



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

August 4, 1971

P. A. Morris, Director, Division of Reactor Licensing
1/2/71
PROPOSED AIR FORCE PRESS RELEASE

Commander MacVean of Dr. Walske's office called and read a proposed Air Force press release on the resumption of low-level SAC flights near Big Rock Point.

He would like our telephoned comments on the proposed press release (attached) by Monday, August 9.

I suggested he let Consumers Power Company know in advance of the resumptions of flights.

Note that nothing is said about proximity to the Big Rock plant or about the planned eventual route relocation. Should we suggest that the relationship of the new route to the Big Rock site be mentioned?

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "B. Grimes", is positioned above the typed name.

Brian Grimes, Chief
Radiological Safety Branch
Division of Reactor Licensing

Enclosure:
Proposed Press Release

cc: D. Schovholt
F. Schroeder
T.R. Wilson
R. DeYoung
R. Boyd
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PDR WASTE
WM-11 DCD

Beginning August 16, 1971 Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-52 and FB-111 bombers will resume low-level simulated bombing missions near Petoskey and Bay Shore, Michigan. Radar Bomb Schooling (RBS) equipment located near Bay Shore will use radio and radar signals to measure accuracy of the simulated bomb drops.

Low-level flights over the Bay Shore Area were suspended in January, 1971 following the crash of a B-52 into Lake Michigan, killing the nine crew members aboard. The crash occurred while the bomber, which did not carry weapons, was flying a routine low-level training mission.

Aircraft flying the new route will approach the simulated targets from the North after descent to low-level altitude. The bombers will fly over Lake Michigan northwest of Petoskey, Michigan, and pass over the coastline approximately five miles west of Petoskey. The aircraft will continue south to a point approximately 5 miles northwest of Boyne City, Michigan, turn westerly, begin ascending and pass approximately 10 miles southwest of Charlevoix, Michigan. The bombers will then return to high altitude flight over Lake Michigan. The route has been coordinated with the FAA and other interested governmental agencies.

Scoring simulated bomb missions with ground radar gives crews realistic training in the use of radar bombing, against all kinds of targets, day or night, in all kinds of weather. Navigators and bombardiers receive practice in recognizing terrain features, rail centers, factories and other structures used as reference points as they appear on radar scopes.

The effectiveness of combat crews is scored by using a combination of radio and radar contacts between the aircraft and the scoring site. RBS ground radars "lock-on" the approaching bomber tracking it automatically on a plotting board. Prior to the simulated release of the bomb the aircraft transmits a tone to the RBS site by radio. The point of simulated bombing release is indicated by stopping the tone. The target and radar site has been precisely plotted on the tracking board prior to this action.

By using figures of distance, direction of the bomber from its target, the aircraft ground speed, heading, altitude, wind conditions, simulated bomb fall characteristics and other data, RBS technicians compute the accuracy of the particular bombing system, they can determine if the target was hit, and if not, by how far and what direction it was missed.

When SAC aircraft fly low altitude missions they remain at least 400 feet above the terrain at all times and fly at sub-sonic speeds, which cause no sonic booms. No bombs are carried by SAC bombers flying RBS training missions.

SAC and FAA coordination assures mission safety during low-level flying since civilian aircraft are informed when routes are in use by SAC.

H.B. Robinson
Inspection: Feb 23-25
March 17-18

1. Aircraft Overflights

In response to a memo of February 1, 1971, from J. P. O'Reilly, Beatty was asked about overflights of aircraft. He said that military aircraft, presumably from Shaw Air Force Base at Sumter, South Carolina, apparently use the plant for a turning point at times. He estimated an average of one overflight per day at altitudes of 1,000 to 2,000 feet.

2. Liquid Waste Releases

Release of liquid radioactive waste while the discharge probe was inoperative is discussed in CO Report No. 50-261/71-3, Section D. A no-response Form AEC-592 has been issued on this subject, and the report to DRL has been sent by the licensee. Beatty was asked if this probe would be a continuing problem. He replied that the probe continues to accumulate radioactive debris, thus giving untrue readings of radioactive waste releases. He stated that the probe is now being cleaned routinely, and procedures prevent repetition of the previous Technical Specification violation.

Release of liquid waste without having an H. B. Robinson No. 2 circulating pump in operation, as mentioned in the nonconformance section of this report, was discussed. Beatty said that procedures had been revised to prevent recurrence of this incident and that a report had been sent to DRL. He did not feel that this was truly a Technical Specification violation, since the specifications do not say specifically a Unit 2 circulating pump must be in operation. The inspector said that it appeared to be a violation of the intent of the Technical Specifications and of the licensee's radioactive waste release procedures. He added that a Form AEC-592 may be issued on this item. (See Section B.)

3. Diesel Generator Protective Trips

Failure of the emergency diesels during test was the subject of a Region II Inquiry Memorandum of March 13, 1971. Beatty was asked again if he had given consideration to having the diesel protective trips removed. He replied, as before, that he could not do this without invalidating the manufacturer's warranty. (See Section C.)

4. D.C. Power Failure and Turbine Damage

Beatty and Furr were asked if they had been aware, prior to the incident, of the possible design weakness which permitted the incident. They replied that they had not. They were asked if Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L) was reevaluating design in an attempt to locate other possible sources of similar failures in the nuclear system. Furr replied that the nuclear system had received extensive reviews