



July 24, 2003

Re: 10 CFR 2.202  
10 CFR 50.4

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attention: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Serial Nos.: 03-417  
B18941  
NL&OS/MAE: R4  
Docket Nos.: 50-338/339  
50-280/281  
50-336/423  
License Nos.: NPF-4/7  
DPR-32/37  
DPR-65  
NPF-49

**VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY**  
**DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.**  
**NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2**  
**SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2**  
**MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3**  
**SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER AND RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR**  
**COMPENSATORY MEASURES RELATED TO FITNESS-FOR-DUTY**  
**ENHANCEMENTS APPLICABLE TO NUCLEAR FACILITY SECURITY FORCE**  
**PERSONNEL DATED APRIL 29, 2003**

By letter dated July 10, 2003, *Relaxation of the Order, Exercising Enforcement Discretion, and Extension of the Time to Submit an Answer or Request a Hearing Regarding Order EA-03-038, Fitness-For-Duty Enhancements for Nuclear Security Force Personnel, for Millstone Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3, North Anna Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Surry Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2* ("NRC letter"), the NRC responded to the May 30, 2003 (Serial Nos. 03-332 and B18911), submittal of Virginia Electric and Power Company and Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Dominion and DNC) to the NRC's April 29, 2003, *Order for Compensatory Measures Related to Fitness-For-Duty Enhancements Applicable to Nuclear Facility Security Force Personnel* (EA-03-038) ("Order"). In our May 30, 2003 letter, Dominion and DNC had provided an Answer to the Order and a response and schedule for achieving compliance with each requirement described in Attachment 2 to the Order (as required by Section III.C.1 of the Order).

Pursuant to the NRC letter, this letter constitutes Dominion's and DNC's supplemental Answer (pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202 and Section IV of the Order) and Response (pursuant to 10 CFR § 50.4 and Sections III.A, B.1 and 2, and C.1 of the Order). This letter also contains a request for relief pursuant to Section III of the Order and confirms Dominion's and DNC's understanding with respect to the

JE53

Commission's intent to exercise enforcement discretion associated with the implementation of the Order.

Answer and Response:

Dominion and DNC hereby consent to the Order and do not request a hearing. Dominion and DNC have started implementing the requirements of Attachment 2 to the Order and will complete implementation by October 29, 2003, as required by Section III.A of the Order. At this time, Dominion and DNC know of no matters about which the Commission must be notified pursuant to Section III.B.1 or B.2 of the Order, but will promptly notify the Commission if any such matters arise in Dominion's and DNC's further implementation of the Order. Enclosure 1 to this letter provides Dominion's and DNC's response and schedule for achieving compliance with the requirements described in Attachment 2 to the Order as required by Section III.C.1 of the Order. Although Dominion's and DNC's Answer and Response dated May 30, 2003 provided a schedule for achieving compliance with the Order, a supplemental response and schedule is enclosed.

Basis for the Order:

Dominion and DNC appreciate the NRC providing the basis for the Order as requested in our submittal of May 30, 2003, to enable us to more fully understand the NRC's intent in promulgating the Order. However, after reviewing the basis provided in Enclosure 1 to the NRC letter, Dominion and DNC question whether the rationale appropriately supports many of the requirements established by the Order. Working through NEI, we intend to continue discussions with the NRC to bring greater clarity to those matters to ensure that the implications of the Order and related issues are fully addressed, including how they might apply in the broader context of revisions to 10 CFR Part 26.

Request for Relief Pursuant to the Order:

Section 4 of Enclosure 1 to the NRC letter states that licensees must include shift turnover time in the calculation of group work-hour controls. We believe that this interpretation of the Order's requirements does not promote safety or prevent fatigue, that it deviates from the precedent established in Generic Letter 82-12, and that it is unnecessarily burdensome given the context of implementing the requirements of the Order. Therefore, pursuant to the provisions of Section III of the Order, and consistent with the Staff Requirements Memorandum to William D. Travers dated March 31, 2003, Dominion and DNC hereby request that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, rescind the interpretation provided in the NRC letter that shift turnover time must be included in the calculation of group work-hour controls. Enclosure 2 provides the good cause basis upon which the requested relief should be granted.

