INDIAN POINT 2 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Basic Plant Description:

One Unit/PWR Westinghouse

960 MWe

24 years

Current SALP Period: February 16, 1997 to August 15, 1998 (Proposal pending to extend to

November 7, 1998)

SALP Issue Date:

March 31, 1997

Previous SALP Rating:

Operations

Maintenance

Engineering Plant Support

Senior Management Meeting History:

Recent SALP and CP

IP-2 was discussed for the first time at the June 1997 SMM and again at the January 1998 meeting. At those meetings, it was decided that IP-2 would continue to receive the current level of NRC attention.

Following the January 1998 meeting, Region I sent a letter to Con Ed which detailed NRC concerns with IP-2 performance and requested a meeting to discuss their efforts to address human performance issues and equipment and process related weaknesses at the site. This letter also informed Con Ed of the NRC's intent to conduct a broad sooped OSTI type review at IP-2. Con Ed responded on February 23, 1998, agreeing to meet with the NRC and detailing their intent to conduct an Independent Safety Assessment Information in this record was deleted

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(ISA). That meeting was held on March 19, 1998, and was followed by issuance of Confirmatory Action Letter 98-005 documenting Con Edison's restart and short term commitments to improve performance at the site as well as their commitment to perform an ISA. The ISA was performed in late March and early April by a team of eleven experienced individuals led by "Buzz" Carns with the team's findings presented to Con Edison at the end of April 1998. In late May 1998, "Buzz" was offered and accepted a position as senior vice president - nuclear with Con Edison in order to lead their performance improvement efforts; three other former ISA members are now on a five member Executive Oversight Team formed by Con Edison. On June 4, 1998, another meeting was held with Con Edison to understand their planned corrective actions in response to the ISA findings. Con Edison documented these planned corrective actions in a submittal made on July 1st; these planned corrective actions are being evaluated by the IP-2 Assessment Panel, established in April 1998 to closely monitor performance at the station.

Current Performance / Relevant Trends

At the last SMM, I discussed both equipment and process related weaknesses. Con Edison's performance was largely unchanged during the last six months with respect to human performance and the control of plant activities. Human performance-related problems continued to surface through events or be identified by the NRC or third parties such as the ISA. With respect to material condition, equipment problems continued to surface, albeit at a slower rate recently, but Con Edison used the current outage to more aggressively identify and correct them; some long-standing problems were resolved and maintenance backlogs were reduced. Informalities in using station processes continue to be observed, resulting in performance lapses such as those leading to isolation of the reactor head vent with the RCS in a partial draindown condition, fire watch program implementation deficiencies and various other plant configuration control problems. Several problems occurred in the operations area with respect to procedural adherence. Furthermore, minor problems continue to be identified by the NRC in various aspects of the site corrective action system. A number of weaknesses were identified in the Technical Specification surveillance program during a licensee review, initiated while the NRC was questioning the extent of the problem after three long-standing TS surveillance failures were found by Con Edison. An Architect-Engineering Team inspection, conducted at the site in January 1998, also identified concerns with the control of system configurations and design information.

The ISA confirmed that the plant was being operated safely, but identified that some important deficiencies and weaknesses exist at the facility, particularly in the areas of management and operations. The ISA commented that the chain of command is not clearly defined, that direct supervision in the

