoir about 21 kilometers (13 miles) upstream of the Chickamauga Dam. Chickamauga Reservoir is TVA's sixth largest reservoir. The reservoir is 95 kilometers (59 miles) long on the Tennessee River and 51 kilometers (32 miles) long on the Hiwassee River, with an area of 14,300 hectares (35,356 acres) and a volume of 775 million cubic meters (628,000 acre-feet). At the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site, the Chickamauga Reservoir is about 914 meters (3,000 feet) wide, with cross-sectional depths ranging up to 15 meters (50 feet) at normal pool elevation.

During the steam cycle, heat from Sequoyah 1 and 2 turbines is released when the steam passes through a condenser cooled with water from the Tennessee River. This water may be cooled by passing it through evaporative cooling towers. The cooling towers may be operated in open mode, helper mode, or closed mode. In open mode, the towers are not used. All cooling water is discharged first to a pond, then through diffuser pipes into the Tennessee River. In helper mode, water is cooled by the cooling towers before being discharged to the pond. From the pond, water is discharged through diffuser pipes into the Tennessee River. In closed mode, cooling is accomplished in the same manner as described for Watts Bar 1 in Section 3.2.5.1. When the cooling towers are used in closed mode, makeup water from the Tennessee River is needed to replace water losses due to evaporation, drift, and blowdown. In closed mode, most of the water is recirculated back to the condenser, and only the blowdown water is discharged to the pond. From the pond, water is discharged through diffusers into the Tennessee River. The cooling towers have only been used for approximately 2 percent of the plant operating time (TVA 1998d) to meet thermal discharge limits. At full power, the temperature of the water flowing through each condenser is raised by approximately 17°C (30°F) (TVA 1996b).

The open cooling mode using the diffuser pipes withdraws and returns 4,250,000 liters per minute (1,222,000 gallons per minute) with two units operating (TVA 1974a). In the cooling tower closed cycle cooling mode, approximately 249,745 liters per minute (65,978 gallons per minute) are withdrawn from the Tennessee River to make up for water lost through evaporation, small leaks, drift, and blowdown (TVA 1974a). When used, blowdown from a natural-draft cooling tower is discharged into the Tennessee River at a normal rate of 120,000 liters per minute (31,700 gallons per minute) (TVA 1974a).

The direct open cooling system uses a diffuser system that discharges water from diffuser pipes. One diffuser pipe is 4.9 meters (16 feet) in diameter and extends 107 meters (350 feet), while the other diffuser pipe is 5.2 meters (17 feet) in diameter and extends 213 meters (700 feet). These two pipes are perforated with several thousand 5-centimeter (2-inch) ports through which water is discharged into the Tennessee River for maximum thermal mixing (TVA 1974a). Diffusers are used to mix the blowdown with river water, thus limiting the temperature rise after mixing to less than 5.6°C (10°F) (TVA 1996c). This water is discharged under an NPDES Permit (TN DEC 1993a). Tritium production would not affect the thermal discharge characteristics of the plant.

River flow in the vicinity of the Sequoyah site is governed by hydropower operations at the upstream Watts Bar Dam (Tennessee River Mile 529.9) and the downstream Chickamauga Dam (Tennessee River Mile 471). Peaking hydropower operation at these two hydroprojects can cause short periods of zero or reverse flow near the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site.

## Surface Water Quality

The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation classifies the streams and creeks of Tennessee based on water quality, stream uses, and resident aquatic biota. Classifications are defined in the State of Tennessee Water Quality Standards. The Chickamauga Reservoir is classified by the Tennessee Division of Water Pollution Control as suitable for the following uses: municipal water supply, industrial water supply, fish and aquatic life, recreation, irrigation, livestock and wildlife watering, and navigation (TVA 1996b). Monitoring data for surface water in the vicinity of Sequoyah 1 and 2 are presented in Table 4-15.

**Table 4-15 Summary of Surface Water Quality Monitoring in the Vicinity of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site**

<i>Parameter</i>	<i>Unit of Measure</i>	<i>Water Quality Criteria</i>	<i>Average Water Body Concentration</i>
<b>Radiological</b>			
Alpha (gross)	picocuries per liter	15 <sup>a</sup>	1.9
Beta (gross)	picocuries per liter	50 <sup>b</sup>	2.67
Tritium	picocuries per liter	20,000 <sup>c</sup>	<300 <sup>e</sup>
<b>Nonradiological</b>			
Manganese	milligrams per liter	0.05 <sup>d</sup>	0.000956
Nitrate (as N)	milligrams per liter	10.0 <sup>a</sup>	0.245
Arsenic	milligrams per liter	0.05 <sup>a</sup>	0.00233
Barium	milligrams per liter	2.0 <sup>a</sup>	<0.1
Cadmium	milligrams per liter	0.005 <sup>a</sup>	0.000117
Chromium	milligrams per liter	0.1 <sup>a</sup>	0.00333
Lead	milligrams per liter	0.005 <sup>a</sup>	0.00142
Mercury	milligrams per liter	0.002 <sup>a</sup>	0.0002
pH (acidity/alkalinity)	pH units	6.0-9.0 <sup>a</sup>	7.52

- <sup>a</sup> National Primary Drinking Water Regulations (40 CFR 141).
- <sup>b</sup> Proposed National Primary Drinking Water Regulations.
- <sup>c</sup> Below lower limit of detection of 300 picocuries per liter.
- <sup>d</sup> National Secondary Drinking Water Regulations (40 CFR 143).
- <sup>e</sup> Tennessee General Water Quality Criteria for Domestic Water Supply (TN DEC 1995).

Source: TVA 1998c, TVA 1998c, TN DEC 1998a.

## Surface Water Use and Rights

From its head near Knoxville, Tennessee, to the Kentucky Dam near its mouth, the Tennessee River is a series of highly controlled multiple-use reservoirs. This chain of reservoirs provides flood control, navigation, generation of electric power, sport and commercial fishing, industrial and public water supply, waste disposal, and recreation.

There are two municipal drinking water supply intakes from the Tennessee River within 80 kilometers (50 miles) downstream of the Sequoyah site: East Side Utility and Tennessee American Water. In addition, there are nine industrial water intakes within 80 kilometers (50 miles) downstream of the Sequoyah site; the closest are the Gold Point Marina, Chickamauga Dam, Chickamauga Power Service Shop, and E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company (TVA 1996b, TVA 1999).

In Tennessee, the state's water rights are codified in the Water Quality Control Act. Water rights are similar to riparian rights in that the designated usage of a water body cannot be impaired. To construct intake structures for the purpose of withdrawing water from available supplies, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and TVA permits are required.

## Liquid Chemical and Radioactive Effluents

The radionuclide contaminants in the primary coolant are the source of liquid radioactive effluent from Sequoyah 1 and 2. Liquid effluent varies considerably in composition. It may include nonradioactive contaminants and chemical constituents depending on the history and collection point of the liquid. Each source of liquid effluent receives an individual degree and type of treatment before storage for reuse or discharge to the environment under the Sequoyah 1 and 2 NPDES Permit. To increase the efficiency of waste processing, wastes of similar characteristics are grouped together before treatment. The Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 liquid effluent to the environment during normal operation are shown in Table 4-16.

**Table 4-16 Annual Chemical and Radioactive Liquid Effluents from Operation of Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2**

<i>Materials</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Chemicals (kilograms)	294,012 <sup>a</sup>
Tritium (Curies)	714 <sup>b</sup>
Other Radionuclides (Curies)	1.15 <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> TVA 1996b.

<sup>b</sup> TVA 1998e, TVA 1999.

## Floodplains and Flood Risk

At the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant the 100-year floodplain for the Tennessee River would be at elevation 209.4 meters (687 feet) above mean sea level. The TVA Flood Risk Profile elevation on the Tennessee River would be elevation 210 meters (689 feet). The Flood Risk Profile is used to control flood damageable development for TVA projects and is based on the 500-year flood elevation (TVA 1998e). The safety-related facilities, systems, and equipment are housed in structures that provide protection from flooding for all flood conditions up to plant grade at the reactor building elevation of 215 meters (705 feet). Rainfall floods exceeding this elevation would require plant shutdown. The situation producing the maximum plant site flood level was determined to be one of two events: (1) a sequence of March storms producing maximum precipitation on the watershed above Chattanooga, or (2) a sequence of March storms centered and producing maximum precipitation in the basin to the west of the Appalachian Divide and above Chattanooga. Seismic and flood events could cause dam failure surges above the plant grade elevation of 219 meters (720 feet) (TVA 1996b).

## Groundwater

Groundwater at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site is derived principally from local precipitation. The average annual precipitation is 1.47 meters (58 inches). There is no distinct aquifer in the Conasauga Shale that underlies the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site. The groundwater occurs in small openings that rapidly decrease in size and depth along fractures and bedding planes. The shales and limestones provide relatively low permeability compared to terrace deposits and, therefore, the majority of the discharge of groundwater occurs by movement along the strike of bedrock to the northeast and southwest into the Chickamauga Reservoir.

## Groundwater Quality

A total of 16 groundwater monitoring wells have been installed at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site. Older monitoring wells at the site are primarily bedrock monitoring wells. Monthly groundwater levels are obtained at all wells except for two: one destroyed during cooling tower construction and the other installed with an automatic sampler for routine monitoring of radiological contaminants. Two of the wells were installed near



the low-level radiological waste storage area in August 1981 to obtain background groundwater radiological data (TVA 1998e).

### **Groundwater Availability, Use, and Rights**

There are 8 public groundwater supplies and 24 industrial water supplies drawn from wells within a 32-kilometer (20-mile) radius of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site. Two supplies are taken from groundwater springs. There is no groundwater use at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site.

Groundwater rights in the State of Tennessee are traditionally associated with the Reasonable Use Doctrine. Under this doctrine, landowners can withdraw groundwater to the extent that they exercise their rights reasonably in relation to the similar rights of others.

### **4.2.2.5 Geology and Soils**

#### **Geology**

The controlling feature of the geologic structure at the site is the Kingston thrust fault that developed some 250 million years ago. The fault has been inactive for many millions of years and recurrence of movement is not expected. The fault crosses the northwestern portion of the site area; however, it was not involved directly in the foundation for any of the major plant structures.

#### **Seismology**

The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site lies within the borders of the Southern Appalachian Seismotectonic Province, a Zone 1 (minor damage region) on the U.S. Geologic Survey Seismic Probability Map of the United States. The seismic history of the southeastern United States since 1776 indicates that there has been no seismic activity originating in the site area. Sequoyah 1 and 2 were designed based on the largest historic earthquake to occur in the Southern Appalachian Tectonic Province, the 1897 Giles County, Virginia, earthquake (intensity: Modified Mercalli VIII and Richter magnitude of 6 to 7). The safe-shutdown earthquake for the plant was established at a maximum horizontal acceleration of 0.18 g (g = acceleration due to gravity) and a simultaneous maximum vertical acceleration of 0.12 g (TVA 1996b). The safe-shutdown earthquake is defined as the earthquake that produces the maximum ground vibration for which: (1) the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (2) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in the shutdown mode, and (3) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures are designed to remain functional (10 CFR 100, Appendix A).

#### **Soils**

The Conasauga Formation provides a satisfactory and competent foundation for the plant structures. Cores from holes drilled in the plant area indicate no evidence of weathering below the upper 1.5 meters (5 feet) of the rock that would be removed under normal construction procedures. Physical testing, both static and dynamic, has shown that the unweathered rock is capable of supporting loads in excess of those that would be imposed by the plant structures. The Conasauga Formation at the site is relatively unfossiliferous and has no known areas of unique paleontological significance.

#### **4.2.2.6 Ecological Resources**

##### **Terrestrial Resources**

The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site is located within the Ridge and Valley Physiographic Province. This province lies between the Blue Ridge Mountains and the Cumberland Plateau and is characterized by prominent, northwest-trending ridges and adjacent valleys. The Tennessee River flows through this province, roughly paralleling the alignment of the valleys. The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site is located near the center of Hamilton County, Tennessee, approximately 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) northeast of the Chattanooga city limits. The area immediately surrounding the site is primarily open agricultural lands with scattered forests.

##### **Terrestrial Wildlife**

Hamilton and Bradley Counties, Tennessee, are in the vicinity of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site and provide habitat for seven upland game species: white-tailed deer, gray squirrel, raccoon, wild turkey, ruffed grouse, cottontail rabbit, and bobwhite quail. The largest deer populations are located along the western border of Hamilton County (Waldens Ridge) and in the northeastern corner of Hamilton County near the junction of the Hiwassee and Tennessee Rivers. Squirrel populations occur in large stands of hardwoods, while raccoons and rabbits are most common in the wide, rolling valleys between the ridges (TVA 1974a).

The mixture of forest and open vegetative types of terrain and the large degree of openness within the forest provide an abundance of niches favoring a diverse bird population. The diverse habitat sites surrounding the plant support varied and abundant populations of snakes, frogs, salamanders, and other reptiles (TVA 1974a).

##### **Wetlands**

The potential wetland areas identified in the vicinity of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site are: (1) palustrine, bottomland hardwood deciduous, temporarily flooded wetlands and (2) fringe wetlands. They are indicated in Figure 4-9 (TVA 1974a).

##### **Aquatic Resources**

The Chickamauga Reservoir in the vicinity of the site includes areas of varying depth, blind nonflowing embayments, tributary streams, peninsulas, inundated reservoir shallows (overbank areas), and the navigation channel or old riverbed. The area is characterized by embayments and shallow overbanks that alternate between right and left banks as the channel changes course. There are extensive shallow areas in the stretch approximately 3.2 to 6.4 kilometers (2 to 4 miles) downstream from the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site (TVA 1974a).

There are a variety of benthic substrates in the area. They range from bedrock to fine organic leaf fragments. The substrate of greatest areal extent is composed of mixed sand, clay, and silt (TVA 1974a).

##### **Fish Communities**

Preoperational monitoring for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site was conducted from 1971 to 1977. Operational monitoring occurred from 1980 to 1986. Species designated as important to the Chickamauga Reservoir (sauger, crappie, white bass, and channel cat fish) were monitored from 1986 to 1995.

The fish community of the Chickamauga Reservoir, as in most main stream Tennessee River impoundments, is dominated by gizzard and threadfin shad. Rough fish, especially carp, drum, and smallmouth buffalo, also contribute significantly to standing crop (biomass) estimates. Among the sport fish, largemouth and spotted




Figure 4-9 Wetlands Map of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site Vicinity

bass, bluegill, redear and longear sunfish, crappie, and sauger are abundant, but smallmouth bass and walleye are rare. The Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency reported the commercial fish harvest from Chickamauga Reservoir during 1994 to be 63,908 kilograms (140,892 pounds) of fish, primarily channel and blue catfish, buffalo, and common carp (Tennessee 1994).

#### *Mussel and Clam Communities*

Very few native mussels persist in the impounded river habitat adjacent to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site. Recent sampling in this part of Chickamauga Reservoir produced only a few individuals representing eight wide-ranging species. Large numbers of native mussel species occur in seminatural reaches of the Tennessee River not far downstream from Chickamauga Dam (at Tennessee River Mile 471) and in an approximate 25-kilometer (15-mile) reach downstream from Watts Bar Dam (at Tennessee River Mile 529). These areas are at least 20 kilometers (13 miles) downstream and 30 kilometers (19 miles) upstream from the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site (Tennessee River Mile 483). There has not been any commercial harvest of native mussels from the downstream part of Chickamauga Reservoir within the last 20–25 years.

An important factor contributing to the decline in native mussel populations was the loss of habitat following impoundment of the river. Dam construction slowed the flow of the river, thereby permitting silt to settle and other bottom conditions. Mussels generally prefer gravel or a mixture of sand, mud, and gravel, but do not survive in deep silt.

While habitat for native mussels is scarce in this impounded part of the Tennessee River, suitable habitat supports large populations of the exotic Asiatic clam, *Corbicula fluminea*, and a few native snails. Also, the zebra mussel, *Dreissena polymorpha*, has been found in this area within the last few years. The Asiatic clam has been present in the Chickamauga Reservoir for at least 30 years (TVA 1998e).

#### *Other Aquatic Life*

There is an abundance of aquatic life in the Chickamauga Reservoir. The dominant spring and fall phytoplankton is typically a species of *Melosira*. The summer flora is dominated by two or three species of green algae. Blue-green algae are represented, but are not abundant. A large portion of zooplankton density is composed of rotifers. However, calenoid, copepods, and cladocerans are also plentiful.

As a rule, bottom fauna communities are not diverse and species populations are small. An exception is the Asiatic clam, *Corbicula fluminea*, which achieves densities of 2,000 per square meter (217.3 per square feet) in limited areas. Asiatic clam densities fluctuate throughout the reservoir, but densities are much less in the lacustrine portions. The most abundant insects are the burrowing mayfly, *Hexagenia bilineata*, and midges of the family *Chironomidae*.

#### *Aquatic Macrophytes*

In the reach of the Chickamauga Reservoir above the Sequoyah site (toward the Watts Bar site), some embayments support colonies of coontail, potamogetons, and cattails. A chemical control program has been used to suppress a Eurasian watermilfoil invasion. Only a few submerged or emergent macrophytes occur in the immediate area of the Sequoyah site (TVA 1974a).

### Threatened and Endangered Species

The 1974 Final Environmental Statement for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (TVA 1974a) listed a few endangered or threatened species potentially occurring near the Sequoyah site. Based on more recent information, several terrestrial and aquatic species listed as endangered or threatened by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or state agencies in Tennessee could occur in the general vicinity of the Sequoyah site (Table 4-17). Additional information on the status and biology of the Federally listed species in Table 4-17 (except for mountain skullcap) is contained in the biological assessment included in the 1995 NRC Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Final EIS (NRC 1995b), which is incorporated here by reference.

**Table 4-17 Listed Threatened or Endangered Species Potentially On or Near the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site**

<i>Common Name</i>	<i>Scientific Name</i>	<i>Federal</i>	<i>State</i>
<b>Plants</b>			
Large-flowered Skullcap	<i>Scutellaria montana</i>	Endangered	Endangered
<b>Mollusks</b>			
Orange-footed Pearlymussel	<i>Plethobasus cooperianus</i>	Endangered	Endangered
Pink Mucket	<i>Lampsilis abrupta/Lampsilis orbiculata</i>	Endangered	Endangered
<b>Fish</b>			
Blue Sucker	<i>Cyprogenia elongata</i>	Not Listed	Threatened
Snail Darter	<i>Percina tanasi</i>	Threatened	Threatened
<b>Amphibians</b>			
Eastern Hellbender	<i>Cryptobranchus a. alleganiensis</i>	Not Listed	In Need of Management
<b>Birds</b>			
Bald Eagle	<i>Haliaeetus leucocephalus</i>	Threatened	Threatened
Osprey	<i>Pandion haliaetus</i>	Not Listed	Threatened
Peregrine Falcon	<i>Falco peregrinus</i>	Endangered	Endangered
<b>Mammals</b>			
Gray Bat	<i>Myotis grisescens</i>	Endangered	Endangered
Indiana Bat	<i>Myotis sodalis</i>	Endangered	Endangered

Source: NRC 1995b, TVA 1998c, Tennessee 1994, DOI 1998a.

#### Plants

The large-flowered skullcap (also known as the mountain skullcap) is a perennial herb in the mint family. It is restricted to three counties in southeast Tennessee and four counties in northwest Georgia. It occurs on rocky, relatively dry forested slopes and ravines and along forested streams with gravelly, fine sandy loam soils. It was first listed in 1986, when it was known to exist at a total of 10 different locations. Since then, it has been found at many more locations and is presently known to exist at 36 sites with a minimum total population of 48,000 individuals. Because some of the recovery objectives for this species have been met, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service recently began a review of its status (DOI 1996, DOI 1998b).

A population of large-flowered skullcap occurs on a steep bluff across the Tennessee River from the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site, and several other skullcap populations occur within a few kilometers of the site. No suitable habitat for this species occurs on the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site (TVA 1998e).

A population of the small whorled pogonia, *Isotria medeoloides*, Federally listed as threatened and state-listed as endangered, occurs on Walden Ridge about 24 kilometers (15 miles) southwest of the Sequoyah Nuclear

Plant site. This widespread species occurs in open, dry deciduous woods with acid soil (DOI 1992). Little suitable habitat occurs on the Sequoyah site, and the species has not been found during field surveys of the site.

#### *Terrestrial Animals*

The bald eagle is a fairly common winter resident and rare summer resident on the Chickamauga Reservoir. Its summer population has increased in the last decade and in early 1999 a pair nested in a wooded area on the Sequoyah site. Ospreys feed primarily on fish and regularly occur on the Chickamauga Reservoir. None have been known to nest in the immediate vicinity of the Sequoyah site. The peregrine falcon formerly nested on the Cumberland Escarpment in Hamilton County and very recently nested on a bridge spanning the Chickamauga Dam tailwater. Suitable nest habitat does not occur in the vicinity of the Sequoyah plant. The peregrine falcon is, however, a rare migrant in the area. Peregrine falcons feed mostly on waterfowl, shorebirds, and, in urban areas, pigeons.

No caves inhabited by gray bats are known to be near the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site; it is likely, however, that gray bats forage over adjacent portions of the Chickamauga Reservoir. The Indiana bat has not been observed at the Chickamauga Reservoir or elsewhere in Hamilton County. It is known to hibernate in caves in other areas of east Tennessee and in northeast Alabama and periodically is seen in riparian forests along the Chickamauga Reservoir. Little suitable habitat occurs on the Sequoyah site (TVA 1998e).

#### *Aquatic Animals*

No endangered or threatened aquatic species are known or are likely to occur in the impounded part of the Chickamauga Reservoir adjacent to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site. Present conditions in this part of the reservoir are quite unlike the flowing water, rocky bottom habitats in which nearly all the Tennessee River's endangered and threatened species normally occur.

Four protected aquatic species listed in Table 4-17 occur in the Tennessee River not far downstream from Chickamauga Dam, 20 kilometers (13 miles) downstream from the Sequoyah site. Of these species, only the endangered pink mucket and the threatened snail darter have been encountered in the Chickamauga Dam tailwater within the last decade. The State of Tennessee has listed the blue sucker as a threatened species and the hellbender to be "in need of management." Both of these species have been observed only on rare occasions in the Chickamauga Dam tailwater.

Three other aquatic species, all Federally listed as endangered, were found in preimpoundment surveys of nearby portions of the Tennessee River. These species are the fine-rayed pigtoe, *Fusconaia cuneolus*, the tubercled-blossom pearl mussel, *Epioblasma torulosa*, *Dysnomia torulosa*, and the Cumberland monkeyface pearl mussel, *Quadrula intermedia*. They all inhabit gravel riffles in medium to large rivers and have not been found in the Chickamauga Reservoir or its tailwaters for 25 years.

#### **4.2.2.7 Archaeological and Historic Resources**

No archaeological survey was conducted prior to the initiation of construction activities at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site. An archaeological survey of the site was conducted on June 16, 1973, after construction activity was well advanced (TVA 1974a).

No properties on the National Register of Historic Places were identified by a Tennessee Historical Commission review of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site (TVA 1974a).

Construction of Sequoyah 1 and 2 is complete, and the reactors have operated since 1980 and 1982, respectively. The operational experience to date has not identified any impact on archaeological or historic resources on or near the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site.

#### 4.2.2.8 Socioeconomics

The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant is near the town of Soddy Daisy, in Hamilton County, Tennessee. Its precise location is latitude 35°13'24" north and longitude 85°5'16" west (NRC 1998d). Soddy Daisy is about 11 kilometers (7 miles) northeast of Chattanooga, Tennessee, and about 129 kilometers (80 miles) southwest of Knoxville, Tennessee. Highway access from the plant to Soddy Daisy and Chattanooga is via State Route 27. State Route 27 also links the plant to State Route 68 to the north, to Interstate Highway 40 about 73 kilometers (45 miles) to the north, and to State Routes 11, 127, 41, and Interstate Highway 75.

#### Demography

According to the U.S. Census, the population of Soddy Daisy was 8,240 in April 1990 (DOC 1998c). The estimated population in mid-1996 was 8,884, indicating a growth rate from 1990 to 1996 of almost 8 percent.

Hamilton County had an estimated population of 285,536 in 1990 (DOC 1998c). It also had 79,031 families and 111,380 households in that year. Table 4-18 shows demographic data for Soddy Daisy, Hamilton County, and the Sequoyah region of influence. The Sequoyah region of influence was defined as the area within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.

**Table 4-18 General Demographic Characteristics of Soddy Daisy, Hamilton County, and the Sequoyah Region of Influence (1990 U.S. Census)**

<i>Demographic Measure</i>	<i>Soddy Daisy</i>	<i>Hamilton County</i>	<i>Sequoyah Region of Influence</i>
Total population	8,240	285,536	857,880
Families	2,468	79,031	245,206
Households	3,213	111,380	325,243
Male	3,961	134,510	413,227
Female	4,279	151,026	444,654

Sources: DOC 1992, DOC 1998c.

The Sequoyah region of influence had an estimated population of 857,880 in 1990 (DOC 1992). The number of households in the region of influence was about 325,000 in 1990; the number of families was about 245,000. Table 4-19 shows Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations residing within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site.

**Table 4-19 Population Distribution by Ethnic Group in Soddy Daisy, Hamilton County, and the Sequoyah Region of Influence (1990 U.S. Census)**

<i>Ethnic Group or Subgroup (U.S. Census Definitions)</i>	<i>Soddy Daisy</i>		<i>Hamilton County</i>		<i>Sequoyah Region of Influence</i>	
	<i>Population</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Population</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Population</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Population</i>
White not of Hispanic origin	8,176	99.22	226,222	79.23	758,404	90.20
Black not of Hispanic origin	36	0.44	54,251	19.00	69,553	8.27
American Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo not of Hispanic origin	8	0.10	762	0.27	2,714	0.32
Asian or Pacific Islander not of Hispanic origin	0	0.00	2,339	0.82	3,601	0.43
Other race not of Hispanic origin	0	0.00	97	0.03	178	0.02
White of Hispanic origin	7	0.09	1,237	0.43	3,674	0.44
Black of Hispanic origin	0	0.00	126	0.04	199	0.02
American Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo of Hispanic origin	0	0.00	10	0.00	53	0.01
Asian or Pacific Islander of Hispanic origin	13	0.16	42	0.01	62	0.01
Other race of Hispanic origin	0	0.00	450	0.16	2,403	0.29
Hispanic total	20	0.24	1,865	0.65	6,391	0.76
Total population (all ethnic groups)	8,240	100.00	285,536	100.00	840,840	100.00

Note: Sum of items may not add up to population total due to rounding error.


Source: DOC 1992, DOC 1998c.

Figure 4-10 shows the projected racial and ethnic composition of the population residing within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site. Low-income households, as determined from 1990 Census data, are presented on Figure 4-11. Low-income households are those with incomes of 80 percent or lower than the median income of the counties. As indicated in that figure, approximately 43 percent of the total households are low-income households (see Appendix G).


### Income

Per capita income in Soddy Daisy was \$10,709 in 1989, while median household and family income were \$22,115 and \$27,022, respectively (DOC 1998c). Total personal income in Hamilton County was \$7.4 billion in 1996, up from \$7.13 billion in 1995 (DOC 1998a). Per capita income in the county was \$25,401 in 1996, up from \$24,316 in 1995. Hamilton County was ranked fourth in the State of Tennessee in terms of per capita income in 1996. Table 4-20 summarizes income data for Soddy Daisy and Hamilton County.





**Figure 4-10 Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Minority Population Residing in Counties Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Projected for the Year 2025**



**Figure 4-11 Low-Income Households Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (1990)**

**Table 4-20 Income Data Summary for Soddy Daisy and Hamilton County (1989)**

<i>Income Measure</i>	<i>Soddy Daisy</i>	<i>Hamilton County</i>
Per capita income	\$10,709	\$13,619
Median household income	\$22,115	\$26,523
Median family income	\$27,022	\$32,185
Median housing value	\$46,700	\$61,700

Sources: DOC 1998c.

## Community Services

Education, public safety, and health care were examined to determine the level of community services for the region of influence.

### Education

There are 396 schools within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site, with a capacity of 135,755 students. The average student-to-teacher ratio is 17:1.

### Public Safety

City, county, and state law enforcement agencies provide police protection to residents of the region of influence. The average officer-to-population ratio is 1.4:1,000 persons. Fire protection services are provided by both paid and volunteer firefighters. The ratio of firefighters to the population is 0.7:1,000.

### Health Care

The region of influence includes 31 hospitals with a total of 3,672 beds. All of the hospitals are operating below capacity.

## Local Transportation

The nearest land transportation routes are State Route 58, about 8 kilometers (5 miles) east of the site and paralleling the east bank of the Tennessee River, and U.S. Highway 27, also 8 kilometers (5 miles) from the site on the west side of the river. State Route 60 passes the northeast quadrant of the site at a distance of about 16 kilometers (10 miles). Interstate Route 75 passes the site from northeast to southwest at a distance of about 14.5 kilometers (9 miles) en route to Chattanooga. A main line of the CNO&TP Railroad (Norfolk Southern Corporation) runs adjacent to Interstate Highway 27 west of the site. The TVA railroad spur connecting the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site is in good condition from the plant to the CNO&TP tie-in. On the site, 61 meters (200 feet) of track have been removed from the auxiliary building railroad bay. Replacement of this track and other maintenance of the onsite track would be necessary before it could be used. The Tennessee River is navigable past the site and is used as a major barge route (TVA 1996b). These transportation routes are shown in Figure 4-12.




Figure 4-12 Transportation Routes in the Vicinity of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site

The major surface roads mentioned above and the network of local roads connecting with them adequately serve the needs of the local communities and TVA employees at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site.

#### 4.2.2.9 Public and Occupational Health and Safety

##### Radiation Environment

Background radiation exposure to individuals in the vicinity of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site is expected to be the same as for the Watts Bar site. The background radiation exposure at the Sequoyah site is presented in Table 4-21. The annual doses to individuals from background radiation are expected to remain constant over time. Thus, any incremental change in the total dose to the population would be a function only of a change in the size of the population.

**Table 4-21 Sources of Background Radiation Exposure to Individuals in the Vicinity of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site<sup>a</sup>**

<i>Source</i>	<i>Total Effective Dose Equivalent (millirem per year)</i>
<b>Natural Background Radiation</b>	
Cosmic and cosmogenic radiation	28
External terrestrial radiation	28
In the body	39
Radon in homes (inhaled)	200
<b>Total</b>	<b>295</b>
<b>Other Sources of Radiation</b>	
Release of radioactive material in natural gas, mining, ore processing, etc.	5
Diagnostic x-rays and nuclear medicine	53
<u>Nuclear energy</u>	0.28
Consumer and industrial products	0.03
<b>Total</b>	<b>355</b>

<sup>a</sup> Values are based on average national data, not measured values at the Sequoyah site.

Source: TVA 1998b.

Radionuclides released in effluents from Sequoyah 1 and 2 are a potential source of radiation exposure to individuals in the vicinity of Sequoyah 1 and 2 and are additional to the background radiation values listed. Calculations of radiation doses to individuals and the population surrounding the plant were performed by TVA using measurements from the various radiological monitoring points around the plant during operation in 1997, as well as conservative assumptions regarding individual and population exposure time. The doses are presented in Table 4-22.

Radiation doses to onsite workers include the same background dose received by the general public plus an additional dose from working in the facility.

**Table 4–22 Annual Doses to the General Public During 1997 from Normal Operation at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 (Total Effective Dose Equivalent)**

<i>Affected Environment</i>	<i>Airborne Releases</i>		<i>Liquid Releases</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Most Stringent Standard<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Calculated Based on Actual Measurements</i>	<i>Most Stringent Standard<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Calculated on the Basis of Actual Measurements</i>	<i>Most Stringent Standard<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Calculated on the Basis of Actual Measurements</i>
Maximally exposed offsite individual (millirem)	5	0.031	3	0.022	25	0.053
Population within 80 kilometers (50 miles), (person-rem) <sup>b</sup>	None	0.37	None	0.79	None	1.16
Average dose to an individual within 80 kilometers (50 miles) (millirem) <sup>c</sup>	None	0.00039	None	0.00085	None	0.0012

<sup>a</sup> From 10 CFR 50, Appendix I (design objectives for equipment to control releases of radioactive materials in effluents from nuclear power reactors). The standard for the maximally exposed individual (25 millirem per year total body from all pathways) is given in 40 CFR 190.

<sup>b</sup> Population used: 933,852.

<sup>c</sup> The average is obtained by dividing the population dose by the 50-mile radius population.

Source: TVA 1998c.

### *Direct Radiation*

Radiation fields are produced in nuclear plant environs as a result of the radioactivity contained in the reactor and its associated components. Doses from sources within the plant are largely due to nitrogen-16, a radionuclide produced from the primary coolant in the reactor core. Since the primary coolant of pressurized water reactors is contained in a heavily shielded area of the plant, dose rates from direct radiation in the vicinity of pressurized water reactors are generally less than 5 millirem per year.

The plant operator committed to design features and operating practices that ensure that individual occupational radiation doses are within the occupational dose limits defined in 10 CFR 20, and that individual and total plant operational doses would be as low as is reasonably achievable. The combined radiation doses received by the onsite worker are shown in Table 4–23.

**Table 4–23 Annual Worker Doses from Normal Operation at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 During 1996**

<i>Affected Environment</i>	<i>Standard<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Dose<sup>b</sup></i>
Average worker (millirem)	None	90
Maximally exposed worker (millirem)	5,000	≤ 2,000
Total workers (person-rem)	None	132

<sup>a</sup> NRC regulatory limit: 10 CFR 20.

<sup>b</sup> TVA 1996 report based on 1,470 badged workers per unit.

Source: NRC 1997b.

## **Chemical Environment**

Nonradioactive chemical wastes from Sequoyah 1 and 2 include boiler blowdown, water treatment wastes (sludges and high saline streams whose residues are disposed of as solid wastes and biocides), boiler metal cleaning, floor and yard drains, and stormwater runoff. Processes for defouling facility piping produce about 22,000 kilograms per year (24 tons per year) of organic residue byproducts and halites (oxygenated chlorine and bromine ions) per reactor.

Operation of Sequoyah 1 and 2 takes into account the storage of process chemicals and disposal of the waste products. Adverse health impacts to the public are minimized through administrative and design controls to decrease hazardous chemical releases to the environment and to achieve compliance with permit requirements (such as air emissions and NPDES Permit requirements). The effectiveness of these controls is verified by monitoring information about and inspecting compliance with mitigation measures.

Section 4.2.2.3, Table 4-13, and Section 4.2.2.4, Table 4-15, contain data on chemical concentrations in ambient air and surface water in the vicinity of the Sequoyah site.

## **Emergency Preparedness**

The license issued by the NRC for the operation of Sequoyah 1 and 2 is based in part on a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. This finding by the NRC is based on: (1) a review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency findings; (2) determinations that state and local emergency plans are adequate and give reasonable assurance that they can be implemented; and (3) the NRC's assessment that the applicant's onsite emergency plans are adequate and give reasonable assurance that they can be implemented.

The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant emergency plan (Annex H) establishes that evacuation is the most effective protective action that can be taken to cope with radiological incidents. The plan provides the details of the evacuation plan. Risk counties, identified as Bradley and Hamilton Counties, are tasked with preparing evacuation plans for citizens within the 16-kilometer (10-mile) emergency planning zone and determining the number of people to be evacuated from the zone. Host counties, identified as Meigs, Rhea, and Sequatchie, are assigned responsibility to identify suitable shelters for evacuees. A State Emergency Operation Center would provide the focus for emergency reaction, e.g., notifications, protective action, and evacuation implementation. Fixed sirens would alert residents and transients within the 16-kilometer (10-mile) emergency planning zone with backup provided, if needed, by emergency vehicle sirens and loudspeakers. The State Emergency Operation Center Director would involve the counties' Emergency Management Directors as required.

The Emergency Alert System and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Weather Radio would be used to provide emergency information and instructions.

The evacuation would be ordered and accomplished by designated sectors. The designated evacuation routes would be patrolled by traffic assistance teams.

The American Red Cross would operate mass care shelters. Shelter information points would be established on each evacuation route to help direct evacuees to their assigned shelters.

Considerable planning is involved in evacuation planning. Training, education, and practice runs are utilized to further the probability of successful evacuation in the event it is ever required.

#### 4.2.2.10 Waste Management

As with any major industrial activity, Sequoyah 1 and 2 generate waste as a consequence of normal operation. Such wastes include hazardous waste, nonhazardous solid waste, low-level radioactive waste, and sanitary liquid waste. Table 4-24 summarizes the annual amount of waste generated at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site in each category.

**Table 4-24 Annual Waste Generation at Sequoyah 1 and 2**

<i>Waste Type</i>	<i>Volume or Mass</i>
Hazardous waste (cubic meters)	1.196
Nonhazardous waste (kilograms)	1,301,966
Low-level radioactive waste (cubic meters)	383
Mixed waste (cubic meters)	less than 1

Source: TVA 1998e.

#### Hazardous Waste

Hazardous wastes typically generated at Sequoyah 1 and 2 include paints, solvents, acids, oils, radiographic film and development chemicals, and degreasers. Neutralization is the only waste treatment performed on site. Hazardous wastes are normally stored in polyethylene containment systems during accumulation. An approved storage building is used to store hazardous wastes for either 90 or 180 days, depending on the plant's hazardous waste generator status (i.e., small quantity or large quantity) at the time. Waste is transported to an offsite hazardous waste storage or disposal facility prior to exceeding the 90- or 180-day storage limit.

#### Low-Level Radioactive Waste

During the fission process, an inventory of radioactive fission and activation products builds up within the reactor (in the fuel and the materials of construction). A small fraction of these radioactive materials escape and contaminate the reactor coolant. The primary coolant system also receives radioactive contaminants. These contaminants are removed from the coolant by a radioactive waste treatment system. Sequoyah 1 and 2 use separate radioactive waste treatment systems for gaseous, liquid, and solid waste treatment. Residues from the gaseous and liquid waste treatment systems (filters, resins, dewatered solids) are combined and disposed of with the solid, low-level radioactive waste. Contaminated protective clothing, paper, rags, glassware, compactible and noncompactible trash, and reactor components and equipment constitute the majority of solid low-level radioactive waste at Sequoyah 1 and 2.

Before disposal, compactible trash (with the exception of irradiated metals) is shipped to a commercial processor where it is compacted to a lesser volume and shipped to the Barnwell low-level radioactive waste disposal facility in South Carolina. Trash that can be incinerated is shipped to a commercial waste incinerator in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where the material is burned to ashes before final disposal at the Barnwell facility. Metal waste is either decontaminated and recycled or melted to form shielding blocks. Any radioactive waste from these processes is shipped to the Barnwell disposal facility (TVA 1998a). TVA does not send irradiated metals for volume reduction due to their excessive dose rate. Instead, this material accumulates until a sufficient amount is on hand to ship directly to the Barnwell disposal facility.

## **Mixed Waste**

Mixed waste is material that is both hazardous and radioactive. No mixed waste has been generated at Sequoyah since 1990. Past sources of mixed low-level radioactive waste at TVA nuclear plants have included beta-counting fluids (e.g., zylene, toluene) for use in liquid scintillation detectors, polychlorinated biphenyls susceptible to contact with radioactive contamination as a result of an accidental transformer spill or explosion, isopropyl alcohol used for cleaning radioactive surfaces, chelating agents, and various acids.

## **Waste Minimization Practices**

The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site has an active waste minimization program that consists of the following practices:

- Useful portions of construction and demolition materials are salvaged for resale.
- Segregated storage areas are maintained for each type of recoverable material.
- Scrap treated lumber is sold or placed in dumpsters for disposal by the solid waste disposal contractor at an offsite permitted landfill.
- Inert construction and demolition wastes are collected for disposal at the onsite permitted landfill.
- Waste paper is placed in bins or dumpsters and sold to an offsite recycle facility.
- Aluminum cans are recycled and sold.
- Nonrecoverable solid wastes are placed in dumpsters for disposal by the solid waste disposal contractor.
- Special wastes (e.g., desiccants, oily wastes, insulation) are collected and stored and then disposed of by incineration. Asbestos is sent to an approved special waste landfill for disposal.
- Used oil, fluorescent tubes, and antifreeze are collected and stored in drums or tanks and recycled.
- Medical wastes are collected and disposed of in accordance with the medical waste disposal procedure for TVA medical facilities.
- All plant sanitary wastewater is discharged directly to the Hamilton County Public Operated Treatment Works.
- Metal-cleaning wastewater (e.g., trisodium phosphate, acetic acid) is discharged into approved storage ponds for future disposal in accordance with the NPDES Permit.
- Wastewater from floor and equipment drains in nonradiation areas is routed through sumps to the turbine building sump for discharge in accordance with the NPDES Permit.
- Surplus chemicals are sold; lead acid batteries are recycled; refrigerant is recovered and recycled; and solvent recovery equipment is used for painting operations.
- Steps to use biodegradable solvents and cleaners to replace hazardous chemicals in various cleaning operations have been incorporated to the extent practical.

### **4.2.2.11 Spent Fuel Management**

When nuclear reactor fuel has been irradiated to the point that it no longer contributes to the operation of the reactor, the fuel assembly is termed spent nuclear fuel and is removed from the reactor core and stored in the spent fuel storage pool or basin. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, assigned to the Secretary of Energy the responsibility for the development of a repository for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. When such a repository is available, spent nuclear fuel will be transported for disposal from the nation's nuclear power reactors to the repository. Until a repository is available, spent nuclear fuel must be stored in the reactor pools or in other acceptable, NRC-licensed storage locations. Because of the uncertainty associated with opening a repository, this EIS assumes spent fuel would be stored at the Sequoyah site for the duration of the proposed action (i.e., 40 years).



## Storage Capacity

Storage cells have been provided in the Sequoyah 1 and 2 spent fuel storage pools to hold 2,089 fuel assemblies. A reserve capacity is required for a discharge of one complete core (193 fuel assemblies) in the event it becomes necessary to remove fuel from one of the reactor vessels. An administrative policy requires the reserve spent fuel pool to have the capacity to discharge two complete cores (386 fuel assemblies). The remaining storage capacity is 1,703 fuel assemblies. As of January 1998, the spent fuel storage inventory at Sequoyah 1 and 2 was 1,214 assemblies, leaving a usable storage capacity of 489 fuel assemblies.

## Management Practice

The normal (projected equilibrium average) refueling batch size is 80 spent fuel assemblies, with the refueling frequency established at 18 months. The current capacity for storing spent nuclear fuel is adequate through the year 2001 (following Unit 1 fuel cycle Number 11). However, Sequoyah 1 and 2 already are licensed for an additional storage rack that would increase the capacity by 193 assemblies (one full core) to a total spent fuel storage pool capacity of 2,282 fuel assemblies. After Unit 2 Reload 12, scheduled for year 2003, Sequoyah 1 and 2 will no longer be able to retain a two-full-core storage reserve.

### 4.2.3 Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2

As discussed in Section 3.2.5.3, one of the reactor options under consideration is the irradiation of TPBARs in Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 after they have been completed and licensed for operation by the NRC. An assumption incorporated in this option is that the units would operate for the generation of electricity at their licensed full-power output with no reduced operability attributable to the production of tritium. However, the irradiation of TPBARs for tritium production would be considered the primary mission of the plant.

Bellefonte 1 and 2 were issued a construction permit by the Atomic Energy Commission in December 1974. By 1988, Unit 1 was 90 percent complete, and Unit 2 about 57 percent complete. On July 29, 1988, TVA notified the NRC that completion of construction of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant was being deferred. A lower-than-expected load forecast for the near future was given as the reason for deferral. On March 23, 1993, TVA notified the NRC of its plans to complete Bellefonte 1 and 2. This decision was the result of an extensive, three-year study that concluded completion of the facility as a nuclear power plant was viable. In December 1994, the TVA Board announced that Bellefonte would not be completed as a nuclear plant without a partner. Construction was halted again and has remained stopped pending completion of a comprehensive evaluation of TVA's power needs (TVA 1997f).

Since December 1994, engineering and construction activities have been suspended. The plant systems and structures are maintained through an active layup and preservation program initiated in 1988. The program is described briefly in Section 3.2.5.3, including brief descriptions of the existing structures. Detailed descriptions of the site, buildings, structures, systems, and operations are provided in the following licensing and environmental documentation for the plant:

- Atomic Energy Commission, *Final Environmental Statement Related to Construction of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2* (AEC 1974).
- Tennessee Valley Authority, *Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bellefonte Conversion Project*, (TVA 1997f).
- Tennessee Valley Authority, *Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, Final Safety Analysis Report, through Amendment 30*, Chattanooga, Tennessee, (TVA 1991).

The following sections describe the affected environment at the Bellefonte site for land resources, noise, air quality, water resources, geology and soils, ecological resources, cultural resources, and socioeconomics. In addition, the radiation and hazardous chemical environment, waste management, and spent nuclear fuel considerations are described.

#### **4.2.3.1 Land Resources**

##### **Land Use**

Located in Jackson County, Alabama, the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site occupies approximately 607 hectares (1,500 acres) of land on a peninsula at Tennessee River Mile 392, on the west shore of Guntersville Lake, about 11.3 kilometers (7 miles) east-northeast of Scottsboro, Alabama. This land has already been dedicated as the site for Bellefonte 1 and 2. No additional land is needed to complete construction of either unit or to accommodate tritium production. The location of the Bellefonte site is shown in Figure 4-13. The Bellefonte site is shown in greater detail in Figure 4-14.

Greater than 90 percent of the land within the three-county area surrounding the site is characterized by forest and agricultural use or is undeveloped. The remaining land is used for residential, commercial, industrial, infrastructure, social, cultural, or governmental purposes. The nearest town, Hollywood, Alabama, is approximately 4.8 kilometers (3 miles) from the site.

Completion of the units for industrial purposes (including contracted irradiation services) would conform with the proposed urban and industrial development land use for the site and its vicinity as designated by the local governmental plans, policies, and controls.

##### *Industry*

Industrial development is largely concentrated along the Scottsboro-Stevenson-Bridgeport corridor and is mainly influenced by the availability of transportation and urban services.

##### *Agriculture*

The total area of Jackson County, Alabama, is approximately 277,000 hectares (684,500 acres), of which about 30 percent or 82,800 hectares (204,600 acres) is used for agriculture (GISP 1998b).

##### *Forest*

Sixty-three percent of the area of Jackson County, Alabama, is forested, amounting to 174,200 hectares (430,500 acres). Oak-hickory hardwood forests make up 78 percent of the forested area. The balance includes loblolly and short-leaf pine and oak-pine forests (DOA 1998b, DOA 1998c).

##### *Recreation*

Hunting, fishing, and pleasure boating are among the more popular activities in the Bellefonte site area. Guntersville Lake supports a variety of water-based recreation activities. Most of this activity occurs during the spring, summer, and early fall periods of the year.

##### *Nature Reserves*

A wildlife management area includes Mud Creek and Crow Creek embayments and their shoreline lands. The Coon Gulf Habitat Protection Area on the eastern shore of Guntersville Reservoir is a state-managed reserve.






Figure 4-13 Location of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site




Figure 4-14 Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site

## Visual Resources

The visual landscape of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site is characterized by a flat valley adjacent to a reservoir and a river. The visual landscape of the site reflects that of an industrialized facility. The viewshed includes hilly land with urban-industrial nodes surrounded by low density development scattered among agricultural uses and forest lands.

The major visual elements of the plant already exist, including the cooling towers, containment structures, turbine building, and transmission lines. Views of the Bellefonte site from passing river traffic on the Tennessee River are partially screened by the ridge lines close to the shoreline. The plant is overlooked by a few residences on Sand Mountain on the east side of the river. Distant glimpses of the plant site can be had from the coves and hollows along the Sand Mountain rim, from State Roads 35 and 40 as they traverse Sand Mountain, and from Comber Bridge, which crosses Guntersville Lake (TVA 1997f). The plant can be seen from various locations along U.S. Highway 72 to the northwest and from residences on the northern shore of Town Creek Embayment.

A visual resource inventory is composed of three factors: Visual Resource Management classification, distance zones, and sensitivity levels. Distance zones for each viewpoint are determined as foreground-middleground, background, or seldom-seen. Based on the Bureau of Land Management Visual Resource Management method, the existing landscape at the site would be classified as Visual Resource Management Class 3 or 4. Class 3 includes areas where there has been a moderate change in the landscape and these changes may attract attention, but do not dominate the view of the casual observer. Class 4 includes areas where major modifications to the character of the landscape have occurred. These changes may be dominant features of the view and the major focus of viewer attention (DOI 1986a). Due to the location of the site adjacent to the Tennessee River, the area is subject to high user volumes associated with recreational uses. Because of the proximity to urban development and recreational areas, the facilities are visible from viewpoints with low to moderate sensitivity levels (DOI 1986a).

### 4.2.3.2 Noise

The most common measure of environmental noise impact is the day-night average sound level. The day-night average sound level is a 24-hour sound level with a 10 dBA penalty added to sound levels between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. to account for increased annoyance due to noise during nighttime hours. The EPA has developed noise level guidelines for different land-use classifications based on day-night average sound levels and equivalent sound levels. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has established noise impact guidelines for residential areas based on day-night average sound levels. Some states and localities have established noise control regulations or zoning ordinances that specify acceptable noise levels by land-use category. The State of Alabama has not developed a noise regulation that specifies the numerical community noise levels that are acceptable.

For the purpose of this document, noise impacts are assessed using a day-night average sound level of 65 dBA as the level below which noise levels would be considered acceptable for residential land uses and outdoor recreational uses, and an increase of 2 dBA as an indicator of "substantial" increases in noise. This approach is based on the TVA noise analysis for the Bellefonte Conversion Project (TVA 1997f).

The day-night average sound levels at locations near the site are typical of a quiet rural community. The daytime and nighttime equivalent sound level values ranged from 41 to 51 dBA. The maximum day-night average sound level, 55 dBA, falls well within the Department of Housing and Urban Development guidelines limit. The EPA considers the typical day-night average sound level noise range for a rural location where noise sources include wind, insect activity, aircraft, and agricultural activity to be 35 to 50 dBA. Offsite noise levels below 65 dBA are considered acceptable.

#### **4.2.3.3 Air Quality**

The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site is in the Tennessee River Valley, Alabama-Cumberland Mountains, Tennessee, Interstate Air Quality Control Region. Ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants in the vicinity of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant that were determined by monitoring at a station on Sand Mountain are presented in Table 4-25. This station is about 3.8 kilometers (2.4 miles) east of the plant site. During the period from February 1, 1990, through January 31, 1991, six criteria pollutants were monitored at the station. Monitoring data for 1996 and 1997 from Scottsboro and Huntsville are used to supplement this data.

The ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants are compared with the most stringent regulation or guideline. Alabama Ambient Air Quality Standards are the same as the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for all criteria pollutants.

The area surrounding the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site is designated by the EPA as an attainment area with respect to National Ambient Air Quality Standards for criteria pollutants (40 CFR 81). The nearest Prevention of Significant Deterioration Class I areas to the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site are the Cohutta National Wildlife Area in north-central Georgia and the Sipsey National Wildlife Area in northeastern Alabama. Both sites are more than 100 kilometers (62 miles) from the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site.

Sources of criteria pollutant emissions found at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site include the occasional operation of diesel-powered emergency generators and fire protection pumps; the backup security generator; the environmental data station generator; site, trade, and employee vehicles; and auxiliary boilers. Small quantities of toxic chemicals and metals are emitted from the testing and operation of the diesel-fueled equipment, resulting in contributions to offsite concentrations of less than 0.0001 percent of the threshold limit value of any of these pollutants.

The calculated concentrations of carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide from operation of the auxiliary steam boilers, diesel generators, lube oil system, and diesel fire pumps are two or more orders of magnitude below the ambient standards. Compliance with the new PM<sub>2.5</sub> standards was not evaluated since current emission data for PM<sub>2.5</sub> are not available. When the calculated concentrations from onsite sources are combined with concentrations from offsite sources, the ambient air quality standards for carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxide compounds, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide continue to be met.

#### **Gaseous Radioactive Emissions**

Bellefonte 1 and 2 are not completed and are not operating. Therefore, there are no gaseous radioactive emissions.

#### **Meteorology and Climatology**

The regional and local climatology and meteorology of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site described in the Atomic Energy Commission's 1974 *Final Environmental Statement Related to Construction of Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2* (AEC 1974) were re-evaluated in 1997 (TVA 1997f), with consideration of additional data accumulated in the intervening years. It was determined that the records used for the 1974 *Final Environmental Statement* provide an adequate representation of regional climatic conditions. This information has been updated with more recent data for Huntsville and Chattanooga.

## Regional Climate

The Bellefonte site is located in an area dominated by prominent valley ridge topographical features, generally aligned from northeast to southwest. Local prevailing wind patterns of the Tennessee River Valley are down-valley (north through northeast) and up-valley (south through southwest).

**Table 4–25 Comparison of Baseline Bellefonte 1 and 2 Ambient Air Concentrations With the Most Stringent Applicable Regulations and Guidelines**

Criteria Pollutant	Averaging Time	Most Stringent Regulation or Guideline <sup>a</sup> ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	Baseline Concentrations $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$
Carbon monoxide	8-hour	10,000	4,104 <sup>b</sup>
	1-hour	40,000	5,472 <sup>b</sup>
Lead	Calendar quarter	1.5	0.03 <sup>c</sup>
Nitrogen dioxide	Annual	100	24.1 <sup>b</sup>
Ozone	8-hour (4th highest averaged over 3-years)	157 <sup>d</sup>	e
Particulate matter	PM <sub>10</sub>		
	Annual	50 <sup>d</sup>	24 <sup>e</sup>
	24-hour (interim)	150 <sup>d</sup>	46 <sup>e</sup>
	24-hour (99th percentile 3-year average)	150 <sup>d</sup>	46 <sup>e</sup>
	PM <sub>2.5</sub>		
	Annual (3-year average)	15 <sup>f</sup>	g
Sulfur dioxide	24-hour (98th percentile averaged over 3-years)	65 <sup>f</sup>	g
	Annual	80	13.1 <sup>e</sup>
	24-hour	365	73.4 <sup>h</sup>
	3-hour	1,300	210 <sup>e</sup>

$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  = micrograms per cubic meter

PM<sub>n</sub> = particulate matter size less than or equal to *n* micrometers.

<sup>a</sup> The Alabama Department of Environmental Management, Air Division, has incorporated all National Primary Air Quality Standards and all National Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards by reference in Chapter 335-3-1, General Provisions, Paragraph 335-3-1-.03. Therefore, only National Ambient Air Quality Standards are provided. The standards, other than those for ozone, particulate matter, lead, and those based on annual averages, are not to be exceeded more than once per year. The 1-hour ozone standard is attained when the expected number of days per year with maximum hourly average concentrations above the standard is  $\leq 1$ . The 1-hour ozone standard applies only to nonattainment areas. The 8-hour ozone standard is attained when the 3-year average of the annual fourth-highest daily maximum 8-hour average concentration is less than or equal to 157  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ . The interim 24-hour PM<sub>10</sub> standard is attained when the expected number of days with a 24-hour average concentration above the standard is  $\leq 1$ . The annual arithmetic mean particulate matter standard is attained when the expected annual arithmetic mean concentration is less than or equal to the standard.

<sup>b</sup> Madison County - Huntsville. Carbon monoxide - 1997, nitrogen dioxide - 1993.

<sup>c</sup> Sand Mountain, 1990-1991.

<sup>d</sup> EPA recently revised the ambient air quality standards for particulate matter and ozone. The new standards, finalized on July 18, 1997, change the ozone primary and secondary standards from a 1-hour concentration of 235  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  (0.12 parts per million) to an 8-hour concentration of 157  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  (0.08 parts per million). During a transition period while states are developing state implementation plan revisions for attaining and maintaining these standards the 1-hour ozone standard would continue to apply in nonattainment areas (62 FR 38855-38894). For particulate matter, the current PM<sub>10</sub> (particulate matter size less than or equal to 10 micrometers) annual standard is retained and two PM<sub>2.5</sub> (particulate matter size less than or equal to 2.5 micrometers) standards are added. These standards are set at 15  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  3-year annual average arithmetic mean based on community-oriented monitors and 65  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  3-year average of the 98th percentile of 24-hour concentrations at population-oriented monitors. The current 24-hour PM<sub>10</sub> standard is revised to be based on the 3-year average of the 99th percentile of 24-hour concentrations. The existing PM<sub>10</sub> standards would continue to apply in the interim period (62 FR 38652).

<sup>e</sup> There is insufficient data to compare to the 8-hour standard for ozone.

<sup>f</sup> Federal standard.

<sup>g</sup> Compliance with the new PM<sub>2.5</sub> standards was not evaluated since current emissions data for PM<sub>2.5</sub> are not available.

<sup>h</sup> Sulfur dioxide - Jackson County, 1996.

Source: TVA 1998a.

### **Severe Weather**

The site is vulnerable to severe weather, including heavy general rainstorms; thunderstorms that can be accompanied by heavy downpours, strong winds, hail, lightning, or tornadoes; and snow and ice storms.

The probability of a tornado occurring at any point within a radius of 55 kilometers (34.2 miles) of the plant site is  $1.15 \times 10^{-4}$  (TVA 1997f) or once in 8,700 years. For straight winds, the fastest wind measured 10 meters (33 feet) above ground and about 145 kilometers per hour (90 miles per hour), and is expected once in a 100-year period (TVA 1997f).

### **Local Meteorological Conditions**

Data collected over a 30-year period (1961–1990) indicate that at Huntsville the annual average temperature is 15.7°C (60.3°F); the average daily minimum temperature in January is -1.6°C (29.2°F); and the average daily maximum temperature in July is 31.7°C (89.0°F) (TVA 1998e). The average annual precipitation is approximately 145.2 centimeters (57.18 inches). Prevailing winds are from the east-southeast. The average annual wind speed is 3.6 meters per second (8 miles per hour) (NOAA 1997b).

#### **4.2.3.4 Water Resources**

##### **Surface Water**

The Bellefonte site is located at Tennessee River Mile 391.5, about 68.8 kilometers (43 miles) upstream of the Guntersville Dam, on a peninsula formed between the Town Creek Embayment and the Guntersville Reservoir, on the western shore of Guntersville Reservoir. The surface area of the reservoir is 275 square kilometers (106 square miles).

The average daily flow volume at the Bellefonte site is 1,100 cubic meters per second (38,850 cubic feet per second). Seasonal averages derived from records for 1950 to 1987 are 895 cubic meters per second (31,600 cubic feet per second) during summer and 1,400 cubic meters per second (49,500 cubic feet per second) during winter (TVA 1997f, TVA 1998e). Hourly flows at the site may vary considerably from daily average flows, depending on turbine operations at the Nickajack and Guntersville Hydro Plants. Hourly flows may be zero or may be in an upstream direction for up to six hours per day (TVA 1998e).

##### **Surface Water Quality**

Guntersville Reservoir is classified for uses of public water supply, fish and wildlife, and swimming and other whole body water-contact sports (TVA 1997f). Monitoring data from the EPA Storage and Retrieval of Parametric Data base (STORET) for 1974 to 1990 showed that dissolved oxygen concentrations routinely drop below 5 milligrams per liter during the summer months at lower depths of the lake. No concentrations less than 4 milligrams per liter were measured. Mild dissolved oxygen stratification was found to occur occasionally in the main channel areas. Strong stratification occurred fairly frequently in the shallower overbank and embayment areas. All pH (acidity) measurements were above the minimum Alabama criterion of 6.0. In areas of high biological activity, pH values above the maximum Alabama criterion of 8.5 were observed (TVA 1997f). Surface water quality monitoring data are presented in Table 4-26.



**Table 4–26 Summary of Surface Water Quality Monitoring in the Vicinity of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site**

<i>Parameter</i>	<i>Unit of Measure</i>	<i>Water Quality Criteria</i>	<i>Average Water Body Concentration</i>
<b>Radiological</b>			
Alpha (gross)	picocuries per liter	15 <sup>a</sup>	3.25
Beta (gross)	picocuries per liter	50 <sup>b</sup>	2.4
Tritium	picocuries per liter	20,000 <sup>c</sup>	<300 <sup>c</sup>
<b>Nonradiological</b>			
Aluminum	milligrams per liter	0.2 <sup>d</sup>	0.43
Ammonia	milligrams per liter	30 <sup>e</sup>	0.03
Arsenic	milligrams per liter	0.05 <sup>a</sup>	0.0002
Barium	milligrams per liter	2.0 <sup>a</sup>	0.05
Beryllium	milligrams per liter	0.004 <sup>a</sup>	0.001
Boron	milligrams per liter	0.9 <sup>a</sup>	0.15
Cadmium	milligrams per liter	0.005 <sup>a</sup>	0.0005
Chlorides	milligrams per liter	250 <sup>d</sup>	7.6
Chromium	milligrams per liter	0.1 <sup>a</sup>	0.003
Copper	milligrams per liter	1.3 <sup>f</sup>	0.011
Iron	milligrams per liter	0.3 <sup>d</sup>	0.53
Lead	milligrams per liter	0.015 <sup>a</sup>	0.006
Manganese	milligrams per liter	0.05 <sup>d</sup>	Not available
Mercury	milligrams per liter	0.002 <sup>a</sup>	0.0009
Molybdenum	milligrams per liter	0.01 <sup>a</sup>	0.02
Nickel	milligrams per liter	0.1 <sup>a</sup>	0.0017
pH (acidity/alkalinity)	pH units	6.5–8.5 <sup>d</sup>	7.4
Silver	milligrams per liter	0.2 <sup>a</sup>	0.01
Sodium	milligrams per liter	20 <sup>a</sup>	6.83
Sulfate	milligrams per liter	250 <sup>d</sup>	15.4
Total Dissolved Solids	milligrams per liter	500 <sup>d</sup>	100
Zinc	milligrams per liter	3 <sup>a</sup>	0.11

- <sup>a</sup> Alabama Drinking Water Standards.
- <sup>b</sup> Proposed National Primary Drinking Water Regulations.
- <sup>c</sup> Below Lower Limit of Detection of 300 picocuries per liter.
- <sup>d</sup> National Secondary Drinking Water Regulations (40 CFR 143).
- <sup>e</sup> EPA health advisory.
- <sup>f</sup> EPA primary drinking water standard goal.

Source: Alabama 1998, ADEM 1998a, ADEM 1998b, EPA 1996b, TVA 1997f.

### Surface Water Use and Rights

The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant currently draws water from the Guntersville Reservoir for fire protection and some cooling needs. There are eight municipal water supplies that use water from Guntersville Reservoir downstream of the Bellefonte intake at distances of 6.3 kilometers (3.9 miles) for Fort Payne to 62.6 kilometers (38.9 miles) for Guntersville. Guntersville State Park, 47.2 kilometers (29.3 miles) downstream, uses Guntersville Reservoir water for irrigation. Water intakes near Bellefonte are shown in Table 4-27. The nearest intake to the Bellefonte diffuser discharge at Tennessee River Mile 390.3 is Fort Payne, 4.3 kilometers (2.7 miles) downstream (TVA 1999).

**Table 4-27 Public and Industrial Surface Water Supplies From the Tennessee River Near Bellefonte**

<i>Plant Name</i>	<i>Use (million liters per day)</i>	<i>Location (Tennessee River Mile and Bank)</i>	<i>Approximate Distance From Site (kilometers)</i>	<i>Type of Supply</i>
South Pittsburg	4.16	TRM 418.0 R	42.6	Municipal
Bridgeport	2.69	TRM 413.6 R	35.6	Municipal
TVA Widows Creek Fossil Plant	4084	TRM 407.7 R	26.1	Industrial
Mead Corporation	16.7	TRM 405.2 R	22.0	Industrial
TVA Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	unknown <sup>a</sup>	TRM 391.5 R	0.0	Industrial
Fort Payne	37.9	TRM 387.6 L	6.3	Municipal
Scottsboro Water System <sup>b</sup>	18.9	TRM 385.8 R TRM 377.4 R	9.2 22.7	Municipal
Section, Alabama Water Board	7.6	TRM 382.0 L	15.3	Municipal
Christian Youth Camp	unknown	TRM 367.9 R	38.0	Municipal
Guntersville State Park	unmetered <sup>c</sup>	TRM 362.2 L	47.2	Irrigation
Albertville	34.1	TRM 361.0 L Short Creek 2.0	49.1	Municipal
Guntersville	10.7	TRM 358.0 L TRM 352.6 L	53.9 62.6	Municipal
Arab	11.9	TRM 356.0 L	57.1	Municipal

L = Left bank.

R = Right bank.

<sup>a</sup> River water usage currently limited to fire protection needs.<sup>b</sup> Also supplies water to Jackson County.<sup>c</sup> Water usage is not metered.

Source: TVA 1997f.

Surface water rights concerning the Guntersville Reservoir and the Town Creek Embayment near the Bellefonte site involve nonimpairment of designated uses. In addition, constructing intake structures for withdrawing water from available supplies requires U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and TVA permits.

### Liquid Chemical and Radioactive Effluents

The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant uses a small amount of chemicals for maintenance and layup. There is no liquid radioactive effluent at the partially completed plant.

Other effluent streams from the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site leave through pathways, all of which are regulated by an NPDES Permit issued by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management. Three process discharge streams are routed to the Guntersville Reservoir. Nine stormwater discharge streams are routed to the Town Creek Embayment and the Guntersville Reservoir. Sanitary wastewater is discharged to the Hollywood Waste Water Treatment Facility, which is operated by the city of Hollywood. A small quantity of sanitary wastewater from the simulator building, training facility, and environmental data station is treated on site by sand filters and a septic system.

## **Floodplains and Flood Risk**

The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant is situated on a peninsula formed between the Town Creek Embayment and the Guntersville Reservoir in Jackson County, Alabama.

The 100-year floodplain for the Guntersville Reservoir varies from elevation 183.0 meters (600.5 feet) above mean sea level at Tennessee River Mile 390.4 to elevation 183.2 meters (601.1 feet) at Tennessee River Mile 392.3. The TVA Flood Risk Profile elevations on the Guntersville Reservoir vary from elevation 183.4 meters (601.8 feet) at Tennessee River Mile 390.4 to elevation 183.7 meters (602.7 feet) at Tennessee River Mile 392.3. For Town Creek, the 100-year floodplain is the area lying below elevation 183.7 meters (602.7 feet). The Flood Risk Profile elevation is 183.8 meters (603.1 feet). The Flood Risk Profile is used to control flood damageable development for TVA projects. At this location, the Flood Risk Profile elevations are equal to the 500-year flood elevations. The safety-related facilities, systems, and equipment are housed in structures that provide protection from flooding for all flood conditions up to an elevation of 191.2 meters (627.3 feet) (TVA 1978).

Jackson County, Alabama, has adopted the 100-year flood as the basis for its floodplain regulations, and all development would be consistent with these regulations. There are no floodways published for this area.

## **Groundwater**

The near-surface aquifer beneath the Bellefonte site occurs under unconfined conditions. Typical aquifer material is highly weathered sedimentary bedrock overlying slightly fractured bedrock. Groundwater movement through the Chickamauga Reservoir underlying the site is via fractures that have been subjected to solution activity.

## **Groundwater Quality**

The groundwater quality of the near-surface aquifer beneath the site ranges from good to fair. Sampling of groundwater for prereactor ambient condition information was initiated at the site in 1973. During the period from 1977 through 1983, monthly groundwater samples were collected from six onsite bedrock wells to establish the background radionuclide levels at the site (TVA 1997f).

Groundwater sampling also has been conducted for organics and indicator parameters associated with known or potential subsurface releases at the site. Very few constituents exceeded the EPA Maximum Contaminant Levels specified in the Primary and Secondary Drinking Water Standards (TVA 1997f). Metals that appeared at levels consistently higher than the Maximum Contaminant Levels include iron, manganese, and aluminum. These may be related to the natural mineralogy of the area.

## **Groundwater Availability, Use, and Rights**

Most of the potable water for nearby users is surface water taken from the Guntersville Reservoir near the site. There are, however, both private and public uses of groundwater in the vicinity of the site, including water supply wells for the cities of Stevenson, Scottsboro, and Hollywood, Alabama. The closest active municipal groundwater supply using the shallow (Chickamauga) aquifer is the city of Scottsboro, 11.3 kilometers (7.0 miles) from the plant site. The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant does not currently withdraw any groundwater. The aquifer is designated Class II, indicating it is currently being used for, or is a potential source of, drinking water. The city of Hollywood, 4 kilometers (2.5 miles) northwest of the site, pumps 416,000 liters per day (110,000 gallons per day) from two deep wells. These wells, along with surface water from Guntersville Reservoir, provide the water supply for the city of Hollywood and potable water for the Bellefonte site.

Groundwater rights concerning the aquifers near the site are associated with the Reasonable Use Doctrine. Under this doctrine, landowners can withdraw water to the extent that they must exercise their rights in accordance with the similar rights of others. The location of Bellefonte on a peninsula also tends to hydrologically isolate Bellefonte from the neighborhood residential wells on the other side of Town Creek.

#### **4.2.3.5 Geology and Soils**

##### **Geology**

The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site is located in the Southern Appalachian Tectonic Province, in a 241-kilometer (150-mile) long anticlinal valley known as the Brown-Sequatchie Valley. This valley is representative of the valley and ridge topography and structure. The valley was formed by erosion of the Sequatchie anticline. When erosion breached the arch of thick sandstone and exposed the limestone and dolomite, an axial valley developed.

The controlling feature of the geologic structure is the Sequatchie thrust fault some 4 kilometers (2.5 miles) northwest of the site. The Sequatchie fault and resultant anticline developed more than 200 million years ago. The fault has been inactive for many millions of years.

##### **Seismology**

The known seismic history of the southeastern United States since 1776 indicates the site is located in an area of low seismic risk. The maximum historic intensities affecting the site were the result of earthquakes centered at distant points. Nevertheless, the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant design is based on the largest historic earthquake to occur in the Southern Appalachian Tectonic Province—the 1897 Giles County, Virginia, earthquake (intensity: Modified Mercalli VIII and Richter magnitude 6 to 7). The safe-shutdown earthquake for the plant was established at a maximum horizontal acceleration of 0.18 g (g = acceleration due to gravity) and a simultaneous maximum vertical acceleration of 0.18 g. The safe-shutdown earthquake is defined as the earthquake that produces the maximum ground vibration for which: (1) the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (2) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in the shutdown mode, and (3) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures are designed to remain functional (10 CFR 100, Appendix A).

##### **Soils**

Extensive evaluation was made of the soil and bedrock on the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site. All major Seismic Category I structures important to the safe operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2 are founded on competent bedrock. Physical testing has shown that the bedrock is capable of supporting loads in excess of those imposed by the plant structures.

The effects of amplifications of ground motions through soil columns should be considered in the seismic design of structures not founded on rock. The potential for liquefaction beneath any new structure, pipeline, or conduit not founded on rock should be evaluated in areas that are not investigated as part of the original *Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report, as Amended* (TVA 1991).

#### **4.2.3.6 Ecological Resources**

##### **Terrestrial Resources**

The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site is located within the Ridge and Valley Physiographic Province. This province lies between the Blue Ridge Mountains and the Cumberland Plateau and is characterized by

prominent, northwest-trending ridges and adjacent valleys. The Tennessee River flows through this province, roughly paralleling the alignment of the valleys. The area surrounding the Bellefonte site is characterized by forests that have been continuously disturbed by timbering and agricultural practices.

The forest region that constitutes the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site is characterized by numerous tree species (rather than domination by one or only a few species) sharing the canopy. Site vegetation has been continuously disturbed by decades of timbering and agriculture. Five categories of vegetative communities present on the site are mixed hardwoods, lawns and grassy fields, scrub-shrub thickets (including fencerows), bottomland riparian hardwoods, and pine-hardwood forests. Parking lots, roads, buildings, cooling towers, and other structures associated with the partially completed nuclear facility occupy 20 percent of the site. Mixed hardwood communities, most commonly located on the ridges and knobs, comprise 40 percent of the site. Ten percent of the site is planted in lawns and grassy fields. Fifteen percent of the site is occupied by scrub-shrub communities occurring in areas that were previously managed as open land, but which have been left undisturbed for the past 2 to 25 years. Five percent of the site is occupied by bottomland hardwood and riparian forests associated with streams and the shoreline margins of Guntersville Lake. The remainder of the site area, approximately 10 percent, is occupied by pine-hardwood forests (TVA 1997f).

### Terrestrial Wildlife

Although disturbed areas in the immediate vicinity of the Bellefonte plant provide little habitat for wildlife, the remaining portions of the site are suitable for a wide variety of animals. Mixed-hardwood and pine-hardwood forests provide habitat for mammals such as white-tailed deer, gray squirrels, and flying squirrels. Common birds in these habitats include red-bellied woodpeckers, blue jays, wood thrush, Kentucky warblers, and Carolina wrens. Reptiles and amphibians commonly found in these forested habitats include ring-necked snakes, ground skinks, slimy salamanders, and Fowler's toads.

Lawns and grassy fields provide habitat for mammals such as eastern cottontail rabbits, woodchuck, hispid cotton rats, and least shrews. A variety of birds may be seen in this habitat including ground-nesting species such as meadowlarks and field sparrows. Gray rat snakes, eastern garter snakes, and American toads are a few of the reptiles and amphibians commonly found in lawns and grassy fields.

Scrub-shrub communities are one of the most abundant habitat types occurring on the site. Such communities provide important nesting and foraging areas, as well as travel corridors for birds and small mammals. Mammals present in this habitat type include southeastern shrews, eastern cottontail rabbits, and gray squirrels. Birds utilizing scrub-shrub communities include gray catbirds, rufous-sided towhees, and mockingbirds.

Bottomland hardwood and riparian forests are located along streams and the Guntersville Reservoir and support a highly diverse wildlife population. Mammals found in these forests include beaver, mink, muskrat, and gray squirrels. Great blue herons, great egrets, wood ducks, screech owls, and prothonotary warblers are a few of the many birds that may be found in bottomland hardwood and riparian forests. Several species of amphibians and reptiles are commonly found in these forests. These include rough green snakes, midland water snakes, bullfrogs, and gray treefrogs (TVA 1997f).

### Wetlands

There are many wetland areas in and around the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site, most of them located along the 20-kilometer (12.5-mile) shoreline that borders much of the site (TVA 1997f). Figure 4-15 indicates the location of wetlands located near the plant site. Included are 9 hectares (52 acres) of islands along the old river channel. The wetlands on these islands are classified as palustrine, bottomland hardwood, deciduous, and temporarily flooded. Aquatic bed wetlands that separate the islands from the mainland are classified as lacustrine, aquatic bed, or rooted vascular submerged permanently flooded wetlands. Fringe wetlands are




Figure 4-15 Wetlands Map of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site Vicinity

characterized by the presence of emergent and scrub-shrub plant communities and forested shoreline. These are shallow overbank areas adjacent to the old river channel (TVA 1997f).

Plant species found in the fringe wetlands include:

Common cattail ( <i>Typha latifolia</i> )	Black willow ( <i>Salix nigra</i> )
Giant cutgrass ( <i>Zizaniopsis miliacae</i> )	River birch ( <i>Betula nigra</i> )
Bulrush ( <i>Scirpus americanus</i> )	Sycamore ( <i>Platanus occidentalis</i> )
Soft rush ( <i>Juncus effusus</i> )	Willow oak ( <i>Quercus phellos</i> )
Button Bush ( <i>Cephalanthus occidentalis</i> )	Water oak ( <i>Quercus nigra</i> )
	Red maple ( <i>Acer rubrum</i> ).

Aquatic bed wetlands are formed by floating mats of Eurasian milfoil, *Myriophyllum heterophyllum*; American pondweed, *Potamogeton pectinatus*; and spiny-leaved naiad, *Najas minor*.

Wetlands have also developed in three ponds that were constructed in the 1970s during the initial phase of development of the Bellefonte project. The dikes of two ponds were breached in 1989, and 2.4 hectares (6 acres) of palustrine, emergent, persistent, intermittently flooded wetlands have developed. The third 5-hectare (12-acre) pond is used to filter stormwater runoff and is classified as palustrine, scrub-shrub, permanently flooded wetlands.

TVA fulfills its mandate to protect wetlands as directed by Executive Order 11990. Other wetlands have developed in areas where ponds were constructed for previous construction activities.

#### Aquatic Resources

The Bellefonte site is located on a peninsula bounded to the north by Town Creek Embayment and to the south by the Tennessee River (Guntersville Reservoir). The site, with its narrow backwater sloughs and embayments protected from the wave and current action of the main river by strip islands and bars, supports diverse aquatic flora and fauna. Beyond the strip islands and bars, the original channel of the Tennessee River also contains a diverse aquatic community that is affected by the river current. The Town Creek Embayment is more isolated from river currents than the shallow overbank aquatic habitat along the river proper.

#### Plankton

Assessments show phytoplankton to be quite variable among sample stations, months, and years, making the determination of spatial and temporal trends difficult. The exception is the trend for greatest phytoplankton abundance and blue-green algae dominance during parts of the year at shallow overbank habitats and at downstream sampling locations. This trend can be anticipated based on the increased hydraulic retention time during the transition from fast-flowing (lotic) to slow-flowing (lentic) conditions (TVA 1997f).

#### Fish Communities

Guntersville Reservoir supports an abundant and diverse fish community, including both a sport and commercial fishery. Eighty-two species of fish have been collected in TVA field investigations. Two study programs are compared: 1949 to 1984 and 1984 to 1994. Comparisons show that, of 61 species collected in both studies, only 13 species found prior to 1985 were not collected in the 1984–1994 samples. Eight new species were found after 1985. All species that are unique to either of the studies, with the exception of the introduced grass carp, are typically rare individuals.

Fish present within the Guntersville Reservoir may be placed into one of three major groups: game, rough, and forage. Game fish include bluegill, redear sunfish, warmouth, and yellow bass. Rough fish include freshwater drum, yellow bullhead, spotted gar, skipjack herring, and grass carp. Forage fish include gizzard shad and threadfin shad. Prior to 1975, forage fish were the predominant group in terms of numbers of individuals, while after 1975 game fish were the predominant group. This shift in fish numbers coincided with the onset of nonnative aquatic macrophytes in the reservoir and illustrates the impact of aquatic macrophytes on the fishery community (TVA 1997f).

The health of the fish community in the vicinity of the Bellefonte site was rated "fair" from 1993 to 1996 (Reservoir Fish Assemblage Index scores ranging from 35 to 38). This assessment included sampling the inflow region of Guntersville Reservoir (upstream from the plant site), the transition region (downstream from the plant site), and the forebay region (farfield downstream from the plant site). Aspects that appear to be limiting the fish community quality in the transition zone are the low number of sucker species, the high percentage of individuals of tolerant species, the numerical dominance by a single species, and the high percentage of omnivores in the community. Sport Fish Index scores for the upper Guntersville Reservoir reveal that this portion of the reservoir maintained a good sauger, channel catfish, and largemouth and spotted bass fishery during 1996. Smallmouth bass and crappie fisheries rated low. Commercial species taken in the reservoir include catfish, buffalo fish, and paddlefish (TVA 1997f).

Grass carp, or white amur, is a herbivorous fish native to eastern Asia. As many as 120,000 individuals were introduced into the Guntersville Reservoir from 1988 to 1990 to control aquatic vegetation; specifically, to control hydrilla and spinyleaf naiad. The decline in these aquatic macrophytes can be attributed at least in part to feeding by grass carp. Since nearly all grass carp introduced into the reservoir have been sterile, they have not reproduced. Thus, the influence of this species on the existing environment of the reservoir should decline with time.

#### *Mussel and Clam Communities*

The most permanent (long-lived) members of the benthic macroinvertebrate community are the freshwater mussels, *Unionidae*. These organisms, which require a fish host to complete their life cycle, were at one time a dominant and diverse part of the benthic community of the Tennessee River. Major declines in the numbers and diversity of these organisms have occurred during the past 30 years. A recent investigation in August 1995 identified 14 species of mussels. The greatest abundance for one of the samples (a single transect) was at Tennessee River Mile 391.1, just downstream from the Bellefonte underwater diffuser. This sample contained 65 mussels of 8 species with a population of 1.3 per square meter.

The three most abundant mussels, *Megalonaias nervosa*, *Potamilus alatus*, and *Pleurobema cordatum*, made up 84 percent of the total. While some mussels species found near Bellefonte are harvested by the commercial mussel industry (e.g., *Megalonaias nervosa*), the low average density found (0.3) indicates this area does not support a valuable commercial mussel resource (TVA 1997f).

Two introduced species, the Asiatic clam, *Corbicula fluminea*, and the zebra mussel, *Dreissena polymorpha*, are known to occur in the part of Guntersville Reservoir that is adjacent to the Bellefonte site. The Asiatic clam has been present in this part of the Tennessee River for at least 30 years, but the zebra mussel was first found here in 1995. Both species have the potential to clog power plant water systems (TVA 1997f).

#### *Aquatic Macrophytes*

The greatest abundance of aquatic macrophytes in the TVA system is in the Guntersville Reservoir (TVA 1997f). Over the past decade, coverage of aquatic macrophytes has varied from about 8,100 hectares (20,000 acres) in 1988 (about 29 percent of the water surface area) to about 2,024 hectares (5,000 acres) in 1991. The



peak coverage in 1988 occurred at the end of a record drought period (1984–1988) in the Tennessee Valley. Although several native submersed species such as southern naiad, coontail, American pondweed, small pondweed, and muskgrass colonize portions of the lake, the most abundant plants are the introduced or nonnative species.

The most widespread and abundant submersed macrophyte is Eurasian watermilfoil, *Myriophyllum spicatum*. This nonnative species was introduced into the TVA system in the 1950s, and established colonies were observed on the Guntersville Reservoir in 1963. By the late 1960s there were several thousand acres of Eurasian watermilfoil growing in embayments and overbank areas of the Guntersville Reservoir. Coverage of Eurasian watermilfoil on the Guntersville Reservoir over the past decade ranged from about 1,214 hectares (3,000 acres) in 1991 to about 6,070 hectares (15,000 acres) in 1988. Abundance and coverage of Eurasian watermilfoil and other submersed macrophytes can be expected to fluctuate in response to such factors as flow and water clarity, and should be most abundant in years with the low flows and clear water commonly associated with drought conditions.

Eurasian watermilfoil typically grows at water depths of a few inches up to about 3 meters (10 feet) and can form dense colonies that can interfere with small craft navigation and recreational activities, provide habitat for mosquitoes, and clog water intakes. Eurasian watermilfoil is abundant in shallow embayments near Bellefonte and along the overbank adjacent to the river channel. However, because of the riverine nature of the Guntersville Reservoir in the vicinity of the site, the overbank habitat is not as extensive as it is in portions of the reservoir farther downstream. Extensive colonization of Town Creek Embayment by aquatic macrophytes has little potential for clogging the facility intake structure; however, they have some potential for increasing mosquitoes at the facility.

Spinyleaf naiad, *Najas minor*, and hydrilla, *Hydrilla verticillata*, are two other introduced species of submersed aquatic macrophytes that have established themselves on the Guntersville Reservoir. Like Eurasian watermilfoil, these two species also can colonize shallow water habitats and have the potential to cause similar problems. Spinyleaf naiad was introduced into the TVA system in the 1940s. During the mid- to late 1980s, spinyleaf naiad colonized as much as 607 to 810 hectares (1,500 to 2,000 acres). These levels have declined to a few hundred acres in the 1990s. Hydrilla has the potential to be an even more problematic plant than Eurasian watermilfoil because of its ability to colonize in deeper water and because it forms a continuous plant mass through the water column. Hydrilla, which was first discovered on the Guntersville Reservoir in 1982, increased to about 1,215 hectares (3,000 acres) in 1988. Although scattered hydrilla currently is present throughout the mid-portion of the reservoir, visible colonies occupy less than 4 hectares (10 acres).

The establishment and rapid spread of hydrilla were the primary reasons for the stocking of 100,000 sterile grass carp in the Guntersville Reservoir in 1990. The dramatic decline in hydrilla and spinyleaf naiad and the suppression of these species can be partially attributed to feeding by the grass carp. Like Eurasian watermilfoil, the abundance of these species can be expected to fluctuate with reservoir conditions (e.g., flow and water clarity), and also can be expected to increase as populations of the grass carp decline and feeding pressure becomes less.

### Threatened and Endangered Species

Federally listed and per or state-listed threatened and endangered species occurring in the vicinity of the Bellefonte site were described in the 1974 Final Environmental Statement (TVA 1974b), and more recently in the Bellefonte Conversion Project Final EIS (TVA 1997f). At least two Federally listed animals occur regularly on the Bellefonte site, and several other Federally or state-listed species are likely to use areas of suitable habitat on or near the site occasionally (Table 4–28).

Table 4-28 Federally and State-Listed Threatened or Endangered Species On or Near the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site

Common Name	Scientific Name	Federal	State
<b>Plants</b>			
Snow-wreath	<i>Neviusia alabamensis</i>	Not listed	Endangered
Smoketree	<i>Cotinus obovatus</i>	Not listed	Species of Concern
Yellow Honeysuckle	<i>Lonicera flava</i>	Not listed	Species of Concern
<b>Mollusk</b>			
Orange-footed			
Pearlymussel	<i>Plethobasus cooperianus</i>	Endangered	Endangered
Pink Mucket	<i>Lampsilis abrupta</i> (= <i>L. orbiculata</i> )	Endangered	Endangered
Anthony's Riversnail	<i>Ashearnia anthonyi</i>	Endangered	Endangered
<b>Fish</b>			
Snail Darter	<i>Percina tanasi</i>	Threatened	Threatened
<b>Reptiles</b>			
Box turtle	<i>Terrapene carolina</i>	Not listed	Species of Concern
<b>Birds</b>			
Bald Eagle	<i>Haliaeetus leucocephalus</i>	Threatened	Threatened
Osprey	<i>Pandion haliaetus</i>	Not listed	Threatened
Cooper's Hawk	<i>Accipiter cooperii</i>	Not listed	Species of Concern
Willow Flycatcher	<i>Empidonax traillii</i>	Not listed	Status Undetermined
Warbling Vireo	<i>Vireo gilvus</i>	Not listed	Status Undetermined
<b>Mammals</b>			
Gray Bat	<i>Myotis grisescens</i>	Endangered	Endangered
Indiana Bat	<i>Myotis sodalis</i>	Endangered	Endangered
Meadow Jumping Mouse	<i>Zapus hudsonius</i>	Not listed	Species of Concern

Source: Tennessee 1994, TVA 1997f, TVA 1998a, TVA 1999.

### Plants

No Federally listed threatened or endangered species are known to occur on or in close proximity to the site. However, two plants Federally listed as endangered occur in Jackson County. American hart's-tongue fern, *Phyllitis scolopendrium* var. *americana*, occurs in a cave mouth about 32 kilometers (20 miles) west of the site. No suitable habitat for this species occurs on the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site, and it has not been found in nearby caves or sinkholes. The green pitcher plant, *Sarracenia oreophila*, occurs in wet woods and streambanks on Sand Mountain. Suitable habitat is absent from the Bellefonte site, and the species has not been found on or in the immediate vicinity of the site.

The snow-wreath, listed as endangered in Alabama, and smoketree and yellow honeysuckle, both listed as of special concern in Alabama, are found across the Tennessee River from the plant site. Although habitat similar to that preferred by these species exists within the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site boundary, these species have not been found there during extensive field surveys (TVA 1998e).

### Terrestrial Animals

Two Federally listed terrestrial animals, the bald eagle and gray bat, have been seen at the Bellefonte site. The bald eagle is a fairly common winter resident and an uncommon summer resident on Guntersville Reservoir. The nearest nest sites are at the Raccoon Creek, and Crow Creek embayments, 14 kilometers (9 miles) and 16 kilometers (10 miles), respectively, upstream of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site. Wintering eagles on Guntersville Reservoir concentrate at a few nocturnal roost sites and disperse over much of the reservoir during

the day. They regularly use the wooded shoreline of the Bellefonte site along both the main stem of the Tennessee River and the intake canal for perching and foraging. Additional information on the biology and status of bald eagles in the southeastern United States is contained in the Biological Assessment included in the 1995 NRC *Final Environmental Statement Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant* (NRC 1995b).

The gray bat roosts in caves year-round and forages over water on insects. At least two caves used as summer roosting sites, Blowing Wind Cave and Nitre Cave, occur within 15 kilometers (9 miles) of the Bellefonte site. The reservoir adjacent to the Bellefonte site provides suitable foraging habitat, and gray bats frequently travel 20 or more kilometers (12 or more miles) from summer roost caves to foraging sites. It is likely, therefore, that gray bats regularly occur along the shoreline of the Bellefonte site. Best, et al., (1995) provide additional details on gray bat movements and foraging ecology at Guntersville Reservoir.

The Indiana bat roosts in hollow trees during summer months and hibernates in caves during the winter. This species typically forages in wooded areas adjacent to streams and other water courses. Because Indiana bats have been observed hibernating in caves within 15 kilometers (9 miles) of the Bellefonte site, it is likely they at least occasionally forage within forested riparian areas on the Bellefonte site during the summer.

The habitat requirements and local status of the meadow jumping mouse, osprey, Cooper's hawk, willow flycatcher, warbling vireo, and box turtle have been described by TVA. In general, suitable habitat for these species occurs at Bellefonte; however, the extent of their use (if any) of the site is not known (TVA 1997f).

#### *Aquatic Species*

In recent years, no aquatic species on the Federal or State of Alabama lists of endangered or threatened wildlife have been found in the Tennessee River in the vicinity of the Bellefonte site. Recent fish community assessments and a mussel survey in Guntersville Reservoir near the Bellefonte site do not indicate the presence of listed or candidate endangered or threatened species (TVA 1997f). A few listed aquatic species have been found in both the upstream part of Guntersville Reservoir and in Wheeler Reservoir just downstream from Guntersville Dam.

The endangered pink mucket and the threatened snail darter occur in suitable gravel and cobble habitats in several Tennessee River reaches, including both the Nickajack and Guntersville Dam tailwaters. The orange-footed pearlymussel also occurs in gravel and cobble habitats within the main stem of the Tennessee River. In recent years it has been found in the Guntersville Dam tailwater and not in the Nickajack Dam tailwater. Anthony's riversnail, the only endangered snail in this group, occurs in the lower Sequatchie River and at a few locations in the Nickajack Dam tailwater about 24 kilometers (15 miles) upstream of the Bellefonte site. It has not been found in surveys near the Bellefonte site or at any other location on Guntersville Reservoir or in the Guntersville Dam tailwater (TVA 1998a). Additional information on the biology, distribution, and recovery objectives for this species is presented in the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service recovery plan (DOI 1997).

#### **4.2.3.7 Archaeological and Historic Resources**

An initial archaeological reconnaissance of the 607 hectares (1,500 acres) of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site was conducted in 1972 (TVA 1997f). This reconnaissance resulted in the verification and discovery of five sites, with three of the sites containing Archaic, Woodland, or Mississippian components. One of the sites was subjected to data recovery in 1973-1974 resulting from mitigation of adverse impacts related to the proposed construction of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant. Another of the sites consists of a woodland component on the northeast edge of the peninsula near the confluence of Town Creek and the Tennessee River that is potentially eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places. None of the other sites are eligible for

inclusion. An archival record search, an initial field check, and discussions with the Alabama Historical Commission determined that the only historical site of significance within the project locality is the original town site of Bellefonte. Bellefonte was incorporated in 1821 and served as the first county seat of Jackson County; it has been determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places. At the time of the survey, two antebellum structures were still standing: the Daniel Martin Inn/Tavern and a one-room cabin with a more recent lean-to addition. The major street layout of Bellefonte was still discernible, as were the limestone foundations of two antebellum brick structures and an associated cistern. Brick remnants of the former jail and the chimney and doorstep foundations of a cabin were also present. Since the 1972 survey, all structures associated with the original town site of Bellefonte were removed by subsequent landowners (TVA 1997f, TVA 1998e).

#### 4.2.3.8 Socioeconomics

The social, economic, and community characteristics of the affected environment are described at three levels of increasing size: (1) the city of Scottsboro, (2) Jackson County, and (3) the region of influence, defined as the area within a 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant that includes the city of Scottsboro and Jackson County. Completion of Bellefonte 1 would have the greatest effect on the socioeconomic characteristics of Jackson County.

The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site is near Hollywood, Jackson County, Alabama. Its exact location is latitude 34°42'32" north and longitude 85°55'36" west (NRC 1998d). Scottsboro, a city of approximately 14,000 persons, is about 11.3 kilometers (7 miles) from the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant and is the largest city in the county. Scottsboro is located on the banks of the Tennessee River's Guntersville Reservoir, Jackson County, Alabama. Jackson County is in the northeast corner of Alabama, adjacent to Marion County, Tennessee, to the north; DeKalb County, Alabama, to the east; Madison County, Alabama, to the west; and Marshall County, Alabama, to the south.

The affected environment section describes only those socioeconomic factors that most likely would be affected if the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant were selected for tritium production. School-related issues and tax related issues are expected to be among the important socioeconomic factors.

#### Regional Economic Characteristics

This section presents data on the current and recent economic conditions in Scottsboro and Jackson County, including unemployment rate, workforce occupations, per capita and household income, and main businesses.

##### *Employment*

The most recent unemployment rate for Jackson County is 8.2 percent for the period January through October, 1997 (Jackson County 1998). Table 4-29 shows the unemployment rate for the county from 1991 to 1997. As indicated in Table 4-29, the 1997 figure is considerably lower than the annual averages from 1991 through 1996. There are no comparable figures available for the city of Scottsboro.

**Table 4-29 Unemployment Percentages in Jackson County (1991-1997)**

1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
10.0	10.2	9.6	9.1	10.0	9.5	8.2

Source: Jackson County 1998.

### Income

Total personal income in Jackson County increased from \$876 million in 1995 to \$931 million in 1996 (DOC 1998b). The per capita personal income went from \$17,539 in 1995 to \$18,366 in 1996. In 1996, the county ranked eighteenth in Alabama in per capita income. Table 4-30 shows the per capita and household income figures for Scottsboro and Jackson County for 1997.

**Table 4-30 Per Capita and Household Income in the City of Scottsboro and Jackson County  
(Estimates for 1997)**

<i>Income Measure</i>	<i>City of Scottsboro</i>	<i>Jackson County</i>
Estimated per capita income	\$15,552	\$13,525
Estimated average household income	Not Available	\$35,264
Estimated median household income	\$27,856	\$26,492

Source: Jackson County 1998.

In terms of occupations, manufacturing is the most important, accounting for about 31 percent of the workforce (5,064 workers) in Jackson County. This is followed by services, with about 27 percent of the workforce (4,377 workers), and by retail trade, with about 19 percent (3,151 workers). Less important occupations include government (almost 8 percent), finance/insurance/real estate (4.7 percent), construction (3.8 percent), and wholesale trade (2.9 percent). Table 4-31 reflects the distribution of industrial occupations in Jackson County compared with the overall figures for Alabama and the United States (as percentages of total employment only for 1996).

**Table 4-31 Industrial Occupation Distribution for Jackson County, Alabama,  
and the United States (1996 Main Occupations as a Percentage of Total Employment Only)**

<i>Type of Occupation</i>	<i>Jackson County (Estimated for 1997)</i>	<i>Alabama (1993)</i>	<i>United States (1993)</i>
Manufacturing	29.7	17.4	12.6
Services	15.4	24.6	30.4
Retail trade	15.7	17.1	16.9
Government	16.6	16.8	14.2
Finance-Insurance-Real Estate	3.3	4.8	7.4
Construction	6.0	6.2	5.3
Wholesale trade	2.7	4.4	4.6
Agriculture	0.9	1.1	1.2

Source: DOC 1998b.

### Businesses

The businesses of greatest economic significance in the region of influence are Akzo Nobel, CommScope, Mead Containerboard, Maples Industries, Patrick Lumber Company, Shaw Industries, U.S. Gypsum, and Wenzel Metal Spinning (Scottsboro 1998). Jackson County businesses employ a total of 16,264 workers. The average number of employees per business in the county is 10.2 (Jackson County 1998).

## Population

The population of Hollywood has remained essentially flat over this decade. According to Census Bureau data, it was 916 and 914 in 1990 and 1996, respectively (DOC 1998c). The population of Scottsboro increased from 13,786 in 1990 to 14,133 in 1996 (estimated), an increase of 2.5 percent. Scottsboro ranks thirty-third in Alabama in terms of population. The nearest metropolitan city to the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site is Huntsville, which grew from 159,880 in 1990 to 170,424 in 1996 (estimated), an increase of 6.6 percent.

According to the 1990 U.S. Census, the total population of Jackson County was 47,796 (DOC 1998c). The estimated county population in 1997 was 50,532, and the projection for 2002 is 51,132 (Jackson County 1998). The estimated number of households in the county in 1997 was 19,315; this number is projected to decrease to 19,177 by 2002.

The total population for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant region of influence was estimated at 883,553 in 1990 (DOC 1992). For the same year, the number of households was estimated at 336,109. About 25 percent (220,967) of the region of influence's population were under 18 years of age; about 53 percent (468,407) were 18 through 54; and about 22 percent were 55 or older.

Demographic characteristics of the region of influence and Jackson County for 1990 are shown in Table 4-32. For the same year, Table 4-33 shows the ethnic breakdown by race and Hispanic origin for the population of the county, the region of influence, and the United States (for comparison).

**Table 4-32 General Demographic Characteristics of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site Region of Influence and Jackson County (1990 Census)**

<i>Demographic Measure</i>	<i>Jackson County</i>	<i>Region of Influence</i>
Total population	47,796	883,553
Families	14,143	252,374
Households	18,099	336,109
Male	23,146	427,549
Female	24,650	456,004

Sources: DOC 1998c.

The racial and ethnic composition of the region of influence projected for the year 2025 is shown in Figure 4-16. Low-income households based on 1990 Census data are presented in Figure 4-17. Low-income households are those with incomes of 80 percent or less than the median income of the counties. As indicated in this figure, approximately 44 percent of total households are low-income households (see Appendix G).

**Table 4-33 Population Distribution by Race and Hispanic Origin in Jackson County, the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site Region of Influence, and the United States<sup>a</sup>**


<i>Ethnic Group or Subgroup (U.S. Census Definitions)</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>Jackson County</i>		<i>Bellefonte Site Region of Influence</i>	
	<i>Percentage of Total Population</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Population</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Population</i>
White not of Hispanic origin	75.60	44,531	93.17	825,149	85.11
Black not of Hispanic origin	11.80	1,957	4.09	126,093	13.01
American Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo not of Hispanic origin	0.70	1,008	2.11	4,934	0.51
Asian or Pacific Islander not of Hispanic origin	2.80	89	0.19	6,958	0.72
Other race not of Hispanic origin	Not Available	3	0.01	125	0.01
White of Hispanic origin	4.63	165	0.35	4,115	0.42
Black of Hispanic origin	0.31	11	0.02	594	0.06
American Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo of Hispanic origin	0.07	12	0.03	41	0.00
Asian or Pacific Islander of Hispanic origin	0.12	1	0.00	160	0.02
Other race of Hispanic origin	3.83	19	0.04	1,346	0.14
Hispanic total	9.10	208	0.44	6,256	0.65
Total population (all ethnic groups)	100.00	47,796	100.00	969,515	100.00

<sup>a</sup>Shown as a percentage of total population for comparison purposes.


Note 1: Region of Influence is defined as the area within a 50-mile radius of the Bellefonte site.

Note 2: The sum of the items may not add up to the population total due to rounding error.

Sources: DOC 1992.



**Figure 4-16 Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Minority Population Residing in Counties Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Projected for the Year 2025**



**Figure 4-17 Low-Income Households Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (1990)**



## Housing

Temporary housing in Jackson County consists of 7 hotels and motels, about 10 trailer parks, and 13 apartment complexes. The hotels and motels are the Budget Inn, Comfort Inn, Days Inn, Goose Pond Colony Cottage Rentals, Hampton Inn, Scottish Inn Motel, and Scottsboro Hotel. The three largest trailer parks together have about 380 camper and mobile home lots, while the other 10 have about 30 each. Camper lots cover an area half the size of mobile homes and are ideal for workers who commute from nearby counties or neighboring states and drive back home on weekends. Thus, a trailer park designed for campers can accommodate twice as many tenants as one designed for mobile homes (Scottsboro 1998). An additional park adjacent to the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site is planned for construction in the fall of 1998; it will feature about 125 lots, with the option for expansion to about 250. The estimated number of camper and mobile home lots in the county, which was about 590 as of May 1998, is expected to increase to about 674 in 1999. Trailer parks take about four months to build. As of spring 1998, all trailer parks in the area were at or near capacity.

Currently, most apartment complexes have low vacancy rates at or near 0 percent. Vacancy rates are subject to seasonal variation and range from 0 to 12 percent (Jackson County 1998). Monthly rents range from the low \$200s to mid \$300s for one-bedroom apartments, the high \$200s to high \$300s for two-bedroom apartments, and the high \$300s to low \$400s for three-bedroom apartments (Jackson County 1998). There are 12 apartment complexes in operation and one under construction in Jackson County (Scottsboro 1998). They range in size from 20 to 100 units and include one complex for the elderly and one for low-income tenants (Jackson County 1998). The estimated number of rental apartment units is 650. There were also 36 homes for rent in Jackson County as of May 1998 (Scottsboro 1998). The home rental market is considered limited by local realtors.

In terms of permanent housing, from 1980 to 1990 a total of 621 electrical utility permits were issued to new single-family homes, equal to a less than 0.5 percent increase per year (Scottsboro 1998). The number of occupied housing units in Jackson County was 18,020 in 1990, of which 13,827 (77 percent) were owner-occupied and 4,193 (23 percent) were rentals (Jackson County 1998). The average number of persons per housing unit in 1990 was 2.6, which is slightly higher than the average for Alabama (2.32) and the United States (2.29) (Jackson County 1998). There were 147 homes listed for sale in Jackson County as of April 21, 1998 (Scottsboro 1998). Of these, 82 were in Scottsboro. The average number of days to sell a home was 126 as of April 21, 1998.

The average home sale price in 1997 was \$72,000. Property taxes, insurance costs, and utility rates are about 88 percent of the national average (Scottsboro 1998).

## Community Services

### *General Education*

A total of 152 students are enrolled in Hollywood Junior High School, part of the Jackson County School System (Jackson County 1998). The city of Scottsboro has four public elementary schools, one junior high school, and one high school. Total public school enrollment in Scottsboro is 2,967, of which 1,664 attend primary schools and 1,303 attend secondary schools (Scottsboro 1998). Scottsboro has one private elementary school (the North Alabama Christian School, a new private elementary school opened for the current academic year) and eight private preschool and kindergarten schools. The Scottsboro School System has 207 certified teachers and can absorb 725 additional students next year with the construction of a new high school. The old high school is being converted into an elementary school (Scottsboro 1998). The current student-to-teacher ratio for the system is 14:1. Presented as Table 4-34 are the student enrollment breakdown by year and the number of staff for 1997-1998 in the Scottsboro School System.

Table 4-34 Scottsboro School System Breakdown by Academic Year (1991-1998)

School and Location	Grade Levels	Total Enrollment (by School Year)							Total Faculty (1997-1998)			Student to Faculty Ratio (1997-1998)
		1991-1992	1992-1993	1993-1994	1994-1995	1995-1996	1996-1997	1997-1998	Certified Teachers	Support	Other	
Brownwood Elementary	K-4	381	364	365	367	416	431	437	32	6	6	14:1
Caldwell Elementary	K-4	501	543	469	449	429	445	428	34	9	7	13:1
Nelson Elementary	K-4	264	239	297	297	338	355	364	27	6	4	13:1
Page Elementary	5-6	492	498	462	436	420	420	435	29	8	5	15:1
Total primary	K-6	1,638	1,644	1,593	1,549	1,603	1,651	1,664	122	29	22	14:1
Scottsboro Junior High School	7-8	454	461	486	480	458	451	453	29	7	7	16:1
Scottsboro High School	9-12	881	868	825	812	842	800	850	56	12	9	15:1
Total secondary	7-12	1,335	1,329	1,311	1,292	1,300	1,251	1,303	85	19	16	15:1
Total system	K-12	2,973	2,973	2,904	2,841	2,903	2,902	2,967	207	48	38	14:1

K = Kindergarten.

Source: Scottsboro 1998.

The system's transportation services can accommodate up to 4,080 students transported by 34 buses on a dual-route basis, or 2,040 on a single route (Armstrong 1998). Thus, the system's transportation services can accommodate an additional 1,113 students, given a dual-route system.

The Scottsboro School System's budget for Fiscal Year 1998 (October 1, 1997, through September 30, 1998) was \$18,368,433 (Scottsboro 1998). The system obtains revenue from the county, state, and Federal governments. For Fiscal Year 1997, Jackson County paid the school system \$204,690 from tax revenues (Jackson County 1998). In addition, \$672,657 were allocated to the school system for Fiscal Year 1998 by the Jackson County Commission from funds provided by TVA in lieu of taxes (Jackson County 1998). The budget per student was \$5,120 for the 1995–1996 academic year.

Overall student enrollment in the Jackson County School System is 6,257, of which 713 are in elementary schools, 566 in middle schools, 1,273 in junior high schools, and 3,705 in high schools (Jackson County 1998). The Jackson County School System has 437 certified teachers and 35 administrators. The current student-to-teacher ratio for the system is 14:3. The system could absorb about 740 additional students without significant disruption. Eighteen new classrooms are being added system-wide. There are two private Christian academies in the county (one in Scottsboro, as mentioned above). The Jackson County School System has 100 school buses and, at an average of 66 students per bus, an overall transportation capacity of 6,600 on a single-route basis or 13,200 on a dual-route basis. This means that the system could accommodate an additional 343 students on a single-route basis and 6,943 on a dual-route basis. The Jackson County Board of Education is considering plans to consolidate three high schools: Woodville, Skyline, and Paint Rock Valley. The proposed consolidated school would be for 432 high school students. Forty-four percent of those students are currently enrolled at Skyline, 33 percent at Woodville, and 23 percent at Paint Rock (Alabama A&M 1998).

The system's budget was \$42,418,000 for the 1997–1998 academic year, of which \$35,765,012 were spent directly on students (about \$5,716 per student, up from \$4,240 for the 1995–1996 academic year) and \$6,652,988 on general student services (Armstrong 1998, Jackson County 1998). The estimated budget for 1998–1999 is \$43 million (Jackson County 1998). There are three revenue components to the budget: Federal, state, and county government funds. For Fiscal Year 1997, Jackson County's share was \$374,403 (Jackson County 1998). In addition, \$1,448,021 were allocated to the school system for Fiscal Year 1998 by the Jackson County Commission out of funds provided by TVA in lieu of taxes (Jackson County 1998).

### *Public Safety*

This section describes public safety—specifically, fire protection and police protection—in the region of influence, including Jackson County and Scottsboro.

Fire protection in Scottsboro is provided by the Scottsboro Fire Department. There are 30 full-time firefighters and 14 volunteers (Scottsboro 1998). Jackson County has 490 volunteer firefighters. Table 4–35 shows full-time and volunteer firefighters in the region of influence. There are 27 fire departments within the region of influence; 24 of these are in Jackson County, as noted above. The total number of firefighters for the region of influence (including all of Jackson County) is approximately 535.

**Table 4-35 Fire Protection Services Available in the City of Scottsboro, Jackson County, and the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site Region of Influence (April 1998)**

Level of Analysis	Number of Stations (Fire Departments)	Number of Firefighters		Vehicles		
		Full-Time	Volunteer	Pumps and Tankers	Ladders	Rescue
City of Scottsboro	3 (1)	30	14	4	1	1
Jackson County <sup>a</sup>	Not available (24)	31	490	24	1	21
Region of Influence <sup>b</sup>	Not available (27)	31	535 <sup>c</sup>	31	1	21

<sup>a</sup> Including the Scottsboro Fire Department.

<sup>b</sup> Including the Scottsboro Fire Department, all of Jackson County's volunteer departments, and three of DeKalb County's fire departments (Henager, Sylvannia, and Powell).

<sup>c</sup> Minimum estimate.

Sources: Scottsboro 1998, Jackson County 1998.

Police protection in the vicinity of the Bellefonte site is provided by the Scottsboro Police Department, the Hollywood Police Department, and the Jackson County Sheriff's Office. The county has eight police departments (Scottsboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport, Hollywood, Woodville, Skyline, Section, and Pisgah). Scottsboro has 37 full-time officers, about 10 civilian dispatchers, 6 jailers, 2 clerks, and 1 maintenance employee. The Hollywood Police Department has three officers. The Sheriff's Office has 27 sworn deputies, including the Sheriff, who is based in Scottsboro (Jackson County 1998).

There are two hospitals in Jackson County. Jackson County Hospital has 170 beds and a staff of 465, including 40 physicians (Jackson County 1998). North Jackson Hospital has 40 beds and a staff of about 270, including 6 physicians.

### Local Transportation

The nearest major interstate highway is Interstate Highway 59, approximately 47 kilometers (29 miles) southeast of the Bellefonte site. U.S. Highway 72, which connects Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Huntsville, Alabama, is 3.2 kilometers (2 miles) northwest of the site. Bellefonte Road is a two-lane road extending from the north across Town Creek Embayment to U.S. Highway 72. Site access from the south is provided by South Access Road, connecting to Jackson County Road 33. The CSX Railway main line between Chattanooga and Huntsville passes about 4.8 kilometers (3 miles) northwest of the Bellefonte site. The Tennessee River is navigable past the Bellefonte site; a minimum 2.7-meter (9-foot) channel depth is maintained for commercial or recreational vessels. The barge traffic in this portion of the Tennessee River navigation system is considered moderate (TVA 1997f). These transportation routes are shown in Figure 4-18.

### Tax Revenues

#### Jackson County Tax Revenues

Jackson County collects tax revenues from real estate, sales taxes, and motor vehicle tags. The net assessed real estate value for Fiscal Year 1997 was \$169,486,219 (Jackson County 1998). Total tax collections in Fiscal Year 1997 were \$9,353,939, up from \$8,618,488 in Fiscal Year 1995. Figure 4-19 shows the total distributions by recipient for Fiscal Year 1997. Table 4-36 shows Jackson County's tax and fee revenue distributions by recipient and by source for Fiscal Year 1997.

The Jackson County Commission also receives monthly payments from TVA of about \$469,629.06, amounting to \$5,635,548.72 for Fiscal Year 1998 (Jackson County 1998).




Figure 4-18 Transportation Routes in the Vicinity of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site




Figure 4-19 Jackson County Tax Revenue Distributions by Recipient FY 1997

Source: Jackson County 1998.

#### Tobacco Tax Revenues

Scottsboro City received \$86,538 in tobacco tax revenues in 1997. Assuming an average \$12 carton price, 30 cents would be allocated to the city, 50 cents to the county, \$1.65 to the state, \$2.48 to the Federal Government, and an additional 44 cents to state and local governments as sales taxes (Scottsboro 1998). Tax revenues are allocated to the city's general fund for operations. Jackson County's tobacco tax share amounts to approximately \$300,000 per year (Scottsboro 1998).

**Table 4-36 Jackson County Revenue Distributions by Recipient (Selected Recipients Only) and Tax and Fee Revenue Sources, Fiscal Year 1997 (October 1996 Through September 1997)**

<i>Tax or Fee Revenue Source</i>	<i>County School Districts</i>			<i>County Hospitals</i>	<i>Fire Fund</i>	<i>Scottsboro</i>	<i>Hollywood</i>
	<i>District 1 (Jackson County)</i>	<i>District 2 (Jackson County)</i>	<i>District 3 (Scottsboro)</i>				
Real estate	\$146,614	\$158,878	\$175,368	\$548,437	\$219,901	\$1,302,747	\$9,837
Motor vehicle ownership	\$23,680	\$35,918	\$25,050	\$113,230	\$0	\$185,722	\$2,171
Motor vehicle sales	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$88,985	\$3,596
Mobile home ownership *	\$5,345	\$485	\$2,337	\$0	\$0	\$2,337	\$154
Motor vehicle tags	\$855	\$2,629	\$1,935	\$0	\$0	\$37,755	\$2,380
<b>Totals</b>	<b>\$176,493</b>	<b>\$197,910</b>	<b>\$204,690</b>	<b>\$661,667</b>	<b>\$219,901</b>	<b>\$1,617,546</b>	<b>\$18,138</b>

\*Only when the land is not owned.  
Source: Jackson County 1998.

#### 4.2.3.9 Public and Occupational Health and Safety

##### Radiation Environment

Construction on Bellefonte 1 and 2 has not been completed. Therefore, no radiation has been released to the environment.

Background radiation exposure of individuals in the vicinity of the Bellefonte site is expected to be the same as for the Watts Bar site. The background radiation exposure at the Bellefonte site is presented in Table 4-37.

**Table 4-37 Sources of Radiation Exposure to Individuals in the Vicinity of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site<sup>a</sup>**

<i>Source</i>	<i>Total Effective Dose Equivalent (millirem per year)</i>
<b>Natural Background Radiation</b>	
Cosmic and cosmogenic radiation	28
External terrestrial radiation	28
In the body	39
Radon in homes (inhaled)	200
<b>Total</b>	<b>295</b>
<b>Other Sources of Radiation</b>	
Release of radioactive material in natural gas, mining, ore processing, etc.	5
Diagnostic x-rays and nuclear medicine	53
<u>Nuclear energy</u>	0.28
Consumer and industrial products	0.03
<b>Total</b>	<b>355</b>

<sup>a</sup> Values are based on average national data, not measured values at the Bellefonte site.

Source: TVA 1998b.

##### Chemical Environment

Since construction of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant has not been completed, only small amounts of hazardous chemicals are used at the site for maintenance and layup (TVA 1997f).

The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant is in compliance with the discharge requirements of the NPDES Permit issued by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management (TVA 1997f). Historical data (from 1974 to 1991) on stormwater discharges indicate that all primary pollutants (list of major health-related contaminants) were below the Method Detection Limits, except for some metals. Two specified examples of these metals are dissolved iron and manganese (TVA 1997f). The background samples from intake water were also above the Method Detection Limits for the same metals. Section 4.2.3.3, Table 4-25, and Section 4.2.3.4, Table 4-26 contain data on quantities of concentrated chemical concentrations in ambient air and surface water in the vicinity of Bellefonte.

#### 4.2.3.10 Waste Management

Small quantities of nonradioactive wastes are generated at the Bellefonte site. Current operations include actions necessary to maintain plant systems such as the turbines.



Ongoing maintenance activities at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant generate a small amount of solid waste. Typical solid waste is routinely put in dumpsters on site and subsequently disposed of off site by contractors. Asbestos and special wastes are sent to the local sanitary landfill after approval by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management. In 1995, the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant generated more than 2.8 cubic meters (100 cubic feet) of asbestos wastes, including insulation board, roofing material, tiles, gaskets, and filters. Special wastes generated by Bellefonte include activated alumina, grease, oil-contaminated rags, oil filters, sandblast grit, cement, and surplus chemicals. Bellefonte's special waste disposal for 1995 included 55 drums (each containing 55 gallons) of oil-contaminated materials, grease and surplus chemicals, several hundred pounds of waste cement, and lesser amounts of other wastes.

The Bellefonte site currently qualifies as an EPA Small Quantity Generator, in accordance with 40 CFR 121.5 (i.e., the site generates more than 100 kilograms, but less than 1,000 kilograms of hazardous waste in any one calendar month per year). Hazardous wastes generated by the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant include waste oil, lead wastes, nickel-cadmium batteries, acetic acid wastes, hydrazine, polyvinylchloride glue, tar, and solvents.

Some polychlorinated biphenyls wastes (e.g., lighting ballasts, small capacitors), which are regulated by the Toxic Substances Control Act, are also generated. Hazardous wastes are shipped to the TVA Hazardous Waste Storage Facility in Muscle Shoals, Alabama, which makes arrangements for disposal at a permitted disposal facility (TVA 1997f).

#### **4.2.3.11 Spent Fuel Management**

There is no spent fuel at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site.

##### **Storage Capacity**

Spent fuel storage has been provided for Bellefonte 1 and 2. There are two separate spent fuel pools, one for each unit. Each pool has a storage capacity of 1,058 spent fuel assemblies.

# **Chapter 5**

## **Environmental Consequences**

## 5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

Chapter 5 describes the environmental consequences of the production of tritium in commercial light water reactors. It begins with a brief introduction, followed by an elaboration of the potential environmental consequences of tritium production at each site. Included for consideration are the radiological impacts of operations and potential facility accidents. There follows a description of the consequences of activities that, although related to the reactor sites, are generic in nature and can be treated separately—specifically, reactor licensing renewal, decontamination and decommissioning, and spent fuel storage. Discussion then turns to the impacts from elements of the proposed action that are not directly related to the reactor sites, such as the fabrication and transport of tritium-producing burnable absorber rods. Also presented is a sensitivity analysis focused on tritium-producing burnable absorber rod design and the refueling cycle; separate evaluations of the implications of programmatic No Action and the impacts of commercial light water reactor facility accidents; and a description of the cumulative impacts of the proposed actions. The chapter concludes with a look at several issues common to all sites: unavoidable, adverse environmental impacts; relationships between local, short-term uses of man's environment and the enhancement of long-term productivity; irreversible, irretrievable commitments of resources; and mitigation measures.

### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

This environmental impact statement (EIS) is in compliance with regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality that require the affected environment of proposed Federal actions to be "interpreted comprehensively to include the natural and physical environment and the relationship of people with that environment," (40 CFR 1508.14). It focuses in part on the environmental consequences of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) production of tritium in three commercial light water reactors (CLWRs) operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)—Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Watts Bar 1) and Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (Sequoyah 1 and 2)—from the perspective of a comparison of the incremental impacts of tritium production with continued operation without tritium production (the present status). Also examined are the environmental impacts of tritium production in one or both of TVA's partially completed reactors, Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (Bellefonte 1 and 2), as well as impacts associated with the construction activities required for the completion and full operation of those units. The assessment results presented in this chapter constitute the analytical basis for a comparison of all proposed actions with the No Action Alternative detailed in Chapter 3.

#### 5.1.1 Methodology

Specific assumptions associated with the impact analysis common to all sites are provided in the appendices. The environmental assessment methods used in assessing the environmental impacts for each resource and issue at each alternative reactor site are discussed in Appendix B of this EIS.

The methods for the evaluation of human health effects for: (1) normal operation of CLWR facilities, (2) CLWR facility accidents, and (3) overland transportation are presented in Appendices C, D, and E respectively. The results of these analyses are presented in this chapter.

The discussion of public and occupational health and safety considers the radiological and chemical impacts under normal operations as well as accident scenarios. The spectrum of potential accident scenarios evaluated in this EIS include: a reactor design-basis accident, a nonreactor design-basis accident, a handling accident

involving the tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs), two transportation cask handling accidents, and beyond design-basis reactor accidents involving core damage with loss of containment integrity. For operating reactors, the impacts from the accidents with tritium production are compared to operation without tritium production. The accident selection and the uncertainties are presented in Appendix D. Analysis of transportation impacts are considered for both routine transportation and transportation accidents. The conservatism of some of the assumptions used in these analyses are summarized below.

### **5.1.2 Assumptions**

Conservative assumptions have been incorporated into the analysis method for this EIS to ensure that the health and safety impacts to the public and workers would not be underestimated. The following are examples of conservative assumptions incorporated in the analysis method.

- The models used to estimate the risk of latent cancers from radiation are known to overestimate the risk for low dose rates. The actual risk may be zero.
- The effective dose from an elemental tritium gas exposure is about 10,000 times less than the effective dose from an exposure to airborne tritium oxide. All tritium released to the environment from TPBARs during normal incident-free operation and/or during reactor, nonreactor, TPBAR handling, and transportation cask handling facility accidents is assumed to be converted to oxide form prior to release.
- When an accident frequency was estimated to be in a range, accident risk estimates were based on the high end of the range.
- The analyses assumed that 1 Curie of tritium from each TPBAR could permeate through the cladding and be released to the environment over a period of a year although, as discussed in Sections 1.3.4 and 3.1.2, the performance of the tritium "getter" is such that there is virtually no tritium available in a form that could permeate through the cladding.
- The analyses involving abnormal events assumed that 2 TPBARs could fail in a given core load of 3,400 TPBARs, and the entire inventory of tritium could be released to the reactor coolant and then to the environment. This is an extremely conservative assumption, considering the historic failure rate of standard burnable absorber rods, as discussed in Section 1.9.
- The analyses assumed that during the reactor design-basis accident all TPBARs would be breached and their tritium contents released to the reactor coolant system. Uncertainty exists on the actual percentage of TPBARs that would be breached during this accident.
- The analyses assumed an average tritium production of 1 gram per TPBAR per 18-month fuel cycle. This would overestimate the available tritium by about 15 percent, considering an estimated average tritium production rate of about 0.84 gram per TPBAR per cycle (WEC 1997).
- The analyses assumed that during a nonreactor design-basis accident about 10 percent of the tritium that was released to the reactor coolant system during normal operation would be released to the atmosphere.
- The analyses assumed that during a TPBAR handling accident the entire tritium inventory of 24 breached TPBARs would be released into the fuel pool and eventually to the environment. The analyses took no credit for mitigating actions that would be taken to limit the release of tritium into the fuel pool.

## 5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

Environmental consequences of the No Action Alternative and tritium production are evaluated in the following sections for Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1 and 2, and Bellefonte 1 and 2. The evaluation of tritium production impacts considers a tritium production reactor core with a nominal 1,000 TPBARs and a core with the maximum number of 3,400 TPBARs. Both the 1,000 and 3,400 TPBAR core configurations assume an 18-month reactor operating cycle. The impacts are evaluated for both individual and combined units at each site as applicable. In some cases the combined effects of two units at a site would be less than twice the impact of the individual units. Sensitivity analyses are performed in Section 5.2.9 to assess the changes in impacts due to TPBAR design modifications to increase tritium production per TPBAR, thereby reducing the core reload cycle to 15.5 or 12 months and reducing the number of TPBARs in the core to 100.

### 5.2.1 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1

#### 5.2.1.1 Land Resources

The land resources analysis addresses land use and visual resources for the region of influence. The region of influence for land use includes land within 3.2 kilometers (2 miles) of the Watts Bar site. The region of influence for visual resources includes those lands and waters from which the site is visible (the viewshed).

#### LAND USE

##### No Action

No land use impacts are anticipated at the Watts Bar site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

##### Tritium Production

- | No additional property would be required for tritium production at the Watts Bar site. Land use would remain unchanged from its current industrial use. The 716-hectare (1,770-acre) site contains ample area for a dry cask spent nuclear fuel storage facility, if constructed. A description of a generic dry cask independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

#### VISUAL RESOURCES

##### No Action

No visual impacts are anticipated at the Watts Bar site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

##### Tritium Production

There would be no change in the visual character of the Watts Bar site as a result of tritium production. The major visual elements of the plant already exist, including the cooling towers and the transmission lines. As described in Section 4.2.1.1, views of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant from passing river traffic on the Tennessee River are partially screened by the wooded area east of the plant. Distant glimpses of the plant site can be had from locations along the river and various roads in the area.

### **5.2.1.2 Noise**

#### **No Action**

No noise impacts are anticipated at the Watts Bar site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

#### **Tritium Production**

Noise levels should not change as a result of tritium production at the Watts Bar site. No construction would occur at the Watts Bar site unless a dry cask ISFSI were constructed. A description of a generic dry cask ISFSI and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

### **5.2.1.3 Air Quality**

#### **NONRADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EMISSIONS**

#### **No Action**

No air quality impacts are anticipated at the Watts Bar site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action (see Section 4.2.1.3, Table 4-1).

#### **Tritium Production**

Air quality should not change as a result of the production of tritium at the Watts Bar site. No construction would occur at Watts Bar unless a dry cask ISFSI were constructed. A description of a generic dry cask ISFSI and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

#### **RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EMISSIONS**

#### **No Action**

Under the No Action Alternative, the radioactive gaseous emissions at Watts Bar 1 should continue at the levels described in Section 4.2.1.3, Table 4-2, assuming that no significant operational deviations would occur.

#### **Tritium Production**

A design objective of the TPBARs is to retain as much tritium as possible within the TPBAR. The performance of the tritium "getter" is such that there is virtually no tritium available in a form that could permeate through the TPBAR cladding. However, for the purposes of this EIS it was conservatively assumed that an average of 1 Curie of tritium per TPBAR per year could permeate to the reactor coolant (PNNL 1997b, PNNL 1999). It also was assumed that 10 percent of this tritium could be released to the environment as gaseous emission. Because of this assumption the radioactive gaseous emissions from Watts Bar 1 would increase. Table 5-1 shows the annual radioactive gaseous emissions during tritium production at Watts Bar 1 with 0, 1,000, and 3,400 TPBARs. The method and assumptions used for the calculations are provided in Appendix C, Section C.3.4. Radiological exposures of the public and workers from radioactive emissions are presented in Section 5.2.1.9. The impacts on plants and animals are described in Section 5.2.1.6.

**Table 5-1 Annual Radioactive Gaseous Emissions at Watts Bar 1**

	<i>No Action (0 TPBARs)</i>	<i>Tritium Production</i>	
		<i>1,000 TPBARs</i>	<i>3,400 TPBARs</i>
Tritium release (Curies)	5.6	105.6	345.6
Other radioactive release (Curies)	283*	283	283
Total release (Curies)	288.6	388.6	628.6

\* The isotopic distribution of this release is presented in Appendix C, Table C-9.

Source: TVA 1998c, TVA 1999.

#### 5.2.1.4 Water Resources

##### SURFACE WATER

###### No Action

No surface water impacts are anticipated at the Watts Bar site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

###### Tritium Production

Impacts on surface water from nonradiological discharges at the Watts Bar site should not change as a result of tritium production. No construction would occur at the Watts Bar site unless a dry cask ISFSI were constructed. A description of a generic dry cask ISFSI and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

##### GROUNDWATER

###### No Action

No groundwater impacts are anticipated at the Watts Bar site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

###### Tritium Production

Impacts on groundwater at the Watts Bar site should not change as a result of tritium production. No construction would occur at the Watts Bar site unless a dry cask ISFSI were constructed. A description of a generic dry cask ISFSI and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

##### RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT

###### No Action

Under the No Action Alternative, the liquid radioactive effluent at Watts Bar 1 should continue at the levels described in Section 4.2.1.4, Table 4-4, assuming that no significant operational deviations would occur.