Further, Dominion and DNC also request pursuant to Section III of the Order, that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, relax use of the group work-hour controls during the preparation for and conduct of force-on-force drill activities. Force-on-force exercises conducted to date demonstrate that a significant amount of effort is involved in preparing for and conducting those exercises and will continue to be required for subsequent licensee force-on-force exercises. Group work-hour controls should not result in the unintended consequence of limiting or discouraging periodic exercises of full shift complements to confirm or improve the integrated response of plant security. The goal of group work-hour controls is not advanced by requiring their application to the preparations for and conduct of force-on-force exercises. Enclosure 3 to this submittal provides the good cause basis for relaxing the group work-hour control requirements in those circumstances.

Unless and until the NRC grants the requested rescission and/or relaxation, Dominion and DNC will continue to implement those portions of the Order on the schedule provided and will complete implementation of all provisions of the Order by October 29, 2003. Dominion and DNC also commit that we will promptly bring to the NRC's attention any matters that Dominion and DNC determine justify any further request for rescission or relaxation of any provision of the Order or the NRC Letter.

Exercise of Enforcement Discretion:

Finally, Dominion and DNC hereby confirm our understanding that the Commission intends to exercise enforcement discretion to accommodate issues which may arise as licensees, in good faith, take reasonable actions to implement the specific requirements of this Order. We further understand that the Commission will exercise enforcement discretion for the period necessary to resolve such issues and to integrate the requirements of the Order with the other Orders issued April 29, 2003, and February 25, 2002, as well as with other pertinent regulatory requirements, and our safeguards contingency plans, security plans and security officer training and qualification plans.

If you have any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'DACA', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

David A. Christian  
Senior Vice President – Nuclear Operations and Chief Nuclear Officer  
Virginia Electric and Power Company  
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

Commitments made by this letter: None

- Enclosures:**
- 1. Supplemental Response and Schedule for Compensatory Measures Related To Fitness-For-Duty Enhancements**
  - 2. Rationale For Not Including Turnover Time In Group Work-Hour Limits**
  - 3. Rationale For Not Including The Preparation For And Conduct Of Force-On-Force Exercises In Group Work-Hour Limits**

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Mr. Glenn Tracy  
Mail Stop T-4A9  
Two White Flint North  
11545 Rockville Pike  
Rockville, MD 20852-2738

Secretary, Office of the Secretary of the Commission  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region I  
Regional Administrator  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center  
61 Forsyth Street, SW  
Suite 23 T85  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8931

Mr. S. R. Monarque  
NRC Project Manager  
North Anna Power Station

Mr. M. J. Morgan  
NRC Senior Resident Inspector  
North Anna Power Station

Mr. C. Gratton  
NRC Senior Project Manager  
Surry Power Station

**Mr. G. J. McCoy**  
**NRC Senior Resident Inspector**  
**Surry Power Station**

**Mr. S. M. Schneider**  
**NRC Senior Resident Inspector**  
**Millstone Power Station**

**Mr. R. B. Ennis**  
**NRC Senior Project Manager**  
**Millstone Power Station Unit 2**

**Mr. V. Nerses**  
**NRC Senior Project Manager**  
**Millstone Power Station Unit 3**

SNs: 03-417

B18941

Docket Nos.: 50-338/339

50-280/281

50-336/423

Subject: Suppl. Answer & Response to FFD Security Order

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA )

)


COUNTY OF HENRICO )

The foregoing document was acknowledged before me, in and for the County and Commonwealth aforesaid, today by David A. Christian who is Senior Vice President – Nuclear Operations and Chief Nuclear Officer of Virginia Electric and Power Company and Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. He has affirmed before me that he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing document in behalf of that Company, and that the statements in the document are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Acknowledged before me this 24<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2003.

