


**FirstEnergy**

# *Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station*

6/1



## **Resolution of Open Design Questions**

1

Opening Remarks . . . . . Lew Myers/Gary Leidich  
System Health Assurance Plan..... Jim Powers  
Resolution of Open Design Issues..... Bob Schrauder  
Closing Comments.....Lew Myers/Gary Leidich

# Opening Remarks

**Gary Leidich**

**Executive Vice President -  
FENOC**

**Lew Myers**

**Chief Operating Officer -  
FENOC**



**CEO of FirstEnergy  
has set the standard of returning  
Davis-Besse  
back to service in a safe  
and reliable manner**

**We must do the job right the  
first time and regain the  
confidence of our customers,  
regulators, and investors in our  
nuclear program**

**We are committed to meeting  
this challenge**

## Desired Outcome

- Provide an update on the Davis-Besse action plan to resolve open design questions identified during the System Health Assurance Plan reviews
- Obtain NRC feedback on the action plan

# Objective

- Our Plan:

“System Health Assurance Plan provides FirstEnergy, the regulators, and the public reasonable assurance that systems at Davis-Besse can perform their safety and accident mitigation functions”

# Return to Service Plan

## Restart Overview Panel

**Reactor Head  
Resolution Plan**  
Bob Schrauder

**System Health  
Assurance Plan**  
Jim Powers

**Program Compliance  
Plan**  
Jim Powers

**Restart Action Plan**  
Lew Myers

**Restart Test Plan**  
Randy Fast

**Containment Health  
Assurance Plan**  
Randy Fast


**Management and  
Human Performance  
Excellence Plan**  
Lew Myers

# Plan to Resolve Open Design Questions

- Three parallel paths
  - Operability determinations for Condition Reports (CRs) and determine extent of condition for operability issues
  - Validation of risk-significant safety functions
  - Resolution of topical issues
- These paths support the safe and reliable operation of Davis-Besse
- Additional corrective actions and improvements after restart



# System Health Assurance Plan



**Jim Powers**  
**Director - Nuclear Engineering**

9

# Licensing Basis Historical Timeline

# Designs Assessments Prior to 2002

- Davis-Besse Independent Safety Engineering Group vertical slice reviews of systems
  - 1989 Station and Instrument Air System
  - 1991 Emergency Diesel Generators
  - 1992 Steam Generators
  - 1993 Service Water System
  - 1994 Instrument and Controls
  - 1995 Auxiliary Feedwater System
- NRC reviews
  - 1992 Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection
  - 1993 Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection
  - 1997 High Pressure Injection/ Low Pressure Injection Systems Architect-Engineer Inspection
  - 2000 Safety System Design and Performance Capability Inspection

# Designs Assessments Prior to 2002

- Results of the previous assessments
  - Systems consistently shown to be Operable and capable of performing safety functions
  - Identified some weaknesses in calculations
  - Continuous improvements and upgrades to calculation methodology/technology

## Resulting Remedial Actions

- Review and update of Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) in 1996
- Design Basis Validation Program (DBVP) in 1997-1999
- Consistent with industry practices in the 1990s
- Repeated conclusion is the design condition was acceptable and supported plant operation
- Corrective actions from DBVP continue to be implemented

# System Health Assurance Plan

- In 2002, a review of the health of plant systems was undertaken to ensure safe and reliable operation
- System health reviews included:
  - Operational Readiness Review
  - System Health Readiness Reviews
  - Latent Issues Reviews

# System Health Assurance Plan

- Operational Readiness Review (Completed)
  - Identified whether systems have any known significant deficiencies and initiated immediate corrective actions
  - Selected systems relative to Maintenance Rule, performance criteria, material condition, and operator burden
  - Utilized significant Operations involvement

# System Health Assurance Plan

- System Health Readiness Reviews
  - Scope: Maintenance Rule Risk Significant systems
  - Reviewed:
    - Test results of functionality
    - Modifications since 1990's
    - Corrective Actions
    - System walkdown
  - Comprehensive identification of known issues; questions documented on Condition Reports
  - Goal: Confidence that systems can perform function




# System Health Assurance Plan

- Latent Issues Reviews
  - Included Reactor Coolant System, Service Water System, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Component Cooling Water System, and Emergency Diesel Generators
    - Verification of design bases
    - Assessment of 31 system attributes
    - Review of various data sources
    - Comprehensive Walkdowns
  - Self Assessments of High Pressure Injection and 4160 Volt System calculations

# System Health Assurance Plan

- Discovery phase from reviews of System Health Assurance Plan is complete
  - Reports for Latent Issues Reviews are issued
  - Reports for System Health Readiness Reviews are issued
  - Condition Reports (CRs) issued for questions identified
  - Encouraged questioning attitude and reviews generated over 1200 CRs (including design and operation questions)
    - Collective significance reviews identified some cross-cutting issues
    - Overall discrepancy ratio related to Latent Issues Review was low ( $< 3\%$ )
    - Preliminary evaluation indicates that few have potential safety consequence
    - Currently performing operability determinations to determine actual impact
- Resolution plan developed to evaluate open design questions