## Tritium Production

Based on the assumption that an average of 1 Curie of tritium per TPBAR per year could permeate to the reactor coolant and that 90 percent of this tritium could be released as liquid effluent, radioactive liquid effluent from Watts Bar 1 would increase. Table 5-2 shows the annual radioactive releases in liquid effluent during tritium production at Watts Bar 1 with 0, 1,000, and 3,400 TPBARs. The method and assumptions used for the calculations are included in Appendix C, Section C.3. Radiological exposures of the public and workers from radioactive emissions are presented in Section 5.2.1.9. The impacts on plants and animals are described in Section 5.2.1.6.

In accordance with the Safe Drinking Water Act requirements promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 40 CFR Parts 100-149, a tritium concentration of 20,000 picocuries per liter has been established as a limit for drinking water. In view of this regulatory limit, an analysis was performed to estimate tritium concentrations in the Tennessee River that could result from tritium production at Watts Bar 1. The average expected tritium concentrations in the river were calculated using the Cornell Mixing Zone Expert System (CORMIX) (Cornell 1996). Table 5-3 presents the potential tritium concentrations from the incident-free irradiation of 1,000 and 3,400 TPBARs at two points: (1) the edge of the near-field and (2) the nearest drinking water intake. "Near-field" in CORMIX is the area surrounding the discharge point of the effluent where initial mixing is taking place. The edge of the near-field typically extends to a few meters away from the point of discharge. Table 5-3 also presents potential tritium concentrations in the unlikely event of 2 TPBAR failures during a given 18-month operating cycle. The results indicate that tritium concentrations would remain well below the 20,000 picocuries per liter limit, and at the drinking water intake the tritium concentration would be below or close to the lower detection limit for tritium which is approximately 300 picocuries per liter. Tritium production is not expected to affect the requirements in the Watts Bar 1 National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit.

**Table 5-2 Annual Radioactive Liquid Effluents at Watts Bar 1**

	No Action (0 TPBARs)	Tritium Production	
		1,000 TPBARs	3,400 TPBARs
Tritium release (Curies)	639	1,539	3,699
Other radionuclides released (Curies)	1.3	1.3	1.3
Total release (Curies)	640.3	1,540.3	3,700.3

Source: TVA 1998e.

**Table 5-3 Tritium Concentration in the Tennessee River from Tritium Production at Watts Bar 1**

	No Action (0 TPBARs) (picocuries per liter)	Incident-Free Tritium Production		2 TPBAR Failures* (picocuries per liter)
		1,000 TPBARs (picocuries per liter)	3,400 TPBARs (picocuries per liter)	
Edge of near-field	280	674	1,620	6,109
At nearest drinking water intake	22	52	126	475

\* See Appendix C, Table C-8 for tritium release.



### 5.2.1.5 Geology and Soils

#### No Action

No impacts on geology and soils are anticipated at the Watts Bar site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

#### Tritium Production

Impacts on geology and soils at the Watts Bar site should not change as a result of tritium production. No construction would occur at the Watts Bar site unless a dry cask ISFSI were constructed. A description of a generic dry cask ISFSI and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

### 5.2.1.6 Ecological Resources

#### No Action

No impacts on land use, air quality, or water quality are anticipated at the Watts Bar site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action. Therefore, no impacts on ecological resources are expected under this alternative.

#### Tritium Production

Operation of Watts Bar 1 during tritium production would not change the terrestrial or aquatic habitat at the site. Thermal and nonradioactive chemical discharges that could affect the ecology at the site would remain the same. No construction would occur at Watts Bar unless a dry cask ISFSI were constructed. A description of a generic dry cask ISFSI and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

Tritium production could increase radiological releases in gaseous emissions and liquid effluents, as presented in Sections 5.2.1.3 and 5.2.1.4. When tritium is inhaled or ingested by an organism, incorporation into bodily fluids is very efficient. However, long-term accumulation in the organism is limited by its rapid elimination by exhalation, excretion in body water, and tritium's short half-life. The biological properties of tritium are discussed in Appendix C.

According to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publication (IAEA 1992), a dose rate of 100 millirem per year to the most exposed human will lead to dose rates to plants and animals of less than 0.1 rad per day. The IAEA concluded that a dose rate of 0.1 rad per day or less for animals and 1 rad per day or less for plants would not affect these populations. Doses to the public and workers from potential releases at Watts Bar 1 are estimated and presented in Section 5.2.1.9. Tritium production could increase the annual dose to the maximally exposed individual from 0.29 millirem per year (No Action) to approximately 0.34 millirem per year (3,400 TPBARs). This cumulative exposure rate is well below the IAEA benchmarks. Therefore, the increase in tritium releases due to tritium production would have no effect on plants and animals at the Watts Bar site. TVA has notified the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of DOE's proposed action at Watts Bar and has provided the States of Tennessee and South Carolina and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service with copies of the *Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor* (CLWR EIS). Copies of the CLWR Final EIS also will be provided to these agencies. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was consulted initially concerning the identification of threatened or endangered species that should be evaluated in this EIS (DOI 1998b). TVA evaluated those species and concluded, that since small increases in tritium releases in gaseous emissions and liquid effluents are the only operational differences for the Watts Bar plant, no threatened or endangered species should be affected.

In its response to the CLWR Draft EIS, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service concluded that adverse effects to listed species potentially occurring at the site from the proposed action are not anticipated (DOI 1998d). TVA and DOE will continue to comply with the requirements of the Endangered Species Act and interact with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, as appropriate. TVA is committed to conducting an environmental monitoring program during tritium production operations. Should the monitoring program indicate any adverse impacts to listed species, consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service would be initiated immediately to address those impacts.

#### **5.2.1.7 Archaeological and Historic Resources**

##### **No Action**

No impacts on land use are anticipated at the Watts Bar site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action. As a result, no impacts on historic and archaeological resources are expected.

##### **Tritium Production**

Since no additional land would be required for tritium production, there would be no impacts on archaeological and historic resources at the Watts Bar site. It should be noted that the Tennessee State Historic Preservation Office reviewed the CLWR Draft EIS for compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act and determined that tritium production at Watts Bar would have no effect upon properties listed or eligible for listing by the National Register of Historic Places (TN DEC 1998b). No construction would occur at Watts Bar unless a dry cask ISFSI were constructed. A description of a generic dry cask ISFSI and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

#### **5.2.1.8 Socioeconomics**

##### **No Action**

Under the No Action Alternative, no socioeconomic impacts are expected in the region of influence of the Watts Bar plant beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

##### **Tritium Production**

As Watts Bar 1 is an operating facility, only the socioeconomic impacts associated with incremental tritium-related changes to plant operations have been considered. The primary costs of operating a CLWR for tritium production could relate to operations and maintenance, supplemental fuel procurement or fuel enrichment, storage of additional spent fuel, replacement power, capital upgrades or replacements, and fees to the utility. Of these costs, only operations and maintenance would have the potential for material socioeconomic impacts within the region of influence. All the other expenses would relate to nonplant functions that generate corporate income, though not local income (e.g., fees from DOE) or procurements (e.g., potential spent fuel storage casks, fuel elements, TPBARs) in other parts of the country. Minor regional costs (e.g., potential maintenance of the spent fuel storage casks) would have no measurable socioeconomic impacts.

Operation of Watts Bar 1 for tritium production should require less than 10 full-time equivalent workers in addition to normal plant operations staff. The addition of 10 full-time equivalent workers to the normal operations staff would increase local socioeconomic factors such as income, housing requirements, and indirect employment by about 1 percent compared to normal plant operations for power production. Regional income would increase by slightly more than \$1 million per year.

The potential increase in spent fuel storage requirements due to tritium production would involve some additional costs, but the overall socioeconomic impacts would be small. These requirements would be met via dry cask storage (see Section 5.2.6) using casks procured from outside the region. Annual costs for additional fuel transfers, spent fuel storage cask maintenance, spent fuel cask pad expansion, and the transfer of spent fuel to shipping casks would be a maximum of \$2 million.

Life extension of Watts Bar 1 as a result of tritium production (see Section 5.2.4) would have substantial regional socioeconomic benefits. An extension of normal plant operations would allow regional earnings to continue at about \$100 million per year.

The transportation impacts of tritium production would be minimal and would be limited to commuter traffic by the personnel assigned to the site. The impact of 50 additional construction workers and associated construction vehicles, assuming the potential construction of a dry cask ISFSI, would be temporary and minor, and the traffic impact of 10 additional tritium production operations workers would not be noticeable. Additional truck traffic during tritium operations would include a total of 16 shipments of TPBARs to and from the plant per year.

#### 5.2.1.9 Public and Occupational Health and Safety

This section describes the impacts of radiological and hazardous chemical releases resulting from normal operation, abnormal conditions, and accidents due to tritium production at Watts Bar 1.

##### 5.2.1.9.1 Normal Operation

#### RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS

During normal operation, there would be incremental radiological releases of tritium to the environment, as well as additional in-plant exposures. The resulting doses and potential health effects on the general public and workers are described below. There would be no immediate construction of new facilities to support tritium production operations at Watts Bar 1; therefore, there would be no associated impacts on the public or workers. Impacts from construction of a dry cask ISFSI are presented in Section 5.2.6.

The annual increase in gaseous radioactive emissions and liquid radioactive effluents from the production of tritium at Watts Bar 1 are presented in Sections 5.2.1.3 and 5.2.1.4, respectively. The radiological impacts of both gaseous and liquid radioactive releases are presented in Table 5-4 for the maximally exposed offsite individual and the general public living within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of Watts Bar 1 in the year 2025. Table 5-5 reflects the radiological impacts on the facility workers. A facility worker is defined as any "monitored" reactor plant employee. Doses to these workers would be kept to minimal levels through programs to ensure worker doses are as low as reasonably achievable. The tables also include the impacts of the No Action Alternative.

Background information on the effects of radiation on human health and safety is included in Appendix C. The method and assumptions used for calculating the impacts on public health and safety at Watts Bar 1 are presented in Appendix C, Section C.3.

**Table 5-4 Annual Radiological Impacts to the Public from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Watts Bar 1**

Tritium Production	Release Media	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual		Population Within 80 kilometers (50 miles) for the Year 2025	
		Dose (millirem)	Latent Fatal Cancer Risk	Annual Dose (person-rem)	Latent Fatal Cancers
No Action <sup>a</sup> (0 TPBARs)	Air	0.036	$1.8 \times 10^{-8}$	0.071	0.000036
	Liquid	0.25	$1.3 \times 10^{-7}$	0.48	0.00024
	Total	0.29	$1.5 \times 10^{-7}$	0.55	0.00028
Incremental dose for 1,000 TPBARs	Air	0.012	$6.0 \times 10^{-9}$	0.15	0.000075
	Liquid	0.0014	$7.0 \times 10^{-10}$	0.19	0.000095
Total dose for 1,000 TPBARs	Air	0.048	$2.4 \times 10^{-8}$	0.22	0.00011
	Liquid	0.25	$1.3 \times 10^{-7}$	0.67	0.00034
	Total	0.30	$1.5 \times 10^{-7}$	0.89	0.00045
Incremental dose for 3,400 TPBARs	Air	0.042	$2.1 \times 10^{-8}$	0.50	0.00025
	Liquid	0.0050	$2.5 \times 10^{-9}$	0.69	0.00035
Total dose for 3,400 TPBARs	Air	0.078	$3.9 \times 10^{-8}$	0.57	0.00029
	Liquid	0.26	$1.3 \times 10^{-7}$	1.2	0.00060
	Total	0.34	$1.7 \times 10^{-7}$	1.8	0.00090

- <sup>a</sup> Doses based on actual measurements during plant operation in 1997 with population exposure adjusted to reflect population growth to the year 2025.

**Table 5-5 Annual Radiological Impacts to Workers from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Watts Bar 1**

Impact	No. Action	1,000 TPBARs	Total With 1,000 TPBARs	3,400 TPBARs	Total With 3,400 TPBARs
Average worker dose (millirem) <sup>a</sup>	104	0.33	104.33	1.1	105.1
Latent fatal cancer risk	$4.2 \times 10^{-5}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-7}$	$4.2 \times 10^{-5}$	$4.5 \times 10^{-7}$	$4.2 \times 10^{-5}$
Total worker dose (person-rem)	112	0.35	112.35	1.2	113.2
Latent fatal cancers	0.045	0.00014	0.045	0.00048	0.045

- <sup>a</sup> Based on 1,073 badged workers in 1997.  
Source: TVA 1998d, TVA 1998e.

### No Action

Under the No Action Alternative, the health and safety risk of members of the public and facility workers at Watts Bar 1, assuming that the operating conditions did not change from those expected, would remain at the levels presented in Section 4.2.1.9. As shown in Tables 5-4 and 5-5:

- The annual dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual would remain at 0.29 millirem per year, with an associated  $1.5 \times 10^{-7}$  risk of a latent cancer fatality per year of operation.
- The collective dose to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of Watts Bar 1 would remain at 0.55 person-rem per year, with an associated 0.00028 latent cancer fatality per year of operation.

- The collective dose to the facility workers on average would remain at 112 person-rem per year, with an associated 0.045 latent cancer fatality per year of operation.

### Tritium Production

In the tritium production mode, the health and safety risk of the public and facility workers would increase due to the estimated releases of tritium in gaseous emissions and liquid effluent. As shown in Tables 5-4 and 5-5, for 3,400 TPBARs in the reactor core:

- The annual dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual would be 0.34 millirem per year, with an associated  $1.7 \times 10^{-7}$  risk of a latent cancer fatality per year of operation. This dose is 1.4 percent of the annual total dose limit of 25 millirem set by regulations in 40 CFR 190.
- The collective dose to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of Watts Bar 1 would be 1.8 person-rem per year, with an associated 0.00090 latent cancer fatality per year of operation.
- The collective dose to the facility workers on average would be 113.2 person-rem per year, with an associated 0.045 latent cancer fatality per year of operation.

In addition to the assumed normal operation release of tritium through permeation, an additional potential release scenario considered in this EIS is the failure of 1 or more TPBARs, such that the inventory of the TPBARs is released to the primary coolant. The occurrence of TPBAR failure is considered to be beyond that associated with normal operating conditions and, as discussed in Section 1.9, such an assumption is extremely conservative. The radiological consequences to the public and workers resulting from the assumption of 2 TPBAR failures in a given core load of 3,400 TPBARs at Watts Bar 1 are presented in Tables 5-6 and 5-7. Releases, doses, and cancer risks associated with 1 TPBAR failure can be determined by dividing the values in Tables 5-6 and 5-7 by two.

**Table 5-6 Radiological Impacts to the Public from the Failure of 2 TPBARs at Watts Bar 1**

Release Pathway	Release Quantity (Curies)	Dose to Maximally Exposed Individual (millirem)	Latent Fatal Cancer Risk	Dose to Population Within 80 kilometers (50 miles) (person-rem)	Latent Fatal Cancers
Air	2,315	0.29	$1.5 \times 10^{-7}$	3.4	0.0017
Liquid	20,835	0.033	$1.7 \times 10^{-8}$	4.4	0.0022

**Table 5-7 Radiological Impacts to Workers from the Failure of 2 TPBARs at Watts Bar 1**

Impact Type	Impact Quantity
Average Worker Dose (millirem)*	7.7
Latent Fatal Cancer Risk	$3.1 \times 10^{-6}$
Total Worker Dose (person-rem)	8.2
Latent Fatal Cancers	0.0033

\* Based on 1,073 badged workers in 1997.

Source: TVA 1998d, TVA 1998e.

## HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL IMPACTS

### No Action

No impacts on public and occupational health and safety from exposure to hazardous chemicals are anticipated at Watts Bar beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

### Tritium Production

Tritium production would introduce no additional operations at the plant that would require the use of hazardous chemicals.

### 5.2.1.9.2 Facility Accidents

## RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS

The accident set selected for evaluation of the impacts of the No Action Alternative and tritium production are described in Section 5.1 and discussed in detail in Appendix D, Section D.1. The consequences of the reactor and nonreactor design-basis accidents for the No Action Alternative at the Watts Bar plant (0 TPBARs) and for maximum tritium production (3,400 TPBARs) were estimated using the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-based licensing approach presented in the *Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report* (TVA 1995c). The receptors were an individual at the reactor site exclusion area boundary and an individual at the reactor site low-population zone. The margin of safety for site dose criteria associated with the same accidents and the same receptors are presented in Table 5-8. Data presented for the No Action Alternative were extracted directly from the *Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report*. As indicated in Table 5-8 the irradiation of TPBARs at the Watts Bar plant would result in a very small increase in design-basis accident consequences and thus, a reduction in the consequence margin. The accident consequences would be dominated by the effects of the nuclide releases inherent to the No Action Alternative.

**Table 5-8 Design-Basis Accident Consequence Margin to Site Dose Criteria at Watts Bar 1**

Accident	Tritium Production	Dose Description <sup>a</sup>	Site Dose Criteria (rem) <sup>b</sup>	Individual at Area Exclusion Boundary		Individual at Low Population Zone	
				Dose (rem)	Margin (%) <sup>c</sup>	Dose (rem)	Margin (%) <sup>c</sup>
Reactor design-basis accident	0 TPBARs (No Action) <sup>d</sup>	Thyroid inhalation dose	300	34.1	88.6	11.0	96.3
		Beta + gamma whole body dose	25	3.5	86.1	3.4	86.2
	3,400 TPBARs	Thyroid inhalation dose	300	34.1	88.6	11.0	96.3
		Beta + gamma whole body dose	25	3.5	86.1	3.4	86.2
Nonreactor design-basis accident	0 TPBARs (No Action) <sup>d</sup>	Thyroid inhalation dose	300	0.018	99.99	0.0042	99.999
		Beta + gamma whole body dose	25	0.13	99.5	0.031	99.9
	3,400 TPBARs	Thyroid inhalation dose	300	0.025	99.92	0.0058	99.998
		Beta + gamma whole body dose	25	0.13	99.5	0.031	99.9

<sup>a</sup> Dose is the total dose from the reactor plus the contribution from the TPBARs.

<sup>b</sup> 10 CFR 100.11.

<sup>c</sup> Margin below the site dose criteria.

<sup>d</sup> TVA 1995c.

Table 5-9 presents the incremental risks due to tritium production for the postulated set of design-basis and handling accidents and the total risks from beyond design-basis accidents to the maximally exposed offsite individual, an average individual in the public within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the reactor site, and a noninvolved worker 640 meters (0.4 miles) from the release point. Accident consequences for the same receptors are summarized in Table 5-10. The assessment of dose and the associated cancer risk to the noninvolved worker are not applicable for beyond design-basis accidents. A site emergency would have been declared early in the beyond design-basis accident sequence; all nonessential site personnel would have evacuated the site in accordance with site emergency procedures before any radiological release to the environment. In accordance with emergency action guidelines, evacuation of the public within 16.1 kilometers (10 miles) of the plant would have been initiated.

Table 5-9 Annual Accident Risks at Watts Bar 1

Accident	Tritium Production	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual <sup>a</sup>	Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles) <sup>a</sup>	Noninvolved Worker <sup>a</sup>
<b>Design-Basis Accidents</b>				
Reactor design-basis accident <sup>b</sup>	1,000 TPBARs	$1.4 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-12}$	$1.9 \times 10^{-12}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$4.8 \times 10^{-10}$	$3.8 \times 10^{-12}$	$6.4 \times 10^{-12}$
Nonreactor design-basis accident <sup>b</sup>	1,000 TPBARs	$3.4 \times 10^{-8}$	$4.0 \times 10^{-10}$	$4.2 \times 10^{-10}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$1.1 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.5 \times 10^{-9}$
Sum of design-basis accident risks	1,000 TPBARs	$3.4 \times 10^{-8}$	$4.0 \times 10^{-10}$	$4.2 \times 10^{-10}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$1.1 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.5 \times 10^{-9}$
<b>Handling Accidents</b>				
TPBAR handling accident	1,000 TPBARs	$2.4 \times 10^{-8}$	$2.7 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-9}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$8.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$9.3 \times 10^{-10}$	$3.9 \times 10^{-9}$
Truck cask handling accident	1,000 TPBARs	$1.9 \times 10^{-13}$	$2.1 \times 10^{-15}$	$9.0 \times 10^{-15}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$5.8 \times 10^{-13}$	$6.4 \times 10^{-15}$	$2.7 \times 10^{-14}$
Rail cask handling accident	1,000 TPBARs	$9.7 \times 10^{-14}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-15}$	$4.6 \times 10^{-15}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$2.9 \times 10^{-13}$	$3.2 \times 10^{-15}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-14}$
Sum of handling accident risks	1,000 TPBARs	$2.4 \times 10^{-8}$	$2.7 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-9}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$8.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$9.3 \times 10^{-10}$	$3.9 \times 10^{-9}$
<b>Beyond Design-Basis Accidents (Severe Reactor Accidents)</b>				
Reactor core damage accident with early containment failure	0 TPBARs (No Action)	$6.7 \times 10^{-9}$	$8.8 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$6.7 \times 10^{-9}$	$8.8 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
Reactor core damage accident with containment bypass	0 TPBARs (No Action)	$2.2 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-9}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$2.2 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-9}$	Not applicable
Reactor core damage accident with late containment failure	0 TPBARs (No Action)	$2.4 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-10}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$2.5 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-10}$	Not applicable
Sum of severe reactor accident risks	0 TPBARs (No Action)	$3.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-9}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$3.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-9}$	Not applicable

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality per year.

<sup>b</sup> Design-basis accident risks only reflect the incremental increase in accident risk due to the production of tritium in TPBARs.

Table 5-10 Accident Frequencies and Consequences at Watts Bar 1

Accident	Accident Frequency (per year)	Tritium Production	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual		Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles)		Noninvolved Worker	
			Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>
Design-Basis Accidents								
Reactor design-basis accident <sup>b</sup>	0.0002	1,000 TPBARs	0.0014	$7.0 \times 10^{-7}$	0.000011	$5.5 \times 10^{-9}$	0.000024	$9.6 \times 10^{-9}$
		3,400 TPBARs	0.0047	$2.4 \times 10^{-6}$	0.000038	$1.9 \times 10^{-8}$	0.000081	$3.2 \times 10^{-8}$
Nonreactor design-basis accident <sup>b</sup>	0.01	1,000 TPBARs	0.0067	$3.4 \times 10^{-6}$	0.000079	$4.0 \times 10^{-8}$	0.00010	$4.2 \times 10^{-8}$
		3,400 TPBARs	0.022	0.000011	0.00027	$1.4 \times 10^{-7}$	0.00036	$1.5 \times 10^{-7}$
Handling Accidents								
TPBAR handling accident	0.0017/ 0.0058 <sup>c</sup>	All TPBAR Configurations	0.028	0.000014	0.00031	$1.6 \times 10^{-7}$	0.0017	$6.8 \times 10^{-7}$
Truck cask handling accident	$5.3 \times 10^{-7}$ / $1.6 \times 10^{-6}$ <sup>c</sup>	All TPBAR configurations	0.00072	$3.6 \times 10^{-7}$	$8.0 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.3 \times 10^{-9}$	0.000043	$1.7 \times 10^{-8}$
Rail cask handling accident	$2.7 \times 10^{-7}$ / $8.0 \times 10^{-7}$ <sup>c</sup>	All TPBAR configurations	0.00072	$3.6 \times 10^{-7}$	$8.0 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.3 \times 10^{-9}$	0.000045	$1.8 \times 10^{-8}$
Beyond Design-Basis Accidents (Severe Reactor Accidents)								
Reactor core damage with early containment failure	$6.8 \times 10^{-7}$	0 TPBARs (No Action)	19.7	0.0099	0.25	0.00013	N/A	N/A
		3,400 TPBARs	19.8	0.0099	0.25	0.00013	N/A	N/A
Reactor core damage with containment bypass	$6.9 \times 10^{-6}$	0 TPBARs (No Action)	6.4	0.0032	0.35	0.00018	N/A	N/A
		3,400 TPBARs	6.4	0.0032	0.35	0.00018	N/A	N/A
Reactor core damage with late containment failure	$9.1 \times 10^{-6}$	0 TPBARs (No Action)	0.51	0.00026	0.024	0.000012	N/A	N/A
		3,400 TPBARs	0.53	0.00027	0.025	0.000013	N/A	N/A

N/A = Not applicable.

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality.<sup>b</sup> Design-basis accident consequences only reflect the incremental increase in accident consequences due to the production of tritium in TPBARs.<sup>c</sup> Frequency for 1,000 TPBARs/frequency for 3,400 TPBARs.

Presented in Tables 5-9 and 5-10 are calculations of the risks and consequences of both the No Action Alternative (0 TPBARs) and maximum tritium production (3,400 TPBARs) for severe reactor accidents. Tritium release is governed by the nature of the core melt accident scenarios analyzed; accident risks and consequences are governed by actions taken in accordance with the EPA Plant Protective Action Guidelines (e.g., evacuation of the public, interdiction of the food and water supply, condemnation of farmland and public property) in response to the postulated core melt accident with containment failure or containment bypass.

The severity of the reactor accident dominates the consequences, is the basis for implementation of protective actions, and is independent of the number of TPBARs. The accident risk is the product of the accident probability (i.e., accident frequency) times the accident consequences. In this EIS, risk is expressed as the increased likelihood of a cancer fatality per year for an individual (e.g., the maximally exposed offsite



individual, an average individual in the population within 80 kilometers [50 miles] of the reactor site, or a noninvolved worker). Table 5-9 indicates that the risks associated with tritium production are low. The highest risk to each individual—the maximally exposed offsite individual, one fatality every 9.1 million years ( $1.1 \times 10^{-7}$  per year); an average member of the public, one fatality every 710 million years ( $1.4 \times 10^{-9}$  per year); the exposed population, one fatality every 3.8 thousand years (0.00026 per year); and a noninvolved worker, one fatality every 670 million years ( $1.5 \times 10^{-9}$  per year)—is from the nonreactor design-basis accident.

The nonreactor design-basis accident has the highest consequence of the design-basis and handling accidents because the postulated accident scenario entails an acute release of tritium in oxide form directly to the environment without any mitigation. Review of Table 5-10 indicates that there would be a very small increase of severe reactor accident consequences due to the irradiation of TPBARs at the Watts Bar plant. The accident consequences are dominated by the effects of the radionuclide releases inherent to the No Action Alternative. The secondary impacts of severe reactor accidents are discussed in Section 5.2.13.

## HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS IMPACTS

### No Action

No impacts on public and occupational health and safety from exposure to hazardous chemicals are anticipated at the Watts Bar site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

### Tritium Production

Tritium production would introduce no additional operations at the plant that would require the use of hazardous chemicals.

#### 5.2.1.10 Environmental Justice

As discussed in Appendix G, Executive Order 12898 directs Federal agencies to address disproportionately high and adverse health or environmental effects of alternatives on minority and low-income populations. The Executive Order does not alter prevailing statutory interpretations under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or existing case law. Regulations prepared by the Council on Environmental Quality remain the foundation for the preparation of environmental documentation in compliance with NEPA (40 CFR, 1500 through 1508).

### No Action

Under the No Action Alternative, there would be no impacts on the general population and thus, no disproportionately high and adverse consequences for minority and low-income populations beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

### Tritium Production

Analyses of incident-free operations and accidents show the risk of latent cancer fatalities among the public residing within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the reactor site to be much less than 1. Because tritium production would not have high and adverse consequences for the population at large, no minority or low-income populations would be expected to experience disproportionately high and adverse consequences.

#### **5.2.1.11 Waste Management**

##### **No Action**

Under the No Action Alternative, waste generation at Watts Bar 1 should continue at the levels described in Section 4.2.1.10. Provisions for the management of these wastes would continue unchanged.

##### **Tritium Production**

No additional hazardous waste, nonhazardous solid waste, or sanitary liquid waste should be generated at Watts Bar 1 as a result of tritium production. Management of these wastes would continue as described in Section 4.2.1.10. However, it is expected that an additional 0.43 cubic meters per year (15 cubic feet per year) of low-level radioactive waste would be generated as a result of tritium production (WEC 1999). It would consist of the approximately 140 base plates and other irradiated hardware remaining after the TPBARs were separated from their assemblies to be placed in the 17 × 17 array consolidation baskets at the reactor site.

Similar to the quantities of low-level radioactive waste generated as a result of activities independent of this action, the additional low-level radioactive waste generated as a result of tritium production (with the exception of the base plates and associated hardware) would be shipped to a commercial processor where it would be compacted to a lesser volume and shipped to the Barnwell, South Carolina, low-level radioactive waste disposal facility. The base plates and associated hardware would accumulate until a sufficient amount were on hand to ship directly to Barnwell for disposal. The additional low-level radioactive waste of 0.43 cubic meters (15 cubic feet) represents approximately 0.1 percent of the total low-level radioactive waste currently generated at the site.

For completeness, this EIS also analyzes the management of the additional volume of low-level radioactive waste (0.43 cubic meters [15 cubic feet]) generated as a result of tritium production at DOE-owned facilities at the Savannah River Site. Under this scenario, the additional low-level radioactive wastes could be transported to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina. The facility consists of a series of vaults in E-Area that have been operational since September 1994. The operating capacity of each vault is 30,500 cubic meters of low-level radioactive waste (DOE 1998c, DOE 1999b). Therefore, the addition of low-level radioactive waste from the proposed action at Watts Bar for a 40-year period would be approximately 0.06 percent of the capacity of a single vault.

#### **5.2.1.12 Spent Fuel Management**

Production of tritium at Watts Bar 1 would not increase the generation of spent nuclear fuel if less than approximately 2,000 TPBARs were irradiated in a fuel cycle. For the irradiation of the maximum number of 3,400 TPBARs, up to 140 spent nuclear fuel assemblies could be generated. This represents up to 60 additional spent nuclear fuel assemblies beyond the normal refueling batch of 80 assemblies. For the purposes of this EIS, it is assumed that the additional spent nuclear fuel would be stored on site for the duration of the proposed action. If needed, a dry cask ISFSI would be constructed at the site. Environmental impacts of the construction and operation of a generic dry cask ISFSI are presented in Section 5.2.6.

### **5.2.2 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2**

#### **5.2.2.1 Land Resources**

The land resources analysis addresses land use and visual resources for the region of influence. The region of influence for land use includes land within 3.2 kilometers (2 miles) of the site. The region of influence for

visual resources includes those lands and waters from which the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant is visible (the viewshed).

#### **LAND USE**

##### **No Action**

No land use impacts are anticipated at the Sequoyah site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

##### **Tritium Production**

No additional property would be required and no additional land would be disturbed to prepare for tritium production at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant site. Land use would remain unchanged from its current industrial use. The 212-hectare (525-acre) site contains ample area for construction of a dry cask ISFSI. A description of a generic dry cask ISFSI and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

#### **VISUAL RESOURCES**

##### **No Action**

No visual impacts are anticipated at the Sequoyah site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

##### **Tritium Production**

There would be no change in the visual character of the Sequoyah site as a result of tritium production. The major visual elements of the plant already exist, including the cooling towers and the transmission lines. As described in Section 4.2.2.1, views of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant from passing river traffic on the Tennessee River are partially screened by the wooded area east of the plant (TVA 1974a).

#### **5.2.2.2 Noise**

##### **No Action**

No noise impacts are anticipated at the Sequoyah site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

##### **Tritium Production**

Noise levels should not change as a result of tritium production at the Sequoyah site. No construction would occur at the Sequoyah site, unless a dry cask ISFSI were constructed. A description of a generic dry cask ISFSI and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

### 5.2.2.3 Air Quality

#### NONRADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EMISSIONS

##### No Action

No air quality impacts are anticipated at the Sequoyah site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action (see Section 4.2.2.3, Table 4-13).

##### Tritium Production

Air quality should not change as a result of the production of tritium at the Sequoyah site. No construction would occur at the Sequoyah site unless a dry cask ISFSI were constructed. A description of a generic dry cask ISFSI and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

#### RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EMISSIONS

##### No Action

Under the No Action Alternative, the radioactive gaseous emissions at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 should continue at the levels described in Section 4.2.2.3, Table 4-14, assuming that no significant operational deviations would occur.

##### Tritium Production

A design objective of the TPBARs is to retain as much tritium as possible within the TPBAR. The performance of the tritium "getter" is such that there is virtually no tritium available in a form that could permeate through the TPBAR cladding. However, for the purposes of this EIS it was conservatively assumed that an average of 1 Curie of tritium per TPBAR per year could permeate to the reactor coolant (PNNL 1997b, PNNL 1999). It also was assumed that 10 percent of this tritium could be released to the environment as gaseous emission. Because of this assumption the radioactive gaseous emissions from Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 would increase. Table 5-11 shows the annual radioactive gaseous emissions during tritium production at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 with 0, 1,000, and 3,400 TPBARs. The method and assumptions used for the calculations are included in Appendix C, Section C.3.4. Radiological exposures of the public and workers from radioactive emissions are presented in Section 5.2.2.9. The impacts on plants and animals are described in Section 5.2.2.6.

**Table 5-11 Annual Radioactive Gaseous Emissions at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2**

	No Action (0 TPBARs)	Tritium Production	
		1,000 TPBARs	3,400 TPBARs
Tritium release (Curies)	25	125	365
Other radioactive release (Curies)	120*	120	120
Total release (Curies)	145	245	485

\* The isotopic distribution of this release is presented in Appendix C, Table C-10.

Source: TVA 1998a.

#### 5.2.2.4 Water Resources

##### SURFACE WATER

###### No Action

No surface water impacts are anticipated at the Sequoyah site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

###### Tritium Production

Impacts on surface water from nonradiological discharges at the Sequoyah site should not change as a result of tritium production. No construction would occur at the Sequoyah site unless a dry cask ISFSI were constructed. A description of a generic dry cask ISFSI and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

##### GROUNDWATER

###### No Action

No groundwater impacts are anticipated at Sequoyah beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

###### Tritium Production

Impacts on groundwater at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 should not change as a result of tritium production. No construction would occur at the Sequoyah site unless a dry cask ISFSI were constructed. A description of a generic dry cask ISFSI and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

##### RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT

###### No Action

Under the No Action Alternative, the liquid radioactive effluent at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 should continue at the levels described in Section 4.2.2.4, Table 4-16, assuming that no significant operational deviations would occur.

###### Tritium Production

Based on the assumption that, on average, 1 Curie of tritium per TPBAR per year could permeate to the reactor coolant and 90 percent of this tritium could be released as liquid effluent, radioactive liquid effluents from Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 would increase. Table 5-12 shows the increase in tritium release in liquid effluent during tritium production at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 with 0, 1,000, and 3,400 TPBARs. The method and assumptions used for the calculations are included in Appendix C, Section C.3. Radiological exposures of the public and workers from radioactive emissions are presented in Section 5.2.2.9. The impacts on plants and animals are described in Section 5.2.2.6.

In accordance with the Safe Drinking Water Act requirements, promulgated by the EPA in 40 CFR, 100-149, a tritium concentration of 20,000 picocuries per liter has been established as a limit for drinking water. In view of this regulatory limit, an analysis was performed to estimate tritium concentrations in the Tennessee River that could result from tritium production at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2. The average expected tritium concentrations in the river were calculated using CORMIX (Cornell 1996). Table 5-13 presents the potential

tritium concentrations from the incident-free irradiation of 1,000 and 3,400 TPBARs at two points: (1) the edge of the near-field, and (2) the nearest drinking water intake. "Near-field" in CORMIX is the area surrounding the discharge point of the effluent where initial mixing is taking place. The edge of the near-field typically extends to a few meters away from the point of discharge. Table 5-13 also presents potential tritium concentrations in the unlikely event of 2 TPBAR failures during a given 18-month operating cycle. The results indicate that tritium concentrations would remain well below the 20,000 picocuries per liter limit, and at the drinking water intake the tritium concentration would be below or close to the lower detection limit for tritium which is approximately 300 picocuries per liter. Tritium production is not expected to affect the requirements in the Sequoyah NPDES Permit.

**Table 5-12 Annual Radioactive Liquid Effluent at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2**

	No Action (0 TPBARs)	Tritium Production	
		1,000 TPBARs	3,400 TPBARs
Tritium release (Curies)	714	1,614	3,774
Other radioactive release (Curies)	1.15	1.15	1.15
Total release (Curies)	715.2	1,615.2	3,775.2

Source: TVA 1998e, TVA 1999.

**Table 5-13 Tritium Concentration in the Tennessee River from Tritium Production at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2**

	No Action (0 TPBARs) (picocuries per liter)	Incident-Free Tritium Production <sup>a</sup>		2 TPBAR Failures <sup>b</sup> (picocuries per liter)
		1,000 TPBARs (picocuries per liter)	3,400 TPBARs (picocuries per liter)	
Edge of near-field	93	150	286	879
At nearest drinking water intake	63	102	195	600

<sup>a</sup> Concentrations include the effect of one nontritium-producing unit.

<sup>b</sup> See Appendix C, Table C-8 for tritium release.

### 5.2.2.5 Geology and Soils

#### No Action

No impacts on geology and soils are anticipated at the Sequoyah site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

#### Tritium Production

Impacts on geology and soils at the Sequoyah site should not change as a result of tritium production. No construction would occur at the Sequoyah site unless a dry cask ISFSI were constructed. A description of a generic dry cask ISFSI and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

### 5.2.2.6 Ecological Resources

#### No Action

No impacts on land use, air quality, or water quality are anticipated at the Sequoyah site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action. Therefore, no impacts on ecological resources are expected under this alternative.

#### Tritium Production

Operation of Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 in a tritium production mode would not involve any physical changes to the terrestrial or aquatic habitat at the site. Thermal and nonradioactive chemical discharges that could affect the ecology at the site would remain the same. No construction would occur at the Sequoyah site unless a dry cask ISFSI were constructed. A description of a generic dry cask ISFSI and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

Tritium production could increase the release of tritium in gaseous emissions and liquid effluents, as presented in Sections 5.2.2.3 and 5.2.2.4. When tritium is inhaled or ingested by an organism, incorporation into bodily fluids is very efficient. However, long-term accumulation in the organism is limited by tritium's rapid elimination by exhalation, excretion in body water, and its short half-life. The biological properties of tritium are discussed in Appendix C.

According to an IAEA publication (IAEA 1992), a dose rate of 100 millirem per year to the maximally exposed human will lead to dose rates to plants and animals of less than 0.1 rad per day. The IAEA concluded that a dose rate of 0.1 rad per day or less for animals and 1 rad per day or less for plants would not affect these populations. Doses to the public and workers from potential releases at Sequoyah 1 have been estimated and are presented in Section 5.2.2.9. Tritium production could increase the annual dose to the maximally exposed individual of the public from 0.053 millirem per year (No Action) to approximately 0.11 millirem per year (3,400 TPBARs). This cumulative exposure rate is below the IAEA's benchmarks. Therefore, the increase in tritium releases due to tritium production would have no effect on plants and animals at the Sequoyah site. TVA has notified the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of DOE's proposed action at Sequoyah and has provided the States of Tennessee and South Carolina and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service with copies of the CLWR Draft EIS. Copies of the CLWR Final EIS also will be provided to these agencies. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was consulted concerning the identification of threatened or endangered species that should be evaluated in this EIS (DOI 1998b). TVA evaluated those species and concluded that, since small increases in tritium releases in gaseous emissions and liquid effluents are the only operational differences for the Sequoyah plant, no threatened or endangered species should be affected.

In its response to the CLWR Draft EIS, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service concluded that adverse effects to listed species potentially occurring at the site from the proposed action are not anticipated (DOI 1998d). TVA and DOE will continue to comply with the requirements of the Endangered Species Act and interact with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service as appropriate. TVA is committed to conducting an environmental monitoring program during tritium production operations. Should the monitoring program indicate any adverse impacts to listed species, consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service would be initiated immediately to address those impacts.

### **5.2.2.7 Archaeological and Historic Resources**

#### **No Action**

No impacts on land use are anticipated at the Sequoyah site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action. As a result, no impacts on historic and archaeological resources are expected.

#### **Tritium Production**

Since no additional land would be required for tritium production, there would be no impacts on archaeological and historic resources at the Sequoyah site. It should be noted that the Tennessee State Historic Preservation Office reviewed the CLWR Draft EIS for compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act and determined that tritium production at Sequoyah would have no effect upon properties listed or eligible for listing by the National Register of Historic Places (TN DEC 1998b). No construction would occur at the Sequoyah site unless a dry cask ISFSI were constructed. A description of a generic dry cask ISFSI and its impacts is presented in Section 5.2.6.

### **5.2.2.8 Socioeconomics**

#### **No Action**

Under the No Action Alternative, no adverse socioeconomic impacts are expected in the region of influence of the Sequoyah plant beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

#### **Tritium Production**

As Sequoyah 1 and 2 are operating facilities, only the socioeconomic impacts associated with incremental tritium-related changes to plant operations have been considered. The primary costs to operate a CLWR for tritium production could relate to operations and maintenance, supplemental fuel procurement or fuel enrichment, storage of additional spent fuel, replacement power, capital upgrades or replacements, and fees to the utility. Of these costs, only operations and maintenance would have the potential for material socioeconomic impacts within the region of influence. All the other expenses would relate to nonplant functions that generate corporate income, though not local income (e.g., fees from DOE) or procurements (e.g., potential spent fuel storage casks, fuel elements, TPBARs) in other parts of the country. Small regional costs (e.g., potential maintenance of the spent fuel storage casks) would have no measurable socioeconomic impacts.

Operation of Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 for tritium production should require less than 10 full-time equivalent workers per unit in addition to normal plant operations staff. The addition of 10 full-time equivalent workers to a normal operations staff would increase local socioeconomic factors such as income, housing requirements, and indirect employment by about 1 percent compared to normal plant operations for power production. Regional income would increase by slightly more than \$1 million per year.

The potential increase in spent fuel storage requirements resulting from tritium production would involve some additional costs, but the overall socioeconomic impacts would be small. These requirements would be met via dry cask storage (see Section 5.2.6), using casks procured from outside the region. Annual costs for activities such as additional fuel transfers, spent fuel storage cask maintenance, spent fuel cask pad expansion, and the transfer of spent fuel to shipping casks would be a maximum of \$2 million.



Life extension of Sequoyah 1 and 2 as a result of tritium production (see Section 5.2.4) would have substantial regional socioeconomic benefits. An extension of normal plant operations would allow regional earnings to continue at about \$100 million per year.

The transportation impacts associated with tritium production would be minimal and would be limited to commuter traffic by the personnel assigned to the site. The impact of 50 additional construction workers and associated construction vehicles, assuming potential construction of the dry cask ISFSI, would be temporary and minor. The traffic impact from 10 to 20 additional tritium production operations workers commuting to and from the plant would not be noticeable. Additional truck traffic during tritium operations would include a total of 16 shipments of TPBARs to and from the plant per year.

### 5.2.2.9 Public and Occupational Health and Safety

This section describes the impacts of radiological and hazardous chemical releases resulting from normal operation, abnormal conditions, and accidents due to tritium production at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2.

#### 5.2.2.9.1 Normal Operations

##### RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS

During normal operation, there would be incremental radiological releases of tritium to the environment, as well as additional in-plant exposures. The resulting dose and potential health effects on the general public and workers are described below. There would be no new construction of facilities to support tritium production operations at the Sequoyah plant site; therefore, there would be no associated impacts on the public or workers.

The annual increase in gaseous radioactive emissions and liquid radioactive effluents from the production of tritium at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 are presented in Sections 5.2.2.3 and 5.2.2.4, respectively. The radiological impacts of both gaseous and liquid radioactive releases are presented in Table 5-14 for the maximally exposed offsite individual and the general public living within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 in the year 2025. Table 5-15 reflects the radiological impacts on the facility workers. A facility worker is defined as any "monitored" reactor plant employee. Doses to these workers would be kept to minimal levels through programs to ensure worker doses are as low as reasonably achievable. The tables also include the impacts of the No Action Alternative.

Background information on the effects of radiation on human health and safety is included in Appendix C. The method and assumptions used in calculating the impacts on public health and safety at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 are presented in Appendix C, Section C.3.

**Table 5-14 Annual Radiological Impacts to the Public from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2**

Tritium Production	Release Media	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual		Population Within 80 kilometers (50 miles) for the Year 2025	
		Dose (millirem)	Latent Fatal Cancer Risk	Annual Dose (person-rem)	Latent Fatal Cancers
No Action * (0 TPBARs)	Air	0.031	$1.6 \times 10^{-4}$	0.49	0.00025
	Liquid	0.022	$1.1 \times 10^{-4}$	1.1	0.00055
	Total	0.053	$2.7 \times 10^{-4}$	1.6	0.00080
Incremental dose for 1,000 TPBARs	Air	0.015	$7.5 \times 10^{-5}$	0.16	0.000080
	Liquid	0.0016	$8.0 \times 10^{-10}$	0.41	0.00021

Tritium Production	Release Media	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual		Population Within 80 kilometers (50 miles) for the Year 2025	
		Dose (millirem)	Latent Fatal Cancer Risk	Annual Dose (person-rem)	Latent Fatal Cancers
Total dose for 1,000 TPBARs	Air	0.046	$2.3 \times 10^{-3}$	0.65	0.00033
	Liquid	0.024	$1.2 \times 10^{-3}$	1.5	0.00075
	Total	0.070	$3.5 \times 10^{-3}$	2.2	0.0011
Incremental dose for 3,400 TPBARs	Air	0.052	$2.6 \times 10^{-3}$	0.54	0.00027
	Liquid	0.0054	$2.7 \times 10^{-3}$	1.4	0.00070
Total dose for 3,400 TPBARs	Air	0.083	$4.2 \times 10^{-3}$	1.0	0.00050
	Liquid	0.027	$1.4 \times 10^{-3}$	2.5	0.0013
	Total	0.11	$5.6 \times 10^{-3}$	3.5	0.0018

- Doses based on actual measurements during plant operation in 1997 adjusted to reflect population growth to the year 2025.

**Table 5-15 Annual Radiological Impacts to Workers from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2**

Impact	No Action	1,000 TPBARs	Total With 1,000 TPBARs	3,400 TPBARs	Total With 3,400 TPBARs
Average worker dose (millirem) <sup>a</sup>	90	0.24	90.24	0.82	90.82
Latent fatal cancer risk	$3.6 \times 10^{-5}$	$9.6 \times 10^{-5}$	$3.6 \times 10^{-5}$	$3.3 \times 10^{-7}$	$3.6 \times 10^{-5}$
Total worker dose (person-rem)	132	0.35	132.35	1.2	133.2
Latent fatal cancers	0.053	0.00014	0.053	0.00048	0.053

- Based on 1,470 badged workers per unit for a total of 2,940 badged workers for the site.

Source: NRC 1997b, TVA 1998d.

### No Action

Under the No Action Alternative, the health and safety risk of members of the public and facility workers at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2, assuming that the operating conditions did not change from those expected, would remain at the levels presented in Section 4.2.2.9. As shown in Tables 5-14 and 5-15:

- The annual dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual would remain at 0.053 millirem per year, with an associated  $2.7 \times 10^{-3}$  risk of a latent cancer fatality per year of operation.
- The collective dose to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 would remain at 1.6 person-rem per year, with an associated 0.00080 latent cancer fatality per year of operation.
- The collective dose to the facility workers would remain at 132 person-rem per year, with an associated 0.053 latent cancer fatality per year of operation.

### Tritium Production

In the tritium production mode, the health and safety risk of the public and facility workers would increase due to the estimated releases of tritium in gaseous emissions and liquid effluents. As shown in Tables 5-14 and 5-15 for 3,400 TPBARs in the reactor core:

- The annual dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual would be 0.11 millirem per year, with an associated  $5.6 \times 10^{-8}$  risk of a latent cancer fatality per year of operation. This dose is 0.44 percent of the annual total dose limit of 25 millirem set by regulations in 40 CFR 190.
- The collective dose to the population within 50 miles of Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 would be 3.5 person-rem per year, with an associated 0.0018 latent cancer fatality per year of operation.
- The collective dose to the facility workers would be 133.2 person-rem per year, with an associated 0.053 latent cancer fatality per year of operation.

In addition to the assumed normal operation release of tritium through permeation, an additional potential release scenario considered in this EIS is the failure of 1 or more TPBARs, such that the inventory of the TPBARs is released to the primary coolant. The occurrence of TPBAR failure is considered to be beyond that associated with normal operating conditions and, as discussed in Section 1.9, such an assumption is extremely conservative. The radiological consequences to the public and workers resulting from the assumption of 2 TPBAR failures in a given core load of 3,400 TPBARs at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 are presented in Tables 5-16 and 5-17. Releases, doses, and cancer risks associated with 1 TPBAR failure can be determined by dividing the values in Tables 5-16 and 5-17 by two.

**Table 5-16 Radiological Impacts to the Public from the Failure of 2 TPBARs at Sequoyah 1 or 2**

<i>Release Pathway</i>	<i>Release Quantity (Curies)</i>	<i>Dose to Maximally Exposed Individual (millirem)</i>	<i>Latent Fatal Cancer Risk</i>	<i>Dose to Population Within 80 kilometers (50 miles) (person-rem)</i>	<i>Latent Fatal Cancers</i>
Air	2,315	0.36	$1.8 \times 10^{-7}$	3.7	0.0018
Liquid	20,835	0.037	$1.9 \times 10^{-8}$	9.2	0.0046

**Table 5-17 Radiological Impacts to Workers from the Failure of 2 TPBARs at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2**

<i>Impact Type</i>	<i>Impact Quantity</i>
Average Worker Dose (millirem)*	5.6
Latent Fatal Cancer Risk	$2.2 \times 10^{-6}$
Total Worker Dose (person-rem)	8.2
Latent Fatal Cancers	0.0033

\* Based on 1,470 badged workers per unit.

Source: NRC 1997b, TVA 1998d.

## HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL IMPACTS

### No Action

No impacts on public and occupational health and safety from exposure to hazardous chemicals are anticipated at Sequoyah beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

### Tritium Production

Tritium production would introduce no additional operations at the plant that would require the use of hazardous chemicals.

## 5.2.2.9.2 Facility Accidents

## RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS

The accident set selected for evaluation of the impacts of the No Action Alternative and tritium production are described in Section 5.1 and discussed in detail in Appendix D, Section D.1. The consequences of the reactor and nonreactor design-basis accidents for the No Action Alternative at the Sequoyah plant (0 TPBARs) and for maximum tritium production (3,400 TPBARs) were estimated using the NRC-based deterministic approach presented in the *Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report* (TVA 1996b). The receptors were an individual at the reactor site exclusion area boundary and an individual at the reactor site low-population zone. The margin of safety for site dose criteria associated with the same accidents and the same receptors are presented in Table 5-18. Data presented for the No Action Alternative were extracted directly from the *Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report*. As indicated in Table 5-18, the irradiation of TPBARs at the Sequoyah plant would result in a very small increase in design-basis accident consequences and thus, a reduction in the consequence margin. The accident consequences would be dominated by the effects of the nuclide releases inherent to the No Action Alternative.

Table 5-18 Design-Basis Accident Consequence Margin to Site Dose Criteria at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2

Accident	Tritium Production	Dose Description <sup>a</sup>	Site Dose Criteria (rem) <sup>b</sup>	Individual at Area Exclusion Boundary		Individual at Low Population Zone	
				Dose (rem)	Margin (%) <sup>c</sup>	Dose (rem)	Margin (%) <sup>c</sup>
Reactor design-basis accident	0 TPBARs (No Action) <sup>d</sup>	Thyroid inhalation dose	300	145	51.6	27	91.0
		Beta + gamma whole body dose	25	12.2	51.1	2.9	88.4
	3,400 TPBARs	Thyroid inhalation dose	300	145	51.6	27	91.0
		Beta + gamma whole body dose	25	12.2	51.1	2.9	88.4
Nonreactor design-basis accident	0 TPBARs (No Action) <sup>d</sup>	Thyroid inhalation dose	300	0.000013	100	$1.1 \times 10^{-6}$	100
		Beta + gamma whole body dose	25	0.0017	99.993	0.00014	99.999
	3,400 TPBARs	Thyroid inhalation dose	300	0.019	99.994	0.0022	99.999
		Beta + gamma whole body dose	25	0.0028	99.989	0.00027	99.998

<sup>a</sup> Dose is the total dose from the reactor plus the contribution from the TPBARs.

<sup>b</sup> 10 CFR 100.11.

<sup>c</sup> Margin below the site dose criteria.

<sup>d</sup> TVA 1996b.

Table 5-19 presents the incremental risks due to tritium production for the postulated set of design-basis and handling accidents and the total risks from beyond design-basis accidents to the maximally exposed offsite individual, an average individual in the public within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the reactor site, and a noninvolved worker at the site boundary 556 meters (0.35 miles) from the release point. Accident consequences for the same receptors are summarized in Table 5-20. The assessment of dose and the associated cancer risk to the noninvolved worker are not applicable for beyond design-basis accidents. A site emergency would have been declared early in the beyond design-basis accident sequence; all nonessential site personnel would have evacuated the site in accordance with site emergency procedures before any radiological release to the environment. In accordance with emergency action guidelines, evacuation of the public within 16.1 kilometers (10 miles) of the plant would have been initiated.

Table 5-19 Annual Accident Risks at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2

<i>Accident</i>	<i>Tritium Production</i>	<i>Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual <sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles) <sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Noninvolved Worker <sup>a</sup></i>
<b>Design-Basis Accidents</b>				
Reactor design-basis accident <sup>b</sup>	1,000 TPBARs	$1.9 \times 10^{-10}$	$2.2 \times 10^{-12}$	$6.4 \times 10^{-13}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$6.6 \times 10^{-10}$	$7.6 \times 10^{-12}$	$2.2 \times 10^{-12}$
Nonreactor design-basis accident <sup>b</sup>	1,000 TPBARs	$7.9 \times 10^{-9}$	$6.1 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-10}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$2.7 \times 10^{-8}$	$2.1 \times 10^{-9}$	$4.5 \times 10^{-10}$
Sum of design-basis accident risks	1,000 TPBARs	$8.1 \times 10^{-9}$	$6.1 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-10}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$2.8 \times 10^{-8}$	$2.1 \times 10^{-9}$	$4.5 \times 10^{-10}$
<b>Handling Accidents</b>				
TPBAR handling accident	1,000 TPBARs	$3.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$2.6 \times 10^{-10}$	$9.5 \times 10^{-10}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$1.0 \times 10^{-7}$	$8.7 \times 10^{-10}$	$3.2 \times 10^{-9}$
Truck cask handling accident	1,000 TPBARs	$2.5 \times 10^{-13}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-15}$	$7.4 \times 10^{-15}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$7.5 \times 10^{-13}$	$6.1 \times 10^{-15}$	$2.2 \times 10^{-14}$
Rail cask handling accident	1,000 TPBARs	$1.3 \times 10^{-13}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-15}$	$3.8 \times 10^{-15}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$3.8 \times 10^{-13}$	$3.0 \times 10^{-15}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-14}$
Sum of handling risks	1,000 TPBARs	$3.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$2.6 \times 10^{-10}$	$9.5 \times 10^{-10}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$1.0 \times 10^{-7}$	$8.7 \times 10^{-10}$	$3.2 \times 10^{-9}$
<b>Beyond Design-Basis Accidents (Severe Reactor Accidents)</b>				
Reactor core damage accident with early containment failure	0 TPBARs (No Action)	$1.7 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-10}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$1.7 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-10}$	Not applicable
Reactor core damage accident with containment bypass	0 TPBARs (No Action)	$2.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-9}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$2.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.5 \times 10^{-9}$	Not applicable
Reactor core damage accident with late containment failure	0 TPBARs (No Action)	$3.9 \times 10^{-9}$	$2.4 \times 10^{-10}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$4.0 \times 10^{-9}$	$2.5 \times 10^{-10}$	Not applicable
Sum of severe reactor accident risks	0 TPBARs (No Action)	$4.2 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-9}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$4.2 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.5 \times 10^{-9}$	Not applicable

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality per year.<sup>b</sup> Design-basis accident risks only reflect the incremental increase in accident risk due to the production of tritium in TPBARs.

Table 5-20 Accident Frequencies and Consequences at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2

Accident	Accident Frequency (per year)	Tritium Production	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual		Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles)		Noninvolved Worker	
			Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>
Design-Basis Accidents								
Reactor design-basis accident <sup>b</sup>	0.0002	1,000 TPBARs	0.0019	$9.5 \times 10^{-7}$	0.000022	$1.1 \times 10^{-6}$	$8.1 \times 10^{-6}$	$3.2 \times 10^{-6}$
		3,400 TPBARs	0.0065	$3.3 \times 10^{-6}$	0.000075	$3.8 \times 10^{-6}$	0.000028	$1.1 \times 10^{-6}$
Nonreactor design-basis accident <sup>b</sup>	0.01	1,000 TPBARs	0.0016	$7.9 \times 10^{-7}$	0.00012	$6.1 \times 10^{-6}$	0.000032	$1.3 \times 10^{-6}$
		3,400 TPBARs	0.0054	$2.7 \times 10^{-6}$	0.00042	$2.1 \times 10^{-7}$	0.00011	$4.5 \times 10^{-6}$
Handling Accidents								
TPBAR handling accident	0.0017/ 0.0058 <sup>c</sup>	All TPBAR Configurations	0.036	0.000018	0.00029	$1.5 \times 10^{-7}$	0.0014	$5.6 \times 10^{-7}$
Truck cask handling accident	$5.3 \times 10^{-7}$ / $1.6 \times 10^{-6}$ <sup>c</sup>	All TPBAR Configurations	0.00093	$4.7 \times 10^{-7}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-6}$	$3.8 \times 10^{-9}$	0.000036	$1.4 \times 10^{-8}$
Rail cask handling accident	$2.7 \times 10^{-7}$ / $6.0 \times 10^{-7}$ <sup>c</sup>	All TPBAR Configurations	0.00093	$4.7 \times 10^{-7}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-6}$	$3.8 \times 10^{-9}$	0.000036	$1.4 \times 10^{-8}$
Beyond Design-Basis Accidents (Severe Reactor Accidents)								
Reactor core damage with early containment failure	$6.8 \times 10^{-7}$	0 TPBARs (No Action)	25.0 <sup>d</sup>	0.025 <sup>d</sup>	0.48	0.00024	N/A	N/A
		3,400 TPBARs	25.1 <sup>d</sup>	0.025 <sup>d</sup>	0.48	0.00024	N/A	N/A
Reactor core damage with containment bypass	$4.0 \times 10^{-6}$	0 TPBARs (No Action)	10.4	0.0052	0.72	0.00036	N/A	N/A
		3,400 TPBARs	10.4	0.0052	0.73	0.00037	N/A	N/A
Reactor core damage with late containment failure	$9.2 \times 10^{-6}$	0 TPBARs (No Action)	0.84	0.00042	0.051	0.000026	N/A	N/A
		3,400 TPBARs	0.87	0.00044	0.053	0.000027	N/A	N/A

N/A = Not applicable.

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality.<sup>b</sup> Design-basis accident consequences only reflect the incremental increase in accident consequences due to the production of tritium in TPBARs.<sup>c</sup> Frequency for 1,000 TPBARs/frequency for 3,400 TPBARs.<sup>d</sup> Dose greater than 20 rem. Cancer fatality risk doubled.

Presented in Tables 5-19 and 5-20 are calculations of both risks and consequences of the No Action Alternative (0 TPBARs) and maximum tritium production (3,400 TPBARs) for severe reactor accidents. The tritium release is governed by the nature of the core melt accident scenarios analyzed; the accident risks and consequences are governed by actions taken in accordance with the EPA Protective Action Guidelines (e.g., evacuation of the public, interdiction of the food and water supply, condemnation of farmland and public property) in response to the postulated core melt accident with containment failure or containment bypass.

The severity of the reactor accident dominates the consequences, is the basis for implementation of protective actions, and is independent of the number of TPBARs. The accident risk is the product of the accident probability (i.e., accident frequency) times the accident consequences. In this EIS, risk is expressed as the

increased likelihood of cancer fatality per year for an individual (i.e., the maximally exposed offsite individual, an average individual in the population within 80 kilometers [50 miles] of the reactor site, or a noninvolved worker). Table 5-19 indicates that the risks associated with tritium production are low. The highest risk to each individual—the maximally exposed offsite individual, one fatality every 37 million years ( $2.7 \times 10^{-8}$  per year); an average member of the public, one fatality every 480 million years ( $2.1 \times 10^{-9}$  per year); the exposed population, one fatality every 1.9 thousand years (0.00052 per year); and a noninvolved worker, one fatality every 2.2 billion years ( $4.5 \times 10^{-10}$  per year)—is from the nonreactor design-basis accident.

The nonreactor design-basis accident has the highest consequence of the design-basis and handling accidents because the postulated accident scenario entails an acute release of tritium, in oxide form, directly to the environment without any mitigation. Review of Table 5-20 indicates that there would be a very small increase of severe reactor accident consequences due to the irradiation of TPBARs at the Sequoyah plant. The accident consequences are dominated by the effects of the radionuclide releases inherent to the No Action Alternative. The secondary impacts of severe reactor accidents are presented in Section 5.2.13.

## HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL IMPACTS

### No Action

No impacts on public and occupational health and safety from exposure to hazardous chemicals are anticipated at the Sequoyah site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

### Tritium Production

Tritium production would introduce no additional operations at the plant that would require the use of hazardous chemicals.

#### 5.2.2.10 Environmental Justice

As discussed in Appendix G, Executive Order 12898 directs Federal agencies to address disproportionately high and adverse health or environmental effects of alternatives on minority and low-income populations. The Executive Order does not alter prevailing statutory interpretations under NEPA or existing case law. Regulations prepared by the Council on Environmental Quality remain the foundation for the preparation of environmental documentation in compliance with NEPA (40 CFR, 1500 through 1508). As discussed previously, the alternatives would have no adverse or beneficial environmental effects on the general population, nor would they have any effects on any particular group within the general population, including minority and low-income populations.

### No Action

Under the No Action Alternative, there would be no impacts on the general population. Therefore, no disproportionately high and adverse consequences for minority and low-income populations are expected beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

### Tritium Production

Analyses of incident-free operations and accidents show the risk of latent cancer fatalities among the public residing within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the reactor site to be much less than 1. Because tritium production would not have high and adverse consequences for the population at large, no minority or low-income populations would be expected to experience disproportionately high and adverse consequences.

### **5.2.2.11 Waste Management**

#### **No Action**

Under the No Action Alternative, waste generation at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 should continue at the levels described in Section 4.2.2.10. Provisions for the management of these wastes would continue unchanged.

#### **Tritium Production**

No additional hazardous waste, nonhazardous solid waste, or sanitary liquid waste should be generated at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 as a result of tritium production. Management of these wastes would continue as described in Section 4.2.2.10. However, it is expected that an additional 0.43 cubic meters per year (15 cubic feet per year) of low-level radioactive waste would be generated as a result of tritium production (WEC 1999). It would consist of the approximately 140 base plates and other irradiated hardware remaining after the TPBARs were separated from their assemblies to be placed in the 17 × 17 array consolidation baskets at the reactor site.

Similar to the quantities of low-level radioactive waste generated as a result of activities independent of this action, the additional low-level radioactive waste generated as a result of tritium production (with the exception of the base plates and associated hardware) would be shipped to a commercial processor where it would be compacted to a lesser volume and shipped to the Barnwell, South Carolina, low-level radioactive waste disposal facility. The base plates and associated hardware would accumulate until a sufficient amount were on hand to ship directly to Barnwell for disposal. The additional low-level radioactive waste of 0.43 cubic meters (15 cubic feet) represents less than 0.1 percent of the total low-level radioactive waste generated currently at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2.

For completeness, this EIS also analyzes the management of the additional volume of low-level radioactive waste (0.43 cubic meters [15 cubic feet]) generated as a result of tritium production at DOE-owned facilities at the Savannah River Site. Under this scenario, the additional low-level radioactive waste could be transported to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina. The facility consists of a series of vaults in E-Area that have been operational since September 1994. The operating capacity of each vault is 30,500 cubic meters of low-level radioactive waste (DOE 1998c, DOE 1999b). Therefore, the addition of low-level radioactive waste from the proposed action at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 for a 40-year period would be approximately 0.06 percent of the capacity of a single vault.

### **5.2.2.12 Spent Fuel Management**

Production of tritium at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 would not increase the generation of spent nuclear fuel if less than approximately 2,000 TPBARs were irradiated in a fuel cycle. For the irradiation of the maximum number of 3,400 TPBARs, up to 140 spent nuclear fuel assemblies could be generated. This represents up to 60 additional spent nuclear fuel assemblies beyond the normal refueling batch of 80 assemblies. For the purposes of this EIS it is assumed that the additional spent nuclear fuel would be stored on site for the duration of the proposed action. If needed, a dry cask ISFSI would be constructed at the site. Environmental impacts of the construction and operation of a generic dry cask ISFSI are presented in Section 5.2.6.



### **5.2.3 Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2**

#### **5.2.3.1 Land Resources**

The land resources analysis addresses land use and visual resources for the region of influence. The region of influence for land use includes land within 3.2 kilometers (2 miles) of the site. The region of influence for visual resources includes those lands from which the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant is visible (the viewshed). The land use impacts of tritium production are compared with the existing land use patterns. Visual resource impacts are associated with changes in the existing landscape character that could result from tritium production.

#### **LAND USE**

##### **No Action**

No land use impacts are anticipated at the Bellefonte site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

##### **Tritium Production**

The land use analysis considers the magnitude and extent of potential impacts on current land use patterns and densities that are attributable to the alternative. The amount of land disturbed during construction and used during operation is identified, as are the potential changes in land use and conflicts with land use policies, plans, and controls.

##### *Construction*

The 607-hectare (1,500-acre) site contains ample existing construction laydown areas that are conveniently located near large warehouse storage buildings and yard storage areas. Land disturbance would be limited to that required for new support buildings. Completing construction of Bellefonte 1 alone or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 would require land already disturbed during previous construction at the site. There would be no impacts on undisturbed grassland and forest land. Completing construction should not impact the ability to continue hay production on areas of the site. The total land disturbed is discussed in Section 4.2.3.1. Land use would remain unchanged from its current industrial and agricultural uses.

An electric power distribution system exists to adequately support the power demands of plant equipment, construction shops, and employee facilities. No additional land area would be required for furnishing utilities to the site. Utility distribution systems are in place and occupy sufficient land area to accommodate any required additions or enhancements.

Based on the evaluation of land use impacts for the Bellefonte Conversion Project (for completion of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2) there would be a small increase in the amount of land used for residential development and mobile homes to accommodate construction workers. The overall impact, however, should be very small (TVA 1997f).

##### *Operation*

Operation of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 would require no additional undisturbed land on the site other than that described for construction.

Based on the evaluation of the land use impacts for the Bellefonte Conversion Project (TVA 1997f) and the projected operations employment at Bellefonte 1 or both units, the anticipated population increase in Jackson County from operation of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant would result in an increased demand for new housing units, as discussed in Section 5.2.3.8. According to the latest population estimates by the U.S. Census Bureau, Jackson County has averaged an increase of about 391 persons per year since the 1990 Census of Population was taken. The population increase resulting from completion and operation of the Bellefonte plant would noticeably exceed normal growth. Therefore, an increased demand for housing would increase the amount of land needed for residential development, but this would not be an important impact in the context of the county land base.

## **VISUAL RESOURCES**

The visual resources analysis addresses the magnitude and extent of potential changes in the visual environment that could result from tritium production. Visual resources impact assessments are conducted using the Bureau of Land Management Visual Resource Management method (DOI 1986a). The existing landscape at a site is assigned a classification ranging from 1 to 4. The existing landscape at the Bellefonte site would be Class 3 or 4. Class 3 includes areas in which there have been moderate changes in the landscape that could attract attention, but do not dominate the view of the casual observer. Class 4 includes areas in which major modifications to the character of the landscape have occurred. These changes may be dominant features of the view and the major focus of viewer attention (DOI 1986b).

Class designations are derived from an inventory of the scenic quality, sensitivity levels, and distance zones of a particular area. The elements of scenic quality are landform, vegetation, water, color, adjacent scenery, scarcity, and cultural modification. Scenic value is determined by the variety and harmonious composition of the elements of scenic quality. Sensitivity levels are determined by user volumes and user attention. Distance zones concern the relative visibility from travel routes or observation points. They include the following categories: foreground—middleground, less than 4.8 to 8 kilometers (3 to 5 miles) away; background, 4.8 to 24 kilometers (3 to 15 miles); and seldom seen, 24 kilometers (15 miles) to infinity and areas blocked or screened from view. The analysis objectives include identification of the degree of contrast between the proposed action and the existing landscape, the location and sensitivity levels of viewpoints accessible to the public, and the visibility of the proposed action from the viewpoints. The distance from a viewpoint to the affected area and the atmospheric conditions also are taken into consideration because distance and haze can diminish the degree of contrast and visibility (DOI 1986a, DOI 1986b, DOE 1996c).

### **No Action**

No visual impacts are anticipated at the Bellefonte site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

### **Tritium Production**

#### *Construction*

Little physical change would be required to the parts of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant that are visible to the public. The major visual elements of the plant, the two hyperbolic cooling towers and the transmission lines, already exist. As discussed in Section 4.2.3.1, views of Bellefonte from passing river traffic on the Tennessee River are partially screened by the ridge lines close to the shoreline. The plant is overlooked by a few residences on Sand Mountain on the east side of the river. Distant glimpses of the plant site can be had from the coves and hollows along the Sand Mountain rim, from State Roads 35 and 40 as they traverse Sand Mountain, and from Comer Bridge, which crosses Guntersville Reservoir (TVA 1997f). The plant also can be seen from various locations along U.S. Highway 72 to the northwest and from residences on the north shore

of Town Creek Embayment. Completion of construction would result in little or no visual change from offsite viewpoints.

### *Operation*

During operation, additional visual impacts would result from the vapor plume associated with the 145-meter (477-foot) cooling towers; one would be operating with Bellefonte 1, and two would be operating with the combination of Bellefonte 1 and 2. The plume would be visible up to 16 kilometers (10 miles) away. The plume would vary with atmospheric conditions, being most visible during cooler months and after the passage of weather fronts. Plumes would be less visible during summer months when hazy conditions persist and morning fog is more common. Since the reactor site represents an existing condition that would be classified as Visual Resource Management Class 4, contrasts created by minor changes at the plant site and the cooling tower plume are considered to be moderate to none; that is, there would be no visual impact when there is no plume (TVA 1974b, TVA 1997f). Vapor plumes would have an aesthetic impact on the towns of Pisgah, Hollywood, and Scottsboro, as well as on traffic along U.S. Highway 72 (TVA 1974b).

### 5.2.3.2 Noise

Sound results from the compression and expansion of air or some other medium when an impulse is transmitted through it. Sound requires a source of energy and a medium for transmitting the sound wave. The propagation of sound is affected by various factors, including meteorology, topography, and barriers. Noise is undesirable sound that interferes or interacts negatively with the human or natural environment. Noise may disrupt normal activities (e.g., hearing, sleep), damage hearing, or diminish the quality of the environment (i.e., cause annoyance).

Sound-level measurements used to evaluate the effects of nonimpulsive sound on humans are compensated for by an A-weighting scale that accounts for the hearing response characteristics (i.e., frequency) of the human ear. Sound levels are expressed in decibels (dB) or, in the case of A-weighted measurements, decibels A-weighted (dBA). The most common measure of environmental noise impact is the day-night average sound level, a 24-hour, A-weighted equivalent sound level with a 10-dBA penalty added to sound levels between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. to account for increased annoyance due to noise during nighttime hours. The EPA has developed noise-level guidelines for different land use classifications that are based on the day-night average and equivalent sound levels. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has established noise impact guidelines for residential areas that are based on day-night average sound levels. Some states and localities have established noise control regulations or zoning ordinances that specify acceptable noise levels by land use category. The State of Alabama has not developed a noise regulation that specifies acceptable numerical community noise levels.

For the purpose of this document, noise impacts are assessed using a day-night average sound level of 65 dBA as the level above which noise impacts would be considered "significant impacts" and an increase of 2 dBA as an indicator of "substantial" increases in noise. This approach is based on the TVA noise analysis for the Bellefonte Conversion Project (TVA 1997f). Short-term noises above a level of about 75 dBA, such as steam releases, could have a "startle" effect on humans and wildlife (TVA 1997f).

The noise analysis conducted by TVA for the conversion project considered the nearest fence line receptor as representative of a future residential land use or other use, as well as the nearest existing residential area (across Town Creek), the nearest ecologically sensitive area (a heron rookery near the confluence of Town Creek and the Tennessee River), and a location on the high bluffs on Sand Mountain across the Tennessee River from the site. Measured sound levels near the boundaries of the site range from a day-night average sound level of 50 dBA to 55 dBA. For the purpose of the analysis, a background day-night average sound level of 50 dBA was used. This level is typical of a low-density residential or rural location (TVA 1997f).

## No Action

No noise impacts are anticipated at the Bellefonte site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

## Tritium Production

### Construction

The location of the Bellefonte facilities relative to the Bellefonte site boundary and sensitive receptors was examined to evaluate the potential for onsite and offsite noise impacts. Noise sources during construction would include materials-handling equipment (e.g., cranes and forklifts), employee vehicles, and truck traffic. Traffic noise associated with construction of these facilities would occur both on site and along offsite local and regional transportation routes used to bring construction materials and workers to the site.

The Bellefonte Conversion Project noise analysis was based on a composite of construction noise. This composite included excavation and structure erection activities, with all activities occurring during daylight hours between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. Noise impacts from these construction activities would depend on the equipment used, the noise levels from individual equipment items, the number of sources, the duration and frequency of operation, the time of day, and other factors. Most of the activities associated with completion of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 would be indoors. Activities occurring outdoors would not be expected to produce the high levels of noise that were analyzed for the Bellefonte Conversion Project. The analysis indicated that the daytime equivalent sound levels would not increase at the two more distant sensitive receptors evaluated, the heron rookery and Sand Mountain. At the fence line receptor and the nearest residential area, the daytime equivalent sound levels would increase less than 1 dBA. Regular sounding of the shift change whistle would be heard at the fence line receptor and at the nearest residence.

Table 5-21 presents a range of noise levels for the major construction equipment expected to be used during construction activities for Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2. In addition, a variety of other noise-producing equipment would be used, including pumps, generators, compressors, pneumatic wrenches, vibrators, saws, hand compactors, concrete mixers, concrete pumps, pavers, and compactors. These items are typically somewhat quieter than the items shown in the table.

**Table 5-21 General Construction Equipment Noise Levels**

Activity	Item	Maximum Noise Level (dBA) at 15 meters (50 feet)
Earthmoving:	Front-end loaders	82-86
	Backhoes	81-84
	Tractors	82-86
	Scrapers, graders	86-91
	Trucks	81-87
	Dozers	81-90
Materials handling:	Concrete trucks	81-87
	Cranes (movable)	80-85
	Cranes (derrick)	82-86
	Fork-lift trucks	82-86
	Delivery trucks	81-87
Impact equipment:	Jack hammers, rock drills	83-99
	Pile drivers	81-96

Source: BBN 1977, TVA 1998a.

Noise from traffic associated with construction of these facilities should result in a less than 1 dBA increase in day-night average sound level from traffic along U.S. Highway 72 near the Bellefonte plant entrance. This noise level should not result in any increased annoyance of the public. Peak-hour construction traffic noise at the beginning and end of the workday would result in about a 2 dBA increase in traffic noise levels (1-hour equivalent sound level) along U.S. Highway 72 from about 65 dBA at 30 meters (100 feet) to about 67 dBA.

Traffic noise levels along the access road, which has been fairly quiet since construction of Bellefonte was deferred, would increase to a day-night average sound level of about 55 dBA during construction. Much of the traffic during the construction period would be at the beginning and end of the work day. Peak-hour traffic noise would increase by about 12 dBA along the access road. Traffic noise during the peak hours should be noticeable at the nearby residences.

### *Operation*

The location of Bellefonte 1 and 2 relative to the site boundary and sensitive receptors was examined to evaluate the potential for onsite and offsite noise impacts. Noise sources during operation would include cooling towers; heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems; vents; motors; pumps; transformers; switchyard equipment; generators; material-handling equipment; audible paging systems; sirens; employee vehicles; and truck traffic. Traffic noise associated with operation of these facilities would occur both on site and along offsite local and regional transportation routes used to bring materials and workers to the site. Operational noise sources would be primarily in the center of the site near the switchyard, turbine building, and cooling towers. Modeling of routine onsite noise sources associated with the operation of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 indicates that day-night average sound levels would increase to about 51 dBA at the site boundary receptor and at the nearest residence receptor. Day-night average sound levels at the other two receptors considered, the heron rookery and Sand Mountain, would not change from the 50-dBA background level. The routine noise should have no impact (less than 2 dBA) on the nearby residential areas. Other noise sources such as the infrequent actuation of the modulating atmospheric dump valves would result in higher noise levels at the site boundary and could disturb wildlife on the site. Noise from traffic associated with the operation of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 should result in an increase of less than 4 dBA in the day-night average sound level along U.S. Highway 72, and could be noticeable at nearby residences. Peak-hour operations traffic noise at shift changes would result in an increase in traffic noise levels along U.S. Highway 72 from about 65 dBA at 30 meters (100 feet) to about 67 dBA.

Traffic noise levels along the access road would increase to a day-night average sound level of about 57 dBA during operation. Peak-hour traffic would result in an increase in traffic noise levels along the access road from about 51 dBA at 30 meters (100 feet) to about 58 dBA. This increase in noise levels could be noticeable at nearby residences.

Regular testing of the emergency warning siren system would result in outdoor noise levels of about 60 dBC (C-weighted) in areas within a radius of about 16 kilometers (10 miles) of the site. At other nuclear plants TVA typically tests siren systems on a given day of the month at noon (TVA 1998a).

Noise exposure for workers is regulated under Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations (29 CFR 1910.95). Where the 8-hour noise exposure guidelines would be exceeded, appropriate administrative and engineering controls would be implemented to control noise exposure, and a hearing protection program would be implemented.

### **5.2.3.3 Air Quality**

#### **NONRADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EMISSIONS**

Air pollution refers to any substance in the air that could harm human or animal populations, vegetation, or structures, or that unreasonably interferes with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property. For the purpose of this document, only outdoor air pollutants are addressed. These may be in the form of solid particles, liquid droplets, gases, or any combination of these forms. Generally, they can be categorized as primary pollutants (those emitted directly from identifiable sources) and secondary pollutants (those produced in the air by interaction between two or more primary pollutants or by reaction with normal atmospheric constituents that may be influenced by sunlight). Air pollutants are transported, dispersed, or concentrated by meteorological and topographical conditions. Air quality is affected by air pollutant emission characteristics, meteorology, and topography.

Ambient air quality in a given location can be described in terms of a comparison of the concentrations of various pollutants in the atmosphere against the corresponding standards. Ambient air quality standards have been established by Federal and state agencies to ensure an adequate margin of safety for the protection of the public health and welfare from the adverse effects of pollutants in the ambient air. Pollutant concentrations higher than the corresponding standards are considered unhealthy. Concentrations below the corresponding standards are considered acceptable.

The pollutants of concern are primarily those for which Federal and state ambient air quality standards have been established, including criteria air pollutants, hazardous air pollutants, and other toxic air compounds. The criteria pollutants are those listed in 40 CFR 50, National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards. The hazardous air pollutants and other toxic compounds are those listed in Title III of the 1990 Clean Air Act, as amended; those regulated by the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and those that have been proposed or adopted for regulation by the state or are listed in state guidelines. Also of concern are air pollutant emissions that may contribute to the depletion of stratospheric ozone or to global warming.

An assessment of the impacts on air quality is based on a comparison of air pollutant concentrations with applicable Federal and state ambient air quality standards and concentration limits. The more stringent of either the EPA or state standards serve as the assessment criteria. The primary air pollutant emissions resulting from completing the construction of Bellefonte 1 and the operation of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 would consist largely of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide compounds, particulate matter, and carbon monoxide, as shown in Table 5-22. The ambient standards for these pollutants are presented in Table 5-23. Compliance with the new standards for particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to 2.5 micrometers ( $PM_{2.5}$ ) was not evaluated because the currently available emission factors are for particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to 10 micrometers ( $PM_{10}$ ).

#### **No Action**

No air quality impacts are anticipated at the Bellefonte site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

#### **Tritium Production**

##### *Construction*

The potential air quality impacts of construction activities required to complete Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 were evaluated. Since most of the activities such as earth-moving, excavation, and erection

of major structures have been completed, the air pollution sources associated with unit completion would be similar to those associated with ongoing maintenance of the facilities and sources associated with completion of interior work and a few structures (e.g., piping systems). These include diesel generators, auxiliary boilers, employee vehicles, and trucks moving materials and wastes. Emissions from the currently operating generators and boilers are discussed in Section 4.2.3.3.

Air pollutant concentrations during construction should be similar to those for maintenance of the existing facilities, as discussed in Section 4.2.3.3, except for increased vehicular traffic; additional emissions from materials-handling equipment such as trucks, cranes, and forklifts; welding fumes; and emissions of cleaning solvents. Estimated emissions from these sources are presented in Table 5-22.

**Table 5-22 Annual Nonradioactive Gaseous Emissions from Bellefonte 1 or Both Bellefonte 1 and 2 During Construction**

Pollutant	Emissions (kilograms per year)			
	Bellefonte 1 Equipment	Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2 Equipment	Vehicles	
			Bellefonte 1	Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2
Carbon monoxide	20,800	24,700	57,800	87,300
Nitrogen dioxide	54,400	64,700	16,400	24,800
Particulate matter	4,220	5,000	57,300	86,700
Sulfur dioxide	6,110	7,160	0	0
Formaldehyde	6.34	6.34	0	0
Arsenic	0.0658	0.0658	0	0
Beryllium	0.0392	0.0392	0	0
Cadmium	0.172	0.172	0	0
Chromium	1.05	1.05	0	0
Lead	0.14	0.14	0	0
Manganese	0.219	0.219	0	0
Mercury	0.047	0.047	0	0
Nickel	2.66	2.66	0	0

Source: TVA 1995c, TVA 1998a.

The total amount of these emissions would be small and would result in minimal offsite impacts, as shown in Table 5-23. As described in Appendix B, the short-term version of the ISC3 model, ISCST3, was used to calculate concentrations with averaging times of 1 to 24 hours, as well as calendar quarter concentrations and annual average concentrations. Construction equipment and other associated emissions for each alternative were evaluated as a volume source using the ISC3 model. Although there would be finite increases in air pollutant concentrations from construction activities, they would not exceed the ambient air quality standards.

Concentrations of toxic air pollutants from the combustion of diesel fuel in the auxiliary boilers, diesel generators, and construction equipment were also evaluated. There are no Alabama State standards that specify acceptable ambient concentrations of toxic air pollutants. During the permitting process, Alabama compares 1-hour concentrations of toxic air pollutants to 1/40 of the applicable threshold limit value for a pollutant to assess whether the pollutant is of concern and should be evaluated in more detail. Offsite concentrations of all toxic pollutants evaluated for construction at Bellefonte would be below 1 percent of the applicable threshold limit value.

**Table 5-23 Annual Air Pollutant Concentrations from Bellefonte 1 and 2 During Construction**

Pollutant	Averaging Period	Most Stringent Standard or Guidelines <sup>a</sup> ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	Construction's Contribution ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	Total Concentration <sup>b</sup> ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	Percent of Standard or Guideline
Carbon monoxide	8-hour	10,000	211	4,350	44
	1-hour	40,000	846	6,370	16
Lead	Calendar Quarter	1.5	0.00007	0.0301	2.0
	1-hour	3.75	0.00275	0.00275	0.22
Nitrogen dioxide	Annual	100	69.1	93.2	93
Ozone	8-hour (3-year average of annual 4th highest)	157	Not applicable	c	c
Particulate matter	PM <sub>10</sub>				
	Annual	50	5.29	29.3	59
Sulfur dioxide	24-hour	150	24.2	70.2	47
	Annual	80	7.04	20.0	25
	24-hour	365	31.1	105	29
Formaldehyde	3-hour	1,300	79.7	290	22
	1-hour	9.25	0.126	0.126	1.4
Arsenic	1-hour	0.25	0.00130	0.00130	0.52
Beryllium	1-hour	0.05	0.000773	0.000773	1.5
Cadmium	1-hour	0.05	0.0034	0.0034	6.8
Chromium	1-hour	12.5	0.0207	0.0207	0.17
Manganese	1-hour	5.0	0.00432	0.00432	0.086
Mercury	1-hour	0.625	0.000928	0.000928	0.15
Nickel	1-hour	1.25	0.0526	0.0526	2.1

$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  = micrograms per cubic meter.

PM<sub>n</sub> = Particulate matter less than or equal to *n* micrometers.

<sup>a</sup> The more stringent of the Federal and state standards are presented for the averaging time. For toxic air pollutants, a value of 1/40 of the applicable threshold limit value is used for comparison.

<sup>b</sup> Sum of the maximum ambient monitored concentration and the construction contribution.

<sup>c</sup> There is insufficient monitoring data to compare to the 8-hour standard for ozone.

**Note:** The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (40 CFR 50), other than those for particulate matter and those based on annual averages, are not to be exceeded more than once per year. The 1-hour ozone standard applies only to nonattainment areas. The 8-hour ozone standard is attained when the 3-year average of the annual fourth-highest daily maximum 8-hour average concentration is less than or equal to 157  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ . The 24-hour particulate matter standard is attained when the expected number of days with a 24-hour average concentration above the standards is  $\leq 1$ . The annual arithmetic mean particulate matter standard is attained when the expected annual arithmetic mean concentration is less than or equal to the standard. EPA recently revised the ambient air quality standards for particulate matter. The new standards were finalized on July 18, 1997. The current PM<sub>10</sub> annual standard was retained and two PM<sub>2.5</sub> (particulate matter less than or equal to 2.5 micrometers) standards were added. These standards were set at 15  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  3-year annual average arithmetic mean based on community-oriented monitors and 65  $\mu\text{g}/\text{cubic meters}$  3-year average of the 98th percentile of 24-hour concentrations at population-oriented monitors. The current 24-hour PM<sub>10</sub> standard was revised to be based on the 99th percentile of 24-hour concentrations. The existing PM<sub>10</sub> standards would continue to apply in the interim period (62 FR 38652).

**Source:** ADEM 1972, TVA 1998a, TVA 1995b, ADEM 1995.



### Operation

Operational impacts would result from emissions from four diesel generators, four diesel fuel-fired fire pumps, a security power diesel generator, two auxiliary boilers fueled with No. 2 fuel oil (0.05 percent sulfur), two cooling towers, two turbogenerator lube oil systems, and two fixed-roof tanks for storing No. 2 fuel oil (TVA 1997d). Emissions from these sources based on recent operating experience at TVA's Sequoyah Nuclear Plant are summarized in Table 5-24. In addition to these sources, there would be emissions from employee vehicles and trucks moving materials and wastes.

**Table 5-24 Nonradioactive Gaseous Emissions from Bellefonte 1 and 2  
During Operations**

Pollutant	Emissions (kilograms per year)	
	Stationary Sources <sup>a</sup>	Vehicles
Carbon monoxide	23,714	48,100
Nitrogen dioxide	90,707	13,700
Particulate matter	12,611	47,800
Sulfur dioxide	8,869	0
Volatile organic compound	2,105	6,230
Benzene	16.9	0
Toluene	6.13	0
Xylenes	4.21	0
1,3-Butadiene	0.00696	0
Formaldehyde	62.9	0
Acetaldehyde	0.679	0
Acrolein	0.186	0
Arsenic	0.632	0
Beryllium	0.376	0
Cadmium	1.66	0
Chromium	10.1	0
Lead	1.34	0
Manganese	2.11	0
Mercury	0.451	0
Nickel	25.6	0

<sup>a</sup> Stationary sources include diesel generators, diesel fuel-fired fire pumps, security power diesel generators, auxiliary boilers, the lube oil system, fuel oil storage, and cooling towers.

Source: TVA 1997d, TVA 1998a

Maximum air pollutant concentrations resulting from the stationary sources (diesel generators, diesel fuel-fired fire pumps, security power diesel generators, and auxiliary boilers) are summarized in Table 5-25. There would be finite increases in air pollutant concentrations from operational activities, but even in combination with air pollutant concentrations from offsite sources (see Section 4.2.3.3), they would continue to meet the ambient air quality standards for carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, PM<sub>10</sub>, and sulfur dioxide. Concentrations of toxic air pollutants from the combustion of diesel fuel in the auxiliary boilers and diesel generators also were evaluated. There are no Alabama State standards that specify acceptable ambient concentrations of toxic air pollutants. During the permitting process, Alabama compares the concentrations of toxic air pollutants to 1/40 of the applicable threshold limit value for a pollutant to assess whether the pollutant is of concern and should be evaluated in more detail. The offsite concentrations of all the toxic pollutants evaluated for operations at Bellefonte would be below 15 percent of the applicable 1/40 of the threshold limit value. Emissions and resulting concentrations of air pollutants from the operation of Bellefonte 1 individually would be similar to those from operation of the combined units, since the testing and maintenance of the stationary sources would not vary.

Table 5-25 Annual Air Pollutant Concentrations from Bellefonte 1 and 2 During Operations

Air Pollutant	Averaging Period	Most Stringent Standard or Guidelines* ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	Operation's Contribution ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	Total Concentration ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	Percent of Standard or Guideline
Carbon monoxide	8-hour	10,000	404.0	4,540	45
	1-hour	40,000	662.0	6,180	15
Lead	Calendar Quarter	1.5	0.000132	0.0301	2
	1-hour	1.25	0.00541	0.00541	0.43
Nitrogen dioxide	Annual	100	1.19	25.3	25
Ozone	8-hour (3-year average of annual 4th highest)	157	Not applicable	b	b
Particulate matter	PM <sub>10</sub>				
	Annual	50	0.169	24.2	48
	24-hour	150	18.6	64.6	43
Sulfur dioxide	Annual	80	0.198	13.2	16
	24-hour	365	15.6	89	24
	3-hour	1,300	64.6	275	21
Benzene	1-hour	24	0.618	0.618	2.6
Toluene	1-hour	4,700	0.226	0.226	0.0048
Xylenes	1-hour	10,850	0.15	0.15	0.0014
1,3-Butadiene	1-hour	110	0.00148	0.00148	0.0013
Formaldehyde	1-hour	9.25	0.35	0.35	3.8
Acetaldehyde	1-hour	1,125	0.0479	0.0479	0.0043
Acrolein	1-hour	5.75	0.0094	0.0094	0.16
Arsenic	1-hour	0.25	0.00256	0.00256	1.0
Beryllium	1-hour	0.05	0.00152	0.00152	3.0
Cadmium	1-hour	0.05	0.00668	0.00668	13
Chromium	1-hour	12.5	0.0407	0.0407	0.33
Manganese	1-hour	5.0	0.00851	0.00851	0.17
Mercury	1-hour	0.625	0.00183	0.00183	0.29
Nickel	1-hour	2.5	0.104	0.104	4.2

$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  = micrograms per cubic meter.

PM<sub>n</sub> = Particulate matter less than or equal to *n* micrometers.

\* The more stringent of the Federal and state standards is presented for the averaging time. For toxic air pollutants, a value of 1/40 of the applicable threshold limit value is used for comparison.

<sup>b</sup> There is insufficient monitoring data to compare to the 8-hour standard for ozone.

Note: The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (40 CFR 50), other than those for particulate matter and those based on annual averages, are not to be exceeded more than once per year. The 1-hour ozone standard applies only to nonattainment areas. The 8-hour ozone standard is attained when the 3-year average of the annual fourth-highest daily maximum 8-hour average concentration is less than or equal to 157  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ . The 24-hour particulate matter standard is attained when the expected number of days with a 24-hour average concentration above the standards is  $\leq 1$ . The annual arithmetic mean particulate matter standard is attained when the expected annual arithmetic mean concentration is less than or equal to the standard. EPA recently revised the ambient air quality standards for particulate matter. The new standards were finalized on July 18, 1997. The current PM<sub>10</sub> annual standard was retained and two PM<sub>2.5</sub> (particulate matter less than or equal to 2.5 micrometers) standards were added. These standards were set at 15  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  3-year annual average arithmetic mean based on community-oriented monitors and 65  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  3-year average of the 98th percentile of 24-hour concentrations at population-oriented monitors. The current 24-hour PM<sub>10</sub> standard was revised to be based on the 99th percentile of 24-hour concentrations. The existing PM<sub>10</sub> standards would continue to apply in the interim period (62 FR 38652).

Source: TVA 1997d, TVA 1998a.

The potential air pollutant emissions from the auxiliary boilers would exceed the emission level for applicability of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration permitting requirements, although the actual emissions from these sources would be well under these levels. The auxiliary boilers are currently permitted by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management. This department has stated that the boilers are not subject to the Prevention of Significant Deterioration regulations, so it has not issued a Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permit. The diesel generators are operating under a "synthetic minor" permit by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management, owing to their continued operation at less than 50 percent of the 91 metric tons per year (100 tons per year) emission threshold. Under the new operating permit program, permits could be required for other sources such as chlorine, ammonia, and hydrazine storage tanks; lubricating oil system vapor extraction vents; paint and welding shops; and oil storage tanks. Emissions from employee vehicles and trucks carrying materials and wastes would result in some emissions, as shown in Table 5-24.

The combustion of fossil fuels associated with this alternative would result in the emission of carbon dioxide, one of the atmospheric gases believed to influence global climate. Annual carbon dioxide emissions from this alternative would represent less than 0.0006 percent of the 1995 annual U.S. emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes (EPA 1997b). Operation of Bellefonte in lieu of fossil fuel-fired generation would significantly reduce future TVA carbon dioxide emissions.

The possible effects of the natural-draft cooling tower operation would include inadvertent localized atmospheric modifications such as the creation of plumes; cloud formation; changes in local rain, drizzle, fog, icing, and snowfall patterns; and the fallout of salts from cooling tower drift. Cooling tower drift is the dispersion and deposition of wet or dry aerosols emitted from cooling towers. Plans for normal operation of the Bellefonte cooling towers were based on the discharge of heated air carrying 62,800 liters per minute (16,600 gallons per minute) water as vapor and 170 liters per minute (45 gallons per minute) of water as drift from each of the towers (AEC 1974). Most of the drift that fell to the ground would do so within 300 meters (1,000 feet) of the towers. The remainder of the drift and residue would disperse and eventually be removed from the air and deposited on the ground by precipitation. Studies of natural-draft cooling towers in England indicate maximum rates of salt deposition on the order of 0.001 grams per square meter per hour (grams/m<sup>2</sup>-hr). Solids deposition near the Bellefonte cooling towers is estimated to be less than 0.002 grams per square meter per hour (grams/m<sup>2</sup>-hr). The major anions in the drift at Bellefonte would be sulphate and carbonate (AEC 1974).

Modeling of the occurrence of visible plumes was performed for the Bellefonte Environmental Statement (AEC 1974). Incidents of the plumes descending to the ground or causing localized surface fogging should be rare. However, the plumes would frequently cause surface fog on Sand Mountain Plateau, about 2.4 to 4.0 kilometers (1.5 to 2.5 miles) southeast from the site at an elevation 122 meters (400 feet) higher than the tops of the cooling towers. Fogging along roads in this area is predicted to occur about 80 hours per year. The plume modeling is expected to overpredict the occurrence of fog; however, the model does not account for the tendency of the plume to follow the terrain. For this reason, ground-level fog from operation of the cooling towers would likely occur only one to two days per year; icing in the Sand Mountain Plateau area would occur less frequently (AEC 1974).

Ozone is produced from corona discharge (ionization of the air) in the operation of transmission lines and substations, particularly at the higher voltages. TVA gives careful attention to the design and construction of its transmission facilities to minimize corona discharges (TVA 1974b). All but 20 miles of the transmission lines serving the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site are currently energized, and no change in corona discharge from them is anticipated.

## RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EMISSIONS

### No Action

Under the No Action Alternative, construction of Bellefonte 1 and 2 would not be completed. As described in Section 4.2.3.3, there would be no radioactive gaseous emissions at the Bellefonte site.

### Tritium Production

Operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2 as nuclear reactor facilities would result in radioactive gaseous emissions. These would include operational emissions typical of nuclear reactor facilities, as well as a potential increase in tritium emissions due to tritium production. A design objective of the TPBARs is to retain as much tritium as possible within the TPBAR. The performance of the tritium "getter" is such that there is virtually no tritium available in a form that could permeate through the TPBAR cladding. However, for the purposes of this EIS it was conservatively assumed that an average of 1 Curie of tritium per TPBAR per year could permeate to the reactor coolant and 10 percent could be released to the environment as gaseous emission. Table 5-26 shows the anticipated radioactive gaseous emissions at Bellefonte 1 from operations with 0; 1,000; and 3,400 TPBARs. The values presented for 0 TPBARs are based on the operational experience of Watts Bar 1. The calculation method and assumptions are described in Appendix C. Radiological exposures of the public and workers are presented in Section 5.2.3.9.

**Table 5-26 Annual Radioactive Gaseous Emissions from Tritium Production at Bellefonte 1**

	0 TPBARs	Tritium Production	
		1,000 TPBARs	3,400 TPBARs
Tritium release (Curies)	5.6	105.6	345.6
Other radioactive release (Curies)	283	283	283
Total release (Curies)	288.6	388.6	628.6

Note: For Bellefonte 1 and 2 operation, the emission values would be twice the values given.

Source: Based on Watts Bar 1 operation (see Table 5-1).

### 5.2.3.4 Water Resources

The availability and quality of water resources (surface water and groundwater) and the facility-related effects on those resources that could affect other users, are important factors in evaluating the acceptability of these facilities. The presence of floodplains is another important consideration. Legislation passed to protect water resources includes the Clean Water Act, especially Section 402, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, and 307(b), Pretreatment Standards, and the Safe Drinking Water Act. DOE regulation 10 CFR 1022, Compliance with Floodplains/Wetlands Environmental Review Requirements, implements Executive Orders 11988 and 11990 and requires evaluation of the potential effects of an action on floodplains and wetlands.

The issues related to water resources include: (1) whether there is sufficient water available for both the proposed use and local domestic consumption, (2) whether water quality would be degraded or further degraded, (3) whether the proposed use challenges legislative or regulatory compliance, and (4) whether the proposed action is threatened by flooding.

The State of Alabama implements the requirements of the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act and NPDES regulations through its Department of Environmental Management's Water Quality Program.

Bellefonte operations are covered under the Alabama Department of Environmental Management's NPDES Permit, as described in Section 4.2.3.4.

## **SURFACE WATER**

### **No Action**

No surface water impacts are anticipated at the Bellefonte site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

### **Tritium Production**

Analyses of impacts to surface water are presented separately for construction and operations activities.

#### *Construction*

Water uses during construction would include water for employee use, demineralized water, and raw water for cleaning, systems testing, and cooling. A peak use of 3,330,000 liters per day (872,000 gallons per day) of water would be required during startup when plant flushing and cleanup are performed (TVA 1998e). Approximately 379,000 liters per day (100,000 gallons per day) of this peak usage would be potable water. Peak usage could occur over a period of several weeks. A peak use of 280,000 liters per day (74,000 gallons per day) would be required for completion of Unit 2. Potable water would continue to be obtained from the Hollywood water supply system (see Table 5-27). The quantities of water (raw and potable) obtained from the Guntersville Reservoir would have little effect on the availability of water for other uses.

Since construction completion would involve little or no new land disturbance or excavation, there would be little or no impact to surface water quality as a result of soil erosion of disturbed land or siltation of surface drainage channels. Stormwater runoff would continue to be collected and treated, if necessary, before discharge. An NPDES Permit was issued for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant that covers existing site outfalls and stormwater monitoring during construction of the nuclear facility.

Sanitary wastewater would be treated at the Hollywood Waste Water Treatment Facility. This facility is a publicly owned treatment works designed to ensure compliance with the effluent limitations of the state. The city of Hollywood has agreed to add additional treatment facilities as needed to handle the sanitary wastewater from the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant. A small quantity of sanitary wastewater from the simulator building, training facility, and environmental data station is treated on site by sand filters and a septic system.

#### *Operation*

All water for operation of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 would be drawn from the Guntersville Reservoir, except for potable water, which is obtained from the Hollywood water supply system. Potable water requirements would average 95,000 liters per day (25,000 gallons per day) with two units operating (TVA 1998a). Average river flow rates at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant are 65.9 million liters per minute (17.4 million gallons per minute); the 7-day, 10-year minimum flow, 21.9 million liters per minute (5.78 million gallons per minute). Operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2 would require 376 million liters per day (99.4 million gallons per day) for normal full operation. This represents about 0.4 percent of the average river flow and about 1.2 percent of the 7-day, 10-year minimum. In addition, about 24 million liters per year (6 million gallons per year) of water would be used for firefighter training and the testing and maintenance of fire protection systems. Other major water uses served by the Guntersville Reservoir include the 30 million liters per day (7.8 million gallons per day) of potable water demand of several municipalities in Alabama and Tennessee; the 4.9 billion liters per day (1.1 billion gallons per day) for the Widows Creek Fossil Plant; and

various smaller, industrial uses. The water supply from Guntersville Reservoir appears to be adequate to meet the foreseeable requirements for the area (TVA 1997d, TVA 1997f). Water required from the Guntersville Reservoir for Bellefonte operation would be a small fraction of the river flow, and most of it would be returned to the reservoir after use.

Discharges from the Bellefonte plant include storm and process water outfalls, covered by the existing NPDES Permit, which would be treated and monitored before release. Water quality-based limitations include the following:

- Use classification of the upper stretch of the Tennessee River Basin as a public water supply and for swimming, fishing, and wildlife protection
- Select water quality criteria (e.g., temperature, dissolved oxygen, and toxics) for public water supply-designated segments
- Secondary treatment, or the equivalent, of all industrial, sanitary, and combined discharges for biologically degradable waste [Parameters of interest are biochemical/biological oxygen demand, total suspended solids, and acidity (pH) (TVA 1997f).]

Process water discharges would come mostly from cooling tower blowdown (about 247 million liters per day [65.2 million gallons per day]) and sump collection ponds (2.46 million liters per day [0.65 million gallons per day]) with both units operating. These discharges would be to the main river channel (Guntersville Reservoir). In addition to these discharges, approximately 2,720,000 liters per day (718,000 gallons per day) of water would be used for intake strainer and screen backwash (TVA 1997e).

Sanitary wastewater would be treated at the Hollywood Waste Water Treatment Facility, a publicly owned treatment works designed to ensure compliance with the effluent limitations of the State of Alabama. The city of Hollywood has agreed to add additional treatment facilities as needed to handle the wastewater from the Bellefonte plant. Discharges to the treatment facility would not include industrial wastes. The outfall from the Hollywood Waste Water Treatment Facility is covered under the NPDES Permit held by the city of Hollywood.

Discharges from the plant would be monitored to comply with the Bellefonte NPDES Permit limitations. Limitations of the existing NPDES Permit issued by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management are summarized in Section 4.2.3.4. Table 5-27 presents changes to surface water resources attributable to the alternatives involving the Bellefonte plant.

Chemical discharges to the Guntersville Reservoir from various systems at the Bellefonte plant are summarized in Tables 5-28 and 5-29. The blowdown diffuser is designed to mix the blowdown with reservoir water. The average expected chemical concentrations in the reservoir after mixing have been calculated using CORMIX (Cornell 1996). Sources of chemical discharges would include cooling tower blowdown, cooling tower makeup and essential raw water systems, the water filtration plant, steam system makeup water demineralizers, alternative treatment of wastes from makeup and condensate demineralizers, component-cooling systems, the reactor coolant system, auxiliary steam generator blowdown, and yard drainage systems and various sumps (TVA 1974b). Even under adverse conditions, chemical discharges would be small. The change in average concentrations in the reservoir after mixing would represent a small increase over the observed background concentrations. Actual discharges and concentrations in the reservoir should meet the limitations of the NPDES Permit and Alabama Department of Environmental Management drinking water standards. Federal secondary drinking water standards and health advisories also would be met, except for those pertaining to constituents such as aluminum, iron, and molybdenum where the existing concentrations exceed those levels.

A portion of the circulated cooling water would be discharged to prevent the buildup of dissolved salts and minerals in the cooling system (blowdown), resulting in the discharge of heated water to the Guntersville Reservoir. The NPDES Permit for Bellefonte (ADEM 1992) limits in-stream temperatures to less than or equal to 30°C (86°F). Ambient upstream temperatures typically exceed this limit an average of 8.5 days per year in July and August, primarily as a result of natural heating of the lake. Monitoring data for 1975 to 1991 indicate that the ambient upstream temperature ranged from 1.7°C (35°F) to 32.2°C (90°F) (TVA 1997f).

**Table 5-27 Potential Changes to Water Resources from Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 1 and 2**

<i>Affected Resource Indicator</i>	<i>No Action</i>	<i>Tritium Production Bellefonte 1</i>	<i>Tritium Production Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2</i>
<b>Construction</b>			
Water availability and use:			
Raw water source	Guntersville Reservoir	Guntersville Reservoir	Guntersville Reservoir
Site water use requirement (million liters per year)	None	1,260 <sup>a</sup>	1,390 <sup>a</sup>
Percent of river flow	None	0.0036	0.004
Water quality:			
Discharge to surface water (million liters per year)	None <sup>b</sup>	3,100 <sup>c</sup>	3,430 <sup>c</sup>
Discharge of sanitary waste to local treatment plant (million liters per year)	Not applicable	155 <sup>c</sup>	155 <sup>c</sup>
<b>Operation</b>			
Water availability and use:			
Water source	Guntersville Reservoir	Guntersville Reservoir	Guntersville Reservoir
Site raw water use requirement (million liters per year)	Not applicable <sup>d</sup>	68,700 <sup>a</sup>	137,000
Percent of river flow	Not applicable	0.2	0.39
Potable water use requirement (million liters per year)	2.76	27.6	34.5
Water quality:			
Discharge to surface water (million liters per year)	None <sup>b</sup>	46,000 <sup>c</sup>	91,100
Discharge of sanitary waste to local treatment plant (million liters per year)	2.76	27.6	34.5
<b>Floodplain:</b>			
Actions in 500-year floodplains	None	Intake	Intake

<sup>a</sup> Potable and raw water usage.

<sup>b</sup> Except stormwater runoff and a small quantity discharged from the simulator training facility sand filters.

<sup>c</sup> Discharges from construction activities and from runoff are discharged to the diffuser or to other discharge points.

<sup>d</sup> Current raw water use from Guntersville Reservoir is limited to fire protection and cooling water needs.

<sup>e</sup> Estimated assuming one cooling tower operation.

Source: TVA 1997f, TVA 1997d.

**Table 5-28 Summary of "Added" Inorganic Chemical Discharges to Guntersville Reservoir from Operation of Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 1 and 2**

Chemical	Finished Drinking Water Standard (milligrams per liter)	Background Water Quality—Average Concentration (milligrams per liter)	Average Daily Discharge of Chemical for One Unit (kilograms)	Average Daily Contribution to Cooling Tower Blowdown <sup>a</sup> (milligrams per liter)		Average Blowdown Concentration (milligrams per liter)		Concentration in Reservoir after Mixing <sup>b</sup> (milligrams per liter)	
				Unit 1	Units 1 and 2	Unit 1	Units 1 and 2	Unit 1	Units 1 and 2
Ammonia	30	0.03	0.0162	0.000087	0.000103	0.0601	0.0601	0.0336	0.0336
Chlorides	250	7.6	24.5	0.132	0.155	15.3	15.4	8.51	8.52
Copper	1.3	0.011	7.7	0.0416	0.0489	0.0636	0.0709	0.0148	0.0152
Nickel	0.1	0.0017	0.858	0.00463	0.00544	0.00803	0.00884	0.00218	0.00223
Sodium	20	6.83	419	2.26	2.66	15.9	16.3	7.77	7.8
Total dissolved solids	500	100	146	0.788	0.927	201	201	112	112
Sulfates	250	15.4	1210	6.55	7.72	37.4	38.5	17.6	17.7
Zinc	3	0.11	111	0.601	0.707	0.821	0.927	0.159	0.165

<sup>a</sup> Based on annual contributions in blowdown stream for a one-unit plant with a 67,650 liter per year blowdown rate and a two-unit plant with a 115,000 liter per year blowdown rate.

<sup>b</sup> Average concentration at the edge of the near-field mixing zone (6 meters downstream of the diffuser).

Source: Alabama 1998, ADEM 1998b, EPA 1996a, TVA 1997d, TVA 1997f.



**Table 5-29 Summary of Observed Trace Metal Concentrations and Expected Trace Metal Concentrations in the Discharge Stream and at the Edge of the Mixing Zone from Operation of Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 1 and 2**

Parameter (Dissolved)	Finished Drinking Water Standard (milligrams per liter)	Background Water Quality—Average Concentration (milligrams per liter)	Average Blowdown Concentration (milligrams per liter)		Average Concentration in Reservoir After Mixing* (milligrams per liter)	
			Unit 1	Units 1 and 2	Unit 1	Units 1 and 2
Aluminum	0.2	0.43	0.86	0.86	0.481	0.481
Arsenic	0.05	0.0002	0.0004	0.0004	0.000224	0.000224
Barium	2	0.05	0.1	0.1	0.0559	0.056
Beryllium	0.004	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.00112	0.00112
Boron	0.9	0.15	0.3	0.3	0.168	0.168
Cadmium	0.005	0.0005	0.001	0.001	0.000559	0.00056
Chromium	0.1	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.00336	0.00336
Iron	0.3	0.53	1.06	1.06	0.593	0.593
Lead	0.015	0.006	0.012	0.012	0.00671	0.00672
Mercury	0.002	0.0009	0.0018	0.0018	0.00101	0.00101
Molybdenum	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.0224	0.0224
Silver	0.2	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00112	0.00112

\* Average concentration at the edge of the near-field mixing zone (6 meters downstream of the diffuser).

Source: Alabama 1998, ADEM 1998b, EPA 1996a, TVA 1997d, TVA 1997f.

The combined discharges to the Guntersville Reservoir would be through the submerged diffuser to provide dilution with the stream flow. The temperature of the discharge would vary with the ambient wet-bulb temperature. Alabama water quality standards limit the maximum temperature rise (difference between upstream and downstream temperature) to no more than 2.8°C (5°F). The maximum temperature rise would occur when the river was cold and the discharge warm (TVA 1997f).

Results of temperature analyses for various discharges using CORMIX system indicate that the maximum water temperature 3 meters (10 feet) downstream from the diffuser would be 32.6°C (90.7°F) for a 2,720-megawatts-electric facility with multiple units (somewhat larger than the two-unit, 2,440-megawatts-electric nuclear option). At 800 meters (2,620 feet) downstream the predicted maximum temperature was 32.3°C (90.1°F). The maximum temperature rise would occur in January and February; it has been computed at 1.8°C (3.2°F) within 3 meters (10 feet) downstream, cooling (with dilution) to 0.4°C (0.7°F) at 16 kilometers (10 miles) downstream (TVA 1997f, TVA 1998a). The one-unit option would result in lower temperatures downstream due to the lower discharge rate.

An earlier analysis for two-unit operation indicated that the maximum discharge temperature at the diffusers would vary from 28.5°C (83.3°F) in January to 34.7°C (94.5°F) in July (TVA 1982). Given a minimum mixing ratio of 9 to 1, the maximum in-stream temperature at the edge of the mixing zone would vary from 16.8°C (62.2°F) in January to 32°C (90°F) in July for the two-unit nuclear option. In-stream temperatures for the one-unit option would be lower due to the lower discharge flow rate. The maximum predicted discharge temperature rise (downstream temperature minus upstream temperature) would be 1.6°C (2.9°F) in February (TVA 1982). Holdup of the blowdown could be necessary on occasion when the ambient temperature in the summer nears or exceeds the maximum temperature standards. A temperature variance to the NPDES Permit has been requested from the Alabama Department of Environmental Management. Although there would be a finite increase in reservoir water temperature due to the discharge from Bellefonte operation, both the increase in temperature and the maximum temperature would be limited such that impacts on aquatic species would meet the limitations of the NPDES Permit.

The Widows Creek Fossil Plant is about 24 kilometers (15 miles) upstream of the Bellefonte site. It discharges approximately 68 cubic meters per second (2,400 cubic feet per second) of water heated to 10°C (18°F) above ambient water temperature. Assuming that full mixing occurred before the water reached the Bellefonte site, the temperature increase would be 0.8°C (1.5°F) during the summer and 0.6°C (1.0°F) during the winter, excluding surface heat loss. Temperature measurements at Guntersville Dam and Nickajack Dam indicate that the water at the downstream dam is about 0.7°C (1.3°F) warmer on the average. One portion of this temperature increase could be due to the Widows Creek plant, and another portion to solar heating. The Bellefonte plant by comparison would increase the average water temperature flowing past the plant by about 0.05°C (0.1°F). Any combined thermal effect assignable to Bellefonte likely would be small (AEC 1974).

Since stormwater runoff would continue to be collected and treated (if necessary) before discharge, little or no impact on surface water would result from soil erosion or the siltation of surface drainage channels.

## **GROUNDWATER**

### *Construction*

Construction activities related to the completion of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 should have no effect on groundwater availability. There are no planned withdrawals of groundwater. The potential for groundwater contamination from fuels, oils, solvents, or other chemicals used in the operation and maintenance of equipment and other activities during construction would be minimized by careful handling and proper disposal of potential contaminants. TVA's Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasures Plan provides a

method for mitigating releases of contamination into the groundwater at the site. Should a release occur, remediation methods would be employed to prevent impacts on water supplies (TVA 1997f).

### *Operations*

Groundwater availability would not be affected by operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2. There are no planned withdrawals of groundwater. Any impacts on groundwater quality during operations most likely would be associated with the storage and handling of fuel oil and the storage, handling, and disposal of the wastes generated. The disposal of wastes is discussed in Section 5.2.3.11. No impacts on groundwater are expected. TVA's Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasures Plan provides a method for mitigating groundwater releases at the site. Should a release occur, remediation methods would be employed to prevent impacts on water supplies (TVA 1997f).

### **FLOODING**

The Bellefonte facilities have been sited to provide a reasonable level of protection from flooding. The requirements of Executive Order 11988, "Floodplain Management," would be fulfilled. To the extent practicable, required actions would be conducted outside the limits of the 100-year floodplain unless there are no practicable alternatives. If possible, "critical action" facilities (i.e., those facilities whose inoperability would compel the curtailment or shutdown of power generation) would be located outside the 500-year floodplain or protected to the 500-year flood elevation. All safety-related structures, systems, and components have been designed to remain functional in the worst potential flood from any cause (TVA 1997f).

The maximum plant-site flood level from any cause would be elevation 190.4 meters (624.8 feet). Coincident wind waves would raise the reservoir to a maximum elevation of 191.3 meters (627.7 feet). The safety-related facilities, systems, and equipment in the reactor building have been protected against the maximum flood level and the maximum wind- or wave-induced levels. The intake pumping station has been designed for the static and dynamic forces resulting from such an event, and is protected from runup by a wall built around the top deck (TVA 1991).

The situation conducive to the maximum plant-site flood level has been determined to be a sequence of March storms producing maximum precipitation on the watershed above Chattanooga. The flood crest would be augmented by the failure of earth embankments at the Fort Loudoun-Tellico, Watts Bar, Chickamauga, and Nickajack Dams upstream (TVA 1991). While some support facilities and utilities (e.g., the railroad, water, and sewer pipelines) would be below the 500-year flood level, they too have been constructed to protect them from flood damage.

### **Radioactive Liquid Effluent**

#### **No Action**

Under the No Action Alternative, construction of Bellefonte 1 and 2 would not be completed. As discussed in Section 4.2.3.4, there would be no radioactive liquid effluent at the Bellefonte site.

#### **Tritium Production**

##### *Surface Water*

Operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2 as nuclear reactor facilities should produce the liquid radioactive effluents typical of such operation, as well as those attributable exclusively to tritium production. An increase in the tritium release as a result of tritium production is based on the assumption that an average of 1 Curie of tritium

per TPBAR per year could permeate through the TPBAR cladding to the reactor coolant, and that 90 percent of that amount could be released to the environment as liquid effluent. Table 5-30 shows the expected radioactive liquid effluents from operation of Bellefonte 1 with 0, 1,000, and 3,400 TPBARs. The values presented for 0 TPBARs are based on the operational experience at Watts Bar 1. The calculation method and assumptions are described in Appendix C, Section C.3. Radiological exposures of the public and workers are presented in Section 5.2.3.9.

In accordance with the Safe Drinking Water Act requirements promulgated by the EPA in 40 CFR, 100-149, a tritium concentration of 20,000 picocuries per liter has been established as a limit for drinking water. In view of this regulatory limit, an analysis was performed to estimate tritium concentrations in the Tennessee River that could result from tritium production at Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2. The average expected tritium concentrations in the river were calculated using CORMIX (Cornell 1996). Table 5-31 presents the potential tritium concentrations from the incident-free irradiation of 1,000 and 3,400 TPBARs at two points: (1) the edge of the near-field, and (2) at the nearest drinking water intake. "Near-field" in CORMIX is the area surrounding the discharge point of the effluent, where initial mixing is taking place. The edge of the near-field typically extends to a few meters away from the point of discharge. Table 5-31 also presents potential tritium concentrations in the unlikely event of 2 TPBAR failures during a given 18-month operating cycle. The results indicate that tritium concentrations would remain well below the 20,000 picocurie per liter limit, and at the drinking water intake, the tritium concentration would be below or close to the lower detection limit for tritium, which is approximately 300 picocuries per liter.

**Table 5-30 Annual Radioactive Liquid Effluents from Tritium Production at Bellefonte 1**

	0 TPBARs	Tritium Production *	
		1,000 TPBARs	3,400 TPBARs
Tritium release (Curies)	639	1,539	3,699
Other radioactive release (Curies)	1.3	1.3	1.3
Total release (Curies)	640.3	1,540.3	3,700.3

\* For Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2 operation the effluent values would be twice the values given.

Source: Based on Watts Bar 1 operation (see Table 5-2).

**Table 5-31 Tritium Concentration in the Tennessee River from Tritium Production at Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2**

	0 TPBARs (picocuries per liter)	Incident-Free Tritium Production		2 TPBAR Failures <sup>a</sup> (picocuries per liter)
		1,000 TPBARs (picocuries per liter)	3,400 TPBARs (picocuries per liter)	
Edge of near-field	560	1,348	3,240	12,219
At nearest drinking water intake	36	88	211	796

\* See Appendix C, Table C-8, for tritium release.

### 5.2.3.5 Geology and Soils

#### No Action

No impacts on geology and soils are anticipated at Bellefonte beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

## **Tritium Production**

### **Construction**

The limited construction activities required to complete Bellefonte 1 and 2 should have no effect on geology and soils.

**Soil Amplification and Ground Deformation**—Liquefaction of soils at Bellefonte due to earthquake ground motion is believed to be very unlikely. The effects of the amplification of ground motions through soil columns should be considered in the seismic design of structures not founded on rock.

**Seismic Hazard Assessments**—Bellefonte is in a Seismic Hazard Zone 2, or a zone of low seismic hazard. The use of existing building codes should adequately address the earthquake hazard to ordinary buildings at Bellefonte. Additional considerations might be needed for special structures that house hazardous processes or sensitive equipment. Underground or aboveground piping that transports hazardous substances could also require nonroutine design to address seismic hazards at the site.

**Bedrock**—No problems should be created within the consolidated bedrock (the Chickamauga Formation) beneath the main plant area footprint by activities such as excavation or dewatering. All of the unweathered rock at the site is capable of supporting intended loads.

**Overburden**—Soils beneath the footprint areas are variable in depth (0 to 7 meters [0 to 23 feet]) and are expected to consist primarily of stiff silty clays and clayey silts. Structural design would be based upon in-situ soil investigations at the proposed foundation location and appropriate safety factors for the proposed foundations of new facilities on soil.

### **Operation**

No impacts on geologic stability are expected to occur. All structures would be designed and constructed according to sound engineering practices; no materials would be injected underground; and groundwater would not be required for tritium production. The normal operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2 would have no effect on soils and prime farmland at the site.

## **5.2.3.6 Ecological Resources**

### **No Action**

No impacts on land use, air quality, or water quality are anticipated at the Bellefonte site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action. Therefore, no impacts on ecological resources are expected under this alternative.

## **Tritium Production**

The evaluation of impacts on ecological resources was based on a review of previous studies for the Bellefonte plant and analysis of any changes associated with tritium production that might be relevant to previously disclosed impacts. Where relevant, these impacts were identified.

## **Construction**

Evaluation of the ecological impacts of construction activities at the Bellefonte site encompassed terrestrial resources, aquatic resources, wetlands, and threatened and endangered species. Specific sources of construction impacts include increases in air emissions, runoff and sedimentation, human activity, and noise.

### **Terrestrial Resources**

Construction activities required to complete Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 would include the installation of additional equipment, the construction of new support buildings, and minor activities associated with making the intake water structure operational (TVA 1998a) (see the description in Section 3.2.5.3). Most major facilities at Bellefonte have already been completed (TVA 1993). The area of the site that was cleared during initial construction should be adequate for the construction of the new support buildings and for the remaining construction-related activities. Therefore, no additional land would be cleared, and there would be no impacts from disturbance or destruction of vegetation or wildlife habitat in currently undisturbed areas of the site. The transient emissions of gaseous and particulate air pollutants from construction operations would have little or no adverse effect on terrestrial ecological resources (TVA 1974b). During construction, no radioactive materials would be handled. Thus, there should be no radiological impacts on terrestrial resources. Although there would be increased activity at the site and increases in sound levels from construction activities and from traffic along the access road, these changes should have little effect on wildlife on the site (TVA 1974b).

### **Aquatic Resources**

Impacts to aquatic resources from increased surface runoff and sediment loading should be temporary and limited. Land disturbance would be limited to that required for the new support buildings, and there would be no physical disturbance of the Guntersville Reservoir shoreline or adjacent riparian habitat in the vicinity of the Bellefonte site. Standard erosion control and sedimentation mitigation techniques would be used as appropriate in any construction areas. Runoff from construction activities would be collected and processed before release to surface waters. Monitoring investigations from 1974 to 1979 during the major construction activities at Bellefonte indicated that these activities did not adversely impact the Guntersville Reservoir or Town Creek Embayment (TVA 1980).

### **Wetlands**

Construction activities required to complete Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 should disturb no additional wetlands beyond those disturbed during initial construction of the Bellefonte plant. Activities required to make the intake structure operational would involve desilting of the existing pumps. This would not disturb any wetlands. As discussed previously for aquatic resources, impacts to wetlands from increased surface runoff and sedimentation would be both temporary and limited.

### **Threatened and Endangered Species**

Construction activities at the Bellefonte site would not adversely affect any Federally or state-listed threatened or endangered terrestrial species. There should be no impacts on threatened or endangered aquatic animals or plants from construction activities, because no such species have been reported around the Guntersville Reservoir in the vicinity of Bellefonte in recent years.

The gray bat and Indiana bat, both Federally listed as endangered, are known to forage along the Guntersville Reservoir shoreline. Indiana bats also roost in heavily wooded areas on the hillsides and bluff areas along the Tennessee River. The bald eagle, Federally listed as threatened, has been seen along the wooded shoreline

on the eastern side of the Bellefonte site and along the intake canal during the winter. Activities associated with completion of Bellefonte 1 and 2 would not reduce foraging areas and roosting sites for the gray bat, Indiana bat, or the bald eagle. Noise and human disturbance associated with construction should have only minor, short-term effects on these species (TVA 1993, TVA 1997f).

TVA has notified the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of DOE's proposed action and will provide the States of Tennessee, Alabama, and South Carolina and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service with copies of the CLWR Draft and Final EISs. TVA and DOE will continue to comply with the requirements of the Endangered Species Act and interact with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, as appropriate.

### *Operation*

Evaluation of the ecological impacts of the operation of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 encompassed terrestrial resources, aquatic resources, wetlands, and threatened and endangered species. Specific sources of operational impacts would include increases in emissions of air pollutants, effluent releases to surface waters, human activity, and noise levels.

### Terrestrial Resources

Wildlife on the Bellefonte site would be exposed to increased noise levels from operational sources and from traffic during peak traffic hours. Short-term noises above a level of about 75 dBA could startle wildlife (TVA 1997f). Noises from site activities above this level likely would not be experienced by wildlife in the undeveloped areas of the site. The increased operational noise levels should cause little or no disturbance of wildlife on the site; therefore, no changes in local wildlife populations should occur. Testing of the emergency sirens could elicit a "startle" response in nearby wildlife, but these infrequent tests should cause no changes in wildlife populations in these areas.

Emissions of gaseous and particulate air pollutants from combustion sources would result in small increases in air pollutant concentrations (see Section 5.2.3.3). However, the resulting concentrations of hazardous and toxic pollutants in the vicinity of the site should continue to meet the ambient standards and guidelines and have no adverse effect on terrestrial resources.

Surface deposition or root uptake of concentrated salts could cause stress on vegetation. Effects on vegetation would vary with the plant species and the salts being deposited. Most of the drift that fell to the ground would do so within 300 meters (1,000 feet) of the towers (AEC 1974). The remainder would disperse and eventually be removed from the air and deposited on the ground by precipitation. The estimated salt deposition rate for the cooling towers is  $10^{-3}$  grams per square meters per hour (grams per  $m^2$ -hr). The analysis of cooling tower drift for Bellefonte 1 and 2 indicates that gross impacts on terrestrial biota as a result of salt deposition from the cooling towers would be unlikely, but sensitive species could be adversely affected (AEC 1974).

Changes in incoming radiation (due to shadows from the cooling tower plume) and moisture could affect biota in the vicinity of the cooling towers. However, these changes likely would be indistinguishable from natural variations. Impacts should not be adverse—they might not even be measurable—but over the lifetime of the station, subtle effects could appear (AEC 1974). There should be no operations-related changes in bird mortalities from collision with the cooling towers.

Operation of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 for tritium production would release radioactive gaseous emissions and radioactive liquid effluents to the Guntersville Reservoir, as discussed in Sections 5.2.3.3 and 5.2.3.4. When tritium is inhaled or ingested by an organism, incorporation into bodily fluids is very efficient. However, long-term accumulation in the organism is limited by tritium's rapid elimination by exhalation,

excretion in body water, and its short half-life. The biological properties of tritium are discussed in Appendix C.