My Commission Expires: 3-31-04

Maggie McLure  
Notary Public



Serial Nos. 03-417  
B18941

**Enclosure 1**

**Supplemental Response And Schedule For Compensatory Measures  
Related To Fitness-For-Duty Enhancements**

**Supplemental Response And Schedule For Compensatory Measures  
Related To Fitness-For-Duty Enhancements**

**A. Background:**

**These compensatory measures (CMs) are established to delineate licensee responsibility in response to the threat environment presently in existence in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. Excessive work schedules can challenge the ability of security force personnel to remain vigilant and effectively perform their duties.**

**B. Scope:**

**Operating nuclear power reactor licensees shall comply with the following CMs to ensure, in part, that nuclear facility security force personnel are not assigned to duty while in a fatigued condition that could reduce their alertness or ability to perform functions necessary to identify and promptly respond to plant security threats. Work hour controls shall apply to personnel performing the following functions: armed member of the security force, central alarm station operator, secondary alarm station operator, security shift supervisor, and watchperson (i.e., watchman).**

**C. Compensatory Measures:**

**1. Individual Work Hour Controls**

**(a) Personnel performing the functions identified in B:**

**(1) Shall not exceed the following limits, excluding shift turnover time:**

- (i) 16 hours in any 24-hour period,**
- (ii) 26 hours in any 48-hour period, and**
- (iii) 72 hours in any 7-day period.**

**Response:**

**Virginia Electric and Power Company and Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Dominion/DNC) will not exceed the limits described in this CM. Appropriate procedures will be reviewed and revised as necessary.**

**Schedule:**

**Appropriate procedures will be reviewed and revised as necessary by October 29, 2003.**

**(2) Shall have a minimum 10-hour break between work periods. The participation in turnover is permitted during the break period.**

Response:

A minimum 10-hour break between work periods will be provided for personnel performing the functions identified in Section B. Subject to the request for relaxation contained in the cover letter, turnover time may be included as part of the break period.

Schedule:

Appropriate procedures will be established and implemented by October 29, 2003.

**(3) May be authorized, by the licensee, to deviate from the limits specified in C.1(a)(1) and/or C.1(a)(2) provided:**

- (i) The licensee could not have reasonably foreseen or controlled the circumstance necessitating the deviation,**
- (ii) The security shift supervisor has determined that the deviation is required to maintain the security for the facility,**
- (iii) An evaluation is performed, in advance, by individuals with training, as provided by the licensee, in the symptoms, contributing factors, and effects of fatigue that determined that the individual's fitness for duty would not be adversely affected by the additional work period to be authorized under the deviation, and**
- (iv) The basis and approval for C.1(a)(3) items (i), (ii), and (iii) are documented.**

<p><b>Note 1: An 8-hour break may be authorized as deviation from the 10-hour requirement of C.1(a)(2) if the deviation is required for a scheduled transition of crews between work schedules or shifts.</b></p>
---

Response:

Personnel performing the functions identified in Section B may be authorized to deviate from the limits discussed in CMs C.1(a)(1) and/or C.1(a)(2) of this Order.

Schedule:

Appropriate procedures will be established and implemented by October 29, 2003.

**(b) The number and duration of approved deviations shall be reviewed by the Security Manager and limited to the extent practicable.**

Response:

Approved deviations will be reviewed by the site security manager or if the manager is unavailable, a designee. Deviations from established requirements will be limited to the extent practicable.

Schedule:

Appropriate procedures will be established and implemented by October 29, 2003.

**(c) The licensee shall monitor and control individual work hours to ensure that excessive work hours are not compromising worker alertness and performance.**

Response:

This Order provides assurance that excessive work hours are not compromising worker alertness and performance.

Schedule:

Appropriate procedures will be established and implemented by October 29, 2003.

## **2. Group Work Hour Controls**

**Group average work hours for personnel performing the functions identified in B shall be controlled in accordance with the following limits:**

**(a) Normal Plant Conditions: The average number of hours actually worked by personnel performing the functions identified in B, shall not exceed 48 hours per week averaged over consecutive periods not to exceed six (6) weeks. Workers who did not work at least 75 percent of the normally scheduled hours during the averaging period shall not be included when calculating the average. If the group average limit is exceeded, the licensee shall take prompt action to reduce the average hours worked in accordance with this compensatory measure and take actions to prevent recurrence.**

Response:

Subject to the request for relaxation contained in the cover letter, the group average work hours during normal plant conditions will be limited as described in this CM,

with the clarification that the work week shall be administratively defined as hours worked, excluding turnover and work-hours associated with the conduct of force-on-force activities.

Schedule:

Appropriate procedures will be established and implemented by October 29, 2003.

