

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

May 24, 1971

Note for P. A. Morris, Director, Division of Reactor Licensing
THRU: R. S. Boyd, Assistant Director for Boiling Water Reactors, DRL

MILITARY OVERFLIGHTS, INDUSTRIAL SABOTAGE

We have passed on the CO information on H. B. Robinson military overflights to Charlie MacVean of Walske's office. He will look into the matter.

We have also asked that he check with the Army regarding their involvement with Ft. St. Vrain's industrial security plan.

Darrell Eisenhut tells me that MacVean expressed concern that we were planning to publish a Safety Guide on industrial sabotage. MacVean would like to talk to us on the subject of sabotage but did not want to do it on the telephone. We will set something up in the near future.

His concern reinforces our concern on making the Safety Guide public.
(Perhaps the Task Force should reconsider the decision to publish.)


A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "B. Grimes", is positioned above the typed name.

Brian K. Grimes
Technical Coordinator
for Boiling Water Reactors, DRL

cc: R. S. Boyd
E. G. Case, DRS
R. Ireland
D. Eisenhut
R. DeYoung
F. Schroeder
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James H. Campbell
President



Consumers
Power
Company

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June 3, 1971

Col. James M. Campbell
Dep. Chief, Strategic Division
Directorate of Operations
Dept. of the Air Force
Washington, D. C. 20330

Col. Campbell:

Your letter of May 19, 1971 has been addressed to a risk analysis of an accident which might involve one of your aircraft with our Big Rock Point nuclear power plant near Charlevoix, Michigan. Based on data derived from operations similar to the Bayshore OB-9 low-level route, your analysis indicates, I understand, that the likelihood of such an accident is extremely remote, to quote from your letter:

"The probability that a B-52 will stray from the bomb run corridor and overfly any part of an area enclosed by a 1.5 nautical mile radius circle centered on the Big Rock Point Plant is calculated as 1.2×10^{-6} , or about one in a million.

"The probability that, during an operational year, any B-52 will deviate from the corridor, overfly a part of the three nautical mile diameter circle centered on the plant, and crash within that circle is less than 1.5 in ten billion. The probability that such a crash within the circle would result in damage to the plant or injury to the employees is, of course, much smaller."

On the strength of these assessments and your plans to move the route Consumers Power Company is willing, for its part, to agree to resumption of the Bayshore low-altitude training route on an interim basis until the Bayshore scoring facility can be moved to a new location, presumably at Empire, Michigan. It is our clear understanding that you intend to seek to reroute the Bayshore OB-9 low-level route to Empire by the summer of 1972. This plan to move the route is important in our view.

Thank you for providing us with the risk analysis which we requested.

Yours very truly,

JHC/kw
CC: Congressman Gerald R. Ford

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

June 9, 1971

Memo For Mr. Roger S. Boyd

Roger:

Attached is a draft Air Force letter intended for Mr. Price concerning the resumption of flying on the interim Bayshore route about July 1, 1971. I have also enclosed a copy of Mr. Campbell's latest letter to the Air Force. I believe that you already have all of the other documentation mentioned in the draft letter.

CHARLIE

C.R. Mac Vean

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WORKING PAPERS

Mr. Harold L. Price
Director of Regulation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Price:

Following the April 6, 1971 meeting concerning the Strategic Air Command proposed low altitude training route near the nuclear power plant at Big Rock Point, Michigan, the Air Force prepared an analysis of flight statistics in order to assess the risks associated with operations over the proposed route. The analysis (Attachment 1) is based on SAC experience in low level training operations on all low altitude routes during the period 1963 - 1970 including the January 7, 1971 B-52 crash in Lake Michigan. The analysis considers operations on the proposed eight nautical mile wide training bomb run corridor, the centerline of which will be approximately five and one-half nautical miles to the east of the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant. With the anticipation that approximately 2200 low altitude training flights will be conducted along this route during an operational year, the following key facts emerged from the analysis:

- a. The probability that a B-52 would stray from the bomb run corridor and overfly any part of an area enclosed by a 1.5 nautical mile radius circle centered on the Big Rock Point Plant is calculated as 1.2×10^{-6} , or about one in a million.
- b. The probability that, during an operational year, any B-52 would deviate from the corridor, overfly a part of the three nautical mile diameter circle centered on the plant, and crash within that circle is

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less than 1.5 in ten billion. The probability that such a crash within the circle would result in damage to the plant or injury to the employees is, of course, much smaller.

The results of this analysis, as well as the Air Force's plans to initiate training flights on the alternate route in the near future were provided to the Consumers Power Company on May 19, 1971 (Attachment 2) in response to their letter of April 12, 1971 (Attachment 3). Mr. James H. Campbell, President, Consumers Power Company, in his letter of June 3, 1971 (Attachment 4) indicated his concurrence in the Air Force's proposal to conduct operations on the alternate route on an interim basis. The necessary coordination and publication of the revised route in the appropriate flight planning documents is now underway. It is our estimate that SAC will be ready to initiate training on the revised route about July 1, 1971. It is the Air Force's intent to approve the opening of the revised Bayshore route at that time.

Attachments (4)

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