Doses to the public and workers have been estimated and are presented in Section 5.2.3.9. Various studies on exposure of vegetation, wildlife, and aquatic species indicate that radiological effects on the human species are a reasonable indicator of the effects on other organisms. In the Bellefonte Final Environmental Statement (TVA 1974b), maximum radiological doses to terrestrial vertebrates (excluding doses from tritium production) from liquid effluent releases under normal operating conditions were estimated at 160 millirad per year. Particularly instructive in this connection is the IAEA's 100-millirad per day benchmark of a chronic dose rate that appears unlikely to cause observable changes in terrestrial animal populations (IAEA 1992). It has been concluded that, since the exposure estimates are small relative to that benchmark and the incremental doses due to tritium production (see the analysis for the public and workers in Section 5.2.3.9) also would be small, the impact of radiological releases on terrestrial species would be minor.

### Aquatic Resources

Possible major environmental impacts on the aquatic ecosystem of the Guntersville Reservoir due to the operation of Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 include fish losses at the cooling water intake screens; almost total loss of entrained, unscreened organisms; and thermal and chemical discharges.

*Fish Impingement*—Since the water velocity in the intake channel would be low, fish would enter the channel in the normal course of their activities. The recessed embayment location of the intake would be conducive to fish congregation. If congregated fish swam until they were fatigued, they could eventually be impinged on the traveling screens. Since the overbank area has a high density of young-of-the-year fish, impingement should be high for this age group (AEC 1974).

*Entrainment*—Because of closed-cycle cooling, it can be assumed that all free-floating organisms that pass through the vertical traveling intake screens would be destroyed. These would include phyto- and zooplankton, fish eggs and larvae (ichthyoplankton), and small fish. An evaluation of plankton population densities and stream flow data indicates that there would be no discernible effect on the plankton populations in the Guntersville Reservoir. This is due largely to the small volume of water (less than 1 percent of the Tennessee River flow) that would be used by Bellefonte 1 or both units relative to the volume in the river (TVA 1991). Similarly, no adverse effect on fish populations in the reservoir would be expected from fish egg and larvae mortalities, since the withdrawal requirements for the closed-cycle cooling system would be small relative to the volume of the river (TVA 1974b).

Entrainment effects on aquatic macrophytes would mean the probable destruction of submerged floating plants and plant fragments. However, these losses would not constitute a significant reduction in the aquatic macroflora (TVA 1991).

*Thermal Effects*—Fish are normally attracted to the outfalls of power plants, especially when the ambient river temperatures are lower than the preferred temperature of a given species. In some cases, fish captured in the discharge region for a power plant are in poorer condition than those from unheated regions. Although the condition of some fish could be adversely affected, there should be no major effect on the abundance of fish species in the Guntersville Reservoir (AEC 1974).

The impact from thermal effects on the population of plankton in the Guntersville Reservoir should be small, given the limited diffuser mixing zone, which would limit the time of plankton entrainment in the plume, and the 10-fold dilution that would occur in the mixing zone. Some localized changes of backwater plankton assemblages (e.g., upstream and downstream of Jones Creek [Tennessee River Mile 388]) could result from plume dispersion along the left shore, beginning within 1.6 kilometers (1 mile) of the diffuser. Because of the small amounts of heat involved, these changes should be small (TVA 1991).



A major benthic community has been identified along the near shore (right side) overbank area extending downstream of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site (see Section 4.2.3.6). The impact of the thermal plume to the macrobenthos should be small. The benthos in the main channel is very limited in diversity, being composed primarily of the Asiatic clam, *Corbicula fluminea*. No thermal impacts would be expected on mainstream benthic populations. The impact of the thermal plume on emersed, floating-leaved, and submerged aquatic macrophyte species should be limited due to the small temperature change predicted. Some localized enhancement of macrophyte growth could occur along portions of the mainstream left bank and the adjacent shallow overbank area.

During startup and shutdown operations, blowdown discharges would continue. Therefore, changes in the mixed temperature at the edge of the diffuser mixing zone would not be rapid and would be expected to occur primarily from routine changes in plant operation. These changes would be smaller than the maximum changes of  $-0.4^{\circ}\text{C}$  ( $-0.7^{\circ}\text{F}$ ) and  $2.0^{\circ}\text{C}$  ( $3.6^{\circ}\text{F}$ ). Therefore, impacts on the rate of temperature change (e.g. fish kills due to cold shock) should be small (AEC 1974, TVA 1991).

**Chemical Effects**—Analyses of chemical releases to surface waters from operations indicate that releases should comply with NPDES Permit limitations; therefore, the potential impacts of these releases should be minor (TVA 1993). The potential impacts on aquatic organisms from the use of biocides such as chlorine in the treatment of cooling tower makeup water and raw cooling water systems and the use of tolyltriazole and potassium hydroxide for pH and corrosion control in the cooling system also should be minor, as the release of these compounds to surface waters is controlled by provisions of the NPDES Permit. Runoff would be treated before release to receiving surface water bodies in accordance with applicable NPDES Permit requirements (TVA 1993).

**Radiological Effects**—When tritium is ingested by an aquatic organism, incorporation into bodily fluids is very efficient. However, long-term accumulation in the organism is limited by tritium's elimination in body water and its short half-life. The biological properties of tritium are discussed in Appendix C.

TVA has estimated maximum annual doses to aquatic organisms from liquid effluent releases from Bellefonte as originally designed (i.e., without tritium production) at 8.5 millirads for plants, 3.5 millirads for suspended invertebrates, 120 millirads for benthic invertebrates, and 0.4 millirads for fish (TVA 1974b). Instructive in this connection is the benchmark dose of 1 rad per day (1,000 millirads per day) established by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements and IAEA as a level that appears unlikely to cause observable changes in aquatic populations (NCRP 1991, IAEA 1992). It has been concluded that, since the exposure estimates would be small relative to that benchmark and the incremental doses due to tritium production (see the analysis for the public and workers in Section 5.2.3.9) also would be small, the impact of radiological releases on aquatic species would be small, as defined by 10 CFR 51 (see Glossary term "qualitative environmental impacts").

#### Wetlands

Wetlands likely would not be impacted from runoff or sedimentation during tritium production.

#### Threatened and Endangered Species

Operational impacts on threatened or endangered species could occur through the release of thermal, chemical, or radioactive discharges to the atmosphere or river. These releases could affect listed species in the vicinity of the site and in the reservoir downstream of the site, either directly or indirectly, through the food chain. Listed species occurring on or in the immediate vicinity of the Bellefonte site also could be affected by the increased human presence or noise during plant operations.

Impacts on threatened or endangered plants from operational activities would not occur, as no Federally or state-listed plant species occur on or in the immediate vicinity of the Bellefonte site. The periodic presence of plant workers at the intake canal and the increased noise levels could cause foraging eagles to move from this area; however, this disruption would be temporary and unlikely to affect the eagles negatively. There should be no other operational impacts on wooded areas used by eagles, gray bats, or Indiana bats.

Potential thermal and chemical effects on aquatic biota are described above. No aquatic listed species occur in the immediate vicinity of the Bellefonte site, and no thermal or chemical impacts to the endangered pink musket and orange-footed pearly mussels that reside in the Guntersville Dam tailwater would be expected. Thermal and chemical effects on the potential prey of bald eagles and gray bats should be small and localized. Thus, thermal or chemical effects on listed threatened or endangered species would be unlikely.

As discussed previously for terrestrial and aquatic species, the impact of radiological releases should not adversely affect the listed threatened and endangered species.

TVA has notified the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of DOE's proposed action at Bellefonte and has provided the States of Alabama and South Carolina and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service with copies of the CLWR Draft EIS. Copies of the CLWR Final EIS also will be provided to these agencies. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was consulted initially concerning the identification of threatened or endangered species that should be evaluated in the EIS (DOI 1998c). In its response to the CLWR Draft EIS, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service concluded that adverse effects to listed species potentially occurring at the site from the proposed action are not anticipated (DOI 1998d). TVA and DOE will continue to comply with the requirements of the Endangered Species Act and will interact with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, as appropriate. TVA is committed to conducting an environmental monitoring program during tritium production operations. Should the monitoring program indicate any adverse impacts to listed species, consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service would be initiated immediately to address those impacts.

### **Environmental Monitoring**

Before and during the construction of Bellefonte 1 and 2, TVA conducted an extensive environmental monitoring program. It has continued environmental monitoring for various parameters during the period of construction deferment, especially as required to comply with various permits (e.g., the NPDES Permit). TVA also has committed to an extensive environmental monitoring program to be conducted during operations, the aim being to confirm that operation of the plant does not have a significant adverse impact on the environment, including threatened and endangered species (TVA 1993).

### **5.2.3.7 Archaeological and Historic Resources**

#### **No Action**

No impacts on land use are anticipated at the Bellefonte site beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action. As a result, no impacts on archaeological or historic resources are expected.

#### **Tritium Production**

Analyses of impacts on archaeological and historic resources are presented separately for construction and operations activities.

### **Construction**

There are no known archaeological sites within the previously disturbed areas of the Bellefonte site. Historic resources would be unaffected, as all structures associated with the original Bellefonte town site have been removed since 1974, when it was determined that the site was eligible for placement on the National Register of Historic Places. The town site was not on TVA property, and the buildings were removed by non-TVA land owners. Before construction of the existing facilities at Bellefonte, the Alabama State Historic Preservation Office approved the design and indicated that no mitigation would be required (TVA 1997f).

### **Operation**

No impacts to historic or archaeological resources would occur from tritium production activities at the Bellefonte site.

### **5.2.3.8 Socioeconomics**

The socioeconomic impacts resulting from the completion and operation of the Bellefonte units are presented for Unit 1 and then for both units combined. Completion and operation of Bellefonte 2 without Bellefonte 1 is not considered a Reasonable Alternative (see Section 3.2.3).

#### **5.2.3.8.1 Bellefonte 1**

##### **No Action**

The No Action Alternative requires the continuation of the deferred status of Bellefonte 1. Therefore, no socioeconomic impacts are expected. Approximately 80 employees maintain the partially completed plant in its layup condition.


##### **Tritium Production**

Estimates of the staffing requirements needed to complete and operate Bellefonte 1 as a nuclear power plant for the production of tritium are presented as Table 5-32. About 12,800 person-years will be needed through the five-year construction phase and 800 per year for plant operations. [The estimate of 12,800 person-years takes into account the tendency to variation in employment throughout the construction period, especially in years one and five, and does not reflect the total construction employment figure given in the table.] A comparison of peak staffing levels by year for the No Action Alternative and for the completion of Bellefonte 1 is provided as Figure 5-1.

**Table 5-32 Staffing for Completion and Operation of Bellefonte 1**

Construction Year	Staffing (Peak)
1	1,500
2	2,700
3	4,100
4	4,500
5	2,600
6	800+ (operations begin)
7	800
8	800
9	800
10 to 40+	800

Sources: TVA 1998a, TVA 1997e.



**Figure 5-1 Staffing for Completion and Operation of Bellefonte 1, Compared to No Action from First Year of Construction**

\* Operations begin.

Source: TVA 1998a, TVA 1997e.

Income estimates for construction and operations staff are based on local earnings of about \$65,000 per person-year, an estimate that is 30 percent higher than the estimated labor cost to complete and operate the facility as a nonnuclear plant. Such high compensation reflects the requirements levels for many categories of nuclear construction and operations and would provide increased revenues to the local economy.

Another potentially important socioeconomic benefit is the direct and indirect income associated with the procurement of equipment and supplies for completion of the plant. Millions of dollars would be added to the local economy during the construction and operations periods.

The largest impacts would be experienced in the Scottsboro-Hollywood area of Jackson County. A larger region of influence encompassing the commuting area would have a lesser effect. The reasons for the

concentration of socioeconomic impacts within Jackson County and Scottsboro-Hollywood are several. First, Scottsboro-Hollywood—population approximately 15,000 (DOC 1998c)—is the only densely populated area within Jackson County. Second, due to the sparseness of the plant environs, local spending and indirect income generation from that spending are concentrated in the Scottsboro-Hollywood area. Third, procurement of goods and services by the plant and TVA outside Jackson County would be modest. Major impacts such as those relating to schools and taxes would be felt within the county, but not within the region of influence outside the county.

### *Population and Housing*

The completion of Bellefonte 1 would result in a temporary increase in population and income in the region of influence as a direct and indirect result of increased employment at the site. An estimated 33 percent of the construction workers and 50 percent of the operations workers would be expected to move into the area. This is consistent with the values in the *Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bellefonte Conversion Project* (TVA 1997f).

About 75 percent of the construction workers and 90 percent of the operations workers would be expected to live in Jackson County. About 70 percent could be expected to live in the Scottsboro-Hollywood area, assuming housing were available. About 20 percent likely would be located along Routes 79 and 72 in the valley between Guntersville and Bridgeport, with the remainder scattered throughout the county.

The influx of construction and plant operations personnel, plus families, would increase the population of Jackson County by about 3,200, or more than 6 percent. This influx within a period of four years would be about 70 percent greater than local growth in the seven years from 1990 through 1997. Within the Scottsboro-Hollywood area, the estimated peak population influx of about 2,200 workers and family members would represent a 14 percent overall population increase. Adding indirect employees and their families, the population influx into the Scottsboro-Hollywood area could exceed 25 percent at the peak. Peak population growth in Jackson County, including indirect employees and their families, would probably be no more than about 10 percent. Population impacts outside Jackson County would be negligible.

Most construction workers prefer not to buy permanent housing. Their housing needs would include rental homes and apartments, mobile homes, and camper-trailers. Operations workers generally purchase permanent single-family housing. Up to 70 percent of all incoming construction workers and 90 percent of all operations workers would be expected to bring their families. That number could be appreciably lower than 70 percent, depending on the availability of rentals and trailer parks for camper-trailers. Currently, trailer parks near the Bellefonte site are close to capacity. A trailer park with an estimated capacity of 250 campers/trailers is planned for operation near the site in the fall of 1998. Additional trailer parks could be built in three to four months if construction activity at the plant increased rapidly. DOE is estimating maximum housing and, more importantly, school system impacts, based on the expectation that up to 70 percent of construction workers moving into the area would bring their families.

| Demand for housing by construction and operations workers in the vicinity of Bellefonte would increase during  
| the completion and operation of the plant. Data indicate that vacant permanent housing for sale and rent in  
| the vicinity of the Bellefonte plant is insufficient to meet this demand. It is anticipated, however, that the  
| completion and operation of Bellefonte will stimulate the construction of additional permanent housing, the  
| opening of new trailer parks, and the expansion of existing parks to meet this demand, thereby producing a  
| positive effect on the regional economy. It is expected that these new units also would meet permanent  
| housing requirements for plant operations workers and their families.

### **Employment and Income**

Peak employment during construction has been estimated at 4,500. Average employment for construction workers during the four years of the construction phase would be about 2,400 per year. Operations workers would average 800 per year over the operational life of the plant. Indirect employment (e.g., food, retail, banking) could reach an average at least equal to the number of operations workers. During the construction phase, indirect employment would be considerably higher. The effect of this change in employment at the county level would be high. Unemployment in 1997 averaged 8.2 percent. This could decline by very roughly half over the first few years of construction, and then unemployment likely would stabilize at least two points below the average. The unemployment rate would not drop by as much as the employment requirements would suggest. As the construction project escalated and the labor market tightened, the labor pool would expand from the influx of immigrating workers.

Total person-years of employment during construction, including operations staff, have been estimated at about 12,800 over the five-year construction phase. This level of employment should generate about \$835 million in direct labor earnings to the region of influence (i.e., wages and benefits). A large fraction of the locally generated income would be spent locally, and indirect economic impacts would be expected. By means of an income multiplier of 1.7, total earnings during the period would exceed approximately \$1.4 billion. This multiplier compares to the roughly 1.8 to 2.5 multipliers TVA used to estimate the impact of conversion of Bellefonte 1 to a nonnuclear plant (TVA 1997f).

Regional earnings during the period of plant operation have been estimated at a minimum of \$100 million per year. This estimate was developed using a multiplier of 1.8. The higher multiplier reflects the longer-term, more level injection of income into the region during operations than during construction. It is consistent with the multipliers used by TVA for the largest conversion scenario at Bellefonte.

### **Public Finance and Schools**

Construction and operation of Bellefonte 1 as a nuclear unit would generate about \$5.5 million per year in tax-equivalent payments (payments in-lieu-of-taxes) for Alabama. Tax revenues to the region of influence and Jackson County and, in part, to the Scottsboro-Hollywood area are derived from real estate taxes, motor vehicle taxes, and motor vehicle and mobile home sales taxes. Income and sales taxes are collected at the state level. Jackson County collected approximately \$9.4 million (roughly \$200 per capita) in taxes in 1997.

Completion of the plant would affect the school systems of Jackson County and Scottsboro City. The county school system has approximately 6,500 students; the city system, approximately 3,000. Roughly two-thirds of the students (about 6,300) are in the Scottsboro-Hollywood area and the Guntersville-to-Bridgeport corridor, the major impact areas within the county and the region of influence. School facilities within the Scottsboro-Hollywood area and the Guntersville-Bridgeport corridor have the capacity to accommodate about 7,850 students. The peak influx of schoolchildren associated with in-migrating construction and operations workers in the fourth year of construction would be an estimated 970 for the whole of Jackson County, consisting of about 640 in the Scottsboro-Hollywood area, 220 in the Guntersville-Bridgeport corridor, and the remainder in other parts of the county. DOE believes these estimates to be conservative. As discussed in the section on housing, more construction workers than expected could choose to live without their families in camper-trailers rather than with their families in apartments, mobile homes, or single-family homes. As a result, the increase in the number of schoolchildren associated with construction and operations workers would be lower than expected. The number of schoolchildren from the families of in-migrating operations workers would decline to about 325 from the sixth year onward. The impacts of schoolchildren from in-migrating families not directly associated with Bellefonte would be additional.

The Scottsboro school transportation system (excluding Hollywood) operates 26 buses on a dual-route system and 8 on a single-route system (for a maximum of 3,600 students). The actual number of students transported is less than 3,000, leaving a surplus of more than 600. The conversion of some of the 8 single-route buses to a dual-route system could accommodate the peak influx of about 600 students in the Scottsboro system (excluding about 40 students in Hollywood) from families of in-migrating construction and operation workers.

The Jackson County school transportation system would experience an impact similar to the Scottsboro school transportation system. By increasing the number of dual-route operations, the additional number of schoolchildren associated with construction and operation workers could be accommodated.


The combined Jackson County and Scottsboro Boards of Education receive about 40 percent of TVA's payment in-lieu-of-taxes. Completion of Bellefonte 1 would increase TVA's payment to about \$5.5 million. Assuming that the 40 percent share were maintained, this would translate into a payment to the Jackson County and Scottsboro boards of about \$2.2 million. Over the long term, a payment of \$2.2 million would exceed the increase in school costs attributable to students whose families directly support the operation of Bellefonte 1.

In the short term, however, construction of Bellefonte 1 would impose costs averaging almost twice Jackson County's likely long-term receipts from the TVA payment. The TVA payment would not reach the \$5.5 million level until plant operations began. Educational costs in the Scottsboro school system could increase by an estimated average of \$3 million per year (1997\$) for the three busiest years of the construction phase. This estimate includes the cost of hiring 37 additional teachers for the estimated 530 new students averaged over the three peak years of construction to maintain the current student-teacher ratio of about 14:1. The peak year of construction could require an additional 5 teachers over the three-year average of 37 to maintain the current student-teacher ratio. Average educational costs could rise to an estimated \$5,432 per student (1997\$), based on actual costs of \$5,120 per student for the 1995-96 school year plus inflation.

For the Jackson County school system (excluding Scottsboro but including Hollywood), educational costs could increase by an average of less than \$1.8 million per year (1997\$) for the three busiest years of the construction phase. This estimate includes the cost of hiring 23 additional teachers for the estimated 305 new students averaged over the three peak years to maintain the current student-teacher ratio of about 14:1. The peak year of construction could require an additional 4 teachers over the three-year average of 23 to maintain the current student-teacher ratio. Average educational costs could rise to an estimated at \$5,716 per student (1997\$), based on actual costs for the 1997-98 school year.


Assuming inflation-related increases of 3 percent per year in costs per student from the amounts reported above, average annual costs for the three-year period beginning with the 2001-2002 school year could rise to an estimated \$3.4 million per year for Scottsboro and \$1.9 million for the rest of Jackson County. These amounts are in the range of 18 percent and 4 percent of the current school system budgets for Scottsboro and Jackson County, respectively. The costs per student from in-migrating families not directly associated with Bellefonte would be additional.

Costs for the first two years would be well below the three-year construction period average and would allow a gradual phase-in of revenues and expenses to meet the costs associated with the increased student population. Figures 5-2 and 5-3 reflect the projected budget requirements for the first four years of construction versus the No Action Alternative for the Scottsboro and Jackson County school boards. To meet its expenses, the Scottsboro Board of Education could request additional funding from the State of Alabama.



**Figure 5-2 Scottsboro School Board Projected Budget, Completion of Bellefonte 1 Versus the No Action Alternative (FY 1999-2002)**

Source: Scottsboro 1998.



**Figure 5-3 Jackson County School Board Projected Budget, Completion of Bellefonte 1 Versus the No Action Alternative (FY 1999-2002)**

Source: Scottsboro 1998.



Additional tax revenues also would be generated by the increased economic activity involving the plant and plant workers. Such revenues (e.g., property taxes, income taxes, real estate transfer fees, sales taxes, motor vehicle taxes) are collected by or on behalf of the state government and then distributed to the jurisdictions.

The effect of an influx of families on other areas of public finance (e.g., fire, police, ambulance, hospitals) should be minimal. Additional and new equipment would be required for the police and fire departments, but these items could probably be accommodated within the overall expanding budgets arising from additional tax revenues and payments in-lieu-of-taxes.

#### *Local Transportation*

Traffic generated by construction activities associated with the completion of Bellefonte 1 could strain the capacity of the local road network. Traffic impacts during construction would be temporary and similar to the impacts described for the Bellefonte conversion project (TVA 1997f). During peak construction periods, U.S. Highway 72 could experience a 46 percent increase in traffic volume during morning and evening rush hours to the north, and a 48 percent increase in traffic volume to the south. Access roads to the Bellefonte site could experience more than an 80 percent increase in traffic volumes during these hours.

Increased traffic volumes during plant operations, attributable both to the commuting of 800 additional plant employees and to truck transport requirements, would decrease the available capacity of site access roads during morning and evening rush hours. The impacts would be lower than those experienced during peak construction. During plant operations, U.S. Highway 72 could experience a 13 percent increase in traffic volume during morning and evening rush hours to the north, and a 14 percent increase in traffic volume to the south. Access roads to the Bellefonte site could experience a 43 to 59 percent increase in traffic volumes during these hours. Additional truck traffic during plant operations would include a total of 16 shipments of TPBARs to and from the plant per year.

Possible measures that could be used to mitigate traffic volume impacts are physical improvements to the local roads or road network to increase capacity, including construction of additional vehicle lanes throughout road segments, construction of passing lanes in certain locations, or realignment to eliminate some of the no-passing zones. Employee programs that provide flexible hours also could reduce road travel during peak hours, and restrictions for trucks traveling during the peak hours could be made. Also, establishing employee programs and incentives for ride-sharing could be encouraged, and bus and/or vanpool programs could be initiated.

#### **5.2.3.8.2 Bellefonte 1 and 2**

##### **No Action**

The No Action Alternative requires continuation of the deferred status of Bellefonte 1 and 2. Therefore, no socioeconomic impacts are expected. Approximately 80 employees maintain the partially completed plant in its lay-up condition.

##### **Tritium Production**


Estimates of the staffing requirements needed to complete and operate Bellefonte 1 and 2 as a nuclear power plant are presented as Table 5-33. About 15,600 person-years will be needed through the six-year construction phase and 1,000 persons per year will be needed for plant operations. In terms of construction workers, completion of Bellefonte 1 and 2 is estimated to require about 10 percent more labor hours than completion of Bellefonte 1 alone, because all the common facilities were completed as part of Bellefonte 1. Peak employment would be about the same in either case; the additional Bellefonte 2-related employment would

occur mainly in the fifth and sixth years of the construction program. A comparison of the peak staffing levels by year for the No Action Alternative and for the completion of Bellefonte 1 and 2 is provided in Figure 5-4.

**Table 5-33 Staffing For Completion And Operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2**

Construction Year	Staffing (Peak)
1	1,400
2	3,000
3	4,000
4	4,500
5	3,900 (Bellefonte 1 operates)
6	2,000 (Bellefonte 2 operates)
7	1,000
8	1,000
9	1,000
10 to 40+	1,000

Source: TVA 1998a.



**Figure 5-4 Staffing for Completion and Operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2, Compared to No Action from First Year of Construction**

\*Operations at Bellefonte 1 begin.

\*\*Operations at Bellefonte 2 begin.

Sources: TVA 1998a, TVA 1997e.

Income estimates for construction and operations staff are based on local earnings of about \$65,000 per person-year, an estimate that is 30 percent higher than the estimated labor cost to complete and operate the facility as a nonnuclear plant. Such high compensation reflects the requirements levels for many categories of nuclear construction and operations and would provide increased revenues to the local economy.

Another potentially important socioeconomic benefit is the direct and indirect income associated with the procurement of equipment and supplies for completion of the plant. Millions of dollars would continue to be added to the local economy during the construction and operations period.

The largest impacts would be experienced in the Scottsboro-Hollywood area of Jackson County. A larger region of influence encompassing the commuting area would have a lesser effect. The reasons for the concentration of socioeconomic impacts within Jackson County and Scottsboro-Hollywood are several. First, Scottsboro-Hollywood—population approximately 15,000 (DOC 1998c)—is the only densely populated area within Jackson County. Second, due to the sparseness of the plant environs, local spending and indirect income generation from that spending are concentrated in the Scottsboro-Hollywood area. Third, procurement of goods and services by the plant and TVA outside Jackson County would be modest. Major impacts such as those relating to schools and taxes would be felt within the county, but not within the region of influence outside the county.

### *Population and Housing*

The completion of Bellefonte 1 and 2 would result in a temporary increase in population and income in the region of influence as a direct and indirect result of increased employment at the site. An estimated 33 percent of the construction workers and 50 percent of the operations workers would be expected to move into the area. This is consistent with the values in the *Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bellefonte Conversion Project* (TVA 1997f).

About 75 percent of the construction workers and 90 percent of the operations workers who moved would be expected to live in Jackson County. About 70 percent could be expected to live in the Scottsboro-Hollywood area, assuming housing were available. About 20 percent likely would be located along Route 79 and Route 72 in the valley between Guntersville and Bridgeport, with the remainder scattered throughout the county.

The influx of construction and plant operations personnel, plus families, would increase the population of Jackson County by about 3,500, or more than 7 percent. This influx within a period of four years would be about 80 percent greater than local growth in the seven years from 1990 through 1997. Within the Scottsboro-Hollywood area, the estimated peak population influx of about 2,300 workers and family members would represent a 15 percent overall population increase. Adding indirect employees and their families, the population influx into the Scottsboro-Hollywood area could exceed 25 percent at the peak. Peak population growth in Jackson County, including indirect employees and their families, would probably be no more than about 12 percent. Population impacts outside Jackson County would be small.

Most construction workers prefer not to buy permanent housing. Their housing needs would include rental homes and apartments, mobile homes, and camper-trailers. Operations workers generally purchase permanent single-family housing. Up to 70 percent of all incoming construction workers and 90 percent of all operations workers would be expected to bring their families. That number could be appreciably lower than 70 percent, depending on the availability of rentals and trailer parks for camper-trailers. Currently, trailer parks near the Bellefonte site are close to capacity. A trailer park with an estimated capacity of 250 campers/trailers is planned for operation near the site in the fall of 1998. Additional trailer parks could be built in three to four months if construction activity at the plant increased rapidly. DOE is estimating maximum housing and, more importantly, school system impacts, based on the expectation that up to 70 percent of construction workers moving into the area would bring their families.

Demand for housing by construction and operations workers in the vicinity of Bellefonte would increase during the completion and operation of the plant. Data indicate that vacant permanent housing for sale and rent in the vicinity of the Bellefonte plant is insufficient to meet this demand. It is anticipated, however, that the completion and operation of Bellefonte would stimulate the construction of additional permanent housing, the

opening of new trailer parks, and the expansion of existing parks to meet this demand, thereby producing a positive effect on the regional economy. It is expected that these new units also would meet permanent housing requirements for plant operations workers and their families.

### *Employment and Income*

Peak employment during construction has been estimated at 4,500. Average employment during the middle four years of the construction phase would be about 3,650 per year. Operations workers would average 1,000 per year over the operational life of the plant. Indirect employment (e.g., food, retail, banking) could reach an average at least equal to the number of operations workers. During the construction phase, indirect employment would be considerably higher. The effect of this change in employment in Jackson County would be high. Unemployment in 1997 averaged 8.2 percent. This would be expected to decline to perhaps 3 percent over the first few years of construction, and then likely would stabilize at least two points below the average. The unemployment rate would not drop by as much as the employment requirements would suggest. As the construction project escalated and the labor market tightened, the labor pool would expand from the influx of immigrating workers.

Total person-years of employment during construction, including operations staff, have been estimated at about 15,600 over the six-year construction phase. This level of employment should generate about \$1 billion in direct labor earnings to the region of influence (i.e., wages and benefits). A large fraction of the locally generated income would be spent locally, and indirect economic impacts would be expected. By means of an income multiplier of 1.7, total earnings during the period have been estimated at more than \$1.7 billion. This multiplier compares to the roughly 1.8 to 2.5 multipliers TVA used to estimate the impact of conversion of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant to a nonnuclear plant (TVA 1997e).

Regional earnings during the period of plant operation have been estimated at a minimum of \$115 million per year. This estimate was developed using a multiplier of 1.8. The higher multiplier reflects the longer-term, more level injection of income into the region during operations than during construction. It is consistent with the multipliers used by TVA for the largest conversion scenario at Bellefonte.

### *Public Finance and Schools*

Construction and operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2 as a nuclear plant would generate more than \$8 million per year in tax-equivalent payments (payments in-lieu-of-taxes) for Alabama. Tax revenues to the region of influence and Jackson County and, in part, to the Scottsboro-Hollywood area are derived from real estate taxes, motor vehicle taxes, and motor vehicle and mobile home sales taxes. Income and sales taxes are collected at the state level. Jackson County collected approximately \$9.4 million (roughly \$200 per capita) in taxes in 1997.

Completion of the plant would affect the school systems of Jackson County and Scottsboro City. The Jackson County school system has approximately 6,500 students; the city system, approximately 3,000. Roughly two-thirds of the students (about 6,300) are in the Scottsboro-Hollywood area and the Guntersville-to-Bridgeport corridor, the major impact areas within the county and the region of influence. School facilities within the Scottsboro-Hollywood area and Guntersville-Bridgeport corridor have the capacity to accommodate about 7,850 students. The peak influx of schoolchildren associated with in-migrating construction and operations workers in the fourth year of construction would be an estimated 1,055 for the whole of Jackson County, consisting of about 700 in the Scottsboro-Hollywood area, 235 in the Guntersville-Bridgeport corridor, and the remainder in other parts of the county. DOE believes these estimates to be conservative. As discussed in the section on housing, more construction workers than expected could choose to live without their families in camper-trailers rather than with their families in apartments, mobile homes, or single-family homes. As a result, the increase in the number of schoolchildren associated with construction and operations workers would

be lower than expected. The number of schoolchildren from the families of in-migrating operations workers would decline to about 400 from the seventh year onward. The impacts of schoolchildren from in-migrating families not directly associated with Bellefonte would be additional.

The Scottsboro school transportation system (excluding Hollywood) operates 26 buses on a dual-route system and 8 on a single-route system (for a maximum of 3,600 students). The actual number of students transported is less than 3,000, leaving a surplus of more than 600. The conversion of some of the 8 single-route buses to a dual-route system could accommodate the peak influx of about 655 students in the Scottsboro system (excluding about 45 students in Hollywood) from families of in-migrating construction and operation workers.

The Jackson County school transportation system would experience an impact similar to the Scottsboro school transportation system. By increasing the number of dual-route operations, the additional number of schoolchildren associated with construction and operation workers could be accommodated.

The combined Jackson County and Scottsboro Boards of Education receive about 40 percent of TVA's payment in-lieu-of-taxes. Completion of Bellefonte 1 and 2 would increase TVA's payment to about \$8 million. Assuming that the 40 percent share were maintained, this would translate into a payment to the Jackson County and Scottsboro boards of about \$3.2 million. Over the long term, a payment of \$3.2 million would exceed the increase in school costs attributable to students whose families directly support the operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2.

In the short term, however, construction of Bellefonte 1 and 2 would impose costs averaging almost twice Jackson County's likely long-term receipts from the TVA payment. The TVA payment would not reach the \$8 million level until plant operations began. Educational costs in the Scottsboro school system could increase by an estimated average of \$3.5 million per year (1997\$) for the three busiest years of the construction phase. This estimate includes the cost of hiring 43 additional teachers for the estimated 615 new students averaged over the three peak years of construction to maintain the current student-teacher ratio of about 14:1. The peak year of construction could require an additional 3 teachers over the three-year average of 43 to maintain the current student-teacher ratio. Average educational costs could rise to an estimated \$5,432 per student (1997\$), based on actual costs of \$5,120 per student for the 1995-96 school year plus inflation.

For the Jackson County school system (excluding Scottsboro but including Hollywood), educational costs could increase by an average of less than \$2.1 million per year (1997\$) for the three busiest years of the construction phase. This estimate includes the cost of hiring 23 additional teachers for the estimated 355 new students averaged over the three peak years to maintain the current student-teacher ratio of about 14:1. The peak year of construction could require an additional 6 teachers over the three-year average of 23 to maintain the current student-teacher ratio. Average educational costs could rise to an estimated \$5,716 per student (1997\$), based on actual costs for the 1997-98 school year.

Assuming inflation-related increases of 3 percent per year in costs per student from the amounts reported above, average annual costs for the three-year period beginning with the 2001-2002 school year could rise to an estimated \$3.9 million per year for Scottsboro and \$2.3 million for the rest of Jackson County. These amounts are in the range of 20 percent and 4 percent of the current school system budgets for Scottsboro and Jackson County, respectively. The costs per student from in-migrating families not directly associated with Bellefonte would be additional.

Costs for the first two years would be well below the three-year construction period average and would allow a gradual phase-in of revenues and expenses to meet the costs associated with the increased student population. Figures 5-5 and 5-6 reflect the projected budget requirements for the first four years of construction versus the No Action Alternative for the Scottsboro and Jackson County School Boards. These growth rates are similar to those for the case in which only Bellefonte Unit 1 is completed, as the differential impacts of




Figure 5-5 Scottsboro School Board Projected Budget, Completion of Bellefonte 1 and 2 Versus the No Action Alternative (FY 1999-2002)

completing Unit 2 become greater in the fifth year of construction. To meet its expenses, the Scottsboro Board of Education could request additional funding from the State of Alabama.

Source: Scottsboro 1998.




Figure 5-6 Jackson County School Board Projected Budget, Completion of Bellefonte 1 and 2 Versus the No Action Alternative (FY 1999-2002)

Source: Scottsboro 1998.

Additional tax revenues also would be generated by the increased economic activity involving the plant and plant workers. Such revenues (e.g., property taxes, income taxes, real estate transfer fees, sales taxes, motor vehicle taxes) are collected by or on behalf of the state government and then distributed to the jurisdictions. The effect of an influx of families on other areas of public finance (e.g., fire, police, ambulance, hospitals) should be minimal. Additional and new equipment would be required for the police and fire departments, but these items could probably be accommodated within the overall expanding budgets arising from additional tax revenues and payments in-lieu-of-taxes.

### **Local Transportation**

Traffic generated by construction activities associated with the completion of Bellefonte 1 and 2 could strain the capacity of the local road network. Traffic impacts during construction would be temporary and similar to the impacts described for the Bellefonte conversion project (TVA 1997f). During peak construction periods, U.S. Highway 72 could experience a 46 percent increase in traffic volume during morning and evening rush hours to the north, and a 48 percent increase in traffic volume to the south. Access roads to the Bellefonte site could experience more than an 80 percent increase in traffic volumes during these hours.

Increased traffic volumes during plant operations, attributable both to the commuting of 1,000 additional plant employees and to truck transport requirements, would decrease the available capacity of site access roads during morning and evening rush hours. The impacts would be lower than those experienced during peak construction. During plant operations, U.S. Highway 72 could experience a 16 percent increase in traffic volume during morning and evening rush hours to the north and a 17 percent increase in traffic volume to the south. Access roads to the Bellefonte site could experience a 48 to 64 percent increase in traffic volumes during these hours. Additional truck traffic during plant operations would include a total of 16 shipments of TPBARs to and from the plant per year.

Possible measures that could be used to mitigate traffic volume impacts are physical improvements to the local roads or road network to increase capacity, including construction of additional vehicle lanes throughout road segments, construction of passing lanes in certain locations, or realignment to eliminate some of the no-passing zones. employee programs that provide flexible hours also could reduce road travel during peak hours, and restrictions for trucks traveling during the peak hours could be made. Also, establishing employee programs and incentives for ride-sharing could be encouraged, and bus and/or vanpool programs could be initiated.

### **5.2.3.9 Public and Occupational Health and Safety**

This section describes the impacts of radiological and hazardous chemical releases resulting from the construction activities required to complete the units, as well as the normal operation, abnormal conditions, or accidents due to tritium production at Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2.

#### **5.2.3.9.1 Normal Operation**

#### **RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS**

The annual gaseous radioactive emissions and liquid radioactive effluents from the production of tritium at Bellefonte 1 are presented in Sections 5.2.3.3 and 5.2.3.4, respectively. Presented in Table 5-34 are the radiological impacts of both gaseous and liquid radioactive releases on the maximally exposed offsite individual and on the general public living within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of Bellefonte 1 in the year 2025. Table 5-35 provides the radiological impacts on the facility workers. A facility worker is defined as any "monitored" reactor plant employee. Doses to these workers would be kept to minimal levels through programs to keep worker doses as low as reasonably achievable. The tables include the impacts of the No

Action Alternative and, for comparison purposes, the estimated radiological impacts of operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2 without tritium production (0 TPBARs). These values are based on the Bellefonte Final

**Table 5-34 Annual Radiological Impacts from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Bellefonte 1**

Tritium Production	Release Media	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual		Population Within 80 kilometers (50 miles) for the Year 2025	
		Dose (millirem)	Latent Fatal Cancer Risk	Dose (person-rem)	Latent Fatal Cancers
No Action (not operating)	Air	0	0	0	0
	Liquid	0	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	0	0
0 TPBARs <sup>a</sup> (operation without tritium production)	Air	0.25	$1.3 \times 10^{-7}$	0.27	0.00014
	Liquid	0.012	$6.0 \times 10^{-9}$	1.1	0.00055
	Total	0.26	$1.4 \times 10^{-7}$	1.4	0.00069
Incremental dose for 1,000 TPBARs	Air	0.0020	$1.0 \times 10^{-9}$	0.13	0.000065
	Liquid	0.0012	$6.0 \times 10^{-10}$	0.14	0.000070
Total dose for 1,000 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	Air	0.25	$1.3 \times 10^{-7}$	0.40	0.00020
	Liquid	0.013	$6.5 \times 10^{-9}$	1.2	0.00060
	Total	0.26	$1.3 \times 10^{-7}$	1.6	0.00080
Incremental dose for 3,400 TPBARs	Air	0.0065	$3.3 \times 10^{-9}$	0.44	0.00022
	Liquid	0.0042	$2.1 \times 10^{-9}$	0.47	0.00024
Total dose for 3,400 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	Air	0.26	$1.3 \times 10^{-7}$	0.71	0.00036
	Liquid	0.016	$8.0 \times 10^{-9}$	1.6	0.00080
	Total	0.28	$1.4 \times 10^{-7}$	2.3	0.0012

<sup>a</sup> AEC 1974.

<sup>b</sup> The total values are a summation of incremental impacts attributable to tritium production and estimated Bellefonte 1 operational impacts.

Note: The impacts from Bellefonte 1 and 2 operation would be twice those for Bellefonte 1.

Environmental Statement (AEC 1974). Based on actual experience at Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 (see Tables 5-4 and 5-14), the actual values are expected to be lower.

Background information on the effects of radiation to human health and safety is included in Appendix C. The calculation method and assumptions are presented in Appendix C, Section C.3.



**Table 5-35 Annual Radiological Impacts to Workers from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Bellefonte 1**

<i>Impact</i>	<i>No Action<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>0 TPBARs<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>1,000 TPBARs</i>	<i>Total With 1,000 TPBARs<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>3,400 TPBARs</i>	<i>Total With 3,400 TPBARs<sup>c</sup></i>
Average worker dose (millirem) <sup>d</sup>	0	104	0.33	104.33	1.1	105.1
Latent fatal cancer risk	0	$4.2 \times 10^{-5}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-7}$	$4.2 \times 10^{-5}$	$4.5 \times 10^{-7}$	$4.2 \times 10^{-5}$
Total worker dose (person-rem)	0	112	0.35	112.35	1.2	113.2
Latent fatal cancers	0	0.045	0.00014	0.045	0.00048	0.045

- <sup>a</sup> These no action values represent the absence of impacts associated with the nonoperational status of Bellefonte.
  - <sup>b</sup> The 0 TPBARs entry is included for consistency with the Watts Bar and Sequoyah analyses.
  - <sup>c</sup> These values are a summation of incremental impacts and estimated single Bellefonte unit operational (baseline) impacts. "Baseline" impacts are defined as those impacts that result from normal plant (design specification) operation (i.e., operations without tritium production activities).
  - <sup>d</sup> Based on 1,073 badged workers.
- Note: The impacts from Bellefonte 1 and 2 are twice those for Bellefonte 1.  
 Sources: TVA 1998d, TVA 1998e.

### No Action

Under the No Action Alternative, the health and safety risk of members of the public and facility workers at Bellefonte 1 would remain at the level associated with the natural background radiation.

### Tritium Production

#### Construction

During construction, no radioactive materials would be handled. Therefore, there would be no radiological impacts on the workers and the general population.

#### Operation

During tritium production, the health and safety risk of the public and facility workers would increase as a function of Bellefonte's normal operation as a nuclear reactor facility and the estimated releases of tritium in gaseous emissions and liquid effluents. As shown in Tables 5-34 and 5-35, for 3,400 TPBARs in the reactor core:

- The annual dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual would be 0.28 millirem per year, with an associated  $1.4 \times 10^{-7}$  latent cancer fatality per year of operation. This dose is 1.1 percent of the annual total dose limit of 25 millirem set by regulations in 40 CFR 190.
- The collective dose to the population within 50 miles of Bellefonte 1 would be 2.3 person-rem per year, with an associated 0.0012 latent cancer fatality per year of operation.
- The collective dose to the facility workers would be 113.2 person-rem per year, with an associated 0.045 latent cancer fatality per year of operation.

In addition to the assumed normal operation release of tritium through permeation, an additional potential release scenario considered in this EIS is the failure of 1 or more TPBARs such that the inventory of the TPBARs is released to the primary coolant. The occurrence of TPBAR failure is considered to be beyond that

associated with normal operating conditions and, as discussed in Section 1.9, such an assumption is extremely conservative. The radiological consequences to the public and workers resulting from the assumption of 2 TPBAR failures in a given core load of 3,400 TPBARs at Bellefonte 1 are presented in Tables 5-36 and 5-37. Releases, doses, and cancer risk associated with 1 TPBAR failure can be determined by dividing the values in Tables 5-36 and 5-37 by two.

**Table 5-36 Radiological Impacts to the Public from the Failure of 2 TPBARs at Bellefonte 1**

<i>Release Pathway</i>	<i>Release Quantity (Curies)</i>	<i>Dose to Maximally Exposed Individual (millirem)</i>	<i>Latent Fatal Cancer Risk</i>	<i>Dose to Population Within 80 kilometers (50 miles) (person-rem)</i>	<i>Latent Fatal Cancers</i>
Air	2,315	0.045	$2.3 \times 10^{-4}$	3.0	0.0015
Liquid	20,835	0.028	$1.4 \times 10^{-4}$	3.2	0.0016

**Table 5-37 Radiological Impacts to Workers from the Failure of 2 TPBARs at Bellefonte 1**

<i>Impact Type</i>	<i>Impact Quantity</i>
Average Worker Dose (millirem)*	7.7
Latent Fatal Cancer Risk	$3.1 \times 10^{-6}$
Total Worker Dose (person-rem)	8.2
Latent Fatal Cancers	0.0033

\* Based on 1,073 badged workers.

Note: The impacts from Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2 are twice that for Bellefonte 1.

Source: TVA 1998d, TVA 1998e.

## HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL IMPACTS

### No Action

Under the No Action Alternative, no additional impacts on public and occupational health and safety from exposure to hazardous chemicals are anticipated at Bellefonte 1 and 2 beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

### Tritium Production

Analyses of impacts on public and occupational health and safety from exposure to hazardous chemicals are presented separately for construction and operations activities.

#### Construction

Construction activities at the Bellefonte plant could release a number of hazardous chemicals to the atmosphere, as discussed in Section 5.2.3.3 and presented in Table 5-22. The estimated annual and daily airborne concentrations of these chemicals at the location of the maximally exposed offsite individual during construction of both Bellefonte 1 and 2 are presented in Table 5-38. Airborne concentrations were estimated using the method described in Section 5.2.3.3 and Appendix C, Section C.4. Table 5-38 also presents the

EPA Inhalation Cancer Unit Risk Factor values for the carcinogenic chemicals (e.g., formaldehyde, arsenic, beryllium, cadmium, chromium, and nickel) and the Reference Concentration values for the noncarcinogenic chemicals (e.g., beryllium, manganese, and mercury). Application of the estimated airborne concentrations to the chemical-specific inhalation cancer unit risk factor and Reference Concentration values, as described in Section C.4, enables estimation of the potential adverse health effects for the maximally exposed offsite individual. For the noncarcinogens, these estimates are chemical-specific Hazard Quotient values; for the carcinogens, they are probabilities of excess latent cancer incidence. Both types of estimates are also presented in Table 5-38.

**Table 5-38 Cancer and Noncancer Adverse Health Impacts from Exposure to Hazardous Chemicals at Bellefonte 1 and 2 During Construction**

<i>Chemical</i>	<i>Estimated Annual Airborne Concentration<sup>a</sup> (μg/m<sup>3</sup>)</i>	<i>Estimated Daily Airborne Concentration<sup>a</sup> (μg/m<sup>3</sup>)</i>	<i>Reference Concentration<sup>b</sup> (μg/m<sup>3</sup>)</i>	<i>Cancer Inhalation Unit Risk Factor<sup>c</sup> (cancers/(μg/m<sup>3</sup>))</i>	<i>Hazard Quotient<sup>d</sup></i>	<i>MEI Cancer Incidence Probability<sup>e</sup></i>
Formaldehyde	$8.5 \times 10^{-5}$	0.031	Not applicable	0.000013	Not applicable	$1 \times 10^{-9}$
Arsenic	$9 \times 10^{-7}$	0.0003	Not applicable	0.0043	Not applicable	$4 \times 10^{-9}$
Beryllium	$5 \times 10^{-7}$	0.0002	0.02	0.0024	0.01	$1 \times 10^{-9}$
Cadmium	$2.3 \times 10^{-6}$	0.00083	Not applicable	0.0018	Not applicable	$4 \times 10^{-9}$
Chromium	$1.4 \times 10^{-5}$	0.005	Not applicable	0.012	Not applicable	$2 \times 10^{-7}$
Manganese	$2.9 \times 10^{-6}$	0.001	0.05	Not applicable	0.02	Not applicable
Mercury	$6 \times 10^{-7}$	0.0002	0.3	Not applicable	0.0007	Not applicable
Nickel	$3.6 \times 10^{-5}$	0.013	Not applicable	0.00048	Not applicable	$2 \times 10^{-8}$

MEI = maximally exposed individual  
 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  = micrograms per cubic meter

- <sup>a</sup> Estimates of annual and daily airborne concentrations developed by using the ISC3 air dispersion model. See Appendix C, Section C.4, for additional information.
- <sup>b</sup> Reference Concentration values are estimates, with uncertainties spanning perhaps an order of magnitude, of a daily exposure to the human population (including sensitive subgroups) that is likely to be without appreciable risk of deleterious effects during a lifetime. Values are developed by the EPA (EPA 1997a, EPA 1998).
- <sup>c</sup> Cancer Inhalation Unit Risk Factors are estimates of the cancer potency of carcinogens by the inhalation pathway. Values are developed by the EPA (EPA 1997a, EPA 1998).
- <sup>d</sup> Hazard Quotient estimates are developed by dividing the estimated daily airborne concentration by the Reference Concentration. Hazard Quotient estimates are chemical-specific measures of potential noncancer health effects. The Hazard Index is the sum of the Hazard Quotient values. Hazard Index values of less than one suggest low concern for noncancer effects as a result of the exposure, whereas Hazard Index values of greater than one suggest a potential for noncancer effects.
- <sup>e</sup> The offsite population maximally exposed individual cancer incidence probability is estimated by multiplying the estimated annual airborne concentration by the Cancer Inhalation Unit Risk Factor. See Appendix C, Section C.4 for additional information.

For the noncarcinogenic chemicals, the chemical-specific Hazard Quotient values are summed to generate a Hazard Index value. Hazard Index values lower than 1 suggest that the offsite receptor likely would not experience adverse noncancer health effects as a result of the exposure. The Hazard Index value for the noncarcinogenic chemicals presented in Table 5-38 is 0.03.

The highest probability estimate for excess latent cancer incidence presented in Table 5-38 ( $2 \times 10^{-7}$  for chromium) is lower than the 1 in 1 million established by the EPA as the lower bound of concern. This value suggests that exposure to chromium released from construction activity would result in 2 in 10 million additional chances of cancer incidence for the maximally exposed offsite individual. This estimate is actually

higher than would be expected, because all of the released chromium was conservatively assumed to be in the form of chromium VI, which is carcinogenic. Actual releases of chromium also would include some amount of chromium III, which is not carcinogenic.

### Operation

During normal operation, the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant could release a number of toxic chemicals to the atmosphere. These chemicals, discussed in Section 5.2.3.3 (Table 5-24), include carcinogenic (e.g., benzene, acetaldehyde, formaldehyde, arsenic, cadmium, chromium VI, and nickel) and noncarcinogenic (e.g., toluene, acetaldehyde, acrolein, manganese, and mercury) substances. The annual and daily airborne concentrations of these chemicals were estimated at the location of the maximally exposed offsite individual using the method described in Section 5.2.3.3 and Appendix C, Section C.4. The concentrations from the operation of both Bellefonte 1 and 2 are presented in Table 5-39. The table presents the EPA's Inhalation Cancer Unit Risk Factor values for the carcinogens and the Reference Concentration values for the noncarcinogens. Also presented are the chemical-specific Hazard Quotient estimates for noncarcinogens and the probability estimates for excess latent cancer incidence for carcinogens.

**Table 5-39 Cancer and Noncancer Adverse Health Impacts from Exposure to Hazardous Chemicals at Bellefonte 1 and 2 During Normal Operation**

Chemical	Estimated Annual Airborne Concentration <sup>a</sup> ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	Estimated Daily Airborne Concentration <sup>a</sup> ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	Reference Concentration <sup>b</sup> ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	Cancer Inhalation Unit Risk Factor <sup>c</sup> (cancers/ $(\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3)$ )	Hazard Quotient <sup>d</sup>	MEI Cancer Incidence Probability <sup>e</sup>
Benzene	0.0002	0.15	Not applicable	$8.3 \times 10^{-6}$	Not applicable	$2 \times 10^{-9}$
Toluene	0.00008	0.06	400	Not applicable	0.0002	Not applicable
Formaldehyde	0.0015	0.085	Not applicable	0.000013	Not applicable	$2 \times 10^{-4}$
Acetaldehyde	$9 \times 10^{-6}$	0.012	9	$2.2 \times 10^{-6}$	0.0013	$2 \times 10^{-11}$
Acrolein	$2.5 \times 10^{-6}$	0.002	0.02	Not applicable	0.1	Not applicable
Arsenic	0.000015	0.00062	Not applicable	0.0043	Not applicable	$6 \times 10^{-4}$
Cadmium	0.000039	0.0016	Not applicable	0.0018	Not applicable	$7 \times 10^{-4}$
Chromium VI	0.00024	0.0098	Not applicable	0.012	Not applicable	$3 \times 10^{-6}$
Manganese	0.00005	0.002	0.05	Not applicable	0.04	Not applicable
Mercury	0.000011	0.00044	0.3	Not applicable	0.001	Not applicable
Nickel	0.0006	0.025	Not applicable	0.00048	Not applicable	$3 \times 10^{-7}$

MEI = maximally exposed individual

$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  = micrograms per cubic meter

- <sup>a</sup> Estimates of annual and daily airborne concentrations were developed by using the ISC3 air dispersion model. See Appendix C, Section C.4, for additional information. Note that 24-hour maximum daily concentrations were used to calculate Hazard Quotient values in order to be conservative.
- <sup>b</sup> Reference Concentration values are estimates, with uncertainties spanning perhaps an order of magnitude, of a daily exposure to the human population (including sensitive subgroups) that is likely to be without appreciable risk of deleterious effects during a lifetime. Values are developed by the EPA (EPA 1997a).
- <sup>c</sup> Cancer Inhalation Unit Risk Factors are estimates of the cancer potency of carcinogens by the inhalation pathway. Values are developed by the EPA (EPA 1997a).
- <sup>d</sup> Hazard Quotient estimates are developed by dividing the estimated daily airborne concentration by the Reference Concentration. Hazard Quotient estimates are chemical-specific measures of potential noncancer health effects. The Hazard Index is the sum of the Hazard Quotient values. Hazard Index values of less than one suggest low concern for noncancer effects as a result of the exposure, whereas, Hazard Index values of greater than one suggest a potential for noncancer effects.
- <sup>e</sup> The offsite population maximally exposed individual cancer incidence probability is estimated by multiplying the estimated annual airborne concentration by the Cancer Inhalation Unit Risk Factor. See Appendix C, Section C.4, for additional information.

The sum of all of the Hazard Quotient estimates is called the Hazard Index. Hazard Index values lower than 1 suggest that the offsite receptor likely would not experience adverse noncancer health effects as a result of the exposure. The Hazard Index value for the noncarcinogenic chemicals presented in Table 5-39 is 0.1, which is considerably lower than 1.

The only probability of excess latent cancer incidence greater than 1 in 1 million (the lower EPA bound for concern) is the probability attributed to chromium VI: 3 in 1 million ( $3 \times 10^{-6}$ ). However, all the chromium was conservatively assumed to be in the form of chromium VI, which is carcinogenic. Actual releases of chromium also would include some amount of chromium III, which is not carcinogenic.

The health risk estimates presented in Table 5-39 assume that the airborne pathway would be the exposure route of most importance because aqueous waste streams would be treated before release to potable water sources. The hazardous trace chemicals in Table 5-39 would be generated by operating the support and backup systems identified in the footnote to Table 5-24. These are primarily internal combustion systems with engineering controls that emit combustion byproducts considered to be point sources and, therefore, are emitted through exhaust stacks above the level where they would affect workers in the immediate vicinity of the emission source. The backup systems are run on periodic schedules for testing. Because of their infrequent operation, engineering controls, and external emissions, the hazardous trace chemicals generated by these systems pose no hazard to plant workers during operations.

Other potential occupational health risks for facility workers were not estimated because their exposures to additional hazardous chemicals would be adequately controlled by procedural, engineering, and personal protective methods. Historically, facility worker exposures have been well under the permissible exposure levels of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the threshold limits values of the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists.

#### ENERGIZING TRANSMISSION LINES FROM BELLEFONTE 1 AND 2

##### No Action

Under the No Action Alternative, construction of Bellefonte 1 and 2 would not be completed. Unenergized transmission lines from the plant switchyard would remain unenergized; therefore, no impacts would be expected.

##### Tritium Production

Operation of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant would result in energizing approximately 20 miles of 500-kilovolt line leading from the Bellefonte switchyard to the 500-kilovolt line connecting the Widows Creek and Huntsville substations. All other transmission lines in the vicinity of Bellefonte are currently in use. The Bellefonte Final Environmental Statement (AEC 1974) addressed the environmental impacts of transmission lines. Issues associated with their activation include ozone from corona effects, compatibility with communications equipment, and electromagnetic field effects.

Ozone can be produced from corona discharges (ionization of the air) in the operation of transmission lines and substations, particularly at the higher voltages. It can be harmful if breathed in sufficient concentrations over prolonged periods. However, it is not considered to be injurious to vegetation, animals, and humans unless concentrations exceed 0.05 parts per million. According to the Bellefonte Final Environmental Statement, any levels of ozone that could reasonably be expected to be generated by Bellefonte's transmission lines would be environmentally inconsequential.

High-voltage power lines operating close to telephone and signaling equipment can produce undesirable effects on the communication circuit through inductive coupling. However, it is TVA's normal practice to send transmission line vicinity maps to railroad and telephone companies having tracks or communication lines in the general area of proposed power lines for the purpose of making inductive coordination studies. If corrective action is indicated, the problem is jointly studied and any required changes are mutually resolved (AEC 1974).

During the past two decades, the potential role of electromagnetic fields in causing or promoting cancer or other adverse health effects has been the subject of scientific investigation and public concern. If Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 were selected for production of tritium, electric power lines to the plant would be activated. Like all such lines, the power lines to Bellefonte would act as a source of weak, extremely low frequency electrical and magnetic fields. While research in electromagnetic field health effects is continuing, there is no conclusive scientific evidence of a "significant" link between cancer and power line fields. In 1995, the American Physical Society (APS 1995) concluded that: "While it is impossible to prove that no deleterious health effects occur from exposure to any environmental factor, it is necessary to demonstrate a consistent, significant, and causal relationship before one can conclude that such effects do occur. From this standpoint, the conjectures relating cancer to power line fields have not been scientifically substantiated." In response to a Congressional request to review the literature concerning potential electromagnetic field health effects, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS 1996) observed: "Based on a comprehensive evaluation of published studies relating to the effects of power-frequency electric and magnetic fields on cells, tissues, and organisms (including humans), the conclusion of the committee is that the current body of evidence does not show that exposure to these fields presents a human-health hazard." While TVA recognizes that continuing research may establish a credible link between adverse health effects and exposure to power line fields, it has concluded that no mitigation of potential electromagnetic field health effects would be implemented at the Bellefonte site until such a link is conclusively established through scientific investigation.

#### **5.2.3.9.2 Facility Accidents**

##### **RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS**

The accident set selected for evaluation of impacts of the No Action Alternative and tritium production are described in Section 5.1 and discussed in detail in Appendix D, Section D.1. The consequences of the reactor and nonreactor design-basis accidents at Bellefonte 1 for the no-tritium-production case (0 TPBARs) and for the maximum tritium production case (3,400 TPBARs) were estimated using the NRC-based deterministic approach presented in the *Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report* (TVA 1991), the receptors being an individual at the reactor site exclusion area boundary and an individual located at the reactor site low-population zone. The margin of safety for site dose criteria associated with the same accidents and the same receptors are presented in Table 5-40. Data presented for the no-tritium-production case were extracted directly from the *Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report*. As indicated in Table 5-41, the irradiation of TPBARs at Bellefonte 1 would result in a very small increase in design-basis accident consequences and a reduction in the consequence margin. The accident consequences would be dominated by the effects of the same nuclide releases inherent to operation without tritium production. If constructed, Bellefonte 2 accident consequences would be the same as those for Bellefonte 1.

Table 5-40 Design-Basis Accident Consequence Margin to Site Dose Criteria at Bellefonte 1

Accident	Tritium Production	Dose Description <sup>a</sup>	Site Dose Criteria (rem) <sup>b</sup>	Individual at Area Exclusion Boundary		Individual at Low Population Zone	
				Dose (rem)	Margin (%) <sup>c</sup>	Dose (rem)	Margin (%) <sup>c</sup>
Reactor design-basis accident	0 TPBARs <sup>d</sup>	Thyroid inhalation dose	300	5.8	98.1	2.7	99.1
		Beta + gamma whole body dose	25	0.031	99.9	0.18	99.3
	3,400 TPBARs	Thyroid inhalation dose	300	5.9	98.0	2.7	99.1
		Beta + gamma whole body dose	25	0.032	99.9	0.18	99.3
Nonreactor design-basis accident	0 TPBARs <sup>d</sup>	Thyroid inhalation dose	300	0.0067	99.998	0.0019	99.999
		Beta + gamma whole body dose	25	0.71	97.2	0.14	99.4
	3,400 TPBARs	Thyroid inhalation dose	300	0.029	99.99	0.0064	99.998
		Beta + gamma whole body dose	25	0.71	97.2	0.14	99.4

- <sup>a</sup> Dose is the total dose from the reactor plus the contribution from the TPBARs.
- <sup>b</sup> 10 CFR 100.11.
- <sup>c</sup> Margin below the site dose criteria.
- <sup>d</sup> TVA 1991.

Table 5-41 presents the total risks of the postulated set of design-basis, handling, and beyond design-basis accidents to the maximally exposed offsite individual, an average individual in the public within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the reactor site, and a noninvolved worker 640 meters (0.4 mile) from the release point. Accident consequences to the same receptors are summarized in Table 5-42. The assessments of dose and the associated cancer risk to the noninvolved worker are not applicable for beyond design-basis accidents. A site emergency would have been declared early in the accident sequence; all nonessential site personnel would have evacuated the site in accordance with site emergency procedures before any radiological release to the environment; and in accordance with emergency action guidelines, evacuation of the public within 16.1 kilometers (10 miles) of the plant would have been initiated.

Presented in Tables 5-41 and 5-42 are the risks and consequences without tritium production (0 TPBARs) and with maximum tritium production (3,400 TPBARs) for severe reactor accidents. The tritium release is governed by the nature of the core melt accident scenarios analyzed, and the accident risks and consequences are governed by actions taken in accordance with the EPA Protective Action Guidelines (e.g., evacuation of the public, interdiction of the food and water supply, condemnation of farmland and public property) in response to the postulated core melt accident with containment failure or containment bypass.

The severity of the reactor accident dominates the consequences, is the basis for implementation of protective actions, and is independent of the number of TPBARs. Accident risk is the product of the accident probability (i.e., accident frequency) times the accident consequences. In this EIS, risk is expressed as the increased likelihood of cancer fatality per year for an individual (i.e., the maximally exposed offsite individual, an average individual in the population within 80 kilometers [50 miles] of the reactor site, or a noninvolved worker). Table 5-41 indicates that the risks associated with tritium production are low. The highest risk to each individual—the maximally exposed offsite individual, one fatality every 2.8 million years ( $3.6 \times 10^{-7}$  per year); an average member of the public, one fatality every 1.3 billion years ( $8.0 \times 10^{-10}$  per year); the exposed

population, one fatality every 4.6 thousand years (0.00022 per year); and a noninvolved worker, one fatality every 230 billion years ( $4.3 \times 10^{-12}$  per year)—is from the nonreactor design-basis accident.

Table 5-41 Annual Accident Risks at Bellefonte 1

Accident	Tritium Production Core	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual <sup>a</sup>	Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles) <sup>a</sup>	Noninvolved Worker <sup>a</sup>
<b>Design-Basis Accidents</b>				
Reactor design-basis accident	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	$3.3 \times 10^{-9}$ <sup>c</sup>	$1.4 \times 10^{-12}$ <sup>c</sup>	<sup>d</sup>
	1,000 TPBARs	$3.3 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.5 \times 10^{-12}$	$2.4 \times 10^{-15}$ <sup>e</sup>
	3,400 TPBARs	$3.3 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.9 \times 10^{-12}$	$8.0 \times 10^{-15}$ <sup>e</sup>
Nonreactor design-basis accident	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	$3.5 \times 10^{-7}$ <sup>c</sup>	$3.8 \times 10^{-11}$ <sup>c</sup>	<sup>d</sup>
	1,000 TPBARs	$3.5 \times 10^{-7}$	$2.6 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-12}$ <sup>e</sup>
	3,400 TPBARs	$3.6 \times 10^{-7}$	$8.0 \times 10^{-10}$	$4.3 \times 10^{-12}$ <sup>e</sup>
Sum of design-basis accident risks	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	$3.5 \times 10^{-7}$	$3.8 \times 10^{-11}$	<sup>d</sup>
	1,000 TPBARs	$3.5 \times 10^{-7}$	$2.6 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-12}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$3.6 \times 10^{-7}$	$8.0 \times 10^{-10}$	$4.3 \times 10^{-12}$
<b>Handling Accidents</b>				
TPBAR handling accident	1,000 TPBARs	$3.9 \times 10^{-9}$	$2.2 \times 10^{-10}$	$4.8 \times 10^{-11}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$1.3 \times 10^{-8}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-10}$
Truck cask handling accident	1,000 TPBARs	$3.2 \times 10^{-14}$	$1.7 \times 10^{-15}$	$3.8 \times 10^{-16}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$9.6 \times 10^{-14}$	$5.1 \times 10^{-15}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-15}$
Rail cask handling accident	1,000 TPBARs	$1.6 \times 10^{-14}$	$8.6 \times 10^{-16}$	$1.9 \times 10^{-16}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$4.8 \times 10^{-14}$	$2.6 \times 10^{-15}$	$5.8 \times 10^{-16}$
Sum of handling accident risks	1,000 TPBARs	$3.9 \times 10^{-9}$	$2.2 \times 10^{-10}$	$4.8 \times 10^{-11}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$1.3 \times 10^{-8}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-10}$
<b>Beyond Design-Basis Accidents (Severe Reactor Accidents)</b>				
Reactor core damage accident with early containment failure	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	$1.1 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$1.1 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
Reactor core damage accident with containment bypass	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	$3.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$9.1 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$3.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$9.1 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
Reactor core damage accident with late containment failure	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	<u><math>9.7 \times 10^{-10}</math></u>	<u><math>4.1 \times 10^{-11}</math></u>	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	<u><math>9.7 \times 10^{-10}</math></u>	<u><math>4.3 \times 10^{-11}</math></u>	Not applicable
Sum of severe reactor accident risks	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	$3.3 \times 10^{-8}$	<u><math>1.4 \times 10^{-10}</math></u>	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$3.3 \times 10^{-8}$	<u><math>1.5 \times 10^{-10}</math></u>	Not applicable

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality per year.

<sup>b</sup> The No Action Alternative at Bellefonte 1 implies the reactor is not brought into commercial service. The No Action radiological dose is 0.

<sup>c</sup> Derived from AEC 1974.

<sup>d</sup> The dose to the noninvolved worker was not estimated in AEC 1974.

<sup>e</sup> Design-basis accident risks only reflect the incremental increase in accident risk due to the production of tritium in TPBARs.



**Table 5-42 Accident Frequencies and Consequences at Bellefonte 1**

Accident	Accident Frequency (per year)	Tritium Production	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual		Average Individual Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles)		Noninvolved Worker	
			Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>
Design-Basis Accidents								
Reactor design-basis accident	0.0002	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	0.033 <sup>c</sup>	0.000017	0.000013 <sup>d</sup>	6.7 × 10 <sup>-9</sup>	e	e
		1,000 TPBARs	0.033	0.000017	0.000015	7.6 × 10 <sup>-9</sup>	2.9 × 10 <sup>-8f</sup>	1.2 × 10 <sup>-11</sup>
		3,400 TPBARs	0.033	0.000017	0.000019	9.5 × 10 <sup>-9</sup>	1.0 × 10 <sup>-7f</sup>	4.0 × 10 <sup>-11</sup>
Nonreactor design-basis accident	0.01	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	0.070 <sup>c</sup>	0.000035	7.9 × 10 <sup>-6d</sup>	3.9 × 10 <sup>-9</sup>	e <sup>g</sup>	e
		1,000 TPBARs	0.070	0.000035	0.000051	2.6 × 10 <sup>-8</sup>	3.1 × 10 <sup>-7f</sup>	1.2 × 10 <sup>-10</sup>
		3,400 TPBARs	0.071	0.000036	0.00016	8.0 × 10 <sup>-8</sup>	1.1 × 10 <sup>-6f</sup>	4.3 × 10 <sup>-10</sup>
Handling Accidents								
TPBAR handling accident	0.0017/0.0058 <sup>h</sup>	All TPBAR configurations	0.0045	2.3 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	0.00025	1.3 × 10 <sup>-7</sup>	0.00007	2.8 × 10 <sup>-8</sup>
Truck cask handling accident	5.3 × 10 <sup>-7</sup> /1.6 × 10 <sup>-6g</sup>	All TPBAR configurations	0.00012	6.0 × 10 <sup>-8</sup>	6.4 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	3.2 × 10 <sup>-9</sup>	1.8 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	7.2 × 10 <sup>-10</sup>
Rail cask handling accident	2.7 × 10 <sup>-7</sup> /6.0 × 10 <sup>-7g</sup>	All TPBAR configurations	0.00012	6.0 × 10 <sup>-8</sup>	6.4 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	3.2 × 10 <sup>-9</sup>	1.8 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	7.2 × 10 <sup>-10</sup>
Beyond Design-Basis Accidents (Severe Reactor Accidents)								
Reactor core damage with early containment failure	9.0 × 10 <sup>-7</sup>	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	2.3	0.0012	0.023	0.000012	Not applicable	Not applicable
		3,400 TPBARs	2.4	0.0012	0.024	0.000012	Not applicable	Not applicable
Reactor core damage with containment bypass	9.1 × 10 <sup>-7</sup>	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	34 <sup>h</sup>	0.034 <sup>h</sup>	0.20	0.00010	Not applicable	Not applicable
		3,400 TPBARs	34 <sup>h</sup>	0.034 <sup>h</sup>	0.20	0.00010	Not applicable	Not applicable
Reactor core damage with late containment failure	5.1 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	0.37	0.00019	0.016	8.0 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	Not applicable	Not applicable
		3,400 TPBARs	0.38	0.00019	0.017	8.5 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	Not applicable	Not applicable

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality.<sup>b</sup> The No Action Alternative at Bellefonte 1 implies the reactor is not brought into commercial service. The No Action radiological dose is 0.<sup>c</sup> AEC 1974.<sup>d</sup> Derived from AEC 1974; estimate adjusted for differences in population data.<sup>e</sup> The dose to the noninvolved worker was not estimated in AEC 1974.<sup>f</sup> Consequences only reflect the incremental increase in accident consequences due to the production of tritium in TPBARs.<sup>g</sup> Frequency for 1,000 TPBARs/frequency for 3,400 TPBARs.<sup>h</sup> Dose greater than 20 rem. Cancer fatality risk is doubled.

The nonreactor design-basis accident has the highest consequence of the design-basis and handling accidents because the postulated accident scenario entails an acute release of tritium in oxide form directly to the environment without any mitigation.

Review of Table 5-42 indicates that there is a very small increase in design-basis and beyond design-basis reactor accident consequences due to the irradiation of TPBARs at Bellefonte 1. The consequences are dominated by the effects of radionuclide releases inherent to the operation without tritium production. As described in Appendix D, Section D.1.1.10, surrogate data were used for the accident sequences and plant responses in the Bellefonte 1 beyond design-basis accident analysis. Sensitivity analyses indicated that the analysis results are driven by the assumed release fractions and release timing sequences (see Appendix D, Table D-13). As indicated by the results provided in Table 5-42, the accidents involving reactor core damage with containment bypass that have the shortest warning time resulted in the highest dose to a maximally exposed offsite individual. This is because after such accidents the offsite individual would not have sufficient time to evacuate and would be exposed to the radionuclide releases at the site boundary. For the other core damage accidents, the individual would have sufficient time to evacuate before radionuclide releases would occur. It should be noted that Bellefonte 1 beyond design-basis accident analysis estimates do not have the same level of applicability as those for the Watts Bar and Sequoyah plants. TVA will perform a plant-specific severe accident analysis for Bellefonte prior to its operation.

The secondary impacts of severe reactor accidents are discussed in Section 5.2.13.

### **HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL IMPACTS**

#### **No Action**

No additional impacts to public and occupational health and safety from exposure to hazardous chemicals are anticipated at Bellefonte 1 beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action, i.e., tritium production.

#### **Tritium Production**

The impacts of using, handling, and storing hazardous chemicals at Bellefonte 1 were assessed. The chemical inventory for Bellefonte 1 was reviewed to identify potential accident scenarios. Details of the review and accident analysis are presented in Appendix D, Section D.2.

Two hazardous chemical accident scenarios were postulated for this EIS: (1) an accidental, uncontrolled release of ammonium hydroxide from a 15,142-liter (4,000-gallon) tank in the basement of the turbine building; and (2) an accidental, uncontrolled release of hydrazine from a 1,987-liter (525-gallon) tank in the same area. For both scenarios, it was postulated that the total tank inventory is released to form a pool on the floor; the size of the pool is limited by a dike around the chemical storage tanks; and vapor is generated from pool evaporation and fills the immediate area, leaks from the building, and is dispersed downwind.

The potential health impacts of accidental releases of hazardous chemicals were assessed by comparing estimated airborne concentrations of the chemicals to Emergency Response Planning Guidelines developed by the American Industrial Hygiene Association. The Emergency Response Planning Guideline values are not regulatory exposure guidelines and do not incorporate the safety factors normally included in healthy worker exposure guidelines. Emergency Response Planning Guideline-1 values are concentrations below which nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour and could experience only mild, transient, and reversible adverse health impacts. Emergency Response Planning Guideline-2 values are indicative of irreversible or serious health effects or impairment of an individual's ability to take protective action. Emergency Response Planning Guideline-3 values are indicative of potentially life-threatening health effects.

On release of ammonium hydroxide from the storage tank, ammonia would volatilize and disperse. The Emergency Response Planning Guideline values for ammonia were used to evaluate the potential health impacts of an ammonium hydroxide release. The Emergency Response Planning Guidelines for ammonia and hydrazine are presented in Table 5-43.

**Table 5-43 Emergency Response Planning Guideline Values for Hydrazine and Ammonia**

Chemicals	Emergency Response Planning Guideline-1 (parts per million)	Emergency Response Planning Guideline-2 (parts per million)	Emergency Response Planning Guideline-3 (parts per million)
Hydrazine <sup>a</sup>	0.03	8	80
Ammonia <sup>b</sup>	25	200	1000

<sup>a</sup> Gephart, et al. 1994.

<sup>b</sup> Craig, et al. 1995.

Note: Hydrazine Emergency Response Planning Guidelines were removed by the American Industrial Hygiene Association for further study in 1996 and have not been reinserted as of July 1998.

The potential health impacts of the accidental release of ammonium hydroxide and hydrazine were assessed for two types of receptors: (1) noninvolved workers, or workers assumed to be located 640 meters (2,100 feet) from the point of release; and (2) a maximally exposed offsite individual or member of the public located offsite at the site boundary 914 meters (3,000 feet) from the point of release.

Facility workers (i.e., those individuals in the building at the time of the accident) were assumed to be killed by the release. The analysis took no credit for mitigative actions (e.g., area atmosphere monitoring, area evacuation alarms, emergency operating procedures) or accident precursors (e.g., leak before break) to reduce the accident consequences to the facility worker.

The computer code selected for estimation of airborne concentrations is the Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations/Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres, developed by the National Safety Council, EPA, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NSC 1990).

The model results are presented for atmospheric Stability Classes D and F, with wind speeds of 5.3 meters per second (17.4 feet per second) and 1.5 meters per second (4.9 feet per second), respectively. Atmospheric Stability Class D is considered to be representative of "average" weather conditions; Stability Class F is considered to be representative of "worst-case" weather conditions. These weather conditions were selected because they are recommended by the EPA in its *Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis* (EPA 1987).

The potential health impacts of the accidental releases were assessed by comparing the modeled ambient concentrations of ammonia and hydrazine at each of the receptor locations to the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines. Table 5-44 presents a summary of the impacts data.

**Table 5-44 Summary of Impacts Data for Release Scenarios at Bellefonte 1**

Impacts		Hydrazine (Stability Class D)	Hydrazine (Stability Class F)	Ammonia (Stability Class D)	Ammonia (Stability Class F)
Maximum distance (meters) to concentrations of	ERPG-1	greater than 2,000	greater than 2,000	464	2,250
	ERPG-2	179	500	150	825
	ERPG-3	44	200	65	425
Noninvolved worker (640 meters)	Parts per million Level of concern Potential health effects	0.8 ERPG-1 Mild, transient	6 ERPG-1 Mild, transient	<u>16</u> ERPG-1 Mild, transient	318 ERPG-2 Serious

<i>Impacts</i>		<i>Hydrazine (Stability Class D)</i>	<i>Hydrazine (Stability Class F)</i>	<i>Ammonia (Stability Class D)</i>	<i>Ammonia (Stability Class F)</i>
Maximally exposed offsite individual (914 meters)	Parts per million Level of concern Potential health effects	0.4 ERPG-1 Mild, transient	3.2 ERPG-1 Mild, transient	7.7 ERPG-1 None (less than ERPG-1)	169 ERPG-1 Mild, transient

ERPG = Emergency Response Planning Guideline.

#### *Impacts to Noninvolved Workers*

The concentrations of ammonia at 640 meters (3,000 feet) would range from 14 to 318 parts per million, depending on the assumed meteorological conditions. The maximum estimated airborne concentration at that point under Stability Class F conditions would exceed the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-2 value of 200 parts per million for ammonia, which suggests that noninvolved workers could experience irreversible or serious, but not life-threatening, adverse health effects if the exposures were not mitigated.

For the hydrazine release scenarios, the concentrations at 640 meters (3,000 feet) range from 0.8 to 6.0 parts per million, depending on the assumed meteorological conditions. As a result, the maximum estimated airborne concentration at that point would exceed the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-1 value of 0.03 parts per million for hydrazine, which suggests the potential for only mild, transient, and reversible adverse health impacts on noninvolved workers.

#### *Impacts to Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual*

For the ammonium hydroxide release scenarios, the maximally exposed offsite individual could be exposed to an ammonia concentration of 7.7 parts per million under Stability Class D conditions (see Table 5-44), which is below the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-1 value for ammonia of 25 parts per million. Exposures to concentrations below the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-1 value should not produce any adverse health effects for the maximally exposed offsite individual. Under Stability Class F conditions, the maximally exposed offsite individual could be exposed to an ammonia concentration of about 169 parts per million (see Table 5-44), which is below the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-2 value for ammonia of 200 parts per million. Exposure of the maximally exposed offsite individual to concentrations higher than the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-1 value, but lower than the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-2 value, could produce only mild, transient, and reversible adverse health effects.

For the hydrazine release scenarios, the maximally exposed offsite individual exposure concentrations would range from 0.4 to 3.2 parts per million (see Table 5-44; both stability classes). These concentrations exceed the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-1 value for hydrazine of 0.03 parts per million, but are less than the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-2 value of 8 parts per million. This suggests that the maximally exposed offsite individual could experience only mild, transient, and reversible adverse health effects as a result of the exposure.

The results of this analysis should be considered only as screening-level estimations. TVA would conduct analyses compliant with the requirements of 40 CFR 68 before operation of Bellefonte 1.

#### **5.2.3.10 Environmental Justice**

As discussed in Appendix G, Executive Order 12898 directs Federal agencies to address disproportionately high and adverse health or environmental effects of alternatives on minority and low-income populations. The Executive Order does not alter prevailing statutory interpretations under NEPA or existing case law.

Regulations prepared by the Council on Environmental Quality remain the foundation for the preparation of environmental documentation in compliance with NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500 through 1508).

#### No Action

There would be no impacts on the general population. Therefore, there would be no disproportionately high and adverse consequences for minority and low-income populations beyond the effects of existing and future activities that are independent of the proposed action.

#### Tritium Production

Analyses of incident-free operations and accidents have shown estimates of the risk of latent cancer fatalities to the public residing within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the reactor site to be much lower than 1. Because tritium production would not have significant adverse consequences for the population at large, no minority or low-income populations should experience disproportionately high adverse consequences.

#### 5.2.3.11 Waste Management

#### No Action

No additional wastes should be generated at the Bellefonte site beyond the wastes generated as a result of activities independent of the proposed action. These wastes and the provisions for their management are described in Section 4.2.3.10. Solid nonhazardous waste is disposed of off site by contract at a permitted facility. The small quantity of hazardous waste is temporarily stored on site until it is shipped to the TVA Hazardous Waste Storage Facility in Muscle Shoals, Alabama, which makes arrangements for disposal at an offsite permitted disposal facility.

#### Tritium Production

Should Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 be completed for the purpose of producing tritium, some waste would be generated during the construction. During operation, the waste that would be generated would be typical to that of an operating reactor plant like Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2, except for the additional waste due to tritium production.

#### Construction

No radioactive waste should be generated during construction activities. Hazardous waste generated during construction likely would be due to maintenance activities. This waste could include materials such as waste oils that contain solvent residuals or that are high in selected trace metal content, waste paint and paint thinners, solvents, and degreasers. The estimated amounts of solid and liquid wastes that would be generated over the entire construction period for one or both units are presented in Table 5-45.

**Table 5-45 Total Amounts of Wastes Generated During Construction to Complete Bellefonte 1 or Both Bellefonte 1 and 2**

Waste Category	Quantity	
	Bellefonte 1	Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2
Hazardous		
Solids (metric tons)	6.3	9.7
Liquids (metric tons)	56.7	87.3
Nonhazardous solids		
Concrete (cubic meters)	392	603
Steel (metric tons)	208	296

Waste Category	Quantity	
	Bellefonte 1	Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2
Other (cubic meters)	21,000	70,000
Nonhazardous liquids		
Sanitary (cubic meters)	309,000	475,000
Flushing (cubic meters)	6,000	49,100
Other (cubic meters)	65	100

Source: TVA 1995b.

It is expected that the monthly solid hazardous wastes generated would be more than 100 kilograms (220 pounds), but less than 1,000 kilograms (2,205 pounds). Hazardous wastes would be stored on site temporarily, pending shipment to the TVA Hazardous Waste Disposal Facility at Muscle Shoals. Nonhazardous solid waste from construction activities would be routinely placed in dumpsters on site and subsequently disposed of off site by contractors.

### Operation

Waste would be generated at Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 as a consequence of normal operation as a nuclear power plant. Judging from the operating experience at the Sequoyah and Watts Bar plants, the waste generated under the proposed action would fall into four broad categories: hazardous waste, nonhazardous solid waste, low-level radioactive waste, and sanitary liquid waste. Table 5-46 summarizes the expected annual amounts of waste that would be generated at Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2. The low-level radioactive waste would include an additional 0.43 cubic meters per year (15 cubic feet per year) (WEC 1999) generated as a result of tritium production. It would consist of the approximately 140 base plates and other irradiated hardware remaining after the TPBARs were separated from their assemblies and placed in the 17 × 17 array consolidation baskets at the reactor site.

Table 5-46 Annual Waste Generation at Bellefonte 1

Waste Type	Volume or Mass
Hazardous waste (cubic meters)	1.025
Nonhazardous solid waste (kilograms)	853,438
Low-level radioactive waste (cubic meters)	40
Mixed low-level radioactive waste (cubic meters)	less than 1

Note: For Bellefonte 1 and 2 operations the waste values would be twice the values given for Bellefonte 1.

Source: Based on Watts Bar 1 Operation.

### Hazardous Waste

Hazardous waste typical of nuclear plant operation would include paints, solvents, acids, oils, radiographic film and development chemicals, and degreasers. Neutralization would be the only waste treatment performed on site. Hazardous waste normally would be stored in polyethylene containment systems during accumulation. An approved storage building would be used to store hazardous waste for either 90 or 180 days, depending on the plant's hazardous waste generation status (i.e., Small Quantity or Large Quantity Generator) at the time. The waste would be transported to an offsite hazardous waste storage or disposal facility before it exceeded the 90- or 180-day storage limit.

### **Low-Level Radioactive Waste**

One category of low-level radioactive waste would be the solidified and dewatered product of gaseous and liquid waste treatment systems, along with filters and resins. Another would be contaminated protective clothing, paper, rags, glassware, compactible and noncompactible trash, and nonirradiated reactor components. A third category would be the irradiated hardware of the TPBAR assemblies that would have been separated from the TPBARs before the TPBARs were placed in consolidation containers for eventual shipment. Low-level radioactive waste would be shipped to the Barnwell, South Carolina, waste disposal facility.

For purposes of completeness, this EIS also addresses the management of the irradiated TPBAR hardware portion of the low-level radioactive waste at DOE-owned facilities—specifically, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site, near Aiken, South Carolina. That facility consists of a series of vaults in E-Area that have been operational since September 1994. The operating capacity of each vault is 30,500 cubic meters (1,077,100 cubic feet) of low-level radioactive waste (DOE 1998c, DOE 1999b). Therefore, the addition of low-level radioactive waste from the proposed action at Bellefonte 1 or both Bellefonte 1 and 2 for a 40-year period would be approximately 0.06 percent of the capacity of a single vault. The total production of low-level radioactive waste, approximately 41 cubic meters (1,448 cubic feet), represents 0.1 percent of the capacity of a single vault.

### **Mixed Waste**

Typical sources of mixed low-level radioactive waste would be: beta-counting fluids (e.g., zylene, toluene) used in liquid scintillation detectors; polychlorinated biphenyls susceptible to contact with radioactive contamination through an accidental spill or explosion in a transformer; isopropyl alcohol used for cleaning radioactive surfaces; chelating agents; and various acids. The amount of mixed low-level radioactive waste generated should be less than 1 cubic meter (35 cubic feet), judging from experience with Watts Bar 1 operation.

Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 would have an active waste minimization program similar to the existing programs described for Watts Bar and Sequoyah in Sections 4.2.1.10 and 4.2.2.10, respectively.

### **5.2.3.12 Spent Fuel Management**

Production of tritium at Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 with less than 2,000 TPBARs in the reactor core would generate approximately 72 spent nuclear fuel assemblies per fuel cycle. This is the expected normal refueling batch without tritium production. The spent fuel assemblies would be stored in the plant's spent nuclear fuel pools, which have been completed. For the irradiation of the maximum number of 3,400 TPBARs, up to a maximum of 141 spent nuclear fuel assemblies could be generated. This represents up to 69 additional spent nuclear fuel assemblies over the normal refueling batch. For the purposes of this EIS it is assumed that this additional spent nuclear fuel would be stored on site for the duration of the proposed action. If needed, a dry cask ISFSI would be constructed at the site. Environmental impacts of the construction and operation of this generic dry cask ISFSI are presented in Section 5.2.6.

### **5.2.4 Licensing Renewal**

Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 are currently operating plants. Their operating licenses would expire before the end of the tritium production program, which is assumed to last until the year 2043. Therefore, these units would need to undergo licensing renewal before the end of the program. The environmental impacts associated with the licensing renewal activities for these units are discussed in this section.

#### **5.2.4.1 Background**

The decision whether to seek license renewal rests with the licensees. Each licensee must determine whether they are likely to satisfy NRC requirements and evaluate the costs of the venture. As early as 20 years before the expiration of its current license, an applicant may apply to extend its license for up to 20 years. It is estimated that it would take a licensee between three and five years to prepare an application and that the NRC staff would require between three and five years to complete the review and the hearing process. The license renewal application would be subject to public hearings, using a formal adjudicatory process.

License renewal requirements for power reactors are based on two key principles: (1) the regulatory process, continued into the extended period of operation, is adequate to ensure that the licensing basis of all currently operating plants provides an acceptable level of safety; and (2) each plant's licensing basis is required to be maintained during the renewal term. In other words, the foundation of license renewal rests on the determination that currently operating plants continue to maintain adequate levels of safety and, over the plant's life, this level has been enhanced through maintenance of the licensing bases, with appropriate adjustments to address new information from industry operating experience. Additionally, NRC activities provide ongoing assurance that the licensing bases would continue to provide an acceptable level of safety.

The environmental and technical requirements for the renewal of power reactor operating licenses are contained in NRC regulations 10 CFR, 51 and 54, respectively. The environmental protection regulations in 10 CFR 51 were revised on December 18, 1996, to facilitate the environmental review for license renewal. Part 54 was revised in May 1995 to simplify and clarify the license renewal scope and process.

The license renewal environmental review requirements in 10 CFR 51 are based on a conclusion of a detailed generic environmental impact study (NRC 1996a) that certain environmental issues can be resolved generically rather than separately in each plant-specific licensing application. This approach reduces the number of issues that need to be evaluated in detail for each plant site and improves the efficiency of the licensing process for both the licensee and the NRC.

The changes to the licensing requirements in 10 CFR 54 stress managing the effects of aging rather than managing aging mechanisms, and more explicitly address the role of existing licensee programs and the maintenance rule provisions as means to demonstrate the adequacy of programs to manage the effects of aging for the renewal term. Under this regulatory requirement, licensees are required to identify all systems, structures, and components within the scope of the renewal application. The systems, structures, and components within the scope are: (1) all safety-related systems, structures, and components; (2) all systems, structures, and components whose failure could affect safety-related functions; and (3) systems, structures, and components relied on to demonstrate compliance with the NRC's regulations for fire protection, environmental qualification, pressurized thermal shock, anticipated transients without scram, and station blackout. A screening review is required of all systems, structures, and components within the scope of the rule to identify "passive" and "long-lived" structures and components for which the applicant must demonstrate that the effects of aging would be managed in such a way that the intended function or functions of those structures and components would be maintained for the period of extended operation. Active equipment is considered to be adequately monitored under the current regulatory process where the detrimental aging effects that may occur are more readily detectable and would be identified and corrected by routine surveillances and performance indicators. For some structures and components within the scope of the evaluation, no additional action may be required where the applicant can demonstrate that the existing programs provide adequate aging management throughout the period of extended operation. However, if additional aging management activities are warranted for a structure or component within the scope of the rule, applicants would have the flexibility to determine appropriate actions. These activities could include, for example, new monitoring programs, new inspections, or revised design criteria. Another requirement for license renewal is the identification and



updating of time-limited aging analyses, which are those design analyses for systems, structures, and components based on the current operating license term.

In 1996, the NRC developed a draft regulatory guide for the format and content of a license renewal application that proposes to endorse an implementation guideline prepared by the Nuclear Energy Institute as an acceptable method of implementing the license renewal rule. The NRC plans to maintain the regulatory guide in draft form and use it along with the working draft of the standard review plan for license renewal to review plant-specific and owners group reports. An update of the working draft standard review plan was made publicly available in September 1997. NRC staff will use the experience gained from the review of plant-specific and owners group reports to incorporate improvements into the working draft standard review plan and clarify regulatory guidance before soliciting formal public comment and approval of those documents. The NRC has developed a draft inspection guidance for license renewal. Consistent with the development of the standard review plan and regulatory guide, the inspection guidance will be prepared in final form after the NRC staff completes the review of several license renewal applications.

#### **5.2.4.2 Environmental Effect of Renewing the Operating License of a Nuclear Power Plant**

The NRC staff has assessed the environmental impacts associated with granting a renewed operating license for a nuclear power plant to a licensee who holds either an operating license or construction permit as of June 30, 1995, and has documented the results in a report titled, *Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants*, (NRC 1996a). The NRC amended the environmental protection regulations in 10 CFR 51 to streamline the process of environmental review for license renewal by drawing on the experience of the operating nuclear power reactors and to generically assess many of the environmental impacts. The amendment eliminated consideration of the need for generating capacity and utility economics from the environmental reviews.

The NRC decided to undertake a generic assessment of the environmental impacts associated with the renewal of a nuclear power plant operating license because:

- License renewal would involve nuclear power plants where the environmental impacts of operation are well understood as a result of data evaluated from operating experience to date.
- Activities associated with license renewal are expected to be within this range of operating experience, thus environmental impacts can be reasonably predicted.
- Changes in the environment around nuclear power plants are gradual and predictable with respect to characteristics important to environmental impact analyses.

In general, there are 92 discrete NEPA issues associated with license renewal that require responses in an environmental assessment. Of the 92 issues, 68 were found to have impacts of small significance on all plants and no mitigation would be needed beyond that already employed at the plants. Those issues are adequately addressed in the NRC's generic EIS, and no further assessment of these issues would be required in a plant-specific review. Twenty-four issues were determined to require further analysis and possible new information. The qualitative impacts on these issues were determined to be "small," "moderate," or "large," depending on the specific plant. Table 5-47 summarizes the issues and the NRC's findings in the generic EIS. These issues need to be addressed by the licensees as part of the plant life extension license renewal application.

**Table 5-47 Summary of Findings on NEPA Issues for License Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants**

<i>Issue</i>	<i>Findings</i>
<b>Surface Water Quality, Hydrology, and Use (for all plants)</b>	
Water use conflicts (plants with cooling ponds or cooling towers using make-up water from a small river with low flow)	SMALL OR MODERATE. The issue has been a concern at nuclear power plants with cooling ponds and at plants with cooling towers. Impacts on in-stream and riparian communities near these plants could be of moderate significance in some situations. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(A).
<b>Aquatic Ecology</b>	
Entrainment of fish and shellfish in early life stages	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. The impacts of entrainment are small at many plants, but may be moderate or even large at a few plants with once-through and cooling-pond cooling systems. Further, ongoing efforts in the vicinity of these plants to restore fish populations may increase the numbers of fish susceptible to intake effects during the license renewal period, such that entrainment studies conducted in support of the original license may no longer be valid. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(B).
Impingement of fish and shellfish	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. The impacts of impingement are small at many plants, but may be moderate or even large at a few plants with once-through and cooling-pond cooling systems. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(B).
Heat shock	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. Because of continuing concerns about heat shock and the possible need to modify thermal discharges in response to changing environmental conditions, the impacts may be of moderate or large significance at some plants with once-through and cooling-pond systems. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(B).
<b>Groundwater Use and Quality</b>	
Groundwater use conflicts (potable and service water, and dewatering; plants that use more than 100 gallons per minute)	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. Plants that use more than 100 gallons per minute may cause groundwater use conflicts with nearby groundwater users. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(C).
Groundwater use conflicts (plants using cooling towers withdrawing make-up water from a small river)	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. Water use conflicts may result from surface water withdrawals from small water bodies during low flow conditions which may affect aquifer recharge, especially if other groundwater or upstream surface water users come on line before the time of license renewal. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(A).
Groundwater use conflicts (Ranney wells)	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. Ranney wells can result in potential groundwater depression beyond the site boundary. Impacts of large groundwater withdrawal for cooling tower makeup at nuclear power plants using Ranney wells must be evaluated at the time of application for license renewal. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(C).
Groundwater quality degradation (cooling ponds at inland sites)	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. Sites with closed-cycle cooling ponds may degrade groundwater quality. For plants located inland, the quality of the groundwater in the vicinity of the ponds must be shown to be adequate to allow continuation of current uses. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(D).
<b>Terrestrial Resources</b>	
Refurbishment impacts	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. Refurbishment impacts are insignificant if no loss of important plant and animal habitat occurs. However, it cannot be known whether important plant and animal communities may be affected until the specific proposal is presented with the license renewal application. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(E).
<b>Threatened or Endangered Species (for all plants)</b>	
Threatened or endangered species	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. Generally, plant refurbishment and continued operation are not expected to adversely affect threatened or endangered species. However, consultation with appropriate agencies would be needed at the time of license renewal to determine whether threatened or endangered species are present and whether they would be adversely affected. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(E).
<b>Air Quality</b>	
Air quality during refurbishment (non-attainment and maintenance areas)	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. Air quality impacts from plant refurbishment associated with license renewal are expected to be small. However, vehicle exhaust emissions could be cause for concern at locations in or near nonattainment or maintenance areas. The significance of the potential impact cannot be determined without considering the compliance status of each site and the numbers of workers expected to be employed during the outage. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(F).

Issue	Findings
<b>Human Health</b>	
Microbiological organisms (public health)(plants using lakes or canals, or cooling towers or cooling ponds that discharge to a small river)	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. These organisms are not expected to be a problem at most operating plants except possibly at plants using cooling ponds, lakes, or canals that discharge to small rivers. Without site-specific data, it is not possible to predict the effects generically. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(G).
Electromagnetic fields, acute effects (electric shock)	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. Electrical shock resulting from direct access to energized conductors or from induced charges in metallic structures have not been found to be a problem at most operating plants and generally are not expected to be a problem during the license renewal term. However, site-specific review is required to determine the significance of the electric shock potential at the site. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(H).
Electromagnetic fields, chronic effects	UNCERTAIN. Biological and physical studies of 60-Hertz electromagnetic fields have not found consistent evidence linking harmful effects with field exposures. However, research is continuing in this area and a scientific consensus view has not been reached. If in the future the Commission finds that, contrary to current indications, a consensus has been reached by appropriate Federal health agencies that there are adverse health effects from electromagnetic fields, the Commission will require applicants to submit plant-specific reviews of these health effects as part of their license renewal applications. Until such time, applicants for license renewal are not required to submit information on this issue.
<b>Socioeconomic</b>	
Housing impacts	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. Housing impacts are expected to be of small significance at plants located in a medium or high population area and not in an area where growth control measures that limit housing development are in effect. Moderate or large housing impacts of the workforce associated with refurbishment may be associated with plants located in sparsely populated areas or in areas with growth control measures that limit housing development. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(I).
Public services: public utilities	SMALL OR MODERATE. An increased problem with water shortages at some sites may lead to impacts of moderate significance on public water supply availability. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(I).
Public services, education (refurbishment)	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. Most sites would experience impacts of small significance, but larger impacts are possible depending on site- and project-specific factors. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(I).
Offsite land use (refurbishment)	SMALL OR MODERATE. Impacts may be of moderate significance at plants in low population areas. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(I).
Offsite land use (license renewal term)	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. Significant changes in land use may be associated with population and tax revenue changes resulting from license renewal. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(I).
Public services, transportation	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. Transportation impacts are generally expected to be of small significance. However, the increase in traffic associated with the additional workers and the local road and traffic control conditions may lead to impacts of moderate or large significance at some sites. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(J).
Historic and archaeological resources	SMALL, MODERATE, OR LARGE. Generally, plant refurbishment and continued operation are expected to have no more than small adverse impacts on historic and archaeological resources. However, the National Historic Preservation Act requires the Federal agency to consult with the State Historic Preservation Officer to determine whether there are properties present that require protection. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(K).
<b>Postulated Accidents</b>	
Severe accidents	SMALL. The probability-weighted consequences of atmospheric releases, fallout onto open bodies of water, releases to groundwater, and societal and economic impacts from severe accidents are small for all plants. However, alternatives to mitigate severe accidents must be considered for all plants that have not considered such alternatives. See § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L).
<b>Uranium Fuel Cycle and Waste Management</b>	
Transportation	Table S-4 of CFR 51.52 (c) contains an assessment of impact parameters to be used in evaluating transportation effects in each case. See CFR 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(M).
<b>Environmental Justice</b>	
Environmental Justice	This issue was not addressed in the generic EIS. The need for and content of an environmental justice evaluation will be addressed in a plant-specific review.

Note: Consistent with 10 CFR 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, the following definitions of environmental impacts were used.

**Small** Environmental effects are not detectable or are so minor that they would neither destabilize nor noticeably alter any important attribute of the resource. For the purposes of assessing radiological impacts, the NRC has concluded that those impacts that do not exceed permissible levels in the NRC's regulations are considered small as the term is used in this table.

**Moderate** Environmental effects are sufficient to alter noticeably, but not to destabilize, important attributes of the resource.

**Large** Environmental effects are clearly noticeable and are sufficient to destabilize important attributes of the resource.

Source: 10 CFR 51.

## **5.2.5 Decontamination and Decommissioning**

Construction of Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 has not been completed. Neither of the units are operational. For the purposes of this EIS the future operation of these units depends on whether or not they would be used for tritium production. Consequently, the environmental impacts associated with the production of tritium at Bellefonte would include impacts resulting from construction activities, operation of the units to produce tritium, and decontamination and decommissioning of these reactors at the end of their useful life. The following provides a summary of the impacts that can be expected from the decontamination and decommissioning of the Bellefonte units.

### **5.2.5.1 Background**

Since no CLWRs of a size (i.e., about 1,000 megawatts-electric) comparable to the Bellefonte units have been decommissioned, data for decontamination and decommissioning are limited. In 1988, the NRC issued a *Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities* (NRC 1988). That EIS provided generic assessments and projections of the environmental consequences of decontamination and decommissioning for various nuclear facilities. Projections associated with impacts from commercial pressurized water reactors were used to characterize the environmental impacts.

Another aspect of decontamination and decommissioning of commercial reactors that would continue to influence the nature and extent of environmental impacts is the continuing evolution in the NRC and EPA regulations that govern decontamination and decommissioning activities. An example of this evolution is the *Final Rule on Radiological Criteria for License Termination*, which was issued by the NRC in July 1997. The final rule provides specific radiological criteria for the decommissioning of NRC-licensed facilities. The criteria clarify, for example, that a site would be considered acceptable for unrestricted use if decontaminated to a level of 25 millirem per year. Comparable regulatory guidance on other aspects of decontamination and decommissioning are in various stages of creation/issuance.

### **5.2.5.2 Decontamination and Decommissioning Options**

The decontamination and decommissioning of a CLWR can be accomplished via one of the following three options:

- **Entomb**—Complete isolation of radioactivity from the environment by means of massive concrete and metal barriers until radioactivity has decayed to levels that permit unrestricted release from the facility. This decay may take up to several hundreds of thousands of years.
- **Safstor**—Process of placing and maintaining a nuclear facility in a condition that allows the nuclear facility to be safely stored (to allow radioactive decay) and subsequently decontaminated (i.e., deferred decontamination) to levels that permit the property to be released for unrestricted use.

- **Decon**—Process of immediately removing and disposing of all radioactivity in excess of levels that would permit the release of the facility for unrestricted use.

It would be assumed that the decontamination and decommissioning of the CLWR used for tritium production would select the Decon option. The advantages inherent in Decon are prompt termination of the NRC license shortly after cessation of operation; the elimination of radioactivity at a radioactive site; the return of the site for unrestricted use; the availability of reactor operating staff to support site characterization and subsequent decontamination and decommissioning activities; and the elimination of a need for long-term surveillance and maintenance.

#### 5.2.5.3 Decommissioning Activities

The decontamination and decommissioning of a pressurized water reactor would typically be completed in a period of 8 to 12 years after facility shutdown. It is anticipated that the initial 2 to 3 years would focus on planning and scheduling of the decontamination and decommissioning program and the required coordination activities with local, state and regulatory agencies. The decontamination and decommissioning program would be implemented in a series of steps, but the process can be summarized as follows:

*Removal/dismantlement of the major components of the primary system*—This would involve the removal of the reactor vessel, vessel internals, steam generators, pressurizer, and other major components. The removal phase may be completed in one of two ways: (1) removal of the intact component (e.g., with all reactor vessel internals intact) for shipment to the final disposal site; or (2) segmentation of the major component and/or its internals with the segments shipped to the final disposal site.

*Decontamination of primary system piping*—The primary system and the other large-bore contaminated piping systems would be decontaminated in place and subsequently removed and disposed of in accordance with appropriate regulations.

*Decontamination of primary containment and facility structures*—The primary containment surfaces and structures would be decontaminated in place using scabbling, scarifying, and similar technologies. The waste materials would be packaged and disposed of in accordance with appropriate regulations.

*Spent fuel and Greater-Than-Class-C waste shipments*—It is assumed that a final high level waste repository would be operational to receive spent fuel and Greater-Than-Class-C waste in a timely manner that does not prolong or delay decontamination and decommissioning activities.

*Disposal of low-level radioactive waste*—Low-level radioactive waste would be processed in accordance with established procedures.

#### 5.2.5.4 Decontamination and Decommissioning Impacts

The impacts to be anticipated as a result of decontamination and decommissioning activities would vary according to operating history, facility maintenance, and related factors. The NRC's *Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities*, NUREG-0586 (NRC 1988), provides estimates of impacts that are be used in the discussion below. [The NUREG estimates recently have been characterized as bounding by a commercial reactor (i.e., 619 Megawatts-electric pressurized water reactor) that submitted its Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activity Report in August 1997.]

## **Radiation Exposure**

NUREG-0586 evaluates the radiation dose to plant workers and the public resulting from decontamination and decommissioning activities for a generic pressurized water reactor (1,175 Megawatts-electric) over a four-year period as follows:

Occupational exposure due to decontamination	1,114.5 person-rem
Occupational exposure due to decontamination truck shipments	100.2 person-rem
<i>Total for workers</i>	<i>= 1,215 person-rem</i>
Public exposure due to decontamination	Negligible
Public exposure due to decontamination truck shipments	20.6 person-rem
<i>Total for public</i>	<i>= 21 person-rem</i>

These doses are considerably lower than the typical worker doses accumulated during reactor operation, maintenance, and refueling operations.

In addition to the doses calculated above, the NUREG summarized the results of exposure calculations to a maximally exposed individual from accidental airborne release during decommissioning. These analyses indicated that the radiation doses were "quite low."

## **Waste Disposal**

Decontamination and decommissioning of a pressurized water reactor would result in the creation of low-level radioactive waste that would require transportation to and burial within a licensed site for disposal. NUREG-0586 estimates that approximately 18,340 cubic meters (647,677 cubic feet) of low-level radioactive waste would be generated.

In addition, the disposal of highly activated components (e.g., reactor, reactor internals) could require disposal in a deep geologic repository. NUREG-0586 estimates that approximately 11 cubic meters of highly activated waste would require disposal in this manner.

## **Socioeconomics**

Completion of Bellefonte 1 and 2 would generate impacts associated with the eventual decontamination and decommissioning of the plant. Currently, decontamination and decommissioning of a two-unit nuclear station to green-field status using the immediate dismantlement approach (commonly called Decon) is estimated to cost between \$600 and \$700 million. Offsite disposal of low-level radioactive waste would be responsible for at least half the cost. Low-level radioactive waste disposal costs have escalated at double-digit rates for many years and cannot be forecast with confidence. Currently, onsite costs for labor and materials can be rounded to \$200-250 million, excluding the potential for onsite long-term spent fuel storage. It is also impossible to predict what these costs would be 40 years in the future. It is reasonable to expect that decontamination and decommissioning 40 years in the future would not require the kind of dry cask ISFSI that is necessary for existing reactors with limited onsite spent fuel storage pools.

Assuming that decontamination and decommissioning 40 years in the future would take six years and that onsite spending at that time would have a net present value of \$200-250 million, the effect of decontamination

and decommissioning would be to continue local spending at the level of \$30 to 40 million per year. Operations spending would be at roughly \$90 million per year, including local procurements. Costs at the upper end of any range would be incurred during the last few years of operation as planning for retirement took place. The net socioeconomic effect of decontamination and decommissioning is to extend the local receipt of income by perhaps six years at roughly 30 percent of the operational level. This is beneficial, since it smooths the transition from operational to post-operational status.

### Other Environmental Impacts

NUREG-0586 (NRC 1988) characterizes as "minor" other environmental impacts that result from decommissioning activities when compared to the impacts that result from normal operation of the reactor. These impacts include:

- Water use during decontamination and decommissioning activities is estimated to be 18,000 cubic meters (635,670 cubic feet), which is far less than water use and evaporation during operation—i.e., approximately 27 million cubic meters per year (953 million cubic feet per year).
- Numbers of workers on site typically would not exceed the number of workers during initial construction or operation.
- Disturbance of ground cover would be limited to the restoration of contaminated sites.

### 5.2.6 Spent Fuel Storage

The environmental impacts from the storage of additional spent fuel due to the production of tritium presented in this section assumes that 3,400 TPBARs would be irradiated in a reactor core over an 18-month reactor operating cycle. Westinghouse has estimated (WEC 1999) that no additional spent nuclear fuel would be generated if approximately 2,000 TPBARs or less were irradiated in each operating cycle.

As discussed in Appendix A, the production of tritium in any of the alternative reactor units considered in this EIS would generate additional spent fuel. For the purposes of this EIS, it is assumed that the additional spent fuel generated from tritium production over the duration of the program would be accommodated at the site in a dry cask ISFSI. This section presents the environmental impact of the construction and operation of, and postulated accidents associated with, a generic dry cask ISFSI should it become necessary. This generic ISFSI would be designed to store the number of additional spent nuclear fuel assemblies required for 40-year tritium production at the reactor site.

### Number of ISFSI Casks for 40-Year Tritium Production

The number of ISFSI dry casks required to store the additional nuclear fuel needed for tritium production was calculated using fuel usage information for each nuclear power plant and current NRC-licensed ISFSI dry cask designs applicable to pressurized water reactor spent nuclear fuel (VECTRA 1995, NRC 1996d). Table 5-48 presents the data used for each nuclear plant and the resulting calculated number of ISFSI dry casks required to accommodate the spent nuclear fuel increment from 40 years of tritium production.

The number of dry storage casks calculated to accommodate tritium production as delineated in Table 5-48 is based on the 24 pressurized water reactor spent nuclear fuel assembly capacity of four of the ISFSI cask designs in the United States (VECTRA 1995, NRC 1996d, NRC 1987, NRC 1989). The number of dry storage casks are used in this report to quantify the specific environmental impact for each of the three nuclear power plants.

**Table 5-48 Data for Number of ISFSI Cask Determination for Each Nuclear Power Plant**

<i>Data Parameter</i>	<i>Watts Bar</i>	<i>Sequoyah<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Bellefonte<sup>a</sup></i>
Operating cycle length	18 months	18 months	18 months
Fresh fuel assemblies per cycle—no tritium	80	80	72
Fresh fuel assemblies per cycle—maximum tritium production (3,400 TPBARs)	136	140	141
Increase in fresh fuel assemblies per cycle due to tritium production	56	60	69
Number of operating cycles in 40 years <sup>b</sup>	27	27	27
Number of additional fuel assemblies for 40-year tritium production	1512	1620	1863
Integer number of ISFSI dry casks needed to store additional tritium production fuel assemblies	63	68	78

<sup>a</sup> Per reactor.

<sup>b</sup> Forty years of operation covers 26 refueling outages and 27 operating cycles. Spent fuel is discharged 27 times.

A number of ISFSI dry storage designs have been licensed by the NRC and are in operation in the United States (NRC 1996d). These designs include the Modular Vault Dry Store, metal casks, and concrete casks. The majority of operating ISFSIs have chosen to use concrete casks (NRC 1996d). Concrete casks consist of either a vertical or horizontal concrete structure housing a metal basket that confines the spent nuclear fuel. The Modular Vault Dry Store is a large reinforced concrete building that has been judged by the utility industry to be economically noncompetitive with metal and concrete casks, especially for the number and type of spent nuclear fuel assemblies being evaluated in this report. Therefore, for the determination of the maximum environmental impact of any economically viable and currently licensed ISFSI, only concrete dry storage casks would be considered for this environmental impact analysis.

Currently, the two concrete pressurized water reactor spent nuclear fuel dry cask designs licensed in the United States are the VSC-24 (NRC 1996d) and the NUHOMS-24P (VECTRA 1995). The VSC-24 shape is that of a vertical concrete cylinder, whereas the NUHOMS-24P shape is a rectangular concrete block. Both designs store the same 24 pressurized water reactor spent nuclear fuel assemblies. However, the NUHOMS-24P requires a greater quantity of concrete and steel and occupies a larger footprint for the same number of stored fuel assemblies compared to the VSC-24. Therefore, the environmental impact of using the NUHOMS-24P concrete dry storage ISFSI design is determined, since it should bound all other currently licensed dry storage cask designs.

The environmental impact of dry cask storage of the excess pressurized water reactor spent nuclear fuel required for tritium production is presented in the following three sections. Supporting information for this environmental impact evaluation was obtained from the Calvert Cliffs NUHOMS-24P ISFSI (BGE 1989a, BGE 1989b) and the Oconee NUHOMS-24P ISFSI (Duke 1988), as well as the standardized NUHOMS ISFSI report (VECTRA 1995).

### **Construction Impacts**

The construction of a concrete dry cask ISFSI uses conventional equipment for land leveling and grading, rebar and concrete forms installation, and pouring of concrete for base slabs and the NUHOMS-24P horizontal storage module. The horizontal storage module consists of a rectangular, reinforced concrete block 5.79 meters (19 feet) long, 2.76 meters (9.7 feet) wide, and 4.6 meters (15 feet) high. The module has a hollow internal



cavity to accommodate a stainless steel cylindrical cask that contains the spent nuclear fuel (VECTRA 1995). The stainless steel cask that is placed inside the horizontal storage module is fabricated off site.

Construction of the spent nuclear fuel ISFSI would use a small amount of local water resources. Concrete would be delivered premixed in trucks, while water for drinking, cleaning, and fugitive dust control would be brought onto the construction site by trucks. The portable toilets that would be used on the construction site would also require no local water.

No construction would be located within the limits of the 100-year flood plain, which would be consistent with the requirements of Executive Order 11988, Floodplain Management. Because these facilities would be considered "critical actions," they would be located above the 500-year flood elevation.

Land use during construction of an ISFSI is dependent on the specific site characteristics. More land is disturbed than the actual footprint of the ISFSI due to associated security and personnel exclusion fence boundaries. At Calvert Cliffs, a wooded site that is located approximately 700 meters (2,300 feet) from the nuclear power plant was selected for the ISFSI. Preparation of this site affected approximately 24,281 square meters (6 acres) of land for the ISFSI footprint of 13,982 square meters (3.5 acres) (BGE 1989a). The Calvert Cliffs installation was designed to contain 120 spent nuclear fuel casks (also called horizontal storage modules in the NUHOMS-24P design). For this EIS, it is conservatively assumed that the same ratio (e.g., 1.71) of affected land to actual ISFSI footprint land is applicable. Table 5-49 delineates the land use for each specific nuclear power plant's tritium excess spent nuclear fuel ISFSI.

**Table 5-49 Environmental Impact of ISFSI Construction**

No.	Environmental Parameter	Bellefonte	Sequoyah	Watts Bar
1	External appearance	78 Horizontal storage modules Rectangular cubes (5.79 × 2.96 meters) (19 × 9.7 feet) constructed on 3 concrete cask foundation pads approximately: (31.4 × 11.58 meters) (106.7 × 38 feet)	68 Horizontal storage modules Rectangular cubes (5.79 × 2.96 meters) (19 × 9.7 feet) constructed on 3 concrete cask foundation pads approximately: (38.43 × 11.58 meters) (126.1 × 38 feet)	63 Horizontal storage modules Rectangular cubes (5.79 × 2.96 meters) (19 × 9.7 feet) constructed on 3 concrete cask foundation pads approximately: (35.47 × 11.58 meters) (116.4 × 38 feet)
<b>Site Preparation and Facility Construction</b>				
2	Health and safety (Only construction work performed subsequent to the loading of any horizontal storage modules with spent fuel may result in worker exposures from direct and skyshine radiation in the vicinity of the loaded horizontal storage modules.)	Total dose during construction: <u>87.8</u> person-rem	Total dose during construction: 51.00 person-rem	Total dose during construction: 47.25 person-rem
3	Electrical distribution	Existing electrical services would be used.	Existing electrical services would be used.	Existing electrical services would be used.
4	Construction water use	Small	Small	Small

No.	Environmental Parameter	Bellefonte	Sequoyah	Watts Bar
5	Effects on land use	Footprint: 13,700 square meters (3.4 acres) Disturbed: 23,600 square meters (5.8 acres)	Footprint: 12,920 square meters (3.2 acres) Disturbed: 22,093 square meters (5.5 acres)	Footprint: 12,503 square meters (3.1 acres) Disturbed: 21,380 square meters (5.3 acres)
6	Effects on water bodies use	Small	Small	Small
7	Impact on workers	50 workers	50 workers	50 workers
8	Impact of construction generation of fugitive dust	Small	Small	Small
9	Impact on ecology	Small	Small	Small
10	Construction noise	Small	Small	Small
<b>Transmission Facilities Construction Resources Committed</b>				
11	Water	Small	Small	Small
12	Air	None	None	None
13	Biota	Limited to the land used	Limited to the land used	Limited to the land used
14	Materials (approximate)	Concrete: 12,128 metric tons (13,369 tons) Steel: 1,378 metric tons (1,519 tons)	Concrete: 10,533 metric tons (11,611 tons) Steel: 1,198 metric tons (1,321 tons)	Concrete: 9,653 metric tons (10,618 tons) Steel: 1,096 metric tons (1,208 tons)
<b>Construction Impact Control</b>				
15	Construction traffic control	Use of existing public roadways is recommended.	Use of existing public roadways is recommended.	Use of existing public roadways is recommended.
16	Dust and particulate emission control	During construction, paved road would be used.	During construction, paved road would be used.	During construction, paved road would be used.
17	Noise control	Small/No provision required	Small/No provision required	Small/No provision required
18	Chemical waste management	A chemical control program would be prepared. Liquid waste would be stored in a tank.	A chemical control program would be prepared. Liquid waste would be stored in a tank.	A chemical control program would be prepared. Liquid waste would be stored in a tank.
19	Solid waste management	Construction scrap would be collected in designated area for recycling or removal.	Construction scrap would be collected in designated area for recycling or removal.	Construction scrap would be collected in designated area for recycling or removal.
20	Site clearing	Site would be paved. By providing drainage, erosion would be controlled.	Site would be paved. By providing drainage, erosion would be controlled.	Site would be paved. By providing drainage, erosion would be controlled.
21	Excavation and soil deposition	Construction site would be stabilized.	Construction site would be stabilized.	Construction site would be stabilized.

Note 1: Consistent with 10 CFR 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, the following definition of environmental impacts was used.

Small Environmental effects are not detectable or are so minor that they would neither destabilize nor noticeably alter any important attribute of the resource. For the purposes of assessing radiological impacts, the NRC has concluded that those impacts that do not exceed permissible levels in the NRC's regulations are considered small as the term is used in this table.

Note 2: These environmental parameters were taken directly from an earlier, approved NRC environmental assessment for similar ISFSI design. This CLWR EIS states that, if built, all NEPA requirements for the ISFSI will be addressed.

A peak workforce of 50 people is projected for the construction of this ISFSI (BGE 1989a). The use of local contractors and the rather small number of personnel would not be expected to have any impact on housing, transportation, and educational facilities. Construction fugitive dust should be small. The small construction area should not have any impact on local flora and fauna. The effects of construction noise should be limited for the construction workers by Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations, for the public by distance to the nearest public residence, and for the local fauna by the small area involved with easy access and egress. No electric power transmission lines would have to be erected because access to existing transmission lines to the nuclear power plant would provide the electric power requirements.

The ISFSI construction would not require the commitment of any water or air resources. The principal materials used in the construction of this ISFSI would be steel and concrete. The steel and concrete quantities were delineated previously in Table 5-49. During construction, workers building casks could be exposed to radiation emitted from adjacent casks that have already been completed and loaded with spent nuclear fuel. The dose rates to the construction workers from these casks should average 0.5 millirem per hour (BGE 1989a), and an estimated 1,500 person-hours would be required to complete the construction of one cask or horizontal storage module. The construction dose to workers, as delineated in Table 5-49, conservatively assumes that each cask would be immediately loaded with spent nuclear fuel after it was completed.

Construction traffic would be accommodated by existing nuclear power plant site roadways. Any dust or particulate fugitive emissions caused by earth-moving and grading would be controlled by wetting, seeding, and the use of gravel to minimize soil erosion and runoff. Standard equipment and vehicle noise control devices, limited construction hours, and minimal use of explosives, along with adherence to all applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration requirements, would minimize noise impact during construction. Any liquid or solid wastes generated during construction would be collected at the construction site and removed from the site for suitable recycling or disposal off site in accordance with applicable EPA regulations. None of the wastes would be radioactive.

### Operation Impacts

Spent nuclear fuel decay heat is removed by natural air convection in the NUHOMS horizontal storage module dry cask system. Each horizontal storage module cask is designed and licensed to safely remove up to 24 kilowatts of decay heat from pressurized water reactor spent nuclear fuel (VECTRA 1995). Conservative calculations have shown that, for 24 kilowatts of decay heat, air entering the cask at a temperature of 21°C (70°F) would be heated to a temperature of 72°C (161°F) (VECTRA 1995). The actual spent nuclear fuel decay heat expected for the ISFSI casks would be in the range of 7 to 12 kilowatts with a concomitantly smaller air temperature rise (PN 1993). The environmental impact of the discharge of this amount of heat can be compared to the heat (336 kilowatts) emitted to the atmosphere by an automobile with a 150-brake horsepower engine (Bosch 1976). The heat released by an average automobile is the equivalent of 14 to 48 ISFSI casks at their design maximum heat load. The decay heat released to the atmosphere from the tritium spent nuclear fuel ISFSI is equivalent to the heat released to the atmosphere from two to nine average cars.

The operating ISFSI would not release any radioactive material because the spent nuclear fuel would be in a sealed confinement boundary metal cask. The external surface of the cask would be decontaminated inside the spent fuel pool building to remove any radioactive contamination from the spent fuel pool water. The

horizontal storage module concrete cask never would be exposed to any radioactive material and, therefore, could not release any radioactive contamination to the environment.

The ISFSI would be a source of direct and skyshine-scattered radiation that would penetrate the thick concrete shielding of the cask. The ISFSI direct and scattered radiation would be composed of greater than 90 percent gamma radiation and less than 10 percent neutron radiation (BGE 1989b, VECTRA 1995, Duke 1988). The combined direct and scattered dose rate would be a function of distance from the ISFSI, the number and configuration of casks in the horizontal storage module, and the presence of any radiation-absorbing natural structures or intervening topographical features such as earth berms. NRC regulations (10 CFR 72.106) require that a minimum distance of 100 meters (328 feet) be maintained as a controlled area around the ISFSI. The direct-scattered total dose rate to an individual at 100 meters was calculated to be in the range of 0.01 to 0.1 millirem per hour (BGE 1989b, Duke 1988). The determination of the dose to an offsite individual would depend on site-specific factors (e.g., distance and direction of the nearest offsite residence, fuel conditions, contribution of offsite dose from reactor plant effluents). Based on site-specific environmental assessments of operating ISFSIs (e.g., Surry, H.B. Robinson, Calvert Cliffs), the annual dose to the nearest "real" individual would be a small fraction of the 25-millirem per year criterion in 10 CFR 72.67 and 40 CFR 190.<sup>1</sup> This dose was calculated to be 0.00006 millirem per year at Surry (VEPCO 1985), 0.4 millirem per year at H.B. Robinson (CPL 1986), and less than 2 millirem per year at Calvert Cliffs (BGE 1989b). When combined with the dose commitment from other reactor operations, the total dose commitment would be well within the regulatory limits. Table-50 presents an estimated range of dose rates and annual doses, assuming that onsite workers are 100 meters (328 feet) from the ISFSI and that the nearest public residence is 1,000 meters (3,280 feet) from the installation. The radiation dose effect of the number of casks at each specific ISFSI should be minor because of the small magnitude of the doses.

**Table 5-50 Environmental Impact of ISFSI Operation**

No.	Environmental Parameter	Bellefonte	Sequoyah	Watts Bar
1	Effects of operation of the heat dissipation system	Equivalent to heat emitted into the atmosphere by 2-6 average size cars.	Equivalent to heat emitted into the atmosphere by 2-6 average size cars.	Equivalent to heat emitted into the atmosphere by 2-6 average size cars.
2	Facility water use	Transfer cask decontamination water consumption of less than 35 cubic meters (1,236 cubic feet).	Transfer cask decontamination water consumption of less than 28.9 cubic meters (1,020 cubic feet).	Transfer cask decontamination water consumption of less than 26.8 cubic meters (946 cubic feet).
3	Radiological impact from routine operation	Worker Exposure: As the result of daily inspection of casks, during a 40-year life cycle, workers would be exposed to 74.4 person-rem. Public Exposure: The regulatory limit for public exposure is 25 millirem per year. Doses received by a member of the public living in the vicinity of the ISFSI would be well below the regulatory requirements.	Worker Exposure: As the result of daily inspection of casks, during a 40-year life cycle, workers would be exposed to 64.3 person-rem. Public Exposure: The regulatory limit for public exposure is 25 millirem per year. Doses received by a member of the public living in the vicinity of the ISFSI would be well below the regulatory requirements.	Worker Exposure: As the result of daily inspection of casks, during a 40-year life cycle, workers would be exposed to 58.8 person-rem. Public Exposure: The regulatory limit for public exposure is 25 millirem per year. Doses received by a member of the public living in the vicinity of the ISFSI would be well below the regulatory requirements.
3	Radwaste and source terms	Cask loading and decontamination operation generates less than 4.42 cubic meters (156 cubic feet) of low-level radioactive waste.	Cask loading and decontamination operation generates less than 3.85 cubic meters (136 cubic feet) of low-level radioactive waste.	Cask loading and decontamination operation generates less than 3.57 cubic meters (126 cubic feet) of low-level radioactive waste.

<sup>1</sup>The term "real" is used for an individual living near the ISFSI under realistic conditions, as opposed to a hypothetical individual living under conditions that would tend to overestimate the resulting exposure.

No.	Environmental Parameter	Bellefonte	Sequoyah	Watts Bar
4	Effects of chemical and biocide discharges	Small	Small	Small
5	Effect of sanitary waste discharges	Small	Small	Small
6	Effects of maintenance of the electrical distribution system	Small	Small	Small
7	Noise impact	Small	Small	Small
8	Climatological impact	Small (less than 0.1 percent of the nuclear power plant's heat emission to the atmosphere)	Small (less than 0.1 percent of the nuclear power plant's heat emission to the atmosphere)	Small (less than 0.1 percent of the nuclear power plant's heat emission to the atmosphere)
9	Impact on wildlife	Small	Small	Small
10	Impact of runoff from operation	The horizontal storage module surface is not contaminated. No contaminated runoff is expected.	The horizontal storage module surface is not contaminated. No contaminated runoff is expected.	The horizontal storage module surface is not contaminated. No contaminated runoff is expected.
11	Vehicle emissions during construction and operation	Small	Small	Small
12	Socioeconomics	Small	Small	Small

Note 1: Consistent with 10 CFR 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, the following definition of environmental impacts was used.

Small Environmental effects are not detectable or are so minor that they would neither destabilize nor noticeably alter any important attribute of the resource. For the purposes of assessing radiological impacts, the NRC has concluded that those impacts that do not exceed permissible levels in the NRC's regulations are considered small as the term is used in this table.

Note 2: These environmental parameters were taken directly from an earlier, approved NRC environmental assessment for similar ISFSI design. This CLWR EIS states that, if built, all NEPA requirements for the ISFSI will be addressed.

The storage cask-loading operation would include moving the spent fuel into the confinement cask; removing the transport cask out of the pool; draining water from the cask; vacuuming and backfilling the cask; welding the cover plate; decontaminating the cask surface; moving the cask to the ISFSI site; and installing the cask into the concrete horizontal storage module. These operations would result in a total dose to all the involved workers that is conservatively estimated to be in the range of 1.05 to 1.45 person-rem for each ISFSI cask loaded and installed at the ISFSI site (Duke 1988, BGE 1989b). Table 5-50 presents onsite worker doses associated with cask-loading operations for the three nuclear power plants being considered for tritium production. These doses assume that casks would be loaded with the same frequency and quantity of spent nuclear fuel as the fuel cycle predictions given in Table 5-48.