**(b) Planned Plant or Planned Security System Outages:**

- (1) The average number of hours actually worked by personnel performing the functions identified in B, shall not exceed 60 hours per week averaged over consecutive periods not to exceed six (6) weeks. For planned abnormal plant conditions whose duration is less than the averaging period the limit would be 60 hours per week averaged over the duration of the condition. Workers who did not work at least 75 percent of the normally scheduled hours during the averaging period shall not be included when calculating the average. If the group average limit is exceeded, the licensee shall take prompt action to reduce the average hours worked in accordance with this compensatory measure and take actions to prevent recurrence.**

<b>Note 2: Licensee may define the beginning of a planned plant outage to be up to 3 weeks prior to the plant shutdown (i.e., plant operational mode not equal to 1).</b>
---

Response:

Subject to the request for relaxation contained in the cover letter, the group average work hours during planned plant or planned security system outages will be limited as described in this CM, with the clarification that the work week shall be administratively defined as hours worked, excluding turnover and work-hours associated with the conduct of force-on-force activities. As permitted by Note 2 to this CM, the beginning of a planned plant outage may be defined to include the 3 weeks prior to the plant shutdown in order to allow for worker processing and outage preparation activities.

Schedule:

Appropriate procedures will be established and implemented by October 29, 2003.

- (2) The limit defined in C.2(b)(1) can be used for up to 90 days. For periods greater than 90 days, the licensee shall take prompt action to**

**limit hours worked in accordance with the requirements of C.2(a).  
The use of the limits defined in C.2(b)(1) shall not exceed 120 days.**

Response:

The group average work hours during planned plant or planned security system outages will be limited as described in this CM and the limits described in C.2 (b)(1) shall not exceed 120 days. For periods greater than 90 days, prompt actions will be taken to limit hours worked.

Schedule:

Appropriate procedures will be established and implemented by October 29, 2003.

**(c) Unplanned Plant or Unplanned Security Outages or An Increase in Plant Threat Condition (i.e., increase in protective measure level as promulgated by NRC Advisory):**

**(1) There are no specific group limits for this condition.**

**(2) For periods greater than 90 days, the licensee shall take prompt action to limit hours worked in accordance with the requirements of C.2(a). The use of the allowance defined in C.2(c)(1) shall not exceed 120 days.**

**Note 3: For the purposes of these CMs, the baseline threat condition is defined as the least significant threat condition in effect in the last 120 days.**

**Note 4: If an increase in threat condition occurs while the plant is in a planned outage, the requirements of C.2(c) apply for the increased threat condition. If the threat condition returns to the baseline threat condition during the planned outage, the requirements of C.2(b) apply using the original licensee defined start date for the planned outage.**

**Note 5: If multiple increases in threat condition occur while the conditions of C.2(c) are in effect, the requirements of C.2(c)(2) reset with each increase.**

**Note 6: If the threat condition decreases, the new threat condition shall be compared to the baseline to determine if the requirements of C.2(c) apply as a result of an increased threat condition. If so, C.2(c)(2) shall be referenced to the date when the current threat condition was last entered as the result of an increase.**

**Note 7: Licensees shall reference changes in threat condition prior to the issuance of these CMs to determine the baseline threat condition and whether the requirements of C.2(c) apply.**

Response:

The group average work hours during unplanned plant or unplanned security outages or an increase in plant threat condition will be limited as described in this CM.

Schedule:

Appropriate procedures will be established and implemented by October 29, 2003.

- 3. Licensees shall be exempt from the requirements of C.1 and C.2 during declared emergencies as defined in the licensee's emergency plan.**

Response:

Provisions will be established to ensure that Dominion/DNC personnel shall be exempt from the requirements of C.1 and C.2 during declared emergencies as defined in the licensee's emergency plan.

Schedule:

Appropriate procedures will be established and implemented by October 29, 2003.

**4. Procedures**

**Develop or augment procedures, as necessary, for personnel within the scope of this CM to:**

- (a) Describe the process for implementing the controls for hours worked specified in C.1, C.2, and C.3 of this CM.**

**(b) Describe the process to be followed if an individual reports prior to or during a duty period that he or she considers himself or herself unfit for duty due to fatigue.**

**(c) Document self-declarations of unfit for duty due to fatigue if upon completion of the licensee's evaluation it is determined the individual should be returned to work without a break of at least 10 hours.**

Response:

Dominion/DNC will develop or augment procedures as necessary as described in this CM.