# Resolution of Open Design Questions



**Bob Schrauder**  
**Director - Support Services**

19


# Plan to Resolve Open Design Questions

- Comprehensive plan to provide assurance that:
  - Potentially safety significant issues are identified and resolved
  - Technical Specification Operability is met
  - Safety systems, structures, and components (SSCs) will perform their safety functions
  - Extent of Conditions (EOC) are known
- Preliminary results show:
  - Majority of the design-related Condition Reports (>92%) identified for restart are not potentially safety significant
  - Calculation-related questions dominate the potentially safety significant issues

# Plan to Resolve Open Design Questions


- Three parallel paths
  - Operability determinations for Condition Reports (CRs) and determine extent of condition for operability issues
  - Validation of risk-significant safety functions
  - Resolution of topical issues

## RESOLUTION OF OPEN DESIGN ISSUES




Note: All actions are restart actions unless otherwise designated

# Resolution Plan Overview



- Flow Path A
  - Resolves each condition identified and determines the Extent of Condition
- Flow Path B
  - Provides evaluations for additional assurance of significant safety function capabilities
- Flow Path C
  - Resolves topical programmatic issues

# Resolution of Open Design Issues (Path A)




- Design-related conditions have been identified by the NRC and Davis-Besse
- Conditions Reports are evaluated and their impact on operability is determined
- Condition Reports with operability impact
  - Remedial action prior to restart
  - Determine extent of condition for issues that impact operability
  - Root Cause analysis and preventive actions (non-restart)




# Resolution of Open Design Issues (Path A)

- Methods for determining Extent of Condition
  - If Condition Report is addressed by an existing program/activity, that program determines Extent of Condition for risk-significant systems
    - Design Basis Validation Program
    - Safety Function Validation Project
    - Resolution of topical issues
    - System Health Readiness reviews
  - If not, develop and implement actions to determine Extent of Condition




# Resolution of Open Design Issues (Path A)



- Results of Extent of Condition Reviews
  - Correct any operability issues prior to restart
  - Determine the need for and timing of additional reviews based upon number of issues and their significance

# Resolution of Open Design Issues (Path B)




- Collective Significance Review and potential safety significant evaluation identified potential issues related to calculations that support safety functions
- Safety Function Validation Project
  - Perform evaluations of the functions that contribute more than 1% of Core Damage Frequency (CDF)
    - 15 systems with such functions
    - 5 of 15 systems already validated by Latent Issue Reviews
    - 15 systems contribute 99% to Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) and to CDF

# Resolution of Open Design Issues (Path B)

- 15 plant systems subject to Safety Function Validation Project
  - Component Cooling Water
  - Emergency Diesel Generators
  - Auxiliary Feedwater
  - Service Water
  - Reactor Coolant System
  - High Pressure Injection
  - Decay Heat Removal/  
Low Pressure Injection
  - Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning of Emergency Core Cooling Systems
  - Main Steam
  - Steam Generators
  - Safety Features Actuation System
  - Steam & Feedwater Rupture Control System
  - 4160 Volt AC
  - 125/250 Volt DC
  - 480 Volt AC


# Resolution of Open Design Issues (Path B)



## •Methodology

- For each function, review associated calculations/tests and confirm they support the function
  - If necessary, prepare evaluation to support operability determination for condition reports
- ## •Provides additional assurance that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) can perform their safety functions

# Resolution of Open Design Issues (Path B)




## •Results

- Prepare a summary report that evaluates results for all 15 systems to reach a conclusion on ability of plant to perform its risk-significant functions
- Correct any operability issues prior to restart
- If necessary, determine whether to expand scope

# Resolution of Open Design Issues (Path C)

- Collective Significance Review performed of System Health Readiness
  - Calculation questions
  - Topical issues
    - High Energy Line Break (HELB)
    - Environmental Qualification (EQ)
    - Seismic Qualification
    - Fire Protection (Appendix R -Safe Shutdown)
    - Flooding
    - Other issues



# Resolution of Open Design Issues

- Schedule
  - Identified operability determinations and the Safety Function Validation Project are expected to be completed by the end of January, 2003



# Conclusion

System Health Assurance Plan and the plan to resolve open design questions will provide reasonable assurance that Davis-Besse is ready to support safe and reliable plant operation

# Closing Remarks

**Gary Leidich**

**Executive Vice President -  
FENOC**

**Lew Myers**

**Chief Operating Officer -  
FENOC**

# Closing Remarks

- Prior to restart
  - Resolve topical design issues
  - Validate the most risk-significant function capabilities
  - Address operability issues and extent of condition
- Completion of these will ensure the plant is ready for safe and reliable operations