Operation of the ISFSI would generate no chemical, biocide, or sanitary wastes. The loading process for each cask would generate less than 0.43 cubic meters (15 cubic feet) of low-level radioactive liquid waste and less than 0.057 cubic meters (2 cubic feet) of low-level solid waste per cask. This amount of low-level radioactive solid and liquid waste is presented in Table 5-50 for each nuclear power plant.

The ISFSI operation would generate minimal noise. The only measurable noise levels would be generated by the truck transporting each cask from the spent fuel pool building to the site (two times for every 18-month fuel cycle). Additional light traffic noise would be generated by personnel transportation for daily ISFSI inspection and periodic health physics or security personnel visits. The noise level should be within the range of noise typically generated by nuclear power plant activities.

The heat emitted by the fully loaded, largest projected tritium ISFSI, even at the maximum design-licensed decay heat level for each cask of 24 kilowatts, would be less than 2 megawatts (i.e., 78 casks  $\times$  24 kilowatts = 1,872 kilowatts or 1.87 megawatts). This amount of heat of less than 2 megawatts added to the atmosphere is less than 0.1 percent of the heat released to the environment from any of the proposed nuclear power plants—on the order of 2,400 megawatts for each operating nuclear reactor. The actual decay heat from spent nuclear fuel in the ISFSI should be lower than 1.87 megawatts and would decay with time due to the natural decay of fission products in the spent nuclear fuel. In addition, the incremental loading of the ISFSI over a 40-year period would not generate the full ISFSI heat until 40 years after the initial operation. The heat emitted from the ISFSI would have no effect on the environment or climate because of its small magnitude.

The small amount of land expected to be disturbed would have no impact on local flora and fauna. Runoff from rain would carry no radioactive contamination and would not require monitoring or holdup capability. ISFSI operational vehicle emissions would be a small fraction of the vehicle emissions generated by the operation of the adjacent nuclear power plant. The operation would not involve an irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources.

Decommissioning and dismantling of the ISFSI should occur sometime after the availability of a Federal permanent ISFSI. The materials used in the ISFSI (e.g., concrete, steel, and lead) would be identical to materials at the adjoining nuclear power plant. Decontamination and decommissioning methods for the nuclear power plant would be applied to the site and would represent a small fraction of the quantity and radioactive contamination level of components within the nuclear plant. Some decontamination of an inner layer of the concrete shielding and the metal confinement cask would be required. A minimal incremental environmental impact is expected from the decontamination and decommissioning of the ISFSI, assuming that it occurs simultaneously with the decontamination and decommissioning of the nuclear power plant.

The potential increase in spent fuel storage requirements due to tritium production would create additional costs, but would not appreciably increase socioeconomic impacts. The spent fuel dry storage casks would be procured from outside the region. The costs incurred at the site for additional fuel transfers, spent fuel storage cask maintenance, spent fuel cask pad expansion, transfer of spent fuel to shipping casks, etc., as well as related storage activities, should be no more than \$1 million per year. These costs are not material in a regional socioeconomic context.

### **Environmental Effects of Postulated Accidents**

The most severe environmental impact of all postulated accidents analyzed for the ISFSI is the nonmechanistic release of the gaseous gap content from all 24 pressurized water reactor spent nuclear fuel assemblies in a storage cask (VECTRA 1995). This accident conservatively assumes that 30 percent of all fission product gases present in all the spent nuclear fuel within one cask would be released to the environment. This scenario is extremely conservative because the ISFSI is designed to maintain its confinement capability under all postulated accidents. In addition, ISFSI casks encapsulate intact fuel. Failed fuel must be enclosed in a second sealed container within the cask to ensure the required two levels of confinement for ISFSI design. The radiological consequences of this accident were calculated using the bounding spent nuclear fuel radioisotope fission product inventory and conservative site-specific atmospheric dispersion factors. The regulatory limit for this accident is a 5,000-millirem whole-body or individual organ dose (10 CFR 72.106). The numerical value of the calculated dose for this accident is a function of the specific stored spent nuclear fuel bounding fission product inventory, site-specific atmospheric dispersion factors, and the site-specific distance from the ISFSI to the nearest public boundary. A generic and conservative calculation for the NUHOMS-24P design resulted in a 300-meter (984-foot) whole-body dose of 53 millirem (VECTRA 1995). Similarly, generic conservative calculations for this accident with the VSC-24 ISFSI design (NRC 1996d) resulted in a whole-body dose of 88 millirem at 200 meters (656 feet), 18 millirem at 500 meters (1,640 feet), and 5.7 millirem at 1,000 meters (3,280 feet). All of these results are well within the regulatory limit. The

impact of these calculated doses can be compared with the natural radiation dose of about 300 millirem annually received by each human being in the United States (DOE 1996a). Thus, even at an unrealistically close distance of 200 meters, the public dose to this extremely conservative, nonmechanistic accident represents about 29 percent of the average annual dose due to natural sources. At a more realistic distance of 1,000 meters (3,281 feet), the dose from this accident represents only 2 percent of the average annual natural dose to the public. The generic conservative radiological consequences of this accident are presented in Table 5-51.

All other postulated ISFSI accidents would either have no radiological impacts on the public or would deliver a dose smaller than that calculated for the 100 percent fuel failure associated with a cask leakage.

**Table 5-51 Environmental Impact of Accidents at ISFSI**

<i>Normal Operation and Operational Occurrences</i>			
	<i>Postulated Accident</i>	<i>Accident Evaluation Requirements</i>	<i>Consequences</i>
<i>Anticipated Accident</i>			
1	An inadvertent cask movement causing lateral impact of the fuel basket against the inside of the storage cask	This event should be evaluated to ensure that no release of radioactive materials in the ISFSI would result.	This event does not result in release of radioactive materials.
2	Extreme ambient temperatures	This event should be evaluated to ensure that no release of radioactive materials in the ISFSI would result.	This event does not result in release of radioactive materials
3	Partial blockage of air passages	This event should be evaluated to ensure that no release of radioactive materials in the ISFSI would result.	This event does not result in release of radioactive materials
4	The postulated release of surface contamination from baskets	This event could result in the release of radioactive materials from the ISFSI. An analysis should be conducted to demonstrate that the proposed contamination limits would not result in radiological concern at a distance of 100 meters from the ISFSI. The analysis also should determine the allowable surface contamination limits.	This accident would result in a dose of less than 10 millirem to a person at 100 meters away
<i>Maximum Credible Accident</i>			
1	Fires	The ISFSI Safety Analysis Report should evaluate the consequences of this hypothetical accident to demonstrate that the storage cask system provides a substantial safety margin for the protection of public, facility personnel, and the environment.	Designed to withstand the accident with no consequence
2	Structural collapse	The presence of any structure, the collapse of which may result in any accident, should be acknowledged. The ISFSI Safety Analysis Report should evaluate the consequences of this hypothetical accident to demonstrate that the storage cask system provides a substantial safety margin for the protection of the public, facility personnel, and the environment.	Designed to withstand the accident with no consequence
3	The postulated tipping over of a storage cask	The ISFSI Safety Analysis Report should evaluate the consequences of this hypothetical accident to demonstrate that the storage cask system provides a substantial safety margin for the protection of the public, facility personnel, and the environment.	Designed to withstand the accident with no consequence

<b>Normal Operation and Operational Occurrences</b>			
	<b>Postulated Accident</b>	<b>Accident Evaluation Requirements</b>	<b>Consequences</b>
4	Blockage of the storage cask air inlet vents	The ISFSI Safety Analysis Report should evaluate the consequences of this hypothetical accident to demonstrate that the storage cask system provides a substantial safety margin for the protection of the public, facility personnel, and the environment.	Designed to withstand the accident with no consequence
<b>Beyond Design-Basis Accident</b>			
5	Dry shielded canister leakage	Sites should identify the radiological consequences of this accident and ensure that it is below the regulatory limit at the ISFSI facility fence.	88 millirem at 200 meters (656 feet)  18 millirem at 500 meters (1,640 feet)  5.7 millirem at 1,000 meters (3,280 feet)
<b>Transportation Accidents Involving Radioactivity</b>			
1	Transportation accidents	Sites should: - Confirm that transportation of the storage system would take place within the existing site boundary. - Describe onsite transportation aspects and procedures (i.e., towing and transfer method, distance traveled). - Ensure that no transportation accident (i.e., drop of a loaded cask) could lead to release of radioactive materials.	Designed to withstand the accident with no consequence
<b>Other Accidents</b>			
1	Tornadoes	Such accidents should be evaluated consistent with the plant's Final Safety Analysis Report requirements.	Consistent with the ISFSI's design criteria in the Safety Analysis Report
2	Floods	Such accidents should be evaluated consistent with the plant's Final Safety Analysis Report requirements.	Consistent with the ISFSI's design criteria in the Safety Analysis Report
3	Earthquakes	Such accidents should be evaluated consistent with the plant's Final Safety Analysis Report requirements.	Consistent with the ISFSI's design criteria in the Safety Analysis Report
4	Volcanoes	Such accidents should be evaluated consistent with the plant's Final Safety Analysis Report requirements.	Consistent with the ISFSI's design criteria in the Safety Analysis Report
5	Nearby explosions	Such accidents should be evaluated consistent with the plant's Final Safety Analysis Report requirements.	Consistent with the ISFSI's design criteria in the Safety Analysis Report
6	Lightning strikes	Such accidents should be evaluated consistent with the plant's Final Safety Analysis Report requirements.	Consistent with the ISFSI's design criteria in the Safety Analysis Report
7	The collapse of structures around the ISFSI	Sites should determine any probability of a failure of a surrounding structure which could affect the integrity of the ISFSI.	Consistent with the ISFSI's design criteria in the Safety Analysis Report
8	Fire protection	Sites should ensure that no combustible materials are stored within the ISFSI or its boundaries.	Consistent with the ISFSI's design criteria in the Safety Analysis Report
9	Explosion protection	Sites should ensure that no explosive materials and no credible internal explosions are possible.	Consistent with the ISFSI's design criteria in the Safety Analysis Report



### 5.2.7 Fabrication of TPBARs and Blend-Down of Highly Enriched Uranium

Commercial facilities would fabricate and assemble the TPBARs. Potential fabrication and/or assembly sites include: General Electric, Wilmington, North Carolina; Framatome - Cogema Fuels, Lynchburg Virginia; BWX Technologies, Inc., Lynchburg, Virginia; Asea Brown-Boveri/Combustion Engineering, Hematite, Missouri; Siemens Power Corporation, Richland, Washington; and Westinghouse Electric, Columbia, South Carolina. Each of the facilities has a 10 CFR 70 license issued by the NRC. The successful fabrication bidder will determine whether its NRC license will require an amendment. In the event a license amendment is required, the NRC will prepare the appropriate environmental documentation. In addition, if this DOE fabrication procurement is subject to 10 CFR 1021, DOE will consider the environmental impacts during the fabrication procurement process. Since the fabricator of the TPBARs is still to be determined, the qualitative assessment presented in this EIS presents the reasonably foreseeable impacts of fabrication. This EIS provides a brief description of the fabrication process and a qualitative discussion of the potential, non-site-specific environmental consequences. It also provides estimates of the material resources required by the tritium production program.

The TPBARs consist of multiple components of materials designed to produce, capture, and store tritium until the TPBARs can be removed from the reactor and processed under controlled conditions to remove the tritium.

The TPBARs contain lithium aluminate ( $\text{LiAlO}_2$ ) pellets. The pellets are enriched in lithium-6 to produce tritium. The pellets are stacked in an unplated zircaloy-4 tube called the liner. The liner absorbs oxygen and supports the pellets. The pellets are surrounded by a metal tube of nickel-plated zircaloy. This tube functions as a getter (absorber of tritium). The pellet, liner, and nickel-plated zircaloy components are inserted in stainless steel cladding. The inside surface of the cladding is aluminized to provide a barrier to limit tritium leakage through the cladding.

The enriched lithium aluminate is produced through the chemical reaction of lithium carbonate/lithium monohydrate and aluminum oxide. In the TPBAR fabrication facility, these two materials would be blended, spray dried (to limit the amount of water trapped in the product), and calcined to form the lithium aluminate.

The lithium aluminate would be combined with a binder, conditioned for pressing, pressed into its final ceramic annular shape, and sintered. These annular pellets then would be assembled with the remaining rod components, including the zirconium getter and the rod cladding. Final rod assembly would include additional drying, backfilling of the rods with helium, and welding end caps onto the rods. The TPBARs would be attached to a base plate to create a TPBAR assembly, which would be inserted into a fuel assembly; at this point they would be ready for transport to the CLWR.

No filtration of the off-gases (principally carbon dioxide) produced by this reaction would be necessary. Wastes generated from TPBAR production would consist of sanitary wastes, process wastes, and chemical wastes. Wastes would be primarily generated from TPBAR fabrication laboratory analysis, pellet grinding, and stainless steel tube working. Usable scrap material generated during the machining operations would be recycled for later use in the TPBAR production process (DOE 1992).

The quantities of material required for TPBAR production are presented in Table 5-52. These numbers are based on the production of 4,000 TPBARs per year (6,000 TPBARs or 250 TPBAR assemblies produced for refueling outages for reactors on an 18-month operating cycle). Each TPBAR assembly would weigh less than 27 kilograms (60 pounds), of which less than 400 grams (0.8 pound) would be lithium (WEC 1997). The amounts of source material for the production of lithium aluminate would be derived from the amount of lithium required for each TPBAR. Materials used for the fabrication of the TPBARs (i.e., lithium) have been mined and processed and are part of DOE's inventory of material resources. Therefore, no environmental consequences of any significance are expected from activities other than the fabrication and assembly of the TPBARs.

Table 5-52 Materials Required for TPBAR Production

Material	Annual Requirement (kilograms)	Program Requirement (metric tons) <sup>a,b</sup>
Lithium	61	2.4
Lithium carbonate	325	13
Aluminum oxide	450	18
Other materials <sup>c</sup>	4000	160

- <sup>a</sup> Based on a 40-year program duration.
- <sup>b</sup> 1 metric ton = 1,000 kilograms (2,200 pounds).
- <sup>c</sup> Includes aluminum, zircaloy, stainless steel, and nickel.

The TPBARs would be inserted into fresh fuel assemblies in place of burnable absorber rods or an empty thimble tube. The replacement of the burnable absorber rods with TPBARs for tritium production would require that additional fuel assemblies be used in the CLWR fuel cycle. The addition of lithium into the core design would increase the amount of uranium-235 that must be in the core to produce the design power level throughout the 18-month fuel cycle. The number of fresh assemblies required for each 18-month refueling cycle would depend on the number of TPBARs inserted for irradiation in the reactor core. For up to approximately 2,000 TPBARs, no additional fresh fuel assemblies would be required. As the number of TPBARs increased above 2,000, the additional fresh fuel assemblies would increase. For the maximum number of 3,400 TPBARs considered in this EIS, approximately 60 fresh fuel assemblies would be required in addition to the approximately 80 fresh fuel assemblies normally used in an 18-month refueling cycle nontritium production mode. Therefore, the additional number of fresh fuel assemblies that would be required at Watts Bar or Sequoyah for a 40-year program duration would be approximately 1,700 fresh fuel assemblies. At Bellefonte, all fresh fuel required would be attributed to tritium production; therefore, approximately 3,807 fresh fuel assemblies would be required.

Tritium production would require fuel assemblies with higher enrichments of uranium-235 than the assemblies used in a commercial power reactor (approximately 4.9 percent compared to current 4.5 percent). The increased enrichment would be required to compensate for the increased "loss" of neutrons from the power production capability of the reactor core. These two factors, increased number of fuel assemblies and increased uranium-235 enrichment, would result in an increased use of uranium-235 in a tritium production reactor compared to the same reactor operated solely for power production. Table 5-53 provides a summary of the amounts of uranium-235 required for both commercial operation and tritium production operation of three reactors. These figures are based on the initial core load of fresh fuel and 26 refueling outages over the 40-year life of the program. An average uranium-235 enrichment of 4.95 percent was assumed for the fuel assemblies used for tritium production (WEC 1997).

Enriched uranium used for fuel assemblies in tritium production has already been mined and processed. Therefore, no environmental consequences of any significance are expected from activities other than from the conversion of highly enriched uranium to commercial reactor fuel.

**Table 5-53 Additional Fuel Requirements**

<i>Requirements</i>	<i>Tritium Production Core Configuration</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1 Sequoyah 1 or 2*</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1</i>
Fresh fuel assemblies	3,400 TPBARs	1,700	3,807
	less than 2,000 TPBARs	0	2,013
Uranium-235 (metric tons)	3,400 TPBARs	34.0	75.5
	less than 2,000 TPBARs	0	40.3

\* The values in this column reflect the requirements at Sequoyah which bound those for Watts Bar.  
1 metric ton = 1,000 kilograms (2,200 pounds)

The enriched uranium to be used for the nuclear fuel assemblies would likely be provided by DOE from highly enriched uranium set aside for national security missions such as tritium production. The highly enriched uranium would be downblended with other uranium materials to commercially usable low enriched uranium. Environmental impacts resulting from the potential downblending of highly enriched uranium are described below.

Impacts from the conversion and blending of highly enriched uranium to commercial reactor fuel have been previously described in DOE's *Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Environmental Impact Statement*, DOE/EIS-0240, June 28, 1996 (DOE 1996b). The Highly Enriched Uranium EIS addresses highly enriched uranium conversion and blending at four sites: DOE's Y-12 Plant at the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; DOE's Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina; the Babcock & Wilcox Naval Nuclear Fuel Division facility in Lynchburg, Virginia; and the Nuclear Fuel Services facilities in Erwin, Tennessee. The document evaluated three conversion and blending technologies: uranyl nitrate hexahydrate or liquid blending, molten metal blending, and uranium hexafluoride or gas blending. Of the three technologies, both the uranyl nitrate hexahydrate and uranium hexafluoride convert highly enriched uranium to commercial reactor fuel as well as low-level radioactive waste. The molten metal blending would only convert highly enriched uranium to low-level radioactive waste. The Highly Enriched Uranium EIS addressed the disposition of a nominal 200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium, 170 metric tons of which would be converted to commercial fuel (61 FR 40619).

The environmental analyses in the Highly Enriched Uranium EIS estimated that the incremental radiological impact to workers, the public, and the environment during normal blending operations would be very small and would be well within regulatory requirements for all alternatives, technologies, and sites. Since no new construction would be required and the blending activities would be the same as past blending operations at these sites, all impacts would be small.

### 5.2.8 Transportation of TPBARs

Transportation impacts may be divided into two parts: the impacts of incident-free or routine transportation and the impacts of transportation accidents. Incident-free transportation and transportation accident impacts are divided into two parts: nonradiological impacts and radiological impacts. Incident-free transportation includes radiological impacts on the public and the crew from the radiation field that surrounds the package. Nonradiological impacts of incident-free transportation include vehicular emissions. Nonradiological impacts of potential transportation accidents are traffic accident fatalities. Only in the worst conceivable conditions, which are of low probability, could a transportation cask of the type used to transport radioactive material be so damaged that there could be a release of radioactivity to the environment.

The impacts of accidents are expressed in terms of probabilistic risk, which is the probability of an accident multiplied by the consequences of that accident and summed over all reasonably conceivable accidents. The

impacts due to radiological accidents are measured in terms of the latent cancer fatalities that might result while the effect of non-radiological accidents are measured in additional immediate fatalities. Incident-free effects are also expressed in terms of additional latent cancer fatalities.

The first step in the ground transportation analysis was to determine the incident-free and accident risk factors on a per-shipment basis for transportation of the various materials. Calculation of risk factors was accomplished by using the HIGHWAY (ORNL 1993a) and INTERLINE (ORNL 1993b) computer codes to choose representative routes in accordance with U.S. Department of Transportation regulations. These codes provided population estimates so that RADTRAN (SNL 1993), and TICLD codes could be used to determine the radiological risk factors. This analysis is discussed in Appendix E.

Four transportation segments were evaluated in this EIS: (1) shipment of fabricated TPBARs to an assembly facility; (2) shipment of TPBAR assemblies to each of the CLWRs; (3) shipment of irradiated TPBARs to a Tritium Extraction Facility (assumed for purposes of evaluation to be at DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina); and (4) shipment of irradiated hardware to a waste disposal site. Table 5-54 shows the estimated impacts of transportation for the 40-year duration of the program.

Table 5-54 Risks of Transporting the Hazardous Materials

Reactor Site (No. of TPBARs)	TPBAR Transportation Mode	Routine		Accidental		
		Radiological		Nonradiological		Radiological
		Crew	Public	Emission	Traffic	
Watts Bar (3,400 TPBARs per cycle)	Truck cask via truck	0.0033	0.021	0.0032	0.031	$5.1 \times 10^{-6}$
	Truck cask via rail	0.0016	0.008	0.0023	0.029	$5.7 \times 10^{-6}$
	Rail cask via rail	0.0016	0.008	0.0023	0.029	$1.6 \times 10^{-6}$
Sequoyah (3,400 TPBARs per cycle)	Truck cask via truck	0.0030	0.019	0.0035	0.029	$6.1 \times 10^{-6}$
	Truck cask via rail	0.0014	0.007	0.0024	0.028	$5.2 \times 10^{-6}$
	Rail cask via rail	0.0014	0.007	0.0024	0.028	$1.5 \times 10^{-6}$
Bellefonte (3,400 TPBARs per cycle)	Truck cask via truck	0.0026	0.018	0.0034	0.030	$6.4 \times 10^{-6}$
	Truck cask via rail	0.0010	0.005	0.0024	0.028	$5.8 \times 10^{-6}$
	Rail cask via rail	0.0010	0.005	0.0024	0.028	$1.6 \times 10^{-6}$
Watts Bar (1,000 TPBARs per cycle)	Truck cask via truck	0.0010	0.007	0.0010	0.009	$1.7 \times 10^{-6}$
	Truck cask via rail	0.0005	0.002	0.0007	0.009	$1.9 \times 10^{-6}$
	Rail cask via rail	0.0005	0.002	0.0007	0.009	$5.3 \times 10^{-7}$
Sequoyah (1,000 TPBARs per cycle)	Truck cask via truck	0.0009	0.006	0.0011	0.009	$2.0 \times 10^{-6}$
	Truck cask via rail	0.0004	0.002	0.0007	0.008	$1.7 \times 10^{-6}$
	Rail cask via rail	0.0004	0.002	0.0007	0.008	$4.9 \times 10^{-7}$
Bellefonte (1,000 TPBARs per cycle)	Truck cask via truck	0.0008	0.006	0.0010	0.009	$2.1 \times 10^{-6}$
	Truck cask via rail	0.0003	0.001	0.0007	0.009	$1.9 \times 10^{-6}$
	Rail cask via rail	0.0003	0.001	0.0007	0.009	$5.4 \times 10^{-7}$

Notes: 1. Maximum impacts are assumed for fabrication, assembly, and waste transportation, and are included in these totals.  
2. All risks are expressed in latent cancer fatalities during the implementation of the policy, except for the Accident-Traffic column, which is the number of fatalities.

The impacts from transportation segments (1) and (2) are limited to toxic vehicle exhaust emissions and traffic fatalities since the fabricated TPBARs contain no radioactive elements. Combinations of fabrication and assembly sites were evaluated, including Richland, Washington, (Siemens Power Corporation); Lynchburg, Virginia, (Framatome-Cogema Fuels or B&W Technologies, Inc.); Hematite, Missouri, (Asea Brown-Boveri/Combustion Engineering); and Columbia, South Carolina, (Westinghouse Electric Corporation). The

maximum possible impacts are included in Table 5-54. The choice of facilities would be made by DOE using normal commercial procurement practices.

Transportation segment (3) involves shipment of irradiated TPBARs from the CLWRs to the Tritium Extraction Facility at DOE's Savannah River Site. This EIS evaluated the shipment of TPBARs by three distinct methods: (1) truck casks on trucks, (2) truck casks on trains, and (3) rail casks on trains.

Transportation segment (4) involves shipment of irradiated hardware from the CLWRs to either DOE's Savannah River Site or the Barnwell disposal facility in South Carolina for disposal as low-level radioactive waste. Irradiated hardware includes base plates and thimble plugs removed from the TPBARs at the CLWR site. The number of thimble plugs and base plates cannot be determined until the detailed plans for irradiation are completed.

The next step is to use the risk factors and the number of shipments to estimate the risk for transportation segments. The exact number of shipments cannot be determined unless the precise numbers of TPBARs to be handled are known. The transportation analysis provided information to bound the impacts at each site in Figure 5-7. The transportation analysis looked at potential implementation approaches for each of the three reactor sites. The approaches quantitatively addressed include production at a single unit with 1,000 TPBARs and maximum production at a single unit with 3,400 TPBARs.

### 5.2.9 Sensitivity Analysis

As discussed in Section 3.2.1, the maximum number of TPBARs to be fabricated, irradiated, and transported to the Tritium Extraction Facility under the proposed action would be approximately 6,000 TPBARs per 18-month reactor operating cycle, or approximately 4,000 TPBARs per year. This requirement is based on a tritium production design limit of 1.2 grams of tritium per TPBAR. For the purpose of this sensitivity analysis, the "baseline" tritium production CLWR configuration is defined as a CLWR containing 3,400 TPBARs, with a production design limit of 1.2 grams of tritium per TPBAR operating on an 18-month cycle. The environmental consequences of the baseline tritium production CLWR configuration (3,400 TPBARs), as well as a 1,000 TPBAR case, are evaluated in Sections 5.2.1 through 5.2.3 for the Watts Bar plant, the Sequoyah plant, and the Bellefonte plant, respectively. This section provides a sensitivity analysis of the environmental consequences at a single reactor site that would result by considering some variations on assumptions made for the baseline configuration. These variations are: (1) reducing the number of TPBARs to be irradiated in a single reactor to 100 TPBARs, (2) changing the production design limit of tritium to 1.5 grams per TPBAR and, (3) reducing the length of the reactor operating cycle to 15.5 months or 12 months, in conjunction with the tritium production design limit of 1.5 grams per TPBAR. Table 5-55 provides the values of key parameters used in the sensitivity analyses discussed below. Table 5-56 presents the public health and safety-related results of the analyses in percent change from the baseline configuration for a single reactor facility. This section also discusses the possibility of producing tritium at some later date than 2005, the production date assumed for the baseline analysis in the EIS.




Figure 5-7 Representative Overland Truck Routes

Table 5-55 Sensitivity Analysis Key Parameters

Parameter	Baseline Configuration	Sensitivity Analysis		
TPBAR production design limit (grams)	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.5
Number of TPBARs in reactor core	3,400	100	3,400	3,400
Operating cycle (months)	18	18	15.5	12
Refueling time (months)	1	1	1	1
Tritium production per TPBAR (grams)	1.0 <sup>a</sup>	1.0	1.2 <sup>b</sup>	1.0 <sup>a</sup>
Total tritium production (grams)	3,400	100	4,080	3,400
Annualized tritium production (grams)	2,267	67	3,160	3,400
TPBAR leakage to Reactor Coolant System (Curies per TPBAR per year)	1 <sup>d</sup>	1 <sup>d</sup>	2 <sup>e</sup>	2 <sup>e</sup>
TPBAR leakage to Reactor Coolant System (Curies per TPBAR per operating cycle) <sup>b</sup>	1.5	1.5	2.6	2
Breached TPBAR leakage to fuel pool (Curies per TPBAR per day)	50 <sup>f</sup>	50 <sup>f</sup>	100 <sup>e</sup>	100 <sup>e</sup>
Breached TPBAR leakage to transportation cask (grams of tritium per TPBAR per hour)	0.00001 <sup>g</sup>	0.00001 <sup>g</sup>	0.00002 <sup>g</sup>	0.00002 <sup>g</sup>
Truck shipments per operating cycle (1 unit per shipment) <sup>h</sup>	12	1	12	12
Rail shipments per operating cycle (2 units per shipment) <sup>h</sup>	6	1	6	6

<sup>a</sup> Westinghouse estimated 0.84 gram average and 1.07 peak for the reference plant (WEC 1997).

<sup>b</sup> Westinghouse estimated 1.07 gram average and 1.31 peak for the reference plant (WEC 1997).

<sup>c</sup> Rounded up to 1.0.

<sup>d</sup> Average value for TPBARs in an operating reactor (PNNL 1999).

<sup>e</sup> Detailed design and analyses of the TPBAR with a tritium production limit of 1.5 grams are not available. For the purpose of this sensitivity analysis, it is assumed that the value associated with the 1.5 gram design-limit TPBAR is two times the equivalent value for the 1.2 gram design-limit TPBAR.

<sup>f</sup> Average value for breached TPBARs in a fuel pool (PNNL 1999).

<sup>g</sup> Average value for breached TPBARs in an air or inert atmosphere. No water or moisture is present in the breached TPBAR and the ambient temperature of the air or inert atmosphere is less than 93°C (200°F) (PNNL 1999).

<sup>h</sup> Nominal value. No credit taken for refueling outage.

<sup>i</sup> 1 unit = 1 17 × 17 consolidation unit array = 289 TPBARs.

### Reduction of Number of TPBARs at a Single Reactor

Reducing the number of TPBARs to be irradiated in a single reactor could affect the need for fresh nuclear fuel and spent nuclear fuel production. As discussed in Section 3.2.1 and 5.2.6, the need for additional fresh fuel assemblies for a core reload starts at about 2,000 TPBARs for a single reactor. Therefore, if the implementation of the proposed action would take place in more than one reactor with less than 2,000 TPBARs to be irradiated in each, there would be no need for additional fuel assemblies and associated material resources. In addition, there would be no need for the construction and operation of additional dry storage spent fuel facilities at the reactor sites solely because of tritium production.

**Table 5-56 Sensitivity Analysis Summary for a Single Reactor Site**

<b>CLWR Configuration</b>	<b>Number of TPBARs in Core</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>3,400</b>	<b>3,400</b>
	<b>Operating Cycle (months)</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>15.5</b>	<b>12</b>
	<b>Tritium Production Design Limit per TPBAR per gram</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.5</b>
<b>Normal Operation</b>		<b>Percent Change from Baseline Configuration</b>		
Radiological liquid effluent (tritium)	Quantity per year	-97	100	100
Radiological gaseous emissions (tritium)	Quantity per year	-97	100	100
Hazardous chemical liquid emissions	Quantity per year	0	0	0
Hazardous chemical gaseous emissions	Quantity per year	0	0	0
<b>Facility Accidents</b>		<b>Percent Change from Baseline Configuration</b>		
Reactor design-basis accident <sup>a</sup>	Consequence <sup>d</sup>	-97	20	0
	Risk per year <sup>d</sup>	-97	13	-8
Reactor design-basis accident <sup>b</sup>	Consequence <sup>d</sup>	0	0	0
	Risk per year <sup>d</sup>	0	-6	-8
Nonreactor design-basis accident <sup>a</sup>	Consequence <sup>d</sup>	-97	72	31
	Risk per year <sup>d</sup>	-97	100	97
Nonreactor design-basis accident <sup>b</sup> (Thyroid dose consequences and risks)	Consequence <sup>d</sup>	-69	51	23
	Risk per year <sup>d</sup>	-69	75	85
Nonreactor design-basis accident <sup>b</sup> (Beta+gamma whole body dose consequences and risks)	Consequence <sup>d</sup>	-2	1	0
	Risk per year <sup>d</sup>	-2	17	51
TPBAR handling accident	Consequence <sup>d</sup>	0	20	0
	Risk per year <sup>d</sup>	-97	39	50
Truck cask handling accident	Consequence <sup>d</sup>	0	100	100
	Risk per year <sup>d</sup>	-94	132	200
Rail cask handling accident	Consequence <sup>d</sup>	0	100	100
	Risk per year <sup>d</sup>	-83	132	200
Severe reactor accident	Consequence <sup>d</sup>	-1	0	0
	Risk per year <sup>d</sup>	-1	-6	-8
Hazardous chemical accident	Consequence <sup>d</sup>	0	0	0
	Risk per year <sup>d</sup>	0	0	0
<b>Low-Level Radioactive Waste</b>		<b>Percent Change from Baseline Configuration</b>		
Low-level radioactive waste generation	Quantity per year	-96	16	50
<b>Spent Fuel Space</b>		<b>Percent Change from Baseline Configuration</b>		
Spent fuel storage space	Storage positions per year		16	50
<b>Overland Transportation of Irradiated TPBARs from a Single Reactor Facility</b>		<b>Percent Change from Baseline Configuration</b>		
Truck shipments	Number per year	-92	16	50
Rail shipments	Number per year	-83	16	50

- <sup>a</sup> Design-basis accident consequences only reflect the incremental increase in accident consequences due to the production of tritium in TPBARs.
- <sup>b</sup> Design-basis accident consequences estimated using NRC-based deterministic approach.
- <sup>c</sup> The baseline configuration requires 56 to 69 additional fresh fuel assemblies and, therefore, requires 75-96 percent of additional spent fuel storage space for each core reload with 3,400 TPBARs. No additional fresh fuel assemblies are required for 2,000 TPBARs.
- <sup>d</sup> Maximally exposed offsite individual, average individual in population, and noninvolved worker dose in rem.
- <sup>e</sup> Maximally exposed offsite individual, average individual in population, and noninvolved worker increased likelihood of cancer fatalities per year.



Reducing the number of TPBARs to be irradiated in a single reactor would reduce the tritium releases to the environment under normal operation from that reactor, since the normal operation release of tritium is assumed to be proportional to the number of TPBARs.

Reducing the number of TPBARs to be irradiated in a single reactor would reduce the low-level radioactive waste production and the number of irradiated TPBAR shipments from the reactor site. It would not affect environmental resources at a reactor site such as land, ecology, historical resources, aesthetics, and socioeconomics, and would have reduced already small impacts on resources such as noise and aesthetics. Overall, the baseline analysis of 3,400 TPBARs at a single reactor site bounds the effects of irradiation with fewer TPBARs at the site.

#### **Tritium Production Design Limit of 1.5 grams per TPBAR**

The increase of the tritium production design limit to 1.5 grams per TPBAR, assuming the maximum number of 3,400 TPBARs to be irradiated at a reactor site, would increase the tritium emission to the environment under normal operating and accident conditions compared to the baseline case. The necessary shortening of the reactor operating cycle from 18 months to 15.5 months also would result in increases in low-level radioactive waste production and spent fuel generation and storage requirements. It would have no effect on all other environmental resources considered in this EIS, such as land, aesthetics, archeological and historic resources, ecology, and socioeconomics. The increase in noise due to more frequent refuelings would be small.

From a program point of view, the increase of the tritium production design limit from 1.2 grams per TPBAR to 1.5 grams per TPBAR, would provide the potential for using fewer TPBARs for the same tritium production goal. The number of TPBARs that would need to be fabricated, irradiated, and transported would be reduced. Fewer TPBARs would mean lesser environmental consequences from fabrication. The number of shipments of both nonirradiated and irradiated TPBARs would be reduced, thus proportionately reducing the incident-free risk to the health and safety of the public.

#### **Length of Reactor Operating Cycle**

Shortening the length of the reactor operating cycle to 12 months is discussed in conjunction with the 1.5 grams per TPBAR design limit, as opposed to the 1.2 grams per TPBAR design limit. As discussed above, a shorter cycle (15.5 months) would be required to irradiate the maximum number of 3,400 TPBARs in a reactor. Shortening the reactor operating cycle even further to 12 months with the 1.5 grams per TPBAR design limit, would allow the increase of tritium production from 2,667 grams per year (baseline in a single reactor) to 3,400 grams per year.

Shortening the reactor operating cycle to 12 months would directly affect the number of TPBARs that could be irradiated annually in a single reactor, from 3,400 in 18 months (2,267 grams per year) to 3,400 per year. This would increase the annual generation of spent fuel; the annual generation of low-level radioactive waste; the annual gaseous emissions and liquid effluent releases of tritium; the activities required to handle the irradiated TPBARs at the site; and the number of refueling outages required at the reactor for the 40-year duration of the proposed action. Consequently, there would be proportional increases to impacts associated with air and water quality, ecological resources, and occupational and public health and safety.

Shortening the reactor operating cycle to 12 months would increase the environmental consequences associated with the construction and operation of a dry cask ISFSI at the reactor site by approximately 50 percent. It would have no effect on all other environmental resources considered in this EIS such as land, archaeological and historic resources, aesthetics, and socioeconomics. The noise increase due to more frequent refuelings would be small.

From a program point of view, shortening the reactor operating cycle to 12 months would be practical if the program requirements for tritium production were reduced so that the total number of TPBARs that would need to be fabricated and transported were reduced to approximately 3,400 TPBARs per year, which would be irradiated at single rather than multiple reactor facilities.

### **Producing Tritium at a Later Date**

This EIS evaluates the environmental impacts associated with producing tritium at one or more of five TVA reactors. The need for this tritium is based on the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan and the accompanying Presidential Decision Directive. The 1996 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, which represents the latest official guidance for tritium requirements, is based on a START I-level stockpile size of approximately 6,000 accountable weapons. In accordance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States is committed to good faith efforts to reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile. The United States recently ratified the START II Treaty and is hopeful that Russia will do likewise. In the event START II is ratified by Russia, a program to allow for a lower START II stockpile size of approximately 3,500 accountable weapons would be implemented. Under such a scenario, the existing tritium reserve would last a little longer and the need date for tritium would be pushed out until approximately 2011. At the same time, the annual steady-state tritium requirement also would be reduced to approximately 1.5 kilograms of tritium. This section addresses the environmental impacts associated with tritium production in one or more CLWRs to support a smaller stockpile than the current START I requirements.

The alternatives evaluated in this EIS would not change for a smaller START II stockpile. In fact, the procurement process through which the five TVA reactors were identified as reasonable alternatives included a requirement that offerors respond to a range of tritium production quantities. This range was designed to allow for varying tritium requirements, including a production level commensurate with supporting a START II stockpile size. Accordingly, all 18 of the alternatives presented in Table 3-2, Tritium Production Reasonable Alternatives (see Section 3.2.3) are also reasonable alternatives for a smaller START II-sized stockpile.

Use of existing TVA reactors to satisfy this reduced START II quantity of tritium would result in environmental impacts similar to those presented in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 of this EIS. A slightly smaller number of TPBARs would be manufactured and transported to the reactors, and a slightly smaller number of irradiated TPBARs would be shipped from the reactor sites to the Savannah River Site. The reactor site impacts associated with the reduction of the number of TPBARs to be irradiated at a single reactor are discussed earlier in this section. The impacts from transportation are bounded by the analysis presented in Section 5.2.8.

For the Bellefonte alternative, environmental impacts could be similar to those presented in Section 5.2.3 of this EIS, should DOE and TVA choose to complete these reactors according to a similar schedule. With a smaller sized stockpile, however, DOE and TVA would have the additional flexibility either to delay the construction start date or to stretch out construction over a longer period of time. Delaying the construction start date would entail similar environmental impacts to those presented in Section 5.2.3 of this EIS. These would be incurred at a later date (commensurate with the delay in the construction start date). If DOE chooses to stretch out the construction period over a longer period of time, the socioeconomic impacts described in Section 5.2.3 of this EIS likewise would be spread out over a longer period of time. This would lessen the severity of the impacts on housing, transportation, and schools.

### **5.2.10 Safeguards and Security**

CLWRs are required by the provisions of their NRC license to have security and safeguard procedures to protect against a design-basis threat. On a site-specific basis, a design-basis threat comprises: (1) a

determined, violent, external attack by stealth or deception by several persons or a small group; (2) a well-trained and dedicated adversary group with suitable weapons and hand-carried equipment, tools, and/or explosives that may be aided by an insider; (3) an internal threat by an insider who may attempt theft and per or sabotage; and (4) other threat actions such as attacks on computer systems. Requirements for developing the design-basis threat, as well as requirements for measures to guard against this threat for NRC-licensed facilities, are provided in 10 CFR 73 and 74.

Facilities and activities associated with the production of tritium for DOE are also required to comply with the requirements in DOE 5632.1C and 5633.3A. DOE Orders require a graded protection for all safeguard and security interests, classified matter, property, and sensitive information from theft, diversion, industrial sabotage, radiological sabotage, espionage, unauthorized access or modification, loss or compromise, or other hostile acts that could cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security, our business partners, or on the health and safety of employees and the public. The DOE Orders also require a facility associated with the production of tritium to provide protection against a design-basis threat. A CLWR used for the production of tritium must comply with NRC and DOE regulatory requirements. The transportation of DOE materials also are required to comply with a graded set of DOE safeguard and security requirements, in addition to the NRC, DOE, and the U.S. Department of Transportation safety requirements.

The DOE Safeguards and Security Protection Program defines procedures to ensure physical protection of material and equipment, materials control and accountability, nuclear materials control, nuclear materials accountability, security of personnel, personnel security awareness, information security, automated information security, and personnel training.

TPBARs were placed in the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant as part of the Lead Test Assembly Demonstration Project. The Inspection Branch of DOE's Safeguards and Security Division, Oak Ridge Operations Office, conducted a security survey of the Watts Bar plant in preparation for the Lead Test Assembly Demonstration Project. The existing NRC Program was found to fulfill all DOE requirements satisfactorily. (DOE 1997b)

No environmental impacts are expected as a result of compliance with both NRC and DOE safeguard and security provisions based on the adequacy of the existing TVA security provisions. Before introducing any TPBARs into any CLWR, DOE would conduct an in-depth site-specific safeguards and security inspection. This rigorous review would ensure that the existing safeguards and security programs of any reactor used in the CLWR program satisfy the stringent DOE requirements. Any inadequacies would be resolved before the introduction of any DOE materials to the facility. Although it is not anticipated, if the safeguards and security review determined that additional security provisions were required, DOE would perform the appropriate NEPA review.

This EIS identifies credible accident scenarios caused by internal disturbances; addresses the probability of such accidents; and quantifies the releases and exposures resulting from such accidents. Accidents initiated as a result of sabotage are considered speculative and, accordingly, have not been addressed in the CLWR EIS.

#### **5.2.11 Programmatic No Action**

DOE is preparing a separate EIS to analyze the environmental impacts of the construction and operation of an Accelerator Production of Tritium (APT) facility at DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina. DOE published an APT Draft EIS in December 1997, (DOE 1997e), and the Final EIS in March 1999 (DOE 1999a). Since the No Action Alternative for the CLWR EIS entails production of tritium in the APT facility, this section summarizes the environmental impacts from accelerator production of tritium as presented in Chapter 4 of the APT Draft EIS. For a more detailed analysis of these potential impacts, the reader is referred directly to the APT Draft EIS (DOE 1997e, DOE 1999a).

The APT EIS considered two design alternatives: klystron radio frequency power tubes (the preferred alternative) and inductive output radio frequency power tubes. It also considered two operating temperature alternatives for the design of the accelerator: (1) operating electric components at essentially room temperature, and (2) operating most components at superconducting temperatures and the rest at room temperature (the preferred alternative). Two feedstock alternatives were considered: helium-3 (the preferred alternative) and lithium-6. Four cooling water system designs were considered for the APT EIS: mechanical-draft cooling towers with groundwater makeup; once-through cooling using river water; and use of the existing K-Area natural-draft cooling tower with river water makeup.

The APT EIS also considered two design variations to the preferred alternative to enhance DOE's flexibility: a modular or staged accelerator configuration and a combination of tritium separation and tritium extraction facilities. It also considered two site alternatives. The preferred site is 4.8 kilometers (3 miles) northeast of the Tritium Loading Facility and approximately 10.5 kilometers (6.5 miles) from the boundary of DOE's Savannah River Site. The alternative site is located 3.2 kilometers (2 miles) northwest of the Tritium Loading Facility and approximately 6.4 kilometers (4 miles) from the boundary of DOE's Savannah River Site. Due to the projected magnitude of the electric power usage (peak load as high as 600 megawatts for the room temperature alternative), the APT EIS considered obtaining electricity from the construction and operation of two new electrical source alternatives: coal-fired or natural gas-fired generating plants.

The potential environmental impacts are presented as construction impacts and operational impacts. This summary provides the potential impacts of the APT Preferred Alternative and indicate where alternative impacts vary from the Preferred Alternative. Since the APT EIS was developed in parallel with the CLWR EIS, the impacts represent the conclusions of the APT Draft EIS. These impacts are not expected to change in the APT Final EIS.

### **Construction Impacts**

For the APT Preferred Alternative, construction of the APT facility would convert approximately 101 hectares (250 acres) of forested land into an industrialized area. Excavation of 20 meters (65 feet) in depth would be required. If DOE were to choose the modular design variation, construction impacts could be spread over a longer period of time and require the clearing of an additional 12 hectares (30 acres). New roads, bridge upgrades, and rail lines also would be required. At the preferred site, the construction excavation would reach the water table; therefore, the site would require dewatering. Impacts on the water table would be minimal due to the rather short period of dewatering and the fact that construction would only affect the shallowest portion. Air emissions (fugitive dust and exhaust emissions) should be well below applicable regulatory standards.

Potential impact to terrestrial ecology would result from clearing this land. DOE does not expect, however, that this would create a long-term reduction in the local or regional diversity of plants and animals. No threatened or endangered species occur at any of the alternative sites for the APT facility.

The generation of construction wastes could require the construction of a state-permitted construction debris landfill at DOE's Savannah River Site. Sanitary solid waste would be disposed of in the Three Rivers Regional Landfill. Construction noise at the APT facility site could be higher than the limits imposed by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. However, DOE would ensure compliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's 8-hour noise exposure guidelines through the use of administrative controls, engineering, and protective equipment. Noise to offsite receptors would not present a nuisance.

DOE expects an incremental increase in occupational injuries based on historic Savannah River Site information for injuries requiring medical attention and injuries resulting in lost work time during the construction phase. DOE also expects a slight increase in the potential for traffic fatalities.

The potential socioeconomic impacts of the APT facility should not stress existing regional infrastructure or result in a "boom" situation. Peak employment would add about 1,400 additional jobs during the construction period.

### Operational Impacts

Operation of the APT facility could affect surrounding groundwater. If the groundwater makeup alternative were selected, the removal of 22,700 liters per minute (6,000 gallons per minute) on a sustained basis could result in changes or reductive groundwater flows to some streams surrounding the well field and compaction of clay layers. Operation of the APT facility would produce neutrons that have the potential to penetrate the accelerator's protective shielding and be absorbed by the soil and groundwater. The accelerator would be designed so that the dose associated with this activity would be less than one-eighth of the EPA drinking water standard of 4 millirem per year.

The withdrawal of Savannah River water for cooling would result in the impingement of adult fish and the entrainment of fish eggs and larvae at the river water intake. The once-through cooling water alternative would result in considerably higher rates of impingement and entrainment than the various cooling tower alternatives, but losses of adult fish, fish eggs, and fish larvae under all alternatives would be small relative to total fish production in the upper and middle reaches of the Savannah River.

Operation of the APT facility would result in thermal discharges from the cooling water system to either Indian Grave or Pen Branch or the existing series of precooler ponds and ultimately Par Pond. For all cooling alternatives except the once-through cooling water alternative, water temperature in the receiving water bodies would not exceed 32°C (90°F), meeting South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control standards for fresh water. In the case of the once-through cooling water alternative, however, discharges would be well in excess of 32°C (90°F) in late summer. Under this scenario, DOE could be required to conduct a Clean Water Act Section 316a(1) Demonstration. Under each cooling water alternative, cesium-137 trapped in the fine sediments of Par Pond would be disturbed and remobilized. The once-through cooling water alternative would remobilize the most cesium-137, but in all cases, exposures of the public would be less than allowed by regulatory limits. Par Pond and the precooler ponds, however, are utilized by American alligators and bald eagles. The alligators do not breed in Ponds 2 and 5 and would abandon the ponds and relocate if water temperature exceeded their tolerance range. In Par Pond and Pen Branch, potential effects on alligators could be positive in that the warmer waters could lengthen the active period for the reptiles. Bald eagles use the Par Pond system for feeding. Potential fish kills associated with the once-through cooling water alternative could provide the eagles with an additional food source.

Air emissions of both radiological and nonradiological pollutants would be well below applicable standards for the operation of the APT facility. Offsite concentrations would be slightly higher from the nonpreferred alternative site because it is closer to the Savannah River Site boundary. Tritium would constitute over 99 percent of the offsite dose, but would be well below the 100 millirem per year dose limit for Savannah River Site atmospheric releases.

Operational waste would be managed and treated according to waste type using both Savannah River Site and offsite facilities. Potential impacts on other facilities should be negligible because of the low volume of waste generation.

From normal operations, DOE expects that the dose to the public from the APT facility would be within regulatory limits. Similarly, all concentrations of noncarcinogenic materials would be well below all established limits; consequently, there should be no health impacts. Of the materials expected to be released from the APT facility, only beryllium is a carcinogen. Using EPA's Integrated Risk Information System database, DOE calculated an additional lifetime latent cancer risk of  $4.6 \times 10^{-9}$  to the maximally exposed

individual. This value is well below the  $1 \times 10^{-6}$  risk value that the EPA typically uses as a threshold of concern. Impacts would be slightly higher at the alternative site because it is closer to the Savannah River Site boundary, but would still be well below the EPA threshold of concern. Potential impacts on workers would be slightly higher.

All accidents with a postulated frequency of more than once during the 40-year operating life of the accelerator would have negligible consequences. Only four low-probability accidents (highest frequency = once per 2,000 years) would raise offsite doses high enough (1 rem at site boundary) to warrant public protective actions under the Savannah River Site Emergency Plan.

There should be no significant socioeconomic impacts from the operation of the APT facility at the DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The workforce of 500 additional individuals would produce approximately one-third of the socioeconomic impacts during construction of the APT facility.

The preferred APT alternative would require approximately 350 megawatts of electricity to operate. DOE is considering either purchasing electricity from existing sources through market transactions or obtaining electricity from a new electric power-generating plant. The purchasing of electricity would increase expected environmental impacts from 1 to 3 percent. If a new electricity-generating plant were to be constructed, potential impacts would depend upon its operation. If it were constructed at the Savannah River Site, impacts would probably be only slightly higher than those of the purchasing option.

Although impacts would depend upon the specific location and type of the new electric power-generating facility, such a facility could require about 45 hectares (110 acres) for a natural gas plant or 117 hectares (290 acres) for a coal plant. While the specific constituents of air emissions and discharges to surface water would depend upon the actual location of the new electric power generating plant, overall environmental impacts should be no higher than those of the Preferred Alternative. A peak workforce of about 1,100 workers would be required for the rather short construction period and a workforce of about 200 individuals for operation of the facility. Impacts on the socioeconomics of the region would depend upon the actual location of the facility.

In addition to the impacts on land use, waste would be generated from construction, and the operation of such an electric power generating facility would generate greenhouse gas emissions. Of the greenhouse gases expected to be generated, carbon dioxide emissions would be the largest. Table 5-57 summarizes the expected carbon dioxide emissions from the APT power plant options and compares these emissions to existing U.S. and global carbon dioxide emissions.

**Table 5-57 Estimated Accelerator Production of Tritium Carbon Dioxide Emissions**

<i>Accelerator Production of Tritium Power Plant Option</i>	<i>Estimated Carbon Dioxide Emissions (million tons per Year)</i>	<i>U.S. Fossil Combustion Carbon Dioxide Emissions (%)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Global Combustion Carbon Dioxide Emissions (%)<sup>b</sup></i>
Existing capacity/market transactions	3.45	0.063	0.014
New coal-fired power plant	3.60	0.066	0.014

<sup>a</sup> U.S. estimates of fossil fuel carbon dioxide emissions is 5.446 million tons per year (TVA 1997f).

<sup>b</sup> Global estimates of fossil fuel carbon dioxide emissions is 25.038 million tons per year (TVA 1997f).

Source: DOE 1997e.

## 5.2.12 CLWR Facility Accident Impact to Involved Workers

The range of accident impacts to involved workers at a CLWR tritium production facility would vary depending on the energy and radioactive material released during the accident. The involved workers would evacuate the immediate area of the accident to minimize exposure in accordance with general employee training and emergency procedures. Table 5-58 summarizes accident impacts on involved workers.

Table 5-58 Accident Impacts on Involved Workers

Accident	Worker Location	Impact on Worker	Mitigation
Reactor design-basis accident (large break loss of coolant accident)	Reactor containment	Workers in containment at the time of the accident will die due to the energy (steam) released to the containment. Evacuation from the containment is not considered feasible.	The containment is not normally occupied during power operation. Entrance to containment during power operation is limited by work permits approved by the operations staff.
Nonreactor design-basis accident (waste gas decay tank rupture)	Auxiliary building waste gas tank area	If the accident is initiated by rupture of the tank or associated piping, the worker could be injured by debris or the stream of gas from the rupture. In addition, the worker could receive a radiation dose while evacuating the area.	The probability of this initiating event is extremely unlikely (in the range of $10^{-6}$ to $10^{-4}$ per year). Involved workers will evacuate the immediate area of the accident to minimize radiation exposure in accordance with general employee training and emergency procedures.
		If the accident is initiated by a valve failure or human error, the release will be vented out of the auxiliary building stack. The involved worker is not at risk of injury or an additional radiation dose.	<u>None required</u>
TPBAR handling accident	Auxiliary building spent fuel pool area	The involved worker would observe the drop and immediately evacuate the area. Adequate time will exist to evacuate the area before the release of tritium from the TPBARs. The worker would receive no additional radiological dose.	Involved workers will evacuate the immediate area of the accident to minimize radiation exposure in accordance with general employee training, emergency procedures, and TPBAR handling operating procedures.
Truck or rail cask handling accident	Auxiliary building spent fuel pool area	The involved worker would observe the drop and immediately evacuate the area. Adequate time will exist to evacuate the area before the release of tritium from the TPBARs. The worker would receive no additional radiological dose.	Involved workers will evacuate the immediate area of the accident to minimize radiation exposure in accordance with general employee training, emergency procedures, and TPBAR handling operating procedures.
Beyond design-basis accident	Reactor containment	If the accident sequence is initiated by a large break loss of coolant accident or another high energy release mechanism, workers in containment at the time of the accident will die due to the energy (steam) released to the containment. Evacuation from the containment is not considered feasible.	The containment is not normally occupied during power operation. Entrance to containment during power operation is limited by work permits approved by the operations staff.
		Most of the postulated accident sequences have adequate time for workers to evacuate the containment before there is a radioactive release to the containment.	Involved workers will evacuate the containment to minimize radiation exposure. As the accident sequence progresses, all nonessential personnel will be directed to evacuate the site in accordance with site emergency procedures.

### **5.2.13 Secondary Impact of CLWR Facility Accidents**

For purposes of this EIS, the primary impacts are measured in terms of public and worker exposures to radiation and toxic chemicals. Accidents could also affect elements of the environment other than humans. For example, a radiological release could contaminate farmland, surface water, recreational areas, industrial parks, historic sites, or the habitat of an endangered species. As a result, farm products might have to be destroyed; the supply of drinking water could be lowered; recreational areas could be closed; industrial parks could suffer economic losses during shutdown for decontamination; historical sites could have to be closed to visitors; and endangered species could move closer to extinction. These types of impacts are referred to as secondary impacts in this EIS.

There should be no secondary impacts from design-basis accidents. The most severe class of design-basis accident, a core damage accident with no containment failure or bypass, occurred at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, in Middletown, Pennsylvania, in 1979. There were no secondary impacts of this accident.

This section addresses the secondary impacts of a reactor beyond design-basis accident with radiological release. Secondary impacts are addressed qualitatively; that is, the types of impacts that could result and a range of potential outcomes are identified. These secondary impacts are divided into two types: (1) habitation of land by humans (population dependent); and (2) agricultural uses of land (area dependent). Each of these impact types are discussed below.

*Population Dependent*—Secondary impacts could produce four possible outcomes: (1) land is immediately habitable; (2) land will be habitable after decontamination; (3) land will be habitable after a combination of decontamination and interdiction; and (4) land will not be habitable (condemnation).

*Area Dependent*—Secondary impacts could produce three possible outcomes: (1) no restrictions on agricultural use; (2) short-term restrictions on agricultural use; or (3) long-term restrictions on agricultural use (condemnation).

At the Watts Bar and Sequoyah plants, tritium production would not change the potential secondary impacts that could result from a beyond design-basis accident. This is due to the fact that secondary impacts would be dominated by the radionuclides other than tritium that would be released; any such impact would be independent of tritium production.

At the Bellefonte plant, there would be a potential for secondary impacts arising from the proposed action. This is because the Bellefonte reactors are currently not operating. While it is noted that any secondary impacts would be caused by radionuclides other than tritium, these impacts would still represent a change from no action. As described above, these secondary impacts could range from no change to land habitability/use to long-term restrictions on agricultural use (condemnation). Any secondary impacts would have an extremely low probability of occurring—less than one in a million years.

## **5.3 CUMULATIVE IMPACTS**

A cumulative impact is identified as the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or nonfederal) or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.



### 5.3.1 TPBAR Fabrication

The fabrication and assembly process of the TPBARs would not result in environmental impacts beyond the impacts associated with the normal activities of the commercial facilities where fabrication and assembly would take place. Therefore, the fabrication and assembly process would not alter the cumulative impacts at these facilities.

### 5.3.2 TPBAR Irradiation

The only significant distinction between the effects of tritium production and those of the No Action Alternative at Watts Bar and Sequoyah would be the additional release of tritium and an associated small increase in the risk to occupational and public health and safety. No other known actions, Federal and nonfederal, could effect further changes in the radiological environment of the region of influence. Accordingly, the cumulative impacts at Watts Bar and Sequoyah, as reflected in Tables 5-59 and 5-60, respectively, are the sum of the impacts of the No Action Alternative and the small, incremental impacts of tritium production.

**Table 5-59 Cumulative Impacts at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site**

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Tritium Production Increment</i>	<i>Cumulative Total</i>
Land resources	Potential permanent land requirement - 3.1 acres of developed land at the dry cask ISFSI if constructed	1,770 acres (existing developed land; no additional undisturbed land requirement)
Air quality		
Nonradiological emissions	No additional emissions	No change from current air quality conditions (See Table 4-1)
Greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide)	No additional emissions	0.027 metric tons per year
Radiological emissions	Annual radiological emissions of tritium: 1,000 TPBARs: <u>100</u> Curies 3,400 TPBARs: <u>340</u> Curies Other Emissions: 0 Curies	Annual radiological emissions of tritium: 1,000 TPBARs: <u>106</u> Curies 3,400 TPBARs: <u>346</u> Curies Other emissions: 283 Curies
Water quality		
Surface water	No additional surface water requirements, discharge, or water quality conditions	No changes from current surface water requirements, discharge, or water quality conditions (see Table 4-3)
Radioactive effluent	Annual radiological effluent of tritium: 1,000 TPBARs: <u>900</u> Curies 3,400 TPBARs: <u>3,060</u> Curies Other releases: 0 Curies	Annual radiological effluent of tritium: 1,000 TPBARs: <u>1,539</u> Curies 3,400 TPBARs: <u>3,699</u> Curies Other releases: 1.32 Curies
Groundwater	No additional groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions	No change from current groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions
Socioeconomics	Less than 1 percent impact on regional economy	No change from current regional socioeconomic conditions

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Tritium Production Increment</i>	<i>Cumulative Total</i>
Public and occupational health and safety Normal operation	<p>Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs: Average worker: <u>0.33</u> millirem Maximally exposed (offsite) individual: <u>0.013</u> millirem 50-mile population: <u>0.34</u> person-rem</p> <p>Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs: Average worker: <u>1.1</u> millirem Maximally exposed (offsite) individual: <u>0.047</u> millirem 50-mile population: <u>1.2</u> person-rem</p>	<p>Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs: Average worker: <u>104.33</u> millirem Maximally exposed (offsite) individual: <u>0.30</u> millirem 50-mile population: <u>0.89</u> person-rem.</p> <p>Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs: Average worker: <u>105.1</u> millirem Maximally exposed (offsite) individual: <u>0.34</u> millirem 50-mile population: <u>1.8</u> person-rem.</p>
Waste management	Low-level radioactive waste: approximately 0.43 cubic meters per year	Low-level radioactive waste: approximately 41 cubic meters per year
Spent nuclear fuel generation	<p>less than 2,000 TPBARs: 0 fuel assemblies</p> <p>3,400 TPBARs: up to a maximum of 56 fuel assemblies per cycle</p>	<p>less than 2,000 TPBARs: 80 fuel assemblies per cycle</p> <p>3,400 TPBARs: up to a maximum of 136 fuel assemblies per cycle</p>

**Table 5-60 Cumulative Impacts at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Site**

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Tritium Production Increment<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Cumulative Total<sup>b</sup></i>
Land resources	Potential permanent land requirement - 3.2 acres of developed land at the ISFSI if constructed.	525 acres (existing developed land, no additional undisturbed land requirement)
Air quality		
Nonradiological emissions	No additional emissions	No change from current air quality conditions (See Table 4-14)
Greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide)	No additional emissions	0.039 metric tons per year
Radiological emissions	<p>Annual radiological emissions of tritium:</p> <p>1,000 TPBARs: <u>100</u> Curies</p> <p>3,400 TPBARs: <u>340</u> Curies</p> <p>Other emissions: 0 Curies</p>	<p>Annual radiological emissions of tritium:</p> <p>1,000 TPBARs: <u>249</u> Curies</p> <p>3,400 TPBARs: <u>729</u> Curies</p> <p>Other emissions: 240 Curies</p>
Water quality		
Surface water	No additional surface water requirements, discharge, or water quality conditions	No changes from current surface water requirements, discharge, or water quality conditions (see Table 4-16)
Radioactive effluent	<p>Annual radiological effluent of tritium:</p> <p>1,000 TPBARs: <u>900</u> Curies</p> <p>3,400 TPBARs: <u>3,060</u> Curies</p> <p>Other releases: 0 Curies</p>	<p>Annual radiological effluent of tritium:</p> <p>1,000 TPBARs: <u>3,277</u> Curies</p> <p>3,400 TPBARs: <u>7,597</u> Curies</p> <p>Other releases: 2.3 Curies</p>
Groundwater	No additional groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions	No change from current groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions

Resource/Material Categories	Tritium Production Increment <sup>a</sup>	Cumulative Total <sup>b</sup>
Socioeconomics	Less than 1 percent impact on regional economy	No change from current regional socioeconomic conditions
Public and occupational health and safety Normal operation	Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs: <i>Average worker:</i> <u>0.24</u> millirem <i>Maximally exposed (offsite) individual:</i> <u>0.017</u> millirem <i>50-mile population:</i> <u>0.57</u> person-rem  Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs: <i>Average worker:</i> <u>0.82</u> millirem <i>Maximally exposed (offsite) individual:</i> <u>0.057</u> millirem <i>50-mile population:</i> <u>1.9</u> person-rem	Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs: <i>Average worker:</i> <u>90.24</u> millirem <i>Maximally exposed (offsite) individual:</i> <u>0.14</u> millirem <i>50-mile population:</i> <u>4.4</u> person-rem  Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs: <i>Average worker:</i> <u>90.82</u> millirem <i>Maximally exposed (offsite) individual:</i> <u>0.22</u> millirem <i>50-mile population:</i> <u>7.0</u> person-rem
Waste management	Low-level radioactive waste: approximately 0.43 cubic meters per year	Low-level radioactive waste: approximately <u>384</u> cubic meters per year
Spent nuclear fuel generation	less than 2,000 TPBARs: 0 fuel assemblies  3,400 TPBARs: up to a maximum of 60 fuel assemblies per cycle	less than 2,000 TPBARs: 160 fuel assemblies per cycle 3,400 TPBARs: up to a maximum of <u>280</u> fuel assemblies per cycle

- <sup>a</sup> Assumes tritium production in one unit.
- <sup>b</sup> Assumes tritium production in both units.

As discussed in Chapter 5, operating the Bellefonte units as a nuclear power plant represents a change from the No Action Alternative with impacts to air, water, and ecological resources; socioeconomic characteristics; and an increased risk to human health and safety from potential radiological emissions. Expansion of existing industry and the planned development of new industries in the vicinity of the Bellefonte site also would affect the environmental and socioeconomic characteristics of the region. Table 5-61 indicates industrial expansion would occur in Jackson County, and that additional population growth would occur in the absence of any developments at Bellefonte (TVA 1997f). Table 5-62 shows the cumulative impacts for two-unit operation at the Bellefonte site.

**Table 5-61 Announced Major Recent and Future Expansions and New Industrial Facilities for Jackson County (1997 and 1998)<sup>a</sup>**

Nature of Business	Size of Expansion/Facility	Location
Aluminum forming (Southeastern Metals)	1997 New Facility - 25 new jobs, \$1.6 million	Scottsboro
Nylon fiber (Beaulieu)	1997 Expansion - 15 jobs, \$28 million 1998 Expansion - 50 jobs, \$25 million	Bridgeport
Coaxial TV cable for electronics (CommScope, Inc.)	1997 Expansion - 81 jobs 1998 Expansion - 40 jobs	Scottsboro
Air purifiers (Environmental Health)	1997 Expansion - 45 jobs	Scottsboro
Floor rugs (Maple Industries)	1997 Expansion - 120 jobs 1998 Expansion - 50 jobs, \$4.0 million	Scottsboro
Rolled Aluminum (Norandal USA)	1997 Expansion - \$5 million	Scottsboro
Industrial Plastics (Polymer Industries)	1997 Expansion - 20 jobs, \$2.1 million	Henagar
U.S. Textiles	1997 Expansion - 43 jobs	Scottsboro
Wausau Homes	1998 New - 175 jobs	Scottsboro

<i>Nature of Business</i>	<i>Size of Expansion/Facility</i>	<i>Location</i>
ARES Corporation	1998 New - 45 jobs, \$5.9 million	Scottsboro
Premier Industries	1998 New - 40 jobs	Scottsboro
Buccaneer Rope	1998 New - 40 jobs	Skyline
Wenzel Metals	1998 Expansion - 15 jobs, \$1.66 million	Scottsboro

\* Only those expansions larger than 40 new jobs or a \$1 million investment are listed.

Source: Jackson County 1998.

**Table 5-62 Cumulative Impacts at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site**

<i>Resource/Material Categories</i>	<i>Tritium Production Increment<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Cumulative Total<sup>b</sup></i>
<b>Land resources</b>	Potential permanent land requirement - 3.4 acres of developed land at the ISFSI if constructed and a small amount of land for support buildings	1,500 acres (existing developed land, no additional undisturbed land requirement)
<b>Air quality</b>		
Nonradiological emissions	Additional emissions; <u>concentrations</u> within standards (see Tables 5-23 and 5-25)	Additional emissions; <u>concentrations</u> within standards (see Tables 5-23 and 5-25)
Greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide)	0.031 metric tons per year	0.031 metric tons per year
Radiological emissions	Annual radiological emissions of tritium: 1,000 TPBARs: 105.6 Curies 3,400 TPBARs: 345.6 Curies Other emissions: 283 Curies	Annual radiological emissions of tritium: 1,000 TPBARs: 211 Curies 3,400 TPBARs: 691 Curies Other emissions: 566 Curies
<b>Water quality</b>		
Surface water	Increased surface water use and discharge. Water usage less than 1 percent of Tennessee River flow. All water quality parameters within limits (see Tables 5-21, 5-22, and 5-23).	Increased surface water use and discharge. Water usage less than 1 percent of Tennessee River flow. All water quality parameters within limits (see Tables 5-21, 5-22, and 5-23).
Radioactive effluent	Annual radiological effluent of tritium: 1,000 TPBARs: 1,539 Curies 3,400 TPBARs: 3,699 Curies Other releases: 1.32 Curies	Annual radiological effluent of tritium: 1,000 TPBARs: 3,078 Curies 3,400 TPBARs: 7,398 Curies Other releases: 2.6 Curies
Groundwater	No groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions	No change from current groundwater requirements or additional impacts to groundwater quality conditions
<b>Ecological resources</b>	Additional impacts on ecological resources including fish impingement and entrainment of aquatic biota and thermal impacts of less than 5°F on resident aquatic communities in the vicinity of the diffuser	Additional impacts on ecological resources including fish impingement and entrainment of aquatic biota and thermal impacts of less than 5°F on resident aquatic communities in the vicinity of the diffuser
<b>Socioeconomics</b>	800 to 1,000 workers. Increase in payment-in-lieu of taxes to state and local jurisdictions (approximately \$5.5 to \$8 million annually); decrease in the unemployment rate (from 7.9 percent to approximately 5.9 percent; and minor impacts to school resources.	1,555 to 1,755 workers including other industries. Increase in payment-in-lieu of taxes to state and local jurisdictions (approximately \$5.5 to \$8 million annually); decrease in the unemployment rate (from 7.9 percent to approximately 4.4 percent); and minor impacts to school resources.

Resource/Material Categories	Tritium Production Increment <sup>a</sup>	Cumulative Total <sup>b</sup>
Public and occupational health and safety Normal operation	<p>Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs: Average worker: 104.33 millirem Maximally exposed (offsite) individual: 0.26 millirem 50-mile population: 1.6 person-rem</p> <p>Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs: Average worker: 105.1 millirem MEI: 0.28 millirem 50-mile population: 2.3 person-rem</p>	<p>Annual dose for 1,000 TPBARs: Average worker: 104.33 millirem Maximally exposed (offsite) individual: 0.52 millirem 50-mile population: 3.2 person-rem</p> <p>Annual dose for 3,400 TPBARs: Average worker: 105.1 millirem MEI: 0.56 millirem 50-mile population: 4.6 person-rem</p>
Waste management	Low-level radioactive waste: approximately 41 cubic meters per year	Low-level radioactive waste: approximately 82 cubic meters per year
Spent nuclear fuel generation	<p>less than 2,000 TPBARs: 72 fuel assemblies per cycle</p> <p>3,400 TPBARs: up to a maximum of 141 fuel assemblies per cycle</p>	<p>less than 2,000 TPBARs: 144 fuel assemblies per cycle <u>from both units</u></p> <p>3,400 TPBARs: up to a maximum of 213 fuel assemblies per cycle <u>from both units</u></p>

<sup>a</sup> Assumes tritium production in one unit.

<sup>b</sup> Assumes tritium production in both units.

### 5.3.3 TPBAR Transportation

In determining the impacts of the transportation of DOE-owned spent fuel, the *Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Final Environmental Impact Statement* (DOE 1995a) analyzed the cumulative impacts of all transportation of radioactive materials, taking into account impacts from reasonably foreseeable actions that include transportation of radioactive material and general radioactive materials transportation that is not related to a particular action. The total worker and general population collective doses are summarized in Table 5-63. Total collective worker doses from all types of shipments (historical, the alternatives, reasonably foreseeable actions, and general transportation) were estimated to be 320,000 person-rem (130 latent cancer fatalities) for the period 1943 through 2035 (93 years). Total general population collective doses were also estimated to be 320,000 person-rem (160 latent cancer fatalities). The majority of the collective dose for workers and the general population resulted from the general transportation of radioactive material. Examples of these activities are shipments of radiopharmaceuticals to nuclear medicine laboratories and shipments of commercial low-level radioactive waste to commercial disposal facilities. The total number of latent cancer fatalities estimated to result from radioactive materials transportation over the period between 1943 and 2035 was 290. Over this same period of time (93 years), approximately 28 million people would die from cancer, based on 300,000 cancer fatalities per year (NRC 1977). It should be noted that the estimated number of transportation-related latent cancer fatalities would be indistinguishable from other latent cancer fatalities, and the transportation-related latent cancer fatalities would be 0.0010 percent of the total number of latent cancer fatalities.

**Table 5-63 Cumulative Transportation-Related Radiological Collective Doses and Latent Cancer Fatalities (1943 to 2035)**

<i>Category</i>	<i>Worker Dose (person-rem)</i>	<i>General Population Dose (person-rem)</i>
<b>CLWR</b>		
Shipment of TPBAR and LLW	less than 100	less than 100
Latent cancer fatalities from TPBAR and LLW	less than 1	less than 1
<b>Other nuclear material shipments</b>		
Reasonably foreseeable actions <sup>a</sup>		
Truck	11,000	50,000
Rail	820	1,700
General transportation (1943-2035)	310,000	270,000
Total collective dose	320,000	320,000
Total latent cancer fatalities	130	160

LLW = Low-level radioactive waste.

<sup>a</sup> DOE 1995a.

### 5.3.4 Impacts at the Tritium Extraction Facility

An integral part of the program to produce tritium in a CLWR is the Tritium Extraction Facility proposed for construction and operation at DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina (as discussed in Section 1.5.2.2). The Draft EIS for the Tritium Extraction Facility was issued in May 1998; a Final EIS was issued concurrently with the CLWR EIS (DOE 1998c, DOE 1999b). Table 5-64 provides a summary of the environmental impacts associated with the Preferred Alternative in the Tritium Extraction Facility EIS. Since the Tritium Extraction Facility EIS was developed in parallel with the CLWR EIS, the impacts shown in Table 5-64 are those provided in the Draft Tritium Extraction Facility EIS. These impacts are not expected to change in the Final EIS.

**Table 5-64 Summary of Environmental Impacts, Tritium Extraction Facility**

<i>Resource</i>	<i>Savannah River Site Baseline</i>	<i>Increment Above Baseline for Preferred Alternative</i>
<b>Schedule and Operating Parameters</b>		
Construction	Tritium Extraction Facility is not built	5 years
Annual electricity (megawatt-hours)		20,600
Annual sanitary wastewater (gallons)		770,000
Annual radioactive process wastewater (gallons)		11,000

<i>Resource</i>	<i>Savannah River Site Baseline</i>	<i>Increment Above Baseline for Preferred Alternative</i>
<b>Impacts to the Physical and Manmade Environment</b>		
<b>Geology</b>	Existing sites are cleared and graded, grassed, paved, or graveled, and used for industrial purposes	<p>Minimal construction impacts through application of best management practices and compliance with Federal and state regulations.</p> <p>Minor dewatering during construction activities near or below the water table. Design would prevent process water migration into the groundwater during operations.</p> <p>With an immediate response by Savannah River Site to contain and remediate spills, it is unlikely that a spill would impact groundwater.</p>
<b>Surface water</b>	<p>Construction in an industrial area with established stormwater control systems</p> <p>Permitted process wastewater discharges</p> <p>Permitted sanitary wastewater discharges</p>	<p>Minimal construction impacts; construction would not disturb undeveloped areas.</p> <p>Effluent treatment would remove radioactive cobalt from process water to safe levels before discharge to Upper Three Runs. Tritium concentration in the effluent would be less than the regulatory limit of 20,000 picocuries per liter.</p> <p>Effluent would be treated before release to Fourmile Branch. All discharges would be within permit limits. Minimal impacts expected.</p>
<b>Air resources</b> Nonradiological constituent concentrations at the Savannah River Site and Allied General Nuclear Services Facility site boundaries	Concentrations vary from approximately 0 to 60 percent of applicable standards and average 25 percent.*	Concentrations vary from approximately 0 to 0.19 percent of applicable standards and average 0.02 percent.* Ozone concentrations (measured as VOCs) would be 0.19 percent of the regulatory standard of 235 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ . All other contaminant levels would be less than 0.02 percent of their respective regulatory standards.
Annual radiological dose to the maximally exposed (offsite) individual (millirem). Dose limit = 10 millirem per year.	0.05 millirem	0.02 millirem: The emission is 0.2 percent of the dose limit.

<i>Resource</i>	<i>Savannah River Site Baseline</i>	<i>Increment Above Baseline for Preferred Alternative</i>
<b>Impacts to the Physical and Manmade Environment Continued</b>		
<b>Waste</b>		
Total estimated construction debris (metric tons)	Not applicable	385
Total operations waste by type (cubic meters)		
High-level	150,750 (30 years)	0 (40 years)
Low-level	343,710 (30 years)	9,320 (40 years)
Hazardous or mixed	90,450 (30 years)	132 (40 years)
Transuranic	18,090 (30 years)	0 (40 years)
<b>Impacts to Human Environment</b>		
<b>Aesthetics<sup>b</sup></b>	Area is not visible to and noise is not heard by offsite public. Historical and archaeological resources are not present.	Temporary increase in noise during construction phase, but it would not be heard by the offsite public. No adverse aesthetic impacts during Tritium Extraction Facility operation. Historical and archaeological resources are not present.
<b>Socioeconomics</b>	Savannah River Site employment is assumed to decline to 10,000 employees by 2001, and regional growth trends are expected to continue.	Regional temporary increase of 740 jobs during peak year of construction, which is 0.29 percent of the projected baseline regional employment of 258,000 jobs. The number of jobs at the Savannah River Site would decline to 108 for Tritium Extraction Facility operation. The overall effects would be positive in terms of assisting to stabilize the regional employment base.
<b>Environmental justice</b>	Minorities or low-income communities would not receive disproportionately high and adverse impacts.	Health effects would be minimal. Minority or low-income communities would not be disproportionately affected.
<b>Public health</b>		
Annual probability of fatal cancer to the maximally exposed (offsite) individual (annual fatal cancer risk from all natural causes is $3.4 \times 10^{-3}$ ).	$9.5 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-4}$
<b>Occupational health</b>		
Total estimated number of additional latent cancer fatalities to all involved workers from an annual dose.	0.066	0.0016
Number of construction worker injuries resulting in lost work time.	Not applicable	11



Resource	Savannah River Site Baseline	Increment Above Baseline for Preferred Alternative
Impacts to Human Environment Continued		
Accidents <sup>a</sup> Additional latent cancer facilities in offsite population  Annual frequency      Bounding accident  >10 <sup>-2</sup> Hood or room fire  ≥ 10 <sup>-4</sup> to ≤ 10 <sup>-2</sup> Area fire  ≥ 10 <sup>-6</sup> to <10 <sup>-4</sup> Design-basis seismic event with a fire	Not applicable	                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               <

$\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  = micrograms per cubic meter.

- <sup>a</sup> Concentration increments that would be less than 0.1 percent of standard for both locations are not listed.
- <sup>b</sup> Includes land use, visual resources and noise, and historical and archeological resources.
- <sup>c</sup> Events with the most additional latent fatalities in offsite public are a full-facility fire and a design-basis earthquake with a secondary fire.

AGNS = Allied General Nuclear Services Facility.

VOCs = Volatile Organic Compound.

Source: DOE 1998c.

## **5.4 RESOURCE COMMITMENTS**

This section describes the unavoidable adverse environmental impacts that could result from the proposed action, short-term uses of the environment, maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources.

### **5.4.1 Unavoidable Adverse Environmental Impacts**

Construction and operation activities associated with the irradiation of TPBARs at the CLWR sites and the transportation of the irradiated TPBARs to the Tritium Extraction Facility at DOE's Savannah River Site would result in unavoidable adverse impacts to the human environment. In general, the unavoidable adverse impacts from the operation of Watts Bar and Sequoyah are the incremental impacts attributed to tritium production. For the Bellefonte units, the unavoidable adverse impacts are associated with the full operation of the units as a nuclear reactor plant.

Unavoidable adverse impacts at the Watts Bar and Sequoyah sites would be related to the construction activity if the plants are required to provide additional spent fuel dry storage. Workers would receive exposure from the direct and skyshine radiation of the spent fuel already stored there. These exposures would be of the order of 40 to 50 person-rem. In addition, approximately 2 to 2.5 hectares (5 to 6 acres) of land within the site boundary at each site would be disturbed. Any liquid and solid waste generated during the construction activities, none of which would be radioactive, would be collected at the site, stored, and eventually removed for suitable recycling or disposal off site in accordance with applicable EPA regulations.

The construction activities that could be required for the completion of the Bellefonte units and the associated spent fuel dry storage facility would result in unavoidable adverse impacts on land, air, and water resources. The limited amount of land disturbance would result in small impacts to the ecological resources and public and occupational health and safety. More significant adverse effects associated with the completion of the Bellefonte units would be socioeconomic, arising from the rapid increase of the work force in the region of influence. These effects would be offset by the long-term benefits.

Operation of Watts Bar or Sequoyah in a tritium-producing mode would result in unavoidable increases of radiation exposures to workers and the general public. Annual doses from routine radiological air emissions from the proposed action to the maximally exposed individual, general population, and workers are discussed in Sections 5.2.1.9 and 5.2.2.9.

Operation of the Bellefonte units would result in unavoidable impacts to air and water quality, visual resources, and the surrounding communities. Air quality would be affected by routine radioactive gaseous emissions typical of CLWR operations. Impacts to water resources could affect surface use and quality because of routine radioactive liquid effluent releases and the need for cooling water. The routine emission of chemicals would affect the aquatic biota near the plant intake and discharge pipes. Socioeconomic resources of the community could be affected. These impacts would be associated with the operation of Bellefonte as a nuclear power plant regardless of tritium production. They have also been addressed in the EIS for the construction and operation of Bellefonte 1 and 2, issued by the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1974 (AEC 1974).

Spent nuclear fuel would be generated as an unavoidable result of reactor operations to produce tritium. If more than approximately 2,000 TPBARs were to be irradiated at a single unit, construction of a new dry cask ISFSI could be required. However, as stated in Section 3.2.7, under the Preferred Alternative DOE and TVA would minimize, to the extent practicable, the generation of additional spent nuclear fuel. Also unavoidable would be the generation of additional low-level radioactive waste, which would be transported and managed off site at the low-level radioactive waste disposal facility at the Barnwell facility or at the Savannah River Site.

#### 5.4.2 Relationship Between Local Short-Term Uses of the Environment and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity

Each reactor site would require additional land for the construction of a dry cask ISFSI. Such short-term usage would remove this land from other beneficial uses for the facilities as CLWRs. This land, which is within the site boundary at each candidate site, would not be expected to be used for any other activities as long as the plant is operating.

The use of CLWRs to produce tritium is significant in that carbon dioxide emissions associated with the accelerator option for producing tritium would be avoided. Producing tritium in a CLWR would not add to the "greenhouse" effect and global warming (see Sections 5.2.11 and 5.3).

The use of short-term resources to complete and operate the Bellefonte units for tritium production would affect the long-term productivity of the site by providing both a secure and reliable source of tritium to meet the nation's needs and production of electricity. The purpose and need for the Bellefonte units as a nuclear power plant is the subject of the *Final Environmental Impact Statement Related to the Construction of Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Bellefonte Unit 2* (AEC 1974).

#### 5.4.3 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitments of Resources

This section discusses the major irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources resulting from the proposed action. A commitment of resources is irreversible when its primary or secondary impacts limit the future options for a resource. An irreversible commitment refers to the use or consumption of resources that are neither renewable nor recoverable for later use by future generations. The discussion is divided into the functional segments of the proposed action, such as TPBAR fabrication and irradiation.

##### TPBAR Fabrication

Under the proposed action up to 4,000 TPBARs would need to be fabricated annually for the 40-year duration of the program. The materials involved in the fabrication of the TPBARs, such as lithium, aluminum, stainless steel, and zirconium, would be rendered radioactive during the tritium production process. These materials then would be consumed or reduced to unrecoverable forms of waste. In large part, however, the TPBARs would replace the burnable absorber rods normally used in the operation of the CLWRs and would produce no net change in the irretrievable material resources. None of the associated material resources associated with the fabrication of the TPBARs is in short supply. Material resources associated with the fabrication of the TPBARs are presented in Section 5.2.7.

##### TPBAR Irradiation

At the reactor facilities where construction is necessary (such as the completion of Bellefonte 1 and 2), the materials required include wood, concrete, sand, gravel, plastics, aluminum, steel, and other materials. No unusual construction materials requirements have been identified for any of the alternative sites. None of these identified construction resources is in short supply. No additional transmission lines, roads, rail line, water pipeline, wastewater pipeline, or wastewater treatment facilities would be required for Watts Bar or Sequoyah as a result of tritium production. Additional material (e.g., concrete and steel) would be required if an ISFSI were to be constructed.

Resources that would be consumed during completion of construction at Bellefonte 1 and 2 are summarized in Table 5-65.

**Table 5-65 Resources Consumed During Construction-Bellefonte 1 and 2**

<b>Resources</b>	<b>Total Consumed</b>	
	<b>Bellefonte 1</b>	<b>Bellefonte 2</b>
<b>Utilities</b>		
Electricity	575,000 megawatts-electric (80 megawatts peak demand <sup>a</sup> )	500,000 megawatts-electric (80 megawatts peak demand <sup>a</sup> )
Water	280,000 cubic meters (330 cubic meters per day peak demand <sup>a</sup> )	160,000 cubic meters (280 cubic meters per day peak demand <sup>a</sup> )
<b>Solids</b>		
Concrete	2,190 cubic meters	1,791 cubic meters
Steel	353 metric tons	98 metric tons
<b>Liquids</b>		
Fuel	9,652,872 liters	3,785,440 liters
<b>Gases</b>		
Industrial gases <sup>b</sup>	500 cubic meters	1,300 cubic meters

<sup>a</sup> Peak demand is the maximum rate expected during any hour.

<sup>b</sup> Standard cubic meter measured at 1 atmosphere and 15.55°C.

Source: TVA 1995b.

Additional materials for nuclear fuel assemblies would be required to operate the reactors in a tritium-producing mode. Materials associated with nuclear fuel assemblies include uranium, steel, and zircaloy. After irradiation, these materials and other material byproducts of the fission and irradiation process constitute the high-level radioactive waste constituents of the spent nuclear fuel. At this time, all constituents of the spent fuel are considered nonrecoverable since no reprocessing of the spent fuel is allowed. Material resources associated with use of additional nuclear fuel assemblies were discussed in Section 5.2.7.

## 5.5 MITIGATION MEASURES

Following the completion of an EIS and its associated Record of Decision, DOE is required to prepare a Mitigation Action Plan that addresses any mitigation commitments expressed in the Record of Decision (10 CFR, 1021.331). This Mitigation Action Plan is required to explain how the corresponding mitigation measures designed to mitigate adverse environmental impacts associated with the course of action directed by the Record of Decision will be planned and implemented. This Mitigation Action Plan is to be prepared before DOE takes any action directed by the Record of Decision that is the subject of a mitigation commitment.

Based on the analyses of the environmental consequences resulting from the proposed action, no mitigation measures would be necessary since all potential environmental impacts would be substantially below acceptable levels or promulgated standards. However, each potential reactor site would follow construction and/or operational practices that would minimize the impacts in such areas as air and surface water quality, noise, operational and public health and safety, and accident prevention and mitigation. These practices are dictated by Federal and state licensing and permitting requirements, as described in Chapter 6.

The completion of the Bellefonte facility could cause impacts which might require mitigative actions. In this situation, the final completion of construction activities would require a large number of workers. Since many of these workers are not available in the immediate area, there would be an immigration to the area for the construction period. Such an immigration could impact the available housing inventory and could place substantial demands upon the school system by requiring additional facilities, teachers, administrators, and buses. Section 5.2.3.8 also estimates a noticeable increase in local traffic over current levels during the potential completion and operation of one or both Bellefonte units. As discussed in that section, possible measures that could be used to mitigate traffic volume impacts are physical improvements to the local roads

or road network to increase capacity, including construction of additional vehicle lanes throughout road segments, construction of passing lanes in certain locations, or realignment to eliminate some of the no-passing zones. Employee programs that provide flexible hours could also reduce road travel during peak hours, and restrictions for trucks traveling during the peak hours could be made. Also, establishing employee programs and incentives for ride-sharing could be encouraged, and bus and/or vanpool programs could be initiated.

Although mitigative actions are discussed in the CLWR EIS for these areas, no commitment on the part of DOE can be made until the Record of Decision is issued. It should be noted that the completion of the Bellefonte facility is not the Preferred Alternative.

Although not anticipated, it is possible that DOE may commit to mitigative actions in the CLWR Record of Decision. If this occurs, the Department would prepare a Mitigation Action Plan explaining how all mitigative actions would be planned for and implemented. Such a Mitigation Action Plan would be prepared prior to taking any actions directed by the Record of Decision. Copies of such a Mitigation Action Plan would be placed in the appropriate DOE reading rooms and would be provided to interested parties upon written request.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Applicable Laws, Regulations, and Other Requirements**

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## 6. APPLICABLE LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS

Chapter 6 identifies the Federal and state statutes and regulations that require licenses, permits, or other requirements related to environmental protection, emergency planning, and worker safety and health. In addition, the chapter summarizes the U.S. Department of Energy's regulations and orders, as well as the regulatory compliance history of the three nuclear plants being considered for tritium production.

### 6.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Like most nuclear activities, the production of tritium in a commercial reactor would be closely regulated to ensure the health and safety of the public, protect the environment, and guard employee health. Most of these regulatory requirements already apply to the operating Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Watts Bar 1) and Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (Sequoyah 1 and 2), and have been accounted for in the planning and partial construction of the incomplete Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (Bellefonte 1 and 2). The addition of tritium production would necessitate few, if any, physical or substantive changes to current compliance plans and activities at the plants. The legal responsibility for continued U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulatory compliance would remain with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).

To ensure that individual facilities satisfy the established standards of nuclear safety and environmental protection, some of the applicable laws require the facilities to have licenses or permits. The most comprehensive of these are the operating licenses issued by the NRC under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Tritium production was not contemplated in the existing operating licenses for Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2, or in the construction permit (the precursor to an operating license) for Bellefonte 1 and 2. The NRC would, therefore, have to review the tritium production proposal under established processes to amend the operating licenses for Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2, and as part of the safety analysis and licensing review process associated with the construction of Bellefonte 1 and 2.

Permits for air pollution emissions and water pollution discharges are issued by the relevant state environmental agencies (the Alabama Department of Environmental Management and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation) under state programs approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. Continued compliance with the terms of these permits would be required. Based on the projections for air emissions and liquid effluents, no changes to the existing permits at Watts Bar or Sequoyah should be necessary. TVA has noted, however, that it ships all hazardous wastes to permitted offsite facility contractors; therefore, it does not need its own hazardous waste permits (TVA 1997d). Unless this practice changes as a result of tritium production, no new hazardous waste permits should be required. Each facility has a Hazardous Waste Generator Identification Number and a Special Waste Permit that would have to be transferred to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) if it were to purchase the reactors.

Some applicable laws, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act, and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, require specific reports and/or consultations rather than ongoing permits or activities. These would be satisfied through the legal/regulatory process,

including the preparation of the *Environmental Impact Statement for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor* (CLWR EIS), leading to the proposed tritium production.

The other applicable laws establish general requirements that must be satisfied, but do not include processes (such as the issuance of permits or licenses) to consider compliance prior to specific instances of violations or other events that trigger their provisions. These include the Toxic Substances Control Act (affecting polychlorinated biphenyl transformers and other designated substances); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (affecting pesticide/herbicide applications); the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act; and (if there were to be a spill of a hazardous substance) the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund).

Finally, both TVA and DOE have their own internal requirements that would be applicable to the proposed production of tritium. Occupational safety and health programs constitute the most important internal requirements. The Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Department of Labor regulations established under it do not apply directly to government agencies (such as DOE) or government-owned corporations (such as TVA). However, both are required by statute (29 CFR 1910, 29 U.S.C. 668) and Executive Order 12196 to have their own programs to protect worker safety and health "consistent" with the Occupational Safety and Health Act's standards. Radiological aspects of worker safety and health are governed through the NRC licensing process.

DOE also has numerous requirements that are set forth in DOE Orders to ensure its activities provide general protection of health, safety, and the environment. Most of these, however, do not apply to activities at non-DOE facilities (such as DOE production of tritium in TVA reactors).

Section 6.2 of this chapter discusses the major Federal and state statutes and regulations that impose nuclear safety and environmental protection requirements on the subject facilities, and that might require the reactor facility to obtain a permit or license, or amendment thereof, prior to tritium production. Each of the applicable regulations and statutes establishes how potential releases of pollutants and radioactive materials are to be controlled or monitored. These applicable regulations and statutes include requirements for the issuance of permits or licenses for new operations or new emission sources and for amendments to existing permits or licenses to allow new types of operations at existing sources. In addition to nuclear and environmental license and permit requirements, the regulations and statutes may require consultations with various authorities to determine whether an action requires a permit to be obtained or amended, or whether protective or mitigative measures relative to the action's effect on cultural, natural, or biological resources need to be implemented. Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 discuss the nuclear and environmental licensing and permitting processes, respectively, and list the licenses and permits applicable to tritium production in the subject facilities.

Section 6.3 addresses other general requirements regarding environmental protection, emergency planning, and worker safety and health. Section 6.4 discusses the DOE regulations and Orders that pertain to DOE activities.

## **6.2 STATUTES AND REGULATIONS REQUIRING LICENSES OR PERMITS**

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, gives NRC jurisdiction over the construction and operation of commercial nuclear reactors (including those of TVA) and over the possession, use, transportation, and disposal of radioactive materials (including wastes). The NRC carries out this role by applying extensive regulations and performance standards to specific facilities and operations through a required licensing process. Although most DOE facilities and operations are not subject to NRC jurisdiction, the proposed tritium production services provided to DOE by TVA would be subject to the NRC regulations and license requirements governing TVA.



Federal and state environmental laws establish standards for radiation exposure in the general environment (i.e., everything outside NRC- or DOE-regulated facilities) and for sources of air pollution, water pollution, and hazardous waste. Some of these standards are applied to specific facilities and operations through required permits. To obtain these permits, the facility operator (in the present case, TVA) must submit construction and operation plans and specifications for new or modified sources of pollutants for review by the appropriate government agencies. The environmental permits: (1) contain specific conditions governing construction and operation of a new or modified emission source; (2) describe pollution abatement and prevention methods to reduce pollutants; and (3) contain emission limits for the pollutants that will be emitted from the facility. Section 6.2.2 discusses the environmental regulations and statutes under which new or amended permits may be required for tritium production at the candidate facilities.

### **6.2.1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Permits and Licenses**

#### **Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 *et seq.*, as amended) (10 CFR 50)**

The Atomic Energy Act, as amended, requires entities that operate nuclear power plants, such as TVA, to have a plant license issued by the NRC. The NRC regulations that implement this requirement provide for permits to be issued for the construction or alteration of such facilities. Operating licenses are applied for after completion of the construction or alteration of the facilities (10 CFR Sections 50.23, 50.56, 50.57). Construction permits and operating licenses include detailed provisions regarding their duration and the design, safety, and quality assurance requirements for the subject facilities (10 CFR Sections 50.54, 50.55).

Permits and licensing for completion of the Bellefonte 1 and 2 reactors for tritium and electricity production will be addressed as part of the NRC's consideration of TVA's operating license application. To address tritium production, TVA will be required to apply to the NRC for appropriate amendments to its operating license application for Bellefonte 1 and 2, or to its existing operating licenses for the Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 reactors. The NRC must grant Bellefonte 1 an operating license before it can produce tritium, and the NRC must approve TVA's license amendments for Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 before those plants can produce tritium.

#### **Regulatory Limits of Radiation Exposure (10 CFR 50, Appendix I, 10 CFR 20)**

Limits of exposure to members of the public and radiation workers are based on International Commission on Radiological Protection recommendations. Each country's regulatory organization adopts the International Commission on Radiological Protection's recommendations and sets specific annual exposure limits. For nuclear facilities in the United States, annual exposure limits to the public and radiation workers are established by the NRC in 10 CFR 20 (Standards for Protection Against Radiation) and 10 CFR, Appendix I (Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the Criterion, "As Low as is Reasonably Achievable," for radioactive material in light-water-cooled nuclear power reactor effluents).

### **6.2.2 Environmental Protection Permits**

**Clean Air Act, as amended, and EPA regulations thereunder (42 U.S.C. 7401 *et seq.*), (40 CFR 50-99); Tennessee Air Quality Act and regulations thereunder (Title 68 Tennessee Code Chapter 201); Alabama Air Pollution Control Act and regulations thereunder (Title 22 Alabama Code Chapter 28); air pollution ordinances of the relevant municipal and county governments**

The Clean Air Act, as amended, is intended to "protect and enhance the quality of the nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population." Section 118 of the Clean Air Act, as amended, requires each Federal agency (including TVA and DOE) with jurisdiction over

any property or facility that might result in the discharge of air pollutants to comply with "all Federal, state, interstate, and local requirements" with regard to the control and abatement of air pollution.

The Act requires EPA to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards as necessary to protect public health and welfare with an adequate margin of safety from any known or anticipated adverse effects of a regulated pollutant (42 U.S.C. 7409). The Act also requires the establishment of national standards of performance for new or modified stationary sources of atmospheric pollutants (42 U.S.C. 7411 and 7412) and requires specific emission increases to be evaluated to prevent a significant deterioration in air quality (42 U.S.C. 7470 *et seq.*). Air emissions are regulated by the EPA in 40 CFR Parts 50 through 99. Hazardous air pollutants, including radionuclide emissions from Federal facilities, are regulated under the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Program (40 CFR 61).

These national standards are implemented by states that have an air pollution control program approved by the EPA. In Tennessee, the program is administered by the State Department of Environment and Conservation under the State Air Quality Act (Title 68 Tennessee Code Chapter 201). In Alabama, the program is administered by the State Department of Environmental Management under the Alabama Air Pollution Control Act (Title 22 Alabama Code Chapter 28). The National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Programs standards for radionuclides (40 CFR 61, Subparts H and I) are not applicable to NRC-licensed facilities such as TVA reactors. As cited in EPA's Final Rule (60 FR 46206), compliance with NRC regulations constitutes compliance with 40 CFR 61, Subparts H and I. As indicated in Chapter 5, the radiation exposure of the public would be well within the regulatory limits.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency also establishes standards for radiation protection for members of the public in the general environment and for radioactive materials introduced into the general environment as the result of operations that are a part of a nuclear fuel cycle. These standards are found in 40 CFR 190, Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations. TVA reactors are subject to these standards.

**Federal Clean Water Act, as amended (33 U.S.C. 1251 *et seq.*); Tennessee Water Quality Act (Title 69 Tennessee Code Chapter 3) and regulations thereunder (regulations Chapter 1200-4); Alabama Water Pollution Control Act (Title 22 Alabama Code Chapter 22)**

The Federal Water Pollution Act (commonly known as the Clean Water Act) was enacted to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's water." The Clean Water Act prohibits the "discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts" to navigable waters of the United States (Section 101). Section 313 of the Clean Water Act, as amended, requires all branches of the Federal Government engaged in any activity that might result in a discharge or runoff of pollutants to surface waters to comply with Federal, state, interstate, and local requirements.

In addition to setting water quality standards for the nation's waterways, the Clean Water Act supplies guidelines and limitations (Sections 301-303) for effluent discharges from point-source discharges and provides authority (Sections 401-402) for the EPA to implement the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting program pursuant to 40 CFR 122 and subsequent revisions.

EPA has delegated primary enforcement authority for the Clean Water Act and the NPDES permitting program to the States of Tennessee and Alabama for the waters therein.

**Federal Safe Drinking Water Act, as amended [42 U.S.C. 300f *et seq.*, 40 CFR 41-149]; Tennessee Safe Drinking Water Act (Title 68 Tennessee Code Chapter 221); Alabama Water Pollution Control Act (22 Alabama Code Chapter 22)**

The primary objective of the Safe Drinking Water Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 300f *et seq.*), is to protect the quality of the public water supplies and all sources of drinking water. The implementing regulations, administered by the EPA unless delegated to the states, establish standards applicable to public water systems. They promulgate maximum contaminant levels (including those for radioactivity) in public water systems, which are defined as water systems that serve at least 15 service connections used by year-round residents or that regularly serve at least 25 year-round residents. Safe Drinking Water Act requirements have been promulgated by the EPA in 40 CFR 100-149; for tritium, a concentration limit of 20,000 picocuries per liter has been established per 40 CFR 141.16. As indicated in Chapter 5, the tritium concentration would remain well below the regulatory limits.

**The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and its Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 6901 *et seq.*); Tennessee Hazardous Waste Management Act (Title 68 Tennessee Code Chapter 212); Alabama Hazardous Waste Management and Minimization Act (22 Alabama Code Chapter 30)**

The treatment, storage, and/or disposal of hazardous and nonhazardous waste is governed by the Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Pursuant to Section 3006 of the Act, any state that seeks to administer and enforce a hazardous waste program pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act may apply for EPA authorization of its program. Tennessee and Alabama have such authorization. EPA regulations implementing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (40 CFR 260-280) define hazardous wastes and specify hazardous waste transportation, handling, treatment, storage, disposal, record keeping, and reporting requirements. The regulations imposed on a generator or a treatment, storage, or disposal facility vary according to the type and quantity of material or waste generated, treated, stored, or disposed. The method of treatment, storage, or disposal also affects the extent and complexity of the requirements. These regulations require that facilities obtain a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act permit if they store hazardous waste on site more than 90 days (for large quantity generators) or 180 days (for small quantity generators) or treat hazardous waste. TVA has stated that it does not store waste beyond the periods allowed for hazardous waste generators or conduct treatment of hazardous wastes that require a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act permit at its nuclear facilities; therefore, TVA does not have Resource Conservation and Recovery Act permits for those facilities. Each facility does have an EPA/state Hazardous Waste Generator identification number and files the documents required for the generation of hazardous waste.

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act does not apply to radioactive waste. However, the courts have held that it does apply to the hazardous (i.e., nonradioactive) component of mixed hazardous and radioactive wastes in *Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation (L.E.A.F.) versus Hodel*.

#### **Federal Facility Compliance Act (42 U.S.C. 6961)**

The Federal Facility Compliance Act, enacted on October 6, 1992, amended the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The Federal Facility Compliance Act waived sovereign immunity from fines and penalties for violations at the facilities of Federal agencies (including government-owned corporations such as TVA) associated with the management of mixed waste. However, TVA has stated in its submissions for Watts Bar 1 and Bellefonte 1 and 2 that it does not store hazardous waste at any of its nuclear facilities.

### **6.3 OTHER REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, EMERGENCY PLANNING, AND WORKER SAFETY AND HEALTH**

#### **6.3.1 Environmental Protection**

**National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4321 *et seq.*); DOE Order 451.1A.**

NEPA establishes a national policy promoting awareness of the environmental consequences of human activity on the environment and consideration of environmental impacts during the planning and decisionmaking stages of a project. This Act requires Federal agencies to prepare a detailed statement on the environmental effects of proposed major Federal actions that might significantly affect the quality of the human environment.

This EIS has been prepared in response to NEPA requirements and policies and in accordance with the Council on Environmental Quality (40 CFR 1500-1508), DOE (10 CFR 1021, DOE Order 451.1A), and TVA provisions for implementing the procedural requirements of NEPA. It discusses reasonable alternatives and their potential environmental consequences.

**Executive Order 11514 (Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality); (40 CFR 1500-1508)**

Executive Order 11514 (regulated by 40 CFR 1500-1508) requires Federal agencies to monitor and control their activities continually to: (1) protect and enhance the quality of the environment, and (2) develop procedures to ensure the fullest practicable provision of timely public information and understanding of Federal plans and programs that may have potential environmental impacts so that the views of interested parties can be obtained.

**Executive Order 11988 (Floodplain Management); (10 CFR 1022); (18 CFR 725)**

Executive Order 11988 (regulated by 10 CFR 1022 and 18 CFR 725) requires Federal agencies to establish procedures to ensure that the potential effects of flood hazards and floodplain management are considered for any action undertaken in a floodplain, and that floodplain impacts be avoided to the extent practicable. The production of tritium in the subject TVA facilities would not require further consideration of this Executive Order.

**Executive Order 11990 (Protection of Wetlands); (10 CFR 1022); (18 CFR 725)**

Executive Order 11990 (regulated by 10 CFR 1022 and 18 CFR 725) requires Federal agencies to avoid any short- and long-term adverse impacts on wetlands wherever there is a practicable alternative. The production of tritium in the subject TVA facilities would not require further consideration of this Executive Order.

**Endangered Species Act, as amended (16 U.S.C. 1531 *et seq.*)**

The Endangered Species Act prohibits Federal actions that might harm a listed endangered species or designated critical habitat, unless a special exemption is granted. Consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of the U.S. Department of Interior is required whenever a proposed action is likely to affect a listed species or critical habitat (50 CFR 17). Preparation of a biological assessment of potential effects on listed species is also required for Federal actions that are "major construction activities." As discussed in Sections 5.2.1.6, 5.2.2.6 and 5.2.3.6, the consultation process between TVA and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of the U.S. Department of Interior has been completed for all three candidate sites at Watts Bar, Sequoyah, and Bellefonte (DOI 1998a, DOI 1998c, DOI 1998d).

### **National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (16 U.S.C. 470 *et seq.*)**

This Act provides that sites with significant national historic value be placed on the *National Register of Historic Places* maintained by the Secretary of the Interior. No permits or certifications are required under the Act. However, if a particular Federal activity may impact a historic property resource, consultation with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation is required by 16 U.S.C. 470f. The National Historic Preservation Act provides for an expanded National Register and establishes the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (36 CFR 800.3, Section 106). Section 110 of the Act requires Federal agencies to identify, evaluate, inventory, and protect National Register resources on properties they control. Such consultation usually generates a Memorandum of Agreement that includes stipulations that must be followed to minimize adverse impacts. Coordination with the State Historic Preservation Officer also is done to ensure that potentially significant sites are properly identified and appropriate mitigative actions are implemented. It should be noted that the Tennessee State Historic Preservation Office has reviewed the Draft EIS and concluded that the proposed action at Watts Bar and Sequoyah would have no effect upon properties listed or eligible for listing with the *National Register of Historic Places* (TN DC 1998b).

### **Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 13101 *et seq.*)**

The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 establishes a national policy for waste management and pollution control that focuses first on source reduction, followed sequentially by environmentally safe recycling, treatment, and disposal. Disposal or releases to the environment should occur only as a last resort. In response, DOE has committed to participation in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund) Amendments and Reauthorization Act Section 313, U.S. EPA 33/50 Pollution Prevention Program. The goal for facilities already involved in Section 313 compliance was to achieve by 1997 a 33-percent reduction in the release of 17 priority chemicals from a 1993 baseline. On August 3, 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12856, expanding the 33/50 program such that DOE must reduce its total release of all toxic chemicals by 50 percent by December 31, 1999. The Order applies to all Federal agencies (such as DOE) and government-owned corporations (such as TVA).

### **Comprehensive Guideline for Procurement of Products Containing Recovered Materials (40 CFR 247)**

This regulation was issued under the authority of Section 6002 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and Executive Order 12873, which set forth requirements for Federal agencies (including government-owned corporations) to procure products containing recovered materials for use in their operations according to EPA guidelines. The purpose of these regulations is to promote recycling by using government purchasing to expand markets for recovered materials. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Section 6002 requires that any purchasing agency, when using appropriated funds to procure an item, must purchase it with the highest practicable percentage of recovered materials. The procurement of materials to be utilized in the tritium production program should be conducted in accordance with these regulations.

### **Executive Order 12856 (Right-to-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention Requirements)**

Executive Order 12856 requires all Federal agencies to reduce the toxic chemicals entering any waste stream. This Order also requires Federal agencies to report toxic chemicals entering waste streams; improve emergency planning, response, and accident notification; and encourage clean technologies and testing of innovative prevention technologies.

### **Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)**

Executive Order 12898 requires Federal agencies to identify and address any disproportionately high, adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority and low-income populations. Chapter 5 and Appendix G of this EIS discuss Environmental Justice.

## **Executive Order 12902 (Energy Efficiency and Water Conservation at Federal Facilities)**

Executive Order 12902 requires Federal agencies to develop and implement a program for conservation of energy and water resources.

### **6.3.2 Emergency Planning and Response**

This section discusses laws that address the protection of public health and worker safety and require the establishment of emergency plans; coordination with local and Federal agencies is also covered. These laws relate to the operation of facilities, such as nuclear reactors, that engage directly or indirectly in the production of special nuclear material.

#### **| Quantities of Radioactive Materials Requiring Consideration of the Need for an Emergency Plan for Responding to a Release (10 CFR 30.72 Schedule C)**

| This list determines the need for emergency response plans for unscheduled releases of radiological materials at all NRC-regulated facilities.

#### **Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Preparedness Planning (44 CFR 352 )**

These regulations generally establish the policies, procedures, and responsibilities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the NRC, and DOE as guidance for implementing a Federal Emergency Preparedness Program.

#### **Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. 11001 *et seq.*) (also known as "SARA Title IIP")**

| The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 requires emergency planning and notice to communities and government agencies of the presence and release of specific chemicals. EPA implements this Act under regulations found in 40 CFR 355, 370, and 372. Under Subtitle A of this Act, Federal facilities (including those of government-owned corporations such as TVA) provide information (such as inventories of specific chemicals used or stored and any releases that occur) to the State Emergency Response Commission and the Local Emergency Planning Committee to ensure that emergency plans are sufficient to respond to unplanned releases of hazardous substances.

#### **Transportation of Hazardous Materials (49 U.S.C. 5101 *et seq.*); Hazardous Materials Tables & Communications, Emergency Response Information Requirements (49 CFR 172)**

The regulatory requirements for marking, labeling, placarding, and documenting hazardous material shipments are defined in these regulations. Requirements for providing hazardous material information and training also are specified. Materials shipped to and from the subject facilities would be required to comply with these regulations.

#### **Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended (42 U.S.C. 9601 *et seq.*); National Oil and Hazardous Substance Contingency Plan (40 CFR 300)**

More popularly known as "Superfund," the Act and the implementing regulations provide the needed general authority for Federal and state governments to respond directly to hazardous substance incidents. The regulations require reporting spills of hazardous substances to the National Response Center of EPA, including (in the limited circumstances specified in 40 CFR 302.6(b)(2)) radionuclides specified in 40 CFR 302.4. Tritium production operations would be required to comply with these regulations if a hazardous substance spill occurred.

### 6.3.3 Worker Safety and Health

#### **Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, as amended (29 U.S.C. 651 *et seq.*); Occupational Safety and Health Administration Emergency Response, Hazardous Waste Operations, and Worker Right to Know (29 CFR 1910)**

The Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 U.S.C. 651) establishes standards to enhance safe, healthy working conditions in places of employment throughout the United States. The Act is administered and enforced by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, a U.S. Department of Labor agency. While the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and EPA both have a mandate to reduce exposure to toxic substances, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's jurisdiction is limited to safety and health conditions that exist in the workplace environment. In general, under Occupational Safety and Health Act, it is the duty of each employer to furnish all employees a place of employment that is free of recognized hazards that are likely to cause death or serious physical harm. Employees have a duty to comply with the occupational safety and health standards and all Occupational Safety and Health Act-related rules, regulations, and orders. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration's regulations (29 CFR) establish specific standards that tell employers what must be done to achieve a safe, healthy working environment. These regulations set down the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's requirements for employee safety in a variety of working environments, including employee emergency and fire prevention plans (29 CFR 1910.38), hazardous waste operations and emergency response (29 CFR 1910.120), and hazards communication (29 CFR 1910.1200) to increase employee awareness of the dangers they face from hazardous materials at their workplace.

Occupational Safety and Health Act and the regulations thereunder do not directly apply to Federal agencies or government-owned corporations. However, Section 19 of Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 U.S.C. 668) requires all Federal agencies to have occupational safety programs "consistent" with Occupational Safety and Health Act standards. This requirement has been applied to government-owned corporations, as well as agencies, through 5 U.S.C. 7902 and Executive Order 12196.

Radiological protection for employees of NRC-licensed facilities is regulated by the NRC. DOE Order 440.1, "Worker Protection Management for DOE Federal and Contractor Employees," also applies at all DOE facilities, even if they are also regulated by the NRC. This Order will not apply to the TVA facilities, since TVA will not be a DOE contractor.

### 6.4 DOE REGULATIONS AND ORDERS

The Atomic Energy Act makes DOE responsible for establishing a comprehensive health, safety, and environmental program for its activities. DOE carries out this responsibility through the promulgation of regulations (set forth in 10 CFR 830) and the issuance of DOE Orders. The DOE regulations, however, do not apply to activities regulated by the NRC (see 10 CFR 830.2(a), 835.1(b)). Thus, the DOE regulations would not apply to tritium production at the TVA reactors.

### 6.5 COMPLIANCE HISTORY

This CLWR EIS considered three nuclear facilities for tritium production: Watts Bar 1; Sequoyah 1 and 2; and Bellefonte 1 and 2. A description is provided of each facility's performance in the following areas: (1) compliance with NRC regulations; (2) compliance with environmental and nonnuclear safety regulations; (3) NRC Performance Indicators; and (4) Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance. The assessment is based on the following information sources:

- Information submitted by TVA in response to DOE's request for proposal

- NRC documentation, including Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance reports, transcripts of Commission briefings, and summaries of Notices of Violation
- Review of Industry Performance Indicators compiled by NRC

### **6.5.1 Compliance Indicators**

The purpose of this section is not for DOE to assess the adequacy of TVA's operation of its CLWRs. Such an assessment is the responsibility of NRC. The information contained in this section provides a basis for DOE to assess whether there are any compliance issues that would interfere with the production of tritium or create a potentially significant environmental impact. Three selected compliance indicators used to describe TVA's compliance history are: (1) Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance; (2) enforcement actions; and (3) performance indicators.

#### **6.5.1.1 Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance**

of the NRC's evaluation tools, the Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance Program, has been used to characterize this compliance performance. The Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance Program is an integrated effort by the NRC to collect and evaluate observations and data to assess and better understand the reasons for a licensee's performance. The program was started in the early 1980s. The Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance evaluation is based on a compilation of the NRC staff's regulatory experience with the plant over an extended period of time. Normally, the Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance Program covers about 18 months. This period can be extended to 24 months for plants that are performing well and can be reduced to about 12 months for poorer performers.

Each plant is rated in four functional areas: plant operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. Each functional area is assigned a rating of 1, 2, or 3. The "1" rating represents a superior level of safety performance that may support a reduced NRC inspection effort. A "2" rating reflects a good level of performance. A rating of "3" designates an acceptable level of performance where the NRC will consider increased inspection efforts.

#### **6.5.1.2 NRC Notices of Violations and Enforcement Actions**

The review of each facility's NRC enforcement history also presents an overview of day-to-day compliance with NRC regulations. The NRC's Enforcement Program seeks to protect public health and safety by ensuring compliance with NRC regulations and license conditions; obtaining prompt correction of violations and conditions adverse to quality; deterring future violations; and encouraging improvement of licensee performance.

Violations are identified through inspections and investigations. There are three primary enforcement sanctions available: Notices of Violation, civil penalties, and orders.

- A Notice of Violation summarizes the results of an inspection and formalizes a violation. Severity levels for Notices of Violation of NRC regulations range from Severity Level I, for the most significant violations, to Severity Level IV for those of more minor concern.
- A civil penalty is a monetary fine issued under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act. Civil penalties may be assessed up to \$110,000 per violation per day. Notices of Violation and civil penalties are issued based on violations.
- Orders may be issued for violations, or in the absence of a violation, because of a public health and safety issue.



### 6.5.1.3 Performance Indicators

*Performance Indicators for Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors* (NRC 1998b) was most recently issued in December 1997. This document contains data through September 1997 for 109 commercial power reactors. The information focuses on eight performance indicators using information that was submitted by the reactor operators in Licensee Event Reports, monthly operating reports, and information provided by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. The information is grouped in "Peer Groups" to provide a useful perspective to evaluate a unit's performance against reactors of similar operating history, age, and manufacturer. Also, performance indicator data were categorized by similar data to be characterized as a Peer Group. Plants were categorized by Nuclear Steam Supply System vendor, product line, generating capacity, and licensing date. The following are the Peer Group categories listed under *Performance Indicators for Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors* (NRC 1998b):

- Pre-Three Mile Island General Electric Plants
- Post-Three Mile Island General Electric Plants
- Babcock and Wilcox Plants
- Combustion Engineering Plants without Core Protection Calculators
- Combustion Engineering Plants with Core Protection Calculators
- Westinghouse 2-Loop and Small 3- and 4-Loop Plants
- Westinghouse Older 3-Loop Plants
- Westinghouse New 3- and 4-Loop Plants
- Westinghouse Older 4-Loop Plants
- All New Plants Since 1/1/87

### 6.5.2 Watts Bar 1

Watts Bar 1 started commercial power operations in 1996. The compliance review includes an overview of the plant's regulatory performance from the latter stages of construction through current operations.

#### 6.5.2.1 NRC Performance

##### NRC Overview

In discussing the compliance history in a September 1995 Commission briefing (NRC 1995d), the NRC staff indicated that it had applied "unprecedented NRC inspection resources" to Watts Bar 1 to ensure that the systemic problems that created design and construction concerns in the pre-1985 time frame were effectively addressed by TVA as it completed construction and prepared the plant equipment, systems, and staff for full power operations. Stewart Ebnetter, NRC Region II Administrator noted, "I believe we have inspected Watts Bar 1 more than any other plant...I think this one is the most inspected plant." These inspections provided the NRC an effective forum to review all aspects of the construction, testing, and operation of Watts Bar 1 prior to approval of the Operating License in 1996. In a July 1995 Commission briefing (NRC 1995c), John S. Jaudon, NRC Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II, characterized TVA's performance by saying, "Our inspections indicate that TVA performance on the site has been generally good since the fall of 1994."

This theme was reiterated in the September 1995 Commission briefing as NRC management reviewed the results of recent testing at Watts Bar 1 and summarized the progress of preparing Watts Bar 1 for operation (NRC 1995d).

### Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance Evaluations

Watts Bar 1 operations have been evaluated by the NRC in two Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance inspections (NRC 1996c, NRC 1998a). As summarized in Table 6-1, Watts Bar 1 has an average Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance score of 1.25 for these two evaluations (see Section 6.5.1.1).

**Table 6-1 Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance Results for the Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant**

<i>Review Period</i>	<i>Plant Operations</i>	<i>Maintenance</i>	<i>Engineering</i>	<i>Plant Support</i>
November 1995 to November 1996	2	1	1	1
November 1996 to December 1997	2	1	1	1

The NRC's January 1998 Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance report for the period from November 1996 to December 1997 (NRC 1998a) characterized the engineering, maintenance, and plant support functional areas as "superior." However, the report indicated that, "configuration control of plant equipment remained problematic...component mispositions by nonlicensed operators continued to occur, including examples found by the NRC which rendered safety equipment inoperable." These issues are being addressed by the NRC.

### NRC Notices of Violation and Enforcement Actions

TVA's compliance information (TVA 1997e, NRC 1998f), which was submitted in response to DOE's request for proposal, identified the following NRC Notices of Violation issued during the latter stages of construction:

- 1992 - 15 Level IV violations
- 1993 - 3 Level II violations with civil penalty of \$100,000 and 46 Level IV violations
- 1994 - 50 Level IV violations
- 1995 - 25 Level IV violations

TVA's compliance information for Watts Bar 1 (TVA 1997e) indicates that there were 35 Level IV violations, and 1 Level II violation with a civil penalty of \$80,000 (this penalty was withdrawn in April 1998) during the period from initial operation in 1996 through 1997. These enforcement actions are summarized below:

#### Civil Penalties - Watts Bar 1

NRC Notices of Violation for Watts Bar 1 were found dating back to 1988. There have been no further violations since 1992, except for one civil penalty notice in combination with the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. This penalty was withdrawn in April 1998. The Sequoyah/Watts Bar Nuclear Plants received Level I and Level II Notices of Violation that proposed imposition of civil penalties regarding alleged acts of discrimination in violation of 10 CFR 50.7. These Notices of Violation dated back to 1988 on different discrimination act charges that totaled \$200,000 in civil penalties. Twenty-six cases noted in the NRC letters of January 20 and 25, 1993, included: (1) two cases in which the final order of the Secretary of Labor determined that discrimination was a factor in the actions taken against the employees, (2) 13 cases that were conciliated after an initial U.S. Department of Labor determination of discrimination, and (3) 11 cases that were conciliated before an initial determination of discrimination by the U.S. Department of Labor (NRC 1998f). Payment of these civil penalties was made by wire transfer on January 26, 1994.

The Level IV violations have been found to fit in the following categories as stated: lack of site standard practices; failure to meet code requirements; deficiencies in quality control; improper work instructions; deficiencies in procedures; failure to establish adequate measures to assure that materials conformed to requirements; failure to train personnel properly; drawing errors; inadequate design control; failure to distribute agenda; design and construction practices; and failure to adequately control and secure safeguards. The overview of all Notices of Violation at this level fit into two classifications: a lack of management control and procedural interpretation (NRC 1998f).

### Performance Indicators

*Performance Indicators for Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors* (NRC 1998b) presents performance indicator information for Watts Bar 1 using a peer group defined as "All New Plants Since 1/1/87." Accordingly, the data presented in *Performance Indicators for Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors* were reviewed for the six (of eight) performance indicators that address operational activities. The following data characterizes Watts Bar 1 performance since the second quarter of 1996 in these categories:

- **Automatic Scrams While Critical** [An automatic scram is a reactor shutdown that has been initiated by the plant's safety systems.] The industry average for this indicator was less than 0.3 scrams per quarter. Watts Bar 1's performance included four quarters with no automatic scrams, one quarter with one automatic scram, and two quarters with two scrams, for an average of 0.7 scrams per quarter.
- **Safety System Actuations** The industry average for this indicator was approximately 0.005 actuations per quarter. Watts Bar 1's performance included six quarters with no actuations, and one quarter with three actuations (two occurring with the reactor operating and one with the reactor shut down), for an average of 0.14 actuations per quarter.
- **Significant Events** The industry average for this indicator was approximately zero significant events per quarter, which equaled Watts Bar 1's performance of no significant events through seven quarters.
- **Safety System Failures** The industry average for this indicator was approximately 0.5 failures per quarter. Watts Bar 1's performance included three quarters with no failures, three quarters with one failure per quarter (all during operation), and one quarter with two failures (both with the reactor shut down), for an average of 0.7 failures per quarter.
- **Forced Outage Rate** The industry average for this indicator was less than a 20 percent forced outage rate per quarter. Watts Bar 1's performance included three quarters with no forced outages, one quarter with a 1 percent forced outage rate, one quarter with a 2 percent forced outage rate, and one quarter with an 18 percent forced outage rate.
- **Equipment Forced Outages** The industry quarterly average for this indicator was approximately 0.2 equipment forced outages per 1,000 commercial critical hours. Watts Bar 1's performance included four quarters with no outages resulting from equipment problems, one quarter with a rate of 1.5 outages per 1,000 commercial critical hours, and one quarter with a rate of 1.65 outages per 1,000 commercial critical hours.

Also, a review of performance indicator criteria addressed Collective Radiation Exposure, which is the total radiation dose accumulated by unit personnel. The industry average for this indicator was less than 50 person-rem per quarter. The performance of Watts Bar 1 was only reported in the *Performance Indicators for Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors* (NRC 1998b) for two quarters with values of 3 person-rem per quarter.

### **6.5.2.2 Environmental, Safety & Health (Nonnuclear) Performance**

#### **Occupational Safety and Health Act Compliance/Worker Safety Performance**

As noted in TVA's summary of its Occupational Safety and Health Act performance indicators for the period from 1992 through mid-1997 (TVA 1997e), both the recordable injury rate and the lost-time injury rate are below the rates reported by the industry in general and specifically for the electric industry. This reflects performance from 1992 to 1995, when Watts Bar 1 was completing construction, system testing, and related startup activities. Similarly, 1996 to mid-1997 was a period in which facility staff were transitioning from a construction phase to a power generation phase (i.e., reactor and operating systems were energized and potentially radioactive, and discipline in all phases of facility operations was critical).

#### **Environmental Performance**

As noted in their submittal (TVA 1997e), Watts Bar 1 had no Notices of Violation from 1992 through 1994, only one in 1995, and again one in 1996. None were received in the first seven months of 1997. The 1995 and 1996 Notices of Violation involved the following violations:

- 1995 Notice of Violation - Auxiliary boiler operating hours exceeded limit in air permit
- 1996 Notice of Violation - Unmonitored release from yard pond in sewage treatment plant effluent stream

### **6.5.3 Sequoyah 1 and Sequoyah 2**

#### **6.5.3.1 NRC Performance**

##### **NRC Overview**

Sequoyah 1 and 2 initially achieved commercial operation in July 1981 and June 1982, respectively. The regulatory history of these plants includes the following:

- In 1985, TVA voluntarily shut down five reactors (including Sequoyah 1 and 2) because of charges of mismanagement and inattention to safety requirements. Sequoyah 2 was the first of the shut-down units to be returned to operation in mid-1988 (TVA 1997e).
- The NRC added the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant to its "watch list" as a result of the 1985 shutdown. (The NRC's Watch List identifies power plants that require additional regulatory oversight because of declining performance. Once placed on the "watch list," a plant must demonstrate consistent improved performance before it is removed from the list.) Both Sequoyah 1 and Sequoyah 2 were removed from this list in 1989 (TVA 1997e).
- A reactor trip (i.e., automatic reactor shutdown) at Sequoyah 1 in March 1993 identified a problem with piping that resulted in the shutdown of both units. Sequoyah 2 was restarted in October 1993, and Sequoyah 1 was restarted after completion of a refueling outage.

##### **Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Evaluations**

A review of the most recent evaluations was conducted to determine the facility's current regulatory stature, as described in the NRC's Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance inspections (NRC 1995a, NRC 1996b). As summarized in Table 6-2, the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant has an average Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance score of around 2.0. These scores and the associated assessments by the NRC characterized the overall performance of Sequoyah 1 and 2 as "good."

**Table 6-2 Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance Results for the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant**

<i>Review Period</i>	<i>Plant Operations</i>	<i>Maintenance</i>	<i>Engineering</i>	<i>Plant Support</i>
August 1992 to October 1993	3	3	2	1
October 1993 to January 1995	2	2	2	2
January 1995 to July 1996	2	2	2	2
July 1996 to February 1998	2	2	2	1

As noted in the Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance reports, the NRC has acknowledged that progress and improvements have been made in many areas. However, additional improvements are warranted and expected in the remaining areas. Two examples of the NRC's comments in the recent Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance reports are provided below.

The February 1995 Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance reports for October 1993 to January 1995 (NRC 1995a) summarized the NRC's findings as:

"Performance improved in the Operations and Maintenance functional areas, and remained the same in the Engineering functional area. However, emerging problems and operational occurrences continued to require reactive organizational responses. Performance declined in the Plant Support functional area due to weaknesses in corrective actions for long-standing problems in the fire protection, secondary chemistry, and post-accident sampling system areas." (NRC 1995a)

The September 1996 Systematic Assessments of Licensee Performance report (for January 1995 to July 1996) summarized its findings as:

"Plant performance was characterized by an excessive number of reactor trips and transients early in the assessment period....Operations performance continued to be good in plant transient response, safety sensitivity, and problem identification. Improvement was noted in shutdown operations and personnel error reduction. Weak areas were found in root cause evaluations and controls for infrequently performed evolutions." (NRC 1996b)

The April 1998 Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance report (for July 1996 through February 1998) summarized its findings as:

"Performance in the plant support area improved to superior, and performance in maintenance, plant operations, and engineering areas was still characterized as good. The plant operated well during the last six months of the assessment period. However, it is unclear whether this positive performance indicates a consistent trend towards improved performance.