Schedule:

Appropriate procedures will be established and/or modified, and implemented by October 29, 2003.

Serial Nos. 03-417  
B18941

**Enclosure 2**

**Rationale For Not Including Turnover Time in Group Work-Hour Limits**

## **Rationale For Not Including Turnover Time In Group Work-Hour Limits**

- 1. Including shift turnover time in group work-hour limits can have negative safety implications:** As discussed in Section 3 of Enclosure 1 to the NRC letter of July 10, 2003, the Order appropriately excluded shift turnover time in the calculation of individual work-hour limits to avoid a potential unintended consequence with safety implications (i.e., an individual might rush the turnover process to ensure that he or she complied with the individual work-hour limits). Issues related to management of shift turnover were extensively discussed in public meetings held as part of the 10 CFR Part 26 revision process, and there was broad agreement that such a possibility could have potential safety implications that should be avoided. Including shift turnover time in the calculation of group work-hour controls also creates the potential that turnovers will be rushed. To avoid the potential negative safety consequences that could result from rushing the turnover process, shift turnover time should be excluded from the calculation of the group work-hour controls.
- 2. Including shift turnover time in group work-hour limits undercuts the intent of the Order:** The content of an appropriate mechanism for monitoring total hours worked to meet the group work-hour conditions was also discussed extensively in the public meetings conducted as part of the 10 CFR Part 26 revision process. The goal is to provide licensee management, and the NRC, with an indicator that would provide an early indication if an inadequate staffing situation were to occur. To be effective, such a metric should be straightforward in its implementation, provide meaningful results, and not be unnecessarily burdensome. Including shift turnover time in group work-hour controls is inconsistent with these objectives.

First, including shift turnover times in the group work-hour calculations would add significant and unnecessary complications to the metric, even though turnover time would represent a numerically insignificant amount of the total group work-hours worked. There has been broad agreement that some simplifications are necessary to establish an efficient and effective metric. Appropriate simplifications include the exclusion of individuals who work less than 75% of their scheduled time during a six week monitoring period, the inclusion of meal time and breaks that occur during a shift, and the exclusion of transit time to and from the plant. Consistent with the goal of developing a simple, but effective, metric, excluding turnover time would simplify the necessary calculations and improve the precision of the data collected.

Second, the inclusion of shift turnover time in the group work-hour limit will provide inconsistent and ambiguous data. To be meaningful, group work-hour limits should

be able to be applied, and measured, consistently across the industry. However, differences in lengths of shifts, numbers of turnovers, and shift turnover practices among plants would inhibit meaningful plant-to-plant and industry-wide comparisons.

- 3. Record-keeping burden:** The inclusion of shift turnover time will be unnecessarily burdensome and penalize some licensees. As discussed above, the Order specifically excludes turnover time from the calculation of the individual work-hour limits. Thus, including turnover time in the group work-hour limit calculation would require licensees to calculate the hours that each individual worked twice -- once for the calculation of individual limits, which would exclude shift turnover time, and a second time for the calculation of the group limits, which would be required to include shift turnover time. The resultant multiple counting to implement the staff's interpretation of the Order's intent will create a clearly unwarranted record-keeping burden with no commensurate benefit. Further, plants on an 8 hour shift rotation would be penalized because they would have more shift turnovers each day, and thus significantly more cumulative time would be spent on shift turnovers.

**Conclusion:** The group work-hour controls established by the Order are intended to preclude significant amounts of overtime being worked by security officers over long periods of time by requiring licensees to ensure that they have hired and trained a large enough work force to support routine operations. This intent is clearly consistent with Generic Letter 82-12, *Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours*, which states, "Enough plant personnel should be employed to maintain adequate shift coverage without routine heavy use of overtime." Generic Letter 82-12 has been in effect for more than twenty years and, with but a few exceptions, has been effective in achieving its purpose, and shift turnover time has never been included. Including shift turnover time in the evaluation of security force staffing would represent an insignificant amount of time in the context of total hours worked, but it would impose an unnecessary burden on licensees without any commensurate benefit. Finally, there is no logic that supports treating shift turnover time differently for group work-hour purposes than for individual work-hour limits.