The performance from a safety assessment and quality assurance perspective was mixed. Quality Assurance assessments were generally considered good, as were self-assessments in maintenance and most plant support areas. However, the ability to conduct meaningful self-assessments in all areas was not demonstrated, nor was the identification of root causes and resulting corrective action universally effective." (NRC 1998c)

## **NRC Notices of Violation and Enforcement Actions**

TVA's compliance information on Sequoyah 1 and 2 identifies the following NRC Notices of Violation issued since 1993 (TVA 1997e, NRC 1998e):

- 1993 - 4 Level III and 26 Level IV violations
- 1994 - 29 Level IV violations
- 1995 - 14 Level IV violations
- 1996 - 14 Level IV violations
- 1997 - 4 Level III violations with civil penalties of \$80,000 (this penalty was withdrawn in April 1998) and 18 Level IV violations [These were the first violations to include civil penalties since 1993, according to the TVA data.]

The NRC Notices of Violation were found in all four levels of violation dating back to 1988; since 1992 the Notices of Violation have only been at the Level III and Level IV categories.

The Level IV violations were found to fit in the following categories as stated: lack of maintenance and operating procedures, poor management, improper installation of safety controlled instrumentation, and failure to follow code. The overview of all Notices of Violation at this level fit into two classifications: a lack of management control and procedural interpretation.

The Level III violations were for failure to comply with technical specification requirements, for example: inoperation of mechanical mechanisms, mispositioned safety-system throttle valves, failure to maintain the refueling water storage tank solution temperature, and loss of reactor coolant pump seal injection flow during recovery. The Level III Notices of Violation fit into two classifications: a lack of operation of safety-related devices and failure to maintain system operations guidelines.

Sequoyah received Level I and Level II Notices of Violation that proposed imposition of civil penalties regarding alleged acts of discrimination against employees for engaging in certain protected activities in violation of 10 CFR 50.7. These Notices of Violation resulted in the imposition of a civil penalty in the amount of \$200,000. Payment of this civil penalty was made on January 26, 1994. On January 21, 1997, Sequoyah received a Level I violation and \$100,000 civil penalty for alleged acts of discrimination against an employee engaging in certain protected activities in violation of 10 CFR 50.7.

## **Performance Indicators**

*Performance Indicators for Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors* (NRC 1998b) presents performance indicator information for Sequoyah 1 and 2 using a peer group defined as "Westinghouse New 3- and 4-Loop Plants." The data presented in *Performance Indicators for Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors* (NRC 1998b) was reviewed for the six (of eight) performance indicators that address operational activities. The following data characterizes Sequoyah 1 and 2 performance during the period from the fourth quarter of 1994 through the third quarter of 1997 in these categories:

- *Automatic Scrams While Critical* [An automatic scram is a reactor shutdown that has been initiated by the plant's safety systems.] The industry average for this indicator was less than 0.19 scrams per quarter. The performance of Sequoyah 1 and 2 reflected an average of 0.3 scrams per quarter.
- *Safety System Actuations* The industry average for this indicator was approximately 0 actuations per quarter. The performance of Sequoyah 1 and 2 reflected an average of 0.17 actuations per quarter.

- **Significant Events** The industry average for this indicator was approximately 0 significant events per quarter, while the performance of Sequoyah 1 and 2 reflected 1 significant event each during the reporting period for an average of 0.08 events per quarter.
- **Safety System Failures** The industry average for this indicator was less than one failure per quarter. The performance of Sequoyah 1 and 2 reflected 1 safety system failure for Sequoyah 1 and 0 failures for Sequoyah 2 during the 12-month reporting period.
- **Forced Outage Rate** The industry average for this indicator was less than a 20 percent forced outage rate per quarter. The performance of Sequoyah 1 reflected 1 quarter with a forced outage rate of 26 percent and the remaining 11 quarters reflected a forced outage rate of 10 percent or less, with 4 quarters having an outage rate of 0. The performance of Sequoyah 2 reflected 2 quarters with forced outage rates that exceeded the industry rate and the remaining 10 quarters reflected a forced outage rate of 4 percent or less, with six quarters having an outage rate of 0.
- **Equipment Forced Outages** The industry quarterly average for this indicator was approximately 0.3 equipment forced outages per 1,000 commercial critical hours. The performance of Sequoyah 1 included six quarters with forced outage rates caused by equipment problems that exceeded the industry rate and the remaining six quarters with a forced outage rate of 0. Sequoyah 2 performance included five quarters with forced outage rates that exceeded the industry rate and the remaining seven quarters with a forced outage rate of 0.

Also, a review of performance indicator criteria addressed Collective Radiation Exposure. The industry average for this indicator was less than 50 person-rem per quarter. The performance of Sequoyah 1 reflects four quarters with quarterly radiation exposures that exceeded the industry rate (with a peak of 165 person-rem), and the remaining seven quarters reflected exposures of 3 to 17 person-rem per quarter. The performance of Sequoyah 2 reflects two quarters with quarterly radiation exposures that exceeded the industry rate (with a peak of 213 person-rem) and the remaining nine quarters reflected exposures of 2 to 17 person-rem per quarter.

#### **6.5.3.2 Environmental, Safety & Health (Nonnuclear) Performance**

##### **Occupational Safety and Health Act Compliance/Worker Safety Performance**

As noted in TVA's summary of its Occupational Safety and Health Act performance indicators for 1992 through mid-1997 (TVA 1998a), both the Recordable Injury Rate and the Lost-Time Injury Rate were below the rates reported by industry in general and the electric industry in particular.

##### **Environmental Performance**

Sequoyah 1 and 2 had a total of three Notices of Violation issued by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation from 1992 through 1997 (TVA 1997e). These notices involved the following violations:

- 1992 Notice of Violation - Subsurface release of fuel oil
- 1993 Notice of Violation - Storage of mixed waste (i.e., waste with radioactive and hazardous constituents) on site for over 90 days without a permit
- 1995 Notice of Violation - Failure to notify regulator of a waste stream that had existed since 1991

## **6.5.4 Bellefonte 1 and Bellefonte 2**

### **6.5.4.1 Performance**

#### **NRC Overview**

As noted earlier, the Bellefonte Nuclear Power Plant includes two partially completed reactor units. Construction was halted in 1988 when Bellefonte 1 was 90 percent complete and Bellefonte 2 was 57 percent complete. As a result, the regulatory history is limited. As noted in the TVA submittal, Bellefonte 1 and 2 had received no Notices of Violation since 1989 and have had no escalated enforcement actions, fines, or penalties during their construction history (TVA 1997e).

### **6.5.4.2 Environmental, Safety & Health (Nonnuclear) Performance**

#### **Occupational Safety and Health Act Compliance/Worker Safety Performance**

As noted in TVA's summary of its Occupational Safety and Health Act performance indicators for the period from 1992 through mid-1997, the Recordable Injury Rate was below the rates reported by industry in general and the electric industry in particular. The data also indicates that the Lost-Time Injury Rate was 0 for the same period, which is obviously well below the rates reported by industry in general and the electric industry in particular (TVA 1997e).

#### **Environmental Performance**

As noted in their submittal (TVA 1997e), Bellefonte 1 and 2 had one Notice of Violation, a fuel oil spill, issued by the Alabama Department of Environment and Conservation in 1993.



# **Chapter 7**

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# **Chapter 8**

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**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: SPENT FUEL STORAGE, TECHNICAL OVERVIEW**

---

**Education:** M.S., Nuclear Engineering, Pennsylvania State University  
B.S., Mechanical Engineering, The Cooper Union

***Experience/***

***Technical Specialty:*** Twenty-two years. Safety analysis, nuclear power plant design, operations, foreign nuclear power plant system analysis, and spent nuclear fuel dry storage safety analysis.

**STEVE MIXON, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION**

**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION ISSUES, TECHNICAL EDITING**

---

**Education:** B.S., Communications, University of Tennessee

***Experience/***

***Technical Specialty:*** Ten years. Technical writing and editing.

**MATTHEW RAGER, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION**

**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: NUCLEAR ENGINEERING, DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING**

---

**Education:** B.S., Nuclear Engineering, Purdue University

***Experience/***

***Technical Specialty:*** Eighteen years. NRC licensing, reactor decontamination and decommissioning evaluations, safety analysis assessments, regulatory reviews, and reactor safety.

**JEFFREY J. RIKHOFF, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION**

**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: TECHNICAL INFORMATION COORDINATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES**

---

**Education:** M.R.P., Regional Planning, University of Pennsylvania  
M.S., International Economic Development and Appropriate Technology, University of Pennsylvania  
B.A., English, DePauw University

***Experience/***

***Technical Specialty:*** Twelve years. NEPA compliance, regulatory compliance and permitting, socioeconomics, environmental justice, comprehensive land-use and development planning, and cultural resources.

**CARL A. SNYDER, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION**

**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS**

---

**Education:** B.S., Nuclear Engineering, University of Maryland  
B.S., Mathematics, University of Maryland

***Experience/***

**Technical Specialty:** Six years. Nuclear safety, nuclear criticality, thermal hydraulics, licensing, accident analysis, and dose consequences.

**BARRY SULLIVAN, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION**

**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW**

---

**Education:** M.B.A., Hofstra University  
B.S., Electrical Engineering, Rutgers University

***Experience/***

**Technical Specialty:** Thirty-six years. Radiological impact assessments, safety analysis, facility accident analysis, risk-consequence analysis, and design review.

**KATHERINE VON WALD, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION**

**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: TECHNICAL EDITING, PROJECT COORDINATION**

---

**Education:** B.G.S., General Studies, University of Maryland

***Experience/***

**Technical Specialty:** Fifteen years. Emergency management and training and technical writing and editing.

**GILBERT H. WALDMAN, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION**

**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS**

---

**Education:** M.S., Engineering Candidate, Technical Management, Johns Hopkins University  
B.S., Nuclear Engineering, University of Florida

***Experience/***

**Technical Specialty:** Seven years. Radiological impacts analysis, radiological dose modeling, and radiological risk assessments.

**ROBERT H. WERTH, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION**

**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: NONRADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS**

---

**Education:** B.A., Physics, Gordon College

***Experience/***

**Technical Specialty:** Twenty-four years. Acoustics and air quality analysis, regulatory reviews, and NEPA documentation.

**JOHN W. WILLIAMS, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION**

**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE**

---

**Education:** Ph.D., Physics, New Mexico State University  
M.S., Physics, New Mexico State University  
B.S., Mathematics, North Texas State University

***Experience/***

**Technical Specialty:** Twenty-three years. NEPA compliance, electromagnetic models, air quality modeling, and ionizing radiation impacts and safety.

**KEVIN D. SEAGER, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES**

**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: TRANSPORTATION ANALYSIS**

---

**Education:** Ph.D., Nuclear Engineering, Texas A&M University  
M.S., Nuclear Engineering, Texas A&M University  
B.S., Nuclear Engineering, Texas A&M University

***Experience/***

**Technical Specialty:** Eight years. Transportation risk analysis, containment, shielding, and criticality.

**GREG ASKEW, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY**

**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: AGENCY NEPA COMPLIANCE**

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**Education:** M.S., Mechanical Engineering, Tennessee Technological University  
M.S., Environmental Engineering, University of Tennessee  
B.S., Mechanical Engineering, Tennessee Technological University

***Experience/***

**Technical Specialty:** Twenty-four years. NEPA compliance, environmental systems, thermal analysis, and engineering design.

**ROY V. CARTER, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY**

**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: PROJECT MANAGEMENT, NEPA REVIEWS, AIR QUALITY**

---

**Education:** M.S.E., Environmental Engineering, West Virginia University  
B.S.C.E., Civil Engineering, West Virginia University  
B.S., Biology, Morehead State University

***Experience/***

**Technical Specialty:** Twenty-nine years. Project engineering, air pollution control and engineering, air quality monitoring, environmental assessments, and site analysis.

**JIM CHARDOS, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY**

**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: TVA PROJECT MANAGER**

---

**Education:** M.B.A., Rutgers University  
B.S., Physics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

***Experience/***

**Technical Specialty:** Thirty-four years. Nuclear physics, reactor safety, and reactor operations.

**JAMES H. EBLEN, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY**

***EIS RESPONSIBILITIES:* SOCIOECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE**

---

***Education:*** Ph.D., Economics, University of Tennessee  
B.S., Business Administration, University of Tennessee

***Experience/***

***Technical Specialty:*** Thirty-two years. Socioeconomic impact analysis, economic accounting and indicators, regional economic development, minority economic development, and economic and demographic projections.

**BETSY EIFORD-LEE, WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY**

***EIS RESPONSIBILITIES:* TECHNICAL REVIEW OF RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE AND DOSE**

---

***Education:*** M.S., Health Physics, Georgia Institute of Technology  
B.S., Physics, Rhodes College

***Experience/***

***Technical Specialty:*** Fifteen years. Routine effluent and emergency dose assessments on both the site and corporate level, radioactive effluent monitoring and evaluation, development and maintenance of offsite dose calculation manuals for all TVA sites, safety analysis preparation, and EIS support for radioactive release analyses.

**JOHN J. JENKINSON, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY**

***EIS RESPONSIBILITIES:* REVIEWER, MUSSELS AND CLAMS, ENDANGERED SPECIES**

---

***Education:*** Ph.D., Zoology, Ohio State University

***Experience/***

***Technical Specialty:*** Twenty-five years. Mussel surveys, aquatic impact assessments, Endangered Species Act, and NEPA.

**DON LOKEY, ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY**

***EIS RESPONSIBILITIES:* NONRADIOLOGICAL AIR EMISSION INVENTORY, REVIEW OF EIS AIR QUALITY SECTIONS**

---

***Education:*** M.ChE., Auburn University  
B.ChE., Auburn University

***Experience/***

***Technical Specialty:*** Twenty-three years. Air pollution control technology review, air emission estimates, and regulatory reviews.

**CHARLES P. NICHOLSON, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY**

**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES TECHNICAL OVERVIEW**

**Education:** Ph.D. Candidate, Ecology, University of Tennessee  
M.S., Wildlife Ecology, University of Maine  
B.S., Wildlife and Fisheries Science, University of Tennessee

***Experience/***

**Technical Specialty:** Twenty years. Endangered Species Act compliance, NEPA reviews and compliance, and wildlife and endangered species management and assessment.

**JAMES F. WILLIAMSON, JR., LAND MANAGEMENT, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY**

**EIS RESPONSIBILITIES: COORDINATION OF INPUT FROM LAND MANAGEMENT TECHNICAL STAFF**

**Education:** Ph.D., Fisheries and Wildlife Sciences, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University  
M.S., Wildlife Ecology, Mississippi State University  
B.S., General Science/Zoology, Mississippi State University

***Experience/***

**Technical Specialty:** Eight years. NEPA document preparation, and forest mensuration and modeling of forest-wildlife relationships.

**CHARLES L. WILSON, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY**

**NUCLEAR TECHNICAL REVIEW AND PROJECT NUCLEAR COORDINATION**

**Education:** M.S., Nuclear Engineering, University of Michigan  
B.S., Electrical Engineering, University of Michigan

***Experience/***

**Technical Specialty:** Thirty years. Nuclear safety, operations and maintenance, regulatory compliance, industry experience, and plant events analysis.

# **Chapter 9**

## **Distribution List**

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## 9. DISTRIBUTION LIST

This chapter lists agencies, organizations, and persons who received the *Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor or the Summary*.

### U.S. House of Representatives

Robert Aderholt (R-Alabama)  
"Bud" Robert Cramer (D-Alabama)  
Jack Kingston (R-Georgia)  
Charles Norwood (R-Georgia)  
Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina)  
Floyd Spence (R-South Carolina)  
John M. Spratt, Jr. (D-South Carolina)  
John J. Duncan, Jr., (R-Tennessee)  
Bart Gordon (D-Tennessee)  
Van Hilleary (R-Tennessee)  
Zach Wamp (R-Tennessee)

### U.S. Senate

Jeff Sessions (R-Alabama)  
Richard C. Shelby (R-Alabama)  
Max Cleland (D-Georgia)  
Paul Coverdell (R-Georgia)  
Ernest F. Hollings (D-South Carolina)  
Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina)  
Bill Frist (R-Tennessee)  
Fred Thompson (R-Tennessee)

### Congressional Staffers

Joey Ceci, Huntsville, Alabama (*Office of Congressman Bud Cramer*)  
Gerry Gilligan, Huntsville, Alabama (*Office of Senator Jeff Sessions*)  
Paul Chapman, Morristown, Tennessee (*Office of Congressman Van Hilleary*)  
Ann Cook, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (*Office of Congressman Zach Wamp*)  
Madelyn Creedon, Washington, DC (*Minority Counsel, Senate Armed Services Committee*)  
Bart Gobeil, Savannah, Georgia (*Office of Senator Paul Coverdell*)  
Carolyn Jensen, Knoxville, Tennessee (*Office of Senator Bill Frist*)  
Dean Rice, Knoxville, Tennessee (*Office of Senator Fred Thompson*)  
Jeff McKenzie, Knoxville, Tennessee (*Office of Congressman John J. Duncan, Jr.*)



## **Federal Government**

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Council on Environmental Quality  
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board  
Department of Agriculture  
Department of Commerce  
Department of Defense  
Department of Health and Human Services  
Department of Housing and Urban Development  
Department of Interior  
Department of Justice  
Department of Labor  
Department of State  
Department of Transportation  
Environmental Protection Agency  
Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy  
Federal Communications Commission  
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission  
Federal Highway Administration  
Federal Trade Commission  
General Services Administration  
Library of Congress  
National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Management and Budget  
US General Accounting Office  
US International Trade Commission

## **Local Government**

### **Mayors**

#### **Alabama:**

Dan Williams, Athens  
Charles Smith, Boaz  
Ray Janney, Bridgeport  
Phillip Anderson, Dutton  
Peaches Thompson, Gurley  
Elizabeth Haas, Hollywood  
Thomas Avans, Hytop  
Butch Vaught, Langston  
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J.W. Cain, Pleasant Grove  
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Ted Murray, Phil Campbell  
Louis Price, Scottsboro

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**Georgia:**

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Robert Know, Thomson  
Martin Dolin, Waynesboro

**South Carolina:**

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Robbie Dix, Allendale  
Alton McCollum, Bamberg  
Edward Lemon, Barnwell  
David M. Taub, Beaufort  
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Carolyn Davis, Denmark  
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John Rhoden, Jr., Hampton  
Thomas Peeples, Hilton Head Island  
Paul K. Greene, Jackson  
Paul Parker, New Ellenton  
Lark Jones, North Augusta  
Elbert T. Moore, Snelling  
Thomas R. Rivers, Williston

**Tennessee:**

Lawrence Roseberry, Athens  
Charles Burger, Calhoun  
Jon Kinsey, Chattanooga  
Tom Rowland, Cleveland  
Sam Swafford, Dayton  
Garland Carpenter, Decatur  
Edward Simpson, Englewood  
Garland Evelyn, Erwin  
Joe E. Moates, Etowah  
Charles Elsea, Graysville  
Victor Ashe, Knoxville  
Effie Lones, Niota  
Walter Brown, Oak Ridge  
Bob Privett, Soddy Daisy  
R. Michael Swafford, Spring City  
Billy R. Ridenour, Sweetwater

## **Indian Tribal Representatives**

### **Alabama:**

Darla Graves, Indian Affairs, Montgomery  
Eddie Tullis, Parch Band of Creed Indians, Atmore

### **Idaho:**

Donna Powauke, The Nez Perce Tribe, Lapwai

### **North Carolina:**

Joyce Dugan, Eastern Band of the Cherokee, Cherokee

### **Oklahoma:**

Joe Byrd, Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, Tahlequah  
Bill Fife, Muscogee (Creek) Nation, Okmulgee

### **Oregon:**

J.R. Wilkinson, Confederate Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, Pendelton

### **South Carolina:**

Gilbert Blue, Catawba Indian Nation, Rock Hill

### **Tennessee:**

Luvenia Butler, Tennessee Commission on Indian Affairs Nashville  
Ray Emanuel, Native Indian Association, Nashville  
Dan Stadley, East Tennessee Indian League, Oak Ridge

### **Washington:**

John Evans, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Yakima Indian Nation, Poppenich  
Russell Jim, Confederate Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, Union Gap  
Leanora Seelarsce, Wanapum People, Ephrate

### **Washington, DC:**

JoAnn Chase, National Congress of American Indians, Washington, DC

## **NEPA State Point of Contacts**

James Setser, Atlanta, Georgia  
Omeagia Burgess, Columbia, South Carolina  
Justin Wilson, Nashville, Tennessee  
Earl Leming, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

## **State Government**

### **Alabama Governor:**

Don Siegelman, Montgomery

### **Alabama Representatives:**

Albert Hall, Gurley  
Ben Richardson, Scottsboro  
John Robinson, Scottsboro

**Alabama Senator:**  
Lowell Barron, Fyffe

**Georgia Governor:**  
Roy Barnes, Atlanta

**Georgia Representatives:**  
B. Joseph Brush, Appling  
Jack Connell, Augusta  
Henry Howard, Augusta  
Robin Williams, Augusta  
Sonny Dixon, Garden City  
George DeLoach, Hephzibah

**Georgia Senators:**  
Donald Cheeks, Atlanta  
Hugh Gillis, Sr., Atlanta  
Ben Harbin, Augusta  
Charles Walker, Augusta  
Eric Johnson, Savannah

**South Carolina Governor:**  
Jim Hodges, Columbia

**South Carolina Representatives:**  
William Clyburn, Aiken  
Irene Rudnick, Aiken  
Wilbur Cave, Allendale  
T. Scott Beck, N. Augusta  
Edith Rodgers, Beaufort  
William Bowers, Brunson  
Thomas Rhoad, Columbia  
James Smith Jr., Columbia  
Victoria Mullen, Hilton Head Island  
Clementa Pinckney, Ridgeland  
Molly Spearman, Saluda  
Charles Sharpe, Wagener  
J. Roland Smith, Warrentonville

**South Carolina Senators:**  
Holly Cork, Beaufort  
Thomas Moore, Clearwater  
Phil Leventis, Columbia  
John Matthews, Jr., Columbia  
W. Greg Ryberg, Columbia  
Addison Wilson, Columbia

**Tennessee Governor:**  
Don Sunquist, Nashville

**Tennessee Representatives:**

Tommie Brown, Nashville  
Bill McAfee, Nashville  
Robert Patton, Nashville  
Jack Sharp, Nashville  
Arnold Stulce, Nashville  
Brenda Turner, Nashville  
Raymond Walker, Nashville  
Bobby Wood, Nashville

**Tennessee Senators:**

D.E. Crowe, II, Johnson City  
Ward Crutchfield, Nashville  
Gene Elsea, Nashville  
David Fowler, Nashville  
Robin Holland, Nashville

**General Public/Stakeholders**

Approximately 700 copies of the Final EIS were sent to stakeholders

Approximately 2800 copies of the Summary of the Final EIS were sent to stakeholders

# **Chapter 10**

## **Glossary**

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## 10. GLOSSARY

**Accident Sequence** — With regard to nuclear facilities, an initiating event followed by system failures or operator errors, which can result in significant core damage, confinement system failure, and/or radionuclide releases.

**Activation Products** — Nuclei, usually radioactive, formed by the bombardment and absorption of material with neutrons, protons, or other nuclear particles.

**Acute Exposure** — The exposure incurred during and shortly after a radiological release. Generally, the period of acute exposure ends when long-term interdiction is established, as necessary. The period of acute exposure is generally assumed to end 1 week after the inception of a radiological accident.

**Air Pollutant** — Any substance in the air which could, if in a high-enough concentration, harm man, animals, vegetation, or material.

**Air Quality Control Region** — Geographic subdivisions of the United States, designed to deal with pollution on a regional or local level. Some regions span more than one state.

**Alpha Activity** — The emission of alpha particles by radioactive materials.

**Alpha Particle** — A positively charged particle, consisting of two protons and two neutrons, that is emitted during radioactive decay from the nucleus of certain nuclides. It is the least penetrating of the three common types of radiation (alpha, beta, and gamma).

**Alpha Wastes** — Wastes containing radioactive isotopes that decay by producing alpha particles.

**Ambient** — Surrounding.

**Ambient Air** — The surrounding atmosphere as it exists around people, plants, and structures. Air quality standards are used to provide a measure of the health-related and visual characteristics of the air.

**Ambient Air Quality Standards** — The level of pollutants in the air prescribed by regulations that may not be exceeded during a specified time in a defined area.

**Aquatic** — Living or growing in, on, or near water.

**Aquatic Biota** — The sum total of living organisms within any designated aquatic area.

**Aquatic Macrophytes** — Visible plants occurring in water.

**Aquifer** — A saturated geologic unit through which significant quantities of water can migrate under natural hydraulic gradients.

**Archaic** — Artifacts from the North American archaeological period dating from 8000 B.C. to 1000 B.C.

**Archaeological Sites (resources)** — Any location where humans have altered the terrain or discarded artifacts during either prehistoric or historic times.

**Artifact** — An object produced or shaped by human workmanship of archaeological or historical interest.

**As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)** — A concept applied to ensure the quantity of radioactivity released to the environment and the radiation exposure of onsite workers in routine operations, including "anticipated operational occurrences," is maintained as low as reasonably achievable. It takes into account the state of technology, economics of improvements in relation to benefits to public health and safety, and other societal and economic considerations in relation to the use of nuclear energy in the public interest.

**Atmospheric Dispersion** — The process of air pollutants being dispersed in the atmosphere. This occurs by the wind that carries the pollutants away from their source, and by turbulent air motion that results from solar heating of the Earth's surface and air movement over rough terrain and surfaces.

**Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended** — The statute that established U.S. requirements with respect to nuclear energy and nuclear materials. This Act, as amended, provides the statutory framework for government control of the possession, use, and production of atomic energy, special nuclear material, and other radioactive material, whether owned by the government or others.

**Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)** — A five-member commission, established by the *Atomic Energy Act* of 1946, to supervise nuclear weapons design, development, manufacturing, maintenance, modification, and dismantlement. In 1974, the Atomic Energy Commission was abolished and all functions were transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration. The Energy Research and Development Administration was later terminated and its functions, vested by law in the Administrator, were transferred to the Secretary of Energy.

**Background Radiation** — Ionizing radiation present in the environment from cosmic rays and natural sources in the Earth; background radiation varies considerably with location.

**Badged Worker** — A worker who has the potential to be exposed to radiation and is equipped with a dosimeter to measure his/her dose.

**Barrier** — Any material or structure that prevents or substantially delays movement of radionuclides toward the accessible environment.

**Baseline** — A quantitative expression of conditions, costs, schedule, or technical progress to serve as a base or standard for measurement during the performance of an effort; the established plan against which the status of resources and progress of a project can be measured. For this environmental impact statement, the environmental baseline is the site environmental conditions as they exist or have been estimated to exist in the absence of the proposed action.

**BEIR V** — Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation; referring to the fifth in a series of committee reports from the National Research Council.

**Benthic** — Plants and animals dwelling at the bottom of oceans, lakes, rivers, and other surface waters.

**Beta Particle** — A charged particle emitted from the nucleus of an atom during radioactive decay. A negatively charged beta particle is identical to an electron; a positively charged beta particle is called a "positron."



**Biodiversity** — The diversity of life in all its forms and all its levels of organization. Also termed “biological diversity.”

**Biota (biotic)** — The plant and animal life of a region (pertaining to biota).

**Block** — U.S. Bureau of the Census term describing small areas bounded on all sides by visible features or political boundaries; used in tabulation of census data.

**Block Groups** — U.S. Bureau of the Census term describing a cluster of blocks generally selected to include 250 to 550 housing units.

**Blowdown** — A maintenance procedure to remove sediment in power plant components.

**Boiler** — A pressurized system in which water is vaporized to steam, the desired end product, by heat transferred from a source of higher temperature, usually the products of combustion from burning fuels.

**Boiling Water Reactor** — A type of nuclear reactor that uses fission heat to generate steam in the reactor core or vessel to drive turbines and generate electricity.

**Boost** — The process by which fusion of deuterium-tritium gas inside the pit of a nuclear weapon produces neutrons that increase the fission output of the primary.

**Boron-10** — An isotope of the element boron that has a high-capture cross-section for neutrons. It is used in reactor absorber rods for reactor control.

**Burial Ground** — With regard to radioactive wastes, a place for burying unwanted (i.e., radioactive) materials in which the earth acts as a receptacle to prevent the escape of radiation and the dispersion of wastes in the environment.

**Burnable Absorber** — A material, such as boron or lithium, that captures neutrons and transmutes or changes to another isotope.

**Burnable Poison Rod** — A nuclear reactor rod used to capture or absorb neutrons created in the core by the fission reactions during the early core life.

**Cancer** — The name given to a group of diseases characterized by uncontrolled cellular growth with cells having invasive characteristics such that the disease can transfer from one organ to another.

**Capable Fault** — A fault that has exhibited one or more of the following characteristics:

- (1) Movement at or near the ground surface at least once within the past 35,000 years or movement of a recurring nature within the past 500,000 years.
- (2) Macro-seismicity instrumentally determined with records of sufficient precision to demonstrate a direct relationship with the fault.
- (3) A structural relationship to a capable fault according to characteristics (1) or (2) of this paragraph such that movement on one could be reasonably expected to be accompanied by movement on the other.

**Capacity Factor** — The ratio of the annual average power production of a power plant to its rated capacity.

**Carbon Dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>)** — A colorless, odorless gas that is a normal component of the ambient air; it results from fossil fuel combustion and is an expiration product.

**Carboniferous Age** — Noting or pertaining to a period of the Paleozoic era, including the Pennsylvanian, Mississippian, and formerly the Permian periods as epochs: from 270 million to 350 million years ago.

**Carbon Monoxide (CO)** — A colorless, odorless, poisonous gas produced by incomplete fossil fuel combustion.

**Cask** — A heavily shielded container that meets U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Department of Transportation regulatory requirements and is used to store and/or ship radioactive materials (i.e., spent nuclear fuel, irradiated tritium-producing burnable absorber rods, or high-level waste). Lead, depleted uranium, and steel are common materials used in the manufacture of casks.

**Cesium** — A silver-white alkali metal. A radioactive isotope of cesium, cesium-137, is a common fission product.

**Chain Reaction** — A reaction that initiates its own repetition. In a fission chain reaction, a fissionable nucleus absorbs a neutron and fissions spontaneously, releasing additional neutrons. These, in turn, can be absorbed by other fissionable nuclei, releasing still more neutrons. A fission chain reaction is self-sustaining when the number of neutrons is constant or increases over a period of time.

**Chemical Oxygen Demand** — A measure of the quantity of chemically oxidizable components present in water.

**Chronic Exposure** — Low-level radiation exposure incurred over a long time period due to residual contamination.

**Cladding** — The metal tube that forms the outer jacket of a nuclear fuel rod or burnable absorber rod. It prevents the release of radioactive material into the coolant. Stainless steel and zirconium alloys are common cladding materials.

**Class I Areas** — National parks and wilderness areas designated by the Prevention of Significant Deterioration section of the Clean Air Act amendments. These amendments and the implementing regulations provide special protection to air quality and air quality-related values in such areas. Only very slight deterioration of air quality is allowed in Class I areas.

**Class II Areas** — Most of the country not designated as Class I is designated as Class II. Class II areas are generally cleaner than air quality standards require and moderate increases in new pollution are allowed after a regulatory-mandated impacts review.

**Claystone** — A massive sedimentary rock made up largely of clay minerals having the composition of shale, but lacking its fine lamination.

**Clean Air Act** — This Act mandates and provides for enforcement of regulations to control air pollution from various sources.

**Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990** — Expands the Environmental Protection Agency's enforcement powers and adds restrictions on air toxics, ozone-depleting chemicals, stationary and mobile emissions sources, and emissions implicated in rain and global warming.

**Clean Water Act of 1972, 1987** — This Act regulates the discharge of pollutants from a point source into navigable waters of the United States in compliance with a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit, as well as discharges to or dredging of wetlands.

**Climatology** — The science that deals with climates and investigates their phenomena and causes.

**Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)** — All Federal regulations in force are published in codified form in the Code of Federal Regulations.

**Cold Standby** — Maintenance of a protected reactor condition in which the fuel is removed, the moderator is stored in tanks, and equipment and system lay-up is performed to prevent deterioration, such that future refueling and restart are possible.

**Collective Committed Effective Dose Equivalent** — The committed effective dose equivalent of radiation for a population.

**Commercial Light Water Reactor (CLWR)** — A term used to describe commercially operated power-producing U.S. reactors that use "light" (as opposed to "heavy") water for cooling and neutron moderation.

**Committed Dose Equivalent** — The predicted total dose equivalent to a tissue or organ over a 50-year period after an intake of a radionuclide into the body. It does not include external dose contributions. Committed dose equivalent is expressed in units of rem or Sievert. The committed effective dose equivalent is the sum of the committed dose equivalents to various tissues of the body, each multiplied by the appropriate weighting factor.

**Community (biotic)** — All plants and animals occupying a specific area under relatively similar conditions.

**Complex** — The Nuclear Weapons Complex, which is a set of Federal sites and government-owned/contractor-operated facilities administered by the U.S. Department of Energy.

**Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty** — A proposed treaty prohibiting nuclear tests of all magnitudes.

**Computational Modeling** — The use of a computer to develop a mathematical model of a complex system or process and to provide conditions for testing it.

**Conformity** — Conformity is defined in the Clean Air Act as the action's compliance with an implementation plan's purpose of eliminating or reducing the severity and number of violations of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards and achieving expeditious attainment of such standards; and that such activities will not: (1) cause or contribute to any new violation of any standard in any area; (2) increase the frequency or severity of any existing violation of any standard in any area; or (3) delay timely attainment of any standard or any required interim emission reduction or other milestones in any area.

**Consumptive Water Use** — The difference in the volume of water withdrawn from a body of water and the amount released back into the body of water.

**Container** — With regard to radioactive wastes, the metal envelope in the waste package that provides the primary containment function of the waste package and is designed to meet the containment requirements of 10 CFR 60.

**Containment Design-Basis** — For a nuclear reactor, those bounding conditions for the design of the containment, including temperature, pressure, and leakage rate. Because the containment is provided as an

additional barrier to mitigate the consequences of accidents involving the release of radioactive materials, the containment design-basis may include an additional specified margin above those conditions expected to result from the plant design-basis accidents to ensure that the containment design can mitigate unlikely or unforeseen events.

**Control Rod** — A rod containing material such as boron that is used to control the power of a nuclear reactor. By absorbing excess neutrons, a control rod prevents the neutrons from causing further fissions; i.e., increasing power.

**Coolant** — A substance, either gas or liquid, circulated through a nuclear reactor or processing plant to remove heat.

**Cooperating Agency** — Any other Federal agency having jurisdiction or special expertise with respect to any environmental issue.

**Credible Accident** — An accident that has a probability of occurrence greater than or equal to one in a million years.

**Criteria Pollutants** — The Clean Air Act required the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to set air quality standards for common and widespread pollutants after preparing "criteria documents" summarizing scientific knowledge on their health effects. Today there are standards in effect for six "criteria pollutants": sulfur dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>), carbon monoxide (CO), particulate matter less than or equal to 10 microns in diameter (PM<sub>10</sub>) and less than or equal to 2.5 microns in diameter (PM<sub>2.5</sub>), nitrogen dioxide (NO<sub>2</sub>), ozone (O<sub>3</sub>), and lead (Pb).

**Critical Habitat** — Defined in the *Endangered Species Act* of 1973 as "specific areas within the geographical area occupied by [an endangered or threatened] species, essential to the conservation of the species and which may require special management considerations or protection; and specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species that are essential for the conservation of the species."

**Criticality** — A reactor state in which a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction is achieved.

**Cultural Resources** — Archaeological sites, historical sites, architectural features, traditional use areas, and Native American sacred sites.

**Cumulative Impacts** — In an environmental impact statement, the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions, regardless of what agency (Federal or nonfederal), private industry, or individual(s) undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time (40 CFR 1508.7).

**Curie (Ci)** — A unit of radioactivity equal to 37 billion disintegrations per second; also a quantity of any nuclide or mixture of nuclides having 1 Curie radioactivity.

**Day-Night Average Sound Level** — The 24-hour A-weighted equivalent sound level expressed in decibels, with a 10-decibel penalty added to sound levels between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. to account for increased annoyance due to noise during nighttime hours.

**Decay Heat (radioactivity)** — The heat produced by the decay of certain radionuclides.

**Decay (radioactive)** — The decrease in the amount of any radioactive material with the passage of time due to the spontaneous transformation of an unstable nuclide into a different nuclide or into a different energy state of the same nuclide; the emission of nuclear radiation (alpha, beta, or gamma radiation) is part of the process.

**Decibel (dB)** — A logarithmic unit of sound measurement which describes the magnitude of a particular quantity of sound pressure power with respect to a standard reference value. In general, a sound doubles in loudness for every increase of 10 decibels.

**Decibel, A-weighted (dBA)** — A unit of frequency weighted sound pressure level, measured by the use of a metering characteristic and the "A" weighting specified by the American National Standards Institution ANSI S1.4-1983 (R1594), that accounts for the frequency response of the human ear.

**Deciduous** — Trees which shed leaves at a certain season.

**Decontamination** — The actions taken to reduce or remove substances that pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment, such as radioactive or chemical contamination from facilities, equipment, or soils by washing, heating, chemical or electrochemical action, mechanical cleaning, or other techniques.

**Deposition** — In geology, the laying down of potential rock-forming materials; sedimentation. In atmospheric transport, the settling out on ground and building surfaces of atmospheric aerosols and particles ("dry deposition") or their removal from the air to the ground by precipitation ("wet deposition" or "rainout").

**Design-Basis** — For nuclear facilities, information that identifies the specific functions to be performed by a structure, system, or component and the specific values (or ranges of values) chosen for controlling parameters for reference bounds for design. These values may be: (1) restraints derived from generally accepted state-of-the-art practices for achieving functional goals; (2) requirements derived from analysis (based on calculation and/or experiments) of the effects of a postulated accident for which a structure, system, or component must meet its functional goals; or (3) requirements derived from Federal safety objectives, principles, goals, or requirements.

**Design-Basis Accident** — For nuclear facilities, a postulated abnormal event that is used to establish the performance requirements of structures, systems, and components that are necessary to: (1) maintain them in a safe shutdown condition indefinitely; or (2) prevent or mitigate the consequences of the design-basis accident so that the general public and operating staff are not exposed to radiation in excess of appropriate guideline values.

**Design-Basis Events** — Postulated disturbances in process variables that can potentially lead to design-basis accidents.

**Deuterium** — A nonradioactive isotope of the element hydrogen with one neutron and one proton in the atomic nucleus.

**Direct Economic Effects** — The initial increases in output from different sectors of the economy resulting from some new activity within a predefined geographic region.

**Direct Effect Multiplier** — The total change in regional earnings and employment in all related industries as a result of a one-dollar change in earnings and a one-job change in a given industry.

**Direct Jobs** — The number of workers required at a site to implement an alternative.

**Disposition** — The ultimate "fate" or end use of a surplus U.S. Department of Energy facility following the transfer of the facility to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.

**Dose** — The energy imparted to matter by ionizing radiation. The unit of absorbed dose is the rad.

**Dose Commitment** — The dose an organ or tissue would receive during a specified period of time (e.g., 50 to 100 years) as a result of intake (by ingestion or inhalation) of one or more radionuclides from a defined release, frequently over a year's time.

**Dose Equivalent** — The product of absorbed dose in rad (or Gray) and a quality factor, which quantifies the effect of this type of radiation in tissue. Dose equivalent is expressed in units of rem or Sievert, where 1 rem equals 0.01 Sievert.

**Dosimeter** — A small device (instrument) carried by a radiation worker that measures cumulative radiation dose (e.g., film badge or ionization chamber).

**Drift** — Effluent mist or spray carried into the atmosphere from cooling towers.

**Drinking Water Standards** — The level of constituents or characteristics in a drinking water supply specified in regulations under the Safe Drinking Water Act as the maximum permissible.

**Dual Use/Dual Benefit** — Projects that have uses in or benefits for the defense sector and the private industry or civilian sector.

**Effective Dose Equivalent** — The sum of the products of the dose equivalent received by specified tissues of the body and a tissue-specific weighting factor. This sum is a risk-equivalent value and can be used to estimate the health effects risk to the exposed individual. The tissue-specific weighting factor represents the fraction of the total health risk resulting from uniform whole-body irradiation that would be contributed by that particular tissue. The effective dose equivalent includes the committed effective dose equivalent from internal deposition of radionuclides, and the effective dose equivalent due to penetrating radiation from sources external to the body. Effective dose equivalent is expressed in units of rem or Sievert.

**Effluent** — A gas or fluid discharged into the environment.

**Effluent (liquid)** — Wastewater, treated or untreated, that flows out of a treatment plant, sewer, or industrial outfall; generally refers to wastes discharged into surface waters.

**Electromagnetic Fields** — Two types of energy fields which are emitted from any device that generates, transmits, or uses electricity.

**Emergency Condition** — For a nuclear facility, occurrences or accidents that might occur infrequently during startup testing or operation of the facility. Equipment, components, and structures might be deformed by these conditions to the extent that repair is required prior to reuse.

**Emission** — A material discharged into the atmosphere from a source operation or activity.

**Emission Standards** — Legally enforceable limits on the quantities and/or kinds of air contaminants that may be emitted into the atmosphere.

**Empirical** — Something that is based on actual measurement, observation, or experience rather than on theory.

**Endangered Species** — Any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or significant portions of its range. The Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended, establishes procedures for placing species on the Federal lists of endangered or threatened species.

**Endangered Species Act of 1973** — The Act requires Federal agencies, with the consultation and assistance of the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce, to ensure that their actions likely will not jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species or adversely affect the habitat of such species.

**Engineered Safety Features** — For a nuclear facility, features that prevent, limit, or mitigate the release of radioactive material from its primary containment.

**Enriched Uranium** — Uranium in which the abundance of the isotope uranium-235 is increased above the normal (naturally occurring) level of 0.711 weight percent.

**Entrainment** — The involuntary capture and inclusion of organisms in streams of flowing water; a term often applied to the cooling water systems of power plants/reactors. The organisms involved may include phyto- and zooplankton, fish eggs and larvae (ichthyoplankton), shellfish larvae, and other forms of aquatic life.

**Environment, Safety, and Health Program** — In the context of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), encompasses those DOE requirements, activities, and functions in the conduct of all DOE and DOE-controlled operations that are concerned with: impacts to the biosphere; compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and standards controlling air, water, and soil pollution; limiting the risks to the well-being of both the operating personnel and the general public; and protecting property against accidental loss or damage. Typical activities and functions related to this program include, but are not limited to, environmental protection, occupational safety, fire protection, industrial hygiene, health physics, occupational medicine, process and facilities safety, nuclear safety, emergency preparedness, quality assurance, and radioactive and hazardous waste management.

**Environmental Assessment** — A written environmental analysis prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act. This assessment is performed to determine whether a Federal action could significantly affect the environment and thus require preparation of a more detailed environmental impact statement. If the action will not significantly affect the environment, then a Finding of No Significant Impact is prepared.

**Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)** — A document required of Federal agencies by the National Environmental Policy Act for major proposals or legislation significantly affecting the environment. A tool for decisionmaking, it describes the positive and negative effects of the undertaking and alternative actions.

**Environmental Justice** — The fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, incomes, and educational levels with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment implies that no population of people should be forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of the negative environmental impacts of pollution or environmental hazards due to a lack of political or economic influence.

**Environmental Survey** — A documented, multidisciplinary assessment (with sampling and analysis) of a facility to determine environmental conditions and to identify environmental problems requiring corrective action.

**Epidemiology** — The science concerned with the study of events that determine and influence the frequency and distribution of disease, injury, and other health-related events and their causes in a defined human population.

**Equivalent Sound (Pressure) Level** — The equivalent steady sound level that, if continuous during a specified time period, would contain the same total energy as the actual time varying sound. For example,  $L_{eq}$  (1-h) and  $L_{eq}$  (24-h) are the 1-hour and 24-hour equivalent sound levels, respectively.

**Exposure Limit** — The level of exposure to a hazardous chemical (set by law or a standard) at which or below which adverse human health effects are not expected to occur.

- (1) Reference dose is the chronic exposure dose (milligrams or kilograms per day) for a given hazardous chemical at which or below which adverse human noncancer health effects are not expected to occur.
- (2) Reference concentration is the chronic exposure concentration (milligrams per cubic meter) for a given hazardous chemical at which or below which adverse human noncancer health effects are not expected to occur.

**Fault** — A fracture or a zone of fractures within a rock formation along which vertical, horizontal, or transverse slippage has occurred. A normal fault occurs when the hanging wall has been depressed in relation to the footwall. A reverse fault occurs when the hanging wall has been raised in relation to the footwall.

**Finding of No Significant Impact** — A document by a Federal agency briefly presenting the reasons why an action, not otherwise excluded, will not have a significant effect on the human environment and will not require an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act.

**Fissile Materials** — Although sometimes used as a synonym for fissionable material, this term has acquired a more restricted meaning, namely, any material fissionable by thermal (slow) neutrons. The three primary fissile materials are uranium-233, uranium-235, and plutonium-239.

**Fission (Fissioning)** — The splitting of a nucleus into at least two other nuclei and the release of a relatively large amount of energy. Two or three neutrons are usually released during this type of transformation.

**Fission Products** — Nuclei formed by the fission of heavy elements (primary fission products); also, the nuclei formed by the decay of the primary fission products, many of which are radioactive.

**Fissionable Material** — Material that could undergo fission by fast neutrons.

**Floodplain** — The lowlands adjoining inland and coastal waters and relatively flat areas.

**Flux** — Rate of flow through a unit area; in reactor operation, the apparent flow of neutrons in a defined energy range (see neutron flux).

**Formation** — In geology, the primary unit of formal stratigraphic mapping or description. Most formations possess certain distinctive features.

**Fuel Assembly** — A cluster of fuel rods (or plates). Also called a fuel element. Approximately 200 fuel assemblies make up a reactor core.

**Fuel Rod** — Nuclear reactor component that includes the fissile material.

**Fugitive Emissions** — Emissions to the atmosphere from pumps, valves, flanges, seals, and other process points not vented through a stack. Also includes emissions from area sources such as ponds, lagoons, landfills, piles of stored material, and exposed soil.

**Fusion** — Nuclear reaction in which light nuclei are fused together to form a heavier nucleus, accompanied by the release of energy and fast neutrons.



**Gamma Rays** — High-energy, short-wavelength, electromagnetic radiation accompanying fission and either emitted from the nucleus of an atom or emitted by some radionuclide or fission product. Gamma rays are very penetrating and can be stopped only by dense materials (such as lead) or a thick layer of shielding materials.

**Gaussian Plume** — The distribution of material (a plume) in the atmosphere resulting from the release of pollutants from a stack or other source. The distribution of concentrations about the centerline of the plume, which is assumed to decrease as a function of its distance from the source and centerline (Gaussian distribution), depends on the mean wind speed and atmospheric stability.

**Genetic Effects** — The outcome resulting from exposure to mutagenic chemicals or radiation which results in genetic changes in germ line or somatic cells.

- (1) Effects on genetic material in reproductive cells cause trait modifications that can be passed from parents to offspring.
- (2) Effects on genetic material in nonreproductive cells result in tissue or organ modifications (e.g., liver tumors) that do not pass from parents to offspring.

**Geology** — The science that deals with the Earth: the materials, processes, environments, and history of the planet, including the rocks and their formation and structure.

**Getter** — Material that absorbs free tritium gas and chemically binds it within its own structure. One such structure is zirconium alloy.

**Global Warming** — The theory that certain gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, and chlorofluorocarbon in the Earth's atmosphere effectively restrict radiation cooling, thus elevating the Earth's ambient temperatures.

**Groundshine** — The radiation dose received from an area on the ground where radioactivity has been deposited by a radioactive plume or cloud.

**Groundwater** — The supply of water found beneath the Earth's surface, usually in aquifers, which may supply wells and springs.

**Habitat** — The environment occupied by individuals of a particular species, population, or community.

**Half-Life** — The time in which half the atoms of a radioactive isotope decay to another nuclear form. Half-lives vary from millionths of a second to billions of years.

**Hazardous Chemical** — Under 29 CFR 1910, Subpart Z, "hazardous chemicals" are defined as "any chemical which is a physical hazard or a health hazard." Physical hazards include combustible liquids, compressed gases, explosives, flammables, organic peroxides, oxidizers, pyrophorics, and reactives. A health hazard is any chemical for which there is good evidence that acute or chronic health effects occur in exposed employees. Hazardous chemicals include carcinogens, toxic or highly toxic agents, reproductive toxins, irritants, corrosives, sensitizers, hepatotoxins, nephrotoxins, agents that act on the hematopoietic system, and agents that damage the lungs, skin, eyes, or mucous membranes.

**Hazard Index** — A sum of the Hazard Quotients for all chemicals now being used at a site and those proposed to be added to yield cumulative levels for a site. A Hazard Index value of 1.0 or less means that no adverse human health effects (noncancer) are expected to occur.

**Hazard Quotient** — The value used as an assessment of noncancer-associated toxic effects of chemicals, e.g., kidney or liver dysfunction. It is a ratio of the estimated exposure to that expected to produce no adverse health effects. It is independent of a cancer risk, which is calculated only for those chemicals identified as carcinogens.

**Hazardous Material** — A material, including a hazardous substance, as defined by 49 CFR 171.8, which poses a risk to health, safety, and property when transported or handled.

**Hazardous/Toxic Air Pollutants** — Air pollutants known or suspected to cause serious health problems such as cancer, poisoning, or sickness, and may have immunological, neurological, reproductive, developmental, or respiratory effects.

**Hazardous/Toxic Waste** — Any solid waste (can also be semisolid or liquid, or contain gaseous material) having the characteristics of ignitability, corrosivity, toxicity, or reactivity, defined by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and identified or listed in 40 CFR 261 or by the Toxic Substances Control Act.

**Hazardous Waste** — A by-product of society that can pose a substantial or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly managed. Possesses at least one of four characteristics (ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, or toxicity) or appears on special U.S. Environmental Protection Agency lists.

**Heat Exchanger** — A device that transfers heat from one fluid (liquid or gas) to another.

**Heavy Metals** — Metallic or semimetallic elements of high molecular weight, such as mercury, chromium, cadmium, lead, and arsenic, that are toxic to plants and animals at known concentrations.

**Heavy Water** — A form of water in which the hydrogen atoms are replaced by deuterium atoms. Deuterium is an isotope of the element of hydrogen with one neutron and one proton in the nucleus.

**Heavy Water Reactor** — A nuclear reactor in which circulating heavy water is used to cool the reactor core and to moderate (reduce the energy of) the neutrons created in the core by the fission reactions.

**Helium-3** — A nonradioactive isotope of the element helium, that is produced as a tritium decay product.

**Helium-4** — The naturally occurring isotope of the element helium, that is also a by-product in the atomic conversion of lithium to tritium.

**High Efficiency Particulate Air Filter (HEPA)** — A filter used to remove very small particulates from dry gaseous effluent streams.

**High-Level Waste** — The highly radioactive waste material that results from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing and any solid waste derived from the liquid. High-level waste contains a combination of transuranic waste and fission products in concentrations requiring permanent isolation.

**Historic Resources** — Archaeological sites, architectural structures, and objects produced after the advent of written history dating to the time of the first Euro-American contact in an area.

**Hold-Down Assembly** — The mechanical device that integrates the tritium-producing burnable absorber rods into an assembly and secures this assembly into the reactor fuel assembly.

**HT** — Tritiated hydrogen molecule which emits a low-energy beta particle and has a half-life of 12.3 years.

**Hydrology** — The science dealing with the properties, distribution, and circulation of natural water systems.

**Hydrodynamics** — The study of the motion of a fluid and of the interactions of the fluid with its boundaries, especially in the case of an incompressible inviscid fluid.

**Ignition** — Self-sustained fusion burn of light nuclei.

**Impingement** — The process by which aquatic organisms too large to pass through the screens of a water intake structure become caught on the screens and are unable to escape.

**Implosion** — With respect to nuclear weapons, the sudden inward compression and reduction in volume of fissionable material with chemical explosives in a nuclear weapon.

**Incident-Free Risk** — The radiological or chemical impacts resulting from emissions during normal commercial light water reactor operations and from packages aboard vehicles in normal transport. This includes the radiation or hazardous chemical exposure of specific population groups and workers.

**Indirect Economic Effects** — Indirect effects result from the need to supply industries experiencing direct economic effects with additional outputs to allow them to increase their production. The additional output from each directly affected industry requires inputs from other industries within a region (i.e., purchases of goods and services). This results in a multiplier effect to show the change in total economic activity resulting from a new activity in a region.

**Indirect Jobs** — Within a regional economic area, jobs generated or lost in related industries as a result of a change in direct employment.

**Induced Economic Effects** — The spending of households resulting from direct and indirect economic effects. Increases in output from a new economic activity lead to an increase in household spending throughout the economy as firms increase their labor inputs.

**Injection Wells** — A well that takes water from the surface into the ground, either through gravity or by mechanical means.

**Ion** — An atom that has too many or too few electrons, causing it to be electrically charged; an electron that is not associated (in orbit) with a nucleus.

**Ion Exchange** — A unit physiochemical process that removes anions and cations, including radionuclides, from liquid streams (usually water) for the purpose of purification or decontamination.

**Ionizing Radiation** — Alpha particles, beta particles, gamma rays, neutrons, high-speed electrons, high-speed protons, and other particles or electromagnetic radiation that can displace electrons from atoms or molecules, thereby producing ions.

**Isotope** — An atom of a chemical element with a specific atomic number and atomic mass. Isotopes of the same element have the same number of protons, but different numbers of neutrons and different atomic masses.

**Joule** — A metric unit of energy, work, or heat, equivalent to 1 watt-second, 0.737 foot-pound, or 0.239 calories.

**Lacustrine** — Found or formed in lakes; also, a type of wetland situated on or near a lake.

**Landscape Character** — The arrangement of a particular landscape as formed by the variety and intensity of the landscape features (land, water, vegetation, and structures) and the four basic elements (form, line, color, and texture). These factors give an area a distinctive quality that distinguishes it from its immediate surroundings.

**Large Release** — A release of radioactive material that would result in doses greater than 25 rem to the whole body or 300 rem to the thyroid at 1.6 kilometer (1 mile) from the control perimeter (security fence) of a reactor facility.

**Latent Fatalities** — Fatalities associated with acute and chronic environmental exposures to chemical or radiation that occur within 30 years of exposure.

**Lead Test Assembly** — Tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) assembled and inserted in limited quantities into the Watts Bar 1 commercial light water reactor to confirm the TPBARs' performance.

**Lentic** — Pertaining to or living in still water.

**Licensee Amendment** — Changes to an existing reactor's operating license that are approved by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**Light Water** — The common form of water (a molecule with two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom,  $H_2O$ ) in which the hydrogen atom consists completely of the normal hydrogen isotope (one proton).

**Light Water Reactor** — A nuclear reactor in which circulating light water is used to cool the reactor core and to moderate (reduce the energy of) the neutrons created in the core by the fission reactions.

**Lithium-6** — The isotope of the element lithium that changes to tritium and helium-4 when a neutron is absorbed by the lithium nucleus.

**Long-Lived Radionuclides** — Radioactive isotopes with half-lives greater than about 30 years.

**Loss-of-Coolant Accident** — An accident that results from the loss of reactor coolant because of a break in the reactor coolant system.

**Low-Level Waste** — Waste that contains radioactivity, but is not classified as high-level waste, transuranic waste, spent nuclear fuel, or by-product material as defined by Section 11e (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Test specimens of fissionable material irradiated for research and development only, and not for the production of power or plutonium, may be classified as low-level waste, provided the concentration of transuranic waste is less than 100 nanocuries per gram. Some low-level waste is considered classified because of the nature of the generating process and/or constituents, because the waste would tell too much about the process.

**Macrophyte** — A member of the macroscopic plant life, especially in a body of water.

**Maximum Contaminant Level** — The maximum permissible level of a contaminant in water delivered to any user of a public drinking water system. Maximum contaminant levels are enforceable standards under the Safe Drinking Water Act.

**Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual** — A hypothetical person who could potentially receive the maximum dose of radiation or hazardous chemicals.

**Megajoule** — A unit of heat, work, or energy equal to 1 million joules. See "Joule."

**Megawatt (MW)** — A unit of power equal to 1 million watts. "Megawatt-thermal" is commonly used to define heat produced, while "megawatt-electric" defines electricity produced.

**Meteorology** — The science dealing with the atmosphere and its phenomena, especially as relating to weather.

**Migration** — The natural movement of a material through the air, soil, or groundwater; also, seasonal movement of animals from one area to another.

**Migratory Bird Treaty Act** — This act states that it is unlawful to pursue, take, attempt to take, capture, possess, or kill any migratory bird, or any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, other than permitted activities.

**Mississippian** — Artifacts from the North American archaeological period dating from 500 AD to 1200 AD.

**Mixed Waste** — Waste that contains both "nonradioactive hazardous waste" and "radioactive waste" as defined in this glossary.

**Moderator** — A material used to decelerate neutrons in a reactor from high energies to low energies.

**Mollusks** — Unsegmented, invertebrate animals including gastropods, pelecypods, and cephalopods.

**National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)** — Uniform, national air quality standards established by the Environmental Protection Agency under the authority of the Clean Air Act that restrict ambient levels of criteria pollutants to protect public health (primary standards) or public welfare (secondary standards), including plant and animal life, visibility, and materials. Standards have been set for ozone, carbon monoxide, particulates, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen, nitrogen dioxide, and lead.

**National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants** — A set of national emission standards for listed hazardous pollutants emitted from specific classes or categories of new and existing sources.

**National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)** — This Act is the basic national charter for the protection of the environment. It requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement for every major Federal action that may significantly affect the quality of the human or natural environment. Its main purpose is to provide environmental information to decisionmakers so their actions are based on an understanding of the potential environmental consequences of a proposed action and its reasonable alternatives.

**National Historic Preservation Act** — This Act provides that property resources with significant national historic value be placed on the national Register of Historic Places. It does not require any permits, but, pursuant to Federal code, if a proposed action might impact an historic property resource, it mandates consultation with the proper agencies.

**National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)** — Federal permitting system required for water pollution effluents under the Clean Water Act, as amended.

**National Register of Historic Places** — A list maintained by the Secretary of the Interior of districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects of prehistoric or historic local, state, or national significance under Section 2(b) of the Historic Sites Act of 1935 (16 U.S.C. 462) and Section 101(a) (1) (A) of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended.

**Neutron** — An uncharged elementary particle with a mass slightly greater than that of the proton, found in the nucleus of every atom heavier than hydrogen-1. A free neutron is unstable and decays with a half-life of about 13 minutes into an electron and a proton; used in the fission process.

**Neutron Flux** — The product of neutron number density and velocity (energy), giving an apparent number of neutrons flowing through a unit area per unit time.

**Neutron Poison** — A chemical solution (e.g., a boron or component sheet or a burnable absorber rod) inserted into a nuclear reactor or spent fuel pool to absorb neutrons and end criticality. Any material with a strong affinity for absorbing neutrons without generating new neutrons that can be used to control the nuclear chain reaction.

**Nitrogen ( $N_2$ )** — A colorless, odorless gaseous element that constitutes about four-fifths of the volume of the atmosphere.

**Nitrogen Oxides** — Refers to the oxides of nitrogen, primarily NO (nitrogen oxide) and NO<sub>2</sub> (nitrogen dioxide). These are produced in the combustion of fossil fuels and can constitute an air pollution problem. Nitrogen dioxide emissions contribute to acid deposition and formation of atmospheric ozone.

**Noise** — Any sound that is undesirable because it interferes with speech and hearing, or is intense enough to damage hearing, or is otherwise annoying (unwanted sound).

**Nonattainment Area** — An air quality control region (or portion thereof) in which the Environmental Protection Agency has determined that ambient air concentrations exceed national ambient air quality standards for one or more criteria pollutants.

**Notice of Intent** — Announces the scoping process. The Notice of Intent is usually published in the Federal Register and a local newspaper. The scoping process includes holding at least one public meeting and requesting written comments on what issues and environmental concerns an environmental impact statement should address.

**Nuclear Assembly** — Collective term for the primary, secondary, and radiation case of a nuclear warhead.

**Nuclear Component** — A part of a nuclear weapon that contains fissionable or fusionable material.

**Nuclear Criticality** — (See "criticality.")

**Nuclear Fuel Cycle** — The path followed by the nuclear fuel in its various states from mining the ore to waste disposal. The basic fuel materials for the generation of nuclear power are the elements uranium and thorium.

**Nuclear Grade** — Material of a quality adequate for use in a nuclear application.

**Nuclear Material** — Composite term applied to: (1) special nuclear material; (2) source material such as uranium, thorium, or ores containing uranium or thorium; and (3) by-product material, which is any radioactive material that is made radioactive by exposure to a radiation incident or to the process of producing or using special nuclear material.

**Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty** — An international treaty signed in 1968 and extended in 1996 that seeks to limit nuclear weapons capabilities to the five countries (United States, France, England, Russia, and China) that possessed such weapons before 1967.

**Nuclear Power Plant** — A facility that converts nuclear energy into electrical power. In a commercial light water reactor, heat produced in the nuclear reactor is used to make steam, which drives a turbine connected to an electric generator.

**Nuclear Radiation** — Particles (alpha, beta, neutrons) or photons (gamma) emitted from the nucleus of unstable radioactive atoms as a result of radioactive decay.

**Nuclear Reaction** — A reaction in which an atomic nucleus is transformed into another isotope of that respective nuclide, or into another element altogether; it is always accompanied by the liberation of either particles or energy.

**Nuclear Reactor** — A device that sustains a controlled nuclear fission chain reaction that releases energy in the form of heat.

**Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)** — The Federal agency that regulates the civilian nuclear power industry in the United States.

**Nuclear Weapon** — The general name given to any weapon in which the explosion results from the energy released by reactions involving atomic nuclei; either fission, fusion, or both.

**Nuclear Weapons Complex** — The sites supporting the research, development, design, manufacture, testing, assessment, certification, and maintenance of the nation's nuclear weapons and the subsequent dismantlement of retired weapons.

**Nuclide** — A species of atom characterized by the constitution of its nucleus and, hence, by the number of protons, the number of neutrons, and the energy content.

**Numerical Simulation** — The use of mathematical algorithms and models of physical processes to computationally simulate the behavior or performance of a device or complex system.

**Occupational Safety and Health Administration** — Oversees and regulates workplace health and safety, created by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.

**Off Site** — As used in the environmental impact statement, the term denotes a location, facility, or activity occurring outside of the boundary of the reactor facility.

**Outfall** — The discharge point of a drain, sewer, or pipe as it empties into a body of water.

**Ozone** — The triatomic form of oxygen; in the stratosphere, ozone protects the Earth from the sun's ultraviolet rays, but in lower levels of the atmosphere, ozone is considered an air pollutant.

**Packaging** — With regard to hazardous or radionuclide materials, the assembly of components necessary to ensure compliance with Federal regulations. It may consist of one or more receptacles, absorbent materials, spacing structures, thermal insulation, radiation shielding, and devices for cooling or absorbing mechanical shocks. The vehicle tie-down system and auxiliary equipment may be designated as part of the packaging.

**Palustrine** — Found or formed in marshes; also, a type of wetland situated in or near a marsh.

**Particulate Matter** — Air pollutants including dust, dirt, soot, smoke, or liquid droplets emitted into the air. "Total suspended particulate" was first used as the indicator for particulate concentrations. Current standards use the indicators "PM<sub>10</sub>" and "PM<sub>2.5</sub>," which include only those particles with an aerodynamic diameter smaller than or equal to 10 micrometers and 2.5 micrometers, respectively. The smaller particles are more responsible for adverse health effects because they reach further into the respiratory tract.

**Permeability** — In geology, the ability of rock or soil to transmit a fluid.

**Permutation** — Changing the order of elements arranged in a particular order.

**Person-Rem** — The unit of collective radiation dose to a given population; the sum of the individual doses received by a population segment.

**Plume** — A flowing, often somewhat conical, trail of emissions from a continuous point source.

**Plume Immersion** — With regard to radiation, the situation in which an individual is enveloped by a cloud of radiation gaseous effluent and receives an external radiation dose.

**Plutonium** — A heavy, radioactive, metallic element with the atomic number 94. It is produced artificially in a reactor by bombardment of uranium with neutrons and is used in the production of nuclear weapons.

**Pounds per Square Inch** — A measure of pressure; atmospheric pressure is about 14.7 pounds per square inch.

**Pressurized Water Reactor** — A light water reactor in which heat is transferred from the core to an exchanger by water kept under pressure in the primary system. Steam is generated in a secondary circuit. Many reactors producing electric power are pressurized water reactors.

**Prevention of Significant Deterioration** — An Environmental Protection Agency program, mandated by the Clean Air Act, in which state or Federal permits are required that are intended to limit increases in air pollutant concentrations by restricting emissions for new or modified sources in places where air quality is already better than required to meet primary and secondary ambient air quality standards.

**Primary System** — With regard to nuclear reactors, the system that circulates a coolant (e.g., water) through the reactor core to remove the heat of reaction.

**Prime Farmland** — Land that has the best combination of physical and chemical characteristics for producing food, feed, fiber, forage, oil-seed, and other agricultural crops with minimum inputs of fuel, fertilizer, pesticides, and labor without intolerable soil erosion, as determined by the Secretary of Agriculture (Farmland Protection Act of 1981, 7 CFR 7, paragraph 658).

**Probabilistic Risk Assessment** — A comprehensive, logical, and structured methodology to identify and quantitatively evaluate significant accident sequences and their consequences.

**Probable Maximum Flood** — Flood levels predicted for a scenario having hydrological conditions that maximize the flow of surface waters.

**Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement** — A legal document prepared in accordance with the requirements of 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act which evaluates the environmental impacts of proposed Federal actions that involve multiple decisions potentially affecting the environment at one or more sites.

**Proliferation (Nuclear)** — The spread of nuclear weapons and the materials and technologies used to produce them.

**Qualitative Environmental Impacts** — 10 CFR 51, Appendix B defines the qualitative terms "small," "moderate," and "large" as follows:

Small	Environmental effects are not detectable or are so minor that they would neither destabilize nor noticeably alter any important attribute of the resource. For the purposes of assessing
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radiological impacts, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has concluded that those impacts that do not exceed permissible levels in the NRC's regulations are considered small.

**Moderate** Environmental effects are sufficient to alter noticeably, but not to destabilize, important attributes of the resource.

**Large** Environmental effects are clearly noticeable and are sufficient to destabilize important attributes of the resource.

**Quality Factor** — The principal modifying factor that is employed to derive dose equivalent from absorbed dose.

**Rad** — See "radiation absorbed dose."

**Radiation** — The emitted particles or photons from the nuclei of radioactive atoms. Some elements are naturally radioactive; others are induced to become radioactive by bombardment in a reactor. Naturally occurring radiation is indistinguishable from induced radiation.

**Radiation Absorbed Dose (rad)** — The basic unit of absorbed dose equal to the absorption of 0.01 Joule per kilogram of absorbing material.

**Radioactive Waste** — Materials from nuclear operations that are radioactive or are contaminated with radioactive materials, and for which use, reuse, or recovery are impractical.

**Radioactivity** — The spontaneous decay or disintegration of unstable atomic nuclei, accompanied by the emission of radiation.

**Radioisotopes** — Radioactive nuclides of the same element (same number of protons in their nuclei) that differ in the number of neutrons.

**Radionuclide** — A radioactive element characterized according to its atomic mass and atomic number which can be man-made or naturally occurring.

**Radon** — Gaseous, radioactive element with the atomic number 86 resulting from the radioactive decay of radium. Radon occurs naturally in the environment, and can collect in unventilated enclosed areas, such as basements. Large concentrations of radon can cause lung cancer in humans.

**RADTRAN** — A computer code that combines user-determined meteorological, demographic, transportation, packaging, and material factors with health physics data to calculate the expected radiological consequences and accident risk of transporting radioactive material.

**Reactor Accident** — See "design-basis accident; severe accident."

**Reactor Coolant System** — The system used to transfer energy from the reactor core either directly or indirectly to the heat rejection system.

**Reactor Core** — In a heavy water reactor: the fuel assemblies including the fuel and target rods, control assemblies, blanket assemblies, safety rods, and coolant/moderator. In a light water reactor: the fuel assemblies including the fuel and target rods, control rods, and coolant/moderator. In a modular high-

temperature gas-cooled reactor: the graphite elements including the fuel and target elements, control rods, and other reactor shutdown mechanisms, and the graphite reflectors.

**Reactor Facility** — Unless it is modified by words such as containment, vessel, or core, the term reactor facility includes the housing, equipment, and associated areas devoted to the operation and maintenance of one or more reactor cores. Any apparatus that is designed or used to sustain nuclear chain reactions in a controlled manner, including critical and pulsed assemblies and research, tests, and power reactors, is defined as a reactor. All assemblies designed to perform subcritical experiments that could potentially reach criticality are also to be considered reactors.

**Record of Decision** — A document prepared in accordance with the requirements of the Council on Environmental Quality and National Environmental Policy Act regulations 40 CFR 1505.2, that provides a concise public record of the decision on a proposed Federal action for which an environmental impact statement was prepared. A Record of Decision identifies the alternatives considered in reaching the decision, the environmentally preferable alternative(s), factors balanced in making the decision, whether all practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm have been adopted, and if not, why they were not.

**Recycling** — With regard to tritium in nuclear weapons, the recovery, purification, and reuse of tritium contained in tritium reservoirs within the nuclear weapons stockpile.

**Refueling Outage** — The period of time that a reactor is shut down for refueling operations. A refueling outage usually lasts four to eight weeks.

**Regional Economic Area** — A geographic area consisting of an economic node and the surrounding counties that are economically related and include the places of work and residences of the labor force. Each regional economic area is defined by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

**Region of Influence** — A site-specific geographic area that includes the counties where approximately 90 percent of the current U.S. Department of Energy and/or contractor employees reside.

**Rem** — See "roentgen equivalent man."

**Remediation** — The process, or a phase in the process, of rendering radioactive, hazardous, or mixed waste environmentally safe, whether through processing, entombment, or other methods.

**Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as amended** — The Act that provides a "cradle-to-grave" regulatory program for hazardous waste which established, among other things, a system for managing hazardous waste from its generation until its ultimate disposal.

**Riparian** — Of, on, or relating to the banks of a natural course of water.

**Risk** — A quantitative or qualitative expression of possible loss that considers both the probability that a hazard will cause harm and the consequences of that event.

**Risk Assessment (chemical or radiological)** — The qualitative and quantitative evaluation performed in an effort to define the risk posed to human health and/or the environment by the presence or potential presence and/or use of specific chemical or radiological materials.

**Roentgen** — A unit of exposure to ionizing X or gamma radiation equal to or producing 1 electrostatic unit of charge per cubic centimeter of air. It is approximately equal to 1 rad.

**Roentgen Equivalent Man (rem)** — A measure of radiation dose (i.e., the average background radiation dose is 0.3 rem per year). The unit of biological dose equal to the product of the absorbed dose in rads; a quality factor, which accounts for the variation in biological effectiveness of different types of radiation; and other modifying factors.

**Runoff** — The portion of rainfall, melted snow, or irrigation water that flows across the ground surface and eventually enters streams.

**Safe Drinking Water Act** — This Act protects the quality of public water supplies, water supply and distribution systems, and all sources of drinking water.

**Safety** — With regard to nuclear weapons, minimizing the possibility that a nuclear weapon will be exposed to accidents and preventing the possibility of nuclear yield or plutonium dispersal should there be an accident involving a nuclear weapon.

**Safety Analysis Report** — A safety document that provides a complete description and safety analysis of a reactor design, normal and emergency operations, hypothetical accidents and their predicted consequences, and the means proposed to prevent such accidents or mitigate their consequences.

**Safety Evaluation Report** — A document prepared by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission that evaluates documentation (i.e., technical specifications, safety analysis reports, and special safety reviews and studies) submitted by a reactor licensee for its approval. This ensures that all of the safety aspects of part or all of the activities conducted at a reactor are formally and thoroughly analyzed, evaluated, and recorded.

**Sanitary waste** — Wastes generated by normal housekeeping activities, liquid or solid (including sludge), which are not hazardous or radioactive.

**Scope** — In a document prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the range of actions, alternatives, and impacts to be considered.

**Scoping** — The solicitation of comments from interested persons, groups, and agencies at public meetings, public workshops, in writing, electronically, or via fax to assist in defining the proposed action, identifying alternatives, and developing preliminary issues to be addressed in an environmental impact statement.

**Secondary System** — The system that circulates a coolant (water) through a heat exchanger to remove heat from the primary system.

**Security** — With regard to nuclear weapons, minimizing the likelihood of unauthorized access to or loss of custody of a nuclear weapon or weapon system, and ensuring that the weapon can be recovered should unauthorized access or loss of custody occur.

**Seismic** — Pertaining to any Earth vibration, especially an earthquake.

**Seismic Zone** — An area defined by the Uniform Building Code (1991), designating the amount of damage to be expected as the result of earthquakes. The United States is divided into six zones: (1) Zone 0: no damage; (2) Zone 1: minor damage, corresponds to intensities V and VI of the modified Mercalli intensity scale; (3) Zone 2A: moderate damage, corresponds to intensity VII of the modified Mercalli intensity scale (eastern U.S.); (4) Zone 2B: slightly more damage than 2A (western U.S.); (5) Zone 3: major damage, corresponds to intensity VII and higher of the modified Mercalli intensity scale; (6) Zone 4: areas within Zone 3 determined by proximity to certain major fault systems.

**Severe Accident** — An accident with a frequency rate of less than  $10^{-6}$  per year that would have more severe consequences than a design-basis accident, in terms of damage to the facility, offsite consequences, or both. Also called "beyond design-basis reactor accidents" for this environmental impact statement.

**Sewage** — The total of organic waste and wastewater generated by an industrial establishment or a community.

**Shielding** — With regard to radiation, any material of obstruction (bulkheads, walls, or other construction) that absorbs radiation in order to protect personnel or equipment.

**Short-Lived Activation Products** — An element formed from neutron interaction that has a relatively short half-life and which is not produced from the fission reaction (e.g., a cobalt isotope formed from impurities in the metal of the reactor piping).

**Short-Lived Nuclides** — Radioactive isotopes with half-lives no greater than about 30 years (e.g., cesium-137 and strontium-90).

**Shrink-Swell Potential** — Refers to the potential for soils to contract while drying and expand after wetting.

**Shutdown** — For a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) reactor, that condition in which the reactor has ceased operation and DOE has declared officially that it does not intend to operate it further (see DOE Order 5480.6, *Safety of Department of Energy-Owned Nuclear Reactors*).

**Silt** — A sedimentary material consisting of fine mineral particles intermediate in size between sand and clay.

**Source Term** — The estimated quantities of radionuclides or chemical pollutants released to the environment.

**Special Nuclear Materials** — As defined in Section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, special nuclear material means: (1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines to be special nuclear material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the above. Tritium is NOT a special nuclear material.

**Standardization (Epidemiology)** — Techniques used to control the effects of differences (e.g., age) between populations when comparing disease experience. The two main methods are:

- (1) Direct method, in which specific diseases rated in the study population are averaged, using as weights the distribution of the comparison population.
- (2) Indirect method, in which the specific disease rates in the comparison population are averaged, using as weights the distribution of the study population.

**START I and II** — Terms which refer to negotiations between the United States and Russia (the former Soviet Union during START I negotiations) aimed at limiting and reducing strategic nuclear weapons. START I discussions began in 1982 and eventually led to a ratified treaty in 1988. The START II protocol, which has not been fully ratified, will attempt to further reduce the acceptable levels of nuclear weapons ratified in START I.

**Sulfur Oxides** — Common air pollutants, primarily sulfur dioxide ( $\text{SO}_2$ ), a heavy, pungent, colorless gas formed in the combustion of fossil fuels, which is considered a major air pollutant, and sulfur trioxide.  $\text{SO}_2$  is involved in the formation of acid rain. It can also irritate the upper respiratory tract and cause lung damage.

**Surface Water** — Water on the Earth's surface, as distinguished from water in the ground (groundwater).

**Technical Specifications** — With regard to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations, part of an NRC license authorizing the operation of a nuclear reactor facility. A technical specification establishes requirements for items such as safety limits, limiting safety system settings, limiting control settings, limiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements, design features, and administrative controls.

**Threatened Species** — Any species designated under the Endangered Species Act as likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.

**Threshold Limit Values** — The recommended highest concentrations of contaminants to which workers may be exposed according to the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists.

**Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976** — This Act authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency to secure information on all new and existing chemical substances and to control any of these substances determined to cause an unreasonable risk to public health or the environment. This law requires that the health and environmental effects of all new chemicals be reviewed by the Environmental Protection Agency before they are manufactured for commercial purposes.

**Transients** — Events that could cause a change or disruption of plant thermal, hydraulic, or neutronic behavior.

**Tritium** — A radioactive isotope of the element hydrogen with two neutrons and one proton. Common symbols for the isotope are "H-3" and "T." Tritium has a half-life of 12.3 years.

**Tritium Extraction Facility** — A facility used for the extraction of tritium from the TPBARs. This facility is planned for construction at the Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina.

**Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rods (TPBARs)** — Rods that replace the normally used burnable absorber rods in a reactor for the purpose of producing tritium. TPBARs contain lithium-6.

**Turbine** — A machine for directly converting the kinetic energy and/or thermal energy of a flowing fluid (air, hot gas, steam, or water) into useful rotational energy.

**Unusual Occurrence** — Any unusual or unplanned event that adversely affects or potentially affects the performance, reliability, or safety of a facility.

**Uranium** — A heavy, silvery-white metallic element (atomic number 92) with several radioactive isotopes that is used as fuel in nuclear reactors.

**Viewshed** — The extent of an area that may be viewed from a particular location. Viewsheds are generally bounded by topographic features such as hills or mountains.

**Visual Resource Management Class** — A class defines the different degrees of modification allowed to the basic elements of landscape. They are: Class 1 - applied to wilderness areas, wild and scenic rivers, and other similar situations; Class 2 - contrasts are seen, but do not attract attention; Class 3 - contrasts caused by a cultural activity are evident, but remain subordinate to the existing landscape; Class 4 - contrasts that attract attention and are dominant features of the landscape in terms of scale, but repeat the contrast of the characteristic landscape; Class 5 - applied to areas where unacceptable cultural modification has lowered scenic quality (where the natural character of the landscape has been disturbed to a point where rehabilitation is needed to bring it up to one of the four other classifications).

**Volatile Organic Compounds** — A broad range of organic compounds, often halogenated, that vaporize at ambient or relatively low temperatures, such as benzene, chloroform, and methyl alcohol. With regard to air pollution, any organic compound that participates in atmospheric photochemical reaction, except for those designated by the Environmental Protection Agency administrator as having negligible photochemical reactivity.

**Warhead** — Collective term for the package of nuclear assembly and nonnuclear components that can be mated with a delivery vehicle or carrier to produce a deliverable nuclear weapon.

**Waste Minimization and Pollution Prevention** — An action that economically avoids or reduces the generation of waste and pollution by source reduction, reducing the toxicity of hazardous waste and pollution, improving energy use, or recycling. These actions will be consistent with the general goal of minimizing present and future threats to human health, safety, and the environment.

**Weighting Factor** — With regard to radiation, the fraction of the total health risk resulting from uniform whole-body irradiation that could be contributed to that particular tissue.

**Whole-Body Dose** — With regard to radiation, the dose resulting from the uniform exposure of all organs and tissues in a human body. (Also see "effective dose equivalent.")

**Wind Rose** — A depiction of wind speed and direction frequency for a given period of time.

**Woodland** — Artifacts from the North American archaeological period dating from 1000 BC to 500 AD.

**X/Q (Chi/Q)** — The relative calculated air concentration due to a specific air release and atmospheric dispersion; units are (seconds per cubic meter). For example (Curies per cubic meter)/(Curies per second) = (seconds per cubic meter) or (grams per cubic meter)/(grams per second) = (seconds per cubic meter).

**Zebra Mussel** — An imported mussel which interferes with, among other things, water intake structures.

**Zircaloy-4** — An alloy of zirconium metal used as getter material in tritium-producing burnable absorber rods.

## **Chapter 11**

### **Index**

## 11. INDEX

### -A-

Accident analysis	1-21
Accident scenarios	D-1
Affected environment	4-1
ALOHA computer code	D-40
Alternative reactor facilities	1-4
APT alternative	1-1, 1-22
APT construction impacts	5-114
APT EIS	1-2, 1-12, 1-13, 5-114
APT operational impacts	5-115
Asia Brown-Boveri	-11, 5-103
Atomic Energy Act	1-18, 2-1, 6-3

### -B-

Babcock & Wilcox	3-2
Baseline configuration	5-109
Bellefonte	
affected environment	4-57
air quality	4-62, 5-36
aquatic resources	4-70, 5-52, 5-54
archaeological and historic resources	4-75, 5-51, 5-56
chemical environment	4-88
community services	4-81, 5-60, 5-66
completion requirements	3-22
conversion project EIS	1-14
cumulative impacts	5-122
electromagnetic field health effects	5-75
environmental justice	5-82, G-10
fission product core inventories	D-14
floodplains and flood risk	4-67, 5-49
gaseous radioactive emissions	4-62, 5-42
general design specifications	3-24
geology	4-68, 5-50
groundwater	4-67, 5-48
hazardous waste	5-84
housing	4-81, 5-59, 5-65
land use	4-58, 5-31
liquid chemical and radioactive effluents	4-66
local transportation	4-84, 5-63, 5-69
location, map	4-59
low-level radioactive waste	5-85
meteorology and climatology	4-62
mixed waste	5-85
noise	4-61, 5-33
NPDES permit	3-25
Nuclear Plant	3-20
permit to construct	3-22
population	4-78, 5-59, 5-65
public and occupational health and safety, chemical impacts	5-72, 5-80

public occupational health and safety, accidents	5-76
public occupational health and safety, normal operations	5-69
radiation environment	4-88
regional economic characteristics	4-76, 5-60, 5-66
regulatory compliance history	6-18
resources required to complete construction	3-24
seismology	4-68
socioeconomics	4-76, 5-57
soils	4-68, 5-50
spent nuclear fuel storage capacity	4-89
spent nuclear fuel management	4-89, 5-85
surface water quality	4-64
surface water use and rights	4-65
surface water	4-64, 5-43
tax revenues	4-84, 5-60, 5-66
terrestrial resources	4-68, 5-52, 5-53
terrestrial wildlife	4-69, 5-52, 5-53
threatened and endangered species	4-73, 5-52, 5-55
visual resources	4-61, 5-32
waste management	4-88, 5-83
wetlands	4-69, 5-52, 5-55
Beyond design-basis accidents	D-8, D-34
Boosting	1-8
Burnable absorber rods	3-2
BWX Technologies	3-11, 5-103

### -C-

Carbon dioxide emissions	5-117
CEQ Regulations	1-6, 1-18
Chemical accident analysis methodology	D-39
Chemical accident scenarios	D-37, D-38
Clean Air Act	6-3
Clean Water Act	6-4
Commercial light water reactors	A-5
Comparison of alternatives	3-25
Comparison of CLWR and APT, summary	3-40
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)	6-8
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	1-6, 1-8
Cost-effectiveness	1-17
Critical chain reaction	A-3
Crud	E-24
Cumulative impacts	5-119
Decontamination and decommissioning	3-9, 5-90, 5-91
Defense program mission	1-6



DOE past practices	1-19	ISFSI accidents	5-100
-E-		ISFSI construction	5-94
Economy Act	1-4	ISFSI operation	5-97
Electric power generation	3-1	Large break loss-of-coolant accident	D-21
Emergency planning	6-8	<i>Lead Test Assembly Environmental Assessment</i>	1-12, 1-13
Endangered Species Act	6-6	Lead Test Assembly Demonstration Project	1-13, 5-113
Energy Vision 2000	1-11	Licensing renewal	3-9, 5-85
Environmental consequences, assumptions	5-2	Lithium-6	3-2, 5-103, A-17
Environmental consequences, methodology	5-1, B-1	Long-term productivity	5-129
Environmental justice	1-21, 6-7, G-1, G-2	-M-	
Environmental Protection Permits	6-3	MACCS2 computer code	D-16
Evansville, Tennessee	1-17	Mitigation Action Plan	5-130
Exposure pathways	C-5	Mitigation measures	1-22, 5-130
-F-		-N-	
Federal Facility Compliance Act	6-5	National Ambient Air Quality Standards	6-4
Final EIS for Bellefonte Conversion	3-22	National Defense Authorization Act	1-10
<i>Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling</i>	1-2, 1-12, 3-8	National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Program	6-4
<i>Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling, Record of Decision</i>	1-2	National Environmental Policy Act	1-1, 6-6
Floodplain management	6-6	National Historic Preservation Act	6-7
Framatome-Cogema	3-11, 3-103	National Pollutants Discharge Elimination System Program	6-4
Fuel assembly	3-4, A-9	NEPA process	1-18, 1-19
-G-		NEPA strategy	1-12
General Electric Company	3-11, 3-103	Nickel-plated zircaloy	A-19
GENII computer code	C-13	No Action Alternative	1-1, 3-9, 3-13, 3-26, 5-114
Getter	1-9, 3-2, A-19	Noninvolved workers	D-41
-H-		Nonreactor design-basis accidents	D-3, D-26
Hazardous chemicals impacts	C-23	Nontarget-bearing components	E-24
Health effect risk factors	C-9	North Augusta, Georgia	1-17
Highly Enriched Uranium, blending down	5-105	Nuclear fission	A-1, A-2
Highly Enriched Uranium EIS	5-105	Nuclear fusion	1-8
HIGHWAY computer code	E-10	Nuclear Nonproliferation	1-9
-I-		Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty	1-9, 1-10, 5-112
IAEA safeguards	1-10	Nuclear reaction	A-2
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)	3-10, 5-93	Nuclear weapons	1-6, 1-8
Industrial facilities, Jackson County	5-122	Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum	1-6, 2-1
<i>Interagency Review of the Nonproliferation Implications of Alternative Tritium Production</i>	1-10, 1-18	Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan	1-6, 1-9, 1-18, 2-1, 2-2, 5-112
INTERLINE computer code	E-10	-O-	
Involved workers	5-117	Occupational Safety and Health Act	6-9
Irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources	5-129	-P-	
		Planning assumptions for the CLWR EIS	3-8
		Pollution Prevention Act	6-7
		Population projections	G-3
		Preferred Alternative	1-13, 3-30
		Presidential Decision Directive	1-6, 1-8, 5-112

Pressurized water reactors	3-2, 3-3, A-6	emergency preparedness	4-54
Procurement process	1-2	environmental justice	5-29, G-8
Proposed action	1-2	fission product core inventories	D-11
Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality	6-6	floodplains and flood risk	4-40
Protection of Wetlands	6-6	gaseous emissions	3-20
Public and occupational health and safety	1-19	gaseous radioactive emissions	4-36, 5-18
Public comment period	1-16	general design specifications	3-17
Public hearings	1-17	geology	4-41, 5-20
Public scoping meetings	1-15	groundwater	4-40, 5-19
Public scoping process	1-15, F-1	groundwater availability use and rights	4-41
Purpose and need for tritium	2-1	hazardous waste	4-55
		land use	4-31, 5-17
		liquid chemical and radioactive effluents	4-40, 5-19
-R-		liquid effluent releases	3-19
Radiation	C-2	local transportation	4-50
Radiation exposure assumptions	C-14, C-15	location, map	4-32
Radiation exposure limits	C-6	low-level radioactive waste	4-55
Radiation exposure uncertainties	C-18	meteorology and climatology	4-37
Radiation health effects	C-7	mixed waste	4-56
Radiation measures	C-3	noise	4-34, 5-17
Radiation protection guides	C-6	NPDES permit	3-19
Radiation sources	C-4	Nuclear Plant	3-17
Radiological accident impacts	D-1	public and occupational health and safety, normal operations	5-23
Radiological impacts (all sites)	C-21	public and occupational health and safety, accidents	5-26
Radiological releases (all sites)	C-19	radiation environment	4-52
RADTRAN4 computer code	E-12	regional income	4-48
Rainsville, Alabama	1-17	regulatory compliance history	6-14
Reactor accident analysis assumptions	D-18	seismology	4-41
Reactor coolant system	A-7	socioeconomics	4-47, 5-22
Reactor design-basis accidents	D-2, D-26	soils	4-41, 5-20
Reactor facility alternatives	3-11	spent nuclear fuel generation	3-20
Reactor operating cycle	5-111	spent nuclear fuel management	4-56, 4-57, 5-30
Reactor refueling	A-12	spent nuclear fuel storage capacity	4-57
Reasonable alternatives	3-11, 3-12	surface water	4-38, 5-19
Regulatory compliance history	6-9	surface water use and rights	4-39
Regulatory limits of radiation exposure	6-3	terrestrial resources	4-42, 5-21
Resource commitments	5-128	terrestrial wildlife	4-42, 5-21
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)	6-5	threatened and endangered species	4-45, 5-21
		visual resources	4-34, 5-17
-S-		waste generation	3-20
Safe Drinking Water Act	6-5	waste management	4-55, 5-30
Safeguards and security	1-20, 5-113	waste minimization practices	4-56
Secondary impacts of facility accidents	5-118	wetlands	4-42, 5-21
Sensitivity analysis	1-22, 5-107	Severe reactor accidents	D-8
Separation of civilian and military programs	1-18	Short-term uses	5-129
Sequoyah affected environment	4-30	Siemens Power Corporation	3-11, 5-103
air quality	4-34, 5-8	Spent nuclear fuel storage	5-93
aquatic resources	4-42, 5-21	Spent nuclear fuel generation	1-19, 3-10
archaeological and historic resources	4-46, 5-22	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)	1-10, 2-2, 5-112
chemical environment	4-54	Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)	6-14
community services	4-50		
cumulative impacts	5-120		
demography	4-47		

**-T-**

Technology announcement	1-2, 1-6, 1-13, 1-19, 1-20, 3-13
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)	1-11
TPBAR fabrication	5-103
TPBAR failures	1-20, 5-11, 5-25, 5-72
TPBAR handling	A-21
TPBAR handling accidents	D-4, D-31
TPBAR transportation	5-105, 5-124, E-1
Transportation accidents	E-18
Transportation analysis assumptions	E-12, E-21
Transportation analysis conservatism	E-33
Transportation analysis uncertainties	E-33
Transportation cask handling accidents	D-5, D-6, D-32, D-33
Transportation environmental justice	G-14
Transportation long-term impacts	E-32
Transportation of hazardous materials	6-8
Transportation of low-level radioactive waste	E-17
Transportation regulations	E-7
Transportation risk analysis results	E-26
Transportation risks methodology	E-10
Transportation routes selection	E-9
Tritiated water	C-11
Tritium	1-1
Tritium biological properties	C-10
Tritium extraction facility impacts	5-125
Tritium Extraction Facility EIS	1-12, 1-14, 5-124
<i>Tritium Facility Modernization and Consolidation Project Environmental Assessment</i>	1-14
Tritium genetic effects	C-12
Tritium need	2-1, 3-8
Tritium producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs)	3-2, 3-5, 3-6, A-17, A-20, A-21
Tritium production design limit	5-107, 5-111
Tritium production impacts summary	3-26, 3-31
Tritium project duration	3-9
Tritium requirements and supply	1-21
Tritium reserves	2-2
TVA mission	2-3
TVA proposals	1-2, 1-4
Type B transportation casks	E-3

**-U-**

Unavoidable adverse impacts	5-128
-----------------------------	-------

**-W-**

Warhead	1-8
Waste gas decay tank accident	D-24
Water quality analysis	1-21
Watts Bar	
affected environment	4-2
air quality	4-7, 5-4
aquatic resources	4-17, 5-7

archaeological and historic resources	4-19, 5-8
chemical environment	4-27
community services	4-23
cumulative impacts	5-119
demography	4-20
emergency preparedness	4-27
environmental justice	5-15, G-4
fission product core inventories	D-11
floodplains and flood risk	4-13
gaseous emissions	3-16
gaseous radioactive emissions	4-9, 5-4
general design specifications	3-13
geology	4-14, 5-7
groundwater	4-13, 5-5
groundwater availability use and rights	4-14
hazardous waste	4-28
land use	4-3, 5-3
liquid chemical and radioactive effluent	4-13, 5-5
liquid effluent releases	3-15
local transportation	4-23
location, map	4-4
low-level radioactive waste	4-28
meteorology and climatology	4-9,
mixed waste	4-29
noise	4-6, 5-4
NPDES permit	3-15
Nuclear Plant	3-13
public and occupational health and safety, accident	5-12
public and occupational health and safety, normal operation	5-9
radiation environment	4-24
regional income	4-23
regulatory compliance history	6-11
seismology	4-14
socioeconomics	4-20, 5-8
soils	4-15, 5-7
spent nuclear fuel generation	3-16
spent nuclear fuel management	4-29, 4-30, 5-16
spent nuclear fuel storage capacity	4-30
surface water quality	4-12
surface water use and rights	4-12
surface water	4-10, 5-5
terrestrial resources	4-15, 5-7
terrestrial wildlife	4-15, 5-7
threatened and endangered species	4-18, 5-7
visual resources	4-6, 5-3
waste generation	3-16
waste minimization practices	4-29
waste management	4-28, 5-16
wetlands	4-15, 5-7
Westinghouse Electric Corporation	3-11, 3-13, 5-103

**-Z-**

Zircaloy	A-19
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# **Appendix A**

## **Tritium Production Operations – Application to Production of Tritium in Commercial Light Water Reactors**

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## APPENDIX A

### TRITIUM PRODUCTION OPERATIONS—APPLICATION TO PRODUCTION OF TRITIUM IN COMMERCIAL LIGHT WATER REACTORS

This appendix addresses the operation of a nuclear power plant in relation to its use as a tritium production facility. The first section provides a brief description of the nuclear processes necessary to operate a fission reactor as a nuclear power plant. The next section addresses aspects of the reactor design for commercial light water reactors (CLWRs). The boiling water reactor and the pressurized water reactor are discussed. [Much of the information in this section describes Westinghouse reactors and fuel. Differences between Westinghouse and other operating reactor designs exist, but are not described in detail in this appendix.] Descriptions of the refueling operations at a nuclear facility and some environmentally relevant systems are included in this appendix. Also, a description of the nucleonics of tritium production and the structure of tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) is presented. Finally, the impacts of tritium production on the CLWR fuel cycle are addressed.

#### A.1 NUCLEAR FISSION REACTORS

Most commercial electric power generation plants produce electricity by converting heat into electricity. Typically, these plants heat water to generate steam, and the steam is used to drive a turbine generator. In the turbine generator, the energy in the steam is first converted into mechanical energy (spinning a turbine shaft), which creates electricity by driving a generator. Fossil plants generate heat through a chemical process—the burning of fuels such as natural gas or coal. When fossil fuels are burned, energy is released when the carbon in the fossil fuel combines with oxygen and burns. Commercial nuclear power plants generate heat through the nuclear fission process. The nuclear fission process occurs at a subatomic level and involves the interaction of some component part of the atoms. The following section describes the fission process and the methods used to control this process in a nuclear reactor.

##### A.1.1 Nuclear Fission

Nuclear fission is a nuclear reaction caused by the interaction between a free neutron and the nucleus of some atoms such as uranium or plutonium. An atom consists of a relatively heavy, positively charged nucleus with a number of much lighter, negatively charged particles in various orbits around the nucleus. The nucleus is the central part of the atom and consists of subparticles called nucleons. There are principally two types of nucleons: neutrons, which are electrically neutral, and protons, which are positively charged. The number of protons in the nucleus is called the atomic number of that atom; all atoms of the same element have the same number of protons. The total number of nucleons in the nucleus is called the mass number, designated as A. Using X to represent the chemical symbol for the element and Z to represent the atomic number, each element is presented as  $X^A$ ,  ${}_Z X^A$ , or as "the chemical name" - A. When atoms of an element differ in their number of nucleons, they are called isotopes of that element. For example, there are three isotopes of hydrogen: hydrogen with a single proton, deuterium with a single proton and a single neutron, and tritium with one proton and two neutrons. Tritium can be expressed as  $H^3$ ,  ${}_1 H^3$ , or hydrogen 3. Uranium has an atomic number of 92; that is, each atom has 92 protons. The more common isotopes of uranium have either 143 or 146 neutrons. These two isotopes are designated as uranium-238,  ${}_{92}U^{238}$ , or  $U^{238}$  (approximately 99 percent of all naturally occurring uranium), and uranium-235,  ${}_{92}U^{235}$ , or  $U^{235}$  (approximately 0.7 percent of naturally occurring uranium). These are two of the three naturally occurring isotopes of uranium. In all, there are 18 known isotopes of uranium. Different isotopes of the same element behave identically chemically, but can have significantly different nuclear characteristics.

Fission, as it occurs in a nuclear power plant, is the process by which the atoms of one element (such as uranium or plutonium) are converted into atoms of lighter elements through the capture of a neutron and the subsequent "splitting" of the atom's nucleus (Figure A-1). This results in the release of energy fission products (atoms of the lighter elements), and neutrons. Not all isotopes of an element are capable of fission. For uranium, only 4 of the 18 known isotopes are capable of fission. Of these four, the two most important isotopes are uranium-235 and uranium-233.

Fission produces energy in the form of radiation and the kinetic energy of neutrons and fission products. Most of the energy released in the fission process is produced as the kinetic energy of the fission products. Lesser amounts are released as the kinetic energy of the neutrons and the energy produced from the radioactive decay of the fission products generated in the fission process. It is these forms of energy that are used to heat water in the core of a nuclear reactor.

Fission of an atom is initiated with a single neutron, but can result in the creation of many free neutrons (neutrons released from the nucleus). These neutrons can potentially initiate additional fission reactions. When exactly one neutron generated in a fission reaction initiates another fission reaction, the process is said to be a critical chain reaction. Criticality is an important characteristic of the nuclear power reaction. When a reactor is maintained in a critical state, the fission reaction proceeds at a constant rate. Since each fission reaction releases approximately the same amount of power, this condition will result in the reactor constantly operating at a steady power level. Therefore, it is important to control the number of neutrons available for fission. A critical chain reaction is represented in Figure A-2. If a series of fission reactions produce, on average, more than one neutron per fission that results in additional fissions, the process is said to be supercritical. In this state, the power level of the reactor increases. If, on the other hand, a series of fission reactions produce, on average, less than one neutron per fission that results in additional fissions, the process is said to be subcritical. In this condition, the power level of the reactor drops until eventually the fission process stops.

### **A.1.2 Control of Nuclear Reactions in a Reactor**

Fission is not the only reaction that can take place when a neutron interacts with the nucleus of an atom. One of three interactions is possible: (1) the neutron is scattered—i.e., it essentially bounces off the nucleus (an elastic collision); (2) the neutron is absorbed—the neutron and atom combine to make the next higher isotope of the element; or (3) the neutron is absorbed and initiates a fission reaction. These different reactions are all important in the operation of a nuclear reactor. The first reaction—scattering—results in a change in the energy of the free neutrons. The second reaction—absorption—results in the loss of neutrons from the reactor. Neutrons that are absorbed are not available to initiate fission reactions. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the third reaction, fission, is the process by which energy is produced in a nuclear reactor and additional neutrons are produced to sustain the chain reaction. The likelihood of each of these interactions depends primarily on the following two factors: the energy of the free neutrons and the isotope of the atom being struck by the neutron.

In U.S. commercial nuclear reactors, only uranium-235 is used as the nuclear fuel. Uranium-235 is found naturally in uranium ore, although natural uranium consists predominantly of uranium-238. Enriched uranium is used in U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. This is uranium in which the percentage of uranium-235 has been increased from the less than 1 percent found in natural uranium to 3 to 5 percent. With approximately 100 metric tons of enriched uranium (3 to 5 metric tons of uranium-235) in the reactor core, a nuclear power plant can operate for approximately 18 months without refueling. When the uranium fuel is removed from the reactor, much of the uranium-235 has been consumed, and the spent fuel contains approximately 1 percent uranium-235.




Figure A-1 Fission of Uranium-235 Atom




Figure A-2 Critical Chain Reaction

The fission reaction of a uranium-235 atom produces approximately 2.5 neutrons. Neutrons produced in fission are called fast neutrons. This refers to the amount of kinetic energy associated with the neutrons. However, the fission process using uranium-235 works better with slower-moving neutrons; that is, neutrons with significantly less energy than the neutrons produced from the fission process. These neutrons are called thermal neutrons. Neutrons are slowed via collisions with nuclei of atoms in the reactor core. In the collisions, energy is transferred from the neutron to the atom it collides with. Generally, the closer in weight the neutron and atom are, the more energy is transferred to the atom. This transfer of energy from the neutron to other materials results in the slowing down of the neutron and is called moderation. The moderator in U.S. commercial nuclear power plants, both pressurized and boiling water reactors, is ordinary light water. [Because the moderator used in U.S. commercial power reactors is light water and the fission reaction of uranium-235 requires slower-moving (thermal) neutrons, these types of reactors are referred to as thermal light water reactors.] The hydrogen in light water (with a nucleus containing a single proton) is nearly the same mass as the neutron. Collisions between neutrons and the hydrogen atoms result in a relatively rapid reduction in the energy of the neutrons. After many such collisions, the neutrons travel slow enough to be considered thermal neutrons.

Neutrons that are not lost from the reactor core between the time they are created as fast neutrons and the time they are moderated to thermal energy levels are available for fission. Neutrons are lost from the reactor core in several ways. Some are lost to leakage; that is, they escape from the reactor core and are captured in the reactor vessel or shielding. Some are absorbed by material in the core without producing fission. [Other materials in the core, including uranium-238 and core internal structures, contribute to the absorption of neutrons. Some neutrons that collide with uranium-235 atoms are absorbed without resulting in fission.] Specific materials, referred to as neutron poisons or simply poisons, are inserted in the reactor core to intentionally capture neutrons and provide control over the fission rate by controlling the number of neutrons available for fission. Such poisons, which are contained in control and shutdown rods, are necessary for several reasons. These devices control the rate of fission, thereby controlling the reactor power level. In addition, these devices promptly terminate the fission when the rods are fully inserted into the reactor core, thereby shutting down the reactor. The material used in control and shutdown rods is usually boron; a strong neutron absorber. In a collision between boron and a neutron, there is a high likelihood that the neutron will be absorbed into the boron, thus generating a different boron isotope. Therefore, the position of the control rods determines the power level of the reactor by controlling the number of neutrons available for fission.

Other poisons, called burnable poisons (because during the time the fuel is in the reactor the burnable poisons are used up and gradually become less effective as neutron absorbers), are placed in a reactor core in addition to the poisons that are contained in the control and shutdown rods. These burnable poisons are necessary for a reactor to operate over an extended period without loading fresh fuel into the reactor. Commercial reactors typically load fresh fuel once every one to two years. As the power plant operates during this period, uranium-235 is burned up (consumed in the fission process or by neutron absorption). Since the source of the neutrons is devoured during the generation of power, it is necessary to start the fuel cycle with more uranium-235 than is necessary to sustain a critical reaction at the desired power level. Extra uranium-235 is loaded into the reactor core, necessitating the use of burnable poisons to keep the power at the appropriate level. The reactor's power levels are controlled by using either fixed burnable poisons (burnable poison rods) in areas that would have higher than average free neutron flux, or by adding boron (in the form of boric acid) to the coolant in a pressurized water reactor. As the fuel burns it becomes less reactive because less fissionable uranium is available. Since there are fewer uranium-235 atoms per unit volume, fewer neutrons are produced. With fewer neutrons produced, the percentage of neutrons lost to leakage and absorption must be reduced to maintain the number of neutrons available for fission. Control of neutron loss due to absorption is accomplished by reducing the concentration of boron in the coolant and reducing the burnable poison in the burnable absorber rods placed in the core.



## A.2 COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DESCRIPTIONS

### A.2.1 Commercial Nuclear Reactors

In the United States, there are two types of commercial nuclear power plants currently in operation; the boiling water reactor and the pressurized water reactor.

The boiling water reactor is a single-loop system. The fission energy in the core causes the water to boil in the reactor vessel. In the reactor vessel, above the fuel, the steam passes through steam separators and steam dryers, which are used to ensure dry steam exits the reactor vessel, and travels through steam pipes to the turbine generator. The steam drives the turbine, which in turn powers the generator to create electricity. As steam passes through the turbine, it loses most of its energy but remains as steam as it passes to the main condenser. In the main condenser, where additional heat is removed by a cooling water system, the steam condenses into water. This water is pumped back to the reactor vessel where it is forced through the reactor core and is again converted to steam. Figure A-3 provides a simplified representation of a boiling water reactor. Boiling water reactors typically operate at pressures of approximately 70 kilograms per square meter (1,000 pounds per square inch), and the temperature of the water and steam in the reactor vessel approaches 288°C (550°F).

A pressurized water reactor uses a primary and secondary system to transfer heat from the reactor core to the turbine generator (see Figure A-4 for a simplified representation of a pressurized water reactor). In the primary loop (the reactor coolant system), water is forced up through the core, where it is heated but does not boil. After the water exits the reactor vessel, it passes through steam generators. The number of steam generators used in the power plant depends on the design and power level. Combustion Engineering and Babcock & Wilcox designs have two steam generators. Westinghouse designs can have from two to four steam generators. The more recent (larger power plants) have four steam generators (Figure A-5 is an isometric of a Representative Reactor Four-Loop Primary System). Each steam generator is connected to the reactor vessel in a separate, independent coolant loop. In the steam generators, the primary coolant heats water in the secondary loop and converts the water to steam. After the primary coolant leaves the steam generator, it is pumped back to the reactor vessel where it is again heated in the reactor core. The primary system has a pressurizer, which is used to control the pressure of the primary system. The pressurizer is connected to one of the primary loops and is located above the reactor core. It contains heaters and sprays that are used to control the water level in the pressurizer which, in turn, controls the pressure of the primary coolant system. The steam in the secondary loop (referred to as the steam and power conversion system) is used to drive the turbine generator and produce electricity. As in the boiling water reactor, after the steam passes through the turbine, it is condensed by cooling water in the main condenser. This cooled water is then pumped back to the secondary side of the steam generator. A pressurized water reactor primary system operates at pressures of about 158 kilograms per square meter (2,250 pounds per square inch) and temperatures of up to approximately 315°C (600°F), with the secondary loop operating at approximately 70 kilograms per square meter (1,000 pounds per square inch) and 288°C (550°F).

In addition to the difference in the number of cooling loops associated with a boiling water reactor and a pressurized water reactor, there are some differences in the design of the reactor cores. In a pressurized water reactor, the control and shutdown rods enter the reactor core from above. In a boiling water reactor, these rods are driven into the core (via a control rod-driven system) from the bottom of the core. Also, pressurized water reactors use soluble neutron poison (a boric acid solution) in the primary coolant to help control reactivity. The concentration of the soluble neutron poison is controlled by the chemical and volume control system. Typically, the concentration of boric acid is highest at the beginning of a fuel cycle, when there is fresh fuel in the core. A boiling water reactor does not use this means of reactivity control.




Figure A-3 Boiling Water Reactor Schematic





Figure A-4 Pressurized Water Reactor Schematic



**Figure A-5 Representative Four-Loop Reactor Coolant System**

### **A.2.2 Reactor Core Description**

Fuel in a nuclear reactor is slightly enriched (up to 5 percent) uranium dioxide and is sealed in fuel rods. These rods are approximately 3.6 to 3.9 meters (12 to 13 feet) long and slightly less than half an inch in diameter. Uranium, in the form of approximately half-inch long cylindrical uranium dioxide pellets, is placed in a fuel rod and enclosed in a zircaloy cladding. This cladding holds the pellets in position and provides a barrier against the release of fission products into the reactor coolant system.

In a pressurized water reactor, the fuel rods are collected in a fuel assembly that also contains several guide tubes and an instrumentation channel (illustrated in Figure A-6). The number of fuel rods in an assembly varies depending on the design of the reactor. Assemblies contain fuel rods arranged in  $14 \times 14$ ,  $15 \times 15$ , or  $17 \times 17$  arrays. The more recent reactors tend to use the  $17 \times 17$  array. The guide tubes denote the location where the control rods of the control element assemblies are inserted into the reactor core. The fuel rods, guide tubes, and the instrumentation channel are held in place by a series of grids at several locations along the full length of the fuel assembly. In a reactor core, fuel assemblies are all structurally identical and have space reserved for control element assemblies. In the Westinghouse designs, between a third and a fourth of the fuel assemblies have an associated control element assembly. In a large pressurized water reactor, one with an electrical power rating of over 1,000 megawatts, the core will consist of approximately 200 fuel assemblies. Of these, 50 to 60 fuel assemblies (depending on the reactor design) have associated control element assemblies. The remaining fuel assemblies may have burnable poison rods in the locations used by control element assemblies, or these locations may be empty. The burnable poison rods are rods with the same shape as the control and shutdown rods. However, they are not connected to the control rod-driven mechanism and cannot be removed from the reactor without shutting it down and performing refueling activities that involve removing the fuel assembly containing the burnable poison rods from the reactor core. Loading of the burnable poison rods in these locations for the assemblies without control element assemblies is dictated by the need to balance the power distribution in the core.

The control element assembly consists of a collection of control rods and a spider assembly at the top of the rods. Figure A-7 shows a control element assembly for a Representative Reactor  $17 \times 17$  fuel assembly design. The spider assembly is connected to a control rod drive mechanism that can be used to move the control element assemblies. These assemblies serve two purposes—to limit the effects of reactivity changes during power operation and to shut down the reactor. The rods are made of a strong neutron absorber (typically a boron or cadmium compound). When not needed, the control element assemblies are pulled out of the core by their control rod drives. For reactivity control during operation, the control rod drive can be used to insert the rods into the core at a controlled pace. If needed, the rods can be rapidly inserted to shut down the reactor. It is possible for the control element assemblies to be inserted into the core using only the force of gravity as the driving force. When fully inserted, the poison in the control rods absorbs enough neutrons to make the nuclear reaction become subcritical, shutting down the reactor.

As mentioned earlier, one of the ways in which neutrons are lost from the core and become unavailable for fission is through leakage. The neutrons leak from the edges of the core, and those that do not hit an atom and reflect back into the core are lost. (Reactor core designs address this problem of neutron loss by incorporating a neutron reflector, a layer of water around the core.) Neutrons generated at the center of the core are less likely to be lost through leakage than those generated at the edge of the core. Therefore, in a reactor with no burnable poisons and a uniform fuel enrichment, the number of neutrons available for fission is greater at the center of the core. The center of the core, which is about 3 meters (10 feet) in diameter and 3.6 to 3.9 meters (12 to 13 feet) tall, has a higher power density than the areas at the top, bottom, and edge of the core.

Designers of the reactor core control the distribution of power within the reactor core by using burnable poisons and varied fuel rod enrichments. Figure A-8 displays a possible arrangement of fuel assemblies within a reactor core. Other fuel loading patterns also exist, but the concept is fully expressed by a simple loading pattern described here. This figure shows fresh fuel (typically with the highest enrichment of uranium-235) loaded around the core periphery. Fuel in the center of the core is referred to as once- or twice-burned fuel and has been in the core for one or two fuel cycles. A fuel cycle is the period from one refueling outage to another. The older fuel in the reactor core has been producing power for one to two years and has burned up some of its uranium-235. This fuel is no longer as enriched as the fresh fuel. With less material available for fission in this fuel, the extra neutrons present in the center of the core will not result in overly high power levels. While controlling the enrichment level alone is not sufficient to properly shape the core power, burnable poison rods are included in the fuel assemblies.




Figure A-6 Typical 17 x 17 Reactor Fuel Assembly





Figure A-7 Representative Reactor Control Element Assembly






<u>First Core</u>		<u>Reload Core</u>
	Region 1	Once- or Twice-Burned Fuel
	Region 2	Once- or Twice-Burned Fuel (Different Enrichment)
	Region 3	Fresh Fuel

Figure A-8 General Arrangement of a Possible Reactor Core Fuel Loading Pattern

The burnable poison rods will be replaced with TPBARs in a tritium production facility (see Section A.3). The TPBARs act as neutron absorbers in much the same way as the burnable poison, although there are some differences that may result in changes to the fuel management practices at the facility using the TPBARs. The control and shutdown control element assemblies will remain unchanged in a reactor containing TPBARs and will still enable complete shutdown of the reactor at all times during the fuel cycle.

### **A.2.3 Reactor Refueling**

Unlike fossil-fueled electricity-generating plants that are continually fed fuel, nuclear power plants operate over extended periods without the need for fresh fuel. Typically, reactors will operate for 12 to 18 months between refueling outages. As stated earlier, as the uranium-235 burns up, the reactor becomes increasingly less able to maintain a critical condition. Eventually, when enough fuel is burned, the reactor will not be able to remain critical even if all of the neutron poisons are removed from the core. Before this point is reached, the reactor is shut down and refueled. When the power plant is shut down during the refueling outage, some (between one-third and two-fifths) of the fuel assemblies are removed and replaced with fresh fuel, and some of the assemblies are shuffled to different locations within the reactor core. The removed fuel is called spent fuel. The refueling outage usually lasts less than two months, during which various maintenance activities are performed. The reactor refueling is a small fraction of the overall outage.

Spent fuel is stored on site in a spent fuel pool, located in a separate building attached to the containment structure. The spent fuel is stored on site for several years, allowing the assemblies to cool and the radioactivity levels to drop sufficiently so that the spent fuel can be safely transported to a temporary or permanent waste disposal site.

The refueling operation of a nuclear power plant can be divided into four separate phases: preparation, reactor disassembly, fuel handling, and reactor assembly.

#### **Preparation**

During preparation, the reactor is shut down; all control and shutdown rods are inserted into the reactor core, and the nuclear chain reaction is stopped. Heat is still generated in the reactor core, principally by the radioactive decay of the fission products. The amount of heat produced during decay gradually decreases, and the reactor is brought to a condition called cold shutdown, where the average reactor coolant temperature is below the boiling point of water at atmospheric pressure.

#### **Reactor Disassembly**

The area above the reactor vessel is referred to as the reactor cavity, illustrated in Figure A-9. Adjacent to this cavity is the refueling cavity. During reactor disassembly, these two cavities are flooded with borated water to provide a medium for the transfer of spent and new fuel. The water provides a means to remove heat from the spent fuel assemblies and a radiation shield for the plant workers. The reactor vessel is disassembled in stages. Most items connected to the reactor vessel head are removed. The refueling cavity is partially flooded and the reactor vessel head is unbolted and slightly raised. At this time, borated water is added to the reactor coolant system and allowed to flow out of the top of the reactor vessel, ultimately flooding the reactor cavity and the refueling cavity. The reactor vessel head is completely removed, along with the control rod-driven mechanism and the upper core internals. The fuel assemblies are then free of any obstructions and can be removed from the reactor core.






Figure A-9 Typical Fuel Transfer System

## **Fuel Handling**

Fuel is removed from the core, one assembly at a time. Fuel assemblies are lifted out of the core using an overhead crane. If the spent fuel assembly contains a control element assembly, it is placed in a control element assembly changing device upon its removal from the core; otherwise it is moved to a fuel transfer system. In this device, the control element assembly is removed from the spent fuel assembly and transferred to another fuel assembly placed in the reactor core. Once the control element assembly is removed from the spent fuel assembly, it is transferred to the spent fuel pool.

The fuel transfer system lowers the fuel to a horizontal position and passes the fuel through a fuel transfer tube (which penetrates the containment structure) and into the spent fuel pool. Here, the fuel transfer system lifts the spent fuel assembly into a vertical position, and another crane places the spent fuel assembly into its location within the spent fuel racks in the pool. Spent fuel is stored in the spent fuel pool beneath over 20 feet of water. Storage under this amount of water provides two functions: the spent fuel pool has a cooling system to remove decay heat after it is transferred to the pool water, and the water provides a radiation protection barrier for the plant workers.

Fresh fuel is brought into the reactor core using the same equipment used to remove the spent fuel. New fuel handling equipment is used to unload, inspect, and prepare the fuel for insertion into the reactor. It is then transferred to the fuel transfer machine.

## **Reactor Assembly**

After all of the spent fuel is removed from the reactor, some of the remaining fuel is moved to new locations in the core; fresh fuel is added to the reactor core, and the reactor is reassembled. This is essentially the reverse of the reactor disassembly phase. After some startup tests, the reactor is ready to begin power operations.

### **A.2.4 Commercial Light Water Reactor Systems Important to Environmental Impacts**

The sections below describe the plant systems that are directly associated with environmental impacts from plant operation. These are the cooling water systems and radioactive and nonradioactive waste treatment systems.

#### **A.2.4.1 Cooling and Auxiliary Water Systems**

Water use at a nuclear power plant is predominantly for removing excess heat generated in the reactor by condenser cooling. The quantity of water used for condenser cooling is a function of several factors, including the capacity rating of the plant and the increase in cooled water temperature from the intake to the discharge. The larger the plant, the greater the quantity of waste heat and cooling water required to dissipate the waste heat.

In addition to removing heat from the reactor, cooling is also provided to the service and auxiliary cooling water systems. The volume of water required for once-through cooling is usually less than 15 percent of the volume required for condenser cooling. In closed-cycle cooling, the additional water needed is usually less than 5 percent of that needed for condenser cooling. Of all the CLWR plants operating in the United States, approximately 40 percent use closed-cycle cooling systems and 60 percent use once-through (open-cycle) cooling systems.

In closed-cycle systems, the cooled water is recirculated through the condenser after the waste heat is removed by dissipation to the atmosphere, usually by circulating the water through large cooling towers constructed for that purpose. Several types of closed-cycle cooling systems are currently used by the nuclear power industry.

Recirculating cooling systems consist of either natural-draft or mechanical-draft cooling towers, cooling ponds, cooling lakes, or cooling canals. Because the predominant cooling mechanism associated with closed-cycle systems is evaporation, most of the water used for cooling is consumed and not returned to a water source.

In a once-through cooling (open-cycle) system, circulating water for condenser cooling is drawn from an adjacent body of water, such as a lake or river, passed through the condenser tubes, and returned at a higher temperature to the adjacent body of water.

For both once-through and closed-cycle cooling systems, the water intake and discharge structures are of various configurations to accommodate the source water body and to minimize impact to the aquatic ecosystem. The intake structures are generally located along the shoreline of the body of water and are equipped with fish protection devices. The discharge structures are most often the jet or diffuser outfall type and are designed to promote rapid mixing of the effluent stream with the receiving body of water. Biocides and chemicals used for corrosion control and other water treatment purposes are mixed with the condenser cooling water and are discharged from the system.

In addition to surface water sources, some nuclear power plants use groundwater as a source for service water, makeup water, or potable water. Other plants operate dewatering systems to intentionally lower the groundwater table, either by pumping or by a system of drains, in the vicinity of building foundations.

#### **A.2.4.2 Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems**

During the fission process, a large inventory of radioactive fission products will build up within the fuel rods. A small fraction of these fission products escape the fuel rods and contaminate the reactor coolant. The primary system coolant also has radioactive contaminants as a result of neutron activation. These contaminants are removed from the coolant by a radioactive waste treatment system prior to any release to the environment. Typically, the plants include treatment systems for gaseous, liquid, and low-level radioactive solid waste.

The impacts to the environment are driven by gaseous emissions, liquid effluent, or generation of solid low-level radioactive waste after treatment.

#### **Gaseous Radioactive Emissions**

CLWRs have three primary sources of gaseous radioactive emissions:

- Discharges from the gaseous waste management system
- Discharges associated with the exhaust of noncondensable gases at the main condenser (in the event of leakage between primary and secondary cooling systems)
- Discharges from the building ventilation exhaust, including the reactor building, reactor auxiliary building, and fuel-handling building

The gaseous waste management system collects fission products, mainly noble gases, that accumulate in the primary coolant. A small portion of the primary coolant flow is continually diverted to the primary coolant purification, volume, and chemical control system to remove contaminants and adjust the coolant chemistry and volume. During this process, noncondensable gases are stripped and routed to the gaseous waste management system, which consists of a series of gas storage tanks. The storage tanks allow the short half-life radioactive gases to decay, leaving only relatively small quantities of long half-life radionuclides to be released to the atmosphere via the plant vent at a controlled rate. These releases pass through both high-efficiency particulate air and charcoal filters before entering the environment.

Discharges from the condenser vacuum exhaust and building ventilation exhaust are released to the environment with no filtration. All potentially significant release points are monitored.

### **Liquid Radioactive Effluents**

Radionuclide contaminants in the primary coolant are the source of liquid radioactive waste in CLWRs. Liquid wastes resulting from CLWR plant operation are classified into the following categories: clean wastes, dirty wastes, detergent wastes, turbine building floor drain water, and steam generator blowdown. Clean wastes include all liquid wastes with a normally low conductivity and variable radioactivity content. They consist of reactor-grade water, which is amenable to processing for reuse as reactor coolant makeup water. Clean wastes are collected from equipment leaks and drains, certain valve and pump seal leakoffs not collected in the reactor coolant drain tank, and other aerated leakage sources. In addition, these wastes include primary coolant. Dirty wastes include all liquid wastes with a moderate conductivity and variable radioactivity content that, after processing, may be used as reactor coolant makeup water. Dirty wastes consist of liquid wastes collected in the containment building sump, auxiliary building sumps and drains, laboratory drains, sample station drains, and other miscellaneous floor drains. Detergent wastes consist principally of laundry wastes and personnel and equipment decontamination wastes and normally have a low radioactivity content. Turbine building floor drain wastes usually have a high conductivity and low radionuclide content. Steam generator blowdown can have relatively high concentrations of radionuclides, depending on the amount of primary-to-secondary leakage. After processing, the water may be reused or discharged.

Each source of liquid waste receives varying degrees and types of treatment before storage for reuse or discharge to the environment under the site National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit. The extent and types of treatment depend on the chemical radionuclide content of the waste. To increase the efficiency of waste processing, wastes of similar characteristics are batched before treatment.

The degree of processing, storing, and recycling of liquid radioactive waste has steadily increased among operating plants. For example, extensive recycling of steam generator blowdown is now the typical mode of operation, and secondary side wastewater is routinely treated. In addition, the plant systems used to process wastes are often augmented with the use of commercial mobile processing systems. As a result, radionuclide releases in liquid effluent from CLWR plants have generally declined or remained the same.

### **Solid Waste**

Solid low-level radioactive waste from commercial nuclear power plants is generated by removal of radionuclides from liquid waste streams, the filtration of airborne gaseous emissions, and the removal of contaminated material from various reactor areas. Liquid waste contaminated with radionuclides comes from primary and secondary coolant systems, spent fuel pools, decontaminated wastewater, and laboratory operations. Concentrated liquid, filter sludge, waste oil, and other liquid sources are segregated by type, flushed to storage tanks, stabilized for packaging in a solid form by dewatering, slurried into 55-gallon steel drums, and stored on site in shielded Butler-style buildings or other facilities until suitable for offsite disposal. These buildings usually contain volume reduction and solidification facilities to prepare low-level radioactive waste for disposal at a certified low-level radioactive waste disposal facility.

High-efficiency particulate air filters are used to remove radioactive material from gaseous plant effluents. These filters are compacted and are disposed of as solid waste.

Solid low-level radioactive waste consists of contaminated protective clothing, paper, rags, glassware, compactible and noncompactible trash, and irradiated and nonirradiated reactor components and equipment. Most of this waste comes from plant modifications and routine maintenance activities. Additional sources include tools and other materials exposed to the reactor environment. Before disposal, compactible trash is

usually taken to onsite or offsite volume-reduction facilities. Compacted dry active waste is the largest single form of low-level radioactive waste disposed from commercial nuclear plants, comprising one-half of the total average annual volume from pressurized water reactors.

Volume reduction efforts have been undertaken in response to increased disposal costs and the passage of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 and the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, both of which require low-level radioactive waste disposal allocation systems for nuclear plants. Volume reduction is performed both on and off site. The most common onsite volume-reduction techniques are ultra-high-pressure compaction of waste drums, monitoring waste streams to segregate wastes, minimizing the exposure of routine equipment to contamination, and decontaminating and sorting of radioactive or nonradioactive batches before offsite shipment. Offsite waste management vendors incinerate dry-activated waste; separate and incinerate oily, organic wastes; solidify the ash; and occasionally undertake supercompaction, waste crystallization, and asphalt solidification of resins and sludges.

#### **A.2.4.3 Nonradioactive Waste Systems**

Nonradioactive wastes from commercial nuclear power plants include steam generator blowdown, water treatment wastes (sludges and high saline streams that have residues that are disposed of as solid wastes and biocides), steam generator metal cleaning, floor and yard drains, and stormwater runoff. Principal chemical and biocide waste sources include the following:

- Hydrazine, which is used for corrosion control (it is released in steam generator blowdown)
- Sodium hydroxide and sulfuric acid, which are used to regenerate resins that capture wastes (these are discharged after neutralization)
- Phosphates in cleaning solutions
- Biocides used for condenser defouling

Other small volumes of wastewater are released from plant systems and depend on the design of each plant. These are discharged as the service water and auxiliary cooling systems, water treatment plant, laboratory and sampling wastes, floor drains, stormwater runoff, and metal treatment wastes. These waste streams are discharged as separate point sources or are combined with the cooling water discharges.


### **A.3 TRITIUM-PRODUCING BURNABLE ABSORBER RODS**

#### **A.3.1 Nucleonics of Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rods**

TPBARs serve two functions in a nuclear power reactor: (1) they absorb excess neutrons and help make the power distribution more even in the reactor core, and (2) they produce tritium. The neutron absorber material in a TPBAR is lithium, in the form of lithium aluminate, enriched in lithium-6 ( $\text{Li}^6$ ). When lithium-6 absorbs a neutron, as would happen in the core of an operating power reactor, the neutrons and protons in the lithium would recombine into two parts: tritium (hydrogen-3 or  $\text{H}^3$ ) and helium-4. This process would result in the release of 4.8 million electron volts (MeV) of energy. This process can be written:




or



Once the tritium ( $H^3$ ) is produced inside the TPBAR, it is captured and held in a getter, as described in Section A.3.2. However, the tritium, itself unstable, slowly decays by emitting a beta particle (an electron), and becomes helium-3:




or




Tritium's rate of decay, or "half-life," is 12.3 years, which means that every 12.3 years, half of the tritium will decay and become helium-3. Helium-3 is stable, but it has a strong affinity for neutrons and is a good neutron absorber. As the inventory of tritium accumulates in the TPBARs during irradiation in the core, the amount of helium-3 increases as a result of the decay of tritium. This has the effect of adding a material to the reactor core that is a strong neutron absorber.

Both lithium-6 and helium-3 are considered neutron poisons. The amount of lithium-6 in the TPBARs is reduced or "burned" (hence the term "burnable") during its irradiation in the core, effectively reducing its poisonous effect. However, an increase in the amount of the helium-3 poison during irradiation in the reactor core somewhat balances the reduction of the amount of lithium-6. As a result, the effectiveness of the TPBARs in absorbing neutrons during the 18 months (one fuel cycle) they are in the core is only slightly reduced from the start of the fuel cycle to its finish.

In a normal burnable absorber rod, the rod that TPBARs will replace, the neutron absorber is boron-10, which absorbs a neutron and promptly decays into lithium-7 and helium-4:



or



Boron-10 is a strong poison, but lithium-7 has little capacity to absorb neutrons. Therefore, as the boron-10 is converted to lithium-7 during irradiation in the core, the burnable absorber rod absorbs fewer neutrons and loses its poisonous effect on the reactor core. By design, at the end of an 18-month fuel cycle, the burnable absorber rods are no longer effective neutron absorbers.

Therefore, the result of using TPBARs instead of boron-10 burnable absorber rods is that, over the 18-month fuel cycle, the TPBARs act as a stronger overall poison than the burnable absorber rods that they replace. This, coupled with the fact that there will be many more TPBARs than there were burnable absorber rods, results in a significant increase in neutron poison in the core of the tritium production CLWR compared to the nontritium production CLWR.

To compensate for the added TPBAR poison, the core may need to have more new fuel assemblies loaded during each refueling, and the enrichment of those assemblies may need to be increased. As described previously, enrichment of the fuel is the amount of uranium-235 contained in the fuel. The higher the uranium-235 content in the fuel, the more fissions the fuel is capable of producing. Enrichment of the new fuel placed in the core of a tritium production CLWR may need to be increased to just under 5 percent, compared to the 4.2 to 4.5 percent currently being used in CLWRs. Five percent enrichment is the upper limit for reactor licensing by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

### A.3.2 Physical Description of the Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rod

Lithium, the active ingredient in tritium production, is in the form of an annular-shaped ceramic lithium-aluminate pellet. The pellets are contained in subassemblies called pencils. Each pencil is about 30 centimeters (12 inches) long and consists of a stack of pellets, a zircaloy inner liner inside of the pellets, and a nickel-plated zircaloy tube or getter outside of the pellets. Inside the zirconium liner is a gas plenum. The components of a TPBAR are illustrated in Figures A-10 and A-11.





Figure A-10 TPBAR Transverse Cross Section

Tritium is generated as a gas, almost all of which is captured by the nickel-plated zircaloy getter as a tritide ( $ZrT_x$ ). Tritium that becomes tritiated water vapor before it can be absorbed by the getter is disassociated by the zircaloy inner liner. The getter is nickel-plated to protect it from tritiated water vapor, which would oxidize its surface and block further absorption of tritium gas. The zircaloy inner liner also serves to maintain the overall geometry of the pellets.

Twelve pencils, getter discs at the top and bottom of the twelve pencils, and a spring loaded inside a stainless steel tube create a TPBAR. The spring holds the pencils in place during handling and allows for thermal expansion during operation. The inside surface of the stainless steel tube, or cladding, has an aluminized barrier coating to retard the permeation of hydrogen into and tritium out of the TPBAR. Loss of tritium through the cladding would increase the tritium released into the reactor coolant and, therefore, reduce the amount of tritium available for processing. Ingress of hydrogen into the TPBAR would be absorbed by the getter, diminishing the ability of the getter to absorb tritium. A less effective getter would increase the partial pressure of tritium inside the TPBAR, which would increase tritium loss through the cladding. The TPBARs are evacuated, backfilled with helium at one atmosphere pressure, and seal-welded. TPBARs would be put in the fuel assembly's nonfuel positions designed for burnable poison rods. Therefore, the exterior dimensions of the TPBARs are the same as those of burnable absorber rods. For the Westinghouse  $17 \times 17$  design fuel assembly, the TPBARs would have an outside diameter of 0.381 inches, which is exactly that of a burnable



(Not to Scale)

Figure A-11 TPBAR Longitudinal Cross Section



absorber rod. The cladding of the TPBAR would be stainless steel, type 316. The cladding of absorber rods would be either 304-type stainless steel or zircaloy 4.

All of the TPBARs inserted into a given fuel assembly are attached to a base plate, forming a TPBAR assembly. The base plate is part of the hold-down assembly, which also includes a spring and a locking device. The base plate not only maintains the spacing of the TPBARs for insertion and withdrawal, but also allows the TPBARs to be handled in groups, rather than one at a time. Figure A-12 illustrates the base plate as part of the hold-down assembly.




Figure A-12 TPBAR Hold-Down Assembly

### A.3.3 Handling of Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rods

The individual TPBARs would be mounted on the hold-down assembly through holes in the base plate and locked in place. The TPBAR assemblies would then be inserted into new fuel assemblies at the fuel manufacturer's site. The TPBARs would be transported to the reactor site and loaded into the reactor core as an integral part of the new fuel assembly. After irradiation in the core for approximately 18 months (one fuel cycle), the spent fuel, along with their TPBARs, would be removed from the core. In a normal refueling of a reactor core used for tritium production, some of the fuel assemblies would be re-inserted into the core for use during the second fuel cycle, while the rest of the fuel assemblies would go to the spent fuel pool. The TPBARs in fuel assemblies destined for the spent fuel pool would be left in their host fuel assemblies until after the refueling.

Some TPBARs could reside in fuel assemblies that would be re-inserted in the core and used during a second fuel cycle. Each of the fuel assemblies that are to be re-inserted in the core would be moved to the spent fuel pool and placed in a stand where the TPBAR assembly would be remotely removed. These fuel assemblies would then be returned to the reactor core. The removed TPBARs would be placed in other spent fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool, where they would be stored under water until transported from the site.

After a short period of time following refueling, all of the TPBARs would be removed from the storage position in their host spent fuel assemblies and placed in a handling stand. In the handling stand, the individual TPBARs would be separated from the base plate and moved to the consolidation rack, where they would be inserted in the consolidation assemblies. The consolidation assemblies are essentially square cans

with a  $17 \times 17$  array of positions capable of accepting TPBARs. Once loaded, a handling fixture would be placed on the ends of the assemblies, and the assemblies would be handled with the same tools as fuel assemblies. The consolidation assemblies would then be placed in transportation cask positions designed for fuel assemblies and transported to the Department of Energy (DOE) Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.

#### **A.4 IMPACT OF TRITIUM PRODUCTION ON THE FUEL CYCLE**

The introduction of TPBARs into the fuel assemblies used in a CLWR would impact the fuel management strategy currently in use by the operator of the CLWR. The replacement of burnable poison rods with the TPBARs affects the core physics (the utilization of neutrons to produce power and tritium) and could alter the design of the core. Because the TPBARs have a large residual reactivity penalty, the tritium production core designs require higher enrichments and may require larger feed (fresh fuel) regions than the commercial core designs with a comparable power level and cycle length. These two fuel cycle characteristics were assumed to be unchanged with the introduction of TPBARs into the commercial core. Several core parameters were identified that could be impacted by the replacement of burnable poison rods with TPBARs. The most important among these are the power peaking factors. The distribution of power within the core is limited so that no single area produces significantly more than the average amount of power generated throughout the core. The differences between the average power and local power are quantified in several power peaking factors. By limiting the values of these peaking factors, the plant operator and the NRC ensure that the power plant operates within safety limits and would respond to accidents as described in the accident analysis required of all licensed nuclear power plants. With limitations on the number and distribution of TPBARs in the core used in this environmental impact statement (EIS), the power peaking factors in the commercial power production core and the tritium production core are very similar and the safety limits are not expected to be exceeded. Therefore, tritium production can be performed without the need to modify the CLWR core design, and only changes in the fuel enrichment would be required.

The maximum number of TPBARs that could be placed in the core (or irradiated) at each reactor unit without significantly disturbing the normal electricity-producing mode of reactor operation is approximately 3,400 (the exact number depends on the specific design of the reactor). This section evaluates the impact of tritium production on the fuel cycle by irradiating a range of 1,000 TPBARs to a maximum of 3,400 TPBARs at each reactor unit. The fuel cycle would be assumed to remain unchanged at 18 months. Irradiating a maximum number of TPBARs in each reactor core would require each nonfuel position (guide tube location) inside the core that is not reserved for the control element to be filled by a TPBAR, and the number of fresh fuel assemblies loaded into the core at each refueling to be increased. Irradiation of 1,000 TPBARs can be accomplished by placing the TPBARs in positions currently occupied by burnable poison rods. This action would not change the number of fresh fuel assemblies that are currently loaded into the core during refueling for commercial operation with no TPBARs.

##### **Power Operation with Maximum Number of TPBARs**

As stated earlier, irradiation of a maximum number of TPBARs requires their insertion in every possible guide tube location. For Watts Bar 1, this means that TPBARs would be located in the 24 guide tubes of 136 fuel assemblies (141 in Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 and 140 in Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2) that do not have a control assembly (TVA 1991, TVA 1995, TVA 1996, TVA 1998). Commercial operation of Watts Bar 1 without tritium production consists of an 18-month fuel cycle and replacement of 80 spent fuel assemblies (72 for Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 and 80 for Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2) at each refueling.

The main premise of using a CLWR to produce tritium is that the reactor power would remain unchanged. Since TPBARs use lithium (a strong neutron absorber) to produce tritium and the reactor power level is dependent on the number of neutrons available for fission, additional neutrons must be generated to maintain

the reactor power level when the CLWR is used for tritium production. To meet the increased demand for neutrons, the enrichment of the reactor fuel would need to be increased. This would result in more uranium-235 in the reactor core. The maximum fuel enrichment for the fresh fuel is limited to 5 percent. Because of limitations on the distribution of power and the limits on the maximum enrichment of uranium fuel (5 percent), tritium production would require more fresh fuel to be loaded into the reactor at each refueling to maintain the same fuel cycle. For Watts Bar 1, these factors would result in the need to replace 136 of the 193 fuel assemblies (141 of 205 for Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 and 140 of 193 for Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2) with fresh fuel every fuel cycle. The remaining 57 fuel assemblies (64 for Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 and 53 for Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2) that have been burned once would be moved to the positions where the control element assemblies are located. Fresh fuel assemblies would contain the TPBARs and be positioned in the locations without a control element assembly.

Based on the above discussion and the consideration that each CLWR unit would operate to produce tritium for 40 years, Watts Bar 1 would generate 1,512 additional spent fuel assemblies (1,863 by Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2 and 1,620 by Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2); see also Table A-1.

#### Power Operation with 1,000 TPBARs

The operation of CLWRs with 1,000 TPBARs would not affect the number of fuel assemblies replaced during each refueling. As stated earlier, TPBARs are scattered in the core in place of burnable absorber rods. Production of tritium in a CLWR with less than 2,000 TPBARs is not expected to increase spent fuel generation per fuel cycle (WEC 1999). However, to maintain an 18-month fuel cycle similar to the maximum TPBAR loading, a higher fuel enrichment is required.

**Table A-1 Summary of Increase in Spent Fuel Generation From 40 Years of Tritium Production with Maximum Number of TPBARs**

<i>Data Parameters</i>	<i>Watts Bar 1</i>	<i>Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2</i>	<i>Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2</i>
Operating cycle (months)	18	18	18
Fresh fuel assemblies per cycle—no tritium production	80	80	72
Fresh fuel assemblies per cycle—maximum TPBARs	136	140	141
Increase in fresh fuel assemblies per cycle due to tritium production	56	60	69
Number of operating cycles in 40 years (rounded up)	27	27	27
Number of additional fuel assemblies for 40 years of tritium production	1,512	1,620	1,863

## **A.5 REFERENCES**

TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority), 1991, *Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report*, through Amendment 30, Chattanooga, Tennessee, December 20.

TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority), 1995, *Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report*, through Amendment 91, Chattanooga, Tennessee, October 24.

TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority), 1996, *Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report*, through Amendment 12, Chattanooga, Tennessee, December 6.

TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority), 1998, data collected from TVA personnel by Science Applications International Corporation personnel, January—August.

| WEC (Westinghouse Electric Company), 1999, letter from M. L. Travis to Dr. John E. Kelly, Sandia National  
| Laboratory, Albuquerque, New Mexico, "Transmittal of Information to Support the CLWR Tritium Production  
| Environmental Impact Statement," NDP-MLT-98-156 (Rev. 1), February.

## **Appendix B**

### **Methods for Assessing Environmental Impacts – Application to Production of Tritium in Commercial Light Water Reactors**

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## **APPENDIX B**

### **METHODS FOR ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS— APPLICATION TO PRODUCTION OF TRITIUM IN COMMERCIAL LIGHT WATER REACTORS**

This appendix describes the methods for assessing environmental impacts and addresses the application of those methods to the production of tritium in commercial light water reactors (CLWRs). The methods and applications are designed to comply with the Council on Environmental Quality and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) regulations implementing the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). A summary of Federal environmental, safety, and health statutes, regulations, and orders applicable to relevant resource/issue areas is provided in Section B.13, Table B-1, and a list of relevant DOE Orders and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guides is given in Section B.13, Table B-2 at the end of this appendix.

The following resources and issues are covered in this environmental impact statement (EIS):

- Land resources
- Air quality and noise
- Water resources
- Geology and soils
- Ecology
- Archaeological and historic resources
- Socioeconomics
- Public and occupational health and safety
- Waste management
- Transportation
- Spent fuel management
- Environmental justice.

*The Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor* covers CLWR production of tritium in one or more of the following reactors:

- Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (Watts Bar 1)
- Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (Sequoyah 1 and 2)
- Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (Bellefonte 1 and 2).

The level of detail for the assessment of environmental impacts on each resource depends on the status of each reactor. For the currently operating reactors (Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2), only the resources that would be affected by activities associated with tritium production are discussed and these impacts are evaluated in detail. For the partially completed reactors (Bellefonte 1 and 2), the impacts on all resources are evaluated in detail.

The assessment of the environmental impacts from the production of tritium in CLWRs is based on the following general assumptions:

- For Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2, the impacts attributed to the production of tritium are those associated with the additional activities required to produce tritium that are beyond the current power operation activities.
- For Bellefonte 1 and 2, the impacts attributed to the production of tritium are: (1) impacts from the completion of construction of the facilities; and (2) full impacts from the operation of the reactors.

## **B.1 LAND RESOURCES**

### **B.1.1 Land Use**

The analyses of the impacts on land resources are based on the type and extent of land affected, the degree to which activities alter the land (including irretrievable usages), and the existing Federal, state, and local land use ordinances and policies (e.g., zoning).

### **B.1.2 Visual Resources**

Visual resource assessments are based on the Bureau of Land Management's visual resource management method. A qualitative visual resource analysis, adapted from the Bureau of Land Management's visual contrast rating system (DOI 1986a, DOI 1986b), is conducted, as applicable, to:

- Identify key viewing positions (such as public travel routes, nearby residential/commercial areas, and public use facilities such as parks, recreation areas, and scenic areas)
- Assess the degree of visibility of new or modified facilities (buildings, stacks, access roads, parking areas, facility and perimeter lighting, steam and emission plumes) from these key viewing positions
- Assess the compatibility of such facilities with the existing setting

Sensitivity is assessed based on the potential for public concern about adverse effects on specific views within the affected environment.

## **B.2 AIR QUALITY AND NOISE**

### **B.2.1 Air Quality**

In currently operating reactors where the production of tritium is expected to result in some additional release of tritium to the atmosphere, the additional release is quantified and the expected concentration in air is calculated and compared with existing conditions and standards.

In partially completed reactors where construction activities would take place and the impacts of the full reactor operations are attributed to the production of tritium, assessments of air quality impacts include identification of applicable criteria for assessing impacts, development of emission inventories, and estimation of air pollutant concentrations. Ambient air monitoring data is used to determine background concentrations of pollutants for the specific site. The assessment of impacts is based on estimated pollutant concentrations, data on the existing environment, and assessment criteria. Human health effects due to air pollutant emissions are discussed in Section B.8; potential impacts of airborne radioactive and chemical releases are included.

Assessment criteria for pollutants include the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) primary and secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards for criteria pollutants specified in 40 CFR 50 and those established by each state. The more stringent of either the EPA or state standards serves as the assessment criteria. The hazardous and toxic air pollutants include those listed in Title III of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, in the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants in 40 CFR 61, and in standards and guidelines proposed or adopted by the respective states. Site-specific emissions are modeled using the EPA-recommended ISCST3 model and the EPA's Guidelines on Air Quality Models (40 CFR 51, Appendix W).

### **B.2.2 Noise**

Noise impacts are assessed on the basis of the potential change at residences near the site boundary. The potential for exposure of workers to noise and the measures taken to protect worker hearing are qualitatively discussed.

## **B.3 WATER RESOURCES**

In currently operating CLWRs, tritium production is expected to result in some additional release of tritium as a liquid effluent. This additional release is quantified in the EIS, and the expected concentrations in the liquid environment are calculated and compared to existing conditions and standards. In partially completed CLWRs where construction activities would be required and the impacts of the full operation of the reactor are attributed to tritium production, comprehensive water resource and quality assessments are performed. As part of this assessment, water resource impacts (surface water, groundwater, and floodplain) are reviewed in relation to: the Clean Water Act, specifically Sections 402 (National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System [NPDES]), 307(b) (toxic and pretreatment effluent standards), and 316 (thermal discharge); the Safe Drinking Water Act; DOE Regulation 10 CFR 1022; Compliance with Flood Plains/Wetlands Environmental Review Requirements; Executive Order 11988, Floodplain Management; and applicable state water quality standards. Potential effects on surface water and groundwater availability and quality are assessed by considering whether the proposed action or alternatives can significantly affect the quantity or quality of water available for local consumption, as well as compliance with legislative or regulatory requirements, and the risk of flooding.

### *Surface Water*

Impact assessments to surface water include the following factors:

- Changes in rate of water consumption and wastewater discharges for operation and construction phases (as applicable)
- Changes in chemical, physical, and thermal characterization of all wastewater discharges
- Changes in the annual low flows of surface water resulting from proposed withdrawals and discharges
- Existing water supply to support the demand [This is assessed by comparing projected increases with the capacity of the supplier and by considering existing water rights, agreements, and allocations.]

Water quality impacts are determined by reviewing current monitoring data reports for nonradiological effluents. Potential radiological impacts from the discharge of tritium are discussed in the Public and Occupational Health and Safety Section (see Section B.8). Water quality management practices at each site also are reviewed. Monitoring reports for discharges permitted under the NPDES program are examined for



compliance with permit limits and requirements. In most cases, current available data in the monitoring reports include information on the constituents present or the rate of discharge. A qualitative assessment of water quality impacts from wastewater (sanitary and process), stormwater runoff, stream channel erosion and sedimentation, stream bank flooding, and thermal impacts are identified.

Where possible, the proposed location is compared with the 500-year floodplain.

#### *Groundwater*

Tritium production is not expected to affect groundwater quality or groundwater resources for any of the alternatives. However, effluents are analyzed for effects on aquifers, groundwater usage, and groundwater quality within the regions. Available data on existing groundwater quality conditions are compared to Federal and state groundwater quality standards, effluent limitations, and safe drinking water standards. Additionally, Federal and state permitting requirements for groundwater withdrawal and discharge are identified. Impacts of groundwater withdrawals on existing contaminant plumes due to construction and facility operation are assessed to determine the potential for changes in their rates of migration and the effects of any changes in the plumes on groundwater users. Impacts are assessed by the degree to which groundwater quality, drawdown of groundwater levels, and groundwater availability to other users is affected.

### **B.4 GEOLOGY AND SOILS**

Soil types at construction sites are described, and the capability for supporting construction is assessed. Shrinking or swelling of the ground as a result of landscaping, irrigation, or construction-related dewatering and soil erosion susceptibility also is addressed.

### **B.5 ECOLOGY**

Ecological impacts are addressed as applicable for terrestrial resources, wetlands, aquatic resources, and threatened and endangered species. Sources of impacts considered include land use changes, salt drift (residual salts left behind as a result of the evaporation of cooling tower water), chemical or radionuclide emissions, water withdrawal, wastewater discharges, and human disturbance and noise. Potential impacts are assessed based on both the Federal and state protection regulations and standards and on the degree to which various habitats or species can be affected by the project.

#### *Terrestrial Resources*

The key considerations in assessing the effects on terrestrial resources are the presence and regional importance of affected habitats and the size of the habitat area to be disturbed by construction or operations. Impacts to wildlife are based on plant community loss, which is closely associated with animal habitat. The potential for disturbance, displacement, or loss of wildlife, in accordance with wildlife protection laws such as the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, is evaluated.

#### *Wetlands*

Most impacts on wetlands are related to displacement of wetlands by filling, draining, or clearing activities. Operational impacts to wetlands may occur from effluents, surface or groundwater withdrawals, or creation of new wetlands. The loss of wetlands resulting from construction and operation are addressed in the same way as for terrestrial plant communities—by comparing data on onsite wetlands to proposed land requirements. Sedimentation impacts are evaluated based on the nearness of wetlands to project areas, assuming standard

construction erosion and sedimentation control measures. Impacts resulting from increased flows are evaluated based on a comparison of expected discharge rates with present stream flow rates.

#### *Aquatic Resources*

Impacts to aquatic resources are assessed for sedimentation, increased flows, effluent discharge, impingement, entrainment, loss of spawning habitat, and introduction of waste heat and chemicals.

#### *Threatened and Endangered Species*

Potential impacts to threatened and endangered species are determined in a manner similar to that described for terrestrial and aquatic resources, since the impact sources are similar.

### **B.6 ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORIC RESOURCES**

The archaeological and historic resources impact analyses determine the potential effects on prehistoric, historic, Native American, and paleontological resources.

### **B.7 SOCIOECONOMICS**

Socioeconomic impacts are assessed for the region of influence in the areas of:

- Demographics (population growth)
- Economics (employment and income)
- Housing
- Public finance
- Public infrastructure (schools, transportation, hospitals, recreational facilities, etc.).

The region of influence is the area containing roughly 90 percent of the current and potential employees at the site. Local impacts from a concentration of activity or a relatively large change in activity are noted. Changes are projected over 40 years. Employment impacts are estimated using the Bureau of Economic Analysis' Regional Input-Output Multiplier System.

### **B.8 PUBLIC AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY**

For the currently operating CLWRs where the production of tritium is expected to result only in some additional release of tritium to the environment under either normal operations or accident conditions, the incremental impacts to the public and facility workers are assessed by using the method in the facilities' environmental reports and the associated NRC final environmental statements, and by adding the effects of the increase in the amounts of released tritium.

For the partially completed CLWRs, the impacts of full reactor operations would be attributed to the production of tritium; therefore, the impacts to the public and facility workers are assessed using current NRC guidelines and practices.

The public and occupational health and safety analysis determines the potential adverse effects on human health from exposure to ionizing radiation and hazardous chemicals. Health effects are determined by identifying the types and quantities of additional material (radioactive and chemical) to which one may be

exposed, estimating doses, and then calculating the resultant health effects (latent cancer fatalities). The impacts from various releases during normal operation and the postulated accidents on the human health of workers and the public residing within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of each site are assessed. This assessment uses site-specific factors such as meteorology, population distribution, and agricultural production. Models are used to project the impacts on the health of workers and the public due to radiological and chemical releases during normal operation and postulated accidents. These models include:

- MACCS2 (SNL 1997) for radioactive material releases during beyond design-basis accidents
- GENII (PNL 1988) for all radioactive material releases during normal operations and other accidents (design-basis and TPBAR handling accidents)
- ISCST3 (EPA 1995) and ALOHA (NSC 1990) for hazardous chemical releases during normal operation and accident conditions

*Health Impacts on Plant Workers During Normal Operation*—Because radiation workers are individually monitored, experiences from past and current operations that are similar to future operation are used to estimate the radiological health impacts to workers. Health impacts from chemicals, if any, are discussed qualitatively. There are no individual exposure data on workers for chemicals. Therefore, it is assumed that individuals are exposed to low air chemical emission concentrations during an 8-hour day for a 40-hour week at a point (about 100 meters per 330 feet) downstream from the release point.

*Health Impacts on the General Public During Normal Operation*—Public health impacts from exposure to radiological or hazardous chemical materials released during operations are calculated. The effect is the sum of: (1) internal exposure resulting from breathing, eating, and drinking; and (2) external exposure resulting from standing on contaminated ground, being exposed to the air, and being submerged in water. The type and amount of material released are estimated, and the associated radiological and chemical doses are determined. These doses are converted to health effects using appropriate health risk estimators, both radiological (NRC/NAS 1990, NCRP 1993) and chemical (EPA 1997).

*Accident Analyses for Postulated Accident Scenarios*—Risks to both an individual member of the public and the general population residing within the affected area are calculated. The magnitude and consequences of impacts associated with each alternative are determined using site-specific and/or reactor-specific safety analyses. Although the concepts used are analogous to a formal probabilistic risk assessment, the accident analyses involve less detail and only address a spectrum of beyond design-basis accidents (severe core disruptive reactor accidents) that represent high consequence events with a low probability of occurrences (often  $\leq 1.0 \times 10^{-6}$  per year), and a spectrum of possible design-basis and other operational accidents that represent low-consequence events with a high probability of occurrences (frequency greater than  $1.0 \times 10^{-6}$  per year). These accidents are similar to those that have been postulated in the plant's environmental report and the corresponding NRC final environmental statement.

The accident risk to a noninvolved<sup>1</sup> worker is calculated for a hypothetical worker at 0.64 kilometers (0.4 mile) (or the site boundary, whichever is closer) from the facility release point. The risk to facility workers from radiological accidents is addressed qualitatively, since precise placement of the workers during accidents cannot be known.

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<sup>1</sup>Noninvolved workers are only applicable to DOE sites, since each DOE site usually contains many facilities. At a CLWR, there are no facilities that do not directly support reactor operation. Therefore, noninvolved workers, as defined in DOE documents, do not exist. For consistency, however, this calculation will be performed.

**Uncertainties**—The sequence of analyses needed to generate the radiological impact estimates from normal operations and facility accidents includes: (1) a selection of normal operational modes and accident sequences, (2) estimation of source terms, (3) estimation of environmental transport and uptake of radionuclides, (4) calculation of radiation doses to exposed individuals, and (5) estimation of health effects.

The analyses use conservative models and scenarios to bound the risks. As a result, even though the range of uncertainty in a quantity may be large, the value calculated for the quantity is close to the upper extreme in the range, so the chance of the actual quantity being greater than the calculated value (or the chance of the quantity being less than the calculated value if the criteria are such that the quantity has to be maximized) is low.

For the partially completed CLWRs, the impacts are evaluated using the total source terms (as opposed to incremental) associated with each accident.

### **B.8.1 Emergency Preparedness**

Emergency preparedness plans exist for all operating reactor sites and are summarized in the EIS for each site. For nonoperating reactor sites, approximate plans need to be developed.

## **B.9 WASTE MANAGEMENT**

The volumes of each waste type (low-level radioactive, low-level mixed, hazardous, nonhazardous, and high-level radioactive) are estimated. Methods of minimizing each of the waste streams are discussed. Impacts are assessed in the context of site practices for treatment, storage, and disposal. Wastes related to decontamination and decommissioning are also discussed. Decontamination and decommissioning can range from performing a simple radiological survey to completely dismantling and removing a radioactively contaminated facility.

## **B.10 TRANSPORTATION**

The impacts of transporting program-related materials are described. The packages required for the shipment of materials are also described. For transporting irradiated TPBARs and radioactive waste, the following elements are considered: transport mode, weight of material, Curies, proximity dose rates (transport index), type of package, number of shipments, and distance. Road and railroad routes are identified using HIGHWAY (ORNL 1993a) and INTERLINE (ORNL 1993b) codes, respectively. Radiological transportation health impacts are calculated using RADTRAN and TICLD (SNL 1993) codes for both the incident-free and accident conditions. In addition to the radiological risks posed by the transportation activities, vehicle-related risks are assessed for nonradiological causes (i.e., causes related to the transport vehicles and not the TPBAR packages). Nonradiological risks during incident-free transportation conditions are caused by potential exposure to increased vehicle exhaust emissions. Nonradiological risks resulting from accident conditions unrelated to the shipment cargo are assessed using state-specific transportation fatality rates.

## **B.11 SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT**

“Spent fuel” is the terminology used for nuclear reactor fuel that has been irradiated to the point that it no longer contributes to the continued operation of the reactor. The spent fuel is removed from the reactor core and stored in the spent fuel storage pool or basin. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, assigned the Secretary of Energy the responsibility for developing a repository for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel. When such a repository is available, spent fuel is transported for disposal

from the nuclear power reactors to the repository. Until a repository is available, spent fuel is stored in the reactor pools or in other acceptable, NRC-licensed storage locations. Because of the uncertainty associated with opening a repository, this EIS assumes that spent fuel is stored at the reactor facility for the 40-year duration of the proposed action.

## **B.12 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE**

Executive Order 12898, Federal Action to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low Income Populations, requires an assessment of incidence and mitigation related to disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects on minority and low-income populations. In May 1996, the Council on Environmental Quality released its initial guidance on environmental justice (CEQ 1996). This guidance forms the basis of the environmental justice analysis. The following definitions are used in the analysis:

- *Minority Individuals*—Persons self-designated as Hispanic (of any race), Native American, Asian or Pacific Islander, or Black
- *Minority Population*—The total number of minority individuals residing within a specified area
- *Low-Income Individuals*—Any persons whose income is below the poverty threshold
- *Low-Income Population*—The total number of low-income individuals residing within a specified area

Demographic data provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census is used to quantify minority and low-income populations in the affected area, i.e., within a radius of 80 kilometers (50 miles) and 16 kilometers (10 miles) from the site. Poverty thresholds, which are a function of family size and the number of unmarried children under 18, are used to identify the low-income populations. To avoid significant uncertainties in the population estimate due to partial inclusions of geographic units (such as census tracts, block groups, and blocks) at the boundaries of potentially affected areas, the unit area of spatial resolution is significantly less than the affected area. Uncertainty bounds are calculated by total inclusion (the upper bound) and total exclusion (the lower bound) of the populations residing within the affected area.

As the analysis found no significant impacts on the general population, no further analyses of impacts on minority populations and low-income populations are required. Instead, the discussion states that no significant impacts are likely for the general population or any particular segment of the population.

## **B.13 APPLICABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDANCE**

Tables B-1 and B-2 provide a summary of all environmental laws, regulations, and guidance applicable to the preparation of the CLWR EIS.

Table B-1 Federal Environmental Statutes, Regulations, and Executive Orders<sup>1</sup>

Resource Category	Statute/Regulation/Order	Citation	Responsible Agency	Potential Applicability: Permits, Approvals, Consultations, and Notifications
Air Resources	The Clean Air Act, as amended	42 U.S.C. §§7401 <i>et seq.</i>	Environmental Protection Agency/State	Requires sources to meet standards and obtain permits to satisfy: NAAQS, state implementation plans, the Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, NESHAP, and Prevention of Significant Deterioration regulations.
	The National Ambient Air Quality Standards/State Implementation Plans	42 U.S.C. §§7409 <i>et seq.</i>	Environmental Protection Agency/State	Requires compliance with primary and secondary ambient air quality standards governing sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon dioxide, ozone, lead, and PM <sub>10</sub> and emission limits/reduction measures as designated in each state's implementation plan.
	Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources	42 U.S.C. §7411	Environmental Protection Agency/State	Establishes control/emission standards and record keeping requirements for new or modified sources specifically addressed by a standard.
	The National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants	42 U.S.C. §7412	Environmental Protection Agency/State	Requires sources to comply with emission levels of carcinogenic or mutagenic pollutants; may require preconstruction approval, depending on the process being considered and the level of emissions that will result from the new or modified source.
	Prevention of Significant Deterioration	42 U.S.C. §§7470 <i>et seq.</i>	Environmental Protection Agency/State	Applies to areas that are in compliance with NAAQS. Requires comprehensive preconstruction review and the application of Best Available Control Technology to major stationary sources (emissions of 100 tons per year) and major modifications; requires a preconstruction review of air quality impacts and the issuance of a construction permit from the responsible state agency setting forth emission limitations to protect the Prevention of Significant Deterioration increment.
	Noise Control Act of 1972	42 U.S.C. §§4901 <i>et seq.</i>	Environmental Protection Agency	Requires facilities to maintain noise levels that do not jeopardize the health and safety of the public.
Water Resources	The Clean Water Act	33 U.S.C. §§1251 <i>et seq.</i>	Environmental Protection Agency/State	Requires Environmental Protection Agency or state-issued permits and compliance with provisions of permits regarding discharge of effluents to surface waters.
	National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (Section 402 of the Clean Water Act)	33 U.S.C. § 1342	Environmental Protection Agency/State	Requires permit to discharge effluents to surface waters and stormwaters; permit modifications are required if discharge effluents are altered.
	Dredged or Fill Material (Section 404 of the Clean Water Act)/Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899	33 U.S.C. §1344/33 U.S.C. §§401 <i>et seq.</i>	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	Requires permits to authorize the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters or wetlands and to authorize certain structures.
	Wild and Scenic Rivers Act	16 U.S.C. §§ 1271 <i>et seq.</i>	FWS/Bureau of Land Management/Forest Service/National Park Service	Requires consultation before construction of any new Federal project associated with a river designated or under study as wild and scenic in order to minimize and mitigate any adverse effects on the physical and biological properties of the river.
	Safe Drinking Water Act	42 U.S.C. §§ 300f <i>et seq.</i>	Environmental Protection Agency/State	Requires permits for construction/operation of underground injection wells and subsequent discharging of effluents to ground aquifers.

<b>Resource Category</b>	<b>Statute/Regulation/Order</b>	<b>Citation</b>	<b>Responsible Agency</b>	<b>Potential Applicability: Permits, Approvals, Consultations, and Notifications</b>
Water Resources (cont'd)	Executive Order 11988: Floodplain Management	3 CFR, 1977 Comp., p. 117	Water Resources Council/Federal Emergency Management Agency/CEQ	Requires Federal agencies to avoid to the extent possible the long- and short-term adverse impacts associated with the occupancy and modification of floodplains and to avoid direct and indirect support of floodplain development wherever there is a practicable alternative.
	Executive Order 11990: Protection of Wetlands	3 CFR, 1977 Comp., p. 121	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers/FWS	Requires Federal agencies to avoid the long- and short-term adverse impacts associated with the destruction or modification of wetlands.
	Compliance with Floodplain/Wetlands Environmental Review Requirements	10 CFR 1022	DOE	Requires DOE to comply with all applicable floodplain/wetlands environmental review requirements.
Hazardous Wastes and Land Resources	Resource Conservation and Recovery Act/Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984	42 U.S.C. §§6901 <i>et seq.</i> PL 98-616	Environmental Protection Agency/State	Requires notification and permits for operations involving hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facilities. Changes to site hazardous waste operations could require amendments to RCRA hazardous waste permits involving public hearings.
	Farmland Protection Policy Act of 1981	7 U.S.C. §§4201 <i>et seq.</i>	Soil Conservation Service	Requires avoidance of any adverse effects to prime and unique farmlands.
	Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992	42 U.S.C. §6961	States	Requires waivers of sovereign immunity for Federal facilities under RCRA and requires DOE to develop plans and enter into agreements with states as to specific management actions for specific mixed waste streams.
Ecology (Biotic Resources)	Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act	16 U.S.C. §§661 <i>et seq.</i>	Fish and Wildlife Service	Requires consultation on the possible effects on wildlife if there is construction, modification, or control of bodies of water in excess of 10 acres in surface area.
	Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act	16 U.S.C. §§668 <i>et seq.</i>	Fish and Wildlife Service	Requires consultations to be conducted to determine if any protected birds are found to inhabit the area. If so, DOE must obtain a permit prior to moving any nests due to construction or operation of project facilities.
	Wilderness Act of 1964	16 U.S.C. §§1131 <i>et seq.</i>	Department of Commerce/ Department of Interior	Requires consultations with the Department of Commerce and Department of Interior to minimize impact.
	Migratory Bird Treaty Act	16 U.S.C. §§703 <i>et seq.</i>	Fish and Wildlife Service	Requires consultation to determine if there are any impacts on migrating bird populations due to construction or operation of project facilities. If so, DOE will develop mitigation measures to avoid adverse effects.
	Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971	16 U.S.C. §§1331 <i>et seq.</i>	Department of Interior	Requires consultation with the Department of Interior to minimize impact.
	Endangered Species Act of 1973	16 U.S.C. §§1531 <i>et seq.</i>	Fish and Wildlife Service/National Marine Fisheries Service	Requires consultation to identify endangered or threatened species and biological opinions and, if necessary, develop mitigation measures to reduce or eliminate adverse effects of construction or operation.
Cultural Resources	National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended	16 U.S.C. §§470 <i>et seq.</i>	President's Advisory Council on Historic Preservation	Requires consultation with the State Historic Preservation Office prior to construction to ensure that no historical properties will be affected.
	Archaeological and Historical Preservation Act of 1974	16 U.S.C. §§469 <i>et seq.</i>	Department of Interior	Requires authorization for any disturbance of archaeological resources.
	Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979	16 U.S.C. §§470aa <i>et seq.</i>	Department of Interior	Requires authorization for any excavation or removal of archaeological resources.
	Antiquities Act	16 U.S.C. §§431-33	Department of Interior	Requires compliance with all applicable sections of the Act.

Resource Category	Statute/Regulation/Order	Citation	Responsible Agency	Potential Applicability: Permits, Approvals, Consultations, and Notifications
Cultural Resources (cont'd)	American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978	42 U.S.C. §1996	Department of Interior	Requires consultation with local Native American Indian tribes prior to construction to ensure that their religious customs, traditions, and freedoms are preserved.
	Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990	25 U.S.C. §3001	Department of Interior	Requires consultations with local Native American Indian tribes prior to construction to guarantee that no Native American graves are disturbed.
	Executive Order 11593: Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Environment	3 CFR 154, 1971-1975 Comp., p. 559	Department of Interior	Requires agencies to aid in the preservation of historic and archaeological data that may be lost during construction activities.
Public and Occupational Health and Safety	Occupational Safety and Health Act	5 U.S.C. §5108	Occupational Safety and Health Administration	Requires agencies to comply with all applicable worker safety and health legislation (including guidelines of 29 CFR Part 1960) and to prepare, or have available, Material Safety Data Sheets.
	Standards for Protection Against Radiation	10 CFR 20	Nuclear Regulatory Commission	Establishes standards for protection of workers and the general public against radiation hazards arising out of activities under licenses issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
	Occupational Radiation Protection	10 CFR Part 835	Department of Energy	Establishes radiation protection standards, limits, and program requirements for protecting individuals from ionizing radiation resulting from conduct of DOE activities.
	Hazard Communication Standard	29 CFR 1910.1200	Occupational Safety and Health Administration	Requires agencies to ensure that workers are informed of, and trained to handle, all chemical hazards in the workplace.
Other	Atomic Energy Act of 1954	42 U.S.C. §2011	Department of Energy	Requires DOE to follow its own standards and procedures to ensure the safe operation of its facilities.
	National Environmental Policy Act	42 U.S.C. §§4321 <i>et seq.</i>	Department of Energy	Requires DOE to comply with NEPA implementing procedures in accordance with 10 CFR Part 1021.
	Toxic Substances Control Act 15	U.S.C. §§2601 <i>et seq.</i>	Environmental Protection Agency	Requires compliance with inventory reporting requirements and control provisions of TSCA to protect the public from the risks of exposure to chemicals; TSCA imposes strict limitations on use and disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls-contaminated equipment.
	Hazardous Materials Transport Action Act	49 U.S.C. §§1801 <i>et seq.</i>	Department of Transportation	Requires compliance with the requirements governing hazardous materials and waste transportation.
	Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990	49 U.S.C. §1801	Department of Transportation	Restricts shippers of highway route-controlled quantities of radioactive materials to use only permitted carriers.
	Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986	42 U.S.C. §§11001 <i>et seq.</i>	Environmental Protection Agency	Requires the development of emergency response plans and reporting requirements for chemical spills and other emergency releases, and imposes right-to-know reporting requirements covering storage and use of chemicals which are reported in toxic chemical release forms.
	Pollution Prevention Act of 1990	42 U.S.C. 11001 - 11050	Environmental Protection Agency	Establishes a national policy that pollution should be reduced at the source and requires a toxic chemical source reduction and recycling report for an owner or operator of a facility required to file an annual toxic chemical release form under Section 313 of SARA.



<b>Resource Category</b>	<b>Statute/Regulation/Order</b>	<b>Citation</b>	<b>Responsible Agency</b>	<b>Potential Applicability: Permits, Approvals, Consultations, and Notifications</b>
Other (cont'd)	Executive Order 12843: Procurement Requirements and Policies for Federal Agencies for Ozone-Depleting Substances	April 21, 1993	Environmental Protection Agency	Requires Federal agencies to minimize procurement of ozone depleting substances and conform their practices to comply with Title VI of the Clean Air Act Amendments (stratospheric ozone protection) and to recognize the increasingly limited availability of Class I substances until final phaseout.
	Executive Order 12856: Federal Compliance with Right-To-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention Requirements	August 3, 1993	Environmental Protection Agency	Requires Federal agencies to achieve 50 percent reduction of agency's total releases of toxic chemicals to the environment and offsite transfers; to prepare a written facility pollution prevention plan not later than 1995; to publicly report toxic chemicals entering any waste stream from Federal facilities, including any releases to the environment; and to improve local emergency planning, response, and accident notification.
	Executive Order 12873: Federal Acquisition, Recycling, and Waste Prevention	October 20, 1993	Environmental Protection Agency	Requires Federal agencies to develop affirmative procurement policies and establishes a shared responsibility between the system program manager and the recycling community to effect use of recycled items for procurement.
	Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations	February 11, 1994	Environmental Protection Agency	Requires Federal agencies to identify and address, as appropriate, the disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations.
	Executive Order 12088: Federal Compliance with Pollution Control Standards	3 CFR, 1978 Comp., p. 243	Office of Management and Budget	Requires Federal agency landlords to submit to the Office of Management and Budget an annual plan for the control of environmental pollution and to consult with the Environmental Protection Agency and state agencies regarding the best techniques and methods.
	Executive Order 11514: Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality	3 CFR, 1966-1970 Comp., p. 902	Council on Environmental Quality	Requires Federal agencies to demonstrate leadership in achieving the environmental quality goals of NEPA; provides for DOE consultation with appropriate Federal, state, and local agencies in carrying out their activities as they affect the environment.
	Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982	42 U.S.C. §§10101 <i>et seq.</i>	Department of Energy	Requires DOE to dispose of radioactive waste per 40 CFR 191 standards.
	Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act	42 U.S.C. §§2021b -2021d	Nuclear Regulatory Commission	Requires DOE to dispose of low-level radioactive waste per compacts of the states in which it operates.

PM<sub>10</sub> = Particulate matter smaller or equal to 10 microns.

<sup>1</sup> The applicability of these may vary depending on the reactor and options under consideration.

Acronyms used in this table are listed below.

CEQ = Council on Environmental Quality  
 CFR = Code of Federal Regulations  
 DOE = Department of Energy  
 FWS = U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service  
 NAAQS = National Ambient Air Quality Standards  
 NEPA = National Environmental Policy Act  
 NESHAP = National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants  
 RCRA = Resource Conservation and Recovery Act  
 SARA = Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act  
 TSCA = Toxic Substances Control Act  
 U.S.C. = United States Code

Table B-2 Relevant DOE Orders and NRC Guides

<b>DOE Order</b>	<b>DOE Order Title</b>
151.1	Comprehensive Emergency Management System
225.1	Accident Investigation
231.1	Environment Safety and Health Reporting
232.1	Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information
420.1	Facility Safety
425.1	Startup and Restart of Nuclear Facilities
440.1	Worker Protection Management for DOE Federal and Contractor Employees
451.1	National Environment Policy Act Compliance Program
460.1A	Packaging and Transportation Safety
470.1	Safeguards and Security Program
1230.2	American Indian Tribal Government Policy
5400.5	Radiation Protection of Public and Environment
5480.30	Nuclear Reactor Safety Design Criteria
5610.12	Packaging and Offsite Transportation of Nuclear Components, and Special Assemblies Associated with the Nuclear Explosion
<b>NRC Guide No.</b>	<b>NRC Guide Title</b>
1.101	Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors
1.109	Calculation of Annual Dose to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purposes of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I
1.111	Methods for Estimating Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion of Gaseous Effluents in Routine Releases from Light-Water-Cooled Reactors
1.112	Calculation of Releases of Radioactive Materials in Gaseous and Liquid Effluents from Light-Water-Cooled Reactors
1.113	Estimating Aquatic Dispersions of Effluents from Accidental and Routine Reactor Releases for the Purpose of Implementing Appendix I
1.145	Atmospheric Dispersion Models for Potential Accident Consequences Assessments at Nuclear Power Plants

## **B.14 REFERENCES**

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## **Appendix C**

### **Evaluation of Human Health Effects from Normal Operations**

## APPENDIX C

### EVALUATION OF HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS FROM NORMAL OPERATIONS

#### C.1 INTRODUCTION

This appendix provides a brief general discussion on radiation and its associated health effects and describes the method and assumptions used for estimating the potential impacts and risks to individuals and the general public from exposure to the releases of radioactivity and hazardous chemicals during normal operations at the proposed reactor facilities. This information is intended to present the assessment of impacts from normal operation during tritium production in the proposed reactors, as described in Chapter 5 of this environmental impact statement (EIS). Information regarding potential radiological impacts resulting from facility accidents is provided in Appendix D of this EIS.

This appendix presents numerical information using engineering and/or scientific notation. For example, the number 100,000 can also be expressed as  $1 \times 10^5$ . The fraction 0.00001 can also be expressed as  $1 \times 10^{-5}$ . The following chart defines the equivalent numerical notations that may be used in this appendix.

FRACTIONS AND MULTIPLES OF UNITS			
<i>Multiple</i>	<i>Decimal Equivalent</i>	<i>Prefix</i>	<i>Symbol</i>
$1 \times 10^6$	1,000,000	mega-	M
$1 \times 10^3$	1,000	kilo-	k
$1 \times 10^2$	100	hecto-	h
$1 \times 10$	10	deka-	da
$1 \times 10^{-1}$	0.1	deci-	d
$1 \times 10^{-2}$	0.01	centi-	c
$1 \times 10^{-3}$	0.001	milli-	m
$1 \times 10^{-6}$	0.000001	micro-	$\mu$
$1 \times 10^{-9}$	0.000000001	nano-	n
$1 \times 10^{-12}$	0.000000000001	pico-	p
$1 \times 10^{-15}$	0.000000000000001	femto-	f
$1 \times 10^{-18}$	0.000000000000000001	atto-	a

#### C.2 RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS ON HUMAN HEALTH

Radiation exposure and its consequences are topics of interest to the general public. For this reason, this EIS places much emphasis on the consequences of exposure to radiation, provides the reader with background information on the nature of radiation, and explains the basic concepts used in the evaluation of radiation health effects. In addition, this section provides a brief description of the characteristics of tritium and its potential health effects.

## **C.2.1 Background Information**

### **C.2.1.1 Nature of Radiation and Its Effects on Humans**

#### **What Is Radiation?**

Radiation is energy transferred in the form of particles or waves. Globally, human beings are exposed constantly to radiation from the solar system and from the earth's rocks and soil. This radiation contributes to the natural background radiation that always surrounds us. Manmade sources of radiation also exist, including medical and dental x-rays, household smoke detectors, and materials released from nuclear and coal-fired power plants.

All matter in the universe is composed of atoms. Radiation comes from the activity of tiny particles within an atom. As stated earlier in Appendix A, an atom consists of a positively charged nucleus (central part of an atom) with a number of negatively charged electron particles in various orbits around the nucleus. There are two types of particles in the nucleus: neutrons that are electrically neutral and protons that are positively charged. Atoms of different types are known as elements. There are more than 100 natural and manmade elements. An element has equal numbers of electrons and protons. When atoms of an element differ in their number of neutrons, they are called isotopes of that element. All elements have three or more isotopes, some or all of which could be unstable (i.e., decay with time). For example, tritium (also known as hydrogen-3) has two neutrons and is an unstable isotope of hydrogen, which has no neutrons.

Unstable isotopes undergo spontaneous change, known as radioactive disintegration or radioactive decay. The process of continuously undergoing spontaneous disintegration is called radioactivity. The radioactivity of a material decreases with time. The time it takes a material to lose half of its original radioactivity is its half-life. An isotope's half-life is a measure of its decay rate. For example, an isotope with a half-life of eight days will lose one-half of its radioactivity in that amount of time. In eight more days, one-half of the remaining radioactivity will be lost, and so on. Each radioactive element has a characteristic half-life. The half-lives of various radioactive elements may vary from millionths of a second to millions of years.

As unstable isotopes change into more stable forms, they emit electrically charged particles. These particles may be either an alpha particle (a helium nucleus) or a beta particle (an electron), with various levels of kinetic energy. Sometimes these particles are emitted in conjunction with gamma rays. The alpha and beta particles are frequently referred to as ionizing radiation. Ionizing radiation refers to the fact that the charged particle energy force can ionize, or electrically charge, an atom by stripping off one of its electrons. Gamma rays, even though they do not carry an electric charge as they pass through an element, can ionize its atoms by ejecting electrons. Thus, they cause ionization indirectly. Ionizing radiation can cause a change in the chemical composition of many things, including living tissue (organs), which can affect the way they function.

When a radioactive isotope of an element emits a particle, it changes to an entirely different element, one that may or may not be radioactive. Eventually, a stable element is formed. This transformation, which may take several steps, is known as a decay chain. For example, radium, which is a member of the radioactive decay chain of uranium, has a half-life of 1,622 years. It emits an alpha particle and becomes radon, a radioactive gas with a half-life of only 3.8 days. Radon decays first to polonium, then through a series of further decay steps to bismuth, and ultimately to lead, which is a stable element. Meanwhile, the decay products will build up and will eventually die away as time progresses.

The characteristics of various forms of ionizing radiation are briefly described below and in the box at right (see Glossary for further definition):

### Alpha ( $\alpha$ )

Alpha particles are the heaviest type of ionizing radiation. They can travel only a couple centimeters in air. Alpha particles lose their energy almost as soon as they collide with anything. They can be stopped easily by a sheet of paper or by the skin's surface.

Radiation Type	Typical Travel Distance in Air	Barrier
$\alpha$	Couple of centimeters	Sheet of paper or skin's surface
$\beta$	Few meters	Thin sheet of aluminum foil or glass
$\gamma$	Very Large *	Thick wall of concrete, lead, or steel
n	Very Large	Water, paraffin, graphite

\* Would be infinite in a vacuum

### Beta ( $\beta$ )

Beta particles are much (7,330 times) lighter than alpha particles. They can travel a longer distance than alpha particles in the air. A high energy beta particle can travel a few meters in the air. Beta particles can pass through a sheet of paper, but may be stopped by a thin sheet of aluminum foil or glass. Tritium emits a very low energy beta particle.

### Gamma ( $\gamma$ )

Gamma rays (and x-rays), unlike alpha or beta particles, are waves of pure energy. Gamma rays travel at the speed of light. Gamma radiation is very penetrating and requires a thick wall of concrete, lead, or steel to stop it.

### Neutrons (n)

Neutrons are particles that contribute to radiation exposure both directly and indirectly. The most prolific source of neutrons is a nuclear reactor. Indirect radiation exposure occurs when gamma rays and alpha particles are emitted following neutron capture in matter. A neutron has about one quarter the weight of an alpha particle. It will travel in the air until it is absorbed in another element.

## Units of Radiation Measure

During the early days of radiological experience, there was no precise unit of radiation measure. Therefore, a variety of units were used to measure radiation. These units were used to determine the amount, type, and intensity of radiation. Just as heat can be measured in terms of its intensity or effects using units of calories or degrees, amounts of radiation or its effects can be measured in units of Curies, radiation absorbed dose (rad), or dose equivalent (rem). The following summarizes those units (see also the definition in the Glossary).

### Curie

The Curie, named after the French scientists Marie and Pierre Curie, describes the "intensity" of a sample of radioactive material. The rate of decay of 1 gram of radium is the basis of this unit of measure. It is equal to  $3.7 \times 10^{10}$  disintegrations (decays) per second.

### *Rad*

The rad is the unit of measurement for the physical absorption of radiation. The total energy absorbed per unit quantity of tissue is referred to as absorbed dose (or simply dose). As sunlight heats pavement by giving up an amount of energy to it, radiation similarly gives up rads of energy to objects in its path. One rad is equal to the amount of radiation that leads to the deposition of 0.01 Joule of energy per kilogram of absorbing material.

#### **Radiation Units and Conversions to International System of Units**

1 Curie =  $3.7 \times 10^{10}$  Becquerel  
1 rad = 0.01 Gray  
1 rem = 0.01 Sievert  
1 Gray = 1 Joule/kilogram  
1 Becquerel = 1 disintegration per second

### *Rem*

A rem is a measurement of the dose equivalent from radiation based on its biological effects. The rem is used in measuring the effects of radiation on the body as degrees Centigrade are used in measuring the effects of sunlight heating pavement. Thus, 1 rem of one type of radiation is presumed to have the same biological effects as 1 rem of any other kind of radiation. This allows comparison of the biological effects of radionuclides that emit different types of radiation.

The units of radiation measure in the International Systems of Units are: Becquerel (a measure of source intensity [activity]), Gray (a measure of absorbed dose), and Sievert (a measure of dose equivalent).

An individual may be exposed to ionizing radiation externally (from a radioactive source outside the body) or internally (from ingesting or inhaling radioactive material). The external dose is different from the internal dose because an external dose is delivered only during the actual time of exposure to the external radiation source, but an internal dose continues to be delivered as long as the radioactive source is in the body. The dose from internal exposure is calculated over 50 years following the initial exposure; both radioactive decay and elimination of the radionuclide by ordinary metabolic processes decrease the dose rate with the passage of time.

### **Sources of Radiation**

The average American receives a total of approximately 364 millirem per year from all sources of radiation, both natural and manmade, of which approximately 300 millirem per year are from natural sources (NCRP 1987b). The sources of radiation can be divided into six different categories: (1) cosmic radiation, (2) terrestrial radiation, (3) internal radiation, (4) consumer products, (5) medical diagnosis and therapy, and (6) other sources (NCRP 1987b). These categories are discussed in the following paragraphs.

#### *Cosmic Radiation*

Cosmic radiation is ionizing radiation resulting from energetic charged particles from space continuously hitting the earth's atmosphere. These particles and the secondary particles and photons they create comprise cosmic radiation. Because the atmosphere provides some shielding against cosmic radiation, the intensity of this radiation increases with the altitude above sea level. The average dose to people in the United States from this source is approximately 27 millirem per year.

#### *External Terrestrial Radiation*

External terrestrial radiation is the radiation emitted from the radioactive materials in the Earth's rocks and soils. The average dose from external terrestrial radiation is approximately 28 millirem per year.



### *Internal Radiation*

Internal radiation results from the human body metabolizing natural radioactive material that has entered the body by inhalation or ingestion. Natural radionuclides in the body include isotopes of uranium, thorium, radium, radon, polonium, bismuth, potassium, rubidium, and carbon. The major contributor to the annual dose equivalent for internal radioactivity are the short-lived decay products of radon, which contribute approximately 200 millirem per year. The average dose from other internal radionuclides is approximately 39 millirem per year.

### *Consumer Products*

Consumer products also contain sources of ionizing radiation. In some products, such as smoke detectors and airport x-ray machines, the radiation source is essential to the products' operation. In other products, such as televisions and tobacco, the radiation occurs as the product's function. The average dose from consumer products is approximately 10 millirem per year.

### *Medical Diagnosis and Therapy*

Radiation is an important diagnostic medical tool and cancer treatment. Diagnostic x-rays result in an average exposure of 39 millirem per year. Nuclear medical procedures result in an average exposure of 14 millirem per year.

### *Other Sources*

There are a few additional sources of radiation that contribute minor doses to individuals in the United States. The dose from nuclear fuel cycle facilities (e.g., uranium mines, mills, and fuel processing plants), nuclear power plants, and transportation routes has been estimated to be less than 1 millirem per year. Radioactive fallout from atmospheric atomic bomb tests, emissions of radioactive material from nuclear facilities, emissions from certain mineral extraction facilities, and transportation of radioactive materials contribute less than 1 millirem per year to the average dose to an individual. Air travel contributes approximately 1 millirem per year to the average dose.

### *Exposure Pathways*

As stated earlier, an individual may be exposed to ionizing radiation both externally and internally. The different ways that could result in radiation exposure to an individual are called exposure pathways. Each type of exposure is discussed separately in the following paragraphs.

#### *External Exposure*

External exposure can result from several different pathways, all having in common the fact that the radiation causing the exposure is external to the body. These pathways include exposure to a cloud of radiation passing over the receptor (e.g., an individual member of the public) standing on ground that is contaminated with radioactivity and swimming or boating in contaminated water. If the receptor departs from the source of radiation exposure, the dose rate will be reduced. It is assumed that external exposure occurs uniformly during the year. The appropriate measure of dose is called the effective dose equivalent.

#### *Internal Exposure*

Internal exposure results from a radiation source entering the human body through either inhalation of contaminated air or ingestion of contaminated food and water. In contrast to external exposure, once a

radiation source enters the body, it remains there for a period of time that varies depending on decay and biological half-life. The absorbed dose to each organ of the body is calculated for a period 50 years following the intake. The dose equivalent of this absorbed dose is called the committed dose equivalent. Various organs have different susceptibilities to harm from radiation. The quantity that takes these different susceptibilities into account is called the committed effective dose equivalent, and it provides a broad indicator of the risk to the health of an individual from radiation. The committed effective dose equivalent is a weighted sum of the committed dose equivalent in each major organ or tissue. The concept of committed effective dose equivalent applies only to internal pathways.

### **Radiation Protection Guides**

Various organizations have issued radiation protection guides. The responsibilities of the main radiation safety organizations, particularly those that affect policies in the United States, are summarized.

#### *International Commission on Radiological Protection*

This commission has the responsibility for providing guidance in matters of radiation safety. The operating policy of this organization is to prepare recommendations to deal with basic principles of radiation protection and to leave to the various national protection committees the responsibility of introducing the detailed technical regulations, recommendations, or codes of practice best suited to the needs of their countries.

#### *National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements*

In the United States, this council is the national organization that has the responsibility to adapt and provide detailed technical guidelines for implementing the International Commission on Radiological Protection recommendations. The organization consists of technical experts who are specialists in radiation protection and scientists who are experts in disciplines that form the basis for radiation protection.

#### *National Research Council/National Academy of Sciences*

The National Research Council is an organization within the National Academy of Sciences that associates the broad community of science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the Federal Government.

### **Limits of Radiation Exposure**

Limits of exposure to members of the public and radiation workers are based on International Commission on Radiological Protection recommendations. Each regulatory organization adopts the International Commission on Radiological Protection's recommendations and sets specific annual exposure limits (usually less than those specified by the commission). For nuclear facilities, annual exposure limits to the public are provided by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 10 CFR 20, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix I. For accidents of unlikely probability of occurrence, (a likelihood of between 1-in-100 to 1-in-10,000 years), 10 CFR 100 provides the maximum exposure to the public residing at the site boundary. The dose limits for radiation workers are provided in 10 CFR 20. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) also has established a set of limits for radiation workers in 10 CFR 835. Table C-1 provides the various exposure limits set by the NRC, DOE, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for radiation workers and members of the public.

**Table C-1 Exposure Limits for Members of the Public and Radiation Workers**

<b>Guidance Criteria (Organization)</b>	<b>Public Exposure Limits at the Site Boundary</b>	<b>Worker Exposure Limits</b>
<b>Normal Operations</b>		
10 CFR 20 (NRC)	100 <sup>a</sup> millirem per year, all pathways	5,000 millirem per year
10 CFR 50, Appendix I (NRC) <sup>b</sup>	5 millirem per year, air (external); 3 millirem per year, liquid (total body) 15 millirem per year, air (maximum organ) 10 millirem per year, liquid (maximum organ)	-
40 CFR 190 (EPA)	25 millirem per year, all pathways	-
10 CFR 835 (DOE) <sup>c</sup>	-	5,000 millirem per year
DOE Order 5400.5 (DOE) <sup>c</sup>	10 millirem per year (all air pathways) 4 millirem per year (drinking water pathway) 100 millirem per year (all pathways)	-
40 CFR 61 (EPA)	10 millirem per year (all air pathways)	-
<b>Facility Accidents</b>		
10 CFR 100.11 (NRC) <sup>d</sup>	25 rem (total body dose from gamma and beta)  300 rem (thyroid inhalation dose)	-

- <sup>a</sup> An NRC licensee may apply for prior NRC authorization to operate up to an annual dose limit of 500 millirem for an individual member of the public.
- <sup>b</sup> Design objectives for equipment to control releases of radioactive materials in effluents from nuclear power reactors.
- <sup>c</sup> The nuclear facilities are regulated by the NRC. DOE exposure limits are only included for comparison purposes.
- <sup>d</sup> This guidance criteria is used to determine the exclusion area and low population zone for a nuclear power plant site.

### C.2.1.2 Health Effects

Radiation exposure and its consequences are topics of interest to the general public. To provide the background for discussions of impacts, this section explains the basic concepts used in the evaluation of radiation effects.

Radiation can cause a variety of damaging health effects in people. The most significant effects are induced cancer fatalities. These effects are referred to as "latent" cancer fatalities because the cancer may take many years to develop. In the discussions that follow, all fatal cancers are considered latent; therefore, the term "latent" is not used.

The National Research Council's Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR) has prepared a series of reports to advise the U.S. Government on the health consequences of radiation exposures. *Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation*, BEIR V, (NAS 1990), provides the most current estimates for excess mortality from leukemia and cancers other than leukemia that are expected to result from exposure to ionizing radiation. BEIR V provides estimates that are consistently higher than those in its predecessor, BEIR III. This increase is attributed to several factors, including the use of a linear dose response model for cancers other than leukemia, revised dosimetry for the Japanese atomic bomb survivors, and additional follow-up studies of the atomic bomb survivors and other cohorts. BEIR III employs constant, relative, and absolute risk models, with separate coefficients for each of several sex and age-at-exposure groups. BEIR V develops models in which the excess relative risk is expressed as a function of age at exposure, time after exposure, and sex for each of several cancer categories. The BEIR III models were based on the assumption that absolute risks are comparable between the atomic bomb survivors and the U.S.

population. BEIR V models were based on the assumption that the relative risks are comparable. For a disease such as lung cancer, where baseline risks in the United States are much larger than those in Japan, the BEIR V approach leads to larger risk estimates than the BEIR III approach.

The models and risk coefficients in BEIR V were derived through analyses of relevant epidemiologic data that included the Japanese atomic bomb survivors, ankylosis spondylitis patients, Canadian and Massachusetts fluoroscopy (breast cancer) patients, New York postpartum mastitis (breast cancer) patients, Israeli tinea capitis (thyroid cancer) patients, and Rochester thymus (thyroid cancer) patients. Models for leukemia, respiratory cancer, digestive cancer, and other cancers used only the atomic bomb survivor data, although results of analyses of the ankylosis spondylitis patients were considered. Atomic bomb survivor analyses were based on revised dosimetry, with an assumed relative biological effectiveness of 20 for neutrons, and were restricted to doses less than 400 rads. Estimates of risks of fatal cancers other than leukemia were obtained by totaling the estimates for breast cancer, respiratory cancer, digestive cancer, and other cancers.

The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP 1993), based on the radiation risk estimates provided in BEIR V and the International Commission on Radiological Protection Publication 60 recommendations (ICRP 1991), has estimated the total detriment resulting from low dose<sup>1</sup> or low dose rate exposure to ionizing radiation to be 0.00073 per rem for the general population and 0.00056 per rem for the working population. The total detriment includes fatal and nonfatal cancer and severe hereditary (genetic) effects. The major contribution to the total detriment is from fatal cancer and is estimated to be 0.0004 and 0.0005 per rem for the radiation workers and the general population, respectively. Table C-2 provides the breakdown of the risk factors for both the workers and the general population.

**Table C-2 Nominal Health Effects Coefficients (Risk Factors) from Ionizing Radiation**

<i>Exposed Population</i>	<i>Fatal Cancer<sup>a,c</sup></i>	<i>Nonfatal Cancer<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Genetic Disorders<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Total</i>
Working Population	0.0004	0.00008	0.00008	0.00056
General Population	0.0005	0.0001	0.00013	0.00073

- <sup>a</sup> For fatal cancer, the health effect coefficient is the same as the probability coefficient.
- <sup>b</sup> In determining a means of assessing health effects from radiation exposure, the International Commission on Radiological Protection has developed a weighting method for nonfatal cancers and genetic effects. Genetic effects only can be applied to a population, not individuals.
- <sup>c</sup> For high individual exposures (greater than or equal to 20 rem), the health factors are multiplied by a factor of 2.

Source: NCRP 1993.

The numerical estimates of cancer fatalities presented in this EIS were obtained using a linear extrapolation from the nominal risk estimated for lifetime total cancer mortality, which is 0.1 Gray (10 rad). Other methods of extrapolation to the low-dose region could yield higher or lower numerical estimates of cancer fatalities. Studies of human populations exposed to low doses are inadequate to demonstrate the actual level of risk. There is scientific uncertainty about cancer risk in the low-dose region below the range of epidemiologic observation, and the possibility of no risk cannot be excluded (CIRRPC 1992).

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<sup>1</sup>The low dose is defined as the dose level where DNA repair can occur in a few hours after irradiation-induced damage. Currently, a dose level of about 0.2 Grays (20 rad), or a dose rate of 0.1 milligrays (0.01 rad) per minute is considered to allow the DNA to repair itself in a short period (EPA 1994).

## Health Effect Risk Factors Used in This EIS

Health impacts from radiation exposure, whether from sources external or internal to the body, generally are identified as "somatic" (i.e., affecting the exposed individual) or "genetic" (i.e., affecting descendants of the exposed individual). Radiation is more likely to produce somatic effects than genetic effects. The somatic risks of most importance are induced cancers. Except for leukemia, which can have an induction period (time between exposure to carcinogen and cancer diagnosis) of as little as 2 to 7 years, most cancers have an induction period of more than 20 years.

For a uniform irradiation of the body, the incidence of cancer varies among organs and tissues; the thyroid and skin demonstrate a greater sensitivity than other organs. Such cancers, however, also produce relatively low mortality rates because they are relatively amenable to medical treatment. Because of the readily available data for cancer mortality rates and the relative scarcity of prospective epidemiologic studies, somatic effects leading to cancer fatalities rather than cancer incidence are presented in this EIS. The numbers of cancer fatalities can be used to compare the risks among the various alternatives.

Based on the preceding discussion and the values presented in Table C-2, the fatal cancers to the general public during normal operations and for accidents in which individual doses are less than 20 rem are calculated using a health risk factor of 0.0005 per person-rem. For workers, a risk factor of 0.0004 excess fatal cancer per person-rem is used. This lower value reflects the absence of children (who are more radiosensitive than adults) in the workforce. Nonfatal cancer and genetic disorders among the public are 20 and 26 percent, respectively, of the fatal cancer risk factor. For workers, the health risk estimators are both 20 percent of the fatal cancer risk factor. These factors are not used in this EIS.

The risk factors are used to calculate the statistical expectation of the effects of exposing a population to radiation. For example, in a population of 100,000 people exposed only to natural background radiation (300 millirem per year), it is expected that about 15 latent cancer fatalities per year of exposure would result from this radiation ( $100,000 \text{ persons} \times 0.3 \text{ rem per year} \times 0.0005 \text{ latent cancer fatalities per person-rem} = 15 \text{ latent cancer fatalities per year}$ ).

Calculations of the number of excess cancer fatalities associated with radiation exposure do not always yield whole numbers; calculations may yield numbers less than 1.0, especially in environmental impact applications. For example, if a population of 100,000 were exposed to a total dose of only 0.001 rem per person, the collective dose would be 100 person-rem, and the corresponding estimated number of latent cancer fatalities would be 0.05 ( $100,000 \text{ persons} \times 0.001 \text{ rem} \times 0.0005 \text{ latent cancer fatalities per person-rem} = 0.05 \text{ latent cancer fatalities}$ ). The latent cancer fatality of 0.05 is the *expected* number of deaths that would result if the same exposure situation were applied to many different groups of 100,000 people. In most groups, no person (0 people) would incur a latent cancer fatality from the 0.001 rem dose each member would have received. In a small fraction of the groups, 1 latent cancer fatality would result; in exceptionally few groups, 2 or more latent cancer fatalities would occur. The *average* expected number of deaths over all the groups would be 0.05 latent cancer fatalities (just as the average of 0, 0, 0, and 1 is 1/4, or 0.25). The most likely outcome is 0 latent cancer fatalities.

These same concepts apply to estimating the effects of radiation exposure on a single individual. Consider the effects, for example, of exposure to background radiation over a lifetime. The "number of latent cancer fatalities" corresponding to a single individual's exposure over a (presumed) 72-year lifetime to 0.3 rem per year is 0.011 latent cancer fatalities ( $1 \text{ person} \times 0.3 \text{ rem per year} \times 72 \text{ year} \times 0.0005 \text{ latent cancer fatalities/person-rem} = 0.011 \text{ latent cancer fatalities}$ ).

Again, this is a statistical estimate. That is, the estimated effect of background radiation exposure on the exposed individual would produce a 1.1 percent chance that the individual might incur a latent cancer fatality

caused by the exposure over his full lifetime. Presented another way, this method estimates that approximately 1.1 percent of the population might die of cancers induced by background radiation.

## **C.2.2 Tritium Characteristics and Biological Properties**

### **C.2.2.1 Tritium Characteristics**

Ordinary hydrogen (also called protium), deuterium, and tritium are the three isotopes of hydrogen. Tritium is the only one of the three isotopes that is radioactive. The nucleus of a hydrogen atom contains one proton, a positively charged particle. Around this nucleus orbits a single electron, a negatively charged particle that has a significantly smaller mass than the proton. Ordinary hydrogen, comprising over 99.9 percent of all naturally occurring hydrogen, has one proton and no neutrons. The nucleus of a deuterium atom contains one proton and one neutron. Deuterium comprises approximately 0.015 percent of all hydrogen. The nucleus of the tritium atom contains one proton and two neutrons. Tritium makes up only  $1 \times 10^{-18}$  percent of natural hydrogen. The chemical symbol for hydrogen is H. When designating the different isotopes, the isotopic number is added to the symbol so that protium becomes  $H^1$ , deuterium  $H^2$ , and tritium  $H^3$ . Deuterium and tritium are also represented as D and T, respectively.

In the radioactive decay of tritium, the nucleus emits a beta particle, a negatively charged particle similar to an electron. Upon emission of the beta particle the tritium atom is transformed into a helium atom, helium-3, with two protons and one neutron. Tritium has a half-life of approximately 12.3 years. Any amount of tritium will be reduced by 10 percent in 2 years, 25 percent in 5 years, 50 percent in 12.3 years, and 90 percent in 42 years.

As stated earlier, the emitted beta particle is a form of ionizing radiation. It will interact with the atoms and molecules in the environment around the tritium atom, ionizing atoms by removing electrons from their orbit. The beta particles emitted from a decaying tritium atom are relatively low energy particles and can be stopped by a sheet of paper or skin. Therefore, health effects on humans may result from ingestion (either eating or drinking), inhalation, or skin absorption of tritium. External exposure to tritium does not pose a significant health risk.

Because tritium undergoes radioactive decay, it must be constantly created through either natural or manmade processes. Natural sources of tritium result from the interaction of cosmic radiation and gases in the upper atmosphere. Nuclear power reactors are one manmade source for producing tritium. In a reactor core, lithium can be transformed into tritium via neutron capture. The lithium atom, with three protons and three neutrons, and the captured neutron combine to form a lithium atom with three protons and four neutrons that will instantaneously split to form an atom of tritium (one proton and two neutrons) and an atom of helium (helium-4, with two protons and two neutrons).

The following information on the biological impact of tritium is taken from the *Primer on Tritium Safe Handling Practices* (DOE 1994).

### **C.2.2.2 Biological Properties of Tritium**

At most tritium facilities, the most commonly encountered forms of tritium are tritium gas and tritium oxide, also called "tritiated water." Other forms of tritium may be present, such as metal tritides, tritiated pump oil, and tritiated gases like methane and ammonia. Deuterated and tritiated compounds generally have the same chemical properties as their protium counterparts, although some minor isotopic differences in reaction rates exist. These various tritiated compounds have a wide range of metabolic properties in humans under similar exposure conditions. For example, inhaled tritium gas is only slightly incorporated into the body during exposure, and the remainder is rapidly removed by exhalation following the exposure. On the other hand,

tritiated water vapor is readily taken up and retained in the body water. This discussion is limited to the effects of tritium gas and tritium oxide, the two compounds with the potential to have the most significant impact on workers and the public.

### **Metabolism of Gaseous Tritium**

During a brief exposure to tritium gas, the gas would be inhaled and a small amount would be dissolved in the bloodstream. The dissolved gas would circulate in the bloodstream before being exhaled along with the gaseous waste products (carbon dioxide) and normal water vapor. If the exposure persists, the gas will reach other body fluids. A small percentage of the gaseous tritium would be converted to tritium oxide, most likely by oxidation in the gastrointestinal tract. Early experiments involving human exposure to a concentration of 9 microcuries per milliliter resulted in an increase in the tritium oxide concentration in urine of  $7.7 \times 10^{-3}$  microcuries per milliliter per hour of exposure. Although independent of the breathing rate, this conversion can be expressed as the ratio of the tritium oxide buildup to the tritium inhaled as tritium gas at a nominal breathing rate (20 liters per minute). In this context, the conversion is 0.003 percent of the total gaseous tritium inhaled. More recent experiments with six volunteers resulted in a conversion of 0.005 percent. For gaseous tritium exposures, there are two doses: (1) a lung dose from the tritium in the air inside the lung, and (2) a whole body dose from the tritium gas that has been converted to tritium oxide. The tritiated water converted from the gas in the body behaves as an exposure to tritiated water. Intake of gaseous tritium through the skin has been found to have negligible effects compared with those from inhalation. Small amounts of tritium can enter the skin through unprotected contact with contaminated metal surfaces, which results in organically bound tritium in skin and in urine.

### **Metabolism of Tritiated Water**

The biological incorporation (uptake) of airborne tritium oxide can be extremely efficient—up to 99 percent of inhaled tritium oxide would be taken into the body by the circulating blood. Ingested liquid tritium oxide also would be almost completely absorbed by the gastrointestinal tract and would appear quickly in the bloodstream. Within minutes, it would be found in varying concentrations in the organs, fluids, and tissues of the body. Skin absorption of airborne tritium oxide also is important, especially during hot weather, because of the normal movement of water through the skin. For skin temperatures between 30 and 40°C (86 to 104°F), the absorption of tritium oxide is about 50 percent of that for tritium oxide by inhalation (assuming an average breathing rate associated with light work of 20 liters per minute). No matter how it is absorbed, the tritium oxide would be uniformly distributed in all biological fluids within one to two hours. In addition, a small fraction of the tritium would be incorporated into easily exchanged hydrogen sites in organic molecules. Hence, retention of tritiated water can be described as the sum of several terms: (1) shorter-term retention time associated with the tritium oxide that characteristically behaves like body water, and (2) longer-term retention time that represents the tritium incorporated in body organs.

### **Biological Half-Life of Tritium Oxide (Tritiated Water)**

Biological half-life is a measure of how long tritium would remain in the human body. Studies of biological elimination rates of body water in humans date back to 1934, when the body water turnover rate was measured using deuteriated water, a water molecule containing deuterium ( $H^2$ ). Since that time, several additional studies have been conducted with deuteriated water and tritiated water. A simple average of the data suggests a value of 9.5 days for the measured biological half-life of water in the body with a deviation of  $\pm 50$  percent.

Calculations based on total fluid intake indicate a similar value. This is reasonable because the turnover rate of tritiated water should be identical to that of body water. In other words, the biological half-life of tritium is a function of the average daily throughput of water. The biological half-life of tritium oxide has been studied when outdoor temperatures varied at the time of tritium uptake. The data suggest that biological half-

lives are shorter in warmer months (a measured 7.5-day half-life in an environment with a mean outdoor temperature of 27°C (~81°F) in contrast to an average measured 9.5-day half-life in an environment with a mean outdoor temperature of 17°C (~63°F)). Such findings are consistent with metabolic pathways involving sensible and insensible perspiration. As such, the skin absorption and perspiration pathways can become an important part of body water exchange routes. It is important to note that a person who is perspiring will have a greater absorption of tritium from contact with tritiated surfaces.

Prolonged exposures can be expected to affect the biological half-life. This results from the longer-term components of the retention of tritium in the body. Tritium's interaction with organic hydrogen can result in additional half-life components ranging from 21 to 320 days and 250 to 550 days. The shorter duration indicates that organic molecules in the body retain tritium relatively briefly. The longer duration indicates long-term retention by other compounds in the body that do not readily exchange hydrogen or that metabolize more slowly. However, the overall contribution from organically bound tritium is relatively small—less than about 5 percent for acute exposures and about 10 percent for chronic exposures. Methods used to compute the annual limits on intake of air and water specify only the body water component and include the assumption of a 10-day biological half-life, as mentioned above.

### Bioassay and Internal Dosimetry

Exposure to tritium oxide is by far the most important type of tritium exposure. The tritium oxide enters the body by inhalation or skin absorption. When immersed in tritiated water vapor, the body takes in approximately twice as much tritium through the lungs as through the skin. Once in the body, it is circulated by the blood stream and finds its way into fluids both inside and outside the cells.

According to the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP 1980), the derived air concentration for tritium gas and tritium oxide are 540,000 microcuries per cubic meter and 21.6 microcuries per cubic meter, respectively. The derived air concentration is defined as that concentration of a gas which, if a worker were exposed to it for one working year (2,000 hours), would result in an annual dose of 5 rem. The ratio of these derived air concentrations (25,000) is based on a lung exposure from the gas and a whole body exposure from the oxide. However, as noted earlier, when a person is exposed to tritium gas in the air, an additional dose actually results—one to the whole body. During exposure to tritium gas, a small fraction of the tritium exchanges in the lungs and is transferred by the blood to the gastrointestinal tract where it is oxidized by enzymes. This process results in a buildup of tritium oxide until the tritium gas is removed by exhalation at the end of the exposure. The resultant dose from exposure to this tritium oxide is roughly comparable to the lung dose from exposure to tritium gas. Thus, the total effective dose from a tritium gas exposure is about 10,000 times less than the total effective dose from an equal exposure to airborne tritium oxide.

#### C.2.2.3 Genetic Effects of Tritium

As stated earlier, tritium moves readily through the bloodstream after uptake in the body. The low energy of tritium beta particle emissions limits its range in tissue and results in a unique radiation dose pattern. The potential genetic hazard of tritium has been studied in a variety of systems using both prokaryotes<sup>2</sup> and eukaryotes<sup>2</sup>. This research, presented at the Workshop on Tritium Radiobiology and Health Physics, has been summarized in the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements Report No. 63 (NCRP 1979). A review of these studies, as given in the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements Report No. 89 (NCRP 1987a), concluded that, although transmutational effects exist in both whole animals and *in vitro* cell systems, their effects in the whole animal relative to the effect from a beta particle dose from tritium are small and should receive minor consideration in estimating genetic risks from tritium.

<sup>2</sup>Organisms with one or more cells that have a visible, evident nucleus.



Additional studies were performed as a result of: (1) allegations of links between tritium releases and deaths from congenital anomalies around Canada's Pickering Nuclear Generating Station and (2) concerns about excess cancers from tritium releases during a 1960's detonation in an underground salt dome in Lamar County, Mississippi.

In the first study (AECB 1991), conducted for the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada, the analysis did not support the hypothesis of increased rates of stillbirths, neonatal mortality, increased prevalence of birth defects, or significant correlation between tritium release and Down's Syndrome. In the second study (Richter and Stockwell 1998), conducted by the DOE Office of Epidemiological Studies, the investigators found no association between cancer mortality and distance from the center of detonation.

### **C.3 METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING RADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS**

The radiological impacts from normal operation of the reactor facilities were calculated using Version 1.485 of the GENII computer code (PNL 1988). Site-specific input data were used, including location, meteorology, population, food production and consumption, and source terms. Section C.3.1 briefly describes GENII and outlines the approach used for normal operations.

#### **C.3.1 GENII Computer Code**

The GENII computer model, developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, is an integrated system of various computer modules that analyze environmental contamination resulting from acute or chronic releases to, or initial contamination in, air, water, or soil. The model calculates radiation doses to individuals and populations. The GENII computer model is well documented for assumptions, technical approach, method, and quality assurance issues (PNL 1988). The GENII computer model has gone through extensive quality assurance and quality control steps, including comparing results from model computations with those from hand calculations and performing internal and external peer reviews. Recommendations given in these reports were incorporated into the final GENII computer model, as appropriate.

For this EIS, only the ENVIN, ENV, and DOSE computer modules were used. The codes are connected through data transfer files. The output of one code is stored in a file that can be used by the next code in the system. The functions of the three GENII computer modules used in this EIS are discussed below.

#### **ENVIN**

The ENVIN module of the GENII code controls the reading of input files and organizes the input for optimal use in the environmental transport and exposure module, ENV. The ENVIN code interprets the basic input, reads the basic GENII data libraries and other optional input files, and organizes the input into sequential segments based on radionuclide decay chains.

A standardized file that contains scenario, control, and inventory parameters is used as input to ENVIN. Radionuclide inventories can be entered as functions of releases to air or water, concentrations in basic environmental media (air, soil, or water), or concentrations in foods. If certain atmospheric dispersion options have been selected, this module can generate tables of atmospheric dispersion parameters that will be used in later calculations. If the finite plume air submersion option is requested in addition to the atmospheric dispersion calculations, preliminary energy-dependent finite plume dose factors can be prepared as well. The ENVIN module prepares the data transfer files that are used as input by the ENV module; ENVIN generates the first portion of the calculation documentation—the run input parameters report.

## **ENV**

The ENV module calculates the environmental transfer, uptake, and human exposure to radionuclides that result from the chosen scenario for the user-specified source term. The code reads the input files from ENVIN and then, for each radionuclide chain, sequentially performs the precalculations to establish the conditions at the start of the exposure scenario. Environmental concentrations of radionuclides are established at the beginning of the scenario by assuming decay of preexisting sources, considering biotic transport of existing subsurface contamination, and defining soil contamination from continuing atmospheric or irrigation depositions. For each year of postulated exposure, the code then estimates the air, surface soil, deep soil, groundwater, and surface water concentrations of each radionuclide in the chain. Human exposures and intakes of each radionuclide are calculated for: (1) pathways of external exposure from finite atmospheric plumes; (2) inhalation; (3) external exposure from contaminated soil, sediments, and water; (4) external exposure from special geometries; and (5) internal exposures from consumption of terrestrial foods, aquatic foods, drinking water, animal products, and inadvertent intake of soil. The intermediate information on annual media concentrations and intake rates are written to data transfer files. Although these may be accessed directly, they are usually used as input to the DOSE module of GENII.

## **DOSE**

The DOSE module reads the intake and exposure rates defined by the ENV module and converts the data to radiation dose.

### **C.3.2 Data and General Assumptions**

To perform the dose assessments for this EIS, different types of data were collected and generated. In addition, calculational assumptions were made. This section discusses the data collected and generated (SAIC 1998) for use in performing the dose assessments and the assumptions made for this EIS.

#### **Meteorological Data**

The meteorological data used for all normal operational scenarios discussed in this EIS were in the form of joint frequency data files. A joint frequency data file is a table listing the fractions of time the wind blows in a certain direction, at a certain speed, and within a certain stability class. The joint frequency data files were based on measurements taken over a period of several years at different locations and heights at each of the sites. Average annual meteorological conditions (averaged over the measurement period) as given in the plant's final safety analysis reports were used for normal operation.

#### **Population Data**

Population distributions were based on the *1990 Census of Population and Housing* data (DOC 1992). Projections were determined for the year 2025 (approximate midlife of operations) for areas within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the release location at the three candidate reactor sites. The site population in 2025, assumed to be representative of the population over the operational period evaluated, was used in the impact assessments. The population was spatially distributed on a circular grid with 16 directions and 10 radial distances up to 80 kilometers (50 miles). The grid was centered at the precise location from which the radionuclides were assumed to be released.

#### **Source Term Data**

The tritium-producing burnable absorber rod (TPBAR) source terms (i.e., quantities of tritium [in the form of tritium oxide] released to the environment over a given period) were estimated based on anticipated TPBAR

characteristic releases. The source terms used to generate the estimated incremental impacts of normal operations are provided in Section C.3.4 for each of the three candidate reactor sites evaluated in this EIS.

### **Food Production and Consumption Data**

Data from the *1992 Census of Agriculture* (DOC 1993) were used to generate site-specific data for food production. Food production was spatially distributed on the same circular grid used for the population distributions. The consumption rates used in GENII were those for the maximum individual and the average individual. People living within the 80-kilometer (50-mile) assessment area were assumed to consume only food grown in that area.

### **Calculational Assumptions**

Dose assessments were performed for both members of the general public and workers for each reactor site examined in this EIS. These assessments were made to determine the incremental doses that would be associated with the tritium production alternatives addressed in this EIS. Incremental doses for members of the public were calculated (via GENII) for two different types of receptors:

- **Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual**—The maximally exposed individual was assumed to be located at a position on the site boundary that would yield the highest impacts during normal operations of a given alternative.
- **Population**—The general population living within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the facility in the year 2025.

To estimate radiological impacts from normal operations, the following additional assumptions and factors were considered in using GENII:

- Radiological gaseous emissions were assumed to be released to the atmosphere through the plant stack; for Watts Bar 1, Sequoyah 1, or Sequoyah 2, the stack height is 40 meters (131 feet), and for Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2, it is 83 meters (272 feet).
- Ground surfaces were assumed to have no previous deposition of radionuclides.
- The annual external exposure time to the plume and to soil contamination was 0.7 years (16.8 hours per day) for the maximally exposed offsite individual (NRC 1977b).
- The annual external exposure time to the plume and to soil contamination was 0.5 years (12 hours per day) for the population (NRC 1977b).
- The inhalation exposure time to the plume was 1.0 years for the maximally exposed individual and general population.
- The exposed individual or population was assumed to have the characteristics and habits (e.g., inhalation and ingestion rates) of an adult human.
- A semi-infinite/finite plume model was used for air immersion doses. Other pathways evaluated were ground exposure; inhalation; ingestion of food crops and animal products contaminated by either deposition of radioactivity from the air or irrigation; ingestion of fish and other aquatic food raised in contaminated water; swimming and boating in contaminated surface water; and drinking contaminated water. All applicable pathways (e.g., inhalation, drinking water, external exposure) were analyzed at each of the three reactor site locations.

- Reported release heights were used for atmospheric releases and were assumed to be the effective stack height. The resultant doses were conservative, as use of the actual stack height negates plume rise.
- The calculated doses were 50-year committed doses from 1 year of intake.
- Average volumetric river flow rates (measured locally downstream of each site; see Table C-6) were used.
- Individual annual exposure times to swimming, boating, and shoreline recreation were taken from site environmental reports and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109, as appropriate (TVA 1997, NRC 1995, TVA 1974a, TVA 1974b, NRC 1977b).
- For conservatism, a transit time of zero was assumed for releases to reach aquatic recreation areas.
- The year 2025 drinking water population was estimated by applying the same growth factor as given for the entire 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius population within each respective plant's final environmental statement (NRC 1995, AEC 1974, TVA 1974a). The estimated fish-eating population in year 2025 was conservatively assumed to equal the drinking water population.
- Drinking water treatment was assumed, with a holdup (transit) time of 0.5 days for the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants and 0.2 days for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant.
- Annual drinking water quantities for the average and maximally exposed individual were referenced from NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109 (NRC 1977b).
- Fish consumption data were referenced from NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109 (NRC 1977b).

The exposure, uptake, and usage parameters used in the GENII model for normal operations are provided in Tables C-3, C-4, C-5, and C-6.

**Table C-3 GENII Exposure Parameters to Plumes and Soil Contamination (Normal Operations)**

<i>Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual</i>				<i>General Population</i>			
<i>External Exposure</i>		<i>Inhalation of Plume</i>		<i>External Exposure</i>		<i>Inhalation of Plume</i>	
<i>Plume (hours)</i>	<i>Soil Contamination (hours)</i>	<i>Exposure Time (hours)</i>	<i>Breathing Rate (cubic centimeters per second)</i>	<i>Plume (hours)</i>	<i>Soil Contamination (hours)</i>	<i>Exposure Time (hours)</i>	<i>Breathing Rate (cubic centimeters per second)</i>
6,136	6,136	8,766	270	4,383	4,383	8,766	270

Source: PNL 1988.

Table C-4 GENII Usage Parameters for Consumption of Terrestrial Food

Food Type	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual				General Population			
	Growing Time (days)	Yield (kilograms per square meter)	Holdup Time (days)	Consumption Rate (kilograms per year)	Growing Time (days)	Yield (kilograms per square meter)	Holdup Time (days)	Consumption Rate (kilograms per year)
Leafy Vegetables	90.0	1.5	1.0	30.0	90.0	1.5	14.0	15.0
Root Vegetables	90.0	4.0	5.0	220.0	90.0	4.0	14.0	140.0
Fruit	90.0	2.0	5.0	330.0	90.0	2.0	14.0	64.0
Grains/Cereals	90.0	0.8	180.0	80.0	90.0	0.8	180.0	72.0

Source: PNL 1988.

Table C-5 GENII Usage Parameters for Consumption of Animal Products

Food Type	Human Consumption Rate (kilograms per year)	Holdup Time (days)	Animal Stored Feed				Animal Fresh Forage			
			Diet Fraction	Growing Time (days)	Yield (kilograms per square meter)	Storage Time (days)	Diet Fraction	Growing Time (days)	Yield (kilograms per square meter)	Storage Time (days)
Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual										
Beef	80.0	15.0	0.25	90.0	0.80	180.0	0.75	45.0	2.00	100.0
Poultry	18.0	1.0	1.00	90.0	0.80	180.0	-	-	-	-
Milk	270.0	1.0	0.25	45.0	2.00	100.0	0.75	30.0	1.50	0.00
Eggs	30.0	1.0	1.00	90.0	0.80	180.0	-	-	-	-
General Population										
Beef	70.0	34.0	0.25	90.0	0.80	180.0	0.75	45.0	2.00	100.0
Poultry	8.5	34.0	1.0	90.0	0.80	180.0	-	-	-	-
Milk	230.0	3.0	0.25	45.0	2.00	100.0	0.75	30.0	1.50	0.00
Eggs	20.0	18.0	1.0	90.0	0.80	180.0	-	-	-	-

Source: PNL 1988.

Incremental worker doses associated with tritium production activities were determined from historical data associated with similar operations (TVA 1998b). Very small incremental doses to reactor facility workers may result from refueling outage activities and increased resin bed handling. Estimated baseline and incremental worker doses at the reactor sites are supplied in referenced data reports (TVA 1998a, NRC 1997). Worker doses are provided in Section 5 of this EIS.

Table C-6 GENII Liquid Pathway Parameters

Parameter	Plant		
	Sequoyah	Watts Bar	Bellefonte
Average river volumetric flow rate (cubic meters per second)	850	940	1,100
Swimming exposure time per year (hours)	918 – Maximum 22 – Average	918 – Maximum 22 – Average	918 – Maximum 22 – Average
Boating exposure time per year (hours)	1,500 – Maximum 104 – Average	1,500 – Maximum 104 – Average	1,500 – Maximum 104 – Average
River shoreline exposure time per year (hours)	500–Maximum 8.3–Average	500–Maximum 8.3–Average	500–Maximum 8.3–Average
Transit time for releases to reach aquatic recreation	0	0	0
Year 2025 population ingesting drinking water and fish	524,000	274,000	230,000
Drinking water holdup time (days)	0.5	0.5	0.2*
Drinking water consumption rate (liters per year)	730–Maximum 370–Average	730–Maximum 370–Average	730–Maximum 370–Average
Fish Consumption Rate (pounds per year)	45–Maximum 15.2–Average	45–Maximum 15.2–Average	45–Maximum 15.2–Average

\* This value is calculated based on average river water velocity and the distance between the plant discharge location to water treatment plant (TVA 1974a).

Sources: NRC 1995, NRC 1977a, AEC 1974, TVA 1974a, TVA 1974b, TVA 1997, TVA 1991, TVA 1995, TVA 1996.

### C.3.3 Uncertainties

The sequence of analyses performed to generate the radiological impact estimates from normal operation include: (1) selection of normal operational modes, (2) estimation of source terms, (3) estimation of environmental transport and uptake of radionuclides, (4) calculation of radiation doses to exposed individuals, and (5) estimation of health effects. There are uncertainties associated with each of these steps. Uncertainties exist in the way the physical systems being analyzed are represented by the computational models and in the data required to exercise the models (due to measurement, sampling, or natural variability).

In principle, one can estimate the uncertainty associated with each source and predict the remaining uncertainty in the results of each set of calculations. Thus, one can propagate the uncertainties from one set of calculations to the next and estimate the uncertainty in the final results. However, conducting such a full-scale quantitative uncertainty analysis is neither practical nor a standard practice for a study of this type. Instead, the analysis is designed to ensure—through judicious selection of release scenarios, models, and parameters—that the results represent the potential risks. This is accomplished by making conservative assumptions in the calculations at each step. The models, parameters, and release scenarios used in the calculations are selected in such a way that most intermediate results and, consequently, the final estimates of impacts, are greater than would be expected. As a result, even though the range of uncertainty in a quantity might be large, the value calculated for the quantity would be close to one of the extremes in the range of possible values, so the chance of the actual quantity being greater than the calculated value would be low (or the chance of the quantity being less than the calculated value if the criteria are such that the quantity has to be maximized). The goal of the radiological assessment for normal operation in this study has been to produce results that are conservative.

The degree of conservatism in the calculated results is closely related to the range of possible values the quantity can have. This range is determined by what can be expected to realistically occur. Thus, the only processes considered are those that are credible for the conditions under which the physical system being modeled operates. This consideration has been employed for the normal operation analyses.

Although the radionuclide composition of source terms are reasonable estimates, there are uncertainties in the radionuclide inventory and release reactions that affect estimated impacts.

### C.3.4 Radiological Releases to the Environment and Associated Impact

The NRC has assessed the potential radiation doses to individuals and surrounding populations that could result from the operation of the Watts Bar, Sequoyah, and Bellefonte Nuclear Plants in the related facilities' Final Environmental Statements (NRC 1995, AEC 1974, TVA 1974a). To assess the potential radiation dose to the individual and population from the operation of these plants in a tritium-producing mode, this EIS uses the results in those statements and superimposes the doses that would result from additional releases of tritium. The dose assessment uses the method prescribed by the NRC in Regulatory Guides 1.109 (NRC 1977b), 1.111 (NRC 1977a), and 4.2 (NRC 1976), with the adjustments as needed.

#### Radiological Releases to the Environment

Normal operational radiological assessments were determined (modeled) for two tritium production scenarios at each candidate reactor site: (1) production of tritium via the loading of 1,000 TPBARs into a reactor core, and (2) production of tritium via the loading of a maximum number of TPBARs into a reactor core. The maximum number of TPBARs that can be loaded in each reactor varies among the three candidate sites. For calculational purposes in this EIS, the maximum number of TPBARs was assumed to be 3,400.

During tritium production, some tritium is expected to permeate through the TPBARs, leading to an increase in the quantity of tritium in the reactor's coolant water system. Any tritium that is released from the TPBARs during normal plant operation enters the reactor coolant system and is distributed throughout the reactor coolant, chemical volume control, liquid radwaste, and gaseous radwaste systems. The rate of this accumulation depends on the coolant system capacities and water volume exchanges associated with the plant's required water chemistry and soluble boron adjustments. The tritium released into the reactor coolant system is processed along with the rest of the coolant, and this evolution provides the avenue for the transport and release of tritium outside the reactor coolant system. For the purposes of the analysis, the design tritium permeation per TPBAR, on average, is assumed to be 1 Curie per year (PNNL 1997, PNNL 1999). The anticipated increases in tritium releases (in Curies) to both the atmosphere (air emission) and the water pathways (liquid effluent) as a result of this design permeation rate are shown in Table C-7. These values are based on the assumption that about 90 percent of the tritium in the reactor coolant system would be released in the liquid effluent and 10 percent would be released to the atmosphere as tritiated water vapor (air emissions).

**Table C-7 Annual Increase in Tritium Releases to the Environment at Each Site**

	<i>1,000 TPBARs Irradiation</i>		<i>3,400 TPBARs Irradiation</i>	
	<i>Air Emissions</i>	<i>Liquid Effluents</i>	<i>Air Emissions</i>	<i>Liquid Effluents</i>
Tritium Releases (Curies)	100	900	340	3,060

The design of the TPBARs and the required TPBAR cladding quality assurance essentially preclude the potential for TPBAR failure during irradiation. For the purposes of analyses in this EIS, even though it is unlikely to occur, it was assumed that during a 40-year operation two TPBARs could fail in an operating cycle and release all the tritium generated in the failed TPBARs to the reactor coolant system. The potential increases in tritium releases (in Curies) from the two failed TPBARs to both the air emissions and the liquid effluents over an 18-month operating cycle are shown in Table C-8. These values represent the additional releases over that of the normal operation given in Table C-7, and are based on the following assumptions:

- Each TPBAR would generate a maximum design limit of 1.2 grams of tritium over an 18-month operating cycle; the specific activity of tritium is 9,640 Curies per gram (CRC 1982).
- Two failed TPBARs could release a total of about 23,150 Curies of tritium to the reactor coolant system. The design maximum of 1.2 grams of tritium per rod could be released to the reactor coolant system.
- About 90 percent of the tritium in the reactor coolant system would be released in the liquid effluents and 10 percent would be released to the atmosphere.

**Table C-8 Increases in Tritium Releases to the Environment from Two Failed TPBARs in an 18-Month Operating Cycle**

	<i>Air Emissions</i>	<i>Liquid Effluents</i>
Tritium Releases (Curies)	2,315	20,835

The current radioactivity releases in the air emissions and the liquid effluents from normal operation (with zero TPBARs) at Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2 are given in Tables C-9 and C-10. The estimated radioactivity releases during tritium production at Watts Bar and Sequoyah would be the sum of the values given in these tables and those given in Table C-7. For the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, it is assumed that the releases would be similar to those of Watts Bar.

**Table C-9 Average (1996-1997) Annual Radioactivity Releases to the Air and Liquid at Watts Bar 1**

<i>Isotopes<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Air Emissions (Curies)</i>	<i>Liquid Effluents (Curies)</i>
Tritium releases	5.6	639
Other radioactive releases:	283	1.32
Argon-41	1.0	-
Krypton-85	2.4	-
Krypton-85m	0.06	-
Xenon-131m	3.2	-
Xenon-133	271	-
Xenon-133m	1.2	-
Xenon-135	3.9	-
Chromium-51	-	0.14
Cobalt-58	-	0.42
Cobalt-60	-	0.020
Iron-55	-	0.12
Iron-59	-	0.096
Rubidium-88	-	0.012
Antimony-124	-	0.077



<i>Isotopes<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Air Emissions (Curies)</i>	<i>Liquid Effluents (Curies)</i>
Antimony-125	-	0.10
Antimony-126	-	0.12
Iodine-131	-	0.017
Cesium-134	-	0.050
Cesium-137	-	0.088
Total Releases	288.6	640.3

<sup>a</sup> Only isotopes with values greater than 0.01 were listed in this table.

Source: TVA 1999.

**Table C-10 Average (1995-1997) Annual Radioactivity Releases to the Air and Liquid at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2**

<i>Isotopes<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Air Emissions (Curies)</i>	<i>Liquid Effluents (Curies)</i>
Tritium releases	25	714
Other radioactive releases:	120	1.15
Argon-41	0.95	-
Krypton-85	0.32	-
Krypton-85m	0.090	-
Krypton-88	0.068	-
Xenon-131m	1.9	-
Xenon-133	113	-
Xenon-133m	1.5	-
Xenon-135	1.9	-
Xenon-135m	0.032	-
Chromium-51	-	0.035
Cobalt-58	-	0.65
Cobalt-60	-	0.11
Iron-55	-	0.14
Manganese-54	-	0.014
Niobium-95	-	0.014
Antimony-125	-	0.053
Cesium-134	-	0.03
Cesium-137	-	0.046
Total Releases	145	715.2

<sup>a</sup> Only isotopes with values greater than 0.01 were listed in this table.

Source: TVA 1999.

### Radiological Impacts

As stated earlier, doses to members of the public from tritium releases during normal operations were calculated using GENII code (PNL 1988). GENII uses "special" transport assumptions in its evaluation of the tritiated water movement through various food chains. The concentration of tritium in each food type is assumed to have the same specific activity as the contaminating medium (PNL 1988). The assumption is approximately valid for situations involving continuous replenishment of tritium in the medium and represents a conservative approximation for residual tritium in soil (NRC 1994). When soil is contaminated with residual tritium and no tritium from air and water is continually added to the soil, the contamination would be expected

to rapidly escape (by evaporation) from the soil or plants that had taken up this tritium. GENII, however, conservatively assumes that the soil tritium is retained and remains available for plant uptake over time.

As a result, the effective dose associated with the ingestion pathway calculated by GENII is very conservative. The calculated ingestion dose is between 80 to 95 percent of the total body dose. In addition, the assumption that people living within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of each site would eat all the contaminated food produced within that area makes the dose calculations even more conservative. Even with this overestimation, all calculated doses resulting from tritium releases during normal operation are within the limits set forth for the operation of each reactor (see Tables C-11, C-12, and C-13). Tables C-11, C-12, and C-13 present potential radiological impacts to two individual receptor groups that may be exposed to releases associated with incident-free operation and the abnormal event of two TPBAR failures in a given 18-month fuel cycle for each of the three candidate sites. These two groups are the maximally exposed member of the public and the population living within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of each of the sites in the year 2025. Each table presents the estimated doses from gaseous emissions (air) and liquid effluents (liquid) under the No Action Alternative (current plant conditions), and the estimated incremental doses from tritium releases to air and liquid resulting from 1,000 and 3,400 TPBAR irradiations in each reactor. For Watts Bar and Sequoyah, actual air and liquid doses included in their 1997 operation year environmental reports were used for the No Action Alternative (operation with 0 TPBARs). For Bellefonte, since the plant is not yet operational, the estimated dose values given in the final environmental statement (AEC 1974) were used for the plant operation with 0 TPBARs. The air doses provided in the final environmental statement include external exposure due to gamma rays and beta particles emanating from the gaseous radioactive emissions and thyroid organ dose due to inhalation and ingestion of contaminated air and food (milk), respectively. GENII calculates air doses by considering both the external exposure and the internal exposure to all organs and provides the total effective dose equivalent. Therefore, the results presented in the plant final environmental statements were adjusted (i.e., the organ dose was presented in terms of equivalent whole body dose to enable combination with the external dose) before being added to the incremental doses resulting from tritium releases. The No Action liquid doses given in the plant final environmental statements are the total body doses; therefore, no adjustments were needed.

The following text summarizes the calculated doses presented for the two public groups:

#### *No Action*

- The maximally exposed offsite individual doses from air releases were taken directly from plant environmental reports for Watts Bar and Sequoyah (TVA 1998a) and from the final environmental statement for Bellefonte (AEC 1974). For Bellefonte, the dose value given for the external air immersion "total body dose" was added to the maximum thyroid organ dose that accounts for exposures via inhalation and ingestion pathways. The thyroid dose was multiplied by the International Commission on Radiological Protection 26 weighting factor of 0.03 (PNL 1988) to get a "weighted committed dose equivalent" prior to being added to the external air immersion dose.
- Liquid doses to the maximally exposed offsite individual were directly cited from the referenced reports (TVA 1998a, AEC 1974).
- Population doses from air releases were cited directly from the referenced reports (TVA 1998a, AEC 1974) and subsequently were adjusted for the projected population in the year 2025 by applying the demographic growth factors presented in the EIS.
- Population dose from liquid releases were cited from the referenced reports and also were adjusted for the projected population in the year 2025.

**Tritium Production:**

- Incremental doses from tritium releases under incident-free operation (per air and liquid pathways), calculated for 1,000 and 3,400 TPBARs via the method described in Sections C.3.1 and C.3.2, are presented in Tables C-11 through C-13.
- Total doses (No Action doses + Incremental doses) from incident-free operation under tritium production, presented separately for the air and the liquid releases and then combined to demonstrate regulatory compliance with the applicable standards shown in Table C-1, are presented in Tables C-11 through C-13.
- Incremental doses from tritium release from the abnormal event of two TPBAR failures in a given 18-month fuel cycle are presented in Table C-14.

**C.4 IMPACTS OF EXPOSURES TO HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS ON HUMAN HEALTH**

The potential impacts of exposure to hazardous chemicals released to the atmosphere as a result of tritium production were evaluated for the routine operation of the reactor facilities.

The receptors considered in these evaluations are the maximally exposed individual and the offsite population living within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the facilities. Impacts of exposures to hazardous chemicals for workers directly involved in reactor operation and tritium production were not quantitatively evaluated because the use of personal protective equipment and engineering process controls would limit their exposure to levels within applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration Permissible Exposure Limits or American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists Threshold Limit Values.

As a result of releases from the routine operation of the reactor facilities, receptors are expected to be potentially exposed to concentrations of hazardous chemicals that are below those that could cause acutely toxic health effects. Acutely toxic health effects generally result from short-term exposure to relatively high concentrations of contaminants, such as those that may be encountered during facility accidents. Long-term exposure to relatively lower concentrations of hazardous chemicals can produce adverse chronic health effects that include both carcinogenic and noncarcinogenic effects. The health effect endpoints evaluated in this analysis include excess incidences of latent cancers for carcinogenic chemicals and a spectrum of chemical-specific noncancer health effects (e.g., headaches, membrane irritation, neurotoxicity, immunotoxicity, liver toxicity, kidney toxicity, developmental toxicity, reproductive toxicity, and genetic toxicity) for noncarcinogens.

**Methodology**

Estimates of airborne concentrations of hazardous chemicals were developed using ISC3 air dispersion model (EPA 1995). This model was developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for regulatory air dispersion modeling applications. ISC3 is the most recent version of the model and is approved for use for a wide variety of emission sources and conditions. The ISC3 model estimates atmospheric concentrations based on the airborne emissions from the processing facility for each block in a circular grid comprised of 16 directional sectors (e.g., north, north-northeast, northeast) at radial distances out to 80 kilometers (50 miles) from the point of release, producing a distribution of atmospheric concentrations. The maximally exposed offsite individual is located in the block with the highest estimated concentration. The short-term version of the model (ISCST3) was used to estimate potential exposures to offsite populations.

**Table C-11 Annual Radiological Impacts to the Public from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Watts Bar 1**

Receptors	No Action		Incremental Dose For 1,000 TPBARs		Operation with 1,000 TPBARs			Incremental Dose for 3,400 TPBARs		Operation with 3,400 TPBARs		
	Air	Liquid	Air	Liquid	Air	Liquid	Total	Air	Liquid	Air	Liquid	Total
<b>Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual</b>												
Dose (millirem)	0.036	0.25	0.012	0.0014	0.048	0.25	0.30	0.042	0.0050	0.078	0.26	0.34
Fatal Cancer Risk	$1.8 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-7}$	$6.0 \times 10^{-9}$	$7.0 \times 10^{-10}$	$2.4 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.5 \times 10^{-7}$	$2.1 \times 10^{-4}$	$2.5 \times 10^{-9}$	$3.9 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.7 \times 10^{-7}$
<b>Population Dose Within 80 Kilometers ( 50 Miles) for Year 2025</b>												
Dose (person-rem)	0.071	0.48	0.15	0.19	0.22	0.67	0.89	0.50	0.69	0.57	1.2	1.8
Fatal Cancers	0.000036	0.000024	0.000075	0.000095	0.00011	0.00034	0.00045	0.00025	0.00035	0.00029	0.00060	0.00090

Source: TVA 1998a.

Note: The values given in this table are rounded up to two significant figures.

**Table C-12 Annual Radiological Impacts to the Public from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2**

Receptors	No Action		Incremental Dose For 1,000 TPBARs		Operation with 1,000 TPBARs			Incremental Dose for 3,400 TPBARs		Operation with 3,400 TPBARs		
	Air	Liquid	Air	Liquid	Air	Liquid	Total	Air	Liquid	Air	Liquid	Total
<b>Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual</b>												
Dose (millirem)	0.031	0.022	0.015	0.0016	0.046	0.024	0.070	0.052	0.0054	0.083	0.027	0.11
Fatal Cancer Risk	$1.6 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-4}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-9}$	$8.0 \times 10^{-10}$	$2.3 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-4}$	$3.5 \times 10^{-4}$	$2.6 \times 10^{-4}$	$2.7 \times 10^{-9}$	$4.2 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-4}$	$5.6 \times 10^{-4}$
<b>Population Dose Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) for Year 2025</b>												
Dose (person-rem)	0.49	1.1	0.16	0.41	0.65	1.5	2.2	0.54	1.4	1.0	2.5	3.5
Fatal Cancers	0.00025	0.00055	0.000080	0.00021	0.00033	0.00075	0.0011	0.00027	0.00070	0.00050	0.0013	0.0018

Source: TVA 1998a.

Note: The values given in this table are rounded up to two significant figures.

Table C-13 Annual Radiological Impacts to the Public from Incident-Free Tritium Production Operations at Bellefonte 1

Receptors	No Action		Incremental Dose For 1,000 TPBARs		Operation with 1,000 TPBARs			Incremental Dose for 3,400 TPBARs		Operation with 3,400 TPBARs		
	Air	Liquid	Air	Liquid	Air	Liquid	Total	Air	Liquid	Air	Liquid	Total
<b>Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual</b>												
Dose (millirem)	0 <sup>a</sup>	0 <sup>a</sup>	0.0020	0.0012	0.25 <sup>a</sup>	0.013 <sup>a</sup>	0.26	0.0065	0.0042	0.26 <sup>a</sup>	0.016 <sup>a</sup>	0.28
Fatal Cancer Risk	0	0	$1.0 \times 10^{-9}$	$6.0 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-7}$	$6.5 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-7}$	$3.3 \times 10^{-9}$	$2.1 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-7}$	$8.0 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-7}$
<b>Population Dose Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) for Year 2025</b>												
Dose (person-rem)	0 <sup>a</sup>	0 <sup>a</sup>	0.13	0.14	0.40 <sup>a</sup>	1.2 <sup>a</sup>	1.6	0.44	0.47	0.71 <sup>a</sup>	1.6 <sup>a</sup>	2.3
Fatal Cancers	0	0	0.000065	0.000070	0.00020	0.0006	0.0008	0.00022	0.00024	0.00036	0.0008	0.0012

<sup>a</sup> These no action values represent the absence of impacts associated with the nonoperational status of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant. For a single operational Bellefonte Nuclear Plant unit (operation without tritium production activities), the impacts to the public have been estimated to be: 0.26 millirem (0.25 millirem from the air pathway and 0.012 millirem from the liquid pathway) to the maximally exposed offsite individual and 1.4 person-rem (0.27 person-rem from the air pathway and 1.1 person-rem from the liquid pathway) to the surrounding population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) in the year 2025.

These values are a summation of incremental impacts attributable to TPBAR tritium releases and estimated single Bellefonte Nuclear Plant unit operational impacts. For Bellefonte 1 and 2 operation, the potential impacts are twice the values given in this table.

Source: AEC 1974.

Note: The values given in this table are rounded up to two significant figures.

Table C-14 Radiological Impacts to the Public from the Failure of Two TPBARs at Each of the Reactor Sites

Receptors	Watts Bar 1			Sequoyah 1 or Sequoyah 2			Bellefonte 1 or Bellefonte 2		
	Air	Liquid	Total	Air	Liquid	Total	Air	Liquid	Total
<b>Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual</b>									
Dose (millirem)	0.29	0.033	0.32	0.36	0.037	0.40	0.045	0.028	0.073
Fatal Cancer Risk	$1.5 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.7 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.8 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.9 \times 10^{-8}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-7}$	$2.3 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-8}$	$3.7 \times 10^{-8}$
<b>Population Dose Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) for Year 2025</b>									
Dose (person-rem)	3.43	4.41	7.84	3.67	9.19	12.86	3.06	3.18	6.24
Risk	0.0017	0.0022	0.0039	0.0018	0.0046	0.0064	0.0015	0.0016	0.0031

This EIS estimates the noncancer health risks by comparing modeled air concentrations of contaminants produced by ISC3 to the EPA Reference Concentrations published in the Integrated Risk Information System. For each noncarcinogenic chemical, potential health risks are estimated by dividing the estimated airborne concentration by the chemical-specific Reference Concentrations value to obtain a noncancer hazard quotient:

$$\text{Noncancer Hazard Quotient} = \text{air concentration} / \text{Reference Concentrations}$$

Reference Concentrations are estimates (with an uncertainty spanning perhaps an order of magnitude) of a daily exposure to the human population (including sensitive subgroups) that is likely to be without appreciable risk of harmful effects during a lifetime. Hazard Quotients are calculated for each hazardous chemical to which receptors may be exposed. Hazard Quotients for each chemical are summed to generate a Hazard Index. The Hazard Index is an estimate of the total noncancer toxicity potential from exposure to hazardous chemicals. According to EPA risk assessment guidelines (EPA 1989), if the Hazard Index value is less than or equal to 1.0, the exposure is unlikely to produce adverse toxic effects. If the Hazard Index exceeds 1.0, adverse noncancer health effects may result from the exposure.

For carcinogenic chemicals, risk is estimated by the following equation:

$$\text{Risk} = \text{CA} \times \text{URF}$$

where:

Risk = a unitless probability of cancer incidence.

CA = contaminant concentration in air (in micrograms/cubic meters).

URF = cancer inhalation unit risk factor (in units of cancers per micrograms/cubic meters).

CA is estimated by multiplying the output of the ISC3 model by the process duration to obtain estimates of total airborne exposure for each process.

Cancer unit risk factors are used in risk assessments to estimate an upper-bound lifetime probability of an individual developing cancer as a result of exposure to a particular level of a potential carcinogen.

### Assumptions

The airborne pathway is assumed to be the principal exposure route by which the offsite population maximally exposed individual is exposed to hazardous chemicals released from reactor facilities. No synergistic or antagonistic effects are assumed to occur from exposure to the hazardous chemicals released from reactor facilities. Synergistic effects among released contaminants may result in adverse health effects that are greater than those estimated, whereas antagonistic effects among released chemicals may result in less severe health effects than those estimated.

### Analysis

The potential impacts of exposure to hazardous chemicals released to the atmosphere during routine operations of the reactor facilities to produce tritium are presented in Chapter 5 for each alternative.

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## **Appendix D**

### **Evaluation of Human Health Effects from Facility Accidents**

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## **APPENDIX D**

### **EVALUATION OF HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS FROM FACILITY ACCIDENTS**

This appendix presents the method and assumptions used for estimating potential impacts and risks to individuals and the general public from exposure to releases of radioactive and hazardous chemical materials during hypothetical accidents at the proposed reactor facilities. The impacts from accidental radioactive material releases are given in Section D.1, and the impacts from releases of hazardous chemicals are provided in Section D.2.

#### **D.1 RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT IMPACTS ON HUMAN HEALTH**

##### **D.1.1 Accident Scenario Selection and Description**

###### **D.1.1.1 Accident Scenario Selection**

This accident analysis assessment considers a spectrum of potential accident scenarios. The range of accidents considered includes reactor design-basis accidents, nonreactor design-basis accidents, tritium-producing burnable absorber rod (TPBAR) handling accidents, transportation cask handling accidents, and beyond design-basis accidents (i.e., severe reactor accidents).

The spectrum of reactor and nonreactor design-basis accidents presented in the Watts Bar, Sequoyah, and Bellefonte Safety Analysis Reports were reviewed for evaluation in this environmental impact statement (EIS). The large break loss-of-coolant accident was selected as the representative reactor design-basis accident because it has the potential to damage more TPBARs than any other reactor design-basis accident (see Section D.1.1.2). Based on assumptions used in this EIS for the postulated accident scenario, the waste gas decay tank failure accident was selected as the nonreactor design-basis accident for evaluation in this EIS because it has the potential to release more tritium than other nonreactor design-basis accidents.

Following irradiation in the reactor's tritium production core, the fuel assemblies and the TPBAR assemblies inserted into the fuel assemblies would be removed from the reactor and transferred to the spent fuel pool. There, the TPBAR assemblies would be removed from the fuel assemblies. Next, the TPBARs would be removed from the TPBAR assemblies and inserted in a consolidation container. The consolidation container is a 17 × 17 array of tubes that holds the TPBARs. The consolidation container has the same footprint as a fuel assembly and can accommodate up to 289 TPBARs.

Three TPBAR handling accident scenarios are evaluated. Scenario 1 postulates that the consolidation container with 289 TPBARs is dropped while loading into a transportation cask. The evaluation further postulates that, if the consolidation container lands vertically on the spent fuel pool floor, no TPBARs would be damaged by the impact. If, however, the consolidation container lands on an edge or strikes an object (e.g., an unoccupied fuel rack or the shelf in the cask loading pit), the consolidation container shell and up to one row of tubes containing TPBARs could be damaged, and up to 17 TPBARs possibly could be breached.

Scenario 2 postulates that an irradiated fuel assembly with a TPBAR assembly containing 24 TPBARs is dropped in the spent fuel pool. The evaluation also postulates that, if the fuel assembly lands vertically, no TPBARs would be damaged by the impact. If the assembly lands on an edge or is struck by an object on the side or corner of the fuel assembly, up to 3 TPBARs could be damaged by the impact.

Scenario 3 postulates that a TPBAR assembly containing 24 TPBARs is dropped in the spent fuel pool as it is being removed from an irradiated fuel assembly and all TPBARs are breached by the impact. Scenario 3 was selected for evaluation in this EIS because it has the potential to damage more TPBARs than the other postulated TPBAR handling accidents.

Two truck or rail transportation cask drop accidents that could cause a release of tritium from the casks are evaluated in this EIS. The evaluations consider: (1) cask drops before the cask is sealed, and (2) drops that could breach a sealed cask.

The postulated beyond design-basis reactor accident analyses selected for use in this EIS address core damage accident scenarios leading to the loss of containment integrity. This includes scenarios that fall into three performance categories: (1) early containment failures, (2) late containment failures, and (3) containment bypass. Accident scenarios that do not fall into these categories lead to significantly lower consequences and, therefore, are not evaluated.

#### **D.1.1.2 Reactor Design-Basis Accident**

A reactor design-basis accident is designated as a Condition IV occurrence. Condition IV occurrences are faults that are not expected to take place, but are postulated because they have the potential to release significant amounts of radioactive material. The postulated reactor design-basis accident for this EIS is a large break loss-of-coolant accident. This postulated accident has the potential to damage more TPBARs than any other reactor loss-of-coolant design-basis accident (WEC 1998a). This accident scenario postulates a double-ended rupture of a pipe greater than 15 centimeters (6 inches) in diameter in the reactor coolant system. During the initial phase of the accident, the reactor water (coolant) level would drop below the top of the reactor core for a short period of time before the emergency systems would automatically inject additional water to cover the core. During this period the core would overheat, and the cladding on some of the fuel rods and 100 percent of the TPBARs would be breached due to the overheating (WEC 1998b). The analysis assumes that the entire tritium content in the TPBARs would be released to the containment. Each TPBAR produces 1 gram of tritium on average through the 18-month irradiation cycle (DOE 1996). For the purpose of analyses in this EIS, 1 gram of tritium contains 9,640 Curies (CRC 1982). The analysis also assumes that all of the tritium released to the reactor coolant system from the TPBARs during 17 months of normal operation would be released to the containment during the accident. This would include the release of an amount of tritium corresponding to 1 Curie per TPBAR per year (PNNL 1997). The accident consequence calculations consider applicable, reactor site-specific, protective action guidelines.

Table D-1 shows the total source term released to the containment that would be attributable to 1,000 TPBARs and a maximum of 3,400 TPBARs in a tritium production core configuration. Table D-2 presents the tritium source term released from the containment to the environment. The reduction in the amount of tritium available for release would be the result of post-accident processing of the containment atmosphere to reduce iodine leakage to the environment, operation of hydrogen recombiners, and absorption of elemental and oxidized tritium by water in the containment (WHC 1991). In the design-basis accident, tritium would be released from the containment to the atmosphere through containment leakage. Release pathways from the containment are discussed in Section D.1.2.5.2. The analysis assumes tritiated water vapor would be released to the atmosphere for 30 days following the accident. After 30 days, all the tritiated water vapor in the containment atmosphere would be condensed and, therefore, would not be available for further release. Table D-3 presents the accident frequency estimates.

**Table D-1 Reactor Design-Basis Accident Tritium Inventory**

Source Term	Tritium Production	
	1,000 TPBARs (Curies)	Maximum - 3,400 TPBARs (Curies)
TPBARs breached during accident	$2.64 \times 10^6$	$3.28 \times 10^7$
TPBAR leakage during normal operations	1,500	5,100
Total released to containment	$2.64 \times 10^6$	$3.28 \times 10^7$
Total available to be released to environment *	964,000	$3.28 \times 10^6$

- \* All tritium released to the environment is in oxide form.

**Table D-2 Reactor Design-Basis Accident Tritium Source Term Released to Environment**

Accident Site	Tritium Production	Tritium Released (Curies) <sup>a,b</sup>		
		0-24 Hours	24-720 Hours	Total 0-30 Days
Watts Bar	1,000 TPBARs	814	10,700	11,600
	3,400 TPBARs	2,780	36,600	39,400
Sequoyah	1,000 TPBARs	890	11,900	12,800
	3,400 TPBARs	3,040	40,500	43,500
Bellefonte	1,000 TPBARs	338	3,880	4,220
	3,400 TPBARs	1,150	13,200	14,400

- \* All tritium released to the environment is in oxide form.
- <sup>b</sup> Source terms for a single reactor.

**Table D-3 Reactor Design-Basis Accident Frequency Estimates for Large Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident**

Reactor Site	Frequency (per year)
Watts Bar	0.0002 <sup>a</sup>
Sequoyah	0.0002 <sup>b</sup>
Bellefonte	0.0002 <sup>c</sup>

- <sup>a</sup> TVA 1992b.
- <sup>b</sup> TVA 1992a.
- <sup>c</sup> Value currently assigned in Individual Plant Examinations.

### D.1.1.3 Nonreactor Design-Basis Accident

The waste gas decay tank rupture, a Condition III occurrence, was selected as the nonreactor design-basis accident for this EIS. The consequences of a Condition III occurrence would be less severe than for a Condition IV occurrence. The release of radioactivity would not be sufficient to interrupt or restrict public use

of those areas beyond the exclusion area radius (TVA 1996). The frequency of design-basis accidents is normally expected to be in the range of 0.0001 to 0.01 per year. For the purpose of this EIS, the accident frequency is assumed to be 0.01, the high end of the range.

The gaseous waste processing system is designed to remove fission product gases from the reactor coolant. The maximum storage of waste gases occurs before a refueling shutdown, at which time the gas decay tanks store the radioactive gases that are stripped from the reactor coolant. The accident analysis conservatively assumes that 10 percent of the TPBAR-generated tritium in the reactor coolant, as well as radioactive xenon and krypton fission product gases, would be stripped from the reactor coolant before a refueling shutdown and stored in waste decay tanks. Therefore, it has the potential to release more tritium than other nonreactor design-basis accidents. This assumption is conservative because the analysis postulates that all of the tritium released from the TPBARs to the reactor coolant during the entire fuel cycle would be retained in the coolant.

The postulated nonreactor design-basis accident is defined as an unexpected, uncontrolled release of the gases contained in a single gas decay tank due to the failure of the tank or the associated piping. The analysis assumes that tritium would be released directly to the environment in an oxide form. Accident consequence calculations consider applicable reactor site-specific protective action guidelines. Table D-4 presents the tritium source term that would be released to the environment.

**Table D-4 Nonreactor Design-Basis Accident Tritium Source Term**

<i>Source Term (Curies of tritium)</i>	
<i>1,000 TPBARs</i>	<i>3,400 TPBARs</i>
<u>150</u>	<u>510</u>

#### **D.1.1.4 TPBAR Handling Accident**

The TPBAR handling accident scenario postulates that a TPBAR assembly containing 24 TPBARs was dropped when removing the assembly from an irradiated fuel assembly during the TPBAR consolidation process. The evaluation postulates that all TPBARs would be unprotected and would breach when they impact the spent fuel pool floor. The gaseous tritium in the 24 breached TPBARs would be released into the fuel pool and directly to the environment. The analysis conservatively assumes that the entire tritium inventory in the 24 breached TPBARs (231,360 Curies) would be released into the fuel pool (PNNL 1999). The released tritium would be in oxide form. It also was assumed that all the tritium released to the fuel pool would be released to the environment continuously over a one-year period by evaporation from the fuel pool and would be exhausted by the area ventilation system through the auxiliary building stack. This assumption was made to estimate the maximum dose to the public from this accident. [Release of tritium through liquid effluents would result in a public dose, which is an order of magnitude lower than that from release to the air.] Should a TPBAR handling accident occur, action will be taken to limit the tritium release from the breached TPBARs. However, the analysis took no credit for mitigating actions to limit the release of tritium to the fuel pool (i.e., placing the breached TPBARs in a sealed container) or to reduce the accident consequences to the public (i.e., interdiction of contaminated food and/or drinking water). Table D-5 presents the accident frequency estimates. The frequency estimates are derived from data presented in NUREG/CR-4982, *Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pool in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82* (NRC 1987).

Table D-5 TPBAR Handling Accident Frequency Estimates

Frequency (per year)	
1,000 TPBARs	3,400 TPBARs
0.0017	0.0058

#### D.1.1.5 Truck Transportation Cask Handling Accident at the Reactor Site

The truck cask would be loaded under water in the spent fuel pool cask loading pit. A single TPBAR consolidation container containing a maximum of 289 TPBARs would be loaded into the cask. For the purpose of this EIS, the analysis postulates that, following insertion of the consolidation container, the cask cover would be installed but not tightly sealed. The cask would be raised above the water level where it would be hosed down and drained before moving it to the decontamination area. There it would be sealed, backfilled with inert gas, and decontaminated before loading on the truck trailer bed.

The evaluation also considered an option to seal the cask cover before lifting the cask; in this case the only potential for a tritium release would be if the cask were breached by the drop. The truck cask is designed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 71, and is required to withstand a 9.1-meter (30-foot) drop onto an unyielding surface without loss or dispersal of the radioactive contents of the cask. The cask could drop more than 9.1 meters (30 feet) in the spent fuel pool cask loading pit. It could fall approximately 2.7 meters (9 feet) through the air and approximately 12.2 meters (40 feet) through the water. The terminal velocity of such a fall would exceed that reached in a 9.1 meter (30 foot) drop through air (TVA 1996). The analysis assumes that the cask would be breached by such a fall.

Spent fuel pool designs were reviewed to determine if there were any potential for cascading effects of the cask drop that would initiate releases of additional radionuclides. In the event that the spent fuel pool liner in the cask pit area is breached and the water level in the spent fuel pool drops, the water level would not drop to a level that would uncover the spent fuel in the storage racks. The cask loading area of the spent fuel pool is separated from the storage area by a shelf. The shelf height maintains the water level in the spent fuel pool storage area above the top of the spent fuel when the cask pit area is drained. Additional defense-in-depth is provided when the spent fuel pool gates are installed after loading the cask. With the gates in place, one on each side of the cask loading pit access channel to the spent fuel pool, a breach of the liner in the cask loading pit area would result in a drop in the spent fuel water level to the top of the gates.

The analysis assumed that, in the event the cask is dropped onto the floor of the fuel pool area, the cask would not penetrate the floor or damage equipment located at an elevation below the potential drop zone. Analyses would be performed, if necessary, to verify this assumption during the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) operating license process and/or license amendment process.

It is anticipated that no TPBARs would be damaged by the drop. The TPBARs in the cask would be protected from damage not only by the cask, but also by the consolidation container structure. However, the analysis conservatively assumes that the structural loads on the TPBARs resulting from the drop could breach up to 17 TPBARs, the same number considered for a dropped TPBAR consolidation container. The gaseous tritium in the 17 breached TPBARs would be released into the fuel pool and directly to the environment by evaporation. Two accident scenarios are considered. Scenario 1 assumes that the cask drop occurs prior to draining and drying the cask interior. The analysis conservatively assumes that the 17 breached TPBARs release tritium into the flooded cask at the rate of 50 Curies per TPBAR per day (PNNL 1999) until the cask can be drained into the fuel pool and the cask interior can be vacuum-dried. The analysis further assumes that the cask is drained and vacuum-dried within seven days of the accident to limit the release of tritium from the breached TPBARs. The analysis takes no credit for additional mitigating actions to reduce the released tritium

to the fuel pool (e.g., draining the cask into a storage tank). A total of 5,950 Curies of tritium, in oxide form, would be released to the fuel pool area and exhausted up the auxiliary building stack over a one-year period.

Scenario 2 assumes that the cask drop of more than 30 feet occurs while loading the cask onto a trailer after it is loaded with TPBARs, sealed, and decontaminated. It is assumed that this accident would result in 17 breached TPBARs and loss of the cask confinement integrity. The breached TPBARs would release tritium, assumed to be in oxide form, to the auxiliary building atmosphere at a rate of 0.00001 grams per breached TPBAR per hour (PNNL 1999). Further, the analysis assumes that the tritium release would be terminated when the TPBARs are placed in a replacement cask within 30 days of the accident. During this period, a total of 1,180 Curies of tritium would be released to the atmosphere through the auxiliary building stack. The consequences for Scenario 1 bound the consequences of Scenario 2.

Table D-6 presents the frequency estimates for the truck transportation cask handling accident (Scenario 1). The frequency estimates are derived from data presented in NUREG/CR-4982, *Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pool in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82* (NRC 1987).

**Table D-6 Truck Transportation Cask Handling Accident Frequency Estimates**

<i>Frequency (per year)</i>	
<i>1,000 TPBARs</i>	<i>3,400 TPBARs</i>
$5.3 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-6}$

#### **D.1.1.6 Truck Transportation Cask Handling Accident at the Tritium Extraction Facility**

Cask handling accidents at the Tritium Extraction Facility are in the scope of the Tritium Extraction Facility EIS and are not within the scope of this EIS.

#### **D.1.1.7 Rail Transportation Cask Handling Accident at the Reactor Site**

The rail cask would be loaded under water in the spent fuel pool cask loading pit with 3 to 12 TPBAR consolidation containers. For the purpose of this EIS, the analysis postulates that, following insertion of the consolidation containers, the cask cover would be installed, but not tightly sealed. The cask would be raised above the water level, where it would be hosed down, drained, and the cask interior would be vacuum-dried before moving it to the decontamination area. There it would be sealed, backfilled with inert gas, and decontaminated before loading on the rail car.

The evaluation also considers an option to seal the cask cover before lifting the cask; in this case the only potential for a tritium release would be if the cask were breached by the drop. The rail cask is designed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 71, which requires that the cask withstand a 9.1-meter (30-foot) drop onto an unyielding surface without loss or dispersal of the radioactive contents of the cask. The cask could drop more than 9.1 meters (30 feet) in the spent fuel pool cask loading pit. Here the cask could fall approximately 2.7 meters (9 feet) through air and approximately 12.2 meters (40 feet) through water. The terminal velocity reached in such a fall would exceed that reached in a 9.1-meter (30-foot) drop through air (TVA 1996). The analysis assumes that the cask would be breached by such a fall.

Spent fuel pool designs were reviewed to determine if there were any potential for cascading effects of the cask drop that would initiate releases of additional radionuclides. In the event that the spent fuel pool liner in the cask pit area is breached and the water level in the spent fuel pool drops, the water level would not drop to a level that would uncover the spent fuel in the storage racks. The cask loading area of the spent fuel pool is



separated from the storage area by a shelf. The shelf height maintains the water level in the spent fuel pool storage area above the top of the spent fuel when the cask pit area is drained.

The analysis assumes that, in the event the cask is dropped onto the floor of the fuel pool area, the cask would not penetrate the floor or damage equipment located at an elevation below the drop zone. Analyses will be performed to verify this assumption during the NRC operating license process and/or license amendment process.

It is anticipated that no TPBARs would be damaged by the drop. The TPBARs in the cask would be protected from damage not only by the cask, but also by the TPBAR consolidation container structure. However, the analysis conservatively assumes that the structural loads on the TPBARs resulting from the drop could breach up to 17 TPBARs, the same number considered for a dropped TPBAR consolidation container. Two accident scenarios are considered. Scenario 1 assumes that the cask drop occurs prior to draining and drying the cask interior. The analysis conservatively assumes that the 17 breached TPBARs release tritium into the flooded cask at the rate of 50 Curies per TPBAR per day (PNNL 1999) until the cask can be drained into the fuel pool and the cask interior can be vacuum-dried. The analysis further assumes that the cask is drained and dried within seven days of the accident to limit the release of tritium from the breached TPBARs. The analysis takes no credit for additional mitigating actions to reduce the released tritium to the fuel pool (e.g., draining the cask into a storage tank). A total of 5,950 Curies of tritium, in oxide form, would be released to the fuel pool area and exhausted up the auxiliary building stack over a one-year period.

Scenario 2 assumes that the cask drop of more than 30 feet would occur while loading the cask onto a rail car after it is loaded with TPBARs, sealed, and decontaminated. It is assumed that this accident would result in 17 breached TPBARs and loss of the cask confinement integrity. The breached TPBARs would release tritium, assumed to be in oxide form, to the auxiliary building atmosphere at a rate of 0.00001 grams per breached TPBAR per hour (PNNL 1999). Further, the analysis assumes that the tritium release would be terminated when the TPBARs are placed in a replacement cask within 30 days of the accident. During this period, a total of 1,180 Curies of tritium would be released to the atmosphere through the auxiliary building stack. The consequences for Scenario 1 bound the consequences of Scenario 2.

Table D-7 presents the frequency estimates for the rail transportation cask handling accident (Scenario 1). The frequency estimates are derived from data presented in NUREG/CR-4982, *Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pool in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82* (NRC 1987), and the assumption that each rail cask would contain three TPBAR consolidation containers.

**Table D-7 Rail Transportation Cask Handling Accident Frequency Estimates**

<i>Frequency (per year)</i>	
<i>1,000 TPBARs</i>	<i>3,400 TPBARs</i>
$2.7 \times 10^{-7}$	$8.0 \times 10^{-7}$

#### **D.1.1.8 Rail Transportation Cask Handling Accident at the Savannah River Site Rail Transfer Station**

Rail service is provided on DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina, but not directly to the Tritium Extraction Facility. Rail casks would be transferred to a truck at an onsite rail transfer station for transport to the Tritium Extraction Facility. The rail cask is designed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 71, which requires that the cask be able to withstand a 9.1-meter (30-foot) drop onto an unyielding surface without loss or dispersal of the radioactive contents of the cask. During transfer of the cask from the rail car to the truck, the cask elevation above the ground would not exceed 9.1 meters (30 feet). Therefore, postulated cask

handling accidents at the rail transfer station (i.e., cask drop events) would not cause breach of the cask and release of the radioactive material.

#### **D.1.1.9 Rail Transportation Cask Handling Accident at the Tritium Extraction Facility**

Cask handling accidents at the Tritium Extraction Facility are in the scope of the Tritium Extraction Facility EIS and are not within the scope of this EIS. The scope of the Tritium Extraction Facility EIS starts with the delivery of irradiated TPBARs at the Tritium Extraction Facility.

#### **D.1.1.10 Beyond Design-Basis Accident**

The beyond design-basis accident is limited to the severe reactor accidents. Severe reactor accidents are less likely to occur than reactor design-basis accidents. The consequences of these accidents could be more serious if no mitigative actions are taken. In the reactor design-basis accidents, the mitigating systems are assumed to be available. In the severe reactor accidents, even though the initiating event could be a design-basis event (e.g., large break loss-of-coolant accident), additional failures of mitigating systems would cause some degree of physical deterioration of the fuel in the reactor core and a possible breach of the containment structure leading to releases of radioactive materials to the environment. For the purposes of this EIS, only the severe reactor accident scenarios that lead to containment bypass or failure are considered. Accident scenarios that do not lead to containment bypass or failure are not presented because the public and environmental consequences would be significantly less in those cases. It should be noted that analyses performed as part of the New Production Reactor program in the late 1980s concluded that severe accident core melts do not lead to uncontrolled recriticality if the core enrichment is less than 7.5 percent. Since CLWR core enrichments are less than 5 percent, recriticality is not considered.

In 1988, the NRC asked all licensees of operating plants to perform individual plant examinations for severe accident vulnerabilities (NRC 1988). In the request, the NRC indicated that a probabilistic risk assessment is an acceptable approach to use in performing the individual plant examination. This analysis evaluates in full detail (quantitatively) the consequences of all potential events caused by the operating disturbances (known as internal initiating events) within each plant. [See the discussion under severe reactor accident scenarios presented below.] The state-of-the-art probabilistic risk assessment uses realistic criteria and assumptions in evaluating the accident progression and the systems required to mitigate each accident.

In 1991, the NRC requested that all licensees of operating plants should conduct individual plant examinations of external events for severe accident vulnerabilities (NRC 1991). This analysis covers the accidents that could be initiated naturally (e.g., earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, strong winds) and/or manmade (e.g., aircraft crash and fire). The individual plant examination of external event analyses are less quantitative and results-oriented than those performed under individual plant examination. The analyses were done to confirm that no vulnerabilities or issues exist and that the plants would have sufficient capacity to continue functioning in beyond design-basis external events.

Currently, plant-specific severe accident analyses are only available for operating plants such as the Sequoyah and Watts Bar Nuclear Plants. No such analyses are available for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant. However, the results of such studies will be available prior to operation of the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant.

#### **Severe Reactor Accident Scenarios**

Before identifying the accident scenarios that lead to failure of the containment, it is important to provide a brief overview of the present severe accident analysis techniques used in plant-specific probabilistic risk assessments or individual plant examinations for severe accident vulnerabilities (NRC 1990b). The analysis starts with identification of initiating events (i.e., challenges to normal plant operation or accidents) that require

successful mitigation to prevent core damage. These events are grouped into initiating event classes that have similar characteristics and require the same overall plant response.

For example, a loss of offsite power to a plant could be caused by severe weather events (high wind, tornado, hurricane, and snow and ice storms), power substation breaker faults, instability in the power transmission lines, unbalanced loading of power lines, etc. Each of these events would lead to loss of main generator power and a reactor trip, which would challenge the same safety functions. These events are grouped together and analyzed under the loss of offsite power initiating event.

Event trees are developed for each initiating event class. These event trees depict the possible sequence of events that could occur during the plant's response to each initiating event class. The trees delineate the possible combinations (sequences) of functional and/or system successes and failures that lead to either successful mitigation of the initiator or core damage. Functional and/or system success criteria are developed based on the plant response to the class of accidents. Failure modes of systems that are functionally important to preventing core damage are modeled. This modeling process is usually done with fault trees that define the combinations of equipment failures, equipment outage, and human errors that cause the failure of systems to perform the desired function.

Quantification of the event trees leads to hundreds, or even thousands, of different end states representing various accident sequences that lead to core damage. Each accident sequence and its associated end state has a unique "signature" because of the particular combination of system successes and failures events. These end states are grouped together into plant damage states, each of which collects sequences for which the progression of core damage, the release of fission products from the fuel, the status of containment and its systems, and the potential for mitigating source terms are similar. The sum of all core damage accident sequences then will represent an estimate of plant core damage frequency. The analysis of core damage frequency calculations is called a level 1 probabilistic risk assessment, or front-end analysis.

Next, an analysis of accident progression, containment loading resulting from the accident, and the structural response to the accident loading is performed. The primary objective of this analysis, which is called a level 2 probabilistic risk assessment, is to characterize the potential for, and magnitude of, a release of radioactive material from the reactor fuel to the environment, given the occurrence of an accident that damages the core. The analysis includes an assessment of containment performance in response to a series of severe accidents. Analysis of the progression of an accident (an accident sequence within a plant damage state) generates a time history of loads imposed on the containment pressure boundary. These loads then would be compared against the containment's structural performance limits. If the loads exceed the performance limits, the containment would be expected to fail; conversely, if the containment performance limits exceed the calculated loads, the containment would be expected to survive. Three modes of containment failures are defined: containment bypass, early containment failure, and late containment failure (see Table D-8).

The magnitude of the radioactive release to the atmosphere in an accident is dependent on the timing of the reactor vessel failure and the containment failure. To determine the magnitude of the release, a containment event tree representing the time sequence of major phenomenological events that could occur during the formation and relocation of core debris (after core melt), the availability of the containment heat removal system, and the expected mode of containment failures (i.e., bypass, early, and late), is developed. A reduced set of plant damage states are defined by culling the lower frequency plant damage states into higher frequency ones that have relatively similar severity and consequence potential. This condensed set is known as the key plant damage states (a functional sequence that either has a core damage frequency greater than or equal to  $10^{-6}$  per reactor year or leads to containment bypass at a frequency of greater than or equal to  $10^{-7}$  per reactor year (NRC 1988). These key plant states then would become the initiating events for the containment event tree. The outcome of each sequence in this event tree represents a specific release category. Release categories that can be represented by similar source terms are grouped. Source terms associated with various release

categories describe the fractional releases for representative radionuclide groups, as well as the timing, duration, and energy of release.

**Table D-8 Definition and Causes of Containment Failure Mode Classes**

<i>Failure mode</i>	<i>Definition and Causes</i>
Containment Bypass	Involves failure of the pressure boundary between the high-pressure reactor coolant and low-pressure auxiliary system. For pressurized water reactors, steam generator tube rupture, either as an initiating event or as a result of severe accident conditions, will lead to containment bypass. In these scenarios, if core damage occurs, a direct path to the environment can exist.
Early Containment Failure	Involves structure failure of the containment before, during, or slightly after (within a few hours) reactor vessel failure. A variety of mechanisms can cause structure failure such as: direct contact of core debris with containment, rapid pressure and temperature loads, hydrogen combustion, and fuel coolant interaction (ex-vessel steam explosion). Failure to isolate containment and an early vented containment after core damage also are classified as early containment failures.
Late Containment Failure	Involves structural failure of the containment several hours after reactor vessel failure. A variety of mechanisms can cause late structure failure such as: gradual pressure and temperature increase, hydrogen combustion, and basemat melt-through by core debris. Venting containment late in the accident also is classified as a late containment failure.

Most of the current plant probabilistic risk assessment analyses end at this stage. Only a limited number of plants have performed an evaluation of resulting consequences to the public and environment from releases of radioactive materials following a core melt and containment failure. This type of analysis, which is known as a level 3 probabilistic risk assessment, was first performed by the NRC in WASH-1400 (NRC 1975). In the late 1980s, the NRC performed a comprehensive, full-scope severe accident analyses for five different plant types and documented the results in NUREG-1150 (NRC 1990b). The analyses provided in this EIS use the insights gained from this NRC report and follow the methods applied and the assumptions made to estimate the consequences to the public and the environment.

#### **Representative Severe Reactor Accident Scenarios for the Sequoyah and Watts Bar Nuclear Plants**

As stated earlier, only the plant damage states that lead to containment failure (failure mode defined as bypass, early, and late) and release of radioactive materials to the environment are considered in this EIS. The description of the representative accident scenarios is limited to the dominant sequence (or sequences) within a plant damage state that is a major contributor to the release level categories associated with each of the containment failures defined above. For Watts Bar and Sequoyah, the information is based on the most recent analysis of severe accidents performed by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) under the individual plant examination program that covers both the level 1 and level 2 probabilistic risk assessments in detail. TVA's analyses of the Watts Bar and Sequoyah individual plant examinations were submitted to the NRC in September 1992 (TVA 1992a, TVA 1992b). Both of these analyses have been revised (TVA 1995b, TVA 1994), and the Watts Bar 1 analysis has been revised even further (TVA 1998).

The selected release categories and examples of various accident scenarios leading to containment failure and/or bypass are presented below for the Sequoyah and Watts Bar Nuclear Plants. Table D-9 shows reactor core inventories for Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2. Table D-10 provides important information on time to core damage, containment failure, release duration, and the isotope release fractions associated with each of the release levels. Table D-11 provides a representation of the dominant accident scenarios that lead to each release category, along with its likelihood of occurrence. Release Category I results from a reactor vessel breach with early containment failure. Release Category II results from a reactor vessel breach with containment bypass. Release Category III results from a reactor vessel breach with late containment failure.

Table D-9 Watts Bar 1 and Sequoyah 1 and 2 Core Inventory

Nuclide	Isotope	Inventory (Curies)
Cobalt:	Co-58	874,000
	Co-60	668,000
Krypton:	Kr-85	671,000
	Kr-85m	$3.14 \times 10^7$
	Kr-87	$5.74 \times 10^7$
	Kr-88	$7.76 \times 10^7$
Rubidium:	Rb-86	51,200
Strontium:	Sr-89	$9.73 \times 10^7$
	Sr-90	$5.25 \times 10^6$
	Sr-91	$1.25 \times 10^8$
	Sr-92	$1.30 \times 10^8$
Yttrium:	Y-90	$5.64 \times 10^6$
	Y-91	$1.19 \times 10^8$
	Y-92	$1.31 \times 10^8$
	Y-93	$1.48 \times 10^8$
Zirconium:	Zr-95	$1.50 \times 10^8$
	Zr-97	$1.56 \times 10^8$
Niobium:	Nb-95	$1.42 \times 10^8$
Molybdenum:	Mo-99	$1.65 \times 10^8$
Technetium:	Tc-99m	$1.43 \times 10^8$
Ruthenium:	Ru-103	$1.23 \times 10^8$
	Ru-105	$8.01 \times 10^7$
	Ru-106	$2.80 \times 10^7$
Rhodium:	Rh-105	$5.55 \times 10^7$
Antimony:	Sb-127	$7.56 \times 10^6$
	Sb-129	$2.68 \times 10^7$
Tellurium	Te-127	$7.30 \times 10^6$
	Te-127m	966,000
	Te-129	$2.51 \times 10^7$
	Te-129m	$6.62 \times 10^6$
	Te-131m	$1.27 \times 10^7$
	Te-132	$1.26 \times 10^8$
Iodine:	I-131	$8.69 \times 10^7$
	I-132	$1.28 \times 10^8$
	I-133	$1.84 \times 10^8$
	I-134	$2.02 \times 10^8$
	I-135	$1.73 \times 10^8$
Xenon	Xe-133	$1.84 \times 10^8$
	Xe-135	$3.45 \times 10^7$
Cesium:	Cs-134	$1.17 \times 10^7$
	Cs-136	$3.57 \times 10^6$
	Cs-137	$6.55 \times 10^6$
Barium:	Ba-139	$1.70 \times 10^8$
	Ba-140	$1.69 \times 10^8$
Lanthanum:	La-140	$1.72 \times 10^8$
	La-141	$1.58 \times 10^8$
	La-142	$1.52 \times 10^8$
Cerium:	Ce-141	$1.53 \times 10^8$
	Ce-143	$1.49 \times 10^8$
	Ce-144	$9.23 \times 10^7$
Praseodymium:	Pr-143	$1.46 \times 10^8$
Neodymium:	Nd-147	$6.54 \times 10^7$
Neptunium:	Np-239	$1.75 \times 10^9$

<i>Nuclide</i>	<i>Isotope</i>	<i>Inventory (Curies)</i>
Plutonium:	Pu-238	99,300
	Pu-239	22,400
	Pu-240	28,200
	Pu-241	$4.76 \times 10^6$
Americium:	Am-241	3,140
Curium:	Cm-242	$1.20 \times 10^6$
	Cm-244	70,400

Source: NUREG/CR-4551 (NRC 1990b)

**Table D-10 Release Category Timing and Source Terms**

Release Times, Heights, Energies, and Source Terms for Selected Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants Release Categories										
Release Category	Release Height (meters)			Warning Time (hours)		Release Time (hours)		Release Duration (hours)		Release Energy <sup>a</sup> (megawatts)
I	10.00			8		10		2		28
II	10.00			20		24		4		1
III	10.00			20		30		10		3.5
Fission Product Source Terms (fraction of total inventory) <sup>b</sup>										
Release Category	NG	I	Cs	Te	Sr	Ru	La	Ce	Ba	Mo
I	0.90	0.042	0.043	0.044	0.0027	0.0065	0.00048	0.004	0.0046	0.0065
II	0.91	0.21	0.19	0.0004	0.0023	0.07	0.00028	0.00055	0.025	0.07
III	0.94	0.0071	0.011	0.0052	0.00036	0.00051	4.2 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	4.0 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	0.0013	0.00051

NG = Noble gases.

<sup>a</sup> These values were taken from similar accident scenarios as given in NUREG/CR-4551.

<sup>b</sup> See Table D-9 for explanations of the chemical abbreviations used for the fission products listed above.

Source: TVA 1992a, TVA 1992b.

**Table D-11 Release Category Frequencies and Related Accident Sequences for the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants**

<i>Watts Bar Nuclear Plant</i>		
I	$6.8 \times 10^{-7}$	The major accident contributors to this release event are initiated by loss of offsite power and loss of the essential raw cooling water system with failure of the emergency diesels to start and/or failures in the 125-volt direct current distribution system, in conjunction with loss of secondary cooling and no recovery before core melt.
II	$6.9 \times 10^{-6}$	The main contributor to this release event is initiated by a steam generator tube rupture in conjunction with either an operator error or random failure of electrical distribution systems, leading to failure of the coolant system and failure to control the affected steam generator before core melt occurs.
III	$9.1 \times 10^{-6}$	The major accident contributors to this release event are initiated by loss of offsite power with various failures in the alternating current distribution systems and no recovery of power before core melts, and by a reactor coolant system loss-of-coolant accident (large- and medium-sized loss-of-coolant accident) with failure to establish long-term core cooling.

<i>Sequoyah Nuclear Plant</i>		
<i>Release Category</i>	<i>Release Frequency</i>	<i>Representative Accident Scenario(s)</i>
I	$6.8 \times 10^{-7}$	The major accident contributors to this release event are initiated by loss of the 125-volt battery boards and loss of all offsite power with the failure of emergency diesels to start (station blackout: loss of all alternating current power to all emergency core cooling systems), as well as the failure of the auxiliary feedwater system (loss of secondary cooling) with no recovery before core melt.
II	$4.0 \times 10^{-6}$	The accident scenario for this release event is similar to that given for the Watts Bar plant, above.
III	$9.2 \times 10^{-6}$	The major accident contributors to this release event are initiated by: loss of offsite power with various failures in the alternating current and/or direct current distribution systems and no recovery of power before core melt, and by reactor coolant system small break loss-of-coolant accident (caused by either loss of the component cooling system leading to development of reactor coolant pump seals failure or another nonisolatable break in the reactor coolant system) with failure to depressurize the reactor and/or establish long-term reactor core cooling.

### Representative Severe Accident Scenarios for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant

For the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, no plant-specific severe accident analysis information is available. This plant will have a complete probabilistic risk assessment covering both the internal and the external initiating events prior to the issuance of an operating license by the NRC. For the purposes of this EIS, a surrogate list of accident scenarios will need to be selected based on the review of accident analyses of similar plants. For this selection process, the publicly available reports on individual plant examination results from Three Mile Island 1 (GPUN 1993); Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 (Entergy 1993); and the Oconee Nuclear Station (Duke 1990), as well as a limited scope level 1 probabilistic risk assessment (core damage frequency calculation) report on the uncompleted Washington Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (WHC 1992), were reviewed. The review process identified Washington Nuclear Plant Unit 1 as the most similar in its nuclear steam supply system and containment structure to the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant.

Based on the above review, the Washington Nuclear Plant Unit 1 limited level 1 probabilistic risk assessment report was used as a surrogate for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant. The core damage frequency calculations in this report include the estimate for the original design as well as that for a modified safety system. For the purposes of this EIS, the core damage frequency associated with the original (as built) design was considered. For the level 2 analysis, e.g., determination of containment performance in severe accidents and corresponding release categories, the analyses presented in WHC-EP-0263 (WHC 1991) were used. Again, the release category frequencies given in this report were modified to reflect that of the original design. In addition, in order to present the release categories consistent with those given for the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants, the release categories were regrouped (WHC 1991) as Release Category I, II, and III, and the bounding release fractions and the shortest timings in each group were assigned to the new release categories.

The selected release categories and examples of various accident scenarios leading to containment failure and/or bypass are presented below for the Bellefonte plant. Table D-12 presents the reactor core inventory for the Bellefonte plant. Table D-13 provides relevant information on time to core damage, containment failure, release duration, and the isotope release fractions associated with each of the release levels. Table D-14 provides a brief representation of dominant accident scenarios that lead to each release category level, along with its likelihood of occurrence.

Table D-12 Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Reactor Core Inventory

Nuclide	Isotope	Inventory (Curies)
Cobalt:	Co-58	919,000
	Co-60	703,000
Krypton:	Kr-85	706,000
	Kr-85m	$3.30 \times 10^7$
	Kr-87	$6.04 \times 10^7$
	Kr-88	$8.17 \times 10^7$
Rubidium:	Rb-86	53,800
Strontium:	Sr-89	$1.02 \times 10^8$
	Sr-90	$5.53 \times 10^6$
	Sr-91	$1.32 \times 10^8$
	Sr-92	$1.37 \times 10^8$
Yttrium:	Y-90	$5.93 \times 10^6$
	Y-91	$1.25 \times 10^8$
	Y-92	$1.37 \times 10^8$
	Y-93	$1.56 \times 10^8$
Zirconium:	Zr-95	$1.58 \times 10^8$
	Zr-97	$1.64 \times 10^8$
Niobium	Nb-95	$1.49 \times 10^8$
Molybdenum:	Mo-99	$1.74 \times 10^8$
Technetium:	Tc-99m	$1.50 \times 10^8$
Ruthenium:	Ru-103	$1.30 \times 10^8$
	Ru-105	$8.42 \times 10^7$
	Ru-106	$2.94 \times 10^7$
Rhodium:	Rh-105	$5.83 \times 10^7$
Antimony:	Sb-127	$7.95 \times 10^6$
	Sb-129	$2.81 \times 10^7$
Tellurium	Te-127	$7.68 \times 10^6$
	Te-127m	$1.02 \times 10^6$
	Te-129	$2.64 \times 10^7$
	Te-129m	$6.97 \times 10^6$
	Te-131m	$1.33 \times 10^7$
	Te-132	$1.33 \times 10^8$
Iodine:	I-131	$9.14 \times 10^7$
	I-132	$1.35 \times 10^8$
	I-133	$1.93 \times 10^8$
	I-134	$2.12 \times 10^8$
	I-135	$1.82 \times 10^8$
Xenon:	Xe-133	$1.93 \times 10^8$
	Xe-135	$3.63 \times 10^7$
Cesium:	Cs-134	$1.23 \times 10^7$
	Cs-136	$3.75 \times 10^6$
	Cs-137	$6.89 \times 10^6$
Barium:	Ba-139	$1.79 \times 10^8$
	Ba-140	$1.77 \times 10^8$
Lanthanum:	La-140	$1.81 \times 10^8$
	La-141	$1.66 \times 10^8$
	La-142	$1.60 \times 10^8$
Cerium:	Ce-141	$1.61 \times 10^8$
	Ce-143	$1.57 \times 10^8$
	Ce-144	$9.71 \times 10^7$
Praseodymium:	Pr-143	$1.54 \times 10^8$
Neodymium:	Nd-147	$6.88 \times 10^7$
Neptunium:	Np-239	$1.84 \times 10^9$



Nuclide	Isotope	Inventory (Curies)
Plutonium:	Pu-238	104,000
	Pu-239	23,600
	Pu-240	29,700
	Pu-241	$5.00 \times 10^6$
Americium:	Am-241	3,300
Curium:	Cm-242	$1.26 \times 10^6$
	Cm-244	74,000

Source: Derived from NUREG/CR-4551 (NRC 1990b) by multiplying the values given in Table D-9 by the 1.055 (core thermal ratio of Bellefonte over Sequoyah Nuclear Plants).

Table D-13 Release Category Timing and Source Term

Release Times, Heights, Energies, and Source Terms for Selected Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Release Categories										
Release Category	Release Height (meters)	Warning Time (hours)	Release Time (hours)	Release Duration (hours)	Release Energy (megawatts)					
I	15	2.0	3.0	5	40					
II	30	2.0	3.0	1	30					
III	15	10	24	5	40					
Fission Product Source Terms (fraction of total inventory) <sup>a</sup>										
Release Category	NG	I	Cs	Te	Sr	Ru	La	Ce	Ba	Mo
I	1.0	0.003	0.003	0.006	0.0004	3.0 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	3.0 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	3.0 × 10 <sup>-5</sup>	0.0002	0.0002
II	1.0	0.07	0.07	0.1	0.01	6.0 × 10 <sup>-5</sup>	6.0 × 10 <sup>-5</sup>	0.0007	0.005	0.004
III	0.7	0.001	0.001	0.007	8.0 × 10 <sup>-5</sup>	8.0 × 10 <sup>-7</sup>	8.0 × 10 <sup>-7</sup>	9.0 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	0.0001	3.0 × 10 <sup>-4</sup>

NG = noble gases.

<sup>a</sup> See Table D-12 for explanations of the chemical abbreviations used for the fission products listed above.

Source: WHC 1991.

Table D-14 Release Category Frequencies and the Related Accident Sequences for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant

Release Category	Release Frequency	Representative Accident Scenario(s)
I	$9.0 \times 10^{-7}$	The major accident contributors to this release event would be initiated by a loss of offsite power with failure of the diesel generators (station blackout) and long-term failure of the auxiliary feedwater system. Containment fails early.
II	$9.1 \times 10^{-7}$	The major accident contributors to this release event would be initiated by a small loss-of-coolant accident followed by failure of emergency recirculation, containment spray recirculation, and containment isolation, and by a loss of offsite power with failure of the diesel generators (station blackout) and no recovery of power before core melt and containment isolation fails.
III	$5.1 \times 10^{-6}$	The major accident contributors to this release event are initiated by a loss of offsite power with failure of the diesel generators (station blackout) and long-term failure of the auxiliary feedwater system. Containment fails late.

The information presented in the preceding three tables represents the best available estimate for the core damage frequency and characteristics without a plant-specific probabilistic assessment such as those performed for the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants. The Washington Nuclear Plant was selected as exhibiting the most representative design, but differences between this plant and the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant are to be expected. The referenced probabilistic analysis is a limited scope analysis and the Washington Nuclear Plant, like the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, is not in commercial operation. [The lack of operational data results in the use of some more conservative assumptions that impact the analysis results.] However, use of this data with Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site-specific population and weather data does allow a representative calculation of risk to be performed.

## **D.1.2 Methodology for Estimating Radiological Impacts**

### **D.1.2.1 Introduction**

The GENII and MACCS2 computer codes were used to perform probabilistic analyses of radiological impacts. The GENII computer code was used to estimate the consequences of the reactor design-basis, nonreactor design-basis, TPBAR-handling, and cask-handling accidents. The MACCS2 computer code was used for the beyond design-basis accidents. In addition, deterministic analyses, using the method in the reactor facility safety analysis reports, were performed for the release of tritium in the reactor and the nonreactor design-basis accidents. This additional analysis provides a basis for direct comparison between design-basis analysis results with and without the release of tritium from TPBARs.

A discussion of the GENII code is provided in Appendix C. A general discussion of the MACCS2 computer code is provided in Section D.1.2.2. A detailed description of the MACCS model is provided in NUREG/CR-4691 (NRC 1990a). The enhancements incorporated in MACCS2 are described in the MACCS2 User's Guide (SNL 1997).

### **D.1.2.2 MACCS2 Computer Code**

The MACCS2 computer code, Version 1.12, is used to estimate the radiological doses and health effects that could result from postulated accidental releases of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. The specification of the release characteristics, designated a "source term," can consist of up to four Gaussian plumes that are often referred to simply as "plumes."

The radioactive materials released are modeled as being dispersed in the atmosphere while being transported by the prevailing wind. During transport, whether or not there is precipitation, particulate material can be modeled as being deposited on the ground. If contamination levels exceed a user-specified criterion, mitigative actions can be triggered to limit radiation exposures.

There are two aspects of the code's structure that are basic to understanding its calculations: (1) the calculations are divided into modules and phases, and (2) the region surrounding the facility is divided into a polar-coordinate grid. These concepts are described in the following sections.

MACCS2 is divided into three primary modules: ATMOS, EARLY, and CHRONC. Three phases are defined as the emergency, intermediate, and long-term phases. The relationship among the code's three modules and the three phases of exposure are summarized below.

The ATMOS module performs all of the calculations pertaining to atmospheric transport, dispersion, and deposition, as well as the radioactive decay that occurs before release and while the material is in the atmosphere. It utilizes a Gaussian plume model with Pasquill-Gifford dispersion parameters. The phenomena treated include building wake effects, buoyant plume rise, plume dispersion during transport, wet and dry deposition, and radioactive decay and ingrowth. The results of the calculations are stored for use by EARLY and CHRONC. In addition to the air and ground concentrations, ATMOS stores information on wind direction, arrival and departure times, and plume dimensions.

The EARLY module models the time period immediately following a radioactive release. This period is commonly referred to as the emergency phase. The emergency phase begins at each successive downwind distance point when the first plume of the release arrives. The duration of the emergency phase is specified by the user, and it can range between one and seven days. The exposure pathways considered during this period are direct external exposure to radioactive material in the plume (cloudshine), exposure from inhalation of radionuclides in the cloud (cloud inhalation), exposure to radioactive material deposited on the ground

(groundshine), inhalation of resuspended material (resuspension inhalation), and skin dose from material deposited on the skin. Mitigative actions that can be specified for the emergency phase include evacuation, sheltering, and dose-dependent relocation.

The CHRONC module performs all of the calculations pertaining to the intermediate and long-term phases. CHRONC calculates the individual health effects that result from both direct exposure to contaminated ground and from inhalation of resuspended materials, as well as indirect health effects caused by the consumption of contaminated food and water by individuals who could reside both on and off of the computational grid.

The intermediate phase begins at each successive downwind distance point upon the conclusion of the emergency phase. The user can configure the calculations with an intermediate phase that has a duration as short as zero or as long as one year. Essentially, there is no intermediate phase and a long-term phase begins immediately upon conclusion of the emergency phase.

These models are implemented on the assumption that the radioactive plume has passed and the only exposure sources (groundshine and resuspension inhalation) are from ground-deposited material. It is for this reason that MACCS2 requires the total duration of a radioactive release be limited to no more than four days. Potential doses from food and water ingestion during this period are not considered.

The mitigative action model for the intermediate phase is very simple. If the intermediate phase dose criterion is satisfied, the resident population is assumed to be present and subject to radiation exposure from groundshine and resuspension for the entire intermediate phase. If the intermediate phase exposure exceeds the dose criterion, then the population is assumed to be relocated to uncontaminated areas for the entire intermediate phase.

The long-term phase begins at each successive downwind distance point upon the conclusion of the intermediate phase. The exposure pathways considered during this period are groundshine, resuspension inhalation, and food and water ingestion.

The exposure pathways considered are those resulting from ground-deposited material. A number of protective measures can be modeled in the long-term phase to reduce doses to user-specified levels such as decontamination, temporary interdiction, and condemnation. The decisions on mitigative action in the long-term phase are based on two sets of independent actions: (1) decisions relating to whether land at a specific location and time is suitable for human habitation (habitability), and (2) decisions relating to whether land at a specific location and time is suitable for agricultural production (farmability).

All of the calculations of MACCS2 are stored on the basis of a polar-coordinate spatial grid with a treatment that differs somewhat between calculations of the emergency phase and calculations of the intermediate and long-term phases. The region potentially affected by a release is represented with an  $(r, \theta)$  grid system centered on the location of the release. The radius,  $r$ , represents downwind distance. The angle,  $\theta$ , is the angular offset from north, going clockwise.

The user specifies the number of radial divisions as well as their endpoint distances. The angular divisions used to define the spatial grid are fixed in the code and correspond to the 16 points of the compass, each being 22.5 degrees wide. The 16 points of the compass are used in the U.S. to express wind direction. The compass sectors are referred to as the coarse grid.

Since emergency phase calculations use dose-response models for early fatalities and early injuries that can be highly nonlinear, these calculations are performed on a finer grid basis than the calculations of the intermediate and long-term phases. For this reason, the calculations of the emergency phase are performed

with the 16 compass sectors divided into three, five, or seven equal, angular subdivisions. The subdivided compass sectors are referred to as the fine grid.

The compass sectors are not subdivided into fine subdivisions for the intermediate and long-term phases because these calculations do not include estimation of the often highly nonlinear early fatality and early injury health effects, being limited to cancer and genetic effects. In contrast to the emergency phase, the calculations for these phases are performed using doses averaged over the full 22.5 degree compass sectors of the coarse grid.

Two types of doses may be calculated by the code: "acute" and "lifetime."

Acute doses are calculated to estimate deterministic health effects that can result from high doses delivered at high dose rates. Such conditions may occur in the immediate vicinity of a nuclear power plant following hypothetical severe accidents where containment failure has been assumed to occur. Examples of the health effects based on acute doses are early fatality, prodromal vomiting, and hypothyroidism.

Lifetime doses are the conventional measure of detriment used for radiological protection. These are 50-year dose commitments to either specific tissues (e.g., red marrow and lungs) or a weighted sum of tissue doses defined by the International Commission on Radiological Protection and referred to as "effective dose." Lifetime doses may be used to calculate the stochastic health effect risk resulting from exposure to radiation. MACCS2 uses the calculated lifetime dose in cancer risk calculations.

#### **D.1.2.3 Data and General Assumptions**

To assess the consequences of the accidents, with the exception of the beyond design-basis accidents, data were collected and produced and assumptions were made for incorporation in the GENII analyses. The source terms for the various accidents are described in Section D.1.1. The meteorological and population data are identical to those described in Appendix C. Ingestion parameters are based on Regulatory Guide 1.109 (NRC 1977).

To assess the consequences of beyond design-basis accidents, the following data and assumptions were incorporated into the MACCS2 analysis.

- The nuclide inventory at accident initiation (e.g., reactor trip) of those radioactive nuclides important for the calculation of offsite consequences for each reactor is given in Section D.1.1.
- The atmospheric source term produced by the accident is described by the number of plume segments released; sensible heat content; timing; duration; height of release for each plume segment; time when offsite officials are warned that an emergency response should be initiated; and for each important radionuclide, the fraction of that radionuclide's inventory released with each plume segment. The source terms for each accident scenario are provided in Section D.1.1.
- Meteorological data characteristics of the site region are described by one year of hourly windspeed, atmospheric stability, and rainfall recorded at each site. Although one year of hourly readings contains 8,760 weather sequences, MACCS2 calculations examine only a representative subset of these sequences. The representative subset is selected by sampling the weather sequences after sorting them into weather bins defined by windspeed, atmospheric stability, and intensity and distance of the occurrence of rain.
- The population distribution information about each reactor site is based on the 1990 U.S. Census of Population and Housing (DOC 1992). State and county population estimates were examined to extrapolate the 1990 data to the year 2025. This data was fitted to a polar coordinate grid with 16 angular sectors

aligned with the 16 compass directions and 29 radial intervals that extend outward to 80 kilometers (50 miles).

- **Habitable land fractions** for the region around each reactor site were determined in a manner similar to the population distribution. The census block group boundary files include polygons that are classified as water features. The percentage of each sector that is covered by water is determined by fitting this data to the polar coordinate grid.
- **Farmland fractions** are the percentage of land devoted to farming (DOC 1993).
- **Emergency response assumptions** for evacuation, including delay time before evacuation, area evacuated, average evacuation speed, and travel distance, are provided in the Tennessee Multi-Jurisdictional Plans. Average evacuation speeds are based on the most conservative general population evacuation times.
- **Shielding and exposure data** must be input to the MACCS2 code. The code requires shielding factors be specified for people evacuating in vehicles (cars, buses); taking shelter in structures (houses, offices, schools); and continuing normal activities either outdoors, in vehicles, or indoors. Because inhalation doses depend on breathing rate, breathing rates must be specified for people who are continuing normal activities, taking shelter, and evacuating. Since indoor concentrations of gas-borne radioactive materials are usually substantially less than outdoor concentrations, MACCS2 also requires that inhalation and skin protection shielding factors (indoor/outdoor concentration ratios) be provided.

The protection factors presented in Table D-15 were used in the analyses. The values in Table D-15 are for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant as stated in NUREG/CR-4551, and were used in the analysis for all three plants.

**Table D-15 NUREG/CR-4551 Protection Factors**

<i>Protection Factor<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Evacuees</i>	<i>Sheltering</i>	<i>Normal Activities</i>
Cloud Shielding Factor	1.0	0.65	0.75
Skin Protection Factor	1.0	0.33	0.41
Inhalation Protection Factor	1.0	0.33	0.41

- A protection factor of 1.0 indicates no protection, while a protection factor of 0.0 indicates 100 percent protection.

For this analysis, the evacuation and sheltering region is defined as a 10-mile radial distance centered on the plant. A sheltering period is defined as the phase occurring before the initiation of the evacuation. During the sheltering phase, shielding factors appropriate for sheltered activity are used to calculate doses for the individuals in contaminated areas.

At the end of the sheltering phase, the resident individuals begin their travel out of the region. Travel speeds and delay times are based on the Tennessee Multi-Jurisdictional Plans. The general population evacuation times for the various areas within the 10-mile radius are averaged to determine an overall evacuation delay time and evacuation speed for the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants. Bellefonte Nuclear Plant evacuation plans were unavailable, so the Bellefonte evacuation parameters were based on the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant data.

- **Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual Dose** is the total dose estimated to be incurred by a hypothetical individual assumed to reside at a particular location on the spatial grid. Population data, therefore, have

no bearing on the generation of this consequence measure. Only direct exposure is considered in these results. Exposures from the ingestion of contaminated food and water are not included. Also, the generation of these results takes full account of any mitigative action models activated by exceeding the dose thresholds. During evacuation, individuals have no protection from direct exposure. Therefore, in certain scenarios, it is possible that an evacuee may incur a larger direct exposure dose than an individual who does not evacuate.

- Long-term protective measures such as decontamination, temporary relocation, contaminated crops, milk condemnation, and farmland production prohibition are based on U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides.
- Mitigative actions (relocation, evacuation, interdiction, condemnation) are implemented for beyond design-basis accidents (vessel breach with containment bypass, vessel breach with early containment failure, and vessel breach with late containment failure).
- Dose conversion factors required by MACCS2 for the calculation of committed effective dose equivalents are cloudshine dose-rate factor; groundshine dose-rate factor; "lifetime" 50-year committed inhalation dose, used for calculation of individual and societal doses and stochastic health effects; and 50-year committed ingestion dose, used for calculation of individual and societal doses and stochastic health effects from food and water ingestion.

The MACCS2 dose conversion factor preprocessor FGRDCF was used to create the dose factors. FGRDCF incorporates the data of Federal Guidance Reports 11 and 12 (EPA 1988, EPA 1993). The inhalation and ingestion dose conversion factors are for the most part identical to the values listed in International Commission on Radiological Protection 30 (ICRP 1980). Revised metabolic models for the following transuranic elements: niobium, plutonium, americium, curium, berkelium, californium, einsteinium, fermium, and mendelevium are used (ICRP 1986). In addition, Federal Guidance Report 11 provides inhalation and ingestion dose conversion factors for a few radionuclides (strontium-82, technetium-95, technetium-95m, antimony-116, plutonium-246, and curium-250) not considered in International Commission on Radiological Protection 30, but for which nuclear decay data were presented in International Commission on Radiological Protection 38 (ICRP 1983). Federal Guidance Report 12 provides external dose-rate factors for the 825 nuclides identified in International Commission on Radiological Protection 38.

The only change made to the dose conversion factors produced by FGRDCF was to the tritium inhalation factor. The 50-year committed inhalation dose for tritium was increased by 50 percent to account for skin absorption (PNL 1988).

#### **D.1.2.4 Health Effects Calculations**

The following sections describe the technical approach used to calculate potential consequences to human health from exposure to radionuclides.

The health consequences from exposure to radionuclides from accidental releases were calculated. Total effective dose equivalents were calculated and converted to estimates of cancer fatalities using dose conversion factors recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection. For individuals, the estimated probability of a latent cancer fatality occurring is reported for the maximally exposed individual, an average individual in the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles), and a noninvolved worker.

The nominal values of lifetime cancer risk for low dose or low dose rate exposure (less than 20 rad) used in this EIS are 0.0005 per person-rem for a population of all ages and 0.0004 per person-rem for a working population. These dose-to-risk conversion factors are established by the National Council on Radiation

Protection and Measurement (NCRP 1993). See Appendix C for more detail regarding human health risk factors for nonfatal cancers and genetic disorders.

GENII uses a straight line plume method for calculating doses to receptors. The release/plume is assumed to disperse outward from the release point in one direction. Plume dispersion refers to the plume spreading out over a larger area and becoming less concentrated, which leads to lower doses. Certain weather conditions are better for plume dispersion than others. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the doses to each receptor (e.g., the maximally exposed individual population and the noninvolved worker) for the 16 compass sectors at each site to determine the maximum sector doses. This maximum receptor dose is presented in this EIS. This analysis conservatively assumes that after the accident, the wind would blow towards the sector which produces maximum dosage. In addition, the GENII analyses assume that the accident occurs in autumn, which maximizes the estimated dose from contaminated food ingestion. Doses to each receptor were calculated using 50 percent meteorology. Fifty percent weather indicates a distribution with median weather conditions, (half of the weather conditions are worse and half are better). This meteorology is consistent with the guidance provided in the NRC's Regulatory Guide 4.2 (NRC 1976).

The MACCS2 code was applied in a probabilistic manner using a weather bin sampling technique. The weather bin sampling method sorts weather sequences into categories and assigns a probability to each category according to the initial conditions (wind speed and stability class) and the occurrence of rain. Each of the sampled meteorological sequences was applied to each of the 16 sectors (accounting for the frequency of occurrence of the wind blowing in that direction). Individual doses as a function of distance and direction were calculated for each of the meteorological sequence samples. The mean dose values of the sequences were generated for each of the 16 sectors. The highest of these dose values was used for the maximally exposed individual and the noninvolved worker. Population doses are the sum of the individual doses in each sector.

#### **D.1.2.5 Deterministic Calculations**

##### **D.1.2.5.1 Introduction**

In addition to the GENII and MACCS2 calculations, deterministic analyses were performed for the reactor and nonreactor design-basis accidents (large break loss-of-coolant accident and waste gas decay tank rupture). The deterministic analyses were performed to provide a comparison of the effect of tritium on the doses calculated in the candidate reactor Final Safety Analysis Reports. The Final Safety Analysis Reports present the thyroid inhalation, whole body beta, and whole body gamma doses at the exclusion area boundary and the low population zone. The deterministic analyses calculate the additional dose attributable to tritium using the same method as the Final Safety Analysis Reports.

##### **D.1.2.5.2 Large Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident**

To determine the effects of a tritium release following a postulated design-basis accident, a deterministic analysis based on Regulatory Guide 1.4 (NRC 1974) was adopted. The Regulatory Guide 1.4 analysis was incorporated in the candidate reactor Safety Analysis Reports to calculate the environmental effects resulting from a design-basis large break loss-of-coolant accident event. The following paragraphs describe the release paths from containment to the environment, the conservatisms employed, and the dose calculation method.

The primary containment leak rate used in the Final Safety Analysis Report analyses for the first 24 hours is the design-basis leak rate (as specified in the technical specifications regarding containment leakage), and it is 50 percent of this value for the duration of the accident. The Watts Bar and Sequoyah Final Safety Analysis Reports assume the primary containment (known here as steel containment vessel) leak rates to be 0.25 percent of the containment atmosphere per day for the first 24 hours following the accident and 0.125 percent per day for the remainder of the 30-day period. The Bellefonte Final Safety Analysis Report assumes the leak rate to

be 0.2 percent per day for the first 24 hours following the accident and 0.1 percent per day for the remainder of the 30-day period.

For the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants, the leakage from the steel containment vessel can be grouped into two categories: leakage into the auxiliary building and leakage into the annulus (a space between the steel containment vessel and shield building where leakage from primary containment is collected before it is released). For the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, the leakage from the primary containment can be grouped into three categories: leakage into the auxiliary building, leakage into the annulus (a space between primary and secondary containment), and leakage directly to the environment.

The Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plant analyses assume that 25 percent of the total primary leakage goes to the auxiliary buildings. This value is an estimated upper bound of leakage to the auxiliary buildings based on 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, testing of all containment penetrations. Selecting an upper bound is conservative because an increased leakage fraction to the auxiliary building would result in an increased offsite dose. The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant analysis assumes that 9.5 percent of the total primary leakage goes to the auxiliary building.

At the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants, the auxiliary building is normally ventilated by the auxiliary building ventilation system. However, following a large break loss-of-coolant accident, the normal ventilation systems to all areas of the auxiliary building would be shut down and isolated. Upon auxiliary building isolation, the auxiliary building gas treatment system would be activated to ventilate the area and filter the exhaust to the atmosphere. At the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, during both normal and emergency operations, the auxiliary building's engineered safety feature environmental control system provides pressure control and cleanup.

At each plant, fission products that leak from the primary containment to areas of the auxiliary building would be diluted in the room atmosphere and would travel through ducts and other rooms to the areas where the suction for the auxiliary building gas treatment system or environmental control system are located. The Final Safety Analysis Report analyses allow a holdup time for airborne activity after an initial period of direct release. However, for the tritium analysis, it is conservatively assumed that activity leaking to the auxiliary building would be released directly to the environment through the auxiliary building gas treatment system or environmental control system, neglecting any holdup time in the auxiliary building before being exhausted.

The Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plant analyses assume that 75 percent of the primary containment leakage would be to the annulus (TVA 1995a, TVA 1996). The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant analysis assumes that 90 percent of the primary containment leakage would be to the annulus (TVA 1991). The presence of the annulus between the primary containment (or steel containment vessel) and the secondary containment (or shield building) reduces the probability of direct leakage from the containment to the atmosphere and allows holdup and plate-out of fission products in the shield building. For the tritium analysis, plate-out in the annulus is neglected.

Transfer of activity from the annulus volume to the emergency gas treatment system suction for the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants, or to the secondary containment cleanup system suction for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, is assumed to be a statistical process mathematically similar to the decay process (i.e., the rate of removal from the annulus is proportional to the activity in the annulus). This corresponds to an assumption that the activity is homogeneously distributed throughout the mixing volume. Because of the low emergency gas treatment system or secondary containment cleanup system flow rate compared to the annulus volume, the thermal convection due to heating of the containment structure, and the relative location of the emergency gas treatment system or secondary containment cleanup system suction and the emergency gas treatment system or secondary containment cleanup system recirculation exhausts, a high degree of mixing can be expected.



It is, however, conservatively assumed that only 50 percent of the annulus free volume is available for mixing of the activity.

The emergency gas treatment system and secondary containment cleanup system are essentially annulus recirculation systems with pressure-activated valves that allow part of the system flow to be exhausted to the atmosphere to maintain an adequate annulus pressure. It is conservatively assumed that, for the first hour following the accident, all of the available tritium is exhausted. The holdup time is a function of the emergency gas treatment system or secondary containment cleanup system flow and exhaust rates, as well as the annulus volume. The holdup time before release is defined as 50 percent of the annulus volume divided by the exhaust flow rate of the emergency gas treatment system or secondary containment cleanup system.

The annulus pressure would be maintained at less than the auxiliary building's internal pressure during normal operation; therefore, any leakage between the two volumes following a loss-of-coolant accident would be into the annulus. It is conservatively assumed that there is no leakage via this route.

The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant also has a leakage of 0.5 percent of the total primary containment leak rate directly to the environment. This leakage is assumed to pass directly to the environment without mixing or holdup.

In the Final Safety Analysis Reports, thyroid inhalation and external whole body gamma and beta doses are calculated at the exclusion area boundary and low population zone. The inhalation and beta doses for tritium are calculated; no gamma dose calculation is needed since tritium decays only by beta emission.

The exclusion area boundary is that area surrounding the reactor in which the reactor licensee has the authority to determine all activities, including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. This area may be traversed by a highway, railroad, or waterway, provided these are not so close to the facility that they interfere with normal operations of the facility and appropriate and effective arrangements are made to control traffic and protect public health and safety on the highway, railroad, or waterway in an emergency. Residences within the exclusion area normally would be prohibited. In any event, residents would be subject to ready removal in case of necessity. Activities unrelated to operation of the reactor may be permitted in an exclusion area under appropriate limitations, provided that no significant hazards to the public health and safety would result.

The low population zone is the area immediately surrounding the exclusion area that contains residents whose total number and density indicate there is a reasonable probability that appropriate protective measures could be taken on their behalf in the event of a serious accident. These guides do not specify a permissible population density or total population within this zone because the situation may vary from case to case. For example, whether a specific number of people can be evacuated from a specific area or instructed to take shelter on a timely basis would depend on many factors such as location, number and size of highways, scope and extent of advance planning, and actual distribution of residents within the area.

Calculations are performed using hourly time steps. This time step size is appropriate because of the large primary containment volume and low leakage rate; the tritium concentration (activity per volume) decreases only a few tenths of a percent per hour. At each time step the activity per hour is calculated and placed in the thyroid inhalation and beta dose formulas shown below to determine the doses. Final Safety Analysis Report time-dependent atmospheric dispersion factors, breathing rates, and dose conversion factors are incorporated. The doses at each time step are summed for a total dose. Doses are calculated separately for each pathway (annulus, auxiliary building, bypass), and then summed.

Thyroid inhalation doses are calculated using the following equation (NRC 1974, AEC 1972).

$$Dose = \left( \frac{X}{Q} \right) \cdot BR_t \cdot Q_t \cdot DCF$$

where:

$\left( \frac{X}{Q} \right)_t$  is the average atmospheric dilution factor over a given time interval t

$BR_t$  is the breathing rate for time interval t

$Q_t$  is the activity of tritium released during a given time interval t

DCF is the inhalation dose conversion factor for tritium

Whole body beta doses are calculated using the following equation (NRC 1974, AEC 1972).

$$Dose = 0.23 \cdot \left( \frac{X}{Q} \right)_t \cdot Q_t \cdot \overline{E}_\beta$$

where:

$\left( \frac{X}{Q} \right)_t$  is the average atmospheric dilution factor over a given time interval t

$Q_t$  is the activity of tritium released during a given time interval t

$\overline{E}_\beta$  is the average beta radiation energy emitted by tritium per disintegration

#### D.1.2.5.3 Waste Gas Decay Tank Accident

The effects of a tritium release following a postulated waste gas decay tank rupture also are analyzed using a deterministic approach. As in the Final Safety Analysis Reports, this analysis is based on Regulatory Guide 1.24 (AEC 1972). The tritium source term available for release from the waste gas decay tank is described in Section D.1.1. The inventory of the waste gas decay tank is assumed to leak out at ground level over a two-hour time period. Thyroid inhalation and whole-body beta doses are calculated for the exclusion area boundary and the low population zone using the equations described in Section D.1.2.5.2. Final Safety Analysis Report time-dependent atmospheric dispersion factors, breathing rates, and dose conversion factors are incorporated.

#### **D.1.2.6 Uncertainties**

The sequence of analyses performed to generate the radiological and hazardous chemicals impacts estimates from normal operation of commercial light water reactor (CLWR) facilities, CLWR facility accidents, and overland transportation include: (1) selection of normal operational modes and accident scenarios and their probabilities, (2) estimation of source terms, (3) estimation of environmental transport and uptake of radionuclides and hazardous chemicals, (4) calculation of radiation and chemical doses to exposed individuals, and (5) estimation of health effects. Health effects are presented in terms of latent cancers and latent cancer fatalities. There are uncertainties associated with each of these steps. Uncertainties exist in the way the physical systems being analyzed are represented by the computational models and in the data required to exercise the models (due to measurement errors, sampling errors, or natural variability).

Of particular interest are the uncertainties in the estimates of cancer deaths from exposure to radioactive materials. The numerical values of the health risk estimates used in this EIS (refer to C.2.1.2) are obtained by the practice of linear extrapolation from the nominal risk estimate for lifetime total cancer mortality resulting from exposures at 10 rad. Other methods of extrapolation to the low-dose region could yield higher or lower estimates of cancer deaths. Studies of human populations exposed at low doses are inadequate to demonstrate the actual level of risk. There is scientific uncertainty about cancer risk in the low-dose region below the range of epidemiological observation, and the possibility of no risk or even health benefits (hormesis effects) cannot be excluded. Because the health risk estimators are multiplied by conservatively calculated radiological doses to predict fatal cancer risks, the fatal cancer values presented in this EIS are expected to be overestimates.

For the purposes of presentation in this EIS, the impacts calculated from the linear model are treated as an upper bound case, consistent with the widely used methodologies for quantifying radiogenic health impacts. This does not imply that health effects are expected. Moreover, in cases where the upper bound estimators predict a number of latent cancer deaths that is greater than one, this does not imply that the latent cancer deaths are identifiable to any individual.

Uncertainties are also introduced when accident analyses performed for similar existing facilities have been used as a major source of data. Although the radionuclide composition of source terms are reasonable estimates, there are uncertainties in the radionuclide inventory and release fractions that affect the estimated consequences. Accident frequencies for low probability sequences of events are always difficult to estimate, even for operating facilities, because there is little or no record of historical occurrences. For a new facility, such as Bellefonte 1 or 2, any use of accident frequencies that are estimated from similar existing facilities would tend to further compound the effects of uncertainties.

In summary, the radiological and hazardous chemical impact estimates presented in this EIS were obtained by:

- Using the latest available data
- Considering the processes, events, and accidents reasonably foreseeable for tritium production in a CLWR and overland transportation of irradiated TPBARs
- Making conservative assumptions when there is doubt about the exact nature of the processes and events taking place, such that the chance of underestimating health impacts is small

### **D.1.3 Accident Consequences and Risks**

#### **D.1.3.1 Reactor Design-Basis Accident**

The reactor design-basis accident source term and accident frequency data, presented in Tables D-2 and D-3, were evaluated using two different accident analysis approaches. The first analysis approach used the GENII accident analysis computer code (PNL 1988) to estimate the accident consequences and risks. The second analysis approach was based on published NRC guidance for the assessment of design-basis accident impacts. The NRC requires that the results of an analysis evaluating design-basis accident impacts on a different set of receptors be submitted for evaluation as part of the licensing basis for each reactor.

Analyses were performed in accordance with guidance provided in NRC Regulatory Guide 4.2 (NRC 1976). This guide recommends using an atmospheric diffusion value ( $\chi/Q$  value) corresponding to 1/10 of the value determined in Safety Guide No. 4. This safety guide has been revised and reissued as Revision 2, Regulatory Guide 1.4 (NRC 1974). The NRC in 1983 issued Regulatory Guide 1.145, providing guidance in determining 95th percentile  $\chi/Q$  values using a site meteorological direction-dependent approach (NRC 1983). In these analyses, DOE assumes the 95 percentile direction-dependent  $\chi/Q$  values are consistent with the guidance provided in Safety Guide No. 4 and Regulatory Guide 1.4. The GENII computer code, which is based on the current NRC's acceptable directional dependent approach, was used to determine 50 percentile and 95 percentile meteorological conditions for each site. The results indicated that the estimated doses using 50 percentile meteorological conditions were more than 0.1 times the 95 percentile meteorological doses. Therefore, the 50 percentile meteorological condition at each site was used to estimate the consequences of design-basis and TPBAR handling accidents.

Table D-16 summarizes the GENII-generated consequences of the reactor design-basis accident to the maximally exposed offsite individual, an average individual in the public within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the reactor site, a noninvolved worker at the Watts Bar and Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Sites located 640 meters (0.4 miles) from the release point, and a noninvolved worker at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant located at the site boundary 556 meters (0.35 miles) from the release point. The risks associated with the reactor design-basis accident to the same receptors are summarized in Table D-17.

Table D-18 summarizes the consequences of the reactor design-basis accident (estimated using NRC guidance and 95th percentile  $\chi/Q$  values) to an individual located at the reactor site exclusion area boundary and an individual located at the reactor site low population zone. The 0 TPBAR entries represent total accident dose compared to the 1,000 and 3,400 TPBAR entries, which represent the incremental change to the dose due to the addition of TPBARs. The margin-to-site dose limits (i.e., the difference between the dose estimate and the site dose criteria) associated with the reactor design-basis accident to the same receptors are summarized in Table D-19.

#### **D.1.3.2 Nonreactor Design-Basis Accident**

The nonreactor design-basis accident source term and accident frequency data presented in Section D.1.1.3 were evaluated using two different accident analysis approaches. The first analysis approach used the GENII accident analysis computer code (PNL 1988) to estimate the accident consequences and risks. The second analysis approach was based on published NRC guidance for the assessment of design-basis accident impacts. The NRC requires that the results of an analysis evaluating design-basis accident impacts on a different set of receptors be submitted for evaluation as part of the licensing basis for each reactor.

**Table D-16 GENII-Generated Reactor Design-Basis Accident Consequences**

Reactor Site	Tritium Production	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual		Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles)		Noninvolved Worker	
		Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>
Watts Bar	1,000 TPBARs	0.0014	$7.0 \times 10^{-7}$	0.000011	$5.5 \times 10^{-9}$	0.000024	$9.6 \times 10^{-9}$
	3,400 TPBARs	0.0047	$2.4 \times 10^{-6}$	0.000038	$1.9 \times 10^{-8}$	0.000081	$3.2 \times 10^{-8}$
Sequoyah	1,000 TPBARs	0.0019	$9.5 \times 10^{-7}$	0.000022	$1.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$8.1 \times 10^{-6}$	$3.2 \times 10^{-9}$
	3,400 TPBARs	0.0065	$3.3 \times 10^{-6}$	0.000075	$3.8 \times 10^{-8}$	0.000028	$1.1 \times 10^{-8}$
Bellefonte	1,000 TPBARs	0.000085	$4.3 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.7 \times 10^{-6}$	$8.5 \times 10^{-10}$	$2.9 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-11}$
	3,400 TPBARs	0.00029	$1.5 \times 10^{-7}$	$5.5 \times 10^{-6}$	$2.8 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-7}$	$4.0 \times 10^{-11}$

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality.

**Table D-17 Reactor Design-Basis Accident Annual Risks**

Reactor Site	Tritium Production	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual <sup>a</sup>	Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles) <sup>a</sup>	Noninvolved Worker <sup>a</sup>
Watts Bar	1,000 TPBARs	$1.4 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-12}$	$1.9 \times 10^{-12}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$4.8 \times 10^{-10}$	$3.8 \times 10^{-12}$	$6.4 \times 10^{-12}$
Sequoyah	1,000 TPBARs	$1.9 \times 10^{-10}$	$2.2 \times 10^{-12}$	$6.4 \times 10^{-13}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$6.6 \times 10^{-10}$	$7.6 \times 10^{-12}$	$2.2 \times 10^{-12}$
Bellefonte	1,000 TPBARs	$8.6 \times 10^{-12}$	$1.7 \times 10^{-13}$	$2.4 \times 10^{-15}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$3.0 \times 10^{-11}$	$5.6 \times 10^{-13}$	$8.0 \times 10^{-15}$

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality per year.

**Table D-18 Reactor Design-Basis Accident Consequences Using the NRC Analysis Approach**

Reactor Site	Tritium Production	Dose Description	Individual at Area Exclusion Boundary Dose (rem)	Individual at Low Population Zone Dose (rem)
Watts Bar	0 TPBARs (No Action) <sup>a</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	34.1	11.0
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	3.5	3.4
	1,000 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	0.0018	0.0022
	3,400 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.00010	0.00018
		Thyroid Inhalation Dose	0.0060	0.0075
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.00035	0.00061
Sequoyah	0 TPBARs (No Action) <sup>a</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	145	27
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	12.2	2.9
	1,000 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	0.0044	0.0018
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.00026	0.0001
	3,400 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	0.015	0.0060
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.00088	0.00047

<i>Reactor Site</i>	<i>Tritium Production</i>	<i>Dose Description</i>	<i>Individual at Area Exclusion Boundary Dose (rem)</i>	<i>Individual at Low Population Zone Dose (rem)</i>
Bellefonte	0 TPBARs <sup>a,d</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	5.8	2.7
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.031	0.18
	1,000 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	0.0041	0.0028
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.00024	0.00021
	3,400 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	0.011	0.0095
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.00082	0.00073

<sup>a</sup> TVA 1995a, TVA 1996.

<sup>b</sup> Only TPBAR contribution to dose.

<sup>c</sup> TVA 1991.

<sup>d</sup> The 0 TPBAR entry is included for consistency with the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plant analyses. The No Action alternative at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant implies that the reactors are not brought into commercial service. The No Action radiological dose is 0.

**Table D-19 Reactor Design-Basis Accident Consequence Margin to Site Dose Criteria**

<i>Reactor Site</i>	<i>Tritium Production</i>	<i>Dose Description <sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Site Dose Criteria (rem) <sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Individual at Area Exclusion Boundary</i>		<i>Individual at Low Population Zone</i>	
				<i>Dose (rem)</i>	<i>Margin (%) <sup>c</sup></i>	<i>Dose (rem)</i>	<i>Margin (%) <sup>c</sup></i>
Watts Bar	0 TPBARs (No Action) <sup>d</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	34.1	88.6	11.0	96.3
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	3.5	86.1	3.4	86.2
	1,000 TPBARs	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	34.1	88.6	11.0	96.3
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	3.5	86.1	3.4	86.2
	3,400 TPBARs	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	34.1	88.6	11.0	96.3
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	3.5	86.1	3.4	86.2
Sequoyah	0 TPBARs (No Action) <sup>d</sup>	Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	3.5	86.1	3.4	86.2
		Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	145	51.6	27	91.0
	1,000 TPBARs	Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	12.2	51.1	2.9	88.4
		Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	145	51.6	27	91.0
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	12.2	51.1	2.9	88.4
	3,400 TPBARs	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	145	51.6	27	91.0
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	12.2	51.1	2.9	88.4
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	12.2	51.1	2.9	88.4
Bellefonte	0 TPBARs <sup>a,f</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	5.8	98.1	2.7	99.1
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	0.031	99.9	0.18	99.3
	1,000 TPBARs	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	5.8	98.1	2.7	99.1
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	0.031	99.9	0.18	99.3
	3,400 TPBARs	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	5.9	98.0	2.7	99.1
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	0.032	99.9	0.18	99.3
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	0.032	99.9	0.18	99.3
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	0.032	99.9	0.18	99.3

<sup>a</sup> Dose is the total dose from the reactor plus the contribution from the TPBARs.

<sup>b</sup> 10 CFR 100.11.

<sup>c</sup> Margin below the site dose criteria.

<sup>d</sup> TVA 1995a, TVA 1996.

<sup>e</sup> TVA 1991.

<sup>f</sup> The 0 TPBAR entry is included for consistency with the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plant analyses. The No Action Alternative at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant implies that the reactors are not brought into commercial service. The No Action Alternative radiological dose is 0.

Analyses were performed in accordance with guidance provided in NRC Regulatory Guide 4.2 (NRC 1976). Table D-20 summarizes the GENII-generated consequences of the nonreactor design-basis accident with 50 percent meteorological conditions to the maximally exposed offsite individual, an average individual within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the reactor site, a noninvolved worker at the Watts Bar and Bellefonte Nuclear Plant sites located 640 meters (0.4 miles) from the release point, and a noninvolved worker at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant located at the site boundary 556 meters (0.35 miles) from the release point. The risks associated with the nonreactor design-basis accident to the same receptors are summarized in Table D-21.

Table D-22 summarizes the consequences of the nonreactor design-basis accident to an individual located at the reactor site exclusion area boundary and an individual located at the reactor site low population zone. NRC guidance was used to derive these estimates. The 0 TPBAR entries represent total accident dose as opposed to the 1,000 and 3,400 TPBAR entries, which represent the incremental change to the dose due to the addition of TPBARs. The margin to NRC dose limits (i.e., the difference between the dose estimate and the site dose limit) associated with the reactor design-basis accident to the same receptors are summarized in Table-23.

**Table D-20 GENII-Generated Nonreactor Design-Basis Accident Consequences**

Reactor Site	Tritium Production	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual		Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles)		Noninvolved Worker	
		Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>
Watts Bar	1,000 TPBARs	0.0067	$3.4 \times 10^{-6}$	0.000079	$4.0 \times 10^{-8}$	0.00010	$4.2 \times 10^{-8}$
	3,400 TPBARs	0.022	0.000011	0.00027	$1.4 \times 10^{-7}$	0.00036	$1.5 \times 10^{-7}$
Sequoyah	1,000 TPBARs	0.0016	$7.9 \times 10^{-7}$	0.00012	$6.1 \times 10^{-8}$	0.000032	$1.3 \times 10^{-8}$
	3,400 TPBARs	0.0054	$2.7 \times 10^{-6}$	0.00042	$2.1 \times 10^{-7}$	0.00011	$4.5 \times 10^{-8}$
Bellefonte	1,000 TPBARs	0.00016	$7.9 \times 10^{-8}$	0.000043	$2.2 \times 10^{-8}$	$3.1 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-10}$
	3,400 TPBARs	0.00054	$2.7 \times 10^{-7}$	0.00015	$7.4 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.3 \times 10^{-10}$

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality.

**Table D-21 Nonreactor Design-Basis Accident Annual Risks**

Reactor Site	Tritium Production	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual <sup>a</sup>	Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles) <sup>a</sup>	Noninvolved Worker <sup>a</sup>
Watts Bar	1,000 TPBARs	$3.4 \times 10^{-8}$	$4.0 \times 10^{-10}$	$4.2 \times 10^{-10}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$1.1 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.5 \times 10^{-9}$
Sequoyah	1,000 TPBARs	$7.9 \times 10^{-9}$	$6.1 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-10}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$2.7 \times 10^{-8}$	$2.1 \times 10^{-9}$	$4.5 \times 10^{-10}$
Bellefonte	1,000 TPBARs	$7.9 \times 10^{-10}$	$2.2 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-12}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$2.7 \times 10^{-9}$	$7.4 \times 10^{-10}$	$4.3 \times 10^{-12}$

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality per year.

**Table D-22 Nonreactor Design-Basis Accident Consequences Using the NRC Analysis Approach**

Reactor Site	Tritium Production	Dose Description	Individual at Area Exclusion Boundary Dose (rem)	Individual at Low Population Zone Dose (rem)
Watts Bar	0 TPBARs (No Action) <sup>a</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	0.018	0.0042
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.13	0.031
	1,000 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	0.0020	0.00048
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.00012	0.000028
	3,400 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	0.0068	0.0016
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.00040	0.000097
Sequoyah	0 TPBARs (No Action) <sup>a</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	0.000013	$1.1 \times 10^{-6}$
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.0017	0.00014
	1,000 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	0.0055	0.00065
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.00032	0.000039
	3,400 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	0.019	0.0022
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.0011	0.00013
Bellefonte	0 TPBARs <sup>a,c</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	0.0067	0.0019
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.71	0.14
	1,000 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	0.0067	0.0013
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.00039	0.000079
	3,400 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	0.023	0.0045
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	0.0013	0.00027

<sup>a</sup> TVA 1991, TVA 1995a, TVA 1996.

<sup>b</sup> Only TPBAR contribution to dose.

<sup>c</sup> The 0 TPBAR entry is included for consistency with the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plant analyses. The No Action Alternative at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant implies that the reactors are not brought into commercial service. The No Action Alternative radiological dose is 0.

**Table D-23 Nonreactor Design-Basis Accident Consequence Margin to Site Dose Criteria**

Reactor Site	Tritium Production	Dose Description <sup>a</sup>	Site Dose Criteria (rem) <sup>b</sup>	Individual at Area Exclusion Boundary		Individual at Low Population Zone	
				Dose (rem)	Margin (%) <sup>c</sup>	Dose (rem)	Margin (%) <sup>c</sup>
Watts Bar	0 TPBARs (No Action) <sup>d</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	0.018	99.994	0.0042	99.999
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	0.13	99.5	0.031	99.9
	1,000 TPBARs	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	0.020	99.993	0.0047	99.998
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	0.13	99.5	0.031	99.9
	3,400 TPBARs	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	0.025	99.92	0.0058	99.998
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	0.13	99.5	0.031	99.9



Reactor Site	Tritium Production	Dose Description <sup>a</sup>	Site Dose Criteria (rem) <sup>b</sup>	Individual at Area Exclusion Boundary		Individual at Low Population Zone	
				Dose (rem)	Margin (%) <sup>c</sup>	Dose (rem)	Margin (%) <sup>c</sup>
Sequoyah	0 TPBARs (No Action) <sup>d</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	0.000013	100	$1.1 \times 10^{-6}$	100
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	0.0017	99.993	0.00014	99.999
	1,000 TPBARs	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	0.0055	99.98	0.00065	99.999
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	0.0020	99.992	0.00018	99.999
	3,400 TPBARs	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	0.019	99.994	0.0022	99.999
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	0.0028	99.989	0.00027	99.998
Bellefonte	0 TPBARs <sup>e,f</sup>	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	0.0067	99.998	0.0019	99.99
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	0.71	97.2	0.14	99.4
	1,000 TPBARs	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	0.013	99.996	0.0032	99.999
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	0.71	97.2	0.14	99.4
	3,400 TPBARs	Thyroid Inhalation Dose	300	0.029	99.990	0.0064	99.998
		Beta + Gamma Whole Body Dose	25	0.71	97.2	0.14	99.4

<sup>a</sup> Dose is the total dose from the reactor plus the dose from the TPBARs.

<sup>b</sup> 10 CFR 100.11.

<sup>c</sup> Margin below the site dose criteria.

<sup>d</sup> TVA 1995a, TVA 1996.

<sup>e</sup> Bellefonte Final Safety Analysis Report (TVA 1991), realistic analysis dose estimates. Design analysis dose estimates were also below the site dose limits.

<sup>f</sup> The 0 TPBAR entry is included for consistency with the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plant analyses. The No Action Alternative at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant implies that the reactors are not brought into commercial service. The No Action Alternative radiological dose is 0.

### D.1.3.3 TPBAR Handling Accident

The TPBAR handling accident source term and accident frequency data presented in Section D.1.1.4 were evaluated using the GENII accident analysis computer code (PNL 1988). Analyses were performed in accordance with guidance provided in NRC Regulatory Guide 4.2 (NRC 1976). Table D-24 summarizes the consequences of the TPBAR handling accident to the maximally exposed offsite individual, an average individual in the public within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the reactor site, a noninvolved worker at the Watts Bar and Bellefonte Nuclear Plant sites located 640 meters (0.4 miles) from the release point, and a noninvolved worker at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant located at the site boundary 556 meters (0.35 miles) from the release point. The analysis assumes that no action would be taken on the site to reduce the dose to the noninvolved worker, and that the worker is exposed for 2,000 hours during the airborne release over the postulated one-year period. Calculations indicate that routine plant administrative controls and work permits for workers in the fuel pool area would require protective equipment (e.g., supplied air or air packs) and protective clothing for approximately one week after the accident due to the concentration of tritiated water

vapor in the work area. The risks associated with the TPBAR handling accident to the same receptors are summarized in Table D-25.

**Table D-24 TPBAR Handling Accident Consequences**

Reactor Site	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual		Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles)		Noninvolved Worker	
	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>
Watts Bar	0.028	0.000014	0.00031	$1.6 \times 10^{-7}$	0.0017	$6.8 \times 10^{-7}$
Sequoyah	0.036	0.000018	0.00029	$1.5 \times 10^{-7}$	0.0014	$5.6 \times 10^{-7}$
Bellefonte	0.0045	$2.3 \times 10^{-6}$	0.00025	$1.3 \times 10^{-7}$	0.00007	$2.8 \times 10^{-8}$

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality.

**Table D-25 TPBAR Handling Accident Annual Risks**

Reactor Site	Tritium Production	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual <sup>a</sup>	Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles) <sup>b</sup>	Noninvolved Worker <sup>a</sup>
Watts Bar	1,000 TPBARs	$2.4 \times 10^{-8}$	$2.7 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-9}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$8.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$9.3 \times 10^{-10}$	$3.9 \times 10^{-9}$
Sequoyah	1,000 TPBARs	$3.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$2.6 \times 10^{-10}$	$9.5 \times 10^{-10}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$1.0 \times 10^{-7}$	$8.7 \times 10^{-10}$	$3.2 \times 10^{-9}$
Bellefonte	1,000 TPBARs	$3.9 \times 10^{-9}$	$2.2 \times 10^{-10}$	$4.8 \times 10^{-11}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$1.3 \times 10^{-8}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-10}$

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality per year.

#### D.1.3.4 Truck Transportation Cask Handling Accident

The truck transportation cask handling accident source term and accident frequency data presented in Section D.1.1.5 were evaluated using the GENII accident analysis computer code (PNL 1988). Analyses were performed in accordance with guidance provided in NRC Regulatory Guide 4.2 (NRC 1976). Table D-26 summarizes the consequences of the truck transportation cask handling accident to the maximally exposed offsite individual, an average individual in the public within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the reactor site, a noninvolved worker at the Watts Bar and Bellefonte Nuclear Plant sites located 640 meters (0.4 miles) from the release point, and a noninvolved worker at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant located at the site boundary 556 meters (0.35 miles) from the release point. The analysis assumes that no action would be taken on site to reduce the dose to the noninvolved worker and that the worker is exposed for 2,000 hours during the airborne release over the postulated one-year period. The risks associated with the truck transportation cask handling accident to the same receptors are summarized in Table D-27.

**Table D-26 Truck Transportation Cask Handling Accident Consequences**

Reactor Site	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual		Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles)		Noninvolved Worker	
	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality <sup>a</sup>
Watts Bar	0.00072	$3.6 \times 10^{-7}$	$8.0 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.0 \times 10^{-9}$	0.000043	$1.7 \times 10^{-8}$
Sequoyah	0.00093	$4.7 \times 10^{-7}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-6}$	$3.8 \times 10^{-9}$	0.000036	$1.4 \times 10^{-8}$
Bellefonte	0.00012	$6.0 \times 10^{-8}$	$6.4 \times 10^{-6}$	$3.2 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.8 \times 10^{-6}$	$7.2 \times 10^{-10}$

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality.

**Table D-27 Truck Transportation Cask Handling Accident Annual Risks**

Reactor Site	Tritium Production	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual <sup>a</sup>	Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles) <sup>a</sup>	Noninvolved Worker <sup>a</sup>
Watts Bar	1,000 TPBARs	$1.9 \times 10^{-13}$	$2.1 \times 10^{-15}$	$9.0 \times 10^{-15}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$5.8 \times 10^{-13}$	$6.4 \times 10^{-15}$	$2.7 \times 10^{-14}$
Sequoyah	1,000 TPBARs	$2.5 \times 10^{-13}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-15}$	$7.4 \times 10^{-15}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$7.5 \times 10^{-13}$	$6.1 \times 10^{-15}$	$2.2 \times 10^{-14}$
Bellefonte	1,000 TPBARs	$3.2 \times 10^{-14}$	$1.7 \times 10^{-15}$	$3.8 \times 10^{-16}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$9.6 \times 10^{-14}$	$5.1 \times 10^{-15}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-15}$

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality per year.

#### D.1.3.5 Rail Transportation Cask Handling Accident

The rail transportation cask handling accident source term and accident frequency data presented in Section D.1.1.7 were evaluated using the GENII accident analysis computer code (PNL 1988). Analyses were performed in accordance with guidance provided in NRC Regulatory Guide 4.2 (NRC 1976). Table D-28 summarizes the consequences of the rail transportation cask handling accident to the maximally exposed offsite individual, an average individual in the public within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the reactor site, a noninvolved worker at the Watts Bar and Bellefonte Nuclear Plant sites located 640 meters (0.4 miles) from the release point, and a noninvolved worker at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant located at the site boundary 556 meters (0.35 mile) from the release point. The risks associated with the rail transportation cask handling accident to the same receptors are summarized in Table D-29.

**Table D-28 Rail Transportation Cask Handling Accident Consequences**

Reactor Site	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual		Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles)		Noninvolved Worker	
	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality *	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality *	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality *
Watts Bar	0.00072	$3.6 \times 10^{-7}$	$8.0 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.0 \times 10^{-9}$	0.000045	$1.7 \times 10^{-8}$
Sequoyah	0.00093	$4.7 \times 10^{-7}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-6}$	$3.8 \times 10^{-9}$	0.000036	$1.4 \times 10^{-8}$
Bellefonte	0.00012	$6.0 \times 10^{-8}$	$6.4 \times 10^{-6}$	$3.2 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.8 \times 10^{-6}$	$7.2 \times 10^{-10}$

\* Increased likelihood of cancer fatality.

**Table D-29 Rail Transportation Cask Handling Accident Annual Risks**

Reactor Site	Tritium Production Core Configuration	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual *	Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles) *	Noninvolved Worker *
Watts Bar	1,000 TPBARs	$9.7 \times 10^{-14}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-15}$	$4.6 \times 10^{-15}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$2.9 \times 10^{-15}$	$3.2 \times 10^{-15}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-14}$
Sequoyah	1,000 TPBARs	$1.3 \times 10^{-13}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-15}$	$3.8 \times 10^{-15}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$3.8 \times 10^{-13}$	$3.0 \times 10^{-15}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-14}$
Bellefonte	1,000 TPBARs	$1.6 \times 10^{-14}$	$8.6 \times 10^{-16}$	$1.9 \times 10^{-16}$
	3,400 TPBARs	$4.8 \times 10^{-14}$	$2.6 \times 10^{-15}$	$5.8 \times 10^{-16}$

\* Increased likelihood of cancer fatality per year.

### D.1.3.6 Beyond Design-Basis Accident

The beyond design-basis accident source term and accident frequency data presented in Tables D-10, D-11, D-13, and D-14 were evaluated using the MACCS2 accident analysis computer code (SNL 1997). Table D-30 summarizes the consequences of the beyond design-basis accident, with mean meteorological conditions, to the maximally exposed offsite individual and an average individual in the public within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the reactor site. The assessment of dose and the associated cancer risk to the noninvolved worker are not applicable for beyond design-basis accidents. A site emergency would have been declared early in the beyond design-basis accident sequence, and all nonessential site personnel would have evacuated the site in accordance with site emergency procedures before any radiological releases to the environment occurred. In addition, emergency action guidelines would be implemented to initiate evacuation of the public within 16.1 kilometers (10 miles) of the plant. The location of the maximally exposed offsite individual may or may not be at the site boundary for these accident sequences because emergency action guidelines would have been implemented and the population would be evacuating from the path of the radiological plume released by the accident. The MACCS2 computer code models the evacuation sequence to estimate the dose to the maximally exposed individual and the general population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the accident. The risks associated with the beyond design-basis accident to the same receptors are summarized in Table D-31.

Table D-30 Beyond Design-Basis Accident Consequences

Reactor Site	Tritium Production	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual		Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles)		Noninvolved Worker	
		Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality *	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality *	Dose (rem)	Cancer Fatality *
Release Category I - Vessel Breach with Early Containment Failure							
Watts Bar	0 TPBARs (No Action)	19.7	0.0099	0.25	0.00013	Not applicable	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	19.7	0.0099	0.25	0.00013	Not applicable	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	19.8	0.0099	0.25	0.00013	Not applicable	Not applicable
Sequoyah	0 TPBARs (No Action)	25.0	0.025	0.48	0.00024	Not applicable	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	25.0	0.025	0.48	0.00024	Not applicable	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	25.1	0.025	0.48	0.00024	Not applicable	Not applicable
Bellefonte	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	2.3	0.0012	0.023	0.000012	Not applicable	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	2.3	0.0012	0.023	0.000012	Not applicable	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	2.4	0.0012	0.024	0.000012	Not applicable	Not applicable
Release Category II - Vessel Breach with Containment Bypass							
Watts Bar	0 TPBARs (No Action)	6.4	0.0032	0.35	0.00018	Not applicable	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	6.4	0.0032	0.35	0.00018	Not applicable	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	6.4	0.0032	0.35	0.00018	Not applicable	Not applicable
Sequoyah	0 TPBARs (No Action)	10.4	0.0052	0.72	0.00036	Not applicable	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	10.4	0.0052	0.72	0.00036	Not applicable	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	10.4	0.0052	0.73	0.00037	Not applicable	Not applicable
Bellefonte	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	34	0.034	0.20	0.00010	Not applicable	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	34	0.034	0.20	0.00010	Not applicable	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	34	0.034	0.20	0.00010	Not applicable	Not applicable
Release Category III - Vessel Breach with Late Containment Failure							
Watts Bar	0 TPBARs (No Action)	0.51	0.00026	0.024	0.000012	Not applicable	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	0.51	0.00026	0.025	0.000013	Not applicable	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	0.53	0.00027	0.025	0.000013	Not applicable	Not applicable
Sequoyah	0 TPBARs (No Action)	0.84	0.00042	0.051	0.000026	Not applicable	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	0.85	0.00042	0.052	0.000026	Not applicable	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	0.87	0.00044	0.053	0.000027	Not applicable	Not applicable
Bellefonte	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	0.37	0.00019	0.016	8.0 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	Not applicable	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	0.37	0.00019	0.016	8.0 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	Not applicable	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	0.38	0.00019	0.017	8.5 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	Not applicable	Not applicable

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality.

<sup>b</sup> The 0 TPBAR entry is included for consistency with the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plant analyses. The No Action Alternative at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant implies that the reactors are not brought into commercial service. The No Action Alternative radiological dose is 0.

Table D-31 Beyond Design-Basis Accident Annual Risks

Reactor Site	Tritium Production	Maximally Exposed Offsite Individual <sup>a</sup>	Average Individual in Population to 80 kilometers (50 miles) <sup>a</sup>	Noninvolved Worker
Release Category I - Vessel Breach with Early Containment Failure				
Watts Bar	0 TPBARs (No Action)	$6.7 \times 10^{-9}$	$8.8 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	$6.7 \times 10^{-9}$	$8.8 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$6.7 \times 10^{-9}$	$8.8 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
Sequoyah	0 TPBARs (No Action)	$1.7 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-10}$	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	$1.7 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-10}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$1.7 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-10}$	Not applicable
Bellefonte	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	$1.1 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	$1.1 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$1.1 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
Release Category II - Vessel Breach with Containment Bypass				
Watts Bar	0 TPBARs (No Action)	$2.2 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-9}$	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	$2.2 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-9}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$2.2 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-9}$	Not applicable
Sequoyah	0 TPBARs (No Action)	$2.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-9}$	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	$2.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-9}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$2.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.5 \times 10^{-9}$	Not applicable
Bellefonte	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	$3.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$9.1 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	$3.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$9.1 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$3.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$9.1 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
Release Category III - Vessel Breach with Late Containment Failure				
Watts Bar	0 TPBARs (No Action)	$2.4 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-10}$	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	$2.4 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-10}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$2.5 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.2 \times 10^{-10}$	Not applicable
Sequoyah	0 TPBARs (No Action)	$3.9 \times 10^{-9}$	$2.4 \times 10^{-10}$	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	$3.9 \times 10^{-9}$	$2.4 \times 10^{-10}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$4.0 \times 10^{-9}$	$2.5 \times 10^{-10}$	Not applicable
Bellefonte	0 TPBARs <sup>b</sup>	$9.7 \times 10^{-10}$	$4.1 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
	1,000 TPBARs	$9.7 \times 10^{-10}$	$4.1 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable
	3,400 TPBARs	$9.7 \times 10^{-10}$	$4.3 \times 10^{-11}$	Not applicable

<sup>a</sup> Increased likelihood of cancer fatality per year.

<sup>b</sup> The 0 TPBAR entry is included for consistency with the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plant analyses. The No Action Alternative at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant implies that the reactors are not brought into commercial service. The No Action Alternative radiological dose is 0.

**D.2 HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL ACCIDENT IMPACTS ON HUMAN HEALTH****D.2.1 Accident Scenario Selection and Description****D.2.1.1 Accident Scenario Selection**

Tritium production at the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants would not introduce any additional operations that require the use of hazardous chemicals. No hazardous chemical accidents attributable to tritium production are postulated for the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants.

The chemical inventory for Bellefonte was reviewed to identify potential accident scenarios. The chemical inventory at Bellefonte is given in Table D-32 (TVA 1998):

**Table D-32 Chemical Inventory at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant Site**

<i>Location</i>	<i>Chemical</i>	<i>Storage</i>	<i>Quantity per Tank (gallons)</i>
Auxiliary Building	Boric Acid	1 Tank	2,340
		1 Tank	18,700
		2 Tanks	31,400
	Sodium Hydroxide	2 Tanks*	16,500
	Hydrazine (35 percent)	1 Tank	100
	Lithium Hydroxide	1 Tank	70
	Sodium Hydroxide	1 Tank	210
	Sulfuric Acid	batteries	5,000
Turbine Building	Ammonium Hydroxide	1 Tank	140
		1 Tank	175
		1 Tank	300
		1 Tank	500
		1 Tank	525
		1 Tank	4,000
	Hydrazine (35 percent)	2 Tanks	110
		1 Tank	250
		1 Tank	300
		1 Tank	525
	Sodium Hydroxide	1 Tank	250
	Sulfuric Acid	1 Tank	250
Chemical Storage Building	Sodium Hydroxide	1 Tank	13,000
	Sulfuric Acid	1 Tank	13,000

\* One tank for each unit.

The largest quantity of material at risk that is likely to volatilize and be dispersed following accidental release from the tanks is in the turbine building. The hazardous chemicals stored in the turbine building were reviewed against the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, Section 302, Extremely Hazardous Substances List Threshold Planning Quantity values published by the EPA (EPA 1996) to determine if the quantities of chemicals stored in the turbine building exceed the Threshold Planning Quantity threshold values. In the event that the inventory of a chemical exceeds the Threshold Planning Quantity value, the EPA requires that emergency response planning actions be conducted, including evaluation of potential accident scenarios. Only the chemical inventory in the Turbine Building was used for the purpose of this analysis. The physical properties of the other chemicals suggest that they would be of less concern with respect to widespread exposure upon accidental release from storage tanks. The inventory of two chemicals exceeded the Threshold Planning Quantity values. These Threshold Planning Quantity values are:

Ammonium Hydroxide Threshold Planning Quantity = 500 pounds for anhydrous ammonia

Hydrazine Threshold Planning Quantity = 1,000 pounds

#### **D.2.1.2 Accident Scenario Descriptions**

Two hazardous chemical accident scenarios are postulated for this EIS: (1) the accidental uncontrolled release of ammonium hydroxide, and (2) the accidental uncontrolled release of hydrazine.

##### **Ammonium Hydroxide Release**

EPA requires that the chemical accident analysis consider the release of the maximum inventory from the largest tank. The ammonium hydroxide release scenario was developed based on the following information:

- The largest ammonium hydroxide storage tank volume is 4,000 gallons (TVA 1998).
- The ammonium hydroxide storage tanks are located inside a room in the Turbine Building and are surrounded by an 828-square foot dike (TVA 1998).
- The ammonium hydroxide concentration is 30 percent ammonia by weight (TVA 1998).

The scenario assumes that a break occurs in the largest ammonium hydroxide storage tank, releasing the entire contents of the tank (4,000 gallons) inside the confined area in the room formed by the dike. The released material forms a pool with an effective area of 828 square feet. Ammonia then evaporates from the ammonium hydroxide liquid pool and forms a vapor cloud that fills the immediate area, leaks from the building, and moves downwind away from the building.

The rate of ammonia evaporation from a 30 percent concentration ammonium hydroxide pool is given in the *Draft Risk Management Program Guidance—Wastewater Treatment Facilities Hazard Assessment*, June 1998 (EPA 1998) as follows:

$$QR = 0.036A_p$$

where  $A_p$  is the diked area in square feet, and QR is the rate of evaporation in pounds per minute

Based on a pool area of 828 square feet, the rate of ammonia evaporation from the pool is:

$$QR = 0.036 \times 828 = 29.8 \text{ pounds per minute}$$



## Hydrazine Release

The hydrazine release scenarios were developed for conditions similar to those described for the ammonium hydroxide release scenarios. However, the accident analysis computer code has the capability of modeling pool evaporation for pure chemicals such as hydrazine.

The scenario assumes the release of 525 gallons of hydrazine (35 percent concentration) inside the room of the Turbine Building. Although hydrazine is very reactive, the scenario does not assume any loss of the material by reactivity. The release is assumed to form a pool on the floor, with hydrazine vapor generated from pool evaporation. The vapor fills the immediate area, leaks from the building, and is dispersed downwind. The effective pool area is the same as that of the ammonium hydroxide release case (i.e., 828 square feet) because the tank is located within the same dike. Since hydrazine has a relatively high boiling point, no ground effect is assumed in the release scenario.

### D.2.2 Chemical Accident Analysis Methodology

The potential health impacts from accidental releases of hazardous chemicals were assessed by comparing estimated airborne concentrations of the chemicals to Emergency Response Planning Guidelines developed by the American Industrial Hygiene Association. The Emergency Response Planning Guidelines values are not regulatory exposure guidelines and do not incorporate the safety factors normally included in healthy worker exposure guidelines. Emergency Response Planning Guideline-1 values are maximum airborne concentrations below which nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour, resulting in only mild, transient, and reversible adverse health impacts. Emergency Response Planning Guideline-2 values are protective of irreversible or serious health effects or impairment of an individual's ability to take protective action. Emergency Response Planning Guideline-3 values are indicative of potentially life-threatening health effects.

Emergency Response Planning Guideline values have not been developed for ammonium hydroxide. Upon release of ammonium hydroxide from the storage tanks, ammonia will volatilize and be dispersed downwind to expose potential receptors. Therefore, the Emergency Response Planning Guideline values for ammonia were used to evaluate the potential health impacts of an ammonium hydroxide release. The Emergency Response Planning Guideline values for ammonia and hydrazine are presented in Table D-33.

**Table D-33 Emergency Response Planning Guide Values for Hydrazine and Ammonia**

<i>Chemicals</i>	<i>ERPG-1 (parts per million)</i>	<i>ERPG-2 (parts per million)</i>	<i>ERPG-3 (parts per million)</i>
Hydrazine <sup>a</sup>	0.03	8	80
Ammonia <sup>b</sup>	25	200	1000

ERPG = Emergency Response Planning Guide.

<sup>a</sup> Gephart, et al. 1994.

<sup>b</sup> Craig, et al. 1995.

Note: Hydrazine ERPGs were removed by the American Industrial Hygiene Association for further study in 1996 and have not been reinserted as of July 1998.

#### D.2.2.1 Receptor Description

The potential health impacts of the accidental release of ammonium hydroxide and hydrazine were assessed for two types of receptors:

- noninvolved workers - workers assumed to be located 640 meters from the point of release

- maximally exposed offsite individual - a member of the public located off site at the site boundary, 914 meters from the point of release

Facility workers (i.e. those individuals in the building at the time of the accident) were assumed to be killed by the release. The analysis took no credit for mitigative actions (e.g., area atmosphere monitoring, area evacuation alarms, emergency operating procedures) or accident precursors (e.g., leak before break) to reduce the accident consequences to the facility worker.

#### **D.2.2.2 Analysis Computer Code Selection**

The computer code selected for estimation of airborne concentrations is the Computer Aided Management of Emergency Operations (CAMEO)/Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA), developed by the National Safety Council, the EPA, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NSC 1990).

#### **D.2.2.3 Description of the Model**

The atmospheric dispersion modeling for the above scenarios was conducted using the ALOHA 5.05 computer code (NSC 1990).

The ALOHA code was designed for use by first responders. The model is most useful for estimating plume extent and concentration downwind from the release source for short-duration chemical accidents. It uses a Gaussian dispersion model to describe the movement and spreading of a gas that is neutrally buoyant. For heavier-than-air vapor releases, the model uses the same calculations as those used in the DEGADIS model, an EPA heavy gas dispersion model (EPA 1989).

There are a number of limitations to the model, and these are summarized below:

- ALOHA is not intended for use with accidents involving radioactive chemicals.
- It is not intended for use with the permitting of stack gas or chronic, low-level (fugitive) emissions.
- The ALOHA-DEGADIS heavy gas module is more conservative than the DEGADIS model, which may result in a larger footprint than actually would be expected.
- ALOHA does not consider the effects of thermal energy from fire scenarios or the byproducts resulting from chemical reactions.
- ALOHA does not include the process needed to model particulate dispersion.
- ALOHA does not consider the shape of the ground under the spill or in the area affected by the plume.
- ALOHA does not estimate concentrations under very low wind speeds (less than 1 meter per second), since the wind direction may become inconsistent at these conditions.
- Under very stable atmospheric conditions (usually late night or early morning), the model estimates will have large uncertainties due to shifting wind directions and virtually no mixing of the plume into the surrounding air. Thus, these processes may lead to high airborne concentrations for long periods of time or at large distances from the release source.
- ALOHA does not accurately represent variations associated with near-field (close to the release source) patchiness. In the case of a neutrally buoyant gas, the plume will move downwind; but very near the source,

the plume can be oriented in a different direction (such as going backward) due to the effect of drifting eddies in the wind.

#### D.2.2.4 Weather Condition Assumptions

The model results are presented for atmospheric Stability Classes D and F, with wind speeds of 5.3 meters per second and 1.5 meters per second, respectively. Atmospheric Stability Class D is considered to be representative of "average" weather conditions; Stability Class F is considered to be representative of "worst-case" weather conditions. These weather conditions were selected because they are recommended by the EPA in its *Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis* (EPA 1987).

The model parameter values for these weather conditions are as follows:

- |                          |                       |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Average Condition     | Stability Class D     |
| Ambient air temperature: | 75°F                  |
| Relative humidity:       | 50 percent            |
| Cloud cover:             | 50 percent            |
| Average wind speed:      | 5.3 meters per second |
| 2. Worst-Case Condition  | Stability Class F     |
| Ambient air temperature: | 60°F                  |
| Relative humidity:       | 25 percent            |
| Cloud cover:             | 20 percent            |
| Average wind speed:      | 1.5 meters per second |

#### D.2.3 Human Health Impacts

The potential health impacts from the accidental releases were assessed by comparing the modeled ambient concentrations of ammonia and hydrazine at each of the receptor locations identified previously to the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines. The estimated airborne concentrations of ammonia and hydrazine are presented in Table D-34 and Table D-35 respectively. Table D-36 presents a summary of the impacts data.

##### D.2.3.1 Impacts to Noninvolved Workers

Noninvolved workers are assumed to be located at 640 meters from the point of release. The concentrations of ammonia at 640 meters range from 14 to 318 parts per million, based on the assumed meteorological conditions. The maximum estimated airborne concentration at 640 meters in the F stability class exceeds the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-2 value of 200 parts per million for ammonia, which suggests that noninvolved workers may experience irreversible or serious, but not life-threatening, adverse health effects if the exposures are not mitigated.

For the hydrazine release scenarios, the concentrations at 640 meters range from 0.8 to 6.0 parts per million, based on the assumed meteorological conditions. As a result, the maximum estimated airborne concentration at 640 meters exceeds the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-1 value of 0.03 parts per million for hydrazine, which suggests the potential for only mild, transient, and reversible adverse health impacts to noninvolved workers.

**Table D-34 Airborne Concentration Estimates for Ammonium Hydroxide (NH<sub>3</sub>) Release Scenarios**

Downwind Distance from Source (meters)	NH <sub>3</sub> Concentration under Stability Class D		NH <sub>3</sub> Concentration under Stability Class F	
	milligrams per cubic meters	(parts per million)	milligrams per cubic meters	(parts per million)
30	3,233	(4,590)	83,900	(119,138)
100	306	(435)	7,730	(10,976)
500	15.5	(22)	352	(500)
640	9.9	(14)	224	(318)
914	5.4	(7.7)	119	(169)
1000	4.7	(6.7)	102	(145)
1500	2.5	(3.5)	51.6	(73)
2000	1.5	(2.2)	32.7	(46)

**Table D-35 Airborne Concentration Estimates for Hydrazine Release Scenarios**

Downwind Distance from Source (meters)	Concentration under Stability Class D		Concentration under Stability Class F	
	milligrams per cubic meters	(parts per million)	milligrams per cubic meters	(parts per million)
30	168	(127)	730	(561)
100	30	(22.7)	194	(149)
500	1.6	(1.2)	12.2	(9.4)
640	1.1	(0.8)	7.81	(6.0)
914	0.5	(0.4)	4.17	(3.2)
1000	0.5	(0.4)	3.56	(2.7)
1500	0.3	(0.2)	1.7	(1.3)
2000	--	--	1.07	(0.8)

**Table D-36 Summary of Impacts Data for Release Scenarios**

	Guidelines	Hydrazine (Stability Class D)	Hydrazine (Stability Class F)	Ammonia (Stability Class D)	Ammonia (Stability Class F)
	ERPG-1	>2000	>2000	464	2250
	ERPG-2	179	500	150	825
	ERPG-3	44	200	65	425
Noninvolved worker (640 meters)	Parts per million Level of concern Potential health effects	0.8 ERPG-1 Mild, transient	6 ERPG-1 Mild, transient	16 ERPG-1 Mild, transient	318 ERPG-2 Serious
Maximally exposed offsite individual (914 meters)	Parts per million Level of concern Potential health effects	0.4 ERPG-1 Mild, transient	3.2 ERPG-1 Mild, transient	7.7 ERPG-1 None (<ERPG-1)	169 ERPG-1 Mild, transient

ERPG = Emergency Response Planning Guideline.

### D.2.3.2 Offsite Impacts

The maximally exposed offsite individual is assumed to be located at a distance of 914 meters from the point of release. For the ammonium hydroxide release scenarios, the offsite receptor will be potentially exposed to an ammonia concentration of 7.7 parts per million under Stability Class D condition (see Table D-34), which is below the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-1 value for ammonia of 25 parts per million. Exposures to concentrations below the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-1 value are not expected to produce any adverse health effects for the offsite receptor. Under Stability Class F conditions, the offsite receptor may be exposed to an ammonia concentration of about 169 parts per million which is below the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-2 value for ammonia of 200 parts per million. Exposure of the offsite receptor at concentrations greater than the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-1 value but less than the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-2 value may produce only mild, transient and reversible adverse health effects.

For the hydrazine release scenarios, the offsite receptor exposure concentrations range from 0.4 parts per million to 3.2 parts per million (see Table D-35; both stability classes). These concentrations exceed the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-1 value for hydrazine of 0.03 parts per million, but are less than the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-2 value of 8 parts per million. This suggests that the offsite receptor may experience only mild, transient, and reversible adverse health effects as a result of the exposure.

### D.2.3.3 Uncertainties in the Dispersion Analyses

The results of this screening level analysis contain a number of uncertainties in the atmospheric dispersion calculations, some of which are summarized below:

- The dispersion modeling does not take into account the reduction in the predicted rate of evaporation because the spillage is inside the building; the dilution is caused by the structures on the site; or the potential for other mitigating actions. There are no accurate methods for predicting the extent of this dilution, but predicted concentrations at any point could well be too high by factors of 2 to 5 or more.
- The dispersion modeling does not take account of the deposition of highly reactive vapors (such as hydrazine) onto surfaces including equipment, the ground, water, and vegetation. This means that the model overestimates airborne concentrations at longer distances.
- Overall, the uncertainties in predicted airborne concentrations may be as large as a factor of  $\pm 2 \times$  the estimated concentration.

In view of these uncertainties, the results of this analyses should be considered only as screening level estimations. TVA will conduct analyses to comply with requirements specified in 40 CFR 68 prior to operation of the Bellefonte Nuclear Power Plant.

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# **Appendix E**

## **Evaluation of Human Health Effects of Overland Transportation**

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## **APPENDIX E**

### **EVALUATION OF HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS OF OVERLAND TRANSPORTATION**

#### **E.1 INTRODUCTION**

The overland transportation of any commodity involves a risk to both transportation crew members and members of the public. This risk results directly from transportation-related accidents and indirectly from the increased levels of pollution from vehicle emissions, regardless of the cargo. The transportation of certain materials, such as hazardous or radioactive waste, can pose an additional risk due to the unique nature of the material itself. To permit a complete appraisal of the environmental impacts of the proposed action and alternatives, the human health risks associated with the overland transportation of tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) and associated waste were assessed.

This appendix provides an overview of the approach used to assess the human health risks that may result from overland transportation. The appendix includes discussion of the scope of the assessment, analytical methods used for the risk assessment (i.e., computer models), important assessment assumptions, and determination of potential transportation routes. It also presents the results of the assessment. In addition, to aid in the understanding and interpretation of the results, specific areas of uncertainty are described with an emphasis on how the uncertainties may affect comparisons of the alternatives.

The risk assessment results are presented in this appendix in terms of "per-shipment" risk factors, as well as for the total risks for a given alternative. Per-shipment risk factors provide an estimate of the risk from a single TPBAR or waste shipment. The total risks for a given alternative are found by multiplying the expected number of shipments by the appropriate per-shipment risk factors.

#### **E.2 SCOPE OF ASSESSMENT**

The scope of the overland transportation human health risk assessment, including the alternatives and options, transportation activities, potential radiological and nonradiological impacts, and transportation modes considered, is described below. Additional details of the assessment are provided in the remaining sections of the appendix.

##### **Proposed Action and Alternatives**

The transportation risk assessment conducted for this environmental impact statement (EIS) estimates the human health risks associated with the transportation of TPBARs and waste for a number of alternatives.

##### **Transportation-Related Activities**

The transportation risk assessment is limited to estimating the human health risks incurred during overland transportation for each alternative. The risks to workers or to the public during loading, unloading, and handling prior to or after shipment are not included in the overland transportation assessment, but are addressed in Appendix D of this EIS. Similarly, the transportation risk assessment does not address possible impacts from increased transportation levels on local traffic flow, noise levels, or infrastructure.

## **Radiological Impacts**

For each alternative, radiological risks (i.e., those risks that result from the radioactive nature of the irradiated TPBARs and waste) are assessed for both incident-free (i.e., normal) and accident transportation conditions. The radiological risk associated with incident-free transportation conditions would result from the potential exposure of people to external radiation in the vicinity of a loaded shipment. The radiological risk from transportation accidents would come from the potential release and dispersal of radioactive material into the environment during an accident and the subsequent exposure of people.

All radiological impacts are calculated in terms of committed dose and associated health effects in the exposed populations. The radiation dose calculated is the total effective dose equivalent (see 10 CFR 20), which is the sum of the effective dose equivalent from external radiation exposure and the 50-year committed effective dose equivalent from internal radiation exposure. Radiation doses are presented in units of roentgen equivalent man (rem) for individuals and person-rem for collective populations. The impacts are further expressed as health risks in terms of latent cancer fatalities and cancer incidence in exposed populations using the dose-to-risk conversion factors established by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement (NCRP 1993).

## **Nonradiological Impacts**

In addition to the radiological risks posed by overland transportation activities, vehicle-related risks are also assessed for nonradiological causes (i.e., causes related to the transport vehicles and not the radioactive cargo) for the same transportation routes. The nonradiological transportation risks, which would be incurred for similar shipments of any commodity, are assessed for both incident-free and accident conditions. The nonradiological risks during incident-free transportation conditions would be caused by potential exposure to increased vehicle exhaust emissions. The nonradiological accident risk refers to the potential occurrence of transportation accidents that directly result in fatalities unrelated to the shipment of cargo. State-specific transportation fatality rates are used in the assessment. Nonradiological risks are presented in terms of estimated fatalities.

## **Transportation Modes**

All shipments to the reactors are assumed to take place by truck transportation modes. Additionally, dedicated rail shipments are considered from the commercial light water reactor (CLWR) sites to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Site.

## **Receptors**

Transportation-related risks are calculated and presented separately for workers and members of the general public. The workers considered are truck or rail crew members involved in the actual overland transportation. The general public includes all persons who could be exposed to a shipment while it is moving or stopped en route. Potential risks are estimated for the collective populations of exposed people and for the hypothetical maximally exposed individual. For incident-free operation, the maximally exposed individual would be an individual stuck in traffic next to the shipment for 30 minutes. For accident conditions, the maximally exposed individual would be an individual located 33 meters (105 feet) directly downwind from the accident. The collective population risk is a measure of the radiological risk posed to society as a whole by the alternative being considered. As such, the collective population risk is used as the primary means of comparing various alternatives.

### **E.3 PACKAGING AND REPRESENTATIVE SHIPMENT CONFIGURATIONS**

Regulations that govern the transportation of radioactive materials are designed to protect the public from the potential loss or dispersal of radioactive materials, as well as from routine radiation doses during transit. The primary regulatory approach to promote safety is through the specification of standards for the packaging of radioactive materials. Because packaging represents the primary barrier between the radioactive material being transported and radiation exposure to the public and the environment, packaging requirements are an important consideration for transportation risk assessment. Regulatory packaging requirements are discussed briefly below and in Chapter 6. The representative packaging and shipment configurations assumed for this EIS also are described below.

#### **E.3.1 Packaging Overview**

Although several Federal and state organizations are involved in the regulation of radioactive waste transportation, primary regulatory responsibility resides with the U.S. Department of Transportation and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). All transportation activities must take place in accordance with the applicable regulations of these agencies as specified in 49 CFR 173 and 10 CFR 71.

Transportation packaging for small quantities of radioactive materials must be designed, constructed, and maintained to contain and shield their contents during normal transport conditions. For large quantities and for more highly radioactive material, such as TPBARs or spent nuclear fuel, they must contain and shield their contents in the event of severe accident conditions. The type of packaging used is determined by the total radioactive hazard presented by the material within the packaging. Four basic types of packaging are used: Excepted, Industrial, Type A, and Type B. Another packaging option, "Strong, Tight," is still available for some domestic shipments.

Excepted packages are limited to transporting materials with extremely low levels of radioactivity. Industrial packages are used to transport materials that, because of their low concentration of radioactive materials, present a limited hazard to the public and the environment. Type A packages are designed to protect and retain their contents under normal transport conditions and must maintain sufficient shielding to limit radiation exposure to handling personnel. These packages are used to transport radioactive materials with higher concentrations or amounts of radioactivity than Excepted or Industrial packages. Strong, Tight packages are used in the United States for shipment of certain materials with low levels of radioactivity, such as natural uranium and rubble from the decommissioning of nuclear reactors. Type B packages are used to transport material with the highest radioactivity levels and are described in more detail in the following sections.

#### **E.3.2 Regulations Applicable to Type B Casks**

Regulations for the transport of radioactive materials in the United States are issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation and are codified in 49 CFR 171–178. The regulation authority for radioactive materials transport is jointly shared by the U.S. Department of Transportation and the NRC. As outlined in a 1979 Memorandum of Understanding with the NRC, the U.S. Department of Transportation specifically regulates the carriers of spent nuclear fuel and the conditions of transport, such as routing, handling and storage, and vehicle and driver requirements. The U.S. Department of Transportation also regulates the labeling, classification, and marking of all spent nuclear fuel packages. The NRC regulates the packaging and transport of spent nuclear fuel for its licensees, which include commercial shippers of spent nuclear fuel. In addition, NRC sets the standards for packages containing fissile materials and spent nuclear fuel.

DOE policy requires compliance with applicable Federal regulations regarding domestic shipments of spent nuclear fuel. Accordingly, DOE has adopted the requirements of 10 CFR 71, "Packaging of Radioactive Material for Transport and Transportation of Radioactive Material Under Certain Conditions," and

49 CFR 171-178, "Hazardous Material Regulations." DOE Headquarters can issue a certificate of compliance for a package to be used only by DOE and its contractors.

### **E.3.2.1 Cask Design Regulations**

Spent nuclear fuel is transported in robust Type B transportation casks that are certified for transporting radioactive materials. Casks designed and certified for spent nuclear fuel transportation within the United States must meet the applicable requirements of the NRC for design, fabrication, operation, and maintenance as contained in 10 CFR 71.

Cask design and fabrication can only be done by approved vendors with established quality assurance programs (10 CFR 71.101). Cask and component suppliers or vendors are required to obtain and maintain documents that prove the materials, processes, tests, instrumentation, measurements, final dimensions, and cask operating characteristics meet the design-basis established in the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging for the cask and that the cask will function as designed.

Regardless of where a transportation cask is designed, fabricated, or certified for use, it must meet certain minimum performance requirements (10 CFR 71.71-71.77). The primary function of a transportation cask is to provide containment and shielding. Casks similar to the designs being considered for TPBARs have been used to transport spent nuclear fuel for many years. Regulations require that casks must be operated, inspected, and maintained to high standards to ensure their ability to contain their contents in the event of a transportation accident (10 CFR 71.87). There are no documented cases of a release of radioactive materials from spent nuclear fuel shipments, even though thousands of shipments have been made by road, rail, and water transport. Further, a number of obsolete casks have been tested under severe accident conditions to demonstrate their adherence to design criteria, without failure. Such tests have demonstrated that transportation casks are fabricated not only to a very high factor of safety; they are even sturdier than required.

Transportation casks are built of heavy, durable structural materials, such as stainless steel. These materials must ensure cask performance under a wide range of temperatures (10 CFR 71.43). In addition to the structural materials, shielding is provided to limit radiation levels at the surface and at prescribed distances from the surface of transportation casks (10 CFR 71.47). Shielding typically consists of dense material, such as lead or depleted uranium. The design for a TPBAR cask is less challenging than the design for a spent nuclear fuel cask because the spent nuclear fuel cask must address additional requirements of criticality control and neutron shielding. Additionally, spent fuel rods are more radioactive, and the effect of the radioactivity is significantly greater for spent fuel rods than tritium rods. The cask cavity can be configured to hold various contents, including irradiated TPBARs or irradiated hardware. The assemblies are supported by internal structures, called baskets, that provide shock and vibration resistance and establish minimum spacing and heat transfer to maintain the temperature of the contents within the limits specified in the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging.

DOE is currently evaluating its approach to procuring transportation packages and/or services. DOE will specify the requirements for packages in great detail. As of publication of this document, it has not been determined whether an existing Type B package will be modified to handle TPBARs or a new package will be designed. The level of safety will be the same in either case. The choice will be based on the ability to economically meet the CLWR program requirements. Typical Type B packages are shown in Figures E-1 and E-2.





Figure E-1 Typical Type B Legal Weight Track Shipping Cask



**Figure E-2 Typical Type B Rail Shipping Cask**

Finally, to limit impact forces and minimize damage to the structural components of a cask in the event of a transportation accident, impact-absorbing structures may be attached to the exterior of the cask. These are usually composed of balsa wood, foam, or aluminum honeycomb designed to readily deform to absorb impact energy. All of these components are designed to work together in order to satisfy the regulatory requirements for a cask to operate under normal conditions of transportation and maintain its integrity in an accident.

### **E.3.2.2 Design Certification**

For certification, transportation casks must be shown by analysis and/or testing to withstand a series of hypothetical accident conditions. These conditions have been internationally accepted as simulating damage to transportation casks that could occur in most reasonably foreseeable accidents. The impact, fire, and water-immersion tests are considered in sequence to determine their cumulative effects on one package. These accident conditions are described in Figure E-3. The NRC issues regulations, 10 CFR 71, governing the transportation of radioactive materials. In addition to the tests shown in Figure E-3, the regulations affecting Type B casks require that a transportation cask with activity greater than  $10^6$  Curies (which is applicable to irradiated TPBARs) be designed and constructed so that its undamaged containment system would withstand an external water pressure of 290 pounds per square inch, or immersion in 200 meters (656 feet) of water, for a period of not less than one hour without collapse, buckling, or allowing water to leak into the cask.

Under the Federal certification program, a Type B packaging design must be supported by a Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, which demonstrates that the design meets Federal packaging standards. The Safety Analysis Report for Packaging must include a description of the proposed packaging in sufficient detail to identify the packaging accurately and provide the basis for evaluating its design. The Safety Analysis Report for Packaging must provide the evaluation of the structural design, materials properties, containment boundary, shielding capabilities, and criticality control, and present the operating procedures, acceptance testing, maintenance program, and the quality assurance program to be used for design and fabrication. Upon completion of a satisfactory review of the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging to verify compliance to the regulations, a Certificate of Compliance is issued.





### **E.3.2.3 Transportation Regulations**

To ensure that the transportation cask is properly prepared for transportation, trained technicians perform numerous inspections and tests (10 CFR 71.87). These tests are designed to ensure that the cask components are properly assembled and meet leak-tightness, thermal, radiation, and contamination limits before shipping radioactive material. The tests and inspections are clearly identified in the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging and/or the Certificate of Compliance for each cask. Casks can be operated only by registered users who conduct operations in accordance with documented and approved quality assurance programs meeting the requirements of the regulatory authorities. Records must be maintained that document proper cask operations in accordance with the quality requirements of 10 CFR 71.91. Reports of defects or accidental mishandling must be submitted to the NRC. DOE will be the Shipper-of-Record for the TPBAR and waste shipments.

External radiation from a package must be below specified limits that minimize the exposure of handling personnel and the general public. For these types of shipments, the external radiation dose rate during normal transportation conditions must be maintained below the following limits of 49 CFR 173:

- 10 millirem per hour at any point 2 meters (6.6 feet) from the vertical planes projected by the outer lateral surfaces of the transport vehicle (referred to as the regulatory limit throughout this document)





## Standards for Type B Casks

For certification by the NRC, a cask must be shown by test or analysis to withstand a series of accident conditions without releasing its contents. These conditions have been internationally accepted as simulating damage to spent fuel casks that could occur in most severe credible accidents. The impact, fire, and water-immersion tests are considered in sequence to determine their cumulative effects on one package. A separate cask is subjected to a deep water-immersion test. The details of the tests are as follows:

### Impact

**Free Drop (a)** – The cask drops 30 feet onto a flat, horizontal, unyielding surface so that it strikes at its weakest point.

**Puncture (b)** – The cask drops 40 inches onto a 6-inch-diameter steel bar at least 8 inches long; the bar strikes the cask at its most vulnerable spot.

### Fire (c)

After the impact tests, the cask is totally engulfed in a 1,475°F thermal environment for 30 minutes.

### Water Immersion (d)

The cask is completely submerged under at least 3 feet of water for 8 hours. A separate cask is completely immersed under 50 feet of water for 8 hours.

Figure E-3 Standards for Transportation Casks

- 2 millirem per hour in any normally occupied position in the transport vehicle

Additional restrictions apply to package surface contamination levels, but these restrictions are not important for the transportation radiological risk assessment. For risk assessment purposes, it is important to note that all packaging of a given type is designed to meet the same performance criteria. Therefore, two different Type B designs would be expected to perform similarly during incident-free and accident transportation conditions. The specific containers selected or designed, however, will determine the total number of shipments necessary to transport a given quantity of irradiated TPBARs.

#### **E.3.2.4 Communications**

Proper communication assists in ensuring safe preparation and handling of transportation casks. Communication is provided by labels, markings, placarding, shipping papers, or other documents. Labels (49 CFR 172.403) applied to the cask document the contents and the amount of radiation emanating from the cask exterior (transport index). The transport index lists the ionizing radiation level (in millirem per year) at a distance of 1 meter (3.3 feet) from the cask surface.

In addition to the label requirements, markings (49 CFR 173.471) should be placed on the exterior of the cask to show the proper shipping name and the consignor and consignee, in case the cask is separated from its original shipping documents (49 CFR 172.203). Transportation casks are required to be permanently marked with the designation "Type B," the owner's (or fabricator's) name and address, the Certificate of Compliance number, and the gross weight (10 CFR 71.83).

Placards (49 CFR 172.500) are applied to the transport vehicle or freight container holding the transportation cask. The placards indicate the radioactive nature of the contents. Irradiated TPBARs, which constitute a highway route-controlled quantity or "HRCQ," must be placarded according to 49 CFR 172.507. Placards provide the first responders to a traffic or transportation accident with initial information about the nature of the contents.

Shipping papers for the irradiated TPBARs should contain the notation "HRCQ" and have entries identifying the following: the name of the shipper, emergency response telephone number, description of contents, and the shipper's certificate, as described in 49 CFR 172, Subpart C.

In addition, drivers of motor vehicles transporting radioactive material must have training in accordance with the requirements of 49 CFR 172.700. The training requirements include familiarization with the regulations, emergency response information, and the communication programs required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Drivers are also required to have training on the procedures necessary for safe operation of the vehicle used to transport the irradiated TPBARs or hardware.

#### **E.3.3 Ground Transportation Route Selection Process**

According to DOE guidelines, TPBAR and waste shipments must comply with both NRC and U.S. Department of Transportation regulatory requirements. NRC regulations cover the packaging and transport of irradiated TPBARs and waste, whereas the U.S. Department of Transportation specifically regulates the carriers and the conditions of transport, such as routing, handling and storage, and vehicle and driver requirements. The highway routing of nuclear material is systematically determined according to U.S. Department of Transportation regulations 49 CFR 171-179 and 49 CFR 397 for commercial shipments. Specific routes cannot be identified publicly in advance for DOE's Transportation Safeguards Division's shipments because they are classified to protect national security interests.

The U.S. Department of Transportation routing regulations require that shipment of a highway route-controlled quantity of radioactive material be transported over a preferred highway network, including interstate highways, with preference toward interstate system bypasses and beltways around cities and state-designated preferred routes. A state or Tribe may designate a preferred route to replace or supplement the interstate highway system in accordance with U.S. Department of Transportation guidelines (DOT 1992).

Carriers of highway route-controlled quantities are required to use the preferred network unless they are moving from their origin to the nearest interstate highway or from the interstate highway to their destination, are making necessary repair or rest stops, or emergency conditions render the interstate highway unsafe or impassable. The primary criterion for selecting the preferred route for a shipment is travel time. Preferred routing takes into consideration accident rate, transit time population density, activities, time of day, and day of the week.

The HIGHWAY computer code (ORNL 1993a) is used for selecting highway routes in the United States. The HIGHWAY database is a computerized road atlas that currently describes about 386,400 kilometers (240,000 miles) of roads. The Interstate System and all U.S. (U.S.-designated) highways are completely described in the database. In addition, most of the principal state highways and many local and community roads are also identified. The code is updated periodically to reflect current road conditions and has been benchmarked against reported mileages and observations of commercial truck firms. Features in the HIGHWAY code allow the user to select routes that conform to U.S. Department of Transportation regulations. Additionally, the HIGHWAY code contains data on the population densities along the routes. The distances and populations from the HIGHWAY code are part of the information used for the transportation impact analysis in this EIS.

The INTERLINE (ORNL 1993b) computer program, designed to simulate routing of the U.S. rail system, is used for selecting railway routes for the purpose of analysis. The INTERLINE database consists of 94 separate subnetworks and represents various competing rail companies in the United States. The database used by INTERLINE was originally based on Federal Railroad Administration data and reflected the U.S. railroad system in 1974. The database has since been expanded and modified over the past two decades. The code is updated periodically to reflect current track conditions and has been benchmarked against reported mileages and observations of commercial rail firms. The INTERLINE model uses a shortest-route algorithm that finds the minimum impedance path within an individual subnetwork. A separate routine is used to find paths along the subnetworks. The routes selected for this study used the standard assumptions in the INTERLINE model that simulate the selection process that railroads use to direct shipments.

#### **E.4 METHODS FOR CALCULATING TRANSPORTATION RISKS**

The overland transportation risk assessment method is summarized in Figure E-4. After the EIS alternatives were identified and the goals of the shipping campaign were understood, data was collected on material characteristics and accident parameters. Accident parameters were largely based on the DOE-funded study of transportation accidents (ANL 1994).

Representative routes that may be used for the shipment of TPBARs and waste were selected for risk assessment purposes using the HIGHWAY code. They do not necessarily represent the actual routes that would be used to transport nuclear materials. Specific routes cannot be identified in advance because the routes cannot be finalized until they have been reviewed and approved by the NRC. The selection of the actual route would be responsive to environmental and other conditions that would be in effect or could be predicted at the time of shipment. Such conditions could include adverse weather conditions, road conditions, bridge closures, and local traffic problems. For security reasons, details about a route would not be publicized before the shipment.




Figure E-4 Overland Transportation Risk Assessment

The first analytic step in the ground transportation analysis was to determine the incident-free and accident risk factors on a per-shipment basis. Risk factors, as with any risk estimate, are the product of the probability of exposure and the magnitude of the exposure. Accident risk factors were calculated for radiological and nonradiological traffic accidents. The probabilities, which are much lower than one, and the magnitudes of exposure were multiplied, yielding very low risk numbers. Incident-free risk factors were calculated for crew and public exposure to radiation emanating from the shipping container (cask) and public exposure to the chemical toxicity of the transportation vehicle exhaust. The probability of incident-free exposure is unity (one).

For each alternative, risks were assessed for both incident-free transportation and accident conditions. For the incident-free assessment, risks are calculated for both collective populations of potentially exposed individuals and for maximally exposed individuals. The accident assessment consists of two components: (1) a probabilistic accident risk assessment that considers the probabilities and consequences of a range of possible transportation accident environments, including low-probability accidents that have high consequences and high-probability accidents that have low consequences, and (2) an accident consequence assessment that considers only the consequences of the most severe postulated transportation accidents.

The RADTRAN 4 computer code (SNL 1993b) is used for incident-free and accident risk assessments to estimate the impacts on populations. RADTRAN 4 was developed by Sandia National Laboratories to calculate population risks associated with the transportation of radioactive materials by a variety of modes, including truck, rail, air, ship, and barge. The Transportation Incident Center Line Dose (TICLD) code, run in conjunction with RADTRAN 4, was used to calculate the doses to the maximally exposed individuals.

The RADTRAN 4 population risk calculations take into account both the consequences and probabilities of potential exposure events. The RADTRAN 4 and TICLD codes consequence analyses include the cloud shine, ground shine, inhalation, and resuspension exposures. The collective population risk is a measure of the total radiological risk posed to society as a whole by the alternative being considered. As such, the collective population risk is used as the primary means of comparing the various alternatives.

## **E.5 ALTERNATIVES, PARAMETERS, AND ASSUMPTIONS**

### **E.5.1 Description of Alternatives**

Four transportation segments were evaluated in this EIS: (1) shipment of fabricated TPBARs to assembly facilities, (2) shipment of TPBAR assemblies to each of the CLWRs, (3) shipment of irradiated TPBARs to the Savannah River Site, and (4) shipment of irradiated hardware to a waste disposal site.

Transportation segment 1 involves shipment of nonhazardous, nonradioactive TPBAR material in secure commercial containers from TPBAR fabricators to fuel assembly facilities. Candidate sites for fabrication of the TPBARs include Wilmington, North Carolina (General Electric); Hematite, Missouri (Asea Brown-Boveri/Combustion Engineering); and Columbia, South Carolina (Westinghouse Electric Corporation).

Transportation segment 2 involves shipment of nonhazardous, nonradioactive TPBAR material in secure commercial containers, along with new (fresh, unirradiated) reactor fuel. The impacts of shipping fresh reactor fuel are outside the scope of this EIS and are covered in NUREG-0170 (NRC 1977). Candidate sites for assembly of the TPBARs include Richland, Washington (Siemens Power Corporation); Lynchburg, Virginia (Framatome-Cogema Fuels or BWX Technologies, Inc.); Hematite, Missouri (Asea Brown-Boveri/Combustion Engineering); and Columbia, South Carolina (Westinghouse Electric Corporation). The transportation impacts of all possible combinations of these facilities have been evaluated. The choice of facilities will be made by DOE using normal commercial practices.

Transportation segment 3 involves shipment of irradiated TPBARs from the CLWRs to the Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site. The metallic components of the TPBARs will have been activated by the reactor flux, and they will contain the radioactive tritium. Therefore, these TPBARs will be shipped in a Type B cask. This EIS has evaluated the shipment of TPBARs by three distinct methods. First, truck-sized casks, which hold a single consolidated assembly, could be transported using legal-weight trucks (one cask per truck) on public roads. Second, two truck-sized casks could be shipped by dedicated train on rail lines. Third, rail-sized casks, which hold between 2 and 24 consolidated TPBAR containers, could be shipped by dedicated train on rail lines. For the purpose of conservative analysis, this EIS assumes that only two consolidated containers will be loaded in a rail-size cask. This assumption is conservative because putting more than two consolidated assemblies into a cask would decrease the number of shipments, which decreases the incident-free and traffic accident risks. These risks are dominant contributors of the transportation risk.

The transportation analysis looked at likely implementation approaches for each of the three reactor options. The approaches quantitatively addressed minimum production at a single unit (1,000 TPBARs per 18-month fuel cycle) and maximum production at a single unit (3,400 TPBARs per 18-month fuel cycle).

Transportation segment 4 involves shipment of irradiated hardware from the CLWRs to either the Savannah River Site or the Barnwell disposal facility in South Carolina for disposal as low-level radioactive waste. Irradiated hardware includes base plates and thimble plugs removed from the TPBARs at the CLWR site.

### E.5.2 Representative Routes

Representative overland truck routes were selected for the shipments to the CLWRs, the Savannah River Site, and the Barnwell waste disposal facility. The routes were selected consistent with current routing practices and all applicable routing regulations and guidelines (DOT 1992). However, the routes were determined for risk assessment purposes. They do not necessarily represent the actual routes that would be used to transport TPBARs and waste in the future. Specific routes cannot be identified in advance. The representative truck routes are shown in Figure E-5. Rail routes, determined by commercial as well as safety considerations, are not shown on Figure E-5 for brevity.

Route characteristics that are important to the radiological risk assessment include the total shipment distance and the population distribution along the route. The specific route selected determines both the total potentially exposed population and the expected frequency of transportation-related accidents. Route characteristics are summarized in Table E-1. The population densities along each route are derived from 1990 U.S. Bureau of Census data. Rural, suburban, and urban areas are characterized according to the following breakdown: rural population densities range from 0 to 54 persons per square kilometer (0 to 139 persons per square mile); the suburban range is from 55 to 1,284 persons per square kilometer (140 to 3,326 persons per square mile); and the urban range includes all population densities greater than 1,284 persons per square kilometer (3,326 persons per square mile). The exposed population includes all persons living within 800 meters (0.5 mile) of each side of the road. The exposed population, for the purpose of route characterization and incident-free dose calculation, includes all persons living within 800 meters (0.5 mile) of each side of the road.

The preferred route for truck shipments entering the Savannah River Site is to enter the site from Jackson, South Carolina, on Route 125 at barricade 7; take Road 3 over to Road 5; go south on Road 5 until reaching Road 6; go east on Road 6 until reaching F Road; go north on F Road until reaching E Road; go north on E Road until reaching Road 4; go north on Road 4 into the H-area; and then approach the Tritium Extraction Facility via the local H-area roads. DOE has identified two alternate routes (WSRC 1996):




Figure E-5 Representative Overland Truck Routes

Table E-1 Potential Shipping Routes Evaluated for the CLWR EIS

From	To	Distance (kilometers)	Percentages in Zones			Population Density in Zone (persons per square kilometer)			Number of Affected Persons
			Rural	Suburban	Urban	Rural	Suburban	Urban	
Truck Routes									
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	574.5	61.7	34.9	3.4	18.1	349.7	2,195.3	191,000
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	498.9	55.0	40.6	4.4	16.8	373.0	2,157.4	204,000
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	560.0	61.7	34.5	3.8	16.7	358.4	2,158.0	193,000
Wilmington, NC	Columbia, SC	513.4	72.3	27.2	0.4	19.9	229.3	1,764.7	69,000
Wilmington, NC	Hematite, MO	1,673.7	70.8	28.3	0.8	14.1	294.9	2,229.9	298,000
Wilmington, NC	Lynchburg, VA	577.7	83.0	16.1	0.7	14.4	188.7	2,276.9	54,000
Wilmington, NC	Richland, WA	4,787.7	82.7	16.1	1.2	7.4	329.5	2,169.9	653,000
Columbia, SC	Lynchburg, VA	595.4	70.0	28.7	1.3	16.9	296.5	2,037.7	118,000
Columbia, SC	Richland, WA	4,451.3	85.7	13.1	1.2	6.7	336.5	2,146.8	538,000
Hematite, MO	Columbia, SC	1,337.3	77.8	21.3	0.9	12.7	286.4	2,134.2	193,000
Hematite, MO	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	917.3	83.0	16.2	0.8	12.2	253.1	2,321.9	102,000
Lynchburg, VA	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	614.8	69.6	29.6	0.8	18.7	276.3	2,028.9	109,000
Columbia, SC	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	552.0	70.0	29.1	0.9	14.2	297.0	1,856.0	100,000
Richland, WA	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	4,031.3	87.7	11.0	1.2	6.2	340.7	2,174.7	445,000
Hematite, MO	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	836.8	79.2	19.9	1.0	13.0	280.2	2,297.9	119,000
Lynchburg, VA	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	729.0	64.7	34.2	1.1	19.3	302.4	1,967.3	160,000
Columbia, SC	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	597.1	57.1	39.5	3.4	16.0	348.2	2,110.6	209,000
Richland, WA	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	3,950.8	87.0	11.7	1.3	6.2	347.2	2,173.3	469,000
Hematite, MO	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	811.1	82.0	17.1	0.9	13.0	266.4	2,313.2	100,000
Lynchburg, VA	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	790.2	68.8	30.3	0.9	18.9	287.8	1,950.5	149,000
Columbia, SC	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	658.2	62.6	34.4	3.0	16.0	334.7	2,109.6	198,000
Richland, WA	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	3,925.1	87.6	11.1	1.3	6.2	347.0	2,173.8	453,000
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Barnwell, SC	632.5	62.9	34.3	2.8	16.5	342.3	2,145.2	190,000
Sequoyah Nuclear Plan	Barnwell, SC	556.8	57.0	39.3	3.7	14.9	364.0	2,110.7	205,000
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	Barnwell, SC	618.0	62.9	33.9	3.2	15.2	350.1	2,109.8	194,000



From	To	Distance (kilometers)	Percentages in Zones			Population Density in Zone (persons per square kilometer)			Number of Affected Persons
			Rural	Suburban	Urban	Rural	Suburban	Urban	
Rail Routes									
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	668.2	62.4	36.2	1.3	14.1	269.0	2,091.1	143,000
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	611.9	60.5	38.0	1.4	14.3	271.4	2,091.1	138,000
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	675.9	63.3	35.4	1.2	14.0	268.8	2,091.1	140,000

- Assuming that the newly completed bridge modification on Road F is adequate to handle trucks, enter the site from Jackson, South Carolina, on Route 125 at barricade 7. Take Road 3 over to Road 5. Go northeast on Road 5 until reaching C Road. Go north on C Road until reaching Road 4. Go northeast on Road 4 into the H-area, and approach the Tritium Extraction Facility via the local H-area roads.
- Assuming that the newly completed bridge on Road F is adequate to handle trucks, enter the site from the North on Route 19 through barricade 2. Take road 2 to F Road. Go south on F Road until reaching Road 4. Go southeast on Road 4 into the H-area, and approach the Tritium Extraction Facility via the local H-area roads.

The differences in the risk of the three possible routes were evaluated to be much less than the significant figures shown on the risk estimates. Final determination of route details is an operational decision to be made at the time of shipment.

If rail transportation is the chosen mode, the preferred rail system is to use existing Savannah River Site rails and railspurs. The Savannah River Site would use an existing 300-ton Manitowoc portable crane at the end of the rail spur to transfer the casks from the rail car to trucks. The trucks would travel the quarter mile to the Tritium Extraction Facility. A railspur terminal support facility may be required to support this crane. Construction impact estimates (if construction is required) are not available at this time (WSRC 1996).

The Bellefonte, Watts Bar, and Sequoyah Nuclear Plants currently have cranes that could handle 125-ton casks, although Sequoyah is currently downgraded to 80 tons and load testing would be required to restore the rating to the design capacity of 125 tons. Large cask handling has not been addressed in detail at any of the sites, so regulatory, structural, and spacial issues must be evaluated before rail transportation could be implemented.

### **E.5.3 Material Inventory**

The amount of hazardous material in a package is called the inventory. It refers to the material available for release in an accident scenario. Inventory estimates for the materials shipped are given below.

### **Low-Level Radioactive Waste**

DOE assumes 24 TPBARs per production assembly. Irradiation of 3,400 TPBARs per 18-month fuel cycle would generate 141 hold-down assemblies (see Appendix A, Figure A-12). These hold-down assemblies would be discarded as low-level radioactive waste. The low-level radioactive waste volume is estimated to be about 0.43 cubic meters (15 cubic feet) per year (WEC 1998).

Use of a "generic legal weight truck waste cask" with a usable cavity measuring 18 inches in diameter by 144 inches long would result in about two shipments per year. However, achieving perfect packing efficiency of these wastes is not realistic, and this estimate must be expanded. DOE estimates that the annual waste shipments will be a minimum of two and a maximum of eight.

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory provided source terms for 16 thimble plugs, which are equal to about 1,500 grams of irradiated hardware (PNNL 1998). Using the above information, which was chosen to conservatively estimate the amount of irradiated hardware, each shipment will carry about 56 kilograms of irradiated hardware. The thimble plugs are more highly irradiated than other hardware, so use of the data from thimble plugs is conservative. Table E-2 lists the derived source term used for the purpose of analyzing low-level radioactive waste transportation risks. Further analysis, using final design information and actual irradiation schedules, will be used to verify that the concentration of radionuclides does not exceed the Class C limits of 10 CFR 61. The regulatory limit dose rates were assumed for low-level radioactive waste shipments.

### TPBARs

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory determined the radionuclide inventory and decay heat for the Lead Test Assembly TPBARs at reactor discharge and for decay times ranging from 7 days to 10 years following reactor discharge (PNNL 1998). Table E-2 shows the TPBAR radionuclide inventory, with a decay time of 30 days used for the analysis. The inventory includes tritium and other irradiated components associated with the cladding, liner, getter, and other structures within a TPBAR. The latter is collectively called nontarget-bearing components.

### Crud

The crud inventory assumed to be available for release from TPBARs is shown in Table E-2 with a 30-day decay time following reactor discharge in units of Curies/TPBAR. The crud inventory has been very conservatively bounded using worst-case measurements of crud from pressurized water reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNL 1991a).

**Table E-2 Irradiated Hardware and TPBAR Inventory**

<i>Nuclide</i>	<i>Low-Level Radioactive Waste (Curies per shipment)</i>	<i>TPBAR (Curies per TPBAR)</i>	<i>TPBAR Crud (Curies per TPBAR)</i>
Tritium		9,600*	
Carbon-14	0.0000042	0.0095	NA
Chromium-51	30,000	300	0.21
Manganese-54	2,700	23	0.4
Iron-55	14,000	120	NA
Iron-59	890	7.5	0.21
Cobalt-58	3,400	66	1.2
Cobalt-60	3,500	33	0.15
Zinc-65	0.000038	0.0015	NA
Zirconium-89	0.000029	0.0000022	NA
Zirconium-95	0.04	31	0.029
Niobium-95	8.1	.39	NA
Molybdenum-99	2.6	0.19	NA
Ruthenium-103	0.014	0.0010	NA

\* For a failed TPBAR, a value of  $1.15 \times 10^4$  Curies of tritium (1.2 grams of tritium) per TPBAR is used for analytic consistency.  
NA = Not available

#### **E.5.4 External Dose Rates**

Cask design for irradiated TPBARs and cask selection for low-level radioactive waste are not complete. However, even though the hardware is highly irradiated, the container external dose rate is not as high as the regulatory limits. For the purposes of analysis, it is conservative to assume that TPBAR and low-level radioactive waste container external dose rates are equal to regulatory limits.

#### **E.5.5 Health Risk Conversion Factors**

The health risk conversion factors used to estimate expected cancer fatalities were: 0.0005 and 0.0004 fatal cancer cases per person-rem for members of the public and workers, respectively (NCRP 1993).

#### **E.5.6 Accident Involvement Rates**

For the calculation of accident risks, vehicle accident and fatality rates are taken from data provided in other reports (ANL 1994). Accident rates are generically defined as the number of accident involvements (or fatalities) in a given year per unit of travel in that same year. Therefore, the rate is a fractional value, with accident-involvement count as the numerator of the fraction and vehicular activity (total travel distance in truck-kilometers or railcar-kilometers) as its denominator. Accident rates are generally determined for a multi-year period. For assessment purposes, the total number of expected accidents or fatalities is calculated by multiplying the total shipment distance for a specific case by the appropriate accident or fatality rate.

For truck transportation, the rates presented are specifically for heavy combination trucks involved in interstate commerce (ANL 1994). Heavy combination trucks are rigs composed of a separable tractor unit containing the engine and one to three freight trailers connected to each other. Heavy combination trucks are typically used for radioactive waste shipments. The truck accident rates are computed for each state based on statistics compiled by the U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Motor Carriers from 1986 to 1988. Saricks and Kvitek present accident involvement and fatality counts; estimated kilometers of travel by state; and the corresponding average accident involvement, fatality, and injury rates for the three years investigated. A fatality caused by an accident is the death of a member of the public who is killed instantly or dies within 30 days due to the injuries sustained in the accident.

Rail accident rates are computed and presented similarly to truck accident rates (ANL 1994). The state-specific rail accident involvement and fatality rates are based on statistics compiled by the Federal Railroad Administration from 1985 to 1988. Rail accident rates include both main line accidents and those occurring in railyards. It is important to note that the accident rates used in this assessment were computed using the universe of all interstate heavy combination truck shipments, independent of shipment cargo. The cited report points out that shippers and carriers of radioactive material generally have a higher than average awareness of transport risk and prepare cargoes and drivers for such shipments accordingly (ANL 1994). This preparation should have a twofold effect of reducing component/equipment failure and mitigating the human error contribution to accidents. These effects were not given credit in the accident assessment.

#### **E.5.7 Container Accident Response Characteristics and Release Fractions**

##### **E.5.7.1 Development of Conditional Probabilities**

The Modal Study was the result of an initiative taken by the NRC (NRC 1987) to refine more precisely the analysis presented in NUREG-0170 (NRC 1977) for spent nuclear fuel shipping casks. Whereas the NUREG-0170 analysis was primarily performed using best engineering judgments and presumptions concerning cask response, the Modal Study relies on sophisticated structural and thermal engineering analysis and a probabilistic assessment of the conditions that could be experienced in severe transportation accidents.

The Modal Study results are based on representative spent nuclear fuel casks that were assumed to have been designed, manufactured, operated, and maintained in accordance with national codes and standards. Design parameters of the representative casks were chosen to meet the minimum test criteria specified in 10 CFR 71. The study is believed to provide realistic, yet conservative, results for radiological releases under transport accident conditions.

In the Modal Study, potential accident damage to a cask is categorized according to the magnitude of the mechanical forces (impact) and thermal forces (fire) to which a cask may be subjected during an accident. Because all accidents can be described in these terms, severity is independent of the specific accident sequence. In other words, any sequence of events that results in an accident in which a cask is subjected to forces within a certain range of values is assigned to the accident severity region associated with that range. The accident severity scheme is designed to take into account all potential foreseeable transportation accidents, including accidents with low probability but high consequences and those with high probability but low consequences.

Each severity region actually represents a set of accidents defined by a combination of mechanical and thermal forces. A conditional probability of occurrence—that is, the probability that if an accident occurs, it is of a particular severity—is assigned to each region. The Modal Study conditional probability matrices for truck and train accidents (see Figures E-6 and E-7) each contain 20 accident regions. In the Modal Study, these regions are collapsed to form six severity categories, where a severity category represents a set of accidents defined by a combination of mechanical and thermal forces that are expected to produce accident source terms that have similar magnitudes. The fraction of all accidents that fall into each severity category is developed by summing the values for the fractions of all accidents presented in the Modal Study for the set of regions combined to form one severity category. Figure E-6 indicates the regions that were combined to generate each of the six accident categories specified in DOE/EIS-0203-F (DOE 1995) and DOE/EA-1210 (DOE 1997). The y-axis breakpoints on the accident matrix ( $S_1 = 0.2$  percent,  $S_2 = 2$  percent,  $S_3 = 30$  percent) specify the maximum strain in percent on the inner shell of the Type B truck cask. The x-axis breakpoints ( $T_1 = 260^\circ\text{C}$ ,  $T_2 = 316^\circ\text{C}$ ,  $T_3 = 343^\circ\text{C}$ ,  $T_4 = 565^\circ\text{C}$ ) specify the lead mid-wall temperature. Thus, each of the 20 regions in the matrix specifies both an impact load and a thermal load. Figure E-7 presents the Modal Study matrix for rail accidents and gives the conditional probability for each of the 20 accident regions. The y-axis and x-axis breakpoints are the same as those developed for the Modal Study truck accident matrix. The regions have not been grouped into categories for TPBAR performance in train accidents, so none are presented.

Accidents in Region (1,1) are the least severe but most frequent, whereas accidents in Region (4,5) are very severe but very infrequent. To determine the expected frequency of an accident of a given severity, the conditional probability in the category is multiplied by the baseline accident rate. The entire spectrum of accident severities is considered in the accident risk assessment.

As discussed above, the accident consequence assessment only considers the potential impacts from the most severe transportation accidents. In terms of risk, the severity of an accident must be viewed in terms of potential radiological consequences, which are directly proportional to the fraction of the radioactive material within a cask that is released to the environment during the accident. Although regions span the entire range of mechanical and thermal accident loads, they are grouped into accident categories that can be characterized by a single set of release fractions and are, therefore, considered together in the accident consequence assessment. The accident category severity fraction is the sum of all conditional probabilities in that accident category.

To use the conditional probabilities developed in the Modal Study for Rail Casks Transported by Rail for the case of truck casks transported by rail, a comparison of the effect of rail accidents on truck casks was made. The response of truck and rail casks to rail accident impacts is essentially identical; therefore, no adjustment was required. However, these casks would respond differently to a rail accident involving fire. For the same design-basis fire environment, the truck cask will reach a given temperature in a shorter duration than the rail

cask. The Modal Study provides graphs that relate the fire duration with lead mid-wall temperature for both truck and rail casks. Using the graph for rail casks, the durations of engulfing fires required to reach each of the x-axis breakpoints were determined. From these durations, the graph for truck casks was used to develop new x-axis breakpoints. An exponential function was fitted to the resulting cumulative probability versus mid-wall temperature data, and it was then applied to determine the cumulative probability for the original Modal Study x-axis breakpoints. The resulting conditional probabilities for truck casks transported by rail are given in Figure E-8.

Strain	$R(4,1)$ 1.532E-7	$R(4,2)$ 3.926E-14	$R(4,3)$ 1.495E-14	$R(4,4)$ 7.681E-16	$R(4,5)$ <1.0E-16 Category 6
$S_3$ 30%	$R(3,1)$ 1.7984E-3	$R(3,2)$ 1.574E-7 Category 5	$R(3,3)$ 2.034E-7	$R(3,4)$ 1.076E-7	$R(3,5)$ 4.873E-8
$S_2$ 2%	$R(2,1)$ 3.8192E-3	$R(2,2)$ 2.330E-7 Category 3	$R(2,3)$ 3.008E-7	$R(2,4)$ 1.592E-7 Category 4	$R(2,5)$ 7.201E-8
$S_1$ 0.2%	$R(1,1)$ 0.99431 Category 1	$R(1,2)$ 1.687E-5 Category 2	$R(1,3)$ 2.362E-5	$R(1,4)$ 1.525E-5	$R(1,5)$ 9.570E-6
	$T_1$ 260°C	$T_2$ 316°C	$T_3$ 343°C	$T_4$ 565°C	
	Temperature				

1.532E-7 =  $1.532 \times 10^{-7}$

Figure E-6 Conditional Probability Matrix for Modal Study Truck Cask

Strain	$R(4,1)$ 1.786E-9	$R(4,2)$ 3.290E-13	$R(4,3)$ 2.137E-13	$R(4,4)$ 1.644E-13	$R(4,5)$ 3.439E-14
$S_3$ 30%	$R(3,1)$ 5.545E-4	$R(3,2)$ 1.021E-7	$R(3,3)$ 6.634E-8	$R(3,4)$ 5.162E-8	$R(3,5)$ 5.296E-8
$S_2$ 2%	$R(2,1)$ 2.7204E-3	$R(2,2)$ 5.011E-7	$R(2,3)$ 3.255E-7	$R(2,4)$ 2.531E-7	$R(2,5)$ 1.075E-8
$S_1$ 0.2%	$R(1,1)$ 0.993962	$R(1,2)$ 1.2275E-3	$R(1,3)$ 7.9511E-4	$R(1,4)$ 6.140E-4	$R(1,5)$ 1.249E-4
	$T_1$ 260°C	$T_2$ 316°C	$T_3$ 343°C	$T_4$ 565°C	
	Temperature				

1.786E-9 =  $1.786 \times 10^{-9}$

Figure E-7 Conditional Probability Matrix for Modal Study Rail Cask

Strain	R(4,1) 1.786E-7	R(4,2) 1.659E-13	R(4,3) 2.777E-13	R(4,4) 2.091E-13	R(4,5) 1.361E-13
S <sub>1</sub> 30%	R(3,1) 5.544E-4	R(3,2) 5.148E-8	R(3,3) 8.621E-8	R(3,4) 6.565E-8	R(3,5) 2.084E-7
S <sub>2</sub> 2%	R(2,1) 2.7204E-3	R(2,2) 2.523E-7	R(2,3) 4.230E-7	R(2,4) 3.219E-7	R(2,5) 4.230E-8
S <sub>1</sub> 0.2%	R(1,1) 0.99380	R(1,2) 6.190E-4	R(1,3) 1.033E-3	R(1,4) 7.808E-4	R(1,5) 4.914E-4
	T <sub>1</sub> 260°C	T <sub>2</sub> 316°C	T <sub>3</sub> 343°C	T <sub>4</sub> 565°C	
	Temperature				

1.786E-7 = 1.786 × 10<sup>-7</sup>

Figure E-8 Conditional Probability Matrix for Truck Cask Transported by Rail

### E.5.7.2 Transportation Risk Analyses Assumptions

#### E.5.7.2.1 Cask Response to Impact and Thermal Loads

This section provides separate analyses for casks with elastomeric seals and metallic seals, since they perform differently in accidents. In general, elastomeric seals will perform better (i.e., fail at a higher strain) than metallic seals in accidents involving impacts without fires. Metallic seals will perform better (i.e., fail at a higher temperature) than elastomeric seals in accidents involving fires.

The regulatory design-basis accident defined by 10 CFR 71 and 49 CFR 173 is encompassed within a region bounded by a maximum impact load of S<sub>1</sub> (0.2 percent maximum strain on the inner shell) and a maximum thermal load of T<sub>1</sub> (260°C [500°F] lead shield mid-wall temperature).

The cask containment boundary for a truck or rail cask using elastomeric seals was assumed not to fail for impact loads less than S<sub>2</sub> (2 percent strain) and temperatures less than T<sub>1</sub>. Radioactive material packages are designed to a very rigorous set of standards. This design philosophy results in a large margin of safety against accidents more severe than the design-basis accident. For the EIS analyses, the conditional probabilities were taken directly from the Modal Study, and those conditional probabilities were based on the response of the representative truck and rail casks described in the Modal Study. These generic casks were chosen such that the regulatory design-basis accident would result in a 0.2 percent strain in the inner shell of the cask. Recent tests and analyses performed at Sandia National Laboratory using packages with elastomeric seals have shown that this level of strain is reasonable for the design-basis accident and that the cask containment boundary does not fail for accidents resulting in inner shell strains of up to 20 percent (Ammerman 1995). Based on these results, the EIS transportation risk analyses assumed that the cask containment boundary will not fail for packages using elastomeric seals for inner shell strains less than S<sub>2</sub>.

Packages using metallic seals cannot tolerate the slight amounts of closure movements that may occur during extra-regulatory impacts. Therefore, the EIS analyses assume that any impact load above  $S_1$  for a cask using metallic seals results in failure of the cask containment boundary. The probability of failure of the cask containment boundary as a result of failure of the metallic seal below  $T_4$  (565°C) is similar to the negligible probability of seal failure for normal operating conditions. The American Society for Testing and Materials Type 304 stainless steel structural materials and metallic seal materials typically used in radioactive material packages are also used in high-temperature industrial applications. To avoid creep, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code, Section III, rates the American Society for Testing and Materials Type 304 material commonly used for radioactive material packages at 122 mega-Pascal (17.7 thousand pounds per square inch) for a 10-hour exposure to temperatures of 565°C. With only internal pressure as a source of primary stresses and secondary thermal stresses, stress levels in the seal area are anticipated to be well below this material rating. However, bolt materials for package closures must be carefully selected. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers Codes, Sections VIII and III, rate common high-strength carbon steel bolt materials only to temperatures near 370°C for most applications. Inconel bolts, however, are rated to temperatures as high as 620°C, and these analyses have assumed that high-temperature bolts will be utilized (SNL 1999).

#### **E.5.7.2.2 TPBARs Response to Impact and Thermal Loads**

The EIS transportation risk analyses assumed a TPBAR failure rate, consistent with the assumptions used for reactor operations, of 2 TPBARs per core (maximum of 3,400 TPBARs per core). Since the possibility exists that the 2 assumed failed TPBARs could be transported in the same cask shipment following consolidation at the reactor, the EIS transportation risk analyses assumed that there could be a maximum of 2 prefabricated (failed prior to transportation) TPBARs in a truck cask (at least 289 TPBARs per shipment) or a given rail cask (at least 578 TPBARs per shipment).

Following design-basis accident impacts, spent fuel rods with precracking due to pellet-clad interactions at the pellet boundaries experience very few failures (SNL 1992). Therefore, the analysis assumes that the regulatory impact ( $S_1 = 0.2$  percent) will not cause any TPBAR cladding failures. Moreover, the design conservatism in the impact limiters for spent fuel casks results in only relatively small increases in acceleration loads to the contents for extra-regulatory impacts up to a point where the strain in the wall is equal to 2 percent. Therefore, it is assumed that there are no failures of the TPBAR cladding for impact loads resulting in strains below  $S_2$  (2 percent). To achieve strains higher than 2 percent, the impact limiter must be completely locked up (can no longer absorb energy) and the acceleration levels increase significantly. At this point there is a possibility that some of the TPBARs could experience cladding failure due to the mechanical loads placed upon them. Considering the high ductility of the TPBAR cladding, it was assumed that the only TPBARs that can fail during impact loads are those with pre-existing part-wall cracks (SNL 1999). These analyses conservatively assumed that this is equal to 1 percent of the TPBARs, based on the frequency of spent fuel rods with pre-existing part-wall cracks (SNL 1992). The failed TPBARs would release all of their tritium inventories (PNNL 1999).

As noted earlier, the temperatures that define the regions for the conditional probabilities in the Modal Study truck and rail cask accident matrices are the temperatures at the mid-wall of the lead shield that result from thermal loads during the fire accident. The temperature of the TPBAR cladding is conservatively assumed to be equal to lead shield mid-wall temperature. For temperatures below  $T_3$  (343°C), the EIS analyses assume that 0.12 millicurie per TPBAR per hour of tritium in the form of molecular tritium gas ( $T_2$  and HT) are released from all intact TPBARs into the cask cavity (PNNL 1999). For the purposes of determining the quantity of molecular tritium gas that is released from intact TPBARs into the cask cavity, the EIS analyses conservatively assume that the TPBARs are in the transport cask for a period of two weeks. For the purpose of analysis, each TPBAR is designed to contain an average of 1 gram of tritium, or approximately 9,640 Curies (PNNL 1997). For temperatures between  $T_3$  and  $T_4$  (343° and 565°C), the EIS analyses assume that

0.015 grams of tritium/TPBAR in the form of molecular tritium gas are released from all intact TPBARs into the cask cavity (PNNL 1999).

For temperatures below  $T_4$ , the EIS analyses assume that 0.015 grams of tritium/TPBAR in the form of tritiated water ( $T_2O$  and HTO) are instantaneously released into the cask cavity from all TPBARs that have failed due to impact and thermal loads (PNNL 1999). The potential for TPBAR rupture was assessed at  $T_4$ , and it was determined that TPBARs are unlikely to rupture at temperatures less than  $T_4$ . However, TPBARs may rupture at temperatures higher than  $T_4$ . Therefore, the analyses conservatively assume that all TPBARs fail during a transportation cask fire accident when TPBAR temperatures are above  $T_4$ . For TPBARs with temperatures above  $T_4$ , the analyses assume that 100 percent of the tritium inventory of the TPBARs is instantaneously released in the form of tritiated water into the cask cavity (PNNL 1999).

Finally, the EIS analyses assume that 100 percent of the tritium inventory of prefailed (failed prior to transportation) TPBARs will be released into the cask cavity in the form of tritiated water (PNNL 1999) and that tritiated water does not permeate through the elastomeric seals comprising the cask containment boundary for temperatures less than  $T_1$  ( $260^\circ\text{C}$ ) or through the metallic seals comprising the cask containment boundary for temperatures less than  $T_4$ .

### E.5.7.3 Accident Matrix Category Descriptions

The six accident categories specified in DOE/EA-1210 (DOE 1997) and shown in Figure E-6 were based on the performance of spent nuclear fuel. The analysis described in Section E.5.7.2 has been used to refine the category descriptions to better fit the characteristic behavior of TPBARs. Retaining the basic structure of the Modal Study matrices allows the use of the conditional probabilities given in the Modal Study for accident matrix regions.

The 20 regions described by the  $4 \times 5$  conditional probability matrix were combined to give seven accident severity categories for the truck and rail casks used to transport the irradiated TPBARs from the production reactor to the Tritium Extraction Facility. The regions of the conditional probability matrix that are encompassed by a specific accident category will differ between a cask using elastomeric seals and one using metallic seals, due to the varying response of each cask to the impact and thermal loads.

#### E.5.7.3.1 Elastomeric Seals

Figure E-9 gives the accident matrix for both truck and rail casks using an elastomeric seal. The regions that were combined to generate the seven accident categories are also shown in Figure E-9.

#### E.5.7.3.2 Metallic Seals

Figure E-10 gives the accident matrix for both truck and rail casks using a metallic seal. The regions that were combined to generate each of the seven accident categories are also shown in Figure E-10.



Strain	$S_3$ 30%	R(4,1)	R(4,2) Category 5	R(4,3)	R(4,4) Category 6	R(4,5)
		R(3,1)	R(3,2)	R(3,3)	R(3,4)	R(3,5) Category 7
	$S_2$ 2%	R(2,1) Category 2	R(2,2)	R(2,3)	R(2,4) Category 4	R(2,5)
	$S_1$ 0.2%	R(1,1) Category 1	R(1,2)	R(1,3)	R(1,4)	R(1,5)
		$T_1$ 260°C	$T_2$ 316°C	$T_3$ 343°C	$T_4$ 565°C	
		Temperature				

Figure E-9 Accident Matrix for Truck and Rail Casks Using Elastomeric Seals

Strain	$S_3$ 30%	R(4,1)	R(4,2) Category 5	R(4,3)	R(4,4) Category 6	R(4,5)
		R(3,1)	R(3,2)	R(3,3)	R(3,4)	R(3,5) Category 7
	$S_2$ 2%	R(2,1)	R(2,2)	R(2,3)	R(2,4) Category 4	R(2,5)
	$S_1$ 0.2%	R(1,1) Category 1	R(1,2)	R(1,3) Category 2	R(1,4)	R(1,5)
		$T_1$ 260°C	$T_2$ 316°C	$T_3$ 343°C	$T_4$ 565°C	
		Temperature				

Figure E-10 Accident Matrix for Truck and Rail Casks Using Metallic Seals

#### E.5.7.3.3 Accident Category Release Fractions for Tritium, Nontarget-Bearing Components, and Crud

Release fractions for tritium, both as molecular tritium gas ( $T_2$  or HT) and as tritiated water ( $T_2O$  or HTO); nontarget-bearing components; and crud for truck casks transported by road, truck casks transported by rail, and rail casks transported by rail, with no prefabricated TPBARs, are given in Table E-3 for each of the seven accident categories. For both regulatory and extra-regulatory transport conditions, 100 percent of the crud is assumed to spall. The average crud concentration in a cask cavity can be expressed as the concentration immediately after spallation and initial mixing, multiplied by a release reduction factor that incorporates all geometrical information on the cask volume, settling, and collection areas, and the aerosols time-varying size

distribution (SNL 1993a). A bounding maximum release fraction for crud based on 100-percent spallation and typical release reduction factors is  $2 \times 10^{-3}$  (SNL 1991b). Release fractions for nontarget-bearing components are equivalent to those used in DOE/EA-1210 (DOE 1997) for the Lead Test Assembly, with adjustments made for the accident categories that are defined by different regions of the matrix. The crud and nontarget-bearing components release fractions are independent of whether the cask uses an elastomeric seal or a metallic seal.

**Table E-3 Release Fractions for Truck and Rail Casks with No Prefailed TPBARs**

Category	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
T <sub>2</sub> / HT	0	0	$4.18 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.18 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.18 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.18 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.18 \times 10^{-6}$
T <sub>2</sub> O / HTO	0	0	0	$1.5 \times 10^{-2}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-2}$	$2.5 \times 10^{-2}$	1.0
NTBC	0	0	$3.1 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-7}$
Crud	0	0	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$

T<sub>2</sub> / HT = molecular tritium gas.

T<sub>2</sub>O / HTO = tritiated water.

NTBC = Nontarget-bearing components.

Release fractions for tritium, non-target-bearing components, and crud for truck casks transported by road and truck casks transported by rail with two prefailed TPBARs out of 289 TPBARs are given in Table E-4 for each of the seven accident categories. The release fractions are independent of whether the cask uses an elastomeric seal or a metallic seal.

**Table E-4 Release Fractions for Truck Casks with Two Prefailed TPBARs**

Category	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
T <sub>2</sub> / HT	0	0	$4.15 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.15 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.15 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.15 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.15 \times 10^{-6}$
T <sub>2</sub> O / HTO	0	0	$8.29 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.32 \times 10^{-2}$	$1.83 \times 10^{-2}$	$3.32 \times 10^{-2}$	1.0
NTBC	0	0	$3.1 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-7}$
Crud	0	0	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$

T<sub>2</sub> / HT = molecular tritium gas.

T<sub>2</sub>O / HTO = tritiated water.

NTBC = Nontarget-bearing components.

Release fractions for tritium, nontarget-bearing components, and crud for rail casks transported by rail with two prefailed TPBARs out of 578 TPBARs in two consolidated containers in the rail cask are given in Table E-5 for each of the seven accident categories. The release fractions are independent of whether the cask uses an elastomeric seal or a metallic seal.

**Table E-5 Release Fractions for Rail Casks with Two Prefailed TPBARs**

Category	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
T <sub>2</sub> / HT	0	0	$4.17 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.17 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.17 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.17 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.17 \times 10^{-6}$
T <sub>2</sub> O / HTO	0	0	$4.15 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.91 \times 10^{-2}$	$1.42 \times 10^{-2}$	$2.91 \times 10^{-2}$	1.0
NTBC	0	0	$3.1 \times 10^{-10}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-7}$
Crud	0	0	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$

T<sub>2</sub> / HT = molecular tritium gas.

T<sub>2</sub>O / HTO = tritiated water.

NTBC = Nontarget-bearing components.

#### E.5.7.3.4 Accident Category Severity Fractions

The conditional probabilities given in Figure E-6, Figure E-7, and Figure E-8 were combined using the accident categories depicted in Figures E-9 and E-10 to develop the accident category severity fractions given in Table E-6. The severity fractions are independent of whether there are any prefaulted TPBARs, since the conditional probability accident matrix category descriptions are the same whether there are no prefaulted TPBARs or there are two prefaulted TPBARs in the transport cask.

**Table E-6 Accident Category Severity Fractions**

	Category						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Truck cask transported by road using elastomeric seals	0.99432	$3.819 \times 10^{-3}$	$4.102 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.541 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.799 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.076 \times 10^{-7}$	$9.641 \times 10^{-6}$
Truck cask transported by rail using elastomeric seals	0.99380	$2.720 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.653 \times 10^{-3}$	$9.812 \times 10^{-4}$	$5.546 \times 10^{-4}$	$6.565 \times 10^{-8}$	$4.917 \times 10^{-4}$
Rail cask transported by rail using elastomeric seals	0.99396	$2.720 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.023 \times 10^{-3}$	$6.143 \times 10^{-4}$	$5.547 \times 10^{-4}$	$5.162 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.250 \times 10^{-4}$
Truck cask transported by road using metallic seals	0.99432	$5.574 \times 10^{-3}$	$3.828 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.542 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.799 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.076 \times 10^{-7}$	$9.641 \times 10^{-6}$
Truck cask transported by rail using metallic seals	0.99380	$2.433 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.721 \times 10^{-3}$	$3.219 \times 10^{-7}$	$5.546 \times 10^{-4}$	$6.565 \times 10^{-8}$	$4.917 \times 10^{-4}$
Rail cask transported by rail using metallic seals	0.99396	$2.637 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.721 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.531 \times 10^{-7}$	$5.547 \times 10^{-4}$	$5.162 \times 10^{-8}$	$1.250 \times 10^{-4}$

#### E.5.8 Nonradiological Risk (Vehicle-Related)

Vehicle-related health risks resulting from incident-free transport may be associated with the generation of air pollutants by transport vehicles during shipment and are independent of the radioactive nature of the shipment. The health endpoint assessed under incident-free transport conditions is the excess latent mortality due to inhalation of vehicle exhaust emissions. Risk factors for pollutant inhalation in terms of latent mortality have been generated (SNL 1982). These risks are  $1 \times 10^{-7}$  mortality per kilometer ( $1.6 \times 10^{-7}$  per mile) and  $1.3 \times 10^{-7}$  mortality per kilometer ( $2.1 \times 10^{-7}$  per mile) of truck and rail travel in urban areas, respectively. The risk factors are based on regression analyses of the effects of sulfur dioxide and particulate releases from diesel exhaust on mortality rates. Excess latent mortalities are assumed to be equivalent to latent cancer fatalities. Vehicle-related risks from incident-free transportation are calculated for each case by multiplying the total distance traveled in urban areas by the appropriate risk factor. Similar data are not available for rural and suburban areas.

Risks are summed over the entire route and over all shipments for each case. This method has been used in several EISs to calculate risks from incident-free transport. Lack of information for rural and suburban areas is an obvious data gap, although the risk factor would presumably be lower than for urban areas because of lower total emissions from all sources and lower population densities in rural and suburban areas.

#### E.6 RISK ANALYSIS RESULTS

Per-shipment risk factors have been calculated for the collective populations of exposed persons and for the crew for all anticipated routes and shipment configurations. The radiological risks are presented in doses per shipment for each unique route, material, and container combination. The radiological dose per shipment factors for incident-free transportation are presented in Table E-7. Doses are calculated for the crew, off-link public (i.e., people living along the route), on-link public (i.e., pedestrians and drivers along the route), and the public at rest and fueling stops (i.e., stopped cars, buses and trucks, workers, and other bystanders).

Accident impacts were calculated under the conservative assumption that all tritium gas released is quickly oxidized to form tritiated water.

The radiological dose risk factors for accident transportation conditions are also presented in Table E-7. The accident risk factors are called "dose risk," because the values incorporate the spectrum of accident severity probabilities and associated consequences. They are presented for normal transportation (i.e., no failed TPBARs) and the abnormal event of two failed TPBARs in a shipment. The risks are only slightly higher if the failed TPBARs were to be shipped in a single cask.

The nonradiological risk factors are presented in fatalities per shipment in Table E-8. Separate risk factors are provided for fatalities resulting from exhaust emissions (caused by hydrocarbon emissions known to be carcinogens) and transportation accidents (fatalities resulting from impact).

The performance of both elastomeric and metallic cask seals was evaluated. Elastomeric seals perform better in accidents that involve impact because they are more flexible. Metallic seals perform better in accidents that involve fire because they are less susceptible to heat damage. Overall, metallic seals exhibit a slightly higher risk and, therefore, are used to evaluate EIS alternatives.

Table E-9 shows the risks of transporting each of the hazardous materials. The risks are calculated by multiplying the previously given per-shipment factors by the number of shipments over 40 years' duration of the program and, in the case of the radiological doses, by the health risk conversion factors. The accident risk from TPBAR shipments includes the irradiated metal and the crud deposited onto the TPBARs. Over 90 percent of the accident risk comes from the tritium. Based on the results of the transportation risk analysis, it is unlikely that shipping TPBARs and waste will result in a fatality. The risk estimates include the highest conceivable impacts of shipping unirradiated TPBARs and assemblies.

The risks to various exposed individuals under incident-free transportation conditions have been estimated for hypothetical exposure scenarios. The estimated doses to inspectors and the public are presented in Table E-10 on a per-event basis (person-rem per event). Note that the potential exists for larger individual exposures if multiple exposure events occur. For example, the dose to a person stuck in traffic next to a shipment for 30 minutes is calculated to be 11 millirem. If the exposure duration were longer, the dose would rise proportionally. In addition, a person working at a truck service station could receive a significant dose if trucks were to use the same stops repeatedly. The dose to a person fueling a truck could be as much as 1 millirem. Administrative controls could be instituted to control the location and duration of truck stops if multiple exposures were to happen routinely.

The cumulative dose to a resident was calculated assuming all shipments passed his or her home. The cumulative doses assume that the resident is present for every shipment and is unshielded at a distance of 30 meters (about 100 feet) from the route. Therefore, the cumulative dose is only a function of the number of shipments passing a particular point and is independent of the actual route being considered. The maximum dose to this resident, if all the material were to be shipped via this route, would be less than 0.1 millirem.

The estimated dose to transportation crew members is presented for a commercial crew. No credit is taken for the shielding associated with the tractor or trailer.

Table E-7 Radiological Risk Factors for Single Shipments

From	To	Material & Package	Incident-Free Dose (Person-rem)					Accident Dose (Person-rem)
			Crew	Public				
				Off-link	On-link	Stops	Total	
No Failed TPBARs								
Truck Routes								
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs	$1.4 \times 10^{-2}$	$2.4 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-2}$	$6.8 \times 10^{-2}$	$8.4 \times 10^{-2}$	$3.2 \times 10^{-5}$
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs	$1.3 \times 10^{-2}$	$2.9 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.7 \times 10^{-2}$	$5.9 \times 10^{-2}$	$7.9 \times 10^{-2}$	$3.7 \times 10^{-5}$
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs	$1.4 \times 10^{-2}$	$2.3 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-2}$	$6.6 \times 10^{-2}$	$8.2 \times 10^{-2}$	$4.0 \times 10^{-5}$
Rail Routes								
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs - Rail Cask	$1.2 \times 10^{-3}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-4}$	$4.8 \times 10^{-3}$	$5.7 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-5}$
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs - 2 Truck Casks	$1.2 \times 10^{-3}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-4}$	$4.9 \times 10^{-3}$	$5.8 \times 10^{-3}$	$7.0 \times 10^{-5}$
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs - Rail Cask	$1.1 \times 10^{-3}$	$6.9 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.5 \times 10^{-4}$	$4.7 \times 10^{-3}$	$5.6 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.8 \times 10^{-5}$
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs - 2 Truck Casks	$1.1 \times 10^{-3}$	$6.9 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.5 \times 10^{-4}$	$4.8 \times 10^{-3}$	$5.6 \times 10^{-3}$	$6.5 \times 10^{-5}$
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs - Rail Cask	$1.2 \times 10^{-3}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-4}$	$4.8 \times 10^{-3}$	$5.7 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-5}$
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs - 2 Truck Casks	$1.2 \times 10^{-3}$	$7.6 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-4}$	$4.9 \times 10^{-3}$	$5.8 \times 10^{-3}$	$7.1 \times 10^{-5}$
2 Failed TPBARs								
Truck Routes								
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs	$1.4 \times 10^{-2}$	$2.4 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.3 \times 10^{-2}$	$6.8 \times 10^{-2}$	$8.4 \times 10^{-2}$	$4.0 \times 10^{-5}$
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs	$1.3 \times 10^{-2}$	$2.9 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.7 \times 10^{-2}$	$5.9 \times 10^{-2}$	$7.9 \times 10^{-2}$	$6.1 \times 10^{-5}$
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs	$1.4 \times 10^{-2}$	$2.3 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-2}$	$6.6 \times 10^{-2}$	$8.2 \times 10^{-2}$	$5.4 \times 10^{-5}$

From	To	Material & Package	Incident-Free Dose (Person-rem)					Accident Dose (Person-rem)
			Crew	Public				
				Off-link	On-link	Stops	Total	
All Metallic Seals								
Rail Routes								
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs - Rail Cask	$1.2 \times 10^{-3}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-4}$	$4.8 \times 10^{-3}$	$5.7 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-5}$
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs - 2 Truck Casks	$1.2 \times 10^{-3}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-4}$	$4.9 \times 10^{-3}$	$5.8 \times 10^{-3}$	$7.1 \times 10^{-5}$
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs - Rail Cask	$1.1 \times 10^{-3}$	$6.9 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.5 \times 10^{-4}$	$4.7 \times 10^{-3}$	$5.6 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.8 \times 10^{-5}$
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs - 2 Truck Casks	$1.1 \times 10^{-3}$	$6.9 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.5 \times 10^{-4}$	$4.8 \times 10^{-3}$	$5.6 \times 10^{-3}$	$6.6 \times 10^{-5}$
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs - Rail Casks	$1.2 \times 10^{-3}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-4}$	$4.8 \times 10^{-3}$	$5.7 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-5}$
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Irradiated TPBARs - 2 Truck Casks	$1.2 \times 10^{-3}$	$7.6 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-4}$	$4.9 \times 10^{-3}$	$5.8 \times 10^{-3}$	$7.2 \times 10^{-5}$
Waste Transport								
Truck Routes								
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Low-Level Radioactive Waste	$1.9 \times 10^{-2}$	$1.7 \times 10^{-3}$	$6.2 \times 10^{-3}$	$6.8 \times 10^{-2}$	$7.6 \times 10^{-2}$	$<1.0 \times 10^{-4}$
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Low-Level Radioactive Waste	$1.7 \times 10^{-2}$	$1.7 \times 10^{-3}$	$5.9 \times 10^{-3}$	$5.9 \times 10^{-2}$	$6.7 \times 10^{-2}$	$<1.0 \times 10^{-4}$
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	Low-Level Radioactive Waste	$1.2 \times 10^{-2}$	$1.0 \times 10^{-3}$	$3.9 \times 10^{-3}$	$4.3 \times 10^{-2}$	$4.7 \times 10^{-2}$	$<1.0 \times 10^{-4}$
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Barnwell	Low-Level Radioactive Waste	$2.0 \times 10^{-2}$	$1.7 \times 10^{-3}$	$6.6 \times 10^{-3}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-2}$	$8.3 \times 10^{-2}$	$<1.0 \times 10^{-4}$
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	Barnwell	Low-Level Radioactive Waste	$1.9 \times 10^{-2}$	$1.8 \times 10^{-3}$	$6.3 \times 10^{-3}$	$6.6 \times 10^{-2}$	$7.4 \times 10^{-2}$	$<1.0 \times 10^{-4}$
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	Barnwell	Low-Level Radioactive Waste	$2.0 \times 10^{-2}$	$1.7 \times 10^{-3}$	$6.5 \times 10^{-3}$	$7.3 \times 10^{-2}$	$8.1 \times 10^{-2}$	$<1.0 \times 10^{-4}$

The accident consequence assessment is intended to provide an estimate of the maximum potential impacts posed by the most severe potential transportation accidents involving a shipment. The maximum foreseeable (frequency greater than  $1 \times 10^{-7}$  per year) offsite transportation accident involves a shipment of irradiated TPBARs under neutral (average) weather conditions. The accident has a probability of occurring about once every 10 million years and could result in a 5.9 rem to a person 30 meters (about 100 feet) from the vehicle. The probability of an accident occurring is smaller with failed TPBARs or under stable atmospheric conditions. This accident would fall into Category 5 of the previously described accident matrix shown in Figure E-9. In this hypothetical accident, the impact would cause the cask to fail, and the deformation of the cask would be assumed to fail 1 percent of the TPBARs. In the event of a fire, it would not be hot enough or would be too short in duration to damage the TPBARs. To incur this level of damage, the cask would have to collide with an immovable object at a speed much greater than 88.5 kilometers per hour (55 miles per hour). The probability of an accident with a more energetic collision or fire and higher consequences is lower.

Table E-8 Nonradiological Risk Factors per Shipment

Nonradiological Risk Estimates (Fatalities/Shipment)			
From	To	Exhaust Emission	Accident
<b>Truck Routes</b>			
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	$1.95 \times 10^{-6}$	$1.13 \times 10^{-5}$
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	$2.20 \times 10^{-6}$	$9.87 \times 10^{-6}$
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	$2.13 \times 10^{-6}$	$1.10 \times 10^{-5}$
Wilmington, NC	Columbia, SC	$2.05 \times 10^{-7}$	$9.97 \times 10^{-6}$
Wilmington, NC	Lynchburg, VA	$4.04 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.11 \times 10^{-5}$
Wilmington, NC	Richland, WA	$5.75 \times 10^{-6}$	$9.26 \times 10^{-5}$
Wilmington, NC	Hematite, MO	$1.34 \times 10^{-6}$	$3.26 \times 10^{-5}$
Columbia, SC	Lynchburg, VA	$7.74 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.16 \times 10^{-5}$
Columbia, SC	Richland, WA	$5.34 \times 10^{-6}$	$8.60 \times 10^{-5}$
Hematite, MO	Columbia, SC	$1.20 \times 10^{-6}$	$2.59 \times 10^{-5}$
Hematite, MO	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	$7.34 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.77 \times 10^{-5}$
Lynchburg, VA	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	$4.92 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.20 \times 10^{-5}$
Columbia, SC	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	$4.97 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.08 \times 10^{-5}$
Richland, WA	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	$4.84 \times 10^{-6}$	$7.77 \times 10^{-5}$
Lynchburg, VA	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	$8.02 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.43 \times 10^{-5}$
Columbia, SC	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	$2.03 \times 10^{-6}$	$1.18 \times 10^{-5}$
Hematite, MO	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	$8.37 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.62 \times 10^{-5}$
Richland, WA	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	$5.14 \times 10^{-6}$	$7.63 \times 10^{-5}$
Lynchburg, VA	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	$7.11 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.54 \times 10^{-5}$
Columbia, SC	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	$1.97 \times 10^{-6}$	$1.29 \times 10^{-5}$
Hematite, MO	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	$7.30 \times 10^{-7}$	$1.57 \times 10^{-5}$
Richland, WA	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	$5.10 \times 10^{-6}$	$7.57 \times 10^{-5}$
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Barnwell, SC	$1.77 \times 10^{-6}$	$1.24 \times 10^{-5}$
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	Barnwell, SC	$2.06 \times 10^{-6}$	$1.10 \times 10^{-5}$
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	Barnwell, SC	$1.98 \times 10^{-6}$	$1.21 \times 10^{-5}$
<b>Rail Routes</b>			
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	$1.13 \times 10^{-6}$	$1.57 \times 10^{-5}$
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	$1.11 \times 10^{-6}$	$1.44 \times 10^{-5}$
Bellefonte Nuclear Plant	Savannah River Site	$1.05 \times 10^{-6}$	$1.59 \times 10^{-5}$

Table E-9 Risks of Transporting the Hazardous Materials

Reactor Site (No. of TPBARs)	TPBAR Transportation Mode	Incident-Free			Accident	
		Radiological		Nonradiological		Radiological
		Crew	Public	Emission	Traffic	
Watts Bar (3,400 TPBARs/cycle)	Truck Cask via Truck	0.0033	0.021	0.0032	0.031	$5.1 \times 10^{-6}$
	Truck Cask via Rail	0.0016	0.008	0.0023	0.029	$5.7 \times 10^{-6}$
	Rail Cask via Rail	0.0016	0.008	0.0023	0.029	$1.6 \times 10^{-6}$
Sequoyah (3,400 TPBARs/cycle)	Truck Cask via Truck	0.0030	0.019	0.0035	0.029	$6.1 \times 10^{-6}$
	Truck Cask via Rail	0.0014	0.007	0.0024	0.028	$5.2 \times 10^{-6}$
	Rail Cask via Rail	0.0014	0.007	0.0024	0.028	$1.5 \times 10^{-6}$
Bellefonte (3,400 TPBARs/cycle)	Truck Cask via Truck	0.0026	0.018	0.0034	0.030	$6.4 \times 10^{-6}$
	Truck Cask via Rail	0.0010	0.005	0.0024	0.028	$5.8 \times 10^{-6}$
	Rail Cask via Rail	0.0010	0.005	0.0024	0.028	$1.6 \times 10^{-6}$
Watts Bar (1,000 TPBARs/cycle)	Truck Cask via Truck	0.0010	0.007	0.0010	0.009	$1.7 \times 10^{-6}$
	Truck Cask via Rail	0.0005	0.002	0.0007	0.009	$1.9 \times 10^{-6}$
	Rail Cask via Rail	0.0005	0.002	0.0007	0.009	$5.3 \times 10^{-7}$
Sequoyah (1,000 TPBARs/cycle)	Truck Cask via Truck	0.0009	0.006	0.0011	0.009	$2.0 \times 10^{-6}$
	Truck Cask via Rail	0.0004	0.002	0.0007	0.008	$1.7 \times 10^{-6}$
	Rail Cask via Rail	0.0004	0.002	0.0007	0.008	$4.9 \times 10^{-7}$
Bellefonte (1,000 TPBARs/cycle)	Truck Cask via Truck	0.0008	0.006	0.0010	0.009	$2.1 \times 10^{-6}$
	Truck Cask via Rail	0.0003	0.001	0.0007	0.009	$1.9 \times 10^{-6}$
	Rail Cask via Rail	0.0003	0.001	0.0007	0.009	$5.4 \times 10^{-7}$

Maximum impacts are assumed for fabrication, assembly, and waste transportation, and are included in these totals.

All risks are expressed as number of latent cancer fatalities, except for the Accident-Traffic column, which lists number of accident fatalities.



**Table E-10 Estimated Dose to Exposed Individuals During Incident-Free Transportation Conditions**

	<i>Receptor</i>	<i>Dose to Maximally Exposed Individual<sup>a</sup></i>
Workers	Crew member (truck driver)	0.1 rem per year <sup>b</sup>
	Inspector	0.0029 rem per event
Public	Resident	$4.0 \times 10^{-7}$ rem per event
	Person in traffic congestion	0.011 rem per event
	Person at service station	0.001 rem per event

rem = roentgen equivalent man.

<sup>a</sup> Doses are calculated assuming that the shipment external dose rate is equal to the maximum expected dose of 10 millirem per hour at 2 meters (6.6 feet) from the package.

<sup>b</sup> This is a dose limit for a nonradiation worker (10 CFR 20). The truck driver dose could exceed this limit in the absence of administrative controls.

## **E.7 CONCLUSIONS AND LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF TRANSPORTATION**

### **E.7.1 Conclusions**

It is unlikely that the transportation of radioactive materials will cause an additional fatality.

### **E.7.2 Long-Term Impacts of Transportation**

The *Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Final Environmental Impact Statement* (DOE 1995) analyzed the cumulative impacts of all transportation of radioactive materials, including impacts from reasonably foreseeable actions that include transportation of radioactive material for a specific purpose and general radioactive materials transportation that is not related to a particular action. The total worker and general population collective doses are summarized in Table E-11. The table shows that the impacts of this program are quite small compared with overall transportation impacts. Total collective worker doses from all types of shipments (historical, the alternatives, reasonably foreseeable actions, and general transportation) were estimated to be 320,000 person-rem (130 latent cancer fatalities) for the period 1943 through 2035 (93 years). Total general population collective doses were also estimated to be 320,000 person-rem (160 latent cancer fatalities). The majority of the collective dose for workers and the general population was due to the general transportation of radioactive material. Examples of these activities are shipments of radiopharmaceuticals to nuclear medicine laboratories and shipments of commercial low-level radioactive waste to commercial disposal facilities. The total number of latent cancer fatalities estimated to result from radioactive materials transportation over the period between 1943 and 2035 was 290. Over this same period (93 years), approximately 28 million people would die from cancer, based on 300,000 cancer fatalities per year (10 CFR 71). It should be noted that the estimated number of transportation-related latent cancer fatalities would be indistinguishable from other latent cancer fatalities, and the transportation-related latent cancer fatalities are 0.0010 percent of the total number of latent cancer fatalities.

**Table E-11 Cumulative Transportation-Related Radiological Collective Doses and Latent Cancer Fatalities (1943 to 2035)**

<i>Category</i>	<i>Collective Worker Dose (person-rem)</i>	<i>Collective General Population Dose (person-rem)</i>
<b>CLWR Impacts</b>		
Shipment of TPBARs and LLW	< 100	< 100
Latent cancer fatalities from TPBARs and LLW	<1	<1
<b>Other Nuclear Material Shipments</b>		
Reasonably foreseeable actions*		
Truck	11,000	50,000
Rail	820	1,700
General transportation (1943-2035)	310,000	270,000
Total collective dose	320,000	320,000
<b>Total Latent Cancer Fatalities</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>160</b>

\* LLW = Low-Level Radioactive Waste.

Source: DOE 1995.

## **E.8 UNCERTAINTY AND CONSERVATISM IN ESTIMATED IMPACTS**

The sequence of analyses performed to generate the estimates of radiological risk for transportation includes: (1) determination of the inventory and characteristics, (2) estimation of shipment requirements, (3) determination of route characteristics, (4) calculation of radiation doses to exposed individuals (including estimation of environmental transport and uptake of radionuclides), and (5) estimation of health effects. Uncertainties are associated with each of these steps. Uncertainties exist in the way that the physical systems being analyzed are represented by the computational models; in the data required to exercise the models (due to measurement errors, sampling errors, natural variability, or unknowns simply caused by the future nature of the actions being analyzed); and in the calculations themselves (e.g., approximate algorithms used by the computers).

In principle, one can estimate the uncertainty associated with each input or computational source and predict the resultant uncertainty in each set of calculations. Thus, one can propagate the uncertainties from one set of calculations to the next and estimate the uncertainty in the final, or absolute, result; however, conducting such a full-scale quantitative uncertainty analysis is often impractical and sometimes impossible, especially for actions to be initiated at an unspecified time in the future. Instead, the risk analysis is designed to ensure, through uniform and judicious selection of scenarios, models, and input parameters, that relative comparisons of risk among the various alternatives are meaningful. In the transportation risk assessment, this design is accomplished by uniformly applying common input parameters and assumptions to each alternative. Therefore, although considerable uncertainty is inherent in the absolute magnitude of the transportation risk for each alternative, much less uncertainty is associated with the relative differences among the alternatives in a given measure of risk.

In the following sections, areas of uncertainty are discussed for the assessment steps enumerated above. Special emphasis is placed on identifying whether the uncertainties affect relative or absolute measures of risk. The degree of reality conservatism of the assumption is addressed. Where practical, the parameters that most significantly affect the risk assessment results are identified.

### **E.8.1 Uncertainties in TPBAR and Radioactive Waste Inventory and Characterization**

The inventories and the physical and radiological characteristics are important input parameters of the transportation risk assessment. The potential amount of transportation for any alternative is determined primarily by the projected dimensions of package contents and, in the case of irradiated TPBARs, the strength of the radiation field and assumptions concerning shipment capacities. The physical and radiological characteristics are important in determining the amount of material released during accidents and the subsequent doses to exposed individuals through multiple environmental exposure pathways.

Uncertainties in the inventory and characterization will be reflected to some degree in the transportation risk results. If the inventory is overestimated (or underestimated), the resulting transportation risk estimates also will be overestimated (or underestimated) by roughly the same factor. However, the same inventory estimates are used to analyze the transportation impacts of each of the EIS alternatives. Therefore, for comparative purposes, the observed differences in transportation risks among the proposed reactor sites as given in Table E-9 are believed to represent unbiased, reasonably accurate estimates from current information in terms of relative risk comparisons.

If DOE should enter into the final design and implementation phase of the project, the amount of tritium in the TPBARs could change. The incident-free risk estimate would not change unless the number of shipments changes, because the maximum regulatory limit dose rate was used. However, since over 90 percent of the accident impact comes from the tritium in the TPBARs, the accident impact would increase or decrease in proportion to the amount of tritium in the TPBARs.

### **E.8.2 Uncertainties in Containers, Shipment Capacities, and Number of Shipments**

The amount of transportation required for each alternative is based in part on assumptions concerning the packaging characteristics and shipment capacities for commercial trucks and safe secure transports. Representative shipment capacities have been defined for assessment purposes based on probable future shipment capacities. In reality, the actual shipment capacities may differ from the predicted capacities such that the projected number of shipments and, consequently, the total transportation risk would change. However, although the predicted transportation risks would increase or decrease accordingly, the relative differences in risks among alternatives would remain about the same. The maximum amount of material allowed in Type B containers is set by conservative safety analyses.

### **E.8.3 Uncertainties in Route Determination**

Representative routes have been determined between all origin and destination sites considered in the EIS. The routes have been determined consistent with current guidelines, regulations, and practices, but may not be the actual routes that would be used in the future. In reality, the actual routes could differ from the representative ones in terms of distances and total population along the routes. Moreover, since TPBARs and waste could be transported over an extended period of time starting at some time in the future, the highway infrastructures and the demographics along routes could change. These effects have not been accounted for in the transportation assessment; however, it is not anticipated that these changes would significantly affect relative comparisons of risk among the alternatives considered in the EIS. Specific routes cannot be identified in advance because the routes are classified to protect national security interests.

### **E.8.4 Uncertainties in the Calculation of Radiation Doses**

The models used to calculate radiation doses from transportation activities introduce a further uncertainty in the risk assessment process. It is generally difficult to estimate the accuracy or absolute uncertainty of the risk assessment results. The accuracy of the calculated results is closely related to the limitations of the

computational models and to the uncertainties in each of the input parameters that the model requires. The single greatest limitation facing users of RADTRAN, or any computer code of this type, is the scarcity of data for certain input parameters.

Uncertainties associated with the computational models are minimized by using state-of-the-art computer codes that have undergone extensive review. Because there are numerous uncertainties that are recognized but difficult to quantify, assumptions are made at each step of the risk assessment process that are intended to produce conservative results (i.e., overestimate the calculated dose and radiological risk). Because parameters and assumptions are applied to all alternatives, this model bias is not expected to affect the meaningfulness of relative comparisons of risk; however, the results may not represent risks in an absolute sense.

To understand the most important uncertainties and conservatism in the transportation risk assessment, the results for all cases were examined to identify the largest contributors to the collective population risk. The results of this examination are discussed briefly in the following paragraph.

For truck shipments, the largest contributors to the collective population dose, in decreasing order of importance, were found to be: (1) incident-free dose to members of the public at stops, (2) incident-free dose to transportation crew members, (3) incident-free dose to members of the public sharing the route (on-link dose), (4) incident-free dose to members of the public residing along the route (off-link dose), and (5) accident dose risk to members of the public. Approximately 80 percent of the estimated public dose was incurred at stops; 15 percent was received by the on-link population and 5 percent by the off-link population. In general, the accident contribution to the total risk was negligible compared with the incident-free risks.

As shown above, incident-free transportation risks are the dominant component of the total transportation risk. The most important parameter in calculating incident-free doses is the shipment external dose rate (incident-free doses are directly proportional to the shipment external dose rate). For this assessment, it was assumed that all shipments would have an external dose rate at the regulatory limit of 10 millirem per hour at 2 meters. In practice, the external dose rates would vary from shipment to shipment, but would not exceed the regulatory limit.

Finally, the single largest contributor to the collective population doses calculated with RADTRAN was found to be the dose to members of the public at truck stops. Currently, RADTRAN uses a simple point-source approximation for truck-stop exposures and assumes that the total stop time for a shipment is proportional to the shipment distance. The parameters used in the stop model were based on a survey of a very limited number of radioactive material shipments that examined a variety of shipment types in different areas of the country. It was assumed that stops occur as a function of distance, with a stop rate of 0.011 hour per kilometer (0.018 hour per mile). It was further assumed that an average of 50 people at each stop are exposed at a distance of 20 meters (66 feet). In RADTRAN, the population dose is directly proportional to the external shipment dose rate and the number of people exposed and inversely proportional to the square of the distance. The stop rate assumed results in an hour of stop time per 100 kilometers (62 miles) of travel.

Based upon the qualitative discussion with shippers, the parameter values used in the assessment appear to be conservative. However, data do not exist to quantitatively assess the degree of control and the location, frequency, and duration of truck stops. However, based on the regulatory requirements for continuous escort of the material (10 CFR 73) and the requirement for two drivers, it is clear that the trucks would be on the move much of the time until arrival at the destination. Therefore, the calculated impacts are extremely conservative. By using these conservative parameters, the calculations in this EIS are consistent with the RADTRAN default values.

Shielding of exposed populations was not considered. For all incident-free exposure scenarios, no credit was taken for shielding of exposed individuals. In reality, shielding would be afforded by trucks and cars sharing

the transport routes, rural topography, and the houses and buildings in which people reside. Incident-free exposure to external radiation could be reduced significantly, depending on the type of shielding present. For residential houses, shielding factors (i.e., the ratio of shielded to unshielded exposure rates) have been estimated to range from 0.02 to 0.7, with a recommended value of 0.33. If shielding were to be considered for the maximally exposed resident living near a transport route, the calculated doses and risks would be reduced by approximately 70 percent. Similar levels of shielding may be provided to individuals exposed in vehicles. However, consideration of shielding does not significantly affect the overall incident-free risks to the general public.

Post-accident mitigative actions are not considered for dispersal accidents. For severe accidents involving the release and dispersal of radioactive materials in the environment, no post-accident mitigative actions, such as interdiction of crops or evacuation of the accident vicinity, have been considered in this risk assessment. In reality, mitigative actions would take place following an accident in accordance with U.S. Environmental Protection Agency radiation protection guides for nuclear incidents (EPA 1991). The effects of mitigative actions on population accident doses are highly dependent upon the severity, location, and timing of the accident. For this risk assessment, ingestion doses are only calculated for accidents occurring in rural areas (the calculated ingestion doses, however, assume all food grown on contaminated ground is consumed and is not limited to the rural population). Examination of the severe accident consequence assessment results has shown that ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs contributes on the order of 50 percent of the total population dose for rural accidents. Interdiction of foodstuffs would act to reduce, but not eliminate, this contribution.

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# **Appendix F**

## **The Public Scoping Process**



## APPENDIX F

### THE PUBLIC SCOPING PROCESS

#### F.1 SCOPING PROCESS DESCRIPTION

As a preliminary step in the development of an environmental impact statement (EIS), regulations established by the Council on Environmental Quality (40 CFR 1501.7) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) require "an early and open process for determining the scope of issues to be addressed and for identifying the significant issues related to a proposed action." The purpose of this scoping process is: (1) to inform the public about a proposed action and the alternatives being considered and (2) to identify and/or clarify issues that are relevant to the EIS by soliciting public comments.

On January 16, 1998, DOE published a Notice of Intent in the *Federal Register* concerning its proposal to produce tritium in one or more nuclear power plants owned and operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). During the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, there are opportunities for public involvement (Figure F-1). The Notice of Intent listed the issues initially identified by DOE for evaluation in the EIS. Public citizens, civic leaders, and other interested parties were invited to comment on these issues and to suggest additional issues that should be considered in the EIS. The Notice of Intent informed the public that comments on the proposed action could be communicated via U.S. mail, a special DOE web site on the Internet, a toll-free phone line, a toll-free fax line, or in person at public meetings to be held near the TVA plant sites.

Two public meetings were held near the TVA nuclear power plants proposed for tritium production (Figure F-2). The first was held on February 24, 1998, in Rainsville, Alabama, near the partially completed Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site. More than 800 persons, mostly from regional communities, attended the Rainsville meeting. The second meeting was held in Evensville, Tennessee, near the Watts Bar and Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plants, on February 26, 1998. An estimated 400 persons attended this meeting. A majority of the attendees were residents of communities located near the two TVA plants and several attendees were from cities such as Nashville and Knoxville, Tennessee.





Figure F-1 NEPA Process



**Figure F-2 Public Scoping Meeting Locations and Dates (1998)**

As a result of previous experience and positive responses from attendees of other DOE/NEPA public meetings and hearings, DOE chose an interactive format for the scoping meetings. Each meeting began with a presentation by a DOE representative who explained the proposed tritium production plan. Afterwards, an impartial facilitator opened the floor to questions, comments, and concerns from the audience. DOE and TVA personnel were available to respond to the questions and comments as needed. While verbatim recordings or transcripts of the meetings were not produced, trained note-takers recorded the substance of each public comment. In addition, the public was encouraged to submit written or verbal comments either during the meetings or via letters, the DOE Internet web site, the toll-free phone line, or the toll-free fax line until the end of the scoping period on March 20, 1998.

It should be noted that, for EIS public scoping purposes, a comment is defined as a single statement or opinion concerning a specific issue. Any statement may contain many separate comments. Most of the verbal and written public statements submitted during the EIS scoping period contained multiple comments on various individual issues.

## **F.2 SCOPING PROCESS RESULTS**

Approximately 700 comments were received from citizens, interested groups, and Federal, state, and local officials during the public scoping period, including 156 verbal comments made during the public meetings. The remainder of the comments (513) were submitted at the public meetings in written form, or via mail, Internet, fax, or phone over the entire scoping period. Commentors who spoke at the public meetings often read from written statements that were later submitted during or after the meetings. Where this occurred, each comment provided by an individual commentor in both verbal and written form was counted as a single comment. In addition to the comments, four petitions totaling 1,586 signatures were submitted in support of completing the Bellefonte plant for tritium production purposes.

The majority of the verbal and written comments received during the public scoping period favored producing tritium at one or more of TVA's nuclear power plants. Comments from residents of northern Alabama were particularly supportive of completing the Bellefonte plant for tritium production. Reasons given for this support mostly involved potential socioeconomic benefits such as job creation, a greater abundance of inexpensive electricity, attraction of new businesses to the area, and increased local revenues.

Many of the comments received from residents of the local areas near the TVA plants also communicated an understanding that the United States will begin producing tritium in the near future—either at the Savannah River Site (the accelerator option) or at one of TVA's nuclear power plants. These commentors expressed confidence in the safety of the TVA plants and the capabilities of area workers to provide the skills needed for tritium production. They also said they believe nuclear power plants are a more sensible choice for tritium production because reactors are a proven technology and the total project cost would be less than the cost of building an accelerator.

A significant number of other comments received during the scoping period opposed tritium production in general and the use of a nuclear power plant for this purpose in particular. This group disagreed with the Presidential and Congressional decision to produce tritium and denied there is any real defense-related need for new tritium production because they believe other options are available. Among the options cited were unilateral disarmament, commercial purchases, recycling the material from deactivated nuclear weapons, and/or extending the half-life of tritium.

Several commentors voiced concerns about the environmental, health, and safety risks they believe are inherent to tritium production. DOE representatives were urged to thoroughly evaluate the potential consequences of the proposed action on local water resources and the health and safety of area residents and wildlife. Concerns also were raised about the safety of TVA's nuclear power plants and how the security of the plants would be managed if tritium production were to begin.

Waste production and disposal was another issue. Some commentors correctly stated that tritium production in a nuclear reactor would increase the amount of spent fuel wastes generated. Questions were posed as to how this additional waste would be dealt with, both on site and in the long term.

Many commentors also viewed the U.S. Government's decision to produce tritium as a violation of its own policies and commitments under the international Nonproliferation and Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties. They accused the government of hypocrisy and asserted that tritium production in a commercial light water reactor (CLWR) would blur the historical line between U.S. civilian and military nuclear programs. This action, they warned, would encourage other countries to use their own commercial plants to produce weapons materials and to increase their weapons stockpiles.

The public comments and materials submitted during the scoping period were carefully logged as they were received and placed in the Administrative Record of this EIS. Their disposition is described in the next section.

### **F.3 COMMENT DISPOSITION AND ISSUE IDENTIFICATION**

Comments received during the scoping period were systematically reviewed by the EIS preparers. Where possible, comments on similar or related topics were grouped under comment categories as a means of summarizing the comments. An attempt was made to avoid duplication in counting the number of comments received; however, comments submitted in both written and verbal form may have been counted twice in some cases. The comment categories were used to identify specific issues of public concern. After the issues were identified, they were evaluated to determine whether they fell within or outside the scope of the EIS. Some

issues were found to be already "in scope," i.e., they were among the EIS issues already identified by DOE for inclusion in the EIS. Table F-1 lists these issues along with their EIS references.

**Table F-1 Issues Already Included in the EIS (In Scope)**

<i>Issues</i>	<i>No. of Comments</i>	<i>EIS References</i>
Use of commercial nuclear power reactors to produce tritium will blur the line between civilian and military programs and will impact U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts	93	Section 1.5.4
Socioeconomic benefits such as job creation, new business growth, and increased TVA payments in-lieu-of-taxes to Jackson County as a result of using any of the TVA plants for tritium production	142	Section 5.2.3.8
Tritium's importance to national security	24	Chapter 1 Chapter 2
Environmental, safety, and health impacts of tritium production, including potential for increased rates of breast cancer, childhood leukemia, and birth defects	52	Sections 5.2.1.9 5.2.2.9 5.2.3.9 Appendix C
Section 7 Consultation with the National Wildlife Service	1	Sections 5.2.1.6 5.2.2.6 5.2.3.6
Frequency and public notification of water/soil testing near the Bellefonte plant	1	Chapter 6
Handling and shipping (transportation) of TPBARs and radioactive waste and associated escort requirements	8	Section 5.2.8 Appendix E
Safety record of TVA's nuclear power plants	22	Chapter 6
Reactor accident analyses	18	Sections 5.2.1.9 5.2.2.9 5.2.3.9 Appendix D
Impacts of spent fuel production and interim storage	13	Section 5.2.6
Final, long-term disposition of spent fuel rods if no deep geologic repository is available and the fuel pools are filled	2	Section 3.2.1
Additional plant security requirements	15	Section 5.2.10
Potential safety impacts of shortening the refueling schedule	2	Section 5.2.9
Processing tritium-producing burnable absorber rods	1	Appendix A
Impacts of tritium production on reactor decommissioning plans	1	Section 5.2.5
Need for separate EISs for the Bellefonte plant, one for tritium production and one for completion	4	Section 1.5.1.3
Support for conversion of the Bellefonte plant to a natural gas facility	2	Section 1.5.2.3
Use of excess electricity produced by tritium production at the Bellefonte plant	2	Section 5.4.2
Rationale for making the accelerator option the "no action" alternative	4	Section 3.2.4

One additional issue, the avoidance of greenhouse gases as a result of tritium production in a reactor instead of an accelerator, was added to the scope of the EIS as a result of the public scoping process. (See Table F-2.)

Table F-2 Issues Added to the Scope of the EIS

<i>Issues</i>	<i>No. of Comments</i>	<i>EIS References</i>
Avoidance of greenhouse gases as a result of tritium production in a reactor instead of an accelerator	8	Section 5.2.11

Many of the public issues were not analyzed for a specific reason or were determined to be outside the scope of the EIS. These issues are listed in Table F-3. Corresponding responses from DOE also are provided in Table F-3 to explain why each issue was not analyzed.

Table F-3 Issues Considered to be Out of Scope or Raised But Not Analyzed

<i>Issues</i>	<i>No. of Comments</i>	<i>DOE Responses</i>
<b>Tritium Production</b>		
Tritium production is not needed because: (1) there are reserve stockpiles, (2) it can be recycled from deactivated nuclear weapons and/or purchased, or (3) the half-life can be extended.	33	<p>As stated in Section 1.3.3 of the CLWR EIS, reductions in the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile, brought on by international arms control agreements, have enabled DOE to fulfill its tritium requirements by recycling tritium removed from dismantled weapons. This source of tritium is presently being utilized and has already been factored into the tritium requirement projections, which indicate a need for a new supply of tritium by approximately 2005.</p> <p>DOE has considered the purchase of tritium from other sources, including foreign nations, and has determined that the uncertainties associated with obtaining tritium from foreign sources render this alternative unreasonable for an assured long-term supply. Accordingly, as discussed in Section 3.1.3 of the Tritium Supply and Recycling Programmatic EIS (DOE 1995), DOE considered this alternative but eliminated it from detailed study.</p> <p>DOE is aware of and has reviewed laboratory research on extending the half-life of isotopes similar to tritium. To date, such a process does not exist and the likelihood of developing such a process in sufficient time to reduce the need for tritium is too low to render this a credible alternative. DOE will, however, continue to monitor results from such research.</p> <p>As discussed in Chapter 2 of the CLWR EIS, DOE presently maintains a strategic reserve of tritium. This reserve contains a quantity of tritium maintained for emergencies and contingencies, and similar to tritium available from dismantled weapons, has been factored into the tritium requirement projections which indicate a need for a new supply of tritium by approximately 2005.</p>
Tritium production is not needed because nuclear arms reduction treaties will allow the United States to deactivate and dismantle its nuclear weapons as their tritium load decays.	4	<p>The need for tritium is explained in Chapter 2 of the CLWR EIS. As explained in Chapter 2, the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan and an accompanying Presidential Decision Directive mandate that new tritium must be available by approximately 2005 if a CLWR is the selected option for tritium production. While it is true that recent international arms control agreements have caused the nuclear weapons stockpile to be reduced in size, these reductions are accounted for in the Presidential requirements. While future arms control reductions may change the requirements, DOE is responsible for meeting the current requirements set forth by the President.</p>

<i>Issues</i>	<i>No. of Comments</i>	<i>DOE Responses</i>
Reactor tritium production relies on a proven technology and is more sensible and economical than the accelerator option.	21	The purpose of the CLWR EIS is to assess the environmental impacts associated with tritium production in one or more CLWRs. Relative comparisons between the CLWR option and the accelerator option have previously been documented in the Record of Decision for the Tritium Supply and Recycling Programmatic EIS (DOE 1995). As a tiered document from that Programmatic EIS, the CLWR EIS does not purport to compare the CLWR and the accelerator for tritium production.
An international agreement is needed to halt tritium production as a means of using tritium's decay rate to pace a reciprocal build-down of nuclear weapons.	1	There are currently no international agreements that prohibit tritium production. In accordance with national security requirements set forth by the President, DOE is responsible for producing the tritium required to support the nation's nuclear deterrent. Future international agreements related to tritium production are speculative and beyond the scope of the CLWR EIS.
DOE should: (1) develop a list of no more than three commercial reactors that could be used for tritium production only as a contingency source in case of Congressionally declared war or another national emergency [ref. Section 108 of the Atomic Energy Act], (2) obtain tritium only by purchasing irradiation services at one of these reactors under such emergency circumstances, and (3) use the reactor only under defined conditions that preserve the principle of separating civilian and military nuclear activities (i.e., the reactor should not generate electricity for sale while being used for tritium production).	1	The need for tritium is explained in Chapter 2 of the CLWR EIS. As explained in Chapter 2, the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan and an accompanying Presidential Decision Directive mandate that new tritium must be available by approximately 2005 if a CLWR is the selected option for tritium production. The CLWR EIS is being prepared in accordance with the national security requirements set forth by the President.
DOE should more clearly articulate the policy options for tritium production to the public; e.g., use of reactors as either a primary or contingency source, purchasing a commercial reactor or merely purchasing irradiation services from a commercial reactor, etc. [the comment refers to information found in the Programmatic EIS].	1	The policy options for tritium production are explained in the Tritium Supply and Recycling Programmatic EIS (DOE 1995). The purpose of the CLWR EIS is to assess the environmental impacts associated with tritium production in one or more CLWRs, not debate policy options.
Couldn't nuclear weapons be maintained without tritium?	2	All weapons in the existing stockpile require tritium to function as designed. Section 1.3.2 of the CLWR EIS describes how tritium is used in the modern nuclear weapon. Section 3.1.3 of the Tritium Supply and Recycling Programmatic EIS (DOE 1995) provides a thorough discussion of why redesigning weapons with less or no tritium is not a reasonable alternative.
How many weapons does the United States really need?	2	The number of United States nuclear weapons needed is set forth by the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan and an accompanying Presidential Decision Directive.

Issues	No. of Comments	DOE Responses
The United States has called for a negotiated ban on production of fissile materials for weapons. While not covered under this ban, operation of tritium production facilities would complicate treaty verification because the facilities could be used for clandestine production of plutonium, but will not be subject to intrusive verification measures because of their military significance. How would appropriate safeguards be employed at a commercial tritium production reactor?	1	Safeguard and security provisions of TVA and of DOE have been reviewed and found to be sufficiently protective of both Federal property and employees and the general public. Section 5.2.10 of the CLWR EIS provides additional information related to safeguards and security issues.
Could the K-Reactor at DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina be refurbished and used for tritium production if the serious safety issues were corrected?	2	The option of utilizing the K-Reactor, located at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, along with other existing DOE reactors or accelerators, was evaluated but dismissed from further consideration in the Tritium Supply and Recycling Programmatic EIS (Section 3.1.3) (DOE 1995). In the early 1990s, when tritium supply needs were much greater, DOE not only considered putting the K-Reactor back on line, but had an extensive and costly effort underway to restart the K-Reactor. Unfortunately, the age of this facility and the magnitude of the environmental and safety upgrades required for this task proved too great, and in 1994, the K-Reactor was placed in a "cold stand-by" status with no provisions for restart. The reduced tritium needs of today make the K-Reactor alternative even less attractive.
Why is new reactor-produced tritium needed in 2005, but accelerator-produced tritium is not needed until 2007?	5	The Presidential Decision Directive that accompanies the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan mandates that new tritium must be available by approximately 2005 if a CLWR is the selected option for tritium production, and approximately 2007 if the accelerator is the selected option. The reason the year 2007 is mandated for the accelerator is because that is the earliest date by which the accelerator could be built and begin operation. In such a case, tritium requirements from 2005 until 2007 would have to be met by dipping into the tritium reserve shown on Figure 2-1 of this CLWR EIS. The tritium reserve would then be replenished by producing tritium quantities greater than the decay requirements.
Why doesn't the government just purchase a commercial reactor for tritium production?	5	Concurrent with the preparation of the CLWR EIS, DOE is evaluating the feasibility of various CLWR alternatives through a procurement process. Through that process, DOE expects to enter into a contract/interagency agreement with the owner/operator of one or more commercial reactors for the purpose of producing tritium. Such a contract/interagency agreement could result in DOE purchasing CLWR irradiation services and/or purchasing a CLWR. In response to the procurement request, none of the CLWR owners/operators proposed selling a CLWR to DOE. Instead, only irradiation services have been proposed. Thus, it now appears likely that DOE will purchase irradiation services only.
Would hydrogen ignitors be used in a tritium production plant?	1	Hydrogen ignitors are currently used in Watts Bar and Sequoyah. The use of hydrogen ignitors at a reactor facility is independent of tritium production.

<i>Issues</i>	<i>No. of Comments</i>	<i>DOE Responses</i>
If a second major use for tritium is identified, now or in the future, the safest course would be construction of a new tritium production facility at DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina.	1	DOE is addressing only that amount of tritium necessary to support the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Based on the analysis of the Tritium Supply and Recycling Programmatic EIS DOE, in the December 1995 Record of Decision, decided to pursue a dual-track approach on the two most promising tritium-supply alternatives: (1) to initiate purchase of an existing commercial reactor (operating or partially complete) or irradiation services with an option to purchase the reactor for conversion to a defense facility; and (2) to design, build, and test critical components of an accelerator for tritium production. DOE will select one of these alternatives as the primary source for tritium. The other alternative, if feasible, would continue to be developed as a backup tritium source.
The EIS should address the additional complications of loading and unloading the boron isotope or lithium aluminate cores, their subsequent unloading, and the final tritium separation processes.	2	The environmental impacts associated with the fabrication of the TPBARS are addressed in Section 5.2.7 of the CLWR EIS. DOE has already analyzed the environmental impacts associated with the unloading and the final tritium extraction process in the Tritium Extraction Facility EIS (DOE 1998, DOE 1999). A summary of the environmental impacts associated with the Preferred Alternative in the Tritium Extraction Facility EIS may be found in Section 5.3 of the CLWR EIS.
DOE should not be doing this EIS because they are overcommitted to other activities, their management is inadequate, their staffing and technical expertise are insufficient, and they have contaminated every site they have managed.	11	DOE is fully committed to carrying out all of its responsibilities in full compliance with all Federal, state, and local laws and requirements.
Tritium should not be produced by anyone who thinks about the future of humanity. Everyone involved in creating these weapons of mass destruction should quit their jobs.	1	The issue of an individual's employment choice is beyond the scope of the EIS.
<b>Environment, Safety, and Health</b>		
The EIS should evaluate global environmental impacts resulting from U.S. tritium production.	8	The CLWR EIS evaluates the direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental impacts associated with producing tritium at one or more CLWRs. The only reasonable foreseeable global environmental impacts that are assessed concern impacts to global warming. DOE is unaware of any other global environmental impacts associated with tritium production.
The EIS should evaluate the environmental impacts of tritium production in other countries with similar programs.	3	The CLWR EIS evaluates the direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental impacts associated with producing tritium at one or more CLWRs. Environmental impacts associated with tritium production in other countries is beyond the scope of the CLWR EIS.
The EIS should address the environmental impacts of the full life cycle of the tritium-producing fuel rods, from mining through final disposal.	3	DOE has focused the analysis in the CLWR EIS on the proposed action in accordance with the requirements of NEPA, Council on Environmental Quality requirements, and the DOE NEPA regulations. From a life cycle cost perspective, the analyses of costs are not part of the EIS process. Accordingly, analyses of costs are not included in the CLWR EIS. DOE does, however, consider costs in its final decision, and in this instance, has determined that sufficient quantities of the materials required for the fabrication of the TPBARS are openly available and that the cost of mining and finishing of such products is already reflected in their cost. Since sufficient source material is available already, the provision of source materials (e.g., mining) is not analyzed. The disposition of TPBARS is addressed in the EIS for the construction and operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site. (See Section 1.5.2.2.)



Issues	No. of Comments	DOE Responses
<b>Waste</b>		
The wastes generated by tritium production should be placed in the backyards of those who make the decisions and Congress.	1	Any wastes generated as a result of activities addressed by the CLWR EIS will be managed in accordance with all applicable Federal and state regulations and DOE Orders.
Plutonium should not be brought for disposal to northern Alabama.	1	DOE has no plans to utilize plutonium in the CLWR Tritium Program. The CLWR Tritium Program would utilize nonradioactive lithium targets to be placed into the normal reactor cycle, with no change in normal operations. No plutonium would be generated in these targets. Although the normal operation of a commercial reactor does generate small quantities of plutonium as an integral part of the spent nuclear fuel, such spent nuclear fuel is presently being stored at commercial reactor sites for ultimate disposal at a national repository. DOE is presently considering only one site for the location of such a repository, Yucca Mountain, Nevada. DOE has no plans to site such a repository in the State of Alabama.
<b>Socioeconomics</b>		
The EIS should evaluate the socioeconomic benefits of completing the Bellefonte plant, such as abundant electricity and reduced power rates.	8	The CLWR EIS evaluates the environmental impacts associated with completing construction of one or both of the Bellefonte plants and operating them for tritium production. Socioeconomic impacts are assessed, including impacts associated with population and employment, housing, schools, and tax revenues. The environmental impacts associated with electricity production are also assessed.
The EIS should evaluate the potential economic consequences to ratepayers from extended outages.	2	There are no extended outages expected from tritium production at any of the reactor plant alternatives. Consequently, no economic consequences are expected. As a matter of contract law, the contract/interagency agreement between DOE and TVA would be expected to provide a mechanism for addressing any cost issues associated with unexpected extended outages. The CLWR EIS does provide a sensitivity analysis of shortening a reactor's fuel cycle from 18 to 12 months, but no socioeconomic consequences are envisioned.
It is unfair for the government to subsidize TVA; this proposal is just an attempt to help TVA resolve its debts.	6	Concurrent with the preparation of the CLWR EIS, DOE is evaluating the feasibility of various CLWR alternatives through a procurement process. That process, which was based on the policy of full and open competition, has been conducted in accordance with all applicable laws, and was open to all owners/operators of pressurized CLWRs. The proposals from TVA for producing tritium using existing and partially completed reactors were the only bids determined to be responsive to the requirements contained in the request for proposals.
Area utilities will oppose using government funding to help TVA complete a competitive nuclear power plant at Bellefonte.	1	The opposition or support of area utilities to the alternatives in the CLWR EIS is beyond the scope of the EIS.
Ratepayers who are against nuclear weapons should not be forced to pay for tritium production.	6	DOE does not anticipate costs being passed on to rate payers, since DOE will be paying for services.
Will tritium production at a TVA power plant require any hydro-pumped storage?	1	No.
<b>Costs</b>		
How cost-effective is tritium production in a commercial nuclear power plant for U.S. taxpayers? How do the costs compare with the accelerator option?	38	Costs are beyond the scope of the EIS. Relative cost comparisons between a CLWR and an accelerator have previously been documented in the Record of Decision for the Tritium Supply and Recycling Programmatic EIS (DOE 1995).

<i>Issues</i>	<i>No. of Comments</i>	<i>DOE Responses</i>
Who will cover the costs of power outages or identification of safety problems resulting from the shorter refueling cycle?	5	Costs are beyond the scope of the EIS. Additionally, there is no proposal to shorten the fuel cycle of any reactor that would produce tritium. For completeness, the CLWR EIS does provide a sensitivity analysis of shortening a reactor's fuel cycle from 18 to 12 months. That sensitivity analysis is provided as a contingency to address the situation of maximizing tritium production in a reactor. Such a situation is not currently expected or proposed. As a matter of contract law, the contract/interagency agreement between DOE and TVA would be expected to provide a mechanism for addressing any cost issues associated with shortening a reactor's fuel cycle from 18 to 12 months.
If Bellefonte is completed for tritium production, who will pay for hazardous materials training and equipment?	3	Costs are beyond the scope of the EIS. However, DOE does not expect tritium production to change the requirements for hazardous material training or equipment.
The EIS should include cost analyses for tritium production at each TVA reactor plant.	3	Costs are beyond the scope of the EIS. However, concurrent with the preparation of the CLWR EIS, DOE is evaluating the feasibility of the various CLWR alternatives through a procurement process. Through that process, DOE expects to enter into a contract/interagency agreement with TVA for the purpose of producing tritium. Once a contract/interagency agreement is reached, the terms would be made public, as appropriate.
DOE should release the report from the accounting firm of Putnam, Hayes, & Bartlett, which assessed the costs of various options for tritium production.	1	The Putnam, Hayes, and Bartlett report is available to anyone who wishes to request that report from DOE, DP-62.
The EIS should explain the total cost of completing Bellefonte and the difficulty of obtaining Congressional appropriations for this purpose.	3	The cost to complete the Bellefonte plant is beyond the scope of the CLWR EIS. Through the procurement process, DOE expects to enter into a contract/interagency agreement with TVA for the purpose of producing tritium. Once a contract/interagency agreement is reached, the terms would be made public, as appropriate. The issue of obtaining Congressional appropriations is beyond the scope of the EIS. While it is true that Congressional appropriations will have to be made for any of the CLWR EIS alternatives, DOE will pursue such appropriations independent of the EIS process.
<b>Nuclear Weapons</b>		
The EIS should explain whether new [nuclear weapons] designs or prototypes are being considered and whether international nonproliferation treaties prohibit the manufacture of new nuclear weapons.	2	As stated in Section 1.3.1 of the CLWR EIS, the United States is no longer producing new-design nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has significantly reduced the size of its nuclear weapons stockpile and DOE has dismantled more than 8,000 nuclear weapons. At the present time, the United States is further downsizing the nuclear weapons stockpile consistent with the terms of the START I Treaty, and DOE is continuing dismantlement. The United States has ratified the START II Treaty and is hopeful that Russia will do likewise. DOE acknowledges that further multilateral reductions in the United States' nuclear weapons stockpile could occur. However, the negotiations required for such reductions are likely to stretch well into the next century. Therefore, a new supply source of tritium is required to assure the reliability of the stockpile. Such a program is consistent with, and fully supportive of, the commitments of the United States under the terms of the START I Treaty, the START II Treaty, and Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Issues	No. of Comments	DOE Responses
<b>EIS Process</b>		
The EIS process is inadequate; it does not address all the risks.	16	The EIS process is performed in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations. The purpose of the CLWR EIS is to assess the direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental impacts associated with tritium production in one or more CLWRs.
Why were additional scoping meetings not held in other areas?	11	Scoping meetings were held at all locations where DOE determined that there was significant interest to warrant public input related to the potential for environmental impacts from CLWR tritium production. This resulted in scoping meetings near each of the reactor sites that were determined to be a reasonable alternative in the CLWR EIS. The scoping process allows for comments from anyone at any location.
Other Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Defense, should be involved in preparing this EIS.	2	In accordance with the Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines and DOE's NEPA regulations for the preparation of a NEPA document, the U.S. Department of Defense, as well as other major Federal agencies, were notified of the opportunity to participate as a cooperating agency in the preparation of the CLWR EIS. TVA was the only Federal agency that requested, and was granted, designation as a cooperating agency. The U.S. Department of Defense has a vested interest in DOE activities in assuring the long-term supply of tritium and is briefed as to the status of the Tritium Project Office, including the analysis being conducted for the CLWR EIS, on a regular basis. Although EPA did not choose to participate as a cooperating agency in the preparation of the CLWR EIS, EPA will review the adequacy of the EIS and provide DOE with its comments as to the adequacy of the EIS in accordance with the Council on Environmental Quality guidelines.
The NRC should be fully involved in this EIS process from the beginning.	3	In accordance with the Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines and the DOE NEPA regulations for the preparation of a NEPA document, the NRC was notified of its opportunity to participate as a cooperating agency in the preparation of the CLWR EIS, and did not elect to participate. The CLWR EIS addresses DOE activities for the production of tritium in a commercial reactor. Any commercial reactors participating in the CLWR Tritium Program would be required to obtain a license amendment from the NRC. Prior to the production of any tritium in a commercial reactor, the NRC would be the responsible agency for conducting any NEPA analysis required on the part of specific commercial reactors participating in the CLWR Tritium Program.
The EIS process should be delayed until completion of the tests of the tritium-producing rods at Watts Bar in 1999.	9	DOE has sufficient experience and confidence in the production of tritium using TPBARs to initiate the CLWR Tritium Program prior to the completion of the Watts Bar Demonstration Project. That project, referred to by DOE as the Lead Test Assembly demonstration, has a stated purpose to provide confidence to regulators and the public that tritium production in a commercial light water reactor is straightforward and safe. Preliminary data from the Lead Test Assembly demonstration supports DOE's preliminary conclusion that tritium production in a CLWR is straightforward and safe.
<b>Miscellaneous</b>		
Tritium should be redesignated as a special nuclear material to ensure that it is treated the same as all other materials that are critical for nuclear weapons production.	1	The issue of reclassifying tritium as a special nuclear material is beyond the scope of the EIS. However, Section 51 of the Atomic Energy Act authorizes the NRC to determine whether a material should be classified as "special nuclear material." To date, neither the NRC, nor any of its predecessor agencies, have ever determined that tritium should be classified as a special nuclear material in accordance with the criteria spelled out in Section 51 of the Atomic Energy Act.
What is the possibility of burning mixed oxide fuel at Bellefonte?	8	TVA officials stated at the public scoping meeting in Evensville, Tennessee, on February 26, 1998, that TVA has no intention of burning mixed oxide fuel at any TVA reactor that would be utilized for tritium production. Consequently, the potential impacts associated with producing tritium while also burning mixed oxide fuel are not reasonably foreseeable.

<i>Issues</i>	<i>No. of Comments</i>	<i>DOE Responses</i>
The fairness and adequacy of the procurement process for tritium production appears questionable.	6	The CLWR procurement process was based on the policy of full and open competition and has been conducted in accordance with all applicable laws. The procurement process was open to all owners/operators of pressurized CLWRs. The proposals from TVA for producing tritium using existing and partially completed reactors were the only bids determined to be responsive to the requirements contained in the request for proposals.
The contractors hired to work on this project should be U.S. citizens, and the public should have oversight responsibilities for their qualifications and experience.	1	The nationality and qualifications of contractors, as well as their oversight, are issues beyond the scope of the EIS. However, all work associated with the CLWR Program will comply with all applicable laws and regulations.
The information materials used to prepare this EIS are inadequate and are not conveniently available to the public.	4	The analysis, dissemination of information, and the inclusion of public participation for the CLWR EIS is conducted in accordance with Council on Environmental Quality regulations (40 CFR 1500-1508), and DOE's NEPA regulations (10 CFR 1021) and procedures. DOE has acted in accordance with these requirements, making a good faith effort to disseminate factsheets explaining the issues associated with tritium production, holding meetings with community groups and the media, holding more than the required number of public scoping meetings, and in addressing all questions put to DOE on such issues.
The following information should be declassified because it is relevant to this EIS and the public should have access to it: (1) the amount of tritium currently in the U.S. arsenal, (2) the size of current reserve stockpiles of tritium, (3) the total number of nuclear weapons assumed to be in the U.S. arsenal between 2011 and 2015, and (4) projected amounts that must be produced annually to maintain the nuclear arsenal after 2015.	1	The CLWR EIS has been prepared based on unclassified information. To the extent possible, the EIS provides unclassified information as a substitute for classified information that cannot be disseminated. The classification of information and the potential for the declassification of information within the control of DOE is outside of the scope of the CLWR EIS. Information such as the existing amount of tritium in the national stockpile of nuclear weapons, the exact number and make-up of nuclear weapons in the stockpile, and the exact number of nuclear weapons which are expected to be in the U.S. arsenal in future years is critical to U.S. national security and cannot be disclosed.
The EIS should evaluate the dangers and impacts of maintaining a nuclear weapons stockpile and the possible explosion of a nuclear warhead.	5	The environmental impacts associated with maintaining a nuclear weapons stockpile are assessed in DOE's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic EIS (DOE 1996). The environmental impacts associated with the possible explosion of a nuclear warhead are speculative and beyond the scope of the CLWR EIS.
In addition to evaluating the physical and social environments, the EIS should look at the moral and ethical issues related to continuing the production of nuclear weapons.	6	Moral and ethical issues are beyond the scope of the EIS.

START = Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

#### F.4 REFERENCES

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1995, *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling*, DOE/EIS-0161, Office of Reconfiguration, Washington, DC, October 19.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1996, *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management*, DOE/EIS-0236, September.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1998, *Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Construction and Operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site*, DOE/EIS-0271D, Savannah River Operations Office, Aiken, South Carolina, May.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1999, *Final Environmental Impact Statement, Construction and Operation of a Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River Site*, DOE/EIS-0271F, Savannah River Operations Office, Aiken, South Carolina, to be published March 1999.

# **Appendix G**

## **Environmental Justice Analysis**

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## APPENDIX G ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ANALYSIS

### G.1 INTRODUCTION

Executive Order 12898, *Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations*, directs Federal agencies to identify and address, as appropriate, the disproportionately high and adverse health or environmental effects of their programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations.

The Council on Environmental Quality has oversight responsibility for documentation prepared in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In December 1997, the Council released its guidance on environmental justice under the National Environmental Policy Act (CEQ 1997). The Council's guidance was adopted as the basis for the analysis of environmental justice contained in this environmental impact statement (EIS).

This section provides an assessment of the potential for disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects due to production of tritium in a commercial light water reactor (CLWR) on minority and low-income populations that live within areas surrounding the candidate facilities. The potential for adverse impacts from onsite activities during tritium production and transportation is determined in this EIS.

### G.2 DEFINITIONS AND APPROACH

The following definitions of minority individuals and population were used in this analysis of environmental justice:

- **Minority Individuals**—Members of any of the following population groups: Hispanic, Native American, Asian or Pacific Islander, or Black.
- **Minority Population**—The total number of minority individuals residing within a potentially affected area.

In the discussions of environmental justice in this document, persons self-designated as Hispanic are included in the Hispanic population, regardless of race. For example, the Asian or Pacific Islander population is composed of persons self-designated as Asian or Pacific Islander and not of Hispanic origin. Asian or Pacific Islanders who designate themselves as having Hispanic origins are included in the Hispanic population. Data for the analysis of minorities and racial population were extracted for year 2025 from the U.S. Census Bureau's worldwide web site (<http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/stproj.html>).

Executive Order 12898 specifically addresses "disproportionately high and adverse effects" on "low-income" populations. The Council on Environmental Quality recommends that poverty thresholds be used to identify "low-income" individuals.

The following definitions of low-income individuals and population were used in this analysis:

- **Low-Income Individuals**—All persons whose self-reported incomes are less than the poverty threshold.

- **Low-Income Population**—The total number of poverty-level individuals residing within potentially affected area.

Data for the analysis of low-income populations were extracted from Table P121 of Standard Tape File 3 (DOC 1992).

### **Disproportionately High and Adverse Human Health Effects**

Adverse health effects are measured in risks and rates that could result in latent cancer fatalities, as well as other fatal or nonfatal adverse impacts to human health. Disproportionately high and adverse human health effects occur when the risk or rate of exposure to an environmental hazard for a minority population or low-income population is significant and exceeds the risk of exposure rate for the general population or, where available, for another appropriate comparison group (CEQ 1997).

### **Disproportionately High and Adverse Environmental Impacts**

A disproportionately high environmental impact refers to an impact (or risk of an impact) in a low-income or minority community that is significant and exceeds the environmental impact on the larger community. An adverse environmental impact is a deleterious environmental impact that is determined to be significant. In assessing cultural and aesthetic environmental impacts, impacts that uniquely affect geographically dislocated or dispersed low-income or minority populations were considered (CEQ 1997).

Potentially affected areas examined in this EIS include areas defined by an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius centered on candidate facilities for CLWR production of tritium located at the Watts Bar, Sequoyah, and Bellefonte Nuclear Plants. Minority and low-income populations residing within a 1.6-kilometer (1-mile) corridor centered on representative transportation routes were also included in the evaluation of environmental justice.

## **G.3 METHODOLOGY**

### **G.3.1 Spatial Resolution**

For the purposes of enumeration and analysis, the U.S. Census Bureau has defined a variety of areal units (DOC 1992). Areal units of concern in this document include (in order of increasing spatial resolution) states, counties, census tracts, block groups, and blocks. The block is generally the smallest of these entities and offers the finest spatial resolution. This term refers to a relatively small geographical area bounded on all sides by visible features such as streets and streams or by invisible boundaries such as city limits and property lines. During the 1990 census, the U.S. Census Bureau subdivided the United States and its territories into 7,017,425 blocks. For comparison, the number of counties, census tracts, and block groups used in the 1990 census were 3,248; 62,276; and 229,192; respectively. While blocks offer the finest spatial resolution, economic data required for identification of low-income populations are not available at the block-level of spatial resolution. In the analysis below, block groups are used throughout as the areal unit. Block groups generally contain between 250 and 500 housing units (DOC 1992).

During the decennial census, the U.S. Census Bureau collects data from individuals and aggregates the data according to residence in a geographical area, such as a county or block group. Boundaries of the areal units are selected to coincide with features such as streams and roads or political boundaries such as county and city borders. Boundaries used for aggregation of the census data usually do not coincide with boundaries used in the calculation of health effects. As discussed in Chapter 5 of this EIS, radiological health effects due to an accident at one of the sites for commercial production of tritium are evaluated for persons residing within a distance of 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the accident site. In general, the boundary of the circle with an



80-kilometer (50-mile) radius centered at the accident site will not coincide with boundaries used by the U.S. Census Bureau for enumeration of the population in the potentially affected area. Some block groups lie completely inside or outside of the radius for health effects calculation. However, other block groups are only partially included. As a result of these partial inclusions, uncertainties are introduced into the estimate of the population at risk from the accident.

To estimate the populations at risk in partially included block groups, it was assumed that populations are uniformly distributed throughout the area of each block group. For example, if 30 percent of the area of a block group lies within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the accident site, it was assumed that 30 percent of the population residing in that block group would be at risk. An upper bound for the population at risk was obtained by including the total population of partially included block groups in the population at risk. Similarly, a lower bound for the population at risk was obtained by excluding the population of partially included blocks from the population at risk. As a general rule, if the areas of geographic units defined by the U.S. Census Bureau are small in comparison with the potentially affected area, then the uncertainties due to partial inclusions will be relatively small.

### G.3.2 Population Projections

Health effects were calculated for populations projected to reside in potentially affected areas during the year 2025. Extrapolations of the total population for individual states are available from both the U.S. Census Bureau and various state agencies (DOC 1996). The U.S. Census Bureau also projects populations by ethnic and racial classification in 1-year intervals for the years from 1995 to 2025 at the state level. State agencies project total populations for individual counties. No Federal or state agency projects block groups or low-income populations. Data used to project minority populations were extracted from the U.S. Census Bureau's Internet web site (<http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/stproj.html>). To project minority populations in potentially affected areas, minority populations determined from the 1990 census data were taken as a baseline for each block group. Then it was assumed that percentage changes in the minority population of each block group for a given year (compared to the 1990 baseline data) will be the same as percentage changes in the state minority population projected for the same year. An advantage to this assumption is that the projected populations are obtained using a consistent method, regardless of the state and associated block group involved in the calculation. A disadvantage is that the method is insensitive to localized demographic changes that could alter the projection in a specific area.

The U.S. Census Bureau uses the cohort-component method to estimate future populations for each state (DOC 1996). The set of cohorts is comprised of: (1) age groups from 1 year or less to 85 years or more, (2) male and female populations in each age group, and (3) the following racial and ethnic groups in each age group: Hispanic, non-Hispanic Asian, non-Hispanic African American, non-Hispanic Native American, and non-Hispanic White. Components of the population change used in the demographic accounting system are births, deaths, net state-to-state migration, and net international migration. If  $P(t)$  denotes the number of individuals in a given cohort at time "t," then:

$$P(t) = P(t_0) + B - D + DIM - DOM + IIM - IOM \quad (1)$$

where:

$P(t_0)$	=	Cohort population at time $t_0 \leq t$ . For this analysis, $t_0$ denotes the year 1990.
B	=	Births expected during the period from $t_0$ to $t$ .
D	=	Deaths expected during the period from $t_0$ to $t$ .
DIM	=	Domestic migration expected into the state during the period from $t_0$ to $t$ .
DOM	=	Domestic migration expected out of the state during the period from $t_0$ to $t$ .
IIM	=	International migration expected into the state during the period from $t_0$ to $t$ .
IOM	=	International migration expected out of the state during the period from $t_0$ to $t$ .

Estimated values for the components shown on the right side of equation 1 are based on past data and various assumptions regarding changes in the rates for birth, mortality, and migration (DOC 1996). Persons of Hispanic origin are included in the Hispanic population regardless of race. It should be noted that the U.S. Census Bureau does not project populations of individuals who identified themselves as "other race" during the 1990 Census. This population group is less than 2 percent of the total population in each of the states. However, to project total populations in the environmental justice analysis, population projections for the "other race" group were made under the assumption that the growth rate for the "other race" population will be identical to the growth rate for the combined minority and White populations.

#### **G.4 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ASSESSMENT**


The analysis of environmental justice concerns was based on an assessment of the impacts reported in Chapter 5 of this EIS. This analysis was performed to identify any disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental impacts on minority or low-income populations surrounding the three potential sites. Demographic information obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau was used to identify the minority populations and low-income communities in the zone of potential impact surrounding the sites. The outer zone is within the region of influence, a circle that has an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius around the potential sites. This radius is consistent with that used to evaluate the collective dose for human health effects, air impact modeling, and socioeconomic impacts, and is judged to encompass all of the impacts that may occur.

#### **G.5 RESULTS FOR THE SITES**

As discussed in Chapter 3 of this EIS, three CLWR sites were selected as candidates for the production of tritium: Watts Bar, Sequoyah, and Bellefonte. This section will describe the analysis of potentially affected minority and low-income populations residing near the candidate sites. It should be noted that projections of the total population provided in this appendix differ from the projected total populations used in the health effects calculations described in Chapter 5. This is because the projections used in the analysis of environmental justice are based on projections for the states provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (DOC 1996). Projections used in the analysis of health effects are based on county-wide projections provided by state agencies. As discussed in Section G.3.2, the county projections are more sensitive to localized demographic changes. However, the states do not provide projections for minority populations. Therefore, the U.S. Bureau of the Census projections were used in the analysis of environmental justice. Population projections obtained with the two approaches differ by 8 percent or less and will have essentially no effect on the results of the analyses.

##### **G.5.1 Watts Bar Site**

Figure G-1 shows the racial and ethnic composition of the minority population residing within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Watts Bar site in 1990 (DOC 1992) and those projected to reside in the potentially affected area in the year 2025. In the interval between 1990 and 2025, the percentage of the total population composed of minorities is projected to increase from 8.9 percent to 11.7 percent. For comparison, during the 1990 census, minorities were found to comprise approximately one-quarter of the total national population. By the year 2025, minorities are projected to comprise approximately one-third of the total national population. The percentage minority population residing in the potentially affected area surrounding the Watts Bar site was less than the corresponding national percentage in 1990, and is expected to remain so through the year 2025. Blacks are the largest minority group residing in the potentially affected area, while the Asian and Hispanic populations are projected to show the largest growth rates.



**Figure G-1 Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Minority Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Watts Bar Site**

Figure G-2 shows the location of minority populations residing near the Watts Bar site in 1990. It also shows the annual dose to an individual located 40 kilometers (25 miles) from a 3,400 Curie release with its source at the Watts Bar site. All of the annual doses shown in Figure G-2 are several orders of magnitude less than the annual dose due to natural background radiation and would be expected to pose small, if any, risks to the health of an individual. As indicated in Figure G-2, block groups for which the percentage of minority residents exceeds the corresponding national percentage are concentrated in the Chattanooga, Tennessee, area.

Figure G-3 shows data similar to that of Figure G-2, except that the annual doses displayed in Figure G-3 apply to an individual located 8 kilometers (5 miles) from the Watts Bar site. All of the annual doses shown in Figure G-3 are several orders of magnitude less than the annual dose from the natural background radiation and would be expected to result in small, if any, impacts on the health of an individual.

During the 1990 census, 13.6 percent of the residents within the potentially affected area surrounding the Watts Bar site reported incomes below the poverty threshold. Slightly over 13 percent of the national population reported incomes below the poverty threshold, and nearly 16 percent of the residents of Tennessee reported incomes below the poverty threshold during the same year. Thus, the percentage low-income population residing within the potentially affected area exceeded that for the nation, but is less than the corresponding percentage for Tennessee. Figures G-4 and G-5 show the geographical distribution of low-income residents surrounding the Watts Bar site. Block groups for which the percentage of low-income residents exceeds the corresponding national percentage are located throughout the potentially affected area.

As discussed in Chapter 5, the production of tritium at the Watts Bar site would pose little risk to the public and the natural environment. Thus, selection of the Watts Bar site for the production of tritium would not be expected to pose disproportionately high and adverse risks to potentially affected minority and low-income populations residing near the Watts Bar site.




Figure G-2 Minority Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Watts Bar Site




Figure G-3 Minority Population Residing Within 16 Kilometers (10 Miles) of the Watts Bar Site




Figure G-4 Low-Income Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Watts Bar Site




Figure G-5 Low-Income Population Residing Within 16 Kilometers (10 Miles) of the Watts Bar Site

### G.5.2 Sequoyah Site

Figure G-6 shows the racial and ethnic composition of the minority population residing within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Sequoyah site in 1990 (DOC 1992) and those projected to reside in the potentially affected area in the year 2025. In the interval between 1990 and 2025, the percentage of the total population composed of minorities is projected to increase from 9.8 percent to 12.8 percent. For comparison, during the 1990 census, minorities were found to comprise approximately one-quarter of the total national population. By the year 2025, minorities are projected to comprise approximately one-third of the total national population. The percentage minority population residing in the potentially affected area surrounding the Sequoyah site was less than the corresponding national percentage in 1990, and is expected to remain so through the year 2025. Blacks are the largest minority group residing in the potentially affected area, while the Asian and Hispanic populations are projected to show the largest growth rates.




Figure G-6 Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Minority Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Sequoyah Site

Figure G-7 shows the location of minority populations and low-income populations residing near the Sequoyah site. It also shows the annual dose to an individual located 40 kilometers (25 miles) from a 3,400 Curie release with its source at the Sequoyah site. All of the annual doses shown in Figure G-7 are several orders of magnitude less than the annual dose from the natural background radiation and would be expected to pose small, if any, risks to the health of an individual. As indicated in Figure G-7, block groups for which the percentage of minority residents exceeds the corresponding national percentage are concentrated in the Chattanooga area.

Figure G-8 shows data similar to that in Figure G-7, except that the annual doses displayed in Figure G-8 apply to an individual located 8 kilometers (5 miles) from the Sequoyah site. All of the annual doses shown in Figure G-8 are several orders of magnitude less than the annual dose from the natural background radiation and would be expected to pose little, if any, risk to the health of an individual.




Figure G-7 Minority Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Sequoyah Site




Figure G-8 Minority Population Residing Within 16 Kilometers (10 Miles) of the Sequoyah Site

During the 1990 census, 14.4 percent of the residents within the potentially affected area surrounding the Sequoyah site reported incomes below the poverty threshold. Slightly over 13 percent of the national population reported incomes below the poverty threshold, and nearly 16 percent of the residents of Tennessee reported incomes below the poverty threshold during the same year. Thus, the percentage low-income population residing within the potentially affected area exceeded that for the nation, but is less than the corresponding percentage for Tennessee. Figures G-9 and G-10 show the geographical distribution of low-income residents surrounding the Sequoyah site. Block groups for which the percentage of low-income residents exceeds the corresponding national percentage are located throughout the potentially affected area.

As discussed in Chapter 5, the production of tritium at the Sequoyah site would pose little risk to the public and the natural environment. Thus, selection of the Sequoyah site for the production of tritium would not be expected to pose disproportionately high and adverse risks to potentially affected minority and low-income populations residing near the Sequoyah site.




Figure G-9 Low-Income Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Sequoyah Site

### G.5.3 Bellefonte

Figure G-11 shows the racial and ethnic composition of the minority population residing within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Bellefonte site in 1990 (DOC 1992) and those projected to reside in the potentially affected area by the year 2025. In the interval between 1990 and 2025, the percentage of the total population composed of minorities is projected to increase from 14.9 percent to 17.7 percent. For comparison, during the 1990 census, minorities were found to comprise approximately one-quarter of the total national population. By the year 2025, minorities are projected to comprise approximately one-third of the total national population. The percentage minority population residing in the potentially affected area surrounding the Bellefonte site was less than the corresponding national percentage in 1990, and is expected to remain so through the year 2025. Blacks are the largest minority group residing in the potentially affected area, while the Asian and Hispanic populations are projected to show the largest growth rates.






Figure G-10 Low-Income Population Residing Within 16 Kilometers (10 Miles) of the Sequoyah Site




Figure G-11 Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Minority Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Bellefonte Site

Figure G-12 shows the location of minority populations residing near the Bellefonte site. Minority residents are concentrated in urban areas near Chattanooga and Huntsville-Decatur, Alabama. Throughout the potentially affected area, there are relatively few locations for which the percentage minority population exceeds the corresponding national percentage. Figure G-12 also shows the annual dose to an individual located 40 kilometers (25 miles) from a 3,400 Curie release with its source at the Bellefonte site. All of the annual doses shown in Figure G-12 are several orders of magnitude less than the annual dose from the natural background radiation and would be expected to pose little, if any, risk to the health of an individual.




Figure G-12 Minority Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Bellefonte Site

Figure G-13 shows data similar to that of Figure G-12, except that the annual doses displayed in Figure G-13 apply to an individual located 8 kilometers (5 miles) from the Bellefonte site. All of the annual doses shown in Figure G-13 are several orders of magnitude less than the annual dose from the natural background radiation, and would be expected to pose little, if any, risk to the health of an individual.

During the 1990 census, 14.7 percent of the residents within the potentially affected area surrounding the Bellefonte site reported incomes below the poverty threshold. Slightly over 13 percent of the national population reported incomes below the poverty threshold, and approximately 18 percent of the residents of Alabama reported incomes below the poverty threshold during the same year. Thus, the percentage low-income population residing within the potentially affected area exceeded that for the nation, but is less than the corresponding percentage for Alabama. Figures G-14 and G-15 show the geographical distribution of low-income residents surrounding the Bellefonte site. On the other hand, block groups for which the percentage of low-income residents exceeds the corresponding national percentage are located throughout the potentially affected area.




Figure G-13 Minority Population Residing Within 16 Kilometers (10 Miles) of the Bellefonte Site





Figure G-14 Low-Income Population Residing Within 80 Kilometers (50 Miles) of the Bellefonte Site



**Figure G-15 Low-Income Population Residing Within 16 Kilometers (10 Miles) of the Bellefonte Site**

As discussed in Chapter 5, the production of tritium at the Bellefonte site would pose small risks to the public and the natural environment. Thus, selection of the Bellefonte site for the production of tritium would not be expected to pose disproportionately high and adverse risks to potentially affected minority and low-income populations residing near the Bellefonte site.

## G.6 RESULTS FOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES

Overland transportation of tritium involves radiological and nonradiological risks to the public. Tables G-1 through G-3 show minority and low-income populations residing along highway routes from Watts Bar, Sequoyah, and Bellefonte Nuclear Plants to the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. These tables show populations residing within the 1.6-kilometer (1-mile) corridor centered along highway routes from all three potential sites to the Savannah River Site. Data presented in the tables were resolved at the block-group level. Data for minority populations are projected for the year 2025 and data for low-income populations are taken from the 1990 Census. The distances along highway routes connecting the Savannah River Site with other sites are as follows: 558 kilometers (349 miles), Bellefonte; 497 kilometers (311 miles), Sequoyah; and 576 kilometers (360 miles), Watts Bar.

As discussed in Appendix E, it is unlikely that radiological and nonradiological harm to the general population, including low-income populations and minority populations, would result from highway transportation of tritium.

## G.7 OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

No significant adverse impacts to biotic resources, air resources, socioeconomic, land use, or cultural resources were identified in Chapter 5. Therefore, no disproportionately high or adverse impacts were

identified for any segment of the population. None of the alternatives would have a significant adverse impact on the previously mentioned resources because, under all of the alternatives, a limited amount of previously undisturbed land would be used on and off the sites.

#### **G.8 CUMULATIVE IMPACTS**

Based on the analysis of the environmental impacts evaluated in this EIS, along with the impacts of other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future activities, no reasonably foreseeable cumulative adverse impacts are expected to affect the surrounding minority and low-income populations.

**Table G-1 Minority Populations Residing Near Highway Routes from Potential Sites to the Savannah River Site**

<i>Site</i>	<i>Population Along Route</i>	<i>Minority Population Along Route</i>	<i>Percent Minority Population Along Route</i>
Watts Bar	296,423	122,972	41.5
Sequoyah	298,364	123,694	41.5
Bellefonte	303,417	129,701	43.0

**Table G-2 Racial and Ethnic Composition of Minority Populations (2025) Residing Within 1.6 Kilometers (1 Mile) Along Highway from Potential Sites to the Savannah River Site**

<i>Site</i>	<i>Total Pop.</i>	<i>Total Minority Pop.</i>	<i>Percent Minority Pop.</i>	<i>American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut Pop.</i>	<i>Percent American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut Pop.</i>	<i>Asian or Pacific Islander Pop.</i>	<i>Percent Asian or Pacific Islander Pop.</i>	<i>Black Pop.</i>	<i>Percent Black Pop.</i>	<i>Hispanic Origin Pop.</i>	<i>Percent Hispanic Origin Pop.</i>
Watts Bar	296,423	122,972	41.5	739	0.24	12,108	4	97,594	33	12,531	4
Sequoyah	298,364	123,694	41.5	720	0.24	12,368	4	98,146	33	12,460	4
Bellefonte	303,417	129,701	43.0	821	0.30	12,303	4	104,289	34	12,288	4

**Table G-3 Low-Income Populations Residing Near Highway Routes from Potential Sites to the Savannah River Site**

<i>Site</i>	<i>Population Along Route</i>	<i>Low-Income Population Along Route</i>	<i>Percent Low-Income Population Along Route</i>
Watts Bar	296,423	21,415	7
Sequoyah	298,364	21,489	7
Bellefonte	303,417	24,731	8

## G.9 REFERENCES

CEQ (Council on Environmental Quality), 1997, *Environmental Guidance Under the National Environmental Policy Act*, Executive Office of the President, Washington, DC, December 10.

DOC (U.S. Department of Commerce), 1992, *1990 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3 on CD-ROM*, Bureau of the Census, Washington, DC, May.

DOC (U.S. Department of Commerce), 1996, "Population Projections for States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2025" (available at <http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/pp147.html>), Population Division, October.

# **Appendix H**

## **Contractor Disclosure Statement**



**NEPA DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FOR PREPARATION OF EIS  
FOR THE PRODUCTION OF TRITIUM IN A COMMERCIAL  
LIGHT WATER REACTOR**

CEQ regulations at 40 CFR 1506.5(c), which have been adopted by DOE (10 CFR 1021), require contractors who will prepare an EIS to execute a disclosure specifying that they have no financial or other interest in the outcome of the project. The term "financial interest or other interest in the outcome of the project," for the purposes of this disclosure, is defined in the March 23, 1981 guidance "Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations," 46 FR 18026-18038 at Question 17a and b.

"Financial or other interest in the outcome of the project 'includes' any financial benefit such as a promise of future construction or design work in the project, as well as indirect benefits the contractor is aware of (e.g., if the project would aid proposals sponsored by the firm's other clients)." 46 FR 18026-18038 at 18031.


In accordance with these requirements, the offeror and any proposed subcontractors hereby certify as follows: (check either (a) or (b) to assure consideration of your proposal)

- (a)   ✓   Offeror and any proposed subcontractor have no financial interest in the outcome of the project.
- (b)        Offeror and any proposed subcontractor have the following financial or other interest in the outcome of the project and hereby agree to divest themselves of such interest prior to award of this contract.

**Financial or Other Interests:**

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

Certified by:

  
Signature

Ibrahim H. Zeitoun, Ph.D.  
Name

Project Manager and Corporate Vice President

April 15, 1998  
Date

**Science Applications International Corporation**