Serial Nos. 03-417  
B18941

**Enclosure 3**

**Rationale For Not Including The Preparation For And Conduct Of  
Force-On-Force Exercises In Group Work-Hour Limits**

**Rationale For Not Including The Preparation For And Conduct Of  
Force-On-Force Exercises In Group Work-Hour Limits**

- 1. Including the preparation for and conduct of pilot force-on-force exercise would not be appropriate:** The purpose of the pilot exercise is to develop the process that will be used by the NRC to evaluate the total security program of individual licensees, including observation and participation in required exercises, through the mandated licensee force-on-force exercise. As has been demonstrated in the pilot force-on-force exercise program, significant changes in licensee protective strategies have resulted from the implementation of the Compensatory Measures required by the April 29, 2003 orders and the Interim Compensatory Measures mandated by the February 25, 2002, orders. The pilot exercises are intended to provide valuable insight to licensees and the NRC to evaluate the effectiveness of the security protective strategy developed by licensees and security program performance.

The pilot force-on-force exercises are, by their very nature, developmental, and are occurring coincident with licensees' implementation of the other April 29, 2003, security-related orders. The benefit of conducting these exercises far outweighs the extra man-hours being expended. These exercises occur only once for each participating licensee and therefore would not cause a long-term cumulative fatigue impact on the participating licensee's security force or create any resultant safety concern.

- 2. Including the preparation for and conduct of subsequent licensee force-on-force exercises would not be appropriate:** The protective strategies developed by licensees in response to the NRC security related orders will likely require significantly more resources to prepare for and conduct the mandated exercises than in the past. The pilot program exercises conducted to date have proven that it takes a significant amount of overtime hours for the security force personnel covered by the work-hour order to prepare for and conduct these exercises. We expect that normal training of security personnel can be accommodated within the individual and group work-hour requirements of the Order. However, force-on-force exercises require the concurrent participation of a significant portion of a given security shift complement in addition to the shift complement on duty. While most forms of training can be conducted with a smaller portion of a given shift, the periodic demonstration of an integrated response and the exercising of various defensive strategies can and should only be performed on a full shift complement basis. It would be, in fact, disruptive and counterproductive to assemble portions of various security shifts to form a 'drill shift' that would not be expected to work together under normal on-shift conditions. This approach would reduce the activity's effectiveness from both a training and an evaluation standpoint. In order to obtain the highest

level of unit effectiveness, a security shift should participate in force-on-force drills as one unit to simulate the conditions and personnel synergisms that would be expected to occur in an actual threat response. In this way, the effectiveness of the activity for the participants would be enhanced, as would the evaluation of the defensive strategies employed.

If the overtime hours for the exercises are included in the group work-hour metric for the work-hour order, the six-week period that includes the required exercise may exceed the 48-hour group average. Given the complexity of meeting the group work-hour limits on a rolling six-week basis in this new context, it is possible that licensees may unavoidably, but not significantly, exceed the group limits, even though the individual work-hour limits are met. To require licensee to add staffing to prevent exceeding the 48-hour group average is not reasonable because the exercises occur infrequently and are not a part of the licensee's discretionary use of overtime. It would be inconsistent with the purpose of the group work-hour controls to apply them in this context.

**Conclusion:** The group work-hour controls are intended to preclude significant amounts of overtime being worked by security officers over long periods of time by requiring licensees to ensure that they have hired and trained a large enough work force to support routine operations. This intent is clearly consistent with Generic Letter 82-12, *Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours*, which states, "Enough plant personnel should be employed to maintain adequate shift coverage without routine heavy use of overtime." Generic Letter 82-12 has been in effect for more than twenty years and, with but a few exceptions, has been effective in achieving its purpose. Including the work-hours involved in preparing for and conducting both pilot force-on-force exercises and subsequent licensee force-on-force exercises would represent a significant proportion of the total hours worked during the six weeks when the exercise is conducted and would impose a staffing level requirement on licensees that is not reasonable solely to support the force-on-force exercises. Group work-hour controls on security personnel should not result in the unintended consequence of limiting periodic exercises that are used to confirm or improve the integrated response of security. A licensee's desire to mobilize a full security shift complement for the purpose of enhancing their ability to respond to a security threat in an integrated manner should not be discouraged. Thus, there is good cause for relaxing group work-hour control requirements for force-on-force